Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy
April 14, 2021
Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the post-Soviet states that gained
their independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. With a history of strong
Cory Welt
economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership
Specialist in Russian and
with Georgia since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S. policy
European Affairs
expressly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally

recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia.

Many observers consider Georgia to have a “hybrid” political system, containing both democratic
and nondemocratic elements. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) party has governed Georgia since
2012. Controversy over the October 2020 parliamentary elections, an opposition boycott of parliament, and the February
2021 arrest of opposition leader Nika Melia have led to heightened political tensions. European Union (EU) efforts to
mediate Georgia’s political crisis have been unsuccessful. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and
underemployment, its economy entered a period of relatively strong growth in 2017. In 2020, due to the impact of the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Georgia’s gross domestic product declined by an estimated 6%.
Since the 1990s, Georgia’s relations with Russia have been tense. Georgian authorities accuse Moscow of obstructing
Georgia’s Western integration. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to prevent the Georgian government from reestablishing
control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became
informal Russian protectorates. Many observers believe Russia supports the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to
prevent Georgia from joining NATO. The Georgian government has long made closer integration with NATO and the
European Union a priority.
Over many years, Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the 117th
Congress, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 923) was introduced on February 8, 2021. The act calls for enhanced U.S.
assistance to Georgia. If enacted, the act would require the President to impose sanctions on those responsible for serious
human rights abuses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The House passed similar bills (H.R. 6219, H.R. 598) during the 115th
and 116th Congresses. Members of the 117th Congress and previous Congresses also have expressed views on domestic
developments in Georgia, including the state of its democracy.
Since FY2017, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development bilateral aid allocations to Georgia have
totaled $124 million a year on average ($132 million in FY2020, including $40 million in Foreign Military Financing, or
FMF). For FY2021, Congress appropriated $132 million in bilateral aid to Georgia, including $35 million in FMF. Since
FY2010, Georgia has received U.S. military aid primarily through FMF, Department of Defense capacity-building programs,
and Coalition Support Funds.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 14 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Introduction
Historical y situated at the edge of empires, Georgia is located in the South Caucasus, a region
between the Black and Caspian Seas separated from Russia by the Greater Caucasus mountain
range and bordering Iran and Turkey (see Figure 1). Various Georgian kingdoms and
principalities were incorporated into the Russian Empire beginning in the early 19th century.
Georgia enjoyed a brief period of independence from 1918 until its forcible incorporation into the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) in 1921-1922. Georgia gained
independence in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Since 1991, Georgia has coped with two
Georgia at a Glance
territorial conflicts over the Russian-occupied
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These
Population: 3.72 mil ion (2020 est.)
regions, in addition to being home to ethnic
Comparative Area: slightly larger than West Virginia
Georgians, are home to minority ethnic groups
Capital: Tbilisi
that more closely identify with ethnic kin in
Ethnic Composition: 87% Georgian, 6% Azerbaijani,
Russia’s North Caucasus. After a short war
5% Armenian (2014 census)
with Georgia in 2008, Russia unilateral y
Religion: 83% Georgian Orthodox, 11% Muslim, 3%
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and
Armenian Apostolic (2014 census)
South Ossetia and stationed military forces in
GDP/GDP per capita: $15.9 bil ion/$4,275 (2020
these regions.
est.)
1
Top Exports: copper ores, beverages, motor vehicles,
Georgians speak and write a distinct
iron and steel (2020)
Caucasian language, with a written literary
Leadership: Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili,
form that emerged at least as early as the fifth
President Salome Zurabishvili, Defense Minister
century. The Georgian Orthodox Church, to
Juansher Burchuladze, Foreign Minister David
Zalkaliani, Parliamentary Chairman Archil Talakvadze
which most Georgians belong, is
Sources: National Statistics Office of Georgia (does
autocephalous (independent), with roots that
not include the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
date back to the fourth century.
Politics and Governance
In almost thirty years of Georgia’s independence, many observers have considered the country to
have a “hybrid” political system, containing both democratic and nondemocratic elements. The
U.S.-based nongovernmental organization Freedom House currently assigns Georgia a “global
freedom” score of 60 out of 100 (“partly free”), one of the highest ratings among the post-Soviet
states that gained their independence upon the dissolution of the USSR.2

1 Georgia’s South Caucasus neighbors, Azerbaijan and Armenia, fought a six -week war in autumn 2020 over the
predominantly Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh (also known in Armenian as Artsakh) and
surrounding territories internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. T he war resulted in Azerbaijani control over a
portion of Nagorno-Karabakh and most of the surrounding territories it lost during a previous conflict in the 1990s, as
well as the deployment of Russian forces as peacekeepers in Nagorno -Karabakh. For more, see CRS Report R46651,
Azerbaijan and Arm enia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, by Cory Welt and Andrew S. Bowen.
2 Freedom House ranks all countries in the world by a “global freedom” score, which includes measures of political
rights and civil liberties. Freedom House also ranks post -Communist states by a “ democracy” score that ranges
between 1 (least democratic) and 7 (most democratic). Georgia’s “democracy score” is 3.25 (transitional or hybrid
regime). Scores reflect the state of affairs at the start of the year. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021; and
Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 7 link to page 7 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Georgia has a parliamentary system of governance, shaped by constitutional reforms that came
into effect over the last decade. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) came
to power in 2012 as the leading party in an electoral bloc. In 2016, GD campaigned alone and
won reelection with a supermajority of more than 75% of parliamentary seats. In 2019, however,
GD lost about one-fifth of its parliamentary deputies, following party disputes about judicial
appointments and the party’s backtracking from a commitment to hold fully proportional
parliamentary elections in 2020.
Many observers believe bil ionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, former GD party chairman and a former
prime minister, exerts a dominant behind-the-scenes role in policymaking and personnel
appointments.3 Ivanishvili resigned from the position of GD party chairman in January 2021. He
retired from politics once before, in 2013, after serving as prime minister for 13 months. He
formal y returned to politics as GD chairman in 2018.4
Official y, Georgia’s most powerful executive is the prime minister. The current prime minister,
Irakli Garibashvili, assumed office in February 2021. Garibashvili previously served as GD party
secretary from March 2019 and as minister of defense from September 2019. Garibashvili served
as prime minister once before (2013-2015) and as minister of internal affairs (2012-2013).
Georgia’s president, elected in 2018, is Salome Zurabishvili, a former independent member of
parliament (MP) and minister of foreign affairs.5 Georgia’s president is commander in chief of the
armed forces and has the power to veto legislation and dissolve parliament under certain
circumstances. Zurabishvili is to be Georgia’s last directly elected president; from 2023, Georgia
is to have a president chosen by MPs and local government representatives.
Georgia’s unicameral parliament has 150 members. Constitutional reforms adopted in 2018
established a fully proportional (i.e., party list) system beginning in 2024. For the 2020
parliamentary elections, the parliament established a transitional election system by which 120
seats were elected by party list and 30 seats by majoritarian district. The threshold for entering
parliament was 1% of the vote.6
The October 2020 parliamentary elections were and remain mired in controversy (see “October
2020 Election Controversy,” below). Due to a parliamentary boycott by most opposition parties,
only 96 of 150 MPs currently are seated: 90 from GD and 6 from opposition parties. The
parliament can function legal y with a reduced number of MPs, although some types of votes
require a majority of three-fifths (90 votes) or more.7
According to official results, GD placed first in the 2020 elections with 48% of the proportional
vote. GD party candidates also won 13 of 30 majoritarian seats in the first round. Opposition
parties boycotted the second round, helping GD secure victory in the remaining majoritarian
races. In al , GD received 60% of parliamentary seats.

