Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing
March 5, 2021
Challenges, and U.S. Interests
Kristin Archick
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Specialist in European
Ireland, which is one of four component “nations” of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict,
Affairs
often referred to as “the Troubles,” has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has

reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in
Northern Ireland largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK

(unionists). Most Catholics in Northern Ireland consider themselves Irish, and many desire a
united Ireland (nationalists).
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace
process. For decades, the United States has provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In
recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, police reforms, human rights, and addressing
Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past). Some Members also are concerned about how
Brexit—the UK’s withdrawal as a member of the European Union (EU) in January 2020—is affecting Northern Ireland.
The Peace Agreement: Progress to Date and Ongoing Challenges
In 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement.
The resulting Good Friday Agreement, or Belfast Agreement, recognized that a change in Northern Ireland’s constitutional
status as part of the UK can come about only with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland (as well as with
the consent of a majority in Ireland). The agreement called for devolved government—the transfer of specified powers from
London to Belfast—with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power. It also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK
security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.
Despite a much-improved security situation since 1998, full implementation of the peace agreement has been difficult. For
years, decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that generated instability in the devolved government. In
2007, the pro-British Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the nationalist political party traditionally associated
with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal. Tensions and distrust persisted, however,
between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties. Ten years later, the devolved
government led by the DUP and Sinn Fein collapsed, prompting snap Assembly elections in March 2017 amid several
contentious regional issues and unease in Northern Ireland about Brexit. Negotiations to reestablish the devolved government
repeatedly stalled. The DUP and Sinn Fein agreed to form a new devolved government in January 2020, but the long impasse
renewed concerns about the fragility of the peace process. Northern Ireland also faces a number of broad challenges in its
search for peace and reconciliation, including reducing sectarian divisions, dealing with the past, addressing lingering
concerns about paramilitary and dissident activity, and promoting further economic development.
Brexit and Northern Ireland
Brexit may have significant political and economic repercussions for Northern Ireland. The future of the border between
Northern Ireland and Ireland was a central issue in the UK’s withdrawal negotiations with the EU. Since 1998, as security
checkpoints were dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the
EU single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border on the island of Ireland effectively disappeared,
helping to promote peace, reconciliation, and a dynamic cross-border economy. Preventing a hard border (with customs
checks and physical infrastructure) post-Brexit was thus a key imperative and a major stumbling block in the UK-EU
withdrawal negotiations. Concerns about a hard border developing mostly receded in light of the solution found in the UK-
EU withdrawal agreement, but the end of the Brexit transition period on December 31, 2020, caused some difficulties for
trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Combined with a dispute related to EU export controls on
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines that could have impacted Northern Ireland, tensions have arisen over the
post-Brexit provisions for Northern Ireland. The DUP and other unionists in Northern Ireland argue that the post-Brexit
arrangements for the region are untenable. Brexit has added to divisions within Northern Ireland and continues to pose
challenges for Northern Ireland’s peace process, economy, and, possibly in the longer term, its constitutional status as part of
the UK. Sinn Fein, for example, has called for a border poll, or referendum, on whether Northern Ireland should remain part
of the UK. Also see CRS Report R45944, Brexit: Status and Outlook, coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
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Overview
Between 1969 and 1999, roughly 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern
Ireland, which is a part of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as “the
Troubles,” has its modern origins in the 1921 division of Ireland (see map in Figure 1).1 At its
core, the conflict reflects a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities.
Protestants in Northern Ireland (48% of the population) largely define themselves as British and
support Northern Ireland’s continued incorporation in the UK (unionists). Catholics in Northern
Ireland (45% of the population) consider themselves Irish, and many Catholics desire a united
Ireland (nationalists). In the past, more militant unionists (loyalists) and more militant nationalists
(republicans) were wil ing to use force and resort to violence to achieve their goals.2
The Troubles were sparked in late 1968, when a civil rights movement was launched in Northern
Ireland mostly by Catholics, who had long faced discrimination in areas such as electoral rights,
housing, and employment. This civil rights movement was met with violence by some unionists,
loyalists, and the police, which in turn prompted armed action by nationalists and republicans.
Increasing chaos and escalating violence led the UK government to deploy the British Army on
the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 and to impose direct rule from London in 1972 (between
1920 and 1972, Northern Ireland had its own regional government at Stormont, outside Belfast).
For years, the UK and Irish governments sought to facilitate a negotiated political settlement to
the conflict in Northern Ireland. Multiparty talks began in June 1996, led by former Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchel , who was serving as U.S. President Bil Clinton’s special
adviser on Ireland. After many ups and downs, the UK and Irish governments and the Northern
Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks announced an agreement on April 10,
1998. This accord became known as the Good Friday Agreement (for the day on which it was
concluded); it is also known as the Belfast Agreement.3
Despite the significant decrease in the levels of violence since the Good Friday Agreement,
implementation of the peace accord has been chal enging. Tensions persist among Northern
Ireland’s political parties and between the unionist and nationalist communities more broadly.
Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society and continues to grapple with a number of
issues in its search for peace and reconciliation. Sectarian differences flare periodical y, and
addressing Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past) is
particularly controversial. Many analysts assess that peace and security in Northern Ireland is
fragile. The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) in January 2020—or Brexit—has
added to divisions within Northern Ireland. Brexit has posed new chal enges for Northern

1 In 1921, the mostly Catholic, southern part of Ireland won independence from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in
the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922 within the British Commonwealth . T he Irish government formally
declared Ireland a republic in 1948 and severed its remaining constitutional links with the UK. T he Republic of Ireland,
with a population of roughly 4.9 million, consists of 26 counties and encompasses about five-sixths of the island of
Ireland; Northern Ireland, with approximately 1.9 million people, comprises six counties and encompasses the
remaining one-sixth of the island.
2 Many unionists and loyalists refer to the six counties that today make up Northern Ireland as Ulster. T echnically and
historically, Ulster also includes the three northernmost counties of the Republic of Ireland.
3 T he text of the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) may be found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/
docs//agreement.htm. T he unionist/Protestant community tends to use the term Belfast Agreement, viewing the name
Good Friday Agreement as biased in favor of the nationalist/Catholic community. For the purposes of this report, the
peace accord is referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, because this is the name more widely used and recognized
in the United States.
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Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests

Ireland’s peace process and economy and has renewed questions about Northern Ireland’s
constitutional status as part of the UK.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the
Northern Ireland peace process and encouraged the full implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement, as wel as subsequent accords and initiatives to further the peace process and promote
long-term reconciliation. Some Members have been particularly interested in police reforms and
human rights in Northern Ireland. Since 1986, the United States has provided development aid
through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) as a means to encourage economic development
and foster reconciliation. Some Members of Congress also have demonstrated an interest in how
Brexit wil affect Northern Ireland in the years ahead.4
Figure 1. Map of Northern Ireland (UK) and the Republic of Ireland

Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017).
The 1998 Peace Agreement
Key Elements
The Good Friday Agreement is a multilayered and interlocking document, consisting of a political
settlement reached by Northern Ireland’s political parties and an international treaty between the
UK and Irish governments. At the core of the Good Friday Agreement is the consent principle—
that is, a change in Northern Ireland’s status can come about only with the consent of the majority
of Northern Ireland’s people, as wel as with the consent of a majority in Ireland. Although the

4 Also see CRS Report R45944, Brexit: Status and Outlook, coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
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agreement acknowledged that a substantial section of Northern Ireland’s population and a
majority on the island desired a united Ireland, it recognized that the majority of people in
Northern Ireland wished to remain part of the UK. If the preference of this majority were to
change, the agreement asserted that the UK and Irish governments would have a binding
obligation to bring about the wish of the people; thus, the agreement included provisions for
future polls to be held in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status, should events warrant.
The Good Friday Agreement set out a framework for devolved government—the transfer of
specified powers over local governance from London to Belfast—and cal ed for establishing a
Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in which unionist and nationalist parties would share
power (known as Strand One). The Good Friday Agreement also contained provisions on several
issues viewed as central to the peace process: decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary
weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of
prisoners. Negotiations on many of these areas had been extremely contentious. Experts assert
that the final agreed text thus reflected some degree of “constructive ambiguity” on such issues.
In addition, the Good Friday Agreement created new “North-South” and “East-West” institutions
(Strand Two and Strand Three, respectively). Among the key institutions cal ed for in these two
strands, a North-South Ministerial Council was established to al ow leaders in the northern and
southern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues. A British-
Irish Council also was formed to discuss matters of regional interest; the council comprises
representatives of the two governments and the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland,
Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.
Implementation
Voters in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement in
separate referendums on May 22, 1998. Although considerable progress has been made in
implementing the agreement, the process has been arduous. For years, decommissioning and
police reforms were key sticking points that contributed to instability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government. Sporadic violence from dissident republican and loyalist paramilitary
groups that refused to accept the peace process and sectarian strife also helped to feed mistrust
between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties.
Democratic Power-Sharing Institutions
As noted above, the Good Friday Agreement cal ed for establishing a new Northern Ireland
Assembly and Executive. To ensure that neither unionists nor nationalists could dominate the
Assembly, the agreement specified that “key decisions” must receive cross-community support.
The Executive would be composed of a first minister, deputy first minister, and other ministers
with departmental responsibilities (e.g., health, education, jobs); positions would be al ocated to
political parties according to party strength in the Assembly.
The first elections to the new 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly took place on June 25,
1998. The devolution of power from London to Belfast, however, did not follow promptly
because of unionist concerns about decommissioning, or the paramilitaries’ surrender of their
weapons. Following 18 months of further negotiations, authority over local affairs was transferred
to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive in December 1999. Over the next few years, the
issue of decommissioning—especial y by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—contributed to the
suspension of the devolved government and the reinstatement of direct rule from London several
times between 2000 and 2002. (See “Decommissioning,” below.)
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In May 2007, after a nearly five-year suspension, Northern Ireland’s devolved government was
restored following a landmark deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—which
strongly supports Northern Ireland’s continued integration as part of the UK—and Sinn Fein, the
staunchly nationalist political party traditional y associated with the IRA.5 The DUP and Sinn
Fein have been the largest unionist and nationalist parties, respectively, in Northern Ireland since
2003. The 2007 DUP-Sinn Fein deal paved the way for greater stability in Northern Ireland’s
devolved government over the next decade. Regularly scheduled Assembly elections in 2011 and
2016 produced successive power-sharing governments, also led by the DUP and Sinn Fein.
At the same time, tensions persisted within the devolved government and between the unionist
and nationalist communities. Various incidents—including protests in 2012 and 2013 over the use
of flags and emblems, a 2014 dispute over welfare reform, and the 2015 arrest of a Sinn Fein
leader in connection with the murder of a former IRA member—periodical y threatened the
devolved government’s stability. Following the collapse of the devolved government and snap
Assembly elections in 2017, heightened tensions due to Brexit and other contentious issues
largely stal ed negotiations on forming a new devolved government for almost three years. This
long impasse renewed concerns about political stability and highlighted divisions in Northern
Ireland politics and society. (See “2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government,” below.)
Decommissioning
For years, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was a prominent chal enge in the
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The text of the agreement states, “those who hold
office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded
or removed from office.” Unionists were adamant that the IRA must fully decommission its
weapons. The IRA had been observing a cease-fire since 1997, but it viewed decommissioning as
tantamount to surrender and had long resisted such cal s.
Progress toward full IRA decommissioning was slow and incremental. A key milestone came in
July 2005, when the IRA declared an end to its armed campaign and instructed al members to
pursue objectives through “exclusively peaceful means.”6 In September 2005, Northern Ireland’s
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that the IRA had
put al of its arms “beyond use,” asserting that the IRA weaponry dismantled or made inoperable
matched estimates provided by the security forces.7 The IICD also confirmed decommissioning
by other republican groups and loyalist organizations. The IICD concluded its work in 2011.
Policing
Although recognized as a central element in achieving a comprehensive peace in Northern
Ireland, new policing structures and arrangements were a frequent point of contention between
unionists and nationalists. In 2001, a new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was
established to replace the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s former, 92%
Protestant police force. Catholics viewed the RUC as an enforcer of Protestant domination, and
human rights organizations accused the RUC of brutality and collusion with loyalist paramilitary
groups. Defenders of the RUC pointed to its tradition of loyalty and discipline and its record in
fighting terrorism. In accordance with policing recommendations made by an independent

