Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional
January 28, 2021
Advisory Commission in the 116th Congress: A
Jacob R. Straus
Comparative Analysis
Specialist on the Congress

Throughout U.S. history, Congress has created advisory commissions to assist in the
development of public policy. Among other contexts, commissions h ave been used following

crisis situations, including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the 2008 financial crisis.
In such situations, advisory commissions may potentially provide Congress with a high -visibility forum to assemble expertise
that might not exist within the legislative environment; allow for the in -depth examination of complex, cross -cutting policy
issues; and lend bipartisan credibility to a set of findings and recommendations. Others may determine that the creation of a n
advisory commission is unnecessary and instead prefer to utilize existing congressional oversight structures, such as standing
or select committees.
This report provides a comparative analysis of eight congressional advisory commissions proposed in the 116th Congress that
would have investigated various aspects of the COVID-19 outbreak, governmental responses, governmental pandemic
preparedness, and the virus’s impact on the U.S. economy and society. Each proposed commission’s structure would have
been similar in many respects, both to each other and to previous independent congressional advisory commissions.
Specifically, the proposed commissions would have (1) existed temporarily; (2) served in an advisory capacity; and (3)
reported a work product detailing the commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Many of the proposed
commissions also would have had unique elements, particularly concerning membership structure, appointment structure, and
reporting deadlines.
Specifically, this report compares and discusses the (1) membership structure, (2) appointment structure, (3) rules of
procedure and operation, (4) duties and reporting requirements, (5) commission powers, (6) staffing, and (7) funding of the
eight proposed commission structures. The eight proposals were
 H.R. 6429 (the National Commission on COVID-19 Act),
 H.R. 6431 (the Made in America Emergency Preparedness Act),
 H.R. 6440 (the Pandemic Rapid Response Act),
 H.R. 6455 (the COVID-19 Commission Act),
 H.R. 6548 (the National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States Act),
 H.R. 8358 (the National Coronavirus Commission Act),
 S. 4132 (the National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States Act), and
 S. 4666 (the National Coronavirus Commission Act).
None of these proposals advanced beyond introduction and committee referral in the House or the Senate in the 116th
Congress.

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Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 31

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Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 116th Congress

Introduction
Throughout U.S. history, Congress has created advisory commissions to assist in the development
of public policy. Among other contexts, commissions have been used following crisis situations,
including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks1 and the 2008 financial crisis.2 In such
situations, advisory commissions may potential y provide Congress with a high-visibility forum
to assemble expertise that might not exist within the legislative environment; al ow for the in-
depth examination of complex, cross-cutting policy issues; and lend bipartisan credibility to a set
of findings and recommendations.
As Congress considers its range of responses to the coronavirus pandemic, the creation of one or
more congressional advisory commissions is an option that could provide a platform for
evaluating various pandemic-related policy issues over time. Past congressional advisory
commissions have retrospectively evaluated policy responses, brought together diverse groups of
experts, and supplemented existing congressional oversight mechanisms. Policymakers may
determine that creating an advisory commission is unnecessary and instead prefer to utilize
existing congressional oversight structures, such as standing or select committees,3 or already
established oversight entities.4
This report provides a comparative analysis of eight proposed congressional advisory
commissions introduced in the 116th Congress (2019-2020) that would have investigated various
aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic.5 The eight proposed commissions were found in
 H.R. 6429 (the National Commission on COVID-19 Act, sponsored by
Representative Stephanie Murphy),6
 H.R. 6431 (the Made in America Emergency Preparedness Act, sponsored by
Representative Brian Fitzpatrick),7