3 Iulian Ernst and Will Conroy, “Hard to Conclude Otherwise? Report Paints Oligarch Ivanishvili as Georgia’s De
Facto Ruler,” bne IntelliNews, February 25, 2019; and David Segal, “High in His ‘Glassle,’ Georgia’s Richest Man
Looms over Country’s T op Project,” New York Times, July 2, 2019.
4 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia’s Billionaire Boss Quits … Again,” Eurasianet, January 11, 2021; and Isabelle
Khurshudyan and Inna Lazareva, “ In Georgia, an Oligarch with Echoes of T rump Says He’s Leaving Politics. Many
Don’t Believe Him,” Washington Post, January 15, 2021.
5 Prior to entering the Georgian government, Zurabishvili was a French national and diplomat.
6 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Adopts Landmark Election Reform,” Eurasianet, June 29, 2020.
7 T ransparency International (T I) Georgia, “What Will the Parliament Be Like Without the Opposition,” December 10,
2020.
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 6 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

GD’s main competitor was the opposition bloc Strength in Unity, led by the center-right United
National Movement (UNM), the former ruling party once led by ex-President Mikheil
Saakashvili (2004-2013).8 The party is led currently by Nika Melia, who became party chairman
in December 2020. The UNM official y received 27% of the proportional vote and 36 seats
(24%). UNM splinter party European Georgia-Movement for Liberty came in third with 4% of
the vote (and five seats).9 Six other opposition parties were elected to parliament, each with four
seats or less (see Table 1).
Table 1. October 2020 Parliamentary Elections
Party List
Percentage of
Total
Percentage of
Party
Seats
Party List Vote
Seats
Total Seats
Georgian Dream
60
48.2%
90
60.0%
UNM - Strength in Unity
36
27.2%
36
24.0%
European Georgia
5
3.8%
5
3.3%
Lelo
4
3.2%
4
2.7%
Strategy Aghmashenebeli
4
3.2%
4
2.7%
Al iance of Patriots
4
3.1%
4
2.7%
Girchi
4
2.9%
4
2.7%
Citizens
2
1.3%
2
1.3%
Labor Party
1
1.0%
1
0.7%
Total
120
100%
150
100%
Source: Election Administration of Georgia, “The Central Election Commission Summarized Results of the 31
October Parliamentary Elections of Georgia,” December 3, 2020
The shift to a more proportional election system in 2020 was the result of a March 2020
interparty agreement facilitated by the United States, Germany, the European Union (EU), and the
Council of Europe and widely praised by domestic and international stakeholders.10 Leading
opposition parties did not support the relevant amendments in parliament, however, in response to
what they said was GD’s failure to uphold the agreement in full. In particular, opposition parties
claimed the agreement required authorities to amnesty three opposition-linked figures the
opposition considered political prisoners. President Zurabishvili pardoned two of the individuals
but not a third, Giorgi Rurua, who then was sentenced to four years in prison on il egal firearm
charges the opposition said were political y motivated.11

8 Mikheil Saakashvili has Ukrainian citizenship and currently serves as head of the executive committee of Ukraine’s
National Council of Reforms, a presidential advisory body. In 2015, Saakashvili lost his Georgian citizenship, allegedly
due to restrictions against dual citizenship. Georgia Today, “ Former President Saakashvili Loses Georgian
Citizenship,” December 4, 2015.
9 T he United National Movement (UNM) split in 2017 after months of infighting concerning party tactics and relations
with ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili, who is under indictment and living abroad. T hose who left the UNM sought to
build a rebranded party without Saakashvili. T hose who stayed in the UNM sought to adhere to Saakashvili’s legacy
and, in part, direction.
10 OC Media, “Georgian Government Reaches Agreement with Opposition over 2020 Election,” March 9, 2020; and
Council of Europe Office in Georgia, “ Statement of the Political Dialogue Facilitators on Agreement,” March 8, 2020.
11 One individual pardoned was former T bilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava, who received a 38-month prison sentence in
February 2020 ostensibly for crimes during his time in office prior to 2012 (Ugulava previously served 15 months in
prison from 2015 to 2017 on similar charges). T he second was former Minister of Defense Ir akly Okruashvili, who was
Congressional Research Service

3

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

October 2020 Election Controversy
GD’s popularity declined prior to the emergence of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. However, international y lauded efforts to contain the pandemic by then-Prime
Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s government and a relatively low spread of COVID-19 through the
summer appeared to boost GD’s election prospects.12 At the same time, a COVID-19-related
economic decline and a dramatic rise in COVID-19 case numbers from September 2020 may
have countered GD’s rising popularity somewhat.13
International observers appeared to view the October 2020 election results as legitimate overal ,
although they expressed concerns about various shortcomings. A mission led by the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assessed the elections as “competitive” and
stated that “overal , fundamental freedoms were respected.”14 The OSCE mission, however,
expressed concerns about an appeals process that was a central focus of opposition complaints
after the election. The mission also raised concerns about “al egations of pressure on voters and
blurring of the line between the ruling party and the state.”15
Opposition parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) focused their claims on certain
irregularities, including poll book imbalances and the election commissions’ rejection of most
complaints.16 Opposition parties cal ed for new elections, accusing authorities of electoral fraud
on a scale that was sufficient to grant GD a majority in parliament.17 Some domestic CSOs said
the elections were the most poorly conducted since GD came to power in 2012 but cal ed for
recounts only in specific precincts.18
Georgian authorities made some efforts to address complaints, but opposition parties and CSOs
contended these efforts were limited or flawed. Election commissions reportedly conducted 39
recounts (out of about 450 requested), issued a relatively high number of corrected protocols, and

sentenced to five years in prison in April 2020 on charges relating to June 2019 protests. RFE/RL, “ Georgian
Opposition Figure Sentenced to T hree More Years in Prison,” February 10, 2020; and Civil Georgia, “ Opposition
Parties Release Joint Statement on Rurua’s Imprisonment ,” July 31, 2020.
12 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Gets Rare Plaudits for Coronavirus Response,” Eurasianet, March 20, 2020; Rayhan
Demytrie, “ Coronavirus: How ‘T hree Musketeers’ Helped Georgia Fight Virus,” BBC News, July 6, 2020; and Giorgi
Lomsadze, “ Georgia’s Epidemiological Elections,” Eurasianet, July 23, 2020.
13 Giorgi Lomsadze, “New Wave of COVID Complicates Georgian Ruling Party’s Election Strategy,” Eurasianet,
September 25, 2020.
14 T he observation mission was limited in size due to the COVID-19 pandemic. OSCE/Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Georgia Parliam entary Elections, 31 October 2020 , March 5, 2021, p. 2
(hereinafter, OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia Parliam entary Elections).
15 Other concerns included “the dominance of the ruling party” in election commissions, campaign finance rules that
“disadvantaged smaller and new parties,” the widespread and intimidating “presence of party coordinators and activists,
often acting on behalf of the ruling party, outside of most observed polling stations,” and an “ excessive number of party
representatives and party-affiliated citizen observer groups [that] at times interfered in the election process or actively
determined who should enter the voting premises.” OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia Parliam entary Elections, p. 3-4, 29.
16 More than 2,000 complaints were submitted on or after election day, and more than half were dismissed on technical
grounds. Central Election Commission of Georgia (CEC), “ Statement on the So-Called Misbalance in PEC Summary
Protocols,” December 16, 2020; CEC, “Statistics on Dispute Resolution of Electoral Subjects and Observer
Organizations,” January 12, 2021; and International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), “ISFED
Explains About Summary Protocols of PVT Polling Stations,” January 29, 2021.
17 Civil Georgia, “T housands Rally T oward CEC, Demand Snap Elections,” November 8, 2020.
18 Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association et al., “NGOs’ Assessment of the 2 020 Parliamentary Elections,” November
4, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

