NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress
March 3, 2021
Heads of state and government from the 30 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) are due to meet in May or June 2021 to discuss security
Paul Belkin
chal enges and consider proposals to bolster political cohesion within the al iance. When
Analyst in European Affairs
al ied leaders last met in London, United Kingdom, in December 2019, deliberations

exposed heightened political tension and divergent views on a number of issues. Former
President Trump’s criticisms of NATO and individual European al ies and his

Administration’s perceived lack of consultation with al ies on key foreign policy issues were points of contention.
Despite these tensions, the United States has continued to play a key role in advancing NATO’s respond to a range
of security chal enges. In the seven years since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine, the United
States has been an architect of NATO’s increased focus on deterring Russian aggression, including through the
deployment of an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of about 4,500 troops to the three Baltic States and Poland.
NATO also has bolstered its response to terrorist threats and instability in the Middle East and North Africa,
primarily through partnerships and training activities. In February 2021, NATO defense ministers agreed to
expand NATO’s training mission in Iraq, from its current level of about 500 trainers to potential y as many as
4,000. In the coming months, the al ies also are expected to decide on the future of NATO’s ongoing “train and
assist” mission of about 10,000 troops in Afghanistan; to address the potential security implications of Chinese
investment and engagement in Europe; and to bolster resilience to nonmilitary threats, ranging from pandemics to
climate change.
In response to recent transatlantic tensions and questions about NATO’s longer-term relevance, NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to advance proposals to strengthen the al iance, both
militarily and political y. In 2021, he plans to present al ied leaders with recommendations to reinforce al iance
unity, broaden NATO’s approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order. Recommendations
could include updating NATO’s strategic concept, last updated in 2010, to better reflect today’s security
environment, especial y with respect to Russia and China; enhancing NATO’s capacity to counter nonmilitary
threats; and strengthening NATO’s commitment to democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-
minded partners across the globe.
President Biden has signaled support for Stoltenberg’s proposals and, more broadly, has pledged renewed U.S.
support for NATO and increased cooperation and consultation with NATO al ies. Although these statements have
been welcomed across NATO, analysts caution that disagreements between the United States and its al ies could
persist, including on how best to confront China and Russia and on long-standing concerns about defense
spending and burden-sharing. U.S. al ies also may continue to question U.S. credibility given policy reversals
experienced during the Trump Administration and concerns about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as
a potential embrace of isolationism or a return to “America First” policies by a future Administration.
Although many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—regarding burden-
sharing, for example—Congress as a whole has demonstrated consistent support for NATO. During the Trump
Administration, congressional support at times was viewed by some as an effort to reassure al ies troubled by
President Trump’s criticisms of the al iance. Over the past several years, both chambers of Congress have passed
legislation reaffirming U.S. support for NATO (e.g., H.Res. 397, H.R. 676, H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232, and H.Res.
256 in the 115th Congress; S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 and H.R. 6395/P.S. 116-283 in the 116th Congress) and in some
cases sought to limit the President’s ability to withdraw from NATO unilateral y (H.R. 676 in the 115th; S.
1790/P.L. 116-92 in the 116th Congress). At the same time, Congress continues to assess NATO’s utility and value
to the United States, and some Members are concerned about key chal enges facing NATO, including burden-
sharing, managing relations with Russia and China, and divergent threat perceptions within the al iance.
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Introduction
The United States was the driving proponent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO)
creation in 1949 and has been the unrivaled leader of the al iance as it has evolved from a
collective defense organization of 12 members focused on deterring the Soviet Union to a
global y engaged security organization of 30 members (see Figure 1). Historical y, U.S.
Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a cornerstone of U.S. national security
policy that brings benefits ranging from peace and stability in Europe to the political and military
support of important al ies, including many of the world’s most advanced militaries. During his
term in office, former President Donald Trump openly chal enged long-standing U.S. support for
NATO, however, arguing, among other things, that NATO was a “bad deal” for the United States.1
Although past U.S. presidents criticized burden-sharing dynamics within NATO, none did so as
stridently and publicly as Trump. Trump’s criticisms contributed to heightened political tensions
between the United States and Europe, prompting some al ies to question his Administration’s
commitment to NATO and to criticize its perceived unilateral approach to foreign policy issues.
Trump Administration officials maintained that the United States remained committed to NATO,
highlighting the Administration’s requests in 2017 and 2018 to increase funding for the U.S. force
presence in Europe and its efforts to secure defense-spending increases across the al iance in
recent years.
Many al ies have welcomed President Joe Biden’s pledge to renew U.S. support for NATO and to
prioritize consultation and cooperation with al ies. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has
said the new U.S Administration presents “a unique opportunity to open a new chapter in
relations between Europe and North America.”2 Al ied heads of state and government are
expected to meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, in May or June 2021 to set
NATO’s agenda for the coming year. Key al ied priorities include the following:
 Deterring Russian aggression in Europe, including Russia’s use of cyber and
hybrid warfare tactics;
 Deciding on NATO’s future in Afghanistan, especial y in light of recent
agreements between the United States, the Taliban, and the government of
Afghanistan;
 Confronting instability in the Middle East and North Africa, including
through an expanded mission in Iraq;
 Responding to potential security challenges posed by China and growing
Chinese investment in Europe;
 Enhancing the resilience of member states to respond to nonmilitary security
threats and crises including hybrid and cyber threats, pandemics, and climate
change; and
 Enhancing political cohesion and consultation within the al iance—Stoltenberg
plans to present proposals to reinforce unity within NATO, broaden the al iance’s
approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order of which
NATO has been a part since the end of the Second World War.