5 Frank Millar, “Paisley Reaches Out and Grasps Cherished Prize,” Irish Times, March 27, 2007; Mark Davenport, “NI
Politics Moves Away from Edge,” BBC News, May 8, 2007.
6 “IRA Statement in Full,” BBC News, July 25, 2005.
7 Mark Davenport, “IRA Arms: What Next for NI Politics?,” BBC News, September 26, 2005.
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commission (known as the Patten Commission), increasing the proportion of Catholic officers
(from 8% to 30% in 10 years) was a key goal for the new PSNI. To help fulfil this goal, the PSNI
introduced a 50-50 Catholic/Protestant recruitment process.8
For several years, Sinn Fein refused to participate in the new Policing Board, a democratic
oversight body. Many viewed Sinn Fein’s stance as discouraging Catholics from joining the PSNI
and preventing the nationalist community from fully accepting the new police force. In 2007,
however, as part of the process to restore the devolved government, Sinn Fein members voted to
support the police and join the Policing Board. Experts viewed Sinn Fein’s decision as historic,
given the IRA’s traditional view of the police as a legitimate target. In 2010, the DUP and Sinn
Fein reached an accord (the Hil sborough Agreement) to devolve policing and justice powers
from London to Belfast (on which the parties had been unable to agree at the time of the Good
Friday Agreement’s signing).
In 2011, the 50-50 recruitment process for Catholic and Protestant PSNI officers concluded.
Officials asserted that the 50-50 process fulfil ed the goals set out by the Patten Commission
(including increasing the number of Catholic officers to 30%).9 In recent years, concerns
resurfaced that not enough Catholics were seeking to join the PSNI; partly because of lingering
suspicions about the police within the Catholic/nationalist community but also because of fears
that Catholic police recruits were key targets of dissident republicans. In 2017, the PSNI
introduced a number of procedural changes to help attract more Catholics (and more women).10
Security Normalization
The Good Friday Agreement cal ed for “as early a return as possible to normal security
arrangements in Northern Ireland,” including the removal of security instal ations. In February
2007, the last of more than 100 armored watchtowers in Northern Ireland was dismantled. In July
2007, the British Army ended its 38-year-long military operation in Northern Ireland. Although a
regular garrison of 5,000 British troops remains based in Northern Ireland, British forces no
longer have a role in policing and may be deployed worldwide.
Rights, Safeguards, and Equality of Opportunity
In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement’s provisions related to human rights and equality,
the UK government incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into Northern
Ireland law and established a new Human Rights Commission and a new Equality Commission
for Northern Ireland. Some nationalists, however, continue to press for more progress in the area
of human rights and equality. They argue that Northern Ireland needs its own Bil of Rights
(consideration of which is provided for in the Good Friday Agreement) and a stand-alone Irish
Language Act to give the Irish language the same official status as English in Northern Ireland.
The Good Friday Agreement cal s for tolerance of linguistic diversity in Northern Ireland and
support for the Irish language. The subsequent St. Andrews Agreement of 2006 provided for an
Irish Language Act, but this issue remains controversial.

8 See A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern
Ireland, September 1999, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/patten99.pdf.
9 “Police 50-50 Recruiting System Is to End,” BBC News, March 28, 2011.
10 Deborah McAleese, “T op Officer’s ‘Deep Concern’ at Lack of Catholics Signing Up for Police Career in Norther n
Ireland,” Belfast Telegraph, October 23, 2015; Vincent Kearney, “PSNI Aims to Recruit 300 New Officers,” BBC
News, October 23, 2017.
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Initiatives to Further the Peace Process
Many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement
as complete. Since 2013, however, the Northern Ireland political parties and the UK and Irish
governments have made several attempts to reduce sectarian tensions and promote reconciliation.
Major endeavors include the following:
 The 2013 Haass Initiative. In 2013, the Northern Ireland Executive appointed
former U.S. diplomat and special envoy for Northern Ireland Richard Haass as
the independent chair of interparty talks aimed at tackling some of the most
divisive issues in Northern Ireland society.11 In particular, Haass was tasked with
making recommendations on dealing with the past and the sectarian issues of
parading, protests, and the use of flags and emblems. In December 2013, Haass
released a draft proposal outlining the way forward in these areas, but he was
unable to broker a final agreement among the Northern Ireland political parties.12
 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In 2014, financial pressures and
budgetary disputes related to UK-wide welfare reforms and austerity measures
tested Northern Ireland’s devolved government. The UK and Irish governments
convened interparty talks to address government finances and governing
structures, as wel as the issues previously tackled by the Haass initiative. In the
resulting December 2014 Stormont House Agreement, the Northern Ireland
political parties agreed to support welfare reform (with certain mitigating
measures), balance the budget, address Northern Ireland’s heavy reliance on the
public sector, and reduce the size of the Assembly and the number of Executive
departments to improve efficiency and cut costs. The agreement also included
measures on parading, flags, and dealing with the past. Continued disagreements
over welfare reform between the DUP and Sinn Fein, however, stal ed
implementation of al aspects of the Stormont House Agreement.13
 The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement. In November 2015, the UK and Irish
governments, the DUP, and Sinn Fein reached a new Fresh Start Agreement. Like
the Stormont House Agreement, the accord focused on implementing welfare
reform and improving the stability and sustainability of Northern Ireland’s
budget and governing institutions. It confirmed a reduction in the size of the
Assembly from 108 to 90 members (effective from the first Assembly election
after the May 2016 election), decreased the number of Executive departments,
and made provision for an official opposition in the Assembly. The Fresh Start
Agreement also included provisions on parading and the use of flags, but the
parties were unable to reach final agreement on establishing new institutions to
deal with the past. In addition, the Fresh Start Agreement addressed ongoing
concerns about paramilitary activity, sparked by the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein
official in connection to the August 2015 murder of an ex-IRA member.14

11 Richard Haass served as President George W. Bush’s special envoy for Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003; he is
currently president of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations.
12 For the full text of the December 31, 2013, draft agreement presented by Haass and his negotiating team, see
http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/haass.pdf.
13 T he Stormont House Agreement is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-stormont-house-
agreement .
14 T he Fresh Start Agreement is available at Government of the UK, “News Story: A Fresh Start for Northern Ireland,”
November 17, 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/a-fresh-start -for-northern-ireland.
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Recent Issues and Ongoing Challenges
Despite a much-improved security situation since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, concerns
linger about the stability of the devolved government and the fragility of community relations. As
noted previously, the devolved government led by the DUP and Sinn Fein collapsed in January
2017 amid heightened tensions related to Brexit and other issues. It took nearly three years
following the March 2017 snap Assembly elections to reestablish the devolved government in
January 2020. Since then, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has further tested
the devolved government and the political parties’ ability to work together to manage the public
health response to the virus and its economic repercussions. Northern Ireland’s next Assembly
elections are due in May 2022.
The search for peace and reconciliation remains chal enging. Difficult issues include bridging
sectarian divisions and managing key sticking points (especial y parading, protests, and the use of
flags and emblems); dealing with the past; addressing remaining paramilitary concerns and
curbing dissident activity; and furthering economic development. The 2013 Haass initiative, the
2014 Stormont House Agreement, and the 2015 Fresh Start Agreement attempted to tackle some
aspects of these long-standing chal enges. Some measures agreed in these successive accords
were delayed amid the absence of a devolved government between 2017 and 2020.
2017-2020 Crisis in the Devolved Government
March 2017 Snap Assembly Elections
The immediate impetus for the devolved government’s January 2017 collapse was a renewable
energy scandal involving DUP leader and Northern Ireland First Minister Arlene Foster. Then-
Deputy First Minister Martin McGuiness of Sinn Fein cal ed for Foster to stand aside as First
Minister temporarily while an investigation was conducted into the energy scheme; Foster
refused, and McGuinness resigned his position as Deputy First Minister in protest. McGuinness’s
resignation essential y forced new elections to be cal ed for March 2, 2017.15
Tensions between Sinn Fein and the DUP on several issues other than the energy scandal
contributed to Sinn Fein’s decision to force snap Assembly elections. The elections were cal ed in
the wake of the June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership and amid deep unease over
Brexit’s implications for Northern Ireland. Other points of contention included the introduction of
a potential Irish Language Act and the legalization of same-sex marriage; Sinn Fein supported
both measures, whereas the DUP opposed them.16 Arlene Foster led the DUP’s election
campaign, but Michel e O’Neil succeeded McGuinness as Sinn Fein’s leader in Northern Ireland
and led Sinn Fein’s campaign (McGuinness was suffering from il health and passed away a few
weeks after the election).
As seen in Table 1, the number of Assembly seats contested in 2017 was 90 rather than 108
because of a previously agreed reduction in the size of the Assembly. The DUP retained the
largest number of seats in the 2017 elections, but Sinn Fein was widely regarded as the biggest