4

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

upheld or partial y upheld about 13% of complaints.19 Authorities attributed many discrepancies
to human error and COVID-19-related staffing issues. One of the most commonly cited
discrepancies was later found to stem from an error in how a leading CSO reported results from a
paral el vote tabulation (PVT), an election monitoring tool.20
After the elections, opposition parties organized several protests, including a demonstration
outside the Central Election Commission that was dispersed with the use of anti-riot equipment,
including water cannons.21 Opposition parties boycotted the second round of elections, and most
opposition MPs refused to take their seats in parliament. Members of the diplomatic community,
including the U.S. and EU ambassadors, have tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a resolution to the
dispute.22
Arrest of Opposition Leader
Georgia’s tense political climate deteriorated further in February 2021, when authorities arrested
UNM party chairman Nika Melia, who had been elected to the position in December 2020. The
arrest was the culmination of a lengthy official confrontation with Melia (see text box, below).
After the October 2020 elections, Melia demonstratively removed an ankle monitoring bracelet
he was required to wear pending trial in connection with charges lodged against him in 2019.
Authorities ordered Melia to wear the bracelet or pay increased bail; he refused to do either,
maintaining his prosecution was political y motivated.23
In February 2021, the GD majority in parliament voted to remove Melia’s immunity as an MP,
and he was ordered into pretrial detention for violating court orders. Then-Prime Minister
Gakharia resigned, stating he opposed Melia’s detention given its political overtones, risk of
violence, and potential y destabilizing effects.24 A special police operation raided UNM
headquarters, arrested Melia, and temporarily detained about 20 others. Melia’s arrest was
condemned by CSOs and Georgia’s public defender (ombudswoman) and was criticized
international y.25 In a television interview, President Zurabishvili said, “neither the timing nor the
form [of the detention] probably was the best” but it did “not mean that Georgia has suddenly
become an authoritarian country.”26
June 2019 Protest and Prosecution of Nika Melia
In June 2019, the Georgian government faced a political crisis after police used tear gas and rubber bul ets against
demonstrators, some of whom had confronted riot police in an attempt to forcibly enter the Georgian parliament.
Demonstrators were protesting the decision to al ow a Russian member of parliament (MP) to deliver a speech
from the parliamentary speaker’s chair in his capacity as chairman of the Interparliamentary Assembly on

19 In Georgia, election commissions and courts have discretion to order recounts. OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia
Parliam entary Elections, pp. 28-30, 31-33; and CEC, “ Statistics on Dispute Resolution of Electoral Subjects and
Observer Organizations,” January 12, 2021.
20 ISFED, “Updated Information on ISFED’s PVT Results,” December 11, 2020.
21 Civil Georgia, “19 Detained as Police Used Water Cannons Against Election Rally in T bilisi,” November 9, 2020.
22 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Statement by the United States Embassy and the Delegation of the European Union to
Georgia,” December 11, 2020.
23 Civil Georgia, “Court Increases Bail for UNM’s Melia, Bans Him from Leaving Country,” November 4, 2020.
24 JAM News, “Georgian Opposition Leader Faces Arrest After Parliament Revokes MP Status,” February 16, 2021;
and OC Media, “ Gakharia Resigns as Georgian PM over Melia Arrest,” February 18, 2021.
25 Isabelle Khurshudyan, “ Georgian Opposition Leader Arrested, Deepening the Political Crisis in the South Caucasus
Country,” Washington Post, February 23, 2021; and Amnesty International, “ Georgia: Police Storm Opposition
Headquarters to Arrest Leader Nika Melia,” February 23, 2021.
26 Civil Georgia, “President Zurabishvili T alks Georgia Crisis, Melia Detention,” March 10, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

5

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Orthodoxy, which the Georgian parliament was hosting. Many protestors considered the decision a national
affront, given Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and occupation of parts of its territory.
After the crackdown, the government made some concessions but maintained the police response was largely
appropriate. The chairman of parliament resigned, although he did not take direct responsibility for the incident.
The government did not meet the protestors’ main demand that then-Minister of Internal Affairs, Giorgi Gakharia,
resign; instead, he was appointed prime minister. About 20 protestors were charged with participating in mass
violence and resisting police.
Melia, then an MP and former Tbilisi mayoral candidate, was charged with inciting and leading an attempt to storm
the Georgian parliament. Opposition supporters considered the charges to be political y motivated. The
parliamentary majority voted to remove Melia’s MP immunity from charges; he paid bail and was ordered to wear
a monitoring bracelet. In December 2019, in a second case that supporters considered political y motivated, Melia
was found guilty of abuse of office for actions taken in 2012 against a bank founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, before his
Georgian Dream party won elections that year.
Sources: RFE/RL, “Furious Anti-Russia Protesters in Tbilisi Demand Speaker’s Resignation, Clash with Police,”
June 21, 2019; Giorgi Lomsadze, “Violent Crackdown Throws Georgian Ruling Party’s Survival into Question,”
Eurasianet, June 21, 2019; Civil Georgia, “Two More Arrested for ‘Group Violence,’” July 27, 2019; Civil Georgia,
“Parliament Terminates UNM MP Nika Melia’s Mandate,” December 12, 2019; and OC Media, “Nika Melia Elected
New UNM Head,” December 26, 2020.
EU-Brokered Political Dialogue
After Georgian authorities faced widespread criticism for the February 2021 arrest of Melia, they
agreed to launch a political dialogue with opposition parties mediated by the EU. The dialogue
was launched in March 2021, via the facilitation of European Council President Charles Michel,
who mandated an EU mediator to assist with the dialogue. Issues addressed in the dialogue
included electoral and judicial reform, political y motivated prosecutions, parliamentary roles and
responsibilities, and the possibility of snap elections. 27 At the same time, a parliamentary working
group on electoral reform, co-led by an opposition MP who entered parliament, proposed
amendments to the election code to address, among other things, the composition of election
commissions and the appeals process.28 A group of domestic CSOs issued recommendations on
how to reach a political compromise and implement needed reforms.29
As of mid-April 2021, the EU-brokered dialogue has not resolved the impasse. On March 30,
2021, EU mediator Christian Danielsson released the text of a proposed political agreement.30
Dialogue participants suggested parties had reached agreement on some judicial and election
reforms and parliamentary procedures but not on snap elections. Reports also suggested GD was
wil ing to consider an amnesty law that could free Nika Melia but not Giorgi Rurua, another
individual opposition parties consider a political prisoner.31 In April 2021, President Zurabishvili
said she fully supported the agreement proposed by the EU and lamented political parties’ failure

27 David M. Herszenhorn, “Charles Michel Presides over Crisis T alks in Georgia,” Politico, March 1, 2021; and
Agenda,ge, “ EU Mediator Christian Danielsson Meets with Georgian Political Parties,” March 13, 2021.
28 Civil Georgia, “Electoral Reform Working Group Introduces Draft Amendments,” March 3, 2021.
29 T ransparency International Georgia (T I Georgia) et al., “Letter to Politicians Involved in the Mediation Process,”
March 27, 2021.
30 European Union (EU) External Action Service, “EU Mediator Christian Danielsson Publishes Proposal Made T oday
to Georgian Political Parties,” March 30, 2021; Civil Georgia, “EU’s Georgia Mediation Fails Again,” March 31, 2021.
31 Civil Georgia, “Georgian Dream, Opposition T rade Accusations over Failed Mediation T alks,” March 31, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

6

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

to compromise.32 Several CSOs wrote U.S. Senators to ask their assistance to promote increased
U.S. engagement to help the EU facilitate a compromise.33
Judicial Reform Challenges
In recent years, Georgia has adopted a series of judicial reforms that have restructured its judicial
institutions. As part of these reforms, a High Council of Justice oversees the appointment and
dismissal of judges. The council has 15 members, a majority of whom are selected by the
Conference of Judges, the judiciary’s self-governing body.
In late 2018, some GD members of parliament criticized the High Council’s nomination of
several judges to the Supreme Court whom they considered tainted by association with the UNM.
The dispute sparked debate within the ruling party, as wel as with some CSOs and legal
professionals who expressed concern that some of the nominated judges could be susceptible to
corruption.34
Although the government agreed to alter the rules of appointment, the new judicial selection
process remained controversial. The High Council of Justice submitted a revised (and expanded)
list of 20 candidates to parliament. In 2019, the parliament approved the lifetime appointment of
14 new Supreme Court justices. Domestic and international stakeholders criticized the process as
nontransparent and counter to the intent of long-awaited judicial reforms; they also said the
process did not lead to the appointment of a fully qualified and independent roster of judges.35
Domestic and international stakeholders continue to cal on Georgian authorities to reform the
judiciary. In March 2021, several CSOs declared the judiciary to be in “a state of severe crisis.”
The CSOs proposed a set of reforms to address “institutional and functional problems which
obstruct judicial independence and the ability of judges to exercise their professional authority
competently and with integrity.”36 In March 2021 testimony to Congress, a U.S. State Department
official said Georgia’s judicial reforms should address “the undue influence of powerful judges
on other judges, and use of the disciplinary, promotion, and appointment system to exert
influence on judges.”37 Subsequently, Georgian CSOs criticized GD-sponsored legislation to
reform the justice system as “completely detached” from reality and unable “to improve the
process … increase public confidence [or] address important chal enges.”38