1 T essa Berenson, “Europe Worries as President T rump Heads to NAT O Summit,” Time, July 10, 2018.
2 NAT O, “Online Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg Following t he First Day of the Meetings
of NAT O Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181560.htm.
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NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress

Congress has consistently supported NATO and U.S. leadership of the al iance, including as al ied
concerns about the U.S. commitment to NATO increased during the Trump Administration.
Nevertheless, analysts caution that disagreements between the United States and its al ies could
persist in several key areas, including on how best to confront China and Russia and on long-
standing concerns about defense spending and burden-sharing. Furthermore, some al ies may
continue to question U.S. credibility as a leader and al y in light of the policy reversals
experienced during the Trump Administration, ongoing U.S. political fragmentation, and concerns
about longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of isolationism or a
return to “America First” policies by a future Administration.
Figure 1. NATO Members and Dates of Accession

Source: Congressional Research Service.
Key Defense and Security Challenges
When NATO heads of state and government last met in London in 2019, the al ies stressed their
commitment to advancing existing readiness and deterrence initiatives and to confronting
emerging security chal enges, including by declaring space as an operational domain for NATO.
The al ies also reinforced their support of NATO’s ongoing mission in Afghanistan and other
counterterrorism efforts and discussed the implications for NATO of China’s efforts to deepen
economic and political ties with Europe (see text box below for more on the London Leaders’
Meeting). In 2021, NATO leaders are expected to continue to address these issues while also
advancing initiatives to enhance societal resilience to nonmilitary threats, including pandemics,
building on lessons learned during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
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Outcomes of the 2019 London Leaders’ Meeting
Heads of state and government from NATO’s 30 member states last met in London, United Kingdom (UK), in
December 2019. NATO and U.S. officials highlighted the fol owing key deliverables from the London Leaders’
Meeting:

Completion of a new Readiness Initiative, under which the al iance would have at its disposal 30 mechanized
battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.

Declaration of space as a new operational domain for NATO and advances in combatting cyber and hybrid
threats, including establishing new baseline requirements for telecommunications infrastructure.

Increased defense spending by European al ies and Canada.

Renewed commitment to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and
North Africa.

Agreement to assess China’s impact on NATO and transatlantic security.

Initiation of a new “forward-looking reflection process … to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension
including consultation.”
Source: NATO, London Declaration, December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_171584.htm.
Deterring Russia
Since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has renewed its
focus on territorial defense and deterring Russian aggression. Among other measures, NATO
member states have deployed an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) totaling about 4,500 troops
to the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Poland; established a “Tailored
Forward Presence” in Romania, Bulgaria, and the Black Sea; increased military exercises and
training activities in Central and Eastern Europe; and established new NATO command structures
in six Central and Eastern European countries.3
In 2019, the al ies announced progress on several new initiatives intended to enhance NATO’s
readiness to respond swiftly to an attack on a NATO member, including by reinforcing the EFP
battlegroups. A cornerstone of these efforts is the so-cal ed Four-Thirties Readiness Initiative,
proposed by the United States in 2018, under which NATO should have 30 mechanized
battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.
Although the al ies have continued to support and contribute to NATO deterrence initiatives,
some analysts question the effectiveness and sustainability of these efforts. Several studies have
concluded that as currently postured, NATO forces would struggle to defend NATO’s most
vulnerable al ies, for example the Baltic States, from a Russian attack. Some al ies, including
Poland and the Baltic States, have urged other NATO members to deploy more forces to the
region to reinforce the al iance’s deterrence posture. Others stress the importance of enhancing
military mobility to respond quickly to an attack in the eastern part of the al iance. Critics also
highlight the importance of broadening NATO’s deterrence concept to include countering cyber
and hybrid attacks, including disinformation campaigns.4

3 NAT O, Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast, updated regularly at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/topics_136388.htm.
4 See, for example, David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, RAND
Corporation, February 2016; and Melanie W. Sisson, “It’s T ime to Rethink NAT O’s Deterrent Strategy,” War on the
Rocks, December 6, 2019, at https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/want -to-deter-russia-think-mobility-not-presence/.
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Other al ies, including leaders in Western European countries such as Germany, Italy, and France,
have stressed the importance of a dual-track approach to Russia that complements deterrence with
dialogue. These al ies contend that efforts to rebuild cooperative relations with Moscow should
receive as much attention as efforts to deter Russia. Accordingly, these al ies are reluctant to
endorse permanently deploying troops in countries that joined NATO after the collapse of the
Soviet Union due to concerns that this would violate the terms of the 1997 NATO-Russia
Founding Act; in consideration of these terms, NATO’s EFP has been referred to as “continuous”
but rotational rather than “permanent.”5
Transition in Afghanistan
NATO al ies have expressed continued support for the ongoing NATO training mission in
Afghanistan, but NATO’s future presence could be determined largely by the February 2020
agreement between the United States and the Taliban, in which the United States c ommitted to
withdraw al al ied and partner forces by May 1, 2021.6 In January 2015, following the end of its
11-year-long combat mission in Afghanistan, NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission
(RSM) to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Between 2015 and late 2018, NATO
al ies and partners steadily matched U.S. increases in troop levels to RSM. Over the past year,
however, the mission’s force strength has dropped from about 16,500 troops in February 2020 to
about 9,500 troops. As of February 2021, about 7,100 of the 9,592 troops contributing to RSM
were from NATO members and partner countries other than the United States. After the United
States (2,500 troops), the top contributors to the mission were Germany (1,300), Italy (895), non-
NATO-member Georgia (860), and the United Kingdom (750).7
NATO leaders welcomed the February 29, 2020, joint declaration between the United States and
Afghanistan and agreement between the United States and the Taliban in pursuit of a peaceful
settlement to the conflict in Afghanistan. Secretary General Stoltenberg said NATO would
implement adjustments, including troop reductions, to its mission as outlined in the agreements;
he stressed, however, that such actions would be “conditions-based.” Some European al ies
expressed concern that the Trump Administration did not consult them on possible drawdown
plans and cal ed for any such plans be carried out in close coordination with the al ies.8
At a February 2021 meeting of NATO defense ministers, the al ies agreed to a U.S. request to
postpone decisions on additional troop withdrawals until the Biden Administration completes a
review of U.S. force posture and security conditions in Afghanistan. European al ies and Canada
uniformly welcomed U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s commitment to consult closely
with them on any additional force posture decisions.9 Most analysts question the likelihood of a
sustained NATO military presence in Afghanistan without continued U.S. participation. Not only
do the al ies rely on U.S. force protection capabilities, but many have viewed their participation in