15 Under the rules governing Northern Ireland’s power-sharing arrangements, if either the First Minister or the Deputy
First Minister resigns (without a replacement being nominated), the government cannot continue an d new elections
must be held.
16 Sinead O’Shea, “Northern Ireland, Forced by Sinn Fein, Sets Early Election in Shadow of Brexit,” New York Times,
January 16, 2017; “NI Election: Everything You Need to Know About the 2017 Vote,” BBC News, March 4, 2017.
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winner, given its success in reducing the previous gap between the two parties from 10 seats to 1.
A high voter turnout of almost 65%—fueled by anger over the energy scandal and a perceived
lack of concern from London about Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland—appears to have
favored Sinn Fein and the cross-community Al iance Party. For the first time in the Assembly,
unionist parties do not have an overal majority (a largely symbolic status because of the power-
sharing rules but highly emblematic for the unionist community).17
Table 1. Northern Ireland: Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs)
(2016 and 2017 election results)
Political Party
2016
2017
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; hard-line unionist, conservative)
38
28
Sinn Fein (SF; hard-line nationalist, left-wing)
28
27
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP; moderate nationalist, center-left)
12
12
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP; moderate unionist, center-right)
16
10
Al iance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI; nonsectarian, centrist/liberal)
8
8
Green Party (nonsectarian; left-wing)
2
2
People Before Profit Al iance (PBPA; nonsectarian, left-wing)
2
1
Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV; hard-line unionist, right-wing)
1
1
Independent (unionist)
1
1
Total
108
90
Sources: BBC, “NI Election 2016: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2016/northern_ireland/results, and
BBC, “NI Election 2017: Results,” at http://www.bbc.com/news/election/ni2017/results.
Reestablishing the Devolved Government
Following the March 2017 snap Assembly elections, negotiations between the DUP, Sinn Fein,
and the other main political parties (see text box) on forming a new devolved government
repeatedly stal ed, primarily over a potential Irish Language Act. Divisions over Brexit
exacerbated tensions. The DUP was the only major Northern Ireland political party to back
Brexit, which Sinn Fein and the other main Northern Ireland parties strongly opposed. Some
analysts suggest the DUP’s support for the Conservative Party government in the UK Parliament
following the UK’s June 2017 snap general election further heightened distrust between Sinn
Fein and the DUP and made reaching a new power-sharing agreement more difficult.18
In April 2019, journalist Lyra McKee was shot and kil ed while covering riots in Londonderry
(also known as Derry). The New IRA, a dissident republican group opposed to the peace process,
claimed responsibility (but also apologized, asserting that it had been aiming to shoot a police
officer but hit McKee by accident). McKee’s death sparked a significant public outcry and
prompted the UK and Irish governments to intensify efforts to revive talks on forming a new
devolved government. Negotiations remained largely deadlocked, however, throughout the
summer and fal of 2019 amid ongoing uncertainty over Brexit.

17 Harry McGee, “DUP Smarting from Close Encounter with Sinn Fein Crocodile,” Irish Times, March 3, 2017; Enda
McClafferty, “Assembly Election a Brutal Result for Unionism,” BBC News, March 4, 2017.
18 Peter Hain, “Deal with DUP Means London Is No Longer Honest Broker on North,” Irish Times, June 13, 2017;
William Booth and Amanda Ferguson, “A Battle over Language Is at the Heart of Northern Ireland Crisis,”
Washington Post, February 9, 2018.
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On December 16, 2019, the UK and Irish governments launched a new round of talks with the
main political parties aimed at reestablishing the devolved government. These negotiations
followed the UK’s December 12, 2019, general election, in which Prime Minister Boris
Johnson’s Conservative Party won a convincing parliamentary majority, thereby negating the
DUP’s influence in the UK Parliament and improving the prospects for restoring Northern
Ireland’s devolved government.19
Main Political Parties in Northern Ireland
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The DUP has been the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland since
2003. It enjoys considerable Protestant support and strongly favors union with the United Kingdom (UK). The
party initial y opposed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, viewing virtual y any compromise with Irish nationalists
as a net loss for unionists. Social y conservative, the DUP opposes abortion and same-sex marriage. The DUP has
been led by Arlene Foster since 2015.
Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein has been the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland since 2003. It advocates for a
united Ireland. Sinn Fein is an al -island party and has a political presence in both Northern Ireland and Ireland
(with members in both the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Parliament). Historical y, Sinn Fein was the
political party associated with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A left-wing party, Sinn Fein traditional y has
received considerable support from working-class Catholics. In 2018, Mary Lou McDonald became leader of Sinn
Fein, replacing former long-serving leader Gerry Adams. Since 2017, Michel e O’Neil has led Sinn Fein in the
Northern Ireland Assembly and is considered the party’s “northern leader”; she is also the party’s deputy leader.
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The UUP is a smal er, center-right Protestant party that supports union with the
UK. It was the lead unionist party involved in the negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The UUP has been
led by Steve Aiken since late 2019.
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The SDLP is a smal er, center-left Catholic party that
supports a united Ireland achieved through peaceful means. It was the lead nationalist party involved in the
negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement. The SDLP has been led by Colum Eastwood since 2015.
Alliance Party. The Al iance Party is a nonsectarian, cross-community party. It is centrist and liberal in political
orientation. The Al iance Party has been led by Naomi Long since 2016.
On January 10, 2020, the DUP, Sinn Fein, and the other parties agreed to a deal put forward by
the UK and Irish governments to reestablish the devolved government. The new Assembly
convened the following day and elected a new Executive. The DUP’s Arlene Foster and Sinn
Fein’s Michel e O’Neil were elected as First Minister and Deputy First Minister, respectively.
The new power-sharing deal, known as New Decade, New Approach, is wide-ranging and
addresses a number of key issues, including health and education concerns and measures to
improve the sustainability and transparency of Northern Ireland’s political institutions. The
power-sharing deal does not include a stand-alone Irish Language Act, as initial y demanded by
Sinn Fein, but essential y seeks to strike a compromise that promotes the use of the Irish (Gaelic)
language while protecting the Ulster-Scots language (a regional language similar to English) that
many unionists consider important to their heritage. The deal provides for the official recognition
in Northern Ireland of both the Irish and the Ulster-Scots languages, al ows for their wider use in
government settings, and establishes two new “language commissioners”—one for Irish and one
for Ulster-Scots—to enhance, protect, and develop each language and associated cultural
traditions. Both the UK and Irish governments promised additional financial support for Northern
Ireland as part of the deal to restore the devolved government.20

19 Padraic Halpin, “UK Election Clears Way for Northern Ireland Devolution, Dublin Says,” Reuters, December 13,
2019; Annabelle Dickson, “Northern Ireland’s Post -election Refocus,” Politico, December 16, 2019.
20 T he text of the New Decade, New Approach deal is available at Government of the UK, “Deal to See Restored
Government in Northern Ireland T omorrow,” January 9, 2020, at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/deal-to-see-
restored-government -in-northern-ireland-tomorrow. Also see Henry McDonald and Lisa O’Carroll, “ Northern Ireland
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Sectarian Divisions
Observers suggest that Northern Ireland remains a largely divided society, with Protestant and
Catholic communities existing largely in paral el. Peace walls that separate Protestant and
Catholic neighborhoods are perhaps the most tangible sign of such divisions. Estimates of the
number of peace wal s vary depending on the definition. Northern Ireland’s Department of Justice
and Housing Executive have responsibility for the majority of peace wal s, but when other types
of “interfaces” are included—such as fences, gates, and closed roads—the number of physical
barriers separating Protestant and Catholic communities is estimated at over 100. Northern
Ireland’s Executive has been working to remove the peace wal s since 2013, but a 2015 survey of
public attitudes found that 30% of those interviewed want the wal s to remain in place for reasons
of safety and security; it also found that more than 4 in 10 people have never interacted with
anyone from the community living on the other side of the nearest peace wal . Furthermore,
experts note that schools and housing developments in Northern Ireland remain mostly single-
identity communities. A 2019 survey, however, suggests a gradual attitudinal change in support of
removing the peace wal s and other barriers, especial y among younger people.21
Some analysts contend that sectarian divisions are particularly evident during the annual summer
marching season, when many unionist cultural and religious organizations hold parades
commemorating Protestant history. Although the vast majority of these annual parades are not
contentious, some are held through or close to areas populated mainly by Catholics (some of
whom perceive such unionist parades as triumphalist and intimidating). During the Troubles, the
marching season often provoked fierce violence. Many Protestant organizations view the existing
Parades Commission, which arbitrates disputes over parade routes, as largely biased in favor of
Catholics and have repeatedly argued for abolishing the commission.22 Efforts over the years to
address the contentious issue of parading and related protests have stal ed repeatedly.
A series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013 highlighted frictions between the unionist and
nationalist communities. Protests began following a decision to fly the union (UK) flag at Belfast
City Hal only on designated days rather than year-round. The protests, mostly by unionists and
loyalists, occurred in Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, and some turned violent.
Northern Ireland leaders on both sides of the sectarian divide received death threats, and some
political party offices were vandalized.23
In June 2016, a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition was established to assess
these contentious issues and to recommend policies and solutions to help address them. This
commission consists of 15 members, with 7 appointed by Northern Ireland’s political parties and
8 drawn from outside the government; it was original y proposed by the Haass initiative and
subsequently endorsed in the Stormont House Agreement and the Fresh Start Agreement.
Although this commission was supposed to produce a report with its recommendations within 18
months, its work was delayed by the size of its task and the collapse of the devolved government
between 2017 and 2020. The commission delivered its report to the First Minister and Deputy