32 President of Georgia, “Annual Parliamentary Report by the President of Georgia,” April 12, 2021.
33 T I Georgia et al., “ Nongovernmental Organizations Address Senators with a Letter, Calling for Greater US
Involvement in Resolution of Crisis in Georgia,” April 13, 2021.
34 Civil Georgia, “Ruling Party MPs Divided Over Supreme Court Appointments,” January 9, 2019; and T I Georgia et
al., “Open Letter to the Diplomatic Missions,” February 21, 2019.
35 Andy Heil, “Supreme Court Power Play ‘Raises Stakes’ on T ense Georgian Landscape,” RFE/RL, December 13,
2019; U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy’s Statement on Supreme Court Nominees,” December 12, 2019; and
EU External Action Service, “Statement by t he Spokesperson on the Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of
Georgia,” December 13, 2019.
36 T I Georgia et al., “Judicial Reform Concept,” March 17, 2021. Also see T I Georgia, The State of the Judicial System
2016-2020, October 30, 2020.
37 T estimony of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Kara McDonald, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation,
Bolstering Dem ocracy in Georgia, hearings, 117th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 2021.
38 Coalition for an Independent and T ransparent Judiciary, “T he Coalition Is Responding to the Announced Changes in
the Composition of the Supreme Court,” March 29, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

7

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Economy
For three decades, Georgia has been recovering from the severe economic decline it experienced
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.39 In 2019, Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) was
around $17.5 bil ion (approximately 11 times less than that of Oklahoma, which has a similar
population size). Georgia’s per capita GDP ($4,698 in 2019) is midsized in comparison to the per
capita GDP of Russia and other post-Soviet states.
From 2017 to 2019, Georgia’s GDP grew by about 5% a year, following average growth of about
3% a year from 2013 to 2016. In 2020, Georgia’s GDP declined by an estimated 6% due to the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.40
Prior to the onset of the pandemic, the IMF characterized Georgia as having “resilient” economic
growth, a historical y low current account deficit, strong revenue growth, and a healthy banking
sector.41 In 2020, the IMF stated that Georgia “faces a pronounced economic slowdown” but that
the government’s “fiscal response to the pandemic has helped al eviate its adverse economic and
social impact.”42
Poverty in Georgia has declined in recent years. According to official data, 20% of the population
lived in poverty in 2019 (down from 35% a decade before). The official unemployment rate in
2020 was 19% (down from 27% in 2010).43 About 20% of Georgian laborers work in agriculture,
a sector of the economy that accounts for less than 10% of GDP.44
Georgia’s economy depends in part on migrant remittances. From 2016 to 2020, remittances were
equivalent to about 9% of Georgia’s GDP. In 2020, the National Bank of Georgia reported that
Russia was the largest source of remittances, followed by Italy, Greece, the United States, and
Israel.45
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, tourism was a steadily growing sector in Georgia. Most tourists
to Georgia come from neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, and Turkey. From
2011 to 2019, annual tourism-related income more than tripled; in 2019, tourism was responsible
for about 8% of GDP.46 In 2020, the IMF noted that “tourism revenues came to a virtual
standstil ” due to the COVID-19 pandemic.47

39 According to World Bank estimates, Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 45% in 1992, 29% in
1993, and 10% in 1994. In the three years before the 2008 global financial crisis, Georgia achieved annual growth rates
of 9% or higher. After a 4% decline in 2009, Georgia achieved growth of 6%-7% from 2010 to 2012.
40 Geostat, Rapid Estimates of Economic Growth 2020 (December), January 29, 2021.
41 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Fifth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility for Georgia,” press release, December 17, 2019; IMF, Country Report No. 19/372, December 2019, pp. 4-7.
42 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Seventh Review under the Extended Fund Facility for Georgia,” press
release, December 16, 2020.
43 In 2020, Geostat, Georgia’s national statistics office, introduced a new standard for measuring employment that
excludes subsistence farming and, as a result, recalculated historical employment and unemployment data. Geostat, at
https://www.geostat.ge/en. Also see Geostat, “ Indicators of Employment and Unemployment Calculated Based on New
Standards of the International Labour Organization,” December 28, 2020.
44 Geostat, at https://www.geostat.ge/en.
45 National Bank of Georgia, at https://nbg.gov.ge.
46 Georgian National T ourism Administration, at https://gnta.ge/statistics.
47 IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual Review Mission to Georgia,” press release, November 10, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

8

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

In 2017, the IMF approved a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement to provide
Georgia with about $285 mil ion in loans to support economic reforms focusing, among other
things, on financial stability and infrastructure investment. The IMF noted the need for Georgia to
increase its agricultural productivity, improve its business environment, and reform its education
system.48 To help Georgia address the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF expanded Georgia’s lending
program and, by December 2020, had disbursed about $585 mil ion to Georgia.49
Georgia has improved its energy security in recent years. Almost al of Georgia’s natural gas
supplies come from neighboring Azerbaijan. Georgia has rehabilitated hydropower plants and
constructed new ones, although some hydropower development plans have engendered local and
CSO opposition.50
In 2020, Georgia’s largest merchandise trading partner was the EU, which accounted for about
22% of total trade ($2.5 bil ion, down from $3 bil ion in 2019). Individual y, Georgia’s four
largest trading partners were Turkey ($1.6 bil ion, or 14% of Georgia’s trade), Russia ($1.3
bil ion, 12%), China ($1.2 bil ion, 10%), and Azerbaijan ($934 mil ion, 8%). Half of Georgia’s
merchandise exports went to four countries: China, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Bulgaria. Georgia’s
main exports were copper ores, beverages (wine, water, and spirits), motor vehicles, and iron and
steel.51 Georgia has free trade agreements with the EU and China.
From 2015 to 2019, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Georgia averaged $1.6 bil ion a year.
About 60% of the total amount came from Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Turkey. During this period, most FDI was in transport (24%); other leading sectors were finance
(15%), energy (12%), and construction (9%).52 In 2017, the IMF noted that attracting FDI to
sectors with high export potential, including tourism and agriculture, is “crucial to ensure growth
in foreign markets.”53 In 2020, FDI declined to an estimated $617 mil ion.
Cancellation of Anaklia Port Project
Georgia has aspired to be a key transit hub for the growing East-West overland trade route between China and
Europe. In January 2020, however, the Georgian government canceled a contract to develop a major new
deepwater port and free industrial zone in Anaklia, located on Georgia’s Black Sea coast near the Russian -
occupied region of Abkhazia. The port project was considered Georgia’s largest-ever infrastructure investment
and was to be accompanied by major government investments in Georgia’s road and rail infrastructure. Officials
said project consortium partners, who are contesting the cancel ation in international arbitration court, failed to
raise the necessary funds for the project. In March 2021, Georgian officials said a process to select a new port
developer would commence soon.
Many observers have speculated about the government’s motives for canceling the contract and its level of
commitment to the port project. In 2019, Mamuka Khazaradze, the head of the project consortium’s principal
Georgian partner (TBC Holding, an affiliate of Georgia’s largest bank) and his deputy were charged with money
laundering, in connection with what officials al eged were improper financial transactions from more than a decade
before. Subsequently, a U.S. partner in the consortium withdrew from the project.