5 In the NAT O-Russia Founding Act, the allies agreed not to permanently station “substantial combat forces” in
countries that joined NAT O after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
6 For more on the military drawdown, see CRS Report R46670, U.S. Military Drawdown in Afghanistan: Frequently
Asked Questions, coordinated by Clayton T homas.
7 NAT O, Resolute Support Mission: Key Facts and Figures, February 2021, at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/
assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2021-02-RSM-Placemat.pdf.
8 See, for example, “Germany Worried at Possible U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” DeutscheWelle, December 28,
2018; Ben Farmer, “Britain Left in Dark over U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Telegraph, December 21, 2018.
9 NAT O, “Online Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the Second Day of the
Meetings of NAT O Defense Ministers,” February 19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_181561.htm.
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the mission largely as an act of solidarity with the United States and implicitly contingent on U.S.
participation.
Expanding NATO Engagement in Iraq and Addressing Broader
Instability in the Middle East and North Africa
Over the past several years, some NATO members, including the United States, have cal ed on
the al iance to do more to counter terrorist and other security threats emanating from the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA). NATO has launched new initiatives to address instability in the
MENA region, but progress has been limited, due in part to chal enging political and security
conditions on the ground and a lack of consensus within NATO on the appropriate role for the
al iance. New NATO initiatives launched since 2018 include a training mission in Iraq; the
“Package on the South,” a range of programs aiming to assist crisis management operations and
partner with governments to build security capacity; and establishment of a NATO Regional Hub
for the South in Naples, Italy, to coordinate NATO responses to crises emanating from the MENA
region.10 NATO also has deployed aerial surveil ance aircraft (Airborne Warning and Control
System, or AWACS) to assist the global coalition fighting the Islamic State terrorist organization.
In February 2021, NATO defense ministers announced plans for a significant but gradual
expansion of the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI), a noncombat advisory and training mission
established in Baghdad in 2018.11 According to NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, the mission
could increase from 500 to up to 4,000 personnel.12 NMI was launched at the request of the Iraqi
government and is focused on helping to strengthen Iraqi security institutions and armed forces to
assist their fight against terrorism. NATO forces do not deploy with their Iraqi counterparts, and
al NMI activities are approved by the Iraqi government. NATO officials say the enhanced
mission wil partner with more Iraqi security institutions and expand activities beyond Baghdad.
Political instability, changing security conditions, and the COVID-19 pandemic have at various
times caused NATO to curb or suspend operations, and Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasizes
that the mission’s expansion wil be conditions-based.
Several factors have limited enhanced NATO engagement in the MENA region. These factors
include a belief among some al ies that the EU is the appropriate institution to lead Europe’s
response to terrorism and migration issues and a related reluctance to cede leadership on these
issues to NATO. France, for example, has advocated strong European responses to terrorism and
conflict in the Middle East but has general y opposed a larger role for NATO. Some al ies also
disagree on what the appropriate response should be to some of the security chal enges in the
MENA region, with some appearing hesitant to involve NATO in a way that could be seen as
endorsing military action.
Assessing China’s Impact on NATO and Transatlantic Security
In a February 2021 speech at the Munich Security Conference, President Biden cal ed on the
United States and Europe to “prepare together for a long-term strategic competition with

10 NAT O, “Fact Sheet: Brussels Summit Key Decisions, 11-12 July 2018,” July 2018.
11 NAT O Fact Sheet, “NAT O Mission Iraq,” updated regularly at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/144032.htm.
12 NAT O, “Online Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the Second Day of the
Meetings of NAT O Defense Ministers,” February 19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_181561.htm.
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China.”13 Biden Administration officials have indicated they share the concerns of the Trump
Administration and some Members of Congress who have urged NATO to assess the security
implications of growing Chinese investment in Europe and to work more proactively to counter
potential negative impacts on transatlantic security.14 U.S. officials and some Members of
Congress have expressed particular concern about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure
and telecommunications systems, such as 5G networks.
At their 2019 meeting in London, NATO leaders formal y acknowledged for the first time in a
high-level NATO declaration that China’s “growing influence and international policies” pose
potential “chal enges” to NATO.15 Since then, the al iance has taken steps to address some
specific concerns, and Secretary General Stoltenberg has increasingly singled out potential
chal enges posed by China. In February 2021, Stoltenberg identified the rise of China as a
“defining issue for the transatlantic community” and cal ed on the al ies to enhance cooperation
with like-minded democracies around the world, “so we can protect the rules-based order, which
is undermined by countries that do not share our values, like Russia and China.”16
In 2019, NATO agreed to update its baseline requirements for civilian telecommunications to
reflect emerging concerns about 5G technology.17 The al ies agreed to assess the risks to
communications systems associated with cyber threats, and the consequences of foreign
ownership, control, or direct investment. Although the EU is attempting to develop common
guidelines to govern contracting decisions on 5G networks, these decisions would remain the
prerogative of individual national governments.
U.S. officials have warned European al ies and partners that using Huawei or other Chinese 5G
equipment could impede intel igence sharing with the United States due to fears of compromised
network security. Although some al ies, such as Germany and Italy, have said they would not
prevent Chinese companies from bidding on 5G contracts, these al ies have stressed that they
would not contract with any companies that do not meet their national security requirements.18 In
2020, the United Kingdom announced it was banning Huawei from participating in its 5G
network; other al ies, such as Poland and Romania, have announced stringent security
requirements that would prevent Huawei’s participation.
Despite U.S. concerns about China’s growing footprint in Europe, Biden Administration officials
have expressed optimism that the United States and Europe can work together to meet the various
security and economic issues posed by a rising China. Analysts, too, cite numerous concerns

