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 INSIGHTi  
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG): 
An Overview 
Updated February 11, 2021 
States and localities  make most decisions about the voting systems used in U.S. elections, from what 
equipment to acquire to how to pay for it. Since 1990, however, the federal government has issued 
voluntary guidance states and localities may use to inform their choices. This Insight examines the current 
iteration of that guidance, the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). 
Origins of the VVSG 
Issues with voting systems contributed to delays in the resolution of the 2000 presidential election. 
Congress responded, in part, by including benchmarks for voting systems in the Help America Vote Act of 
2002 (HAVA;  52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145). 
Title III of HAVA  defined and set some mandatory standards for the voting systems states use in federal 
elections. The act also provided for development of more detailed voluntary federal guidelines—the 
VVSG—and creation of a federal program to test and certify voting systems to the guidelines. 
Responsibility for these tasks was assigned primarily to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), 
with roles for the general public, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and three 
EAC advisory bodies (see Table 1). The EAC largely  inherited these responsibilities from the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC), which issued voluntary federal voting system guidelines in 1990 and 2002, 
and the National Association of State Election Directors, which oversaw a program to test and qualify 
systems to the FEC guidelines. 
As with the FEC guidance—and in contrast to the mandatory standards in Title III—states are not 
required to use voting systems that meet the VVSG. Voting systems must comply with the guidelines to 
receive federal certification, however, and states may choose to make some or al  of the federal 
guidelines, testing, or certification mandatory under their own state laws. 
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Table 1. Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG): Roles and Responsibilities 
Roles in Developing  or Adopting 
Roles in Testing  or Certifying 
 
the VVSG 
Voting Systems to the  VVSG 
U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
Provide for publication of final VVSG 
Provide for testing, certification, 
(EAC) Commissioners 
and notice of proposed VVSG in Federal 
decertification,  and recertification  of 
Register 
voting systems 
Provide for public comment and hearing 
Vote on accreditation and revocation of 
on proposed VVSG 
accreditation of voting system  test 
Vote on adoption of VVSG 
laboratories  (VSTLs) 
EAC Technical Guidelines 
Assist  EAC executive director with 
— 
Development  Committee  (TGDC) 
developing VVSG 
Provide for publication of VVSG 
recommendations  in Federal Register 
EAC Board of Advisors  and 
Review proposed VVSG and submit 
Provide consultation on VSTL 
EAC Standards Board 
comments  and recommendations 
performance 
National Institute of Standards and 
Chair TGDC and provide technical 
Recommend  VSTLs for accreditation 
Technology (NIST) 
support upon request 
Monitor VSTL performance and make 
recommendations  about continuing 
accreditation 
Source: CRS, based on review of the U.S.  Code. 
Notes: Roles are as specified  in statute. For more  on the EAC’s implementation  of the federal voting system testing and 
certification program,  see here. For  more on the composition  and duties of the EAC’s three advisory bodies,  see  here. 
Changes for the VVSG 2.0 
The EAC issued the first version of the VVSG (VVSG 1.0) in 2005 and a modification (VVSG 1.1) in 
2015. Work on another update (VVSG 2.0) official y started in 2015, and the new guidelines were 
adopted by the EAC’s commissioners on February 10, 2021. 
The VVSG 2.0 has a different structure than previous versions of the VVSG. It includes high-level 
principles and guidelines accompanied by more detailed technical requirements for use primarily by 
voting system manufacturers and testing information for use primarily by voting system test laboratories. 
Its content also differs. The VVSG 1.1 was a relatively limited modification of the VVSG 1.0. The VVSG 
2.0, by contrast, represents a more thoroughgoing revision. The final draft lists a number of major 
changes from the VVSG 1.1 to the VVSG 2.0, with emphasis on updates related to usability, accessibility, 
security, and interoperability. 
Selected Issues 
According to the FEC, the federal government first started issuing voting system guidelines in response to 
requests for assistance from the states. The guidelines were intended to help states and localities, which 
might have limited resources and technical expertise, make informed decisions about increasingly 
complex voting technology. 
State and local election officials have reported some obstacles to achieving that objective, however, 
including the following:
  
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  Delays in updating the VVSG. Due partly to the lack of a policymaking quorum of EAC 
commissioners for much of the past decade, the VVSG was only updated once between 
its initial  adoption in 2005 and 2021. 
  Lack of coverage of “nonvoting” election systems. The scope of the VVSG is based on 
the definition of “voting system” in Title III of HAVA,  so election systems that do not 
meet that definition, such as voter registration databases, are not covered by the VVSG or 
the federal testing and certification program. 
The change in the structure of the VVSG 2.0 was intended to address the first of these reported issues; 
authority to adopt and modify the principles and guidelines was to be reserved to the EAC’s 
commissioners while other documents could be updated by agency staff. Following an internal legal 
opinion questioning that approach, the EAC has started pursuing an alternative, developing procedures to 
regularly update the VVSG requirements and respond to loss of a quorum. 
The EAC has also partnered with the Center for Internet Security on a pilot program for security testing of 
election systems that are not covered by the VVSG. Other proposed approaches to covering nonvoting 
election systems—offered in legislation in the 117th and previous Congresses—include establishing new 
guidelines  for such systems and expanding the HAVA  definition of voting systems. 
Whether or how to pursue such proposals is likely to continue to be a subject of debate as elections 
stakeholders transition to the VVSG 2.0 and start thinking about the next update to the guidelines. 
 
Author Information 
 
Karen L. Shanton 
   
Analyst in American National Government 
 
 
 
 
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Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
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