48 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Approves US$285.3 Million Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility
for Georgia,” press release, April 12, 2017; and IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017.
49 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Seventh Review under the Extended Fund Facility for Georgia,” press
release, December 16, 2020.
50 Giorgi Lomsadze, “T roubled Dams on Georgia’s Waters,” Eurasianet, February 19, 2020; Andrew Barry and
Evelina Gambino, “Unsustainable T ransition? Hydropower and the Post-Covid Recovery in Georgia,” openDemocracy,
July 30, 2020; and JAM News, “Namakhvani HPP – ‘Dam of Death’ or Critical Energy Security?,” March 5, 2021.
51 Geostat, as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
52 Geostat, at https://www.geostat.ge/en.
53 IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017, p. 45.
Congressional Research Service

9

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Observers raised questions about the case against Khazaradze. The U.S. government stated concerns “about the
context and timing of [the] charges.” In January 2020, the Georgian public defender (ombudsperson) filed an
amicus curiae brief that stated, “the case materials do not contain the elements necessary for assessing an action as
a crime of money laundering.”
Sources: Civil Georgia, “Key Points: TBC Bank Affair,” March 9, 2019; Transparency International Georgia,
“Charges Against the Founders of TBC Bank Raise Many Questions about the Investigation,” July 25, 2019; U.S.
Embassy Georgia, “The U.S. Embassy Statement on Criminal Charges Against TBC Bank Co-founders Mamuka
Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze,” July 25, 2019; Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Cancels Contract for Black Sea
Megaport,” Eurasianet, January 9, 2020; Public Defender of Georgia, “Amicus Curiae Brief Relating to Mamuka
Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze’s Case,” January 15, 2020; Agenda.ge, “PM Garibashvili: 'We Will Start Selecting
New Potential Investor for Anaklia Deep Sea Port Project in Near Future,’” March 4, 2021.
Relations with the European Union and NATO
The Georgian government has long made closer integration with the EU and NATO a priority.
According to recent polls, more than 80% of the Georgian population supports membership in the
EU and more than 70% supports membership in NATO.54
In 2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU that included a Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area and encouraged harmonization with EU laws and regulations.55
In 2017, the EU granted Georgian citizens visa-free entry to the EU’s Schengen area of free
movement, which al ows individuals to travel without passport checks between most European
countries. The EU also is a major provider of foreign aid to Georgia, providing more than €100
mil ion (about $120 mil ion) a year and additional pandemic-related aid.56
NATO considers Georgia “one of the Al iance’s closest partners.”57 A NATO-Georgia
Commission was established in 2008. At the NATO 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders
established a “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package” to help Georgia bolster its defense
capabilities. Georgia is one of NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners, a cooperative status
currently granted to six of NATO’s close strategic partners.58 In 2015, Georgia joined the NATO
Response Force, a rapid reaction force.
Georgia is one of the top troop contributors (and the top non-NATO contributor) to the NATO-led
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. As of February 2021, Georgia is the fourth-largest
contributor to the Resolute Support Mission, with 860 troops.59 At its height, Georgia’s

54 Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute), “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of
Georgia,” February 2021.
55 T he free-trade agreement was applied provisionally in 2014 and entered into force in 2016. T he text of the
association agreement and the corresponding agenda for 2017-2020 are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
georgia/9740/eugeorgia-association-agreement_en. More information on the free-trade agreement is available from the
Georgian government at http://www.dcfta.gov.ge/en/home.
56 European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Staff Working Document: Association
Im plem entation Report on Georgia, February 5, 2021, p. 2.
57 NAT O, “Relations with Georgia,” updated October 21, 2020.
58 NAT O’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine. NAT O,
“Partnership Interoperability Initiative,” updated June 12, 2020.
59 Georgia also contributed more than 2,250 troops to the NAT O-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, between 1999 and 2008.
NAT O, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” updated August 2020; U.S. Department of State,
“U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 21

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

deployment to NATO’s previous International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in
Afghanistan reached over 1,500 troops, who served with no operational caveats.
In 2015, NATO opened a Joint Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia to enhance
interoperability and operational readiness. The center has hosted two joint NATO-Georgia
exercises. Some NATO member states participate in two sets of regular U.S.-Georgia led military
exercises: Agile Spirit and Noble Partner (see “Military Aid” below).
Closer integration with the EU and NATO does not appear to have enabled Georgia to improve its
near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. The EU is unlikely to consider
Georgia a candidate for membership soon, given the EU’s internal chal enges and a lack of
support for enlargement among many members. In 2008, NATO members agreed Georgia and
Ukraine would become members of NATO, but neither state has been granted a clear path to or
timeline for membership.60
Many observers attribute Georgia’s lack of a clear path to NATO membership to some members’
concerns that Georgia’s membership could lead to a heightened risk of war with Russia. Many
believe NATO wil not move forward with membership as long as Russia occupies Georgian
territory and the conflict remains unresolved.
Figure 1. Georgia

Sources: Map created by CRS. Map information generated using data from the National Geospatial Intel igence
Agency, DeLorme, Department of State, and Esri.

60 In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008, heads of state and government of NAT O member countries
declared that “NAT O welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NAT O. We
agreed today that these countries will become members of NAT O.” NAT O, “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” A pril 3,
2008.
Congressional Research Service

11

link to page 14 link to page 16 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions
Since the 1990s, Georgia’s relations with Russia have been tense. Georgian authorities accuse
Moscow of obstructing Georgia’s Western integration. Many observers believe Russia supports
the secession of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent Georgia
from joining NATO.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia original y sought to secede from Georgia in the early 1990s, during
and after Georgia’s pursuit of independence from the Soviet Union.61 At the time, many observers
believed Soviet and, later, Russian authorities instigated the conflicts, assisted local forces to halt
Georgia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia, or both. After the conflicts ended, Russian forces
remained in both regions to serve as peacekeepers.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are smal but strategical y located regions of Georgia that make up
almost 20% of Georgia’s territory (see Figure 1). Abkhazia accounts for more than half of
Georgia’s Black Sea coastline. South Ossetia is located astride a major transportation route to
Russia and close to Georgia’s main east-west highway.
Most Georgians—who were previously the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia—were forced to flee
Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war and became internal y displaced persons, or IDPs.
Abkhazia’s population in the 1989 Soviet census was about 525,000, of which 46% were ethnic
Georgians and 17% were ethnic Abkhaz. Authorities in Abkhazia al ege the region’s population in
2011 was about 240,000 (50% Abkhaz, 19% Georgian, 17% Armenian, and 9% Russian).
The Georgian government has estimated that about 40,000 ethnic Georgians stil live in Abkhazia,
primarily in the southeastern district of Gali. Many observers note these Georgians from the Gali
district face chal enges regarding freedom of movement, political rights, and native-language
education.62 In 2020, a new local government came to power in Abkhazia and suggested it might
be more attentive to the rights of the region’s ethnic Georgian population.63
Authorities in South Ossetia al ege the region’s population in 2015 was about 54,000 (90%
Ossetian, 7% Georgian). In the 1989 Soviet census, the region’s population was about 98,000
(66% Ossetian, 29% Georgian). Most ethnic Georgians who remained in the region after the 2008
war are residents of the easternmost Akhalgori region, which was under Georgia’s direct control
until the war (see “2008 Russia-Georgia War,” below).
As in occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has provided citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Observers note that Russia justified its 2008 invasion of Georgia in part by
al eging the need to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia.64

61 T he South Ossetia conflict occurred in 1991-1992; the Abkhazia conflict occurred in 1992-1993.
62 Giorgi Menabde, “Georgians in Abkhazia: A Choice Between Assimilation and Emigration,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
August 6, 2019; Olesya Vartanyan, “ Easing T ravel Between Georgia and Breakaway Abkhazia,” International Crisis
Group, September 5, 2019.
63 OC Media, “Abkhazian HR Commissioner Condemns T orture, Ethnic Discrimination, and Domestic Violence,” June
30, 2020; Civil Georgia, “Abkhazia’s Ankvab: ‘Gali Georgians Are Our Citizens,’” August 14, 2020.
64 Yuri Zoria, “Is Russia’s Passport Scheme in Donbas a Harbinger of Full-Scale Invasion Like in 2008 Georgia?”
Euromaidan Press, May 14, 2019; and T oru Nagashima, “ Russia’s Passportization Policy T oward Unrecognized
Republics: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and T ransnistria,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 66, no. 3 (2019), pp. 186-
199.
Congressional Research Service