Assembly to Sit on Saturday After T hree Years,” Guardian, January 10, 2020; and Charles Landow, “Brexit Still
Looms over Northern Ireland’s New Government,” Foreign Policy, January 14, 2020.
21 “Northern Ireland Interfaces: More Residents Want Peace Walls to Stay,” BBC News, December 15, 2015; Paul
Nolan, “T wo T ribes: A Divided Northern Ireland,” Irish Times, April 1, 2017; “Will NI’s Peace Walls Come Down by
2023 to Meet 10-Year T arget?,” BBC News, May 3, 2018; International Fund for Ireland, Peace Walls Program m e
Attitudinal Survey: Sum m ary of Results, November 2019.
22 T he Parades Commission was established in 1998 as an independent body to rule on disputed parades.
23 “Q&A: Northern Ireland Flag Protests,” BBC News, December 8, 2012.
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First Minister in July 2020, but the report has not yet been shared with the rest of the Northern
Ireland Executive, the Assembly, or the public.24
Dealing with the Past
Fully addressing the legacy of violence in Northern Ireland remains controversial. The Good
Friday Agreement asserted that, “it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the
victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation.” In 2008, the Northern Ireland
Assembly established a Commission for Victims and Survivors aimed at supporting victims and
their families. Several legal processes for examining crimes stemming from the Troubles also
exist. These include investigations into deaths related to the conflict by a dedicated unit within the
PSNI; investigations by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (PONI) of historical cases
involving al egations of police misconduct; and public inquiries, such as the Savil e inquiry
(concluded in 2010) into the 1972 Bloody Sunday incident.
Critics argue these various legal processes represent a piecemeal approach and give some deaths
or incidents priority over others. Many observers note that progress in investigations has been
slow; as of 2019, there were roughly 1,700 conflict-related cases in total awaiting investigation by
the PSNI or the PONI.25 Others point out the expense and time involved with some of these
processes; for example, the Bloody Sunday inquiry cost £195 mil ion (more than $300 mil ion)
and took 12 years to complete.26 Reaching consensus on the best way to address Northern
Ireland’s legacy of violence has been difficult, in large part because many unionists and
nationalists continue to view the conflict differently and retain competing narratives.
The 2014 Stormont House Agreement cal ed for establishing four new bodies to address “legacy
issues” (based largely on proposals made during the 2013 Haass initiative):
 Historical Investigations Unit (HIU). This body would take forward the work
of the PSNI and the PONI in investigating outstanding cases related to the
Troubles. The UK government pledged full disclosure to the HIU.
 Independent Commission for Information Retrieval (ICIR). The ICIR would
enable victims and survivors to seek and privately receive information about
conflict-related violence. It would be established by the UK and Irish
governments but would be entirely separate from the justice systems in each
jurisdiction. Any information provided to the ICIR would be inadmissible in
criminal and civil proceedings, but individuals who provided information would
not be immune to prosecution for any crime committed should evidentiary
requirements be met by other means.
 Oral History Archive. This archive would provide a central place for people
from al backgrounds to share experiences and narratives related to the Troubles.
 Implementation and Reconciliation Group. This body would oversee work on
themes, archives, and information recovery in an effort to promote reconciliation
and reduce sectarianism.

24 Jayne McCormack, “Dr. Dominic Bryan: NI Flags Commission’s Brief T oo Big,” BBC News, June 27, 2019; “Let
Us See Flags and Culture Report Now,” Belfast Telegraph, February 26, 2021.
25 Commission for Victims and Survivors, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past, January 2019, p. 20, at
https://www.cvsni.org/media/1970/jan-2019-addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-ireland-s-past-policy-advice-paper.pdf.
26 James Clarke, “Was the Bloody Sunday Report Value for Money?,” BBC News, June 14, 2010.
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Efforts to establish these four new institutions in UK law, however, largely stal ed due to
divisions between the UK government, on the one hand, and some nationalists and human rights
advocates, on the other, over proposed “national security caveats” related to the disclosure of
certain information. Victims groups and nationalists were concerned that “national security”
could be used to cover up criminal wrongdoing by state agents. At the same time, unionists
voiced concern that the proposed HIU could unfairly target former soldiers and police officers,
and many argued that any measures to deal with the past in Northern Ireland should contain a
statute of limitations or amnesty to prosecutions. Successive government crises and the stalemate
in reestablishing the devolved government between 2017 and early 2020 also impeded work on
implementing these mechanisms to address Northern Ireland’s legacy of violence.27
In the January 2020 New Decade, New Approach deal to reestablish the devolved government,
the UK government pledged to introduce legislation in the UK Parliament to set up the legacy
bodies proposed in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement. In March 2020, the UK government
outlined its intentions for the new legacy mechanisms. UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Brandon Lewis asserted that the UK government would “remain true to the principles of the
Stormont House Agreement” but essential y suggested some significant changes in an effort to
put “greater emphasis on gathering information for families” and “moving at a faster pace to
retrieve knowledge before it is lost” to the passage of time.28
Instead of the two separate HIU and ICIR bodies cal ed for in the Stormont House Agreement,
Secretary of State Lewis proposed a single “independent body” to “oversee and manage both the
information recovery and investigative aspects of the legacy system” in order to ensure the
investigations were “effective and thorough, but quick.”29 Under the UK government’s new plan,
the vast majority of cases stemming from the Troubles are not expected to receive full police
investigations or to be referred for prosecution (although victim’s families stil would receive
reports). The UK government claims this approach would “end the cycle of reinvestigations that
has failed victims and veterans for too long”; once cases were considered and a decision reached,
there would be a “legal bar” on any future investigations.30
The UK’s March 2020 proposal was widely rejected by Sinn Fein, other nationalists, and many
human rights organizations as short-changing victims and families and as impeding due process
and the delivery of justice. The Irish government also expressed substantial concerns and noted
that any changes to the legacy approach as outlined in the 2014 Stormont House Agreement must
be agreed between the UK and Irish governments.31 The UK House of Common’s Northern
Ireland Affairs Committee initiated an investigation and issued an interim report in October 2020
that was highly critical of the government’s new proposal.32 Some experts view the proposed new

27 Anne Cadwallader, “Bereaved Families Have a Right to the T ruth,” Irish Times, December 31, 2015; “Villiers Meets
U.S. Lawyers in Bid to Resolve National Security Veto Dispute,” Belfast Telegraph, February 17, 2016; Gareth
Gordon, “T roubles Legacy Consultation Launched by Government,” BBC News, May 11, 2018.
28 Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Brandon Lewis, Statement to the UK Parliament, “Addressing Northern
Ireland Legacy Issues,” March 18, 2020, at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2020-
03-18/HCWS168.
29 Ibid.
30 UK Government Press Release, “UK Government Sets Out Way Forward on the Legacy of the Past in Northern
Ireland,” March 18, 2020.
31 Julian O’Neill, “New Plan for NI T roubles Cases to ‘Limit’ Investigations,” BBC News, March 18, 2020; Irish
Government Press Release, “Statement by T anaiste on UK Government Legacy Announcement,” March 18, 2020.
32 UK House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, Addressing the Legacy of Northern Ireland’s Past: the
Government’s New Proposals (Interim Report), October 26, 2020, at https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/
3186/documents/29458/default/.
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UK approach as backtracking on its commitments in the Stormont House Agreement in the
interest of making concessions to unionists and some Members of Parliament who argue that
British soldiers should not be prosecuted for actions taken in service to the state in Northern
Ireland and that doing so would reopen old wounds and be detrimental to the peace process.33
The UK government has not yet introduced draft legislation to enact its new proposed approach
to dealing with Northern Ireland’s past. In January 2021, the UK government released its
response to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee’s interim report and sought to emphasize
areas of agreement with the committee. The committee welcomed the government’s “change in
tone” and its pledge to consult with a wide range of stakeholders, including victims’ groups.34
Remaining Paramilitary Issues and Dissident Activity
Paramilitary Concerns
Experts contend the major paramilitary organizations active during the Troubles are now
committed to the political process and remain on cease-fire. However, the apparent continued
existence of some groups and their engagement in criminality worries many in both the unionist
and the nationalist communities. In response to heightened concerns about paramilitary activity in
Northern Ireland in 2015, the UK government commissioned a study on the status of republican
and loyalist paramilitary groups.35 This review found that al the main paramilitary groups
operating during the Troubles stil exist, but they are on cease-fire and the leadership of each
group, “to different degrees,” is “committed to peaceful means to achieve their political
objectives.” At the same time, the review concluded that individual members of paramilitary
groups stil represent a threat to national security, including through their involvement in
organized crime, and “there is regular unsanctioned activity including behavior in direct
contravention of leadership instruction.”36
The 2015 Fresh Start Agreement sought to address concerns about the main paramilitary groups
in Northern Ireland. Among other measures, it enumerated a new set of principles that cal upon
members of the Assembly and the Executive to work toward disbanding al paramilitary
organizations and to take no instructions from such groups. The agreement also cal ed for
establishing a new, four-member international body to monitor paramilitary activity and to report
annual y on progress toward ending such activity. The resulting Independent Reporting
Commission (IRC) began work in 2017; the UK and Irish governments each named one
representative to the IRC, and the Northern Ireland Executive named two.37 In its third annual