13 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19,
2021.
14 T he T rump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy expressed concern that, “China is gaining a stra tegic
foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and
infrastructure.” White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 47.
15 NAT O’s 2019 London Declaration states, “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies
present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an alliance.” NAT O, London Declaration,
December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.
16 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021; and NAT O, “Online Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the First Day of
the Meetings of NAT O Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_181560.htm.
17 NAT O, “Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meetings of NAT O Defense
Ministers,” October 25, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169945.htm?selectedLocale=en.
18 Guy Chazan and Nic Fildes, “Germany Crackdown Set to Exclude Huawei from 5G Rollout,” Financial Times,
September 30, 2020; Giuseppe Fonte, “Italy Vetoes 5G Deal Between Fastweb and China’s Huawei: Sources,” Reuters,
October 23, 2020.
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shared on both sides of the Atlantic and contend that joint U.S.-European pressure on China
would be more effective than either partner’s individual dealings with China.
Enhancing Resilience
Whereas NATO has long focused on fostering strong militaries, al ied leaders increasingly stress
the importance of broader societal and economic resilience.19 In the coming year, NATO is
expected to refine its baseline requirements for national resilience to reflect lessons learned from
the COVID-19 pandemic and concerns about the potential security impacts of an array of
nonmilitary threats, including disinformation campaigns and vulnerabilities in critical
infrastructure.20 Secretary General Stoltenberg has specifical y identified the need for more
resilient transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, including 5G and undersea cables,
and for safer and more diverse supply lines, especial y for fuel, food, and medical supplies.21
NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
NATO has assisted its member states as they confront the COVID-19 pandemic. Although NATO traditional y
focuses on responding to military threats, the al iance possesses command-and-control and logistics capabilities to
coordinate multilateral responses to a range of security chal enges, including natural disasters and pandemics.
NATO’s primary disaster response mechanism, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
(EADRCC), has coordinated NATO’s pandemic response. Among other measures, NATO’s response has
included the fol owing:

Arranging the acquisition and transportation of critical medical supplies and equipment to NATO members
and partner countries in need;

Coordinating military assistance to national civilian efforts to build hospitals, increase testing, transport
patients and medical personnel, and distribute medical equipment; and

Establishing the NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund to stockpile medical equipment and supplies and to
provide immediate relief to al ies or partners in need.
Some observers argue that NATO’s pandemic response efforts may have boosted al ied unity and cohesion during
a period when individual member states were taking divergent approaches to the crisis and accepting assistance
from potential NATO adversaries, including Russia and China. Other analysts warn that economic fal out from the
pandemic could negatively affect al ied defense budgets and that restrictions on multilateral military exercises and
other NATO operations could reduce al ied readiness.
Sources: NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic,” February 2021, at
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/2/pdf/2102-factsheet-COVID-19_en.pdf; Elisabeth
Braw, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Should be NATO’s Moment,” Defense One, March 31, 2020.
Defense Spending and Burden-Sharing
Congress and successive U.S. Administrations have long urged NATO al ies to increase national
defense budgets to ensure more equitable distribution of defense responsibilities within the
al iance. A primary focus of the Trump Administration’s NATO policy was to secure increased

19 In the words of NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg, “Increasingly, our security does not just rely on strong
militaries. We need strong, resilient societies and economies too.” NAT O, “Opening Remarks by NAT O Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg on NAT O 2030 and the Importance of Strengthening the T ransatlantic Bond in the Next
Decade and Beyond,” February 4, 2021.
20 For background on NAT O’s baseline resilience requirements, see NAT O, “Resilience and Article 3,” updated
regularly, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.
21 NAT O, “Opening Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on NAT O 2030 and the Importance of
Strengthening t he T ransatlantic Bond in the Next Decade and Beyond,” February 4, 2021.
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defense spending in line with NATO targets. Although Secretary General Stoltenberg credited
then-President Trump with playing a role in spurring recent al ied defense spending increases,
many of Trump’s critics, including European leaders, warned that his strong criticism of
European al ies was damaging NATO cohesion and credibility.22
The Biden Administration has signaled it wil continue to prioritize cal s for higher defense
spending and more equitable burden-sharing arrangements, but officials have stressed that they
wil pursue a more consultative and collaborative approach with al ies.23 In February 2021, NATO
Secretary General Stoltenberg said he would seek al ied approval to increase common funding for
ongoing deterrence efforts in Eastern Europe in an effort to increase solidarity and enhance
burden-sharing. Stoltenberg also cal ed for the creation of a new NATO defense innovation
initiative to increase interoperability and promote transatlantic cooperation on defense
innovation.24
In 2006, NATO members informal y agreed to aim to al ocate at least 2% of gross domestic
product (GDP) to their national defense budgets annual y and to devote at least 20% of national
defense expenditure to procurement and related research and development. These targets were
formalized at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, when the al ies pledged to halt declines in defense
expenditures and “move towards the 2% guideline within a decade.”25
U.S. and NATO officials say they are encouraged that defense spending by European al ies and
Canada has grown for seven consecutive years (see Figure 2). According to Secretary General
Stoltenberg, European al ies and Canada have added $190 bil ion in defense spending since 2014;
the figure is expected to rise to $400 bil ion by the end of 2024.26 In 2014, 3 al ies met the 2%
guideline; in 2021, 9 al ies are expected to have met the 2% guideline and 24 al ies are expected
to have met the 20% benchmark for spending on major equipment.27