12

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

2008 Russia-Georgia War
Georgia’s relations with Russia worsened after Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, which brought
ex-President Saakashvili to power.65 Under Saakashvili, the Georgian government sought to
accelerate Georgia’s integration with the West and reintegrate the breakaway regions. Authorities
established greater control over Georgian-populated vil ages in South Ossetia and the remote and
thinly-populated Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In 2004, new clashes occurred in South Ossetia
between Georgian and local forces.66 In 2006, Russian authorities imposed an embargo on
popular Georgian exports (including wine and mineral water) and forcibly deported more than
2,000 Georgian migrant workers from Russia, seemingly in response to Georgia’s arrest of four
Russian military officers on espionage-related charges.67
After another round of escalation in 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to prevent the Georgian
government from reestablishing control over South Ossetia. A five-day war in August 2008 led to
the deaths of more than 800 civilians and military personnel, the expulsion of some 20,000
Georgian residents from South Ossetia, the destruction of vil ages, and Georgian loss of control
over the Akhalgori region.68 In Abkhazia, local forces took control of the Kodori Gorge. Russian
forces temporarily occupied Georgian territory outside Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
recognized the latter as independent states.
In February 2021, the European Court of Human Rights ruled Russia violated several articles of
the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to Russian actions in Georgia in 2008,
including “through its responsibility for the arbitrary detention of civilians, the … treatment,
torture, and other il -treatment of prisoners of war, and the denial of Georgian citizens’ right to
return to their homes.”69
Conflict Resolution
The 2008 war ended with a six-point cease-fire plan and a follow-on implementation plan
brokered by then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The six-point plan included a nonuse of
force pledge and the return of Russia’s armed forces to the positions they held prior to the start of

65 Lincoln A. Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia ’s Rose Revolution (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); and Cory Welt, “ Georgia’s Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to
Regime Collapse,” in Valerie Bunce, Michael A. McFaul and Kathryn Stoner -Weiss, eds., Dem ocracy and
Authoritarianism in the Post-Com m unist World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 155 -188.
66 Cory Welt, “T he T hawing of a Frozen Conflict: T he Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to the Russo -
Georgian War,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, 1 (2010), pp. 63-97.
67 In 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled the deportation violated the European Convention of
Human Rights but did not make a ruling regarding compensation. In 2019, the ECHR ruled that Russia should pay €10
million (almost $12 million) in compensation; as of April 2021, Russia had not complied with the ruling. Civil
Georgia, “ CoE Concerned with Russia’s Failure to Pay to Deportation Victims,” September 5, 2020; and Agenda.ge,
“Russia Ready to Discuss €10 Mln ECHR Fine over 2006 Deportations of Georgian Citizens,” February 8, 2021.
68 Council of the EU, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (3
vols.), September 2009; Ruslan Pukhov, ed., The Tanks of August (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and
T echnologies, 2010); and Gerard T oal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
69 U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “ On the ECHR Judgment in the Case Concerning the Armed Conflict Between Georgia
and the Russian Federation,” January 28, 2021. Also see Helen Duffy, “ Georgia v. Russia: Jurisdiction, Chaos and
Conflict at the European Court of Human Rights,” Just Security, February 2, 2021; and Natia Seskuria, “Georgia’s
Historic Victory: Implications of the ECHR Ruling,” February 11, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

13

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

hostilities.70 Regular Russian forces withdrew from areas they had occupied outside South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, but within the two regions Russia deployed new forces in greater numbers and
outside prior peacekeeping formats. As a result, U.S. officials and others consider Russia to be in
noncompliance with the six-point plan.71
All parties to the conflict, together with the United States, the EU, the United Nations, and the
OSCE, participate in the Geneva International Discussions, convened quarterly to address issues
related to the conflict. Parties to the conflict, together with the United Nations and the OSCE, also
participate in joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) to address local
security issues and build confidence. Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives frequently
suspend participation in the IPRMs.72 The EU leads an unarmed civilian monitoring mission in
Georgia that monitors compliance with the cease-fire; Russian authorities do not permit the
mission to operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.73
After the 2008 War and Recent Developments
Since 2008, Moscow has tightened control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In these regions,
Russia established military bases and border guard outposts that reportedly each house around
3,500-5,000 military and border guard personnel.74 Russian and local authorities constructed
boundary fences, imposed transit restrictions, and frequently detain Georgian citizens for “il egal”
crossings. Since 2015, at least four Georgian citizens have been kil ed or have died under
suspicious circumstances while in detention or in incidents involving local armed forces.75
In recent years, new tensions have arisen around South Ossetia. In 2019, Russian and local
authorities hardened and extended the boundary line. Georgian authorities responded by
establishing a new police checkpoint nearby, after which local authorities closed the crossing
point for the Akhalgori region (with a remaining population of under 2,000). The closure
reportedly contributed to the deaths of at least 16 residents who were unable to be transported for
medical care.76 In 2020, authorities in both regions enacted new crossing point closures,

70 Council of the EU, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, vol. 3,
pp. 587-594.
71 U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “Joint Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia,” December 4, 2020.
72 T he Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) for Abkhazia also did not convene from 2012 to 2016.
T amar Svanidze, “ Breakaway Abkhazia to Resume IPRM Borderline Meetings after 4 Year Break ,” Georgia Today,
March 24, 2016; EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), “ Positive Atmosphere as 96th Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism Meeting T akes Place in Ergneti,” press release, July 30, 2020; Civil Georgia, “ Geneva T alks Co-Chairs
Hold Meetings in T bilisi, T skhinvali, Sokhumi,” September 17, 2020; and OSCE, “ 98th Incident Prevention and
Response Mechanism Meeting T akes Place in Ergneti,” March 5, 2021.
73 For more, see the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia website, at https://eumm.eu.
74 T he 7th Military Base in Abkhazia is in Gudauta; the 4th Military Base in South Ossetia is in T skhinvali. T he
estimated number of armed forces does not include local military formations. Abkhazia maintains local forces under
the command of the Russian military; some local South Ossetian forces have been absorbed into the Russian military.
International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2020, p. 208; and Margarete Klein, Russia’s Military
Policy in the Post-Soviet Space: Aim s, Instrum ents, and Perspectives, SWP, January 2019.
75 In 2018, the Georgian government compiled a list of human rights offenders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and
called for international sanctions. Civil Georgia, “ Government Unveils T atunashvili-Otkhozoria List,” June 27, 2018;
Agenda.ge, “ 327 Detained Illegally By Occupying Forces in Georgia Between 2017 -19,” February 26, 2019; and
Agenda.ge, “ Tbilisi Demands Release of Illegally Detained Citizens at Meeting with De Facto T skhinvali ‘Officials,’”
March 5, 2021.
76 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Russia Advances Its Great Wall of Georgia,” Eurasianet, August 15, 2019; Human Rights Center
(Georgia), State of Hum an Rights Along the Dividing Lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia , 2019; Georgia Today,
“Occupied Akhalgori Faces Humanitarian Crisis,” January 16, 2020; and Civil Georgia, “Akhalgori Patient Dies After
Congressional Research Service

14

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

ostensibly related to COVID-19 concerns, although authorities in Abkhazia occasional y have
opened humanitarian corridors across the boundary line.77 In April 2021, Georgian authorities
reported the drowning deaths of four Georgian residents of Abkhazia who attempted to bypass
closed crossing points by swimming across the boundary line.78
The Georgian government has sought to improve economic relations with Russia. In 2013,
Moscow lifted an embargo on popular Georgian exports (including wine and mineral water) that
had been in place since 2006. As a result, Russia again became one of Georgia’s main trading
partners. The share of Georgia’s merchandise exports to Russia as a percentage of its total exports
rose from 2% in 2012 to 13% in 2020.79 The annual number of Russians visiting Georgia more
than tripled from 2012 to 2019.80 At the same time, disputes between Georgia and Russia persist;
since 2019, for example, Russian authorities have banned passenger flights to and from Georgia,
a measure they imposed in response to Georgian protests against a visiting Russian MP (see “June
2019 Protest and Prosecution of Nika Melia” text box, above).
U.S.-Georgia Relations
Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the post-Soviet states. With a history
of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic
partnership with Georgia since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
A U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in 2009, provides the framework for
much of the two countries’ bilateral engagement. A Strategic Partnership Commission convenes
annual plenary sessions and working groups to address political, economic, security, and people-
to-people issues.81
U.S. officials frequently express support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within
its international y recognized borders. Successive U.S. Administrations and Members of Congress
on a bipartisan basis have condemned Russia’s occupation of territory in Georgia. The
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253)
states the United States “supports the policy known as the ‘Stimson Doctrine’ and thus does not
recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the il egal invasions and occupations” of
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia.82
The United States has cal ed on Russia to comply with the terms of the cease-fire agreement that
ended its 2008 war against Georgia, including withdrawal of its forces to prewar positions, and to
reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. U.S. officials have
criticized Russian efforts at hardening and extending the boundary lines of Abkhazia and South