33 “Stormont Deal: Boris Johnson Restates Support for T roubles Veterans,” BBC News, January 13, 2020; Julian
O’Neill, “T roubles Legacy: MPs Dismiss Proposals as Unhelpful,” BBC News, October 26, 2020.
34 UK House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, “Troubles Legacy Interim Report: Government
Response,” January 18, 2021, at https://committees.parliament.uk/work/282/addressing-the-legacy-of-northern-
irelands-past -the-uk-governments-new-proposals/news/138524/troubles-legacy-interim-report -government-response/.
35 T he 2015 assessment focused on the following paramilitary groups: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); the Red Hand
Commando (RHC); the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, which also conducted attacks under the name of the Ulster
Freedom Fighters, or UFF); the South East Antrim (SEA) group of the UDA; Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF); the Irish
Republican Army (IRA, also known as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, or PIRA); and the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA).
36 Government of the UK, Independent Report: Assessment on Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland, October 20,
2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/assessment -on-paramilitary-groups-in-northern-ireland.
37 T he UK government chose former U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland Mitchell Reiss as its representative on
the IRC. Reiss served as special envoy in the George W. Bush Administration from 2003 to 2007.
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report, released in November 2020, the IRC asserted that paramilitarism “remains a reality of
Northern Ireland life” and urged tackling continued paramilitary activity with a “twin track”
approach that combines policing and criminal justice responses with measures to address the
underlying socioeconomic chal enges facing communities in which paramilitaries operate.38
The Dissident Threat
Security assessments indicate that dissident republican and loyalist groups not on cease-fire and
opposed to the 1998 peace accord continue to present serious threats. The aforementioned 2015
review of paramilitary groups maintained that the most significant terrorist threat in Northern
Ireland was posed not by the groups evaluated in that report but rather by dissident republicans.
The review described dissident loyalist groups as posing another, albeit “smal er,” threat.
At the same time, experts note that dissident groups do not have the same capacity to mount a
sustained terror campaign as the IRA did between the 1970s and the 1990s. Most of the dissident
republican groups are smal in comparison to the IRA during the height of the Troubles.39
According to UK security services, there are currently four main dissident republican groups: the
Continuity IRA (CIRA); Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH); Arm na Poblachta (ANP), and the New
IRA (which reportedly was formed in 2012). These groups have sought to target police officers,
prison officers, and other members of the security services in particular. Between 2009 and 2017,
dissident republicans were responsible for the deaths of two PSNI officers, two British soldiers,
and two prison officers.40
In January 2018, ÓNH declared itself on cease-fire, although a smal splinter group formed in
opposition to the cease-fire. The other groups remain active, and authorities warn the threat posed
by the New IRA in particular is severe. Police suspect the New IRA was responsible for a January
2019 car bomb that exploded in Londonderry (or Derry). As noted above, the New IRA claimed
responsibility for kil ing journalist Lyra McKee in April 2019. Many observers noted a slight
uptick in dissident republican activity in 2019, especial y in border regions, as the New IRA and
the Continuity IRA sought to exploit the stalemates over both Northern Ireland’s devolved
government and Brexit. Security services also report a “growing sophistication” in dissident
republican explosive devices and that the New IRA has attempted to obtain weapons overseas.41
Economic Development and Equal Opportunity
Many assert that one of the best ways to ensure a lasting peace in Northern Ireland and deny
dissident groups new recruits is to promote continued economic development and equal
opportunity for Catholics and Protestants. Northern Ireland’s economy has made considerable
advances since the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Ireland’s economy grew an average
of 5.6% annual y (marginal y above the UK average of 5.4%). Unemployment decreased from

38 Independent Reporting Commission Third Report, November 17, 2020, at https://www.ircommission.org/news-
centre/irc-third-report.
39 David McKittrick, “Northern Ireland: T he Peace Process and the Dissident Menace,” The Independent, February 18,
2014; Richard English, “Why Republican Dissidents Have Not —And Will Not—Go Away,” Irish Times, July 19,
2017.
40 MI5, “Northern Ireland,” at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/northern-ireland.
41 Naomi O’Leary, “Northern Ireland Bomb Is a Warning We Can’t Ignore,” Politico Europe, January 22, 2019; Julian
O’Neill, “Q&A: Why Is Dissident Republican Activity on the Rise?,” BBC News, September 15, 2019; “Security
Report Warns of Dissidents’ Growing Sophistication,” BBC News, April 30, 2020; Julian O’Neill, “ New IRA ‘Still
Dangerous’ After MI5 and PSNI’s Operation Arbacia,” BBC News, September 30, 2020.
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over 17% in the 1980s to 4.3% by 2007.42 The 2008-2009 global recession affected the region,
however, and economic recovery was slow and uneven over much of the last decade.
As in the rest of the UK, Northern Ireland’s economy has been severely impacted by the COVID-
19 pandemic and resulting restrictions on social and business activity. Northern Ireland’s
economic output fel by 13.7% in the second quarter of 2020 (April to June) during the height of
the first COVID-19 lockdown. Although economic output in Northern Ireland rebounded in the
third quarter of 2020 (July to September) to 15.5% growth, economic output decreased by 2.9%
in real terms over the year to September 2020.43 At the end of 2020, the unemployment rate in
Northern Ireland was 3.6%, an increase of 1.2 percentage points over the previous year but lower
than the UK average unemployment rate of 5.1%.44
Both the UK government and the Northern Ireland Executive have implemented a range of
measures to mitigate COVID-19’s adverse economic effects. These measures include financial
support to enable businesses to retain workers, assistance for the self-employed, government-
backed loans for businesses, and additional funding for public services.45 Some experts suggest
Northern Ireland’s economic recovery could be slower than recovery in the rest of the UK, given
the lingering effects of the 2008-2009 recession and the region’s relatively lower levels of
competitiveness.46
Other long-standing economic difficulties and disparities also persist in Northern Ireland. Income
levels and living standards in Northern Ireland remain below the UK average. Of the UK’s 12
economic regions, Northern Ireland had the fifth-lowest gross value added per capita in 2018
(£25,981, or about $33,900), below the UK’s average (£32,216, or about $42,032).47 Northern
Ireland has both a high rate of economic inactivity (28%) and a high proportion of working-age
individuals with no formal qualifications. Studies indicate that the historical y poorest areas in
Northern Ireland (many of which bore the brunt of the Troubles) remain so and that many of the
areas considered to be the most deprived are predominantly Catholic.48
At the same time, Northern Ireland has made strides in promoting equality in its workforce. The
gap in economic activity rates between Protestants and Catholics has shrunk considerably since
1992 (when there was a 10-percentage-point difference) and has largely converged in the last few
years. The most recent data available indicate that in 2017, the economic activity rate was 70%

42 Orla Ryan, “Northern Ireland’s Economic Fears,” BBC News, June 22 , 2001; Northern Ireland Executive Economic
Strategy, Consultation on Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Prosperity, January 2011.
43 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Composite Economic Index Quarter 3 2020,
January 14, 2021.
44 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Labour Market Report, February 23, 2021.
45 Northern Ireland Assembly Research and Information Service, Overview of COVID-19 Funding in NI and the
Econom ic Im plications: An Update, December 16, 2020; UK T reasury, “ Extra £800 Million to Support Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland through Covid-19 T his Year,” press release, December 24, 2020.
46 Esmond Birnie and Graham Brownlow, “How Will Covid-19 Affect Northern Ireland’s Economy?,”
EconomicsObservatory.com, May 28, 2020.
47 Gross value added (GVA) is similar, although not exactly equivalent, to gross domestic product; the UK government
uses GVA as the measure to compare regional economic performance. House of Commons Library Briefing Pap er,
Regional and Country Econom ic Indicators, February 21, 2021.
48 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measures 2017, November
2017; John Campbell, “Belfast Home to Half of NI’s 100 Most Deprived Areas,” BBC News, November 24, 2017.
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for Protestants and 67% for Catholics. In addition, the percentage point gap in unemployment
rates between the two communities decreased from 9% in 1992 to 0% in 2017.49
Over the past decade, efforts to improve Northern Ireland’s long-term economic performance
have sought to promote export-led growth and to decrease Northern Ireland’s economic
dependency on the public sector by growing the private sector. The public sector accounts for
about 27% of total employment in the region.50 Northern Ireland policymakers also have focused
on attracting more foreign investment. In February 2021, the Northern Ireland Executive
proposed a £290 mil ion COVID-19 economic recovery action plan—cal ed Rebuilding a
Stronger Economy—centered on developing a higher skil ed and more agile workforce;
stimulating research and innovation; building a greener economy; and promoting investment,
trade, and exports.51
Implications of Brexit
In the UK’s June 2016 public referendum on EU membership, voters in Northern Ireland favored
remaining in the EU, 56% to 44% (the UK overal voted in favor of leaving, 52% to 48%). The
UK withdrew from the EU on January 31, 2020, but continued to apply EU rules and to
participate in the EU’s single market and customs union until the end of a 10-month transition
period that concluded on December 31, 2020. Brexit has added to divisions within Northern
Ireland and poses considerable chal enges, with potential implications for Northern Ireland’s
peace process, economy, and, in the longer term, constitutional status.
The Irish Border and the Withdrawal Agreement
At the time of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the EU membership of both the UK and the
Republic of Ireland was regarded as essential to underpinning the political settlement by
providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. EU law
also provided a supporting framework for guaranteeing the human rights, equality, and
nondiscrimination provisions of the peace accord. Since 1998, as security checkpoints were
dismantled in accordance with the peace agreement, and because both the UK and Ireland
belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. The open border served as an
important political and psychological symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped
produce a dynamic cross-border economy.
Preventing a hard border with customs checks and physical infrastructure on the island of Ireland
was a key goal, and a major stumbling block, in negotiating the UK’s withdrawal agreement with
the EU. UK, Irish, and EU leaders asserted repeatedly that they did not desire a hard border post-
Brexit. Security assessments suggested that if border or custom posts were reinstated, violent
dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view such infrastructure as targets,
endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Experts feared that such violence would
threaten the region’s security and stability and potential y put the entire peace process at risk.