1 T he National Commission on T errorist Attacks Upon the United States (P.L. 107-306, §601, 116 Stat. 2408,
November 27, 2002).
2 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (P.L. 111-21, §5, 123 Stat. 1624, May 20, 2009).
3 For example, H.Res. 935 (116th Congress), agreed to April 23, 2020, established a Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis as a select investigative subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform.
4 T he CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) created several oversight entities for the implementation of the law. T hese include
the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee and the Con gressional Oversight Commission. For more
information on these, and other COVID-19 oversight entities, see CRS Insight IN11343, The Pandem ic Response
Accountability Com m ittee: Organization and Duties, by Ben Wilhelm; CRS Insight IN11363, Congressional Oversight
Provisions in the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancem ent Act, by Ben Wilhelm; CRS Report
R46315, Congressional Oversight Provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Econom ic Security (CARES) Act
(P.L. 116-136), by Ben Wilhelm and William T . Egar; and CRS Insight IN11304, COVID-19 Congressional Oversight
Com m ission (COC), by Jacob R. Straus and William T . Egar.
5 For general information on congressional advisory commissions, please see CRS Report R40076, Congressional
Com m issions: Overview and Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus and William T . Egar.
6 H.R. 6429 (116th Congress), introduced April 3, 2020. Rep. Stephanie Murphy, “Murphy, Katko Introduce Bipartisan
Bill to Establish 9/11 Style Commission on U.S. Pandemic Preparedness and Response,” press release, April 3, 2020,
https://murphy.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1297. For bill text, see “ National Commission on
COVID-19 Act,” at https://murphy.house.gov/uploadedfiles/national_commission_on_covid_19_act.pdf.
7 H.R. 6431 (116th Congress), introduced April 3, 2020. Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, “Fitzpatrick Intro duces Bipartisan Bill
to Prepare for Future National Emergencies,” press release, April 7, 2020, at https://fitzpatrick.house.gov/media-center/
in-the-news/fitzpatrick-introduces-bipartisan-bill-prepare-future-national-emergencies.
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 H.R. 6440 (the Pandemic Rapid Response Act, sponsored by Representative
Rodney Davis),8
 H.R. 6455 (the COVID-19 Commission Act, sponsored by Representative Bennie
Thompson),9
 H.R. 6548 (the National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United
States Act, sponsored by Representative Adam Schiff),10
 H.R. 8358 (the National Coronavirus Commission Act, sponsored by
Representative Tom Malinowski),11
 S. 4132 (the National Commission on the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United
States Act, sponsored by Senator Dianne Feinstein),12 and
 S. 4666 (the National Coronavirus Commission Act, sponsored by Senator
Robert Menendez).13
Additional y, Members introduced legislation that would have created other COVID-related
commissions, but none would have had a mandate to broadly evaluate the coronavirus response in
the style of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11
Commission). These other proposed commissions would have identified regulations that might be
hindering the government’s response to COVID-19,14 ensured data equity in the COVID-19