Delayed T ransfer to Georgia Proper, T bilisi Says,” November 16, 2020.
77 Georgia Today, “Occupied T skhinvali, Abkhazia Close Entrances to Rest of Georgia,” February 28, 2020; and U.S.
Mission to the OSCE, “ Statement on the 51st Round of the Geneva International Discussions (Conflict in Georgia) ,”
December 17, 2020.
78 Civil Georgia, “Georgian President, MFA Say Russia Responsible for Drownings in Enguri,” April 7, 2021.
79 T he share of Georgian merchandise imports from Russia also increased, from 6% in 2012 to 11% in 2020. Geostat,
as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
80 Georgian National T ourism Administration, at https://gnta.ge/statistics/gnta.
81 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission.
82 As noted in a proposed concurrent resolution introduced in September 2008 ( H.Con.Res. 430), the Stimson Doctrine
is named for Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who “declared in 1932 that the United States would not recognize
territorial changes effected by force following th e seizure of Manchuria by Japan.”
Congressional Research Service

15

link to page 20 Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Ossetia.83 The U.S. government has expressed support for Georgia’s “commitment to dialogue
and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.”84
Before the 2008 war, the United States supported granting Georgia a NATO Membership Action
Plan and backed NATO’s April 2008 pledge that Georgia eventual y would become a member of
NATO. In 2017, then-Vice President Michael Pence said in Tbilisi that the United States “stand[s]
by the 2008 NATO Bucharest statement, which made it clear that Georgia wil one day become a
member of NATO.”85
The United States has criticized cyberattacks against Georgia. In 2020, then-Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo condemned a cyberattack he attributed to Russian military intel igence that
“disrupted operations of several thousand Georgian government and privately-run websites and
interrupted the broadcast of at least two major television stations.”86 Also that year, the U.S.
Embassy in Georgia said it was “appal ed” by reports of an unattributed cyberattack that
“attempted to il egal y access [COVID-19] pandemic management information,” including from
Georgia’s Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research (see “Foreign Aid” below).87
The United States continues to strongly support democracy and governance reforms in Georgia.
With regard to Georgia’s 2020 parliamentary elections, U.S. officials shared the assessment of the
international observation mission that the elections “were competitive and, overal , fundamental
freedoms were respected.” However, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia expressed concern about
irregularities and al egations of abuse that “while not sufficient to invalidate the results, continue
to mar Georgia’s electoral process and are unacceptable.”88
In February 2021, the U.S. Department of State said the United States was “deeply troubled” by
the arrest of UNM chairman Melia and cal ed on the Georgian government to ensure “its judicial
and prosecutorial system is free of political bias.”89
Congressional Action
Members of the 117th Congress and previous Congresses have expressed support for Georgia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since FY2017, foreign operations appropriations prohibit
foreign assistance to governments that recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia
and restrict funds from supporting Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (P.L. 116-

83 U.S. Department of State, “Military Buildup in the Russian-occupied Georgian Region of South Ossetia,” August 30,
2019; U.S. Embassy of Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Shooting/Detention Along South Ossetia Administrative
Boundary Line,” July 12, 2020; and U.S. Mission to the OSCE, “ Statement on the 51st Round of the Geneva
International Discussions (Conflict in Georgia),” December 17, 2020.
84 U.S. Department of State, “United States Welcomes Georgia Peace Initiative,” April 4, 2018.
85 White House, “ Remarks by the Vice President and Georgian Prime Minister in a Joint Press Conference,” August 1,
2017.
86 U.S. Department of State, “The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia,”
February 20, 2020.
87 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy St atement on September 1, 2020 Cyberattack Against Georgian Ministry
of Health,” September 3, 2020.
88 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections,” November 1, 2020.
89 U.S. Department of State, “Political Developments in Georgia,” February 18, 2021; U.S. Department of State,
“Arrest of Opposition Members in Georgia,” February 23, 2021; and U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy
Statement,” February 23, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

16

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

260, §7047(c)).90 The 2014 Ukraine Freedom Support Act (P.L. 113-272) provides for sanctions
against Russian entities that transfer weapons il egal y to the territory of Georgia and other states.
In the 117th Congress, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 923) was introduced on February 8, 2021.
The House passed similar bil s (H.R. 6219, H.R. 598) during the 115th and 116th Congresses. The
Georgia Support Act cal s for enhanced U.S. assistance to Georgia and would require the
Secretary of State to submit to Congress reports on U.S. security assistance to Georgia, U.S. -
Georgia cybersecurity cooperation, and a strategy to enhance Georgia’s capabilities to combat
Russian disinformation and propaganda. If enacted, it also would require the President to impose
sanctions on those responsible for serious human rights abuses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Members of the 117th Congress and previous Congresses also have expressed views on domestic
developments in Georgia, including the state of its democracy.91 The FY2021 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-260, §7046) requires the Secretary of State to submit a report on
actions taken by the Georgian government since January 1, 2020, to “(1) strengthen democratic
institutions, including through recent elections; (2) combat corruption; and (3) ensure that rule of
law in the private-sector and the foreign investment climate meet international standards.”92
The Senate and the House have passed several resolutions in support of Georgia’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity: in 2016 (H.Res. 660), in 2011-2012 (S.Res. 175, H.Res. 526), in
September 2008 (S.Res. 690), and, before the conflict, in May-June 2008 (H.Res. 1166, S.Res.
550) and December 2007 (S.Res. 391).
Foreign Aid
Since independence, Georgia has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign and military aid in
Europe and Eurasia. In the 1990s (FY1992-FY2000), the U.S. government al ocated more than
$860 mil ion in total aid to Georgia ($96 mil ion a year, on average).93
In the 2000s, Georgia became the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia.
From FY2001 to FY2007, foreign aid al ocations to Georgia totaled more than $945 mil ion
($135 mil ion a year, on average).94 In 2005, Georgia also was awarded an initial five-year (2006-

90 Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria have joined Russia in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states. In 2014, T uvalu retracted its earlier recognition of these regions’ independence. Vanuatu, which
recognized the independence of Abkhazia but not South Ossetia, appears to have changed its pol icy over time.
91 A list of congressional letters sent to Georgian leadership from November 2019 to February 2020 is available at Civil
Georgia, “U.S. Congressman Weber Concerned Over Georgia’s ‘Backsliding from Democratic Values,’” February 12,
2020. For responses to the arrest of UNM chairman Nika Melia, see U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “ House
Foreign Affairs Committee and Georgia Caucus Call for Deescalation of Political Situation in Republic of Georgia,”
February 23, 2021; U.S. Senate Committ ee on Foreign Relations, “ Risch, Shaheen, Kinzinger, Connolly on
Developments in Georgian Political Crisis,” February 23, 2021; U.S. Helsinki Commission, “Helsinki Commission
Leaders Slam Detention of Georgian Opposition Leader Nika Melia,” February 23, 20 21; and U.S. Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, “Chairman Menendez and European Allies on Political Situation in Georgia,” February 26, 2021.
92 Explanatory Statement regarding H.R. 133 (P.L. 116-260), Congressional Record, December 21, 2020, p. H8794.
93 Foreign aid totals from FY1992 to FY2000 include all agencies and accounts. Over 40% of this total was for
humanitarian food assistance. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Governm ent Assistance to and Cooperative Activities
with the New Independent States of the Form er Soviet Union , FY2000 Annual Report (Appendix).
94 CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s U.S. Government Assistance to and
Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2001 to FY2007.
Congressional Research Service