49 Northern Ireland Executive Office, Labour Force Survey Religion Report 2017, January 31, 2019.
50 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Northern Ireland Quarterly Employment Survey, December 15,
2020.
51 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Economic Recovery Action Plan, February 25, 2021, at
https://www.economy-ni.gov.uk/publications/economic-recovery-action-plan.
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Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also were eager to maintain an open border to ensure
“frictionless” trade, safeguard the North-South economy, and protect community relations. People
in border communities worried that any hardening of the border could affect daily travel across
the border to work, shop, or visit family and friends. Estimates suggest there are upward of 300
public and private border crossing points along the border today; during the Troubles, only a
fraction of crossing points were open, and hour-long delays due to security measures and
bureaucratic hurdles were common.52
Post-Brexit Arrangements for Northern Ireland
Devising a mechanism to maintain an open border, however, was complicated by the UK
government’s pursuit of a largely hard Brexit, which would keep the UK outside of the EU’s
single market and customs union. In early 2019, the UK Parliament rejected the initial UK-EU
withdrawal agreement three times, in large part because of concerns about the backstop for the
Irish border, which would have kept the UK inside the EU customs union until the UK and EU
determined their future trade relationship. Some Brexit advocates contended that Ireland and the
EU were exaggerating and exploiting the security concerns about the border to keep the UK close
to the EU. Those of this view noted that, although the Good Friday Agreement commits the UK
to normalizing security arrangements—including the removal of security instal ations “consistent
with the level of threat”—it does not explicitly require an open border. The Irish government and
many in Northern Ireland—as wel as most UK officials—argued that an open border had become
intrinsic to peace on the island of Ireland.53
In October 2019, EU and UK negotiators reached a revised withdrawal agreement with a
renegotiated Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to ensure an open border on the island of
Ireland while safeguarding the rules of the EU single market.54 Under the terms of the protocol,
Northern Ireland is to remain legal y in the UK customs territory but is to maintain regulatory
alignment with the EU. In effect, this arrangement keeps Northern Ireland for al practical
purposes in the EU single market and customs union, thus eliminating the need for regulatory
checks on trade in goods between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland but essential y
creating a customs border in the Irish Sea. Any physical checks necessary to ensure customs
compliance are to be conducted at ports or points of entry away from the Northern Ireland-Ireland
land border, with no checks or infrastructure at this border.
The DUP strongly opposed these “Northern Ireland-only” arrangements, contending the effective
customs border in the Irish Sea would divide Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK and
threaten the UK’s constitutional integrity. In light of the large majority won by Prime Minister
Johnson’s Conservative Party in the December 2019 UK parliamentary elections, however, the
DUP lost political influence and was unable to block approval of the renegotiated withdrawal
agreement. Both the UK and the EU subsequently ratified the withdrawal agreement, thus
enabling the UK to end its 47-year membership in the EU in January 2020.

52 Sarah Lyall, “On Irish Border, Worries T hat Brexit Will Undo a Hard-Won Peace,” New York Times, August 5,
2017; Henry McDonald, “Police Chief Says ‘Hard Brexit’ Irish Border Would Be Paramilitary T arget,” Guardian,
February 7, 2018; Maeve Sheehan, “Irish Army Identifies 300 Border Crossing Points,” Belfast Telegraph, December
17, 2018.
53 John Campbell, “Brexit: Does the Irish Peace Accord Rule Out a Hard Border?,” BBC News, January 30, 2019; T om
McT ague, “Brexit’s Ulster Problem,” Politico, June 12, 2019.
54 Department for Exiting the European Union, New Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration, October 19,
2019, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-withdrawal-agreement -and-political-declaration.
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Concerns about a hard border developing on the island of Ireland mostly receded following the
UK Parliament’s approval of the withdrawal agreement and the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol.
In December 2020, the Joint Committee of UK and EU officials reached an agreement on
implementing the protocol after the end of the transition period. Among other issues, the Joint
Committee agreed on a process for checks on animals and plants and rules for the supply of
medicines and food products entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK; the EU presence
in Northern Ireland; export declaration requirements; and criteria for goods to be considered “not
at risk” of entering the EU (and thus not subject to tariffs).55 The UK government also withdrew
controversial provisions in its draft Internal Market Bil (adopted in December 2020 as the United
Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020) that would have al owed UK officials to override parts of the
Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol in the absence of a Joint Committee implementation agreement
and UK-EU trade deal.
Ongoing Tensions and Challenges
Many analysts assert that Brexit has further exacerbated political and societal divisions in
Northern Ireland. As noted previously, the DUP was the only main political party in Northern
Ireland to support Brexit, but it opposed the Northern Ireland provisions in the renegotiated
withdrawal agreement because it viewed them as treating Northern Ireland differently from the
rest of the UK and undermining the union. Amid ongoing demographic, societal, and economic
changes in Northern Ireland that predate Brexit, some in the unionist community perceive a loss
in unionist traditions and dominance in Northern Ireland. Some experts suggest the new post-
Brexit border and customs arrangements for Northern Ireland could enhance this sense of unionist
disenfranchisement, especial y if Northern Ireland is drawn closer to the Republic of Ireland’s
economic orbit post-Brexit. Such unionist unease in turn could intensify frictions and political
instability in Northern Ireland and prompt a resurgence in loyalist violence post-Brexit.56
Meanwhile, long-standing nationalist doubts about the trustworthiness of the UK government
were heightened by the controversy over the Internal Market Bil . Although many analysts
believe the subsequently withdrawn provisions in the bil largely were an attempt by the UK
government to gain leverage in the ongoing UK-EU trade negotiations, some observers suggest
the incident further eroded trust within Northern Ireland, as wel as between the UK and Irish
governments. As the guarantors of the Good Friday Agreement, cooperation between the UK and
Ireland is deemed essential to the accord’s continued functioning and implementation.57
Since the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol took effect on January 1, 2021, the post-Brexit
arrangements for Northern Ireland have faced some chal enges. The protocol’s customs and
regulatory requirements on goods entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK have posed
difficulties for some businesses and consumers in Northern Ireland. Problems have included
shipping delays and product shortages, especial y for Northern Ireland supermarkets dependent

55 T he UK-EU T rade and Cooperation Agreement concluded in December 2020 is expected to further reduce concerns
about “at risk” goods as the deal provides for tariff-free and quota-free merchandise trade between the UK and the EU
(if rules of origin requirements are met). “ Brexit: UK and EU Reach Deal on Northern Ireland Border Checks,” BBC
News, December 8, 2020; European Commission, “Questions and Answers: Joint Committee Formally Adopts a Se t of
Implementation Measures Related to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement,” December 17, 2020.
56 Ceylan Yeginsu, “In Northern Ireland, Brexit Deal Is Seen as Betrayal,” New York Times, October 24, 2019; Dieter
Reinisch, “After Brexit, Will Northern Ireland Return to Violence?,” Washington Post, December 5, 2019.
57 Matthew O’T oole, “Of Course the Internal Market Bill T hreatens Northern Ireland,” Politico, September 23, 2020;
Etain T annam and Mary C. Murphy, “T he Internal Market Bill May Further Erode T rust and Security in
Ireland/Northern Ireland,” London School of Economics, September 24, 2020.
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on suppliers elsewhere in the UK (despite grace periods ranging from three months to a year for
full implementation of the new rules).58 In early February 2021, customs and regulatory checks at
Northern Ireland ports were suspended amid reported loyalist threats to port workers and EU
officials. Northern Ireland police officials subsequently determined there were no credible threats,
but the incident sparked a dispute between nationalists and unionists within Northern Ireland’s
devolved government.59
In addition, in late January 2021, renewed UK-EU tensions arose after the Ireland/Northern
Ireland protocol became entangled in EU efforts to control the export of COVID-19 vaccines
outside the bloc. The EU initial y announced it would trigger Article 16 of the protocol—an
emergency override mechanism available to either the UK or the EU—to prevent vaccines being
exported from Northern Ireland to the rest of the UK. Invoking Article 16 could have resulted in
border checks between Northern Ireland and Ireland. Although the EU almost immediately
reversed itself on invoking Article 16 amid a diplomatic outcry from UK, Irish, and Northern
Ireland officials, the incident is widely viewed as cal ing into question Northern Ireland’s post-
Brexit arrangements. The EU claimed that invoking Article 16 as part of the bloc ’s new vaccine
export control regulation was a simple mistake made in haste, but this error has helped to bolster
the DUP’s claim that the protocol is “unworkable.”60
The DUP and other unionists subsequently began urging the UK government to abandon the
protocol by invoking Article 16. First Minister Foster asserted that the EU’s wil ingness to invoke
Article 16 had “lowered the bar” for the UK to do the same.61 Among other steps in an escalating
campaign against the protocol, the DUP and other unionists launched legal action to chal enge the
protocol in judicial review proceedings. The DUP intends to argue that the new customs and
regulatory arrangements for Northern Ireland violate the UK Act of Union, which guarantees
unfettered trade throughout the UK, and were imposed without the consent of the public (which it
claims also violates provisions in the Good Friday Agreement). In addition, DUP leaders assert
that they wil not cooperate with the Irish government in implementing the protocol and have
threatened to boycott meetings of the North-South Ministerial Council and other meetings with
Irish officials in which the operation of the protocol is to be discussed.62
The UK government has appeared reluctant to abandon the protocol. UK officials have been
seeking to resolve operational problems with the EU and have cal ed for additional
implementation flexibilities, such as extending the grace periods that limit checks on agri-food
products, medicines, and other items until 2023. EU officials, however, have raised concerns
about how the UK is implementing certain aspects of the protocol; many observers doubt the EU
would be wil ing to agree to significant changes, including to the grace periods.63