22 David Wemer, “NAT O’s Stoltenberg Credits T rump as Allies Increase Defense Spending,” Atlantic Council, July
11, 2018.
23 See, for example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, “T he U.S. Can’t Meet its Responsibilities Alone. T hat’s Why
We Believe in NAT O,” Washington Post, February 16, 2021.
24 NAT O, “Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NAT O Defense
Ministers on 17 and 18 February at NAT O Headquarters,” February 15, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_181427.htm.
25 NAT O, Wales Summit Declaration, September 5, 2014, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_112964.htm.
26 NAT O, “Online Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Stoltenberg Following the First Day of the Meetings
of NAT O Defense Ministers,” February 17, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181560.htm; NAT O,
NAT O, “Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of the North A tlantic
Council at the Level of Heads and State and/or Government,” December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/opinions_171554.htm.
27 NAT O, “Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council at the Level of Heads and State and/or Government,” December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/opinions_171554.htm; the nine allies expected to meet the 2% benchmark in 2021 are Estonia, France,
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, and the United States. NAT O, Defence Expenditure
of NATO Countries (2013-2020), October 21, 2020.
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Figure 2. Defense Spending by NATO Members, 2013-2020

Source: Created by CRS. Data from NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries, October 21, 2020.
Although al al ied governments agreed to the Wales commitments, many, including Germany and
Italy, emphasize that al ied contributions to ongoing NATO missions and the effectiveness of
al ied military capabilities should be considered as important as total defense spending levels. For
example, an al y spending less than 2% of GDP on defense could have more modern, effective
military capabilities than an al y that meets the 2% target but al ocates most of that funding to
personnel costs and relatively little to ongoing missions and modernization.
Analysts on both sides of the Atlantic also have argued that a relatively narrow focus on defense
inputs (i.e., the size of defense budgets) should be accompanied by an equal, if not greater, focus
on defense outputs (i.e., military capabilities and the effectiveness of contributions to NATO
missions and activities). The al iance’s target to devote at least 20% of each member’s national
defense expenditure to new equipment and related research and development reflects this goal.
Secretary General Stoltenberg likewise has emphasized a broad approach to measuring
contributions to the al iance, using a metric of “cash, capabilities, and contributions.”28
Proponents of the broad approach additional y argue that an assessment of al ied contributions
that takes into account factors beyond the 2% of GDP defense spending metric would be more
appropriate given NATO’s wide-ranging strategic objectives, some of which may require
capabilities beyond the military sphere.
In 2019, al ied leaders approved a U.S. proposal to reduce assessed U.S. contributions, and to
increase German contributions, to NATO’s relatively smal pot of common funds. National
contributions to NATO’s common funds—about $3.1 bil ion total in 2021—pay for the day-to-
day operations of NATO headquarters, as wel as some collective NATO military assets and
infrastructure. For the budget period from 2021 to 2024, the U.S. share of NATO’s common
funded budget is slated to decrease from 22% to about 16%, or about $500 mil ion.29

28 NAT O, “Press Conference by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NAT O Defense
Ministers,” October 23, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169891.htm.
29 Percentage shares of the common funds are negotiated among the allies based on per capita income and other factors.
U.S. shares for the three funds have fallen over the past three decades. NAT O, Funding NATO, at https://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm.
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Enhancing Political Cohesion
Many NATO leaders have warned that heightened political tensions within the al iance over the
past several years could have lasting negative repercussions. Divergent views have emerged on a
range of issues, including U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe, Turkey’s standing as a member
of the al iance, EU security and defense policy, NATO’s relations with Russia, and al ies’
commitment to democratic values.30 Doubts about the Trump Administration’s support for NATO
and disputes within the al iance on whether and how to respond to policy disagreements have
prompted some to question NATO’s strategic direction and future.31 Although European al ies
have welcomed President Biden’s pledge to enhance U.S. engagement in NATO, and with Europe
more broadly, some analysts caution that lingering European concerns about U.S. credibility
could hamper U.S.-European relations.
Throughout the course of the Trump Administration, Secretary General Stoltenberg stressed that
disagreement among al ies is not a new phenomenon and argued that “Europe and North
American are doing more together in NATO today than we have for decades.”32 More recently,
however, Stoltenberg has acknowledged that differences between Europe and the United States
have raised “serious questions about the strength of our al iance on both sides of the Atlantic” and
has pointed to the coming years as a “historic opportunity to build a stronger al iance. To regain
trust, and reinforce our unity. Europe and North America working together in NATO, in strategic
solidarity.”33
When al ied leaders met in London in 2019, they agreed to initiate a “forward-looking reflection
process … to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation.”34 Secretary
General Stoltenberg has since launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to develop proposals to make
sure “NATO remains strong militarily, becomes even stronger political y and takes a more global
approach.”35 Stoltenberg aims to present his proposals to al ied heads of state and government at a
summit in Brussels during the first half of 2021. He says his recommendations wil focus on the
following three areas:
 Reinforcing unity by increasing common funding for deterrence and the defense
of NATO territory, agreeing to political consultations on al issues affecting
member states’ security, and updating NATO’s Strategic Concept—last updated
in 2010—to “chart a common course going forward;”
 Broadening NATO’s approach to security beyond the military sphere to
include societal resilience, increasing collective investments to maintain NATO’s
technological edge and interoperability, and addressing the security impact of
climate change; and