17

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

2011) $295 mil ion grant from the U.S. Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation (MCC) for road,
pipeline, and municipal infrastructure rehabilitation, as wel as for agribusiness development.95
After Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, the United States substantial y increased its assistance to
Georgia. The U.S. government immediately provided over $38 mil ion in humanitarian aid and
emergency relief, using U.S. aircraft and naval and coast guard ships.96 In September 2008, then-
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a total aid package worth at least $1 bil ion.97
Total U.S. assistance al ocated to Georgia for FY2008-FY2009 totaled $1.04 bil ion, including
$634 mil ion in supplemental funds.98 Georgia also received another $100 mil ion in MCC
funds.99
After the 2008 war, Georgia continued to be a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the Europe
and Eurasia region. From FY2010 to FY2016, State Department and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) bilateral aid al ocations to Georgia amounted to $77 mil ion
a year on average (including Foreign Military Financing, or FMF). Georgia also received a
second five-year (2014-2019) MCC grant of $140 mil ion to support educational infrastructure
and training, and to improve the study of science and technology.100
Since FY2017, bilateral State Department and USAID assistance to Georgia has increased to
$124 mil ion a year on average ($132 mil ion in FY2020, including $40 mil ion in FMF).101 For
FY2021, Congress appropriated $132 mil ion in bilateral aid to Georgia, including $35 mil ion in
FMF.102
Separate nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance administered by the Department of
Defense has totaled more than $266 mil ion in obligated funds since FY2011.103 Such assistance
has supported the establishment of the Lugar Center for Public Health Research. The Lugar
Center is a government laboratory that houses the Georgian National Center for Disease Control
and Public Health, as wel as the U.S. Army Medical Research Directorate-Georgia, an “overseas
infectious disease laboratory of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.”104
Military Aid
The provision of U.S. military aid to Georgia predates Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the
late 1990s, the United States began to provide Georgia with increased aid to improve border and

95 U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), “Georgia Compact.”
96 T estimony of Daniel Fried, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Georgia and Implications for
U.S. Policy, hearings, 110th Congress, 2nd sess., September 9, 2008.
97 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks on U.S. Economic Support Package for Georgia,” September 3, 2008.
98 CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s U.S. Government Assistance to and
Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2008 and FY2009. Also see testimony of S. Ken Yamashita, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Georgia: One Year After the August War, hearings, 111th Congress,
1st sess., August 4, 2009.
99 MCC, “Georgia Compact.”
100 MCC, “Georgia Compact II.”
101 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020.
102 Explanatory Statement regarding H.R. 133 (P.L. 116-260), Congressional Record, December 21, 2020, p. H8794.
103 Nonproliferation and t hreat reduction assistance refers to obligated funds from the Cooperative T hreat Reduction
(CT R) account, as reported by USAID. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer, at https://explorer.usaid.gov/. On the Lugar
Cent er support, see U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “ Lugar Center Supports Georgian NCDC on COVID -19 Response,”
April 9, 2020.
104 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Lugar Center Supports Georgian NCDC on COVID-19 Response,” April 9, 2020.
Congressional Research Service

18

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

maritime security and to combat transnational crime, including through the development of
Georgia’s Coast Guard.105 U.S. military aid increased after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. The George W. Bush Administration considered Georgia part of a “second stage” in the
“war on terror,” together with Yemen and the Philippines, and supported Georgia with a two-year
Train and Equip Program.106 This program was fol owed by a Sustainment and Stability
Operations Program through 2007 that supported a Georgian troop deployment to Iraq in
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Since FY2010, Georgia has received U.S. military aid through FMF and International Military
Education and Training (IMET), as wel as the Department of Defense’s Section 333 (Building
Partner Capacity) account and other train-and-equip programs. The Georgia Defense Readiness
Program, a three-year initiative scheduled to conclude in 2021, has sought to “[enhance]
Georgia’s interoperability and [strengthen its] territorial defense capabilities.”107 FMF assistance
is provided on a bilateral basis, as wel as through the Europe and Eurasia Regional account and
the Countering Russian Influence Fund. In 2017, the Department of Defense notified Congress of
a Foreign Military Sale to Georgia of over 400 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as wel as
launchers, associated equipment, and training, at a total estimated cost of $75 mil ion.108 U.S.
military assistance totaling more than $200 mil ion also has supported Georgia’s deployments to
Afghanistan in ISAF and the follow-on Resolute Support Mission.109
In 2016, the United States and Georgia concluded a three-year framework agreement on security
cooperation focusing on “improving Georgia’s defense capabilities, establishing [an] effective
and sustainable system of defense, enhancing interoperability of the Georgian Armed Forces with
NATO, and ensuring effective military management.”110 In 2019, the United States and Georgia
signed a new three-year Security Cooperation Framework “that reaffirmed the importance of the
U.S.-Georgia strategic relationship and prioritized bilateral security cooperation focused on
Georgian defense readiness and interoperability.”111
The United States and Georgia have held regular joint military exercises in Georgia since 2011.
Initial exercises, dubbed Agile Spirit, began as a counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations
training exercise and shifted to a “conventional warfare focus” in 2015, the year after Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine.112 That year, Agile Spirit began to include other NATO partners. A second
bilateral exercise, Noble Partner, was launched in 2015 and designed “to enhance regional

105 In total, the United States provided about $166 million for the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
program, which existed from FY1998 to FY2011. Another $34 million in border security assistance was provided to
Georgia through the Export and Border Security program. International Business and T echnical Consultants, Maritim e
Security Special Them atic Report, Georgia Monitoring Project, submitted to U.S. Department of State, April 2012, p. 3.
106 In March 2002, President George W. Bush said: “Now that the T aliban are gone and al Qaeda has lost its home base
for terrorism [in Afghanistan], we have entered the second stage of the war on terror —a sustained campaign to deny
sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world.” White House, “ President Bush
T hanks the World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts,” March 11, 2002.
107 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Joint Statement of U.S. Army Europe and Africa and the Georgian Ministry of Defense,”
March 17, 2021.
108 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Georgia—Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units,” T ransmittal No.
17-59, November 20, 2017; and Civil Georgia, “ Javelin Missiles Arrive in Georgia,” January 23, 2018.
109 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020.
110 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, “ Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Security Sector Concluded Between the
U.S. and Georgia,” December 7, 2016.
111 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Georgia Security Working Group,” December 6, 2019.
112 U.S. Marine Corps, “Exercise Agile Spirit Ends with Bang,” July 27, 2015.
Congressional Research Service

19

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

partnerships and increase U.S. force readiness and interoperability in a realistic, multinational
training environment.”113
Trade
In 2020, the United States was Georgia’s 4th-largest source of merchandise imports and 10th-
largest destination for exports. The value of Georgia’s merchandise imports from the United
States—mainly vehicles—was $537 mil ion in 2020 (up from $389 mil ion in 2019). The value of
merchandise exports to the United States—mainly iron and steel—was $80 mil ion in 2020
(down from $132 mil ion in 2019).114
Since 2012, the United States and Georgia periodical y have discussed the possibility of a free-
trade agreement. The Georgia Support Act (H.R. 923), if enacted, would express the sense of
Congress that “the United States Trade Representative should make progress toward negotiations
with Georgia” on a free trade agreement. The United States and Georgia have signed a bilateral
investment treaty and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. They also have established
a High-Level Dialogue on Trade and Investment.
U.S. officials expressed support for Georgia’s deepwater port project in Anaklia prior to the
Georgian government’s cancel ation of the project contract in 2020. Then-Assistant Secretary of
State for Economic and Business Affairs Manisha Singh said the port would “grow Georgia’s
economy, make Georgia an even stronger trading partner to the United States, and provide greater
connectivity between Europe and the entire Caspian region.”115 Then-Secretary Pompeo said the
port would “enhance Georgia’s relationship with free economies and prevent Georgia from
fal ing prey to Russian or Chinese economic influence.”116

Author Information

Cory Welt

Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

113 U.S. Army, “Exercise Noble Partner 2015 Demonstrates Bilateral Cooperation,” May 1, 2015; U.S. Army Europe ,
“Exercise Noble Partner 2020 Begins,” August 26, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing on Exercise Noble
Partner 2020,” September 15, 2020.
114 T rade data from Geostat, as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
115 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Fourth Annual T rans-Caspian Forum,” May 23, 2019.
116 U.S. Department of State, “ Statements to the Press with Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze as Part of the
U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission,” June 11, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

20

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R45307 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED
21