58 Conor Macauley, “Problems in First Week of Post -deal GB-NI T rade,” BBC News, January 6, 2021; Shawn
Pogatchnik, “Supermarket Pleas Mount as Brexit Leaves Northern Ireland Shelves Bare,” Politico, January 13, 2021.
59 Shawn Pogatchnik, “Inspectors Pulled from Brexit Checks at Northern Ireland Ports over T hreats,” Politico,
February 2, 2021; Freya McClements, “ Brexit Checks to Resume at NI Ports Following T hreats,” Irish Tim es, February
9, 2021.
60 “Arlene Foster Urges PM to Replace ‘Unworkable’ NI Brexit Deal,” BBC News, January 30, 2021.
61 As quoted in Shawn Pogatchnik, “Brexit Protocol Row Adds Pressure to Northern Ireland Unionists,” Politico,
February 4, 2021.
62 “Brexit: DUP Vows to Send ‘Strong Message’ to Irish Government over NI Protocol,” BBC News, February 2,
2021; Brian Hutton, “DUP Plans Legal Challenge to Northern Ireland Protocol,” Irish Times, February 21, 2021.
63 Lisa O’Carroll, Heather Stewart, and Daniel Boffey, “UK in ‘Constructive’ T alks with EU Over Northern Ireland
Protocol,” Guardian, February 3, 2021; Denis Staunton and Naomi O’Leary, “UK and EU Appear to Harden Positions
on Implementing Northern Ireland Protocol,” Irish Times, February 11, 2021.
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With the end of the first grace period approaching and with UK-EU talks over an extension
largely stal ed, the UK government announced it would unilateral y extend the first grace period,
due to expire on April 1 (for parcels and certain agri-food products), for six months, until October
1, 2021. EU officials claim this step would breach international law, would undermine trust, and
could have implications for the future ratification by the European Parliament of the December
2020 UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (which applies provisional y until the European
Parliament gives its formal approval). The difficulties with the protocol’s implementation and the
EU vaccine row have heightened tensions between the UK, EU, and Ireland and have exacerbated
frictions between unionist and nationalist parties in the devolved government.64
Economic Concerns
Many experts express concern about Brexit’s possible economic consequences for Northern
Ireland. According to a UK parliamentary report, Northern Ireland depends more on the EU
market (and especial y that of Ireland) for its exports than does the rest of the UK.65 In 2018,
approximately 59% of Northern Ireland’s exports went to the EU, including 37% to Ireland,
which was Northern Ireland’s top single export and import partner.66
Significant fears existed in particular that a no-deal Brexit would have jeopardized labor markets
and industries that operate on an al -island basis. Many manufacturers in Northern Ireland and
Ireland depend on integrated supply chains north and south of the border. For example, raw
materials that go into making products such as milk, cheese, butter, and alcoholic drinks often
cross the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland several times for processing and
packaging.67 The vast majority of cross-border transactions are made by micro and smal
businesses, which dominate the Northern Ireland economy.68
UK and DUP leaders maintained that the rest of the UK is overal more important economical y
to Northern Ireland than the EU given the value of exports. In 2018, sales to other parts of the UK
(£10.6 bil ion) were more than double the value of exports to Ireland (£4.2 bil ion) and roughly
four times the value of exports to the rest of the EU (£2.5 bil ion).69 Among the DUP’s objections
to the renegotiated UK-EU withdrawal agreement, the DUP argued that the Northern Ireland
arrangements would be detrimental to the region’s economy, especial y to trade between Northern
Ireland and the rest of the UK. The DUP asserts that such concerns have proven correct given the
supply problems and shipping delays affecting Northern Ireland since the new post-Brexit
customs and regulatory requirements took effect.70

64 “Pandora’s Box Opened over UK-EU Vaccine Row, Says Gove,” BBC News, February 8, 2021; Shawn Pogatchnik
and Matt Honeycombe-Foster, “ EU Says UK Risks Breaking Law with Solo Bid to Ease Northern Irish Checks,”
Politico Europe, March 3, 2021.
65 Report of the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: UK-Irish Relations, December 2016.
66 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, June 15, 2020.
67 Simon Marks, “Brexit Is (Maybe) the Ruin of Irish Whiskey,” Politico, March 3, 2017; Colm Kelpie, “Brexit: How
Would No-Deal Affect Northern Ireland?,” BBC News, September 22, 2019.
68 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Overview of Northern Ireland Trade, June 15, 2020.
69 Ibid.
70 John Campbell, “Brexit Deal Could Reduce Spending, Investment, and T rade in NI,” BBC News, October 22, 2019;
Peter Foster, Judith Evans, and Daniel T homas, “Brexit One Month On: What Has Changed?,” Financial Times,
January 31, 2021.
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UK officials maintain that the government is determined to safeguard Northern Ireland’s interests
and “make a success of Brexit” for Northern Ireland.71 They insist that Brexit offers new
economic opportunities for Northern Ireland outside the EU. Supporters of the post-Brexit
arrangements for Northern Ireland argue the arrangements wil help to improve the region’s
economic prospects. Northern Ireland wil remain part of the UK customs union and thus wil be
able to participate in future UK trade deals but also wil retain privileged access to the EU single
market, which may help increase competitiveness of Northern Ireland firms and make the region
a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment.72
Constitutional Status and Border Poll Prospects
Brexit has revived questions about Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Sinn Fein argues that
“Brexit changes everything” and could generate greater support for a united Ireland.73 Since the
2016 Brexit referendum, Sinn Fein has repeatedly cal ed for a border poll (a referendum on
whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or join the Republic of Ireland) in the
hopes of realizing its long-term goal of Irish unification. As noted previously, the Good Friday
Agreement provides for the possibility of a border poll in Northern Ireland, in line with the
consent principle.
Any decision to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland on its constitutional status rests with the
UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In accordance with the Good Friday Agreement, the
UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland must cal a border poll if it “appears likely” that “a
majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the
United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.”74 At present, experts believe the conditions
required to hold a border poll in Northern Ireland do not exist. Most opinion polls indicate that a
majority of people in Northern Ireland continue to support the region’s position as part of the
UK.75 Although a January 2021 survey found that 51% of people in Northern Ireland would
support holding a border poll in the next five years (with 44% opposed and 5% having no
opinion), it also found that 47% favored Northern Ireland remaining in the UK versus 42% in
support of a united Ireland.76
At the same time, some surveys suggest that views on Northern Ireland’s status may be shifting
and that a “damaging Brexit” in particular could increase support for a united Ireland. A
September 2019 survey found that 46% of those polled in Northern Ireland favored unification
with Ireland, versus 45% who preferred remaining part of the UK.77 Analysts note that Northern
Ireland’s changing demographics (in which the Catholic, largely Irish-identifying population is

71 UK Government Press Release, “Brokenshire Holds Inaugural Meeting of Northern Ireland Business Advisory
Group,” September 1, 2016. Also see Stephen Walker, “Brexit: Northern Ireland Can Be Success Outside EU,” BBC
News, October 4, 2016.
72 Arthur Beesley and Andy Bounds, “Business Checks on Irish Sea T rade Loom as Next Flashpoint,” Financial Times,
January 28, 2020; Clodagh Rice, “Brexit: My NI Business Now Has the Best of Both Worlds,” BBC News, February 5,
2021.
73 Sinn Fein Discussion Document, Towards a United Ireland, November 2016.
74 UK Government, Northern Ireland Act 1998.
75 Stephen Collins, “UK Election Shows a Border Poll Is Not a Priority,” Irish Times, December 20, 2019.
76 Gerry Moriarty, “Northern Ireland: Polls Can Provide More Confusion than Clarity,” Irish Times, September 5,
2020; Gerry Moriarty, “Poll Finds Majority Favours Holding a Border Poll in Next Five Years,” Irish Times, January
24, 2021.
77 Jonathan Bell, “Brexit Impact on Northern Ireland Could Sway Border Poll Result,” Belfast Telegraph, October 25,
2017; “Slight Majority for Unification in Northern Ireland – Poll,” Irish Times, September 11, 2019.
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growing while the Protestant, British-identifying population is declining)—combined with the
post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland that could lead to enhanced economic ties with the
Republic of Ireland—could boost support for a united Ireland in the long term.78
Irish unification also would be subject to Ireland’s consent and approval. Some question the
current extent of public and political support in the Republic of Ireland for unification, given
potential economic costs and concerns that unification could spark renewed loyalist violence in
Northern Ireland. In Ireland’s February 2020 parliamentary election, however, Sinn Fein secured
the largest percentage of the vote for the first time in Ireland’s history. Sinn Fein’s election
platform included a pledge to begin examining and preparing for Irish unification, but housing,
health care, and economic policy issues dominated the Irish election. Sinn Fein appeared to
benefit mostly from the Irish electorate’s desire for domestic political change rather than from the
party’s stance on a united Ireland. Nevertheless, some commentators suggest Sinn Fein’s electoral
success in the Republic of Ireland could add momentum to cal s for a united Ireland.79
U.S. Policy and Congressional Interests
Support for the Peace Process
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed the Good Friday Agreement as the best framework
for a lasting peace in Northern Ireland. The Clinton Administration was instrumental in helping
the parties forge the agreement, and the George W. Bush Administration strongly backed its full
implementation. U.S. officials welcomed the end to the IRA’s armed campaign in 2005 and the
restoration of the devolved government in 2007.
The Obama Administration remained engaged in the peace process. In October 2009, then-U.S.
Secretary of State Hil ary Clinton visited Northern Ireland, addressed the Assembly, and urged
Northern Ireland’s leaders to reach an agreement on devolving policing and justice powers. In
February 2010, President Obama welcomed the resulting Hil sborough Agreement. In June 2013,
President Obama visited Northern Ireland and noted that the United States would always “stand
by” Northern Ireland.80 The Obama Administration welcomed the conclusion of both the
December 2014 Stormont House Agreement and the November 2015 Fresh Start Agreement.
Like its predecessors, the Trump Administration offered support and encouragement to Northern
Ireland. In November 2017, a U.S. State Department spokesperson expressed regret at the
impasse in discussions to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions and asserted that
the United States remained “ready to support efforts that ensure full implementation of the Good
Friday Agreement and subsequent follow-on cross-party agreements.”81 In March 2020, President
Trump appointed his former acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney as U.S. special envoy to