30 For a more detailed account of broader tensions in the transatlantic relationship, see CRS Report R45745,
Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues, coordinated by Kristin Archick; for more on NAT O’s relations
with Russia, see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin.
31 See, for example, Joe Gould, “U.S., European Lawmakers Swipe T rump and T urkey in New Syria Joint Statement,”
Defense News, October 21, 2019.
32 NAT O, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NAT O Foreign Affairs Ministers”; “T ranscript: Emmanuel Macron
in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019.
33 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021.
34 NAT O, London Declaration, December 4, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm.
35 NAT O, “NAT O 2030: Making a Strong Alliance Even Stronger,” at https://www.nato.int/nato2030/.
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 Defending the rules-based international order, and countering China’s and
Russia’s chal enges to this order, by strengthening NATO’s commitment to
democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-minded partners
across the globe.36
Concerns Regarding the U.S. Commitment to NATO
As noted, many analysts and al ied leaders questioned the Trump Administration’s commitment
to NATO and expressed concern that Trump’s criticisms of the al iance could cause lasting
damage to NATO cohesion and credibility. In addition to admonishing European al ies for failing
to meet agreed NATO defense spending targets, Trump repeatedly questioned NATO’s value to
the United States.37 Although he was not the first U.S. President to press the al ies to increase
defense spending, none did so as stridently and none cal ed into question the U.S. commitment to
NATO as openly or to the same extent as Trump.
Some NATO members contend that divergence between the United States and many European
al ies on a range of key foreign and security policy issues, from Iran’s nuclear program to fighting
the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria, impeded cooperation in NATO and exposed
strategic rifts within the al iance.38 In a widely reported November 2019 interview, French
President Emmanuel Macron cited these divergences when he proclaimed that, “we are currently
experiencing the brain death of NATO.” Referring to concerns about the drawdown of U.S. forces
from Syria in October 2019 and subsequent military operations by Turkey, he lamented, “You
have partners together in the same part of the world, and you have no coordination whatsoever of
strategic decision-making between the United States and its NATO al ies. None. You have an
uncoordinated aggressive action by another NATO al y, Turkey, in an area where our interests are
at stake. There has been no NATO planning, nor any coordination.”39
President Macron has joined other European al ies in welcoming President Biden’s pledge to
“reengage with Europe, to consult with [Europe and NATO], to earn back our position of trusted
leadership.”40 President Biden has stressed that the transatlantic al iance is the foundation for
North American and European security and shared prosperity, and he has emphasized that his
Administration appreciates al ied contributions to NATO and wil consult closely with al ies on
al aspects of foreign and security policy. European al ies, including Germany, have reacted
positively to the Biden Administration’s decision to halt a planned troop withdrawal from
Germany and have welcomed the Administration’s initial moves to reengage with multilateral
agreements and organizations, including the Paris Agreement on climate change, the World
Health Organization, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START Treaty) with Russia, and
the Iran nuclear agreement.41

36 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181696.htm.
37 Atlantic Council, “T rump Again Questions U.S. Commitment to Defend NAT O Allies,” December 12, 2017; T essa
Berenson, “Europe Worries as President T rump Heads to NAT O Summit,” Time, July 10, 2018.
38 See, for example, James McAuley and Rick Noack, “Withdrawal of U.S. T roops from Northern Syria Angers,
Worries Europeans,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019.
39 “T ranscript: Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019.
40 T he White House, “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19,
2021.
41 See, for example, Federal Government of Germany, “Speech by Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel During the
Munich Security Conference Special Edition,” February 19, 2012.
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Analysts caution that the United States and its NATO al ies may continue to disagree on how to
address some major chal enges facing the al iance. Chiefly, some European al ies may be
reluctant to endorse a strategic framework of great power competition between the United States
and China and Russia that continues to be a key driver of U.S. foreign policy doctrine. President
Biden has cal ed on NATO al ies to work with the United States to counter China’s and Russia’s
perceived efforts to undermine transatlantic and European unity and the democratic systems of
governance that undergird NATO and the European Union. Although many al ies have
condemned Chinese and Russian policies, many also have been wary of jeopardizing strong
economic and in some cases, political, relations with one or both countries.
U.S. al ies also could continue to question U.S. credibility given policy reversals experienced
during the Trump Administration; ongoing U.S. political fragmentation; and concerns about
longer-term U.S. foreign policy trends, such as a potential embrace of isolationism or a return to
“America First” policies by a future Administration. Questions about the U.S. commitment to
NATO and European security during the Trump Administration led to heightened cal s in Europe
for European al ies to reduce dependency on the United States and pursue a more autonomous
European foreign and security policy. Proponents of increased European “strategic autonomy,”
including French President Macron, have said a more independent and militarily capable Europe
would benefit both Europe and the United States by ensuring more equitable burden-sharing (see
text box below). Others in Europe, including Poland and the Baltic States, have been more
reluctant to endorse policies that might be viewed as undermining strong U.S. leadership of
NATO.
EU Security and Defense Policy
Some European leaders, including French President Macron, have argued that uncertainty about the future U.S.
role in European security should add urgency to long-standing efforts to develop coordinated European defense
capabilities and policies, independent of but complementary to NATO. For two decades, the EU has sought to
develop its Common Security and Defense Policy to bolster its common foreign policy, strengthen the EU’s ability
to respond to security crises, and enhance European military capabilities. Improving European military capabilities
has been difficult, however, especial y given many years of flat or declining European defense budgets. In recent
years, the EU has announced several new defense initiatives, including a European Defense Fund (EDF) to support
joint defense research and development activities and a new EU defense pact (known as Permanent Structured
Cooperation, or PESCO) aimed at spending defense funds more efficiently.
Secretary General Stoltenberg has expressed support for further EU defense integration and cooperation but
emphasizes that these efforts should strengthen the European pil ar within NATO—21 NATO members are also
members of the EU—rather than replace or supplant NATO. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has echoed
Stoltenberg’s cal s for EU defense initiatives to complement rather than duplicate existing NATO initiatives and
capacities. The Trump Administration joined some Members of Congress in expressing concern that the EDF and
PESCO could restrict U.S. defense companies from participating in the development of pan -European military
projects. Supporters of EU defense integration highlight that PESCO’s initial priority projects were identified in
consultation with NATO and that several of these projects focus on enhancing military mobility across Europe, a
key NATO priority.
Tensions with Turkey
Over the past several years, heightened tensions between some al ies and NATO member Turkey
have prompted some policymakers to cal into question Turkey’s qualification for continued
NATO membership and raised broader questions about standards for NATO membership and
mechanisms to ensure adherence to these standards.42 Turkey has faced sharp criticism and