8 H.R. 6440 (116th Congress), introduced April 3, 2020. Rep. Rodney Davis, “Davis Introduces Bipartisan Pandemic
Rapid Response Act,” press release, April 3, 2020, at https://rodneydavis.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=403644.
9 H.R. 6455 (116th Congress), introduced April 3, 2020. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Homeland Security,
“Chairman T hompson and Committee Democrats to Introduce Coronavirus Commission Legislation,” press release,
April 1, 2020, at https://homeland.house.gov/news/legislation/chairman-thompson-and-committee-democrats-to-
introduce-coronavirus-commission-legislation.
10 H.R. 6548 (116th Congress), introduced April 17, 2020. Rep. Adam Schiff, “Schiff Calls for 9/11-Style Commission
to Examine Coronavirus Response and Begins Circulating Draft Bill,” press release, April 3, 2020, at
https://schiff.house.gov/news/press-releases/schiff-calls-for-9/11-style-commission-to-examine-coronavirus-response-
and-begins-circulating-draft-bill. Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Kamala Harris have both announced that they will be
cosponsoring companion legislation in the Senate. For more information, see Sen. Dianne Feinstein, “Senate Dems to
Introduce Bill Establishing 9/11-Style Coronavirus Commission,” press release, April 10, 2020, at
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=8FFEB75D-F6BB-4138-BD68-2B5629335340;
and Sen. Kamala Harris, “Harris, Senate Dems to Introduce Bill Establishing 9/11-Style Coronavirus Commission,”
press release, April 10, 2020, at https://www.harris.senate.gov/news/press-releases/harris-senate-dems-to-introduce-
bill-establishing-9/11-style-coronavirus-commission_-.
11 H.R. 8358 (116th Congress), introduced September 23, 2020. Rep. T om Malinowski, “Representative Malinowski
Introduced Bipartisan Bill to Create Independent, 9/11 -Style Commission to Assess, Improve Upon COVID-19
Response,” press release, September 23, 2020, at https://malinowski.house.gov/media/press-releases/representative-
malinowski-introduces-bipartisan-bill-create-independent -911.
12 S. 4132 (116th Congress), introduced July 1, 2020. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, “Feinstein, Klobuchar, Casey Introduce
Bill to Establish 9/11-Style Coronavirus Commission,” press release, July 1, 2020, at https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=B7074E21-0560-4270-BA6D-21AE13395083.
13 S. 4666 (116th Congress), introduced September 23, 2020. Sen. Bob Menendez, “Menendez, Collins Bill Would
Create Independent, 9/11-Style Commission to Assess, Improve upon COVID-19 Response,” press release, September
23, 2020, at https://www.menendez.senate.gov/newsroom/press/menendez-collins-bill-would-create-independent -9/11-
style-commission-to-assess-improve-upon-covid-19-response.
14 H.R. 7929 (116th Congress), introduced August 4, 2020; H.R. 8038 (116th Congress), introduced August 14, 2020;
and S. 4708 (116th Congress), introduced September 24, 2020.
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response,15 and opened the economy.16 Because they would not have studied the COVID-19
response broadly, these commissions are not included in this report.
The overal structures of the eight proposed commissions were similar in many respects, both to
each other and to previous independent advisory entities established by Congress.17 Specifical y,
the proposed commissions would have (1) existed temporarily; (2) served in an advisory capacity;
and (3) reported a work product detailing the commission’s findings, conclusions, and
recommendations. Many of the proposed commissions also had distinctive elements, particularly
concerning membership structure, appointment structure, and time line for reporting their work
products to Congress.
This report compares the (1) membership structure, (2) appointment structure, (3) rules of
procedure and operation, (4) duties and reporting requirements, (5) powers of the commission, (6)
staffing issues, and (7) funding for each of the COVID-19 commissions proposed in the 116th
Congress. Table 1, at the end of this report, provides a side-by-side comparison of major
provisions of the eight proposals.
Membership Structure
Several matters related to a commission’s membership structure might be considered. They
include commission size, member qualifications, commission member compensation, and
requirements for partisan balance.
Size of Commission
In general, there is significant variation in the size of congressional advisory commissions.
Among 161 identified congressional commissions created between the 101st Congress and the
116th Congress, the median size was 12 members, with the smal est commission having 5
members and the largest 33 members.18
The membership structure of each of the eight proposed commissions would have been similar to
previous independent advisory entities created by Congress. H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440,
H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have created a 10-member entity.19 H.R. 6455
would have created a 25-member entity.20

15 H.R. 6585 (116th Congress), introduced April 21, 2020.
16 S. 3699 (116th Congress), introduced May 12, 2020.
17 T wo potential analogous entities are the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan ( P.L. 110-181,
§841, 122 Stat. 230, January 28, 2008) and the National Commission on T errorist Attacks Upon the United States ( P.L.
107-306, §601, 116 Stat. 2408, November 27, 2002).
18 A database search of a variety of relevant terms was conducted using Congress.gov for the 101 st through 116th
Congresses (1989-2020) to capture all congressional commissions enacted into law. T he universe of data included all
temporary multimember independent entities that (1) existed temporarily, (2) were statutorily created, (3) served in an
advisory capacity, (4) were appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5) reported to Congress. For
more information, see CRS Report R45328, Designing Congressional Com m issions: Background and Considerations
for Congress, by William T . Egar.
19 H.R. 6429, §4(a); H.R. 6431, §203(a); H.R. 6440, §3(a); H.R. 6548, §2(c); H.R. 8358, §4(a); S. 4132, §2(c); S. 4666,
§4(a).
20 H.R. 6455, §2(c).
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Qualifications
Past legislation creating congressional commissions has often required or suggested that
commission members possess certain substantive qualifications.21 Such provisions arguably make
it more likely that the commission is populated with genuine policy experts, which may improve
the commission’s final work product.22
H.R. 6455 would have provided that commissioners “shal be a United States person with
significant expertise” in a variety of fields related to public health and public administration.23
H.R. 6440, H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have
included a “Sense of Congress” that commission members should be “prominent U.S. citizens”
who are national y recognized experts in a variety of fields relevant to the pandemic and response
efforts.24 In addition, H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548, and S. 4132 would have
prohibited the appointment of federal, state, and local government employees and officers.25 H.R.
6455 would have prohibited federal employees from being commission members.26 H.R. 8358
and S. 4666 would have prohibited federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government
employees from being commission members.27
Compensation of Commission Members
Some congressional commissions have compensated their members. For example, the 9/11
Commission and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission provided that commission members
could be compensated at a daily rate of basic pay.28 Nearly al have reimbursed members for
travel expenses. Those that have provided for commissioner compensation most frequently
provided compensation at the daily equivalent of level IV of the Executive Schedule.29