78 T ony Barber, “Brexit Raises the Spectre of the UK’s Break-Up,” Financial Times, October 22, 2019.
79 Naomi O’Leary, “In Brexit T alks, Belfast Loyalists See Risk of Return to Violence,” Politico, September 23, 2019;
Henry Farrell, “After Britain’s Elections, People Are T alking About a United Ireland. Don’t Hold Your Breath,”
Washington Post, December 13, 2019; Pat Leahy and Vivienne Clark, “ UK Election: Varadkar Warns Against Move
T owards United Ireland, Irish Tim es, December 13, 2019; Naomi O’Leary, “ Sinn Fein Surge Makes Irish Political
History,” Politico, February 9, 2020.
80 As quoted in, “G8 Summit: U.S. Will Stand by Northern Ireland, Says Obama,” BBC News, June 17, 2013.
81 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Statement on Northern Ireland Power -Sharing T alks,”
November 1, 2017.
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Northern Ireland.82 President Biden has close ties to Ireland and is a long-standing supporter of
the Good Friday Agreement; the White House press secretary recently described President
Biden’s support as “unequivocal” for the accord that “has been the bedrock of peace, stability,
and prosperity for al the people of Northern Ireland.”83
Many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process for
decades. Over the last several years, congressional hearings have focused on the implementation
of the Good Friday Agreement, policing reforms, and human rights in Northern Ireland. Some
Members have been interested in the status of public inquiries into several past murders in
Northern Ireland in which collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is
suspected—including the 1989 slaying of Belfast attorney Patrick Finucane and the 1997 kil ing
of Raymond McCord, Jr.84
On the economic front, the United States is a key trading partner and an important source of
investment for Northern Ireland. According to statistics from the Northern Ireland Executive, in
2017, exports to the United States accounted for 17% of total Northern Ireland exports, and
imports from the United States accounted for 10% of total Northern Ireland imports. Foreign
direct investment by U.S.-based companies totaled £1.8 bil ion (about $2.5 bil ion) between 2008
and 2018.85 Between 2009 and 2011, a special U.S. economic envoy to Northern Ireland worked
to further economic ties between the United States and Northern Ireland and to underpin the
peace process by promoting economic prosperity.
Views on Brexit and Northern Ireland
Former President Trump repeatedly expressed his support for Brexit and for a future U.S.-UK
free trade agreement post-Brexit. In a September 2019 visit to Ireland, Vice President Pence also
asserted that the United States recognizes the “unique chal enges” posed by the Irish border and
“wil continue to encourage the United Kingdom and Ireland to ensure that any Brexit respects
the Good Friday Agreement.”86 At the same time, Vice President Pence urged Ireland and the EU
to reach a Brexit withdrawal agreement that “respects the United Kingdom’s sovereignty,” which
many Irish commentators viewed as indicating a limited understanding of Brexit’s potential
implications for both Northern Ireland and Ireland.87
Since his time as Vice President in the Obama Administration, President Biden has maintained a
skeptical view of Brexit. During the 2020 election campaign, President Biden stressed that Brexit
must not undermine the Good Friday Agreement or jeopardize the open border between Northern
Ireland and Ireland. President Biden raised these concerns in a phone cal as President-elect with

82 Mulvaney resigned as special envoy in January 2021.
83 White House Press Briefing, March 4, 2021.
84 See, for example, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
and International Organizations, and Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging T hreats, “The Northern Ireland
Peace Process T oday: Attempting to Deal with the Past,” 113th Congress, March 11, 2014; Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, “Northern Ireland: Stormont, Collusion, and the Finucane Inquiry,” 114 th Congress, March
18, 2015; Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “ T he Good Friday Agreement at 20,” 115th Congress,
March 22, 2018.
85 Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Trade in Goods Data Analysis Northern Ireland – USA (2015-2017),
June 2018; Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, Northern Ireland Trade and Investm ent Patterns, October 2,
2018.
86 Remarks by Vice President Pence and T aoiseach Varadkar of Ireland in Joint Press Statement, September 3, 2019.
87 Suzanne Lynch, “Pence’s Brexit Backing Catches Dublin Unawares,” Irish Times, September 3, 2019; Edward
Helmore, “Mike Pence Accused of Humiliating Hosts in Ireland,” The Guardian, September 5, 2019.
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UK Prime Minister Johnson.88 It is unclear whether the Biden Administration wil continue with
the U.S.-UK trade negotiations begun by the Trump Administration, but some observers doubt the
current Administration wil prioritize a U.S.-UK trade deal amid competing imperatives,
including combating COVID-19 and promoting U.S. economic recovery.89
During the 116th Congress, some Members of Congress demonstrated an interest in how Brexit
might affect Northern Ireland and expressed continued support for the Good Friday Agreement.
Although many Members back, in principle, a future U.S.-UK free trade agreement post-Brexit,
some Members have tied their support to protecting the Northern Ireland peace process. In April
2019, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said there would be “no chance whatsoever” for a U.S.-UK
trade agreement if Brexit were to weaken the Northern Ireland peace process.90 On October 22,
2019, the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the
Environment held a hearing titled “Protecting the Good Friday Agreement from Brexit.” On
December 3, 2019, the House passed H.Res. 585, reaffirming support for the Good Friday
Agreement in light of Brexit and asserting that any future U.S.-UK trade agreement and other
U.S.-UK bilateral agreements must include conditions to uphold the peace accord. Other
Members of Congress have not directly tied their support for a future bilateral U.S.-UK free trade
agreement to protecting Northern Ireland post-Brexit.91
International Fund for Ireland
The United States has provided development aid to Northern Ireland primarily through the
International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which was created in 1986. The UK and Irish governments
established the IFI based on objectives in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, but the IFI is an
independent entity. It supports economic regeneration and social development projects in areas
most affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the border areas of the Republic of
Ireland; in doing so, the IFI has sought to foster dialogue and reconciliation. The United States
has contributed more than $540 mil ion since the IFI’s establishment, roughly half of total IFI
funding. The EU, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have provided funding for the IFI as wel .
In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. appropriations for the IFI averaged around $23 mil ion annual y; in
the 2000s, U.S. appropriations averaged $18 mil ion each year.92
According to the IFI, the vast majority of projects it has supported with seed funding have been
located in disadvantaged areas that have suffered from high unemployment, a lack of facilities,
and little private sector investment. In its first two decades, IFI projects in Northern Ireland and
the southern border counties focused on economic and business development and sectors such as
tourism, agriculture, and technology. In 2006, the IFI announced it would begin shifting its focus
toward projects aimed at promoting community reconciliation and overcoming past divisions.
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have backed the IFI as a means
to promote economic development and encourage divided communities to work together. Support
for paramilitary and dissident groups in Northern Ireland traditional y has been strongest in

88 Patrick Wintour, “Biden and Pelosi Warn UK Over Risking Good Friday Agreement,” The Guardian, September 16,
2020; George Parker and Katrina Manson, “Joe Biden Warns Boris Johnson Not to Let Brexit Upend Northern Ireland
Peace Process,” Financial Times, November 9, 2020.
89 Ryan Heath, “Britain Braces for Not -so-special Relationship with Biden,” Politico, December 31, 2020.
90 Simon Carswell, “Pelosi Warns No US-UK T rade Deal if Belfast Agreement Weakened by Brexit,” Irish Times,
April 15, 2019.
91 Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Joins Colleagues in Letter Pledging to Back Britain After Brexit, August 6, 2019.
92 T he Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-415) authorizes U.S. contributions to the International
Fund for Ireland.
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communities with high levels of unemployment and economic deprivation. Thus, many observers
have long viewed the creation of jobs and economic opportunity as a key part of resolving the
conflict in Northern Ireland and have supported the IFI as part of the peace process.
Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress also encouraged the IFI to place greater focus on
reconciliation activities and were pleased with the IFI’s decision to do so in 2006. At the same
time, some critics have questioned the IFI’s effectiveness, viewing certain IFI projects as largely
wasteful and unlikely to bridge community divides in any significant way.
In FY2011, amid the U.S. economic and budget crisis, some Members of Congress began to cal
for an end to U.S. funding for the IFI as part of a raft of budget-cutting measures. Some Members
asserted that U.S. contributions to the IFI were no longer necessary given Ireland and Northern
Ireland’s improved political and economic situation (relative to what it was in the 1980s). In the
final FY2011 continuing budget resolution (P.L. 112-10), Congress did not specify an al ocation
for the IFI (and has not done so in successive fiscal years).
Since FY2011, however, the Obama and Trump Administrations have continued to al ocate funds
from Economic Support Fund (ESF) resources to the IFI in the form of a grant for specific IFI
activities to support peace and reconciliation programs. The United States provided $2.5 mil ion
per year to the IFI from ESF funding between FY2011 and FY2014, and $750,000 per year since
FY2017.

Author Information

Kristin Archick

Specialist in European Affairs

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Congressional Research Service
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