42 T he only explicit mechanism for leaving NAT O in the North Atlantic T reaty is Article 13, which allows parties to
leave one year after giving a notice of denunciation to the United States. Article 2 of the treaty states that its parties
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sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, from some fel ow NATO members (including the United
States) for a number of issues, including its acquisition and planned operation of a Russian S-400
air defense system; its October 2019 military operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria;
and its actions toward Greece and some other countries in an ongoing dispute in the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea.43
Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and has participated in numerous NATO missions,
including ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Western Balkans. NATO, in turn, has
invested substantial y in military facilities in Turkey, including naval bases and radar sites. Since
2013, NATO members have provided Turkey with air defense support through the deployment of
defensive missile systems along its southern border.44
Secretary General Stoltenberg criticized Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air defense system,
underscoring that it “can pose a risk to Al ied aircraft” and “cannot be integrated into NATO’s air
and missile defense system.”45 Stoltenberg also suggested, however, that Turkey could continue to
participate in NATO’s air and missile defense systems if the S-400 were excluded from these
systems. Some al ied leaders have argued that NATO should uniformly exclude Turkey from
NATO’s defense systems if it deploys the S-400.46 In December 2020, the Trump Administration
enacted sanctions curbing U.S. exports to Turkey’s defense procurement agency as a consequence
of its S-400 acquisition.; this move followed a 2019 decision to suspend Turkey’s participation in
the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program due to concerns about S-400s in Turkey compromising the
security of F-35 technology and some congressional leaders’ placement of informal holds on
other U.S.-Turkey arms sales.47
Since 2012, Turkey has invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty to prompt high-level NATO
consultations on a perceived threat from Syria to Turkey’s territorial integrity or security on three
separate occasions. Nevertheless, many al ies strongly condemned Turkey’s 2019 military
operations against Kurdish forces in Syria that had been cooperating with other NATO members
in the fight against the Islamic State terrorist organization. Although NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg acknowledged Turkey’s “legitimate” security concerns in Syria, he urged Turkey to

“will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration
between any or all of them.”
43 For more on these incidents and T urkish policy more broadly, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and
U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton T homas; and CRS Insight IN11185, Turkey Sanctions in Pending
Legislation: Issues for Congress, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton T homas.
44 In spring 2018, the Italian parliament voted to end its deployment of one of two missile defense systems currently
under NAT O command in southern T urkey by the end of 2019; the other system is under Spanish command. NAT O,
“NAT O Patriot Mission in T urkey,” at https://shape.nato.int/ongoingoperations/nato-patriot-mission-in-turkey-; Emre
Peker, “NAT O Chastises T urkey over Syria, But Fears Driving It T oward Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, October
11, 2019.
45 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Joint Press Conference with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of T urkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,” October 5, 2020, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_178528.htm.
46 Nick Wadhams, “NAT O Chief Says T urkey Remains Important Ally Despite S-400 Deal,” Bloomberg, July 17,
2019.
47 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to T urkey for nearly two years,” Defense News,
August 12, 2020; T he Biden Administration has not expressed openness to changing U.S. positions on the se issues,
despite T urkish leaders’ hopes of reaching some arrangement that would allay U.S. security concerns about S-400s on
T urkish soil. T he future of U.S. sanctions on T urkey and the long-term impact of the S-400 issue on T urkish defense
procurement are unclear.

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“act with restraint” and do everything possible to preserve the gains that had been made against
the Islamic State.48
Long-standing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea between Greece and Turkey escalated in
the second half of 2020, within a broader context involving a number of other regional
countries.49 Greece and non-NATO member Cyprus have strenuously objected to Turkish naval
vessels exploring for natural gas in what they consider to be their exclusive economic zones
(EEZs). Turkey disputes some of the Greek and Cypriot EEZ claims.
Although the EU and most NATO member states have condemned Turkey’s incursions into
international y recognized Greek and Cypriot waters, al ied governments have done so with
varying degrees of severity, reflecting differences in their views on how to manage relations with
Turkey. Within NATO, France has joined Greece in advocating a relatively hard-line approach to
Turkey. In August 2020, France deployed naval vessels and fighter jets for exercises with the
Greek military following the arrival of a Turkish seismic research ship in Greek waters, and
French President Emmanuel Macron has advocated EU sanctions on Turkey. Most analysts view
France’s approach as an outgrowth of its broader disputes with Turkey, including in Libya, where
the two countries have supported opposing sides in the civil conflict.
Tensions within NATO on how best to address Turkey’s actions and grievances have chal enged
al iance cohesion. Secretary General Stoltenberg has focused on de-escalating tensions by
encouraging dialogue and negotiation. The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain provisions
explicitly authorizing NATO al ies to take action against another NATO member. However, the
United States and other NATO members could take measures to affect the character of al ied
cooperation with Turkey—for example, by changing their contributions of equipment or
personnel to specific activities in Turkey.
Commitment to Democratic Values
Over the past several years, policymakers in some NATO member states have cal ed on NATO to
more proactively promote democratic norms and values. Proponents have expressed concern
about perceived democratic “backsliding” within the al iance, including possibly weakening
public support for democracy and democratic values, the rise of authoritarian-leaning nationalist
and populist leaders, and anti-establishment sentiment and deepening polarization in some NATO
member states.50 Some observers have cautioned these trends could have a lasting negative
impact on political cohesion within NATO and ultimately could erode NATO’s capacity to carry
out its core task of ensuring the collective security of its members. They add that these trends
could embolden potential adversaries, including China and Russia, that may seek to undermine
al ies’ commitments to these values by promoting alternative systems of governance.
Secretary General Stoltenberg and President Biden have argued that bolstering democratic
resilience within the al iance should be a component of any effort to counter potential threats

48 NAT O, “Joint Press Conference with NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of T urkey,” October 11, 2019.
49 For background, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and
Clayton T homas.
50 Experts warn against overgeneralizing nationalist and populist movements and note that not every such movement is
necessarily threatening to democracy. However, in some cases political leaders associated with these movements have
altered institutions considered central to democratic checks and balances and to genuinely free and fair democratic
political participation, such as independent judiciaries and protections for freedom of speech, assembly, and other
individual and civil rights.
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from China and Russia.51 Other NATO stakeholders have augmented these cal s, including the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly and a group of independent experts appointed by Secretary
General Stoltenberg to inform the NATO 2030 initiative, both of which have cal ed for NATO to
establish a center for democratic resilience within the al iance.52
In the preamble to NATO’s founding North Atlantic Treaty, the parties to the treaty express
determination to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”53 NATO continues
to promote these principles, and adherence to democratic values is a stated requirement for NATO
membership. Many analysts point out, however, that throughout NATO’s history, al ies have at
times been reluctant to act against other member state governments for breaching democratic
principles; NATO governments have included military dictatorships and unelected leaders who
seized power through force, for example.54 Some analysts caution that NATO’s commitment to
consensus decisionmaking could complicate efforts to enhance democratic accountability, as
some member state governments could be reluctant to endorse additional scrutiny of their
domestic political affairs.55
Issues for Congress
Congress was instrumental in creating NATO in 1949 and has played a critical role in shaping
U.S. policy toward the al iance ever since. Although many Members of Congress have criticized
specific developments within NATO—regarding burden-sharing, for example—Congress as a
whole has consistently demonstrated strong support for active U.S. leadership of and support for
NATO and its cornerstone Article 5 mutual defense commitment.
Congressional support for NATO traditional y has buttressed broader U.S. policy toward the
al iance. During the Trump Administration, however, demonstrations of congressional support for
NATO were at times viewed primarily as an effort to reassure al ies about the U.S. commitment
to NATO after President Trump’s criticisms of the al iance. During the Trump Administration,
both chambers of Congress passed legislation expressly reaffirming U.S. support for NATO.56
Congressional hearings on NATO in the 115th and 116th Congresses reflected a mixed assessment
of President Trump’s impact on the al iance.57 Some in Congress argue that President Trump’s

51 NAT O, “Remarks by NAT O Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2021,” February
19, 2021; “Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,” February 19, 2021.
52 Rep. Gerry Connolly, NAT O Parliamentary Assembly Political Committee report, NATO@70: Why the Alliance
Rem ains Indispensable, paragraph 44, October 12, 2019; NATO 2030: United for a New Era – Analysis and
Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NAT O Secretary General, pg. 52, November 25, 2020.
53 NAT O, The North Atlantic Treaty, April 1949, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
54 Ulla Schmidt, NAT O Parliamentary Assembly Committee on th e Civil Dimension of Security, NATO @ 70:
Reaffirming the Alliance’s Values, October 12, 2019.
55 Judy Dempsey, “NAT O’s Bad Apples,” Carnegie Europe, April 3, 2018; Jonathan Katz and T orrey T aussig, “An
Inconvenient Truth: Addressing Democratic Backsliding within NAT O,” Brookings, July 10, 2018.
56 T his includes legislation passed by the House in January 2019 (H.R. 676), the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92)—both of which seek to limit the President’s ability to unilaterally withdraw
from NAT O—and the FY2021 William M. (Mac) T hornberry National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 6395/P.S.
116-283). Some analysts also portrayed House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and then -Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell’s joint invitation to Secretary General Stoltenberg to address a joint session of Congress in April 2019, in
commemoration of NAT O’s 70th anniversary as an additional demonstration of NAT O’s importance to Congress.
57 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance,
hearing, March 13, 2019, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2019/3/nato-at-70-an-indispensable-alliance; U.S.
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criticism of al ied defense spending levels spurred defense spending increases by NATO members
that were not forthcoming under prior Administrations, despite long-standing U.S. concern.
Other Members of Congress countered that President Trump’s admonition of U.S. al ies and his
questioning of NATO’s utility damaged essential relationships and undermined NATO’s
credibility and cohesion. They contended that doubts about the U.S. commitment to the al iance
could embolden adversaries, including Russia, and ultimately may weaken other al ies’
commitment to NATO. Critics also lamented the Administration’s reported lack of coordination
with its al ies on policies that have significant security ramifications for Europe, such as
countering the Islamic State in Syria.
Most Members of Congress continue to express support for robust U.S. leadership of NATO, in
particular to address potential threats posed by Russia. Many have cal ed for enhanced NATO and
U.S. responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and others have advocated stronger European
contributions to collective defense measures in Europe. Increasingly, some Members of Congress
have raised the possibility of taking formal action against an al y, such as Turkey, which pursues
foreign and defense policies they believe could threaten al iance security. Other Members,
including the current president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Representative Gerald
Connolly, have advocated that NATO do more to monitor and promote NATO members’
adherence to democratic values.
In light of these considerations, Members of the 117th Congress could address a number of key
issues central to NATO’s future, including the following:
 assessing the strategic value of NATO to the United States and the United States’
leadership role within NATO;
 engaging in NATO’s ongoing NATO 2030 Initiative to strengthen the al iance
militarily and political y, including by updating NATO’s strategic concept
(NATO’s current strategic concept was adopted in 2010) and considering ways to
reinforce NATO’s commitment to political consultation and democratic values;
 examining NATO’s capacity and wil ingness to address other security threats to
the Euro-Atlantic region, including from the MENA region, posed by chal enges
such as terrorism and migration;
 examining the possible consequences of member states’ failure to meet agreed
defense spending targets;
 assessing U.S. force posture in Europe and the wil ingness of European al ies to
contribute to NATO deterrence efforts and U.S. defense initiatives in Europe,
such as the bal istic missile defense program and the European Deterrence
Initiative;
 examining options to sanction al ies that act in ways that could jeopardize al ied
security;
 revisiting the al ies’ commitment to NATO’s stated “open door” policy on
enlargement, especial y with respect to the membership aspirations of Georgia
and Ukraine; and
 developing a more comprehensive NATO strategy toward China, particularly
given U.S. and other al ies’ concerns about the security ramifications of increased
Chinese investment in Europe.

Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance, hearing, September 5,
2018, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-value-of-the-nato-alliance-090518.
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Author Information

Paul Belkin

Analyst in European Affairs

Acknowledgments
CRS Visual Information Specialists Jamie Hutchinson and Amber Wilhelm created the graphics in this
report.

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