21 For example, statutory language may require the appointing official to select members who are specifically qualified
by virtue of their education, knowledge, t raining, experience, expertise, distinguished service, or recognized eminence
in a particular field or fields. For example, legislation establishing the United States Commission on North American
Energy Freedom (P.L. 109-58, §1423, 119 Stat. 1064, August 8, 2005) prescribes that nominees for the commission
must be “knowledgeable on energy issues, including oil and gas exploration and production, crude oil refining, oil and
gas pipelines, electricity production and transmission, coal, unconventional hydrocarbon resources, fuel cells, motor
vehicle power systems, nuclear energy, renewable energy, biofuels, energy efficiency, and energy conservation.”
22 In some instances, statutes establishing commissions have either provided for, or prohibited, the service of Members
of Congress on commissions. Inclusion of legislators on such panels may help to ensure that Congress will be able to
exercise a certain degree of control over commission operations or outcomes. At the same time, commission service by
Members is arguably antithetical to two of the rationales for creating a commission in the first place: to reduce the
workload of Congress by delegating certain functions to temporary bodies and to produce independent advice.
23 H.R. 6455, §2(c)(2)(A) and §2(c)(2)(D).
24 H.R. 6429, §4(b)(3); H.R. 6431, §203(b); H.R. 6440, §3(b)(3); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(2)(C), H.R. 8358, §4(b)(4)(B); S.
4132, §2(c)(2)(C); S. 4666, §4(b)(4)(B).
25 H.R. 6429, §4(b)(2); H.R. 6431, §203(b); H.R. 6440, §3(b)(2); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(2)(B); S. 4132, §2(c)(2)(B).
26 H.R. 6455, §2(c)(2)(D).
27 H.R. 8358, §4(b)(2); S. 4666, §4(b)(2).
28 P.L. 107-306, §608(a), 116 Stat. 2412, November 27, 2002; P.L. 111-21, §5(f), 123 Stat. 1629, May 20, 2009.
29 An analysis of congressional advisory bodies created since the 101 st Congress indicates that approximately two-
thirds did not compensate their members, except to reimburse members for expenses directly related to their service,
such as travel costs. Among those that did compensate their members, most provided that the level of compensation
would be the daily equivalent of level IV of the Executiv e Schedule.
For 2020, level IV of the Executive Schedule was $170,800. For 2021, level IV of the Executive Schedule is $172,500.
For more information, see U.S. Office of Personal Management, “Salary T able No. 2020 -EX,” at
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2020/EX.pdf; and “ Salary T able
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Each of the eight proposals would have provided that commission members be compensated at a
rate “not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay” for level IV of the
Executive Schedule, “for each day during which that member is engaged in the actual
performance of duties of the Commission.”30 Members of six proposed commissions would have
received travel expenses, including a per diem.31
Partisan Limitations
Each proposal provided a limit on the number of members appointed from the same political
party. H.R. 6455 would have provided that not more than 13 of its 25 members may be from the
same party.32 H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666
would have provided that not more than 5 (of 10) members are from the same party.33
Most previous advisory entities created by Congress did not impose formal partisan membership
restrictions.34 In general, it may be difficult to assess the political affiliation of potential members,
especial y if they do not have a registered affiliation with a political party. Instead of relying on
partisan voter registration, most past advisory commissions attempted to achieve partisan balance
through the appointment structure; for instance, by providing equal (or near-equal) numbers of
appointments to congressional leaders of each party.
Appointment Structure
Past congressional commissions have used a wide variety of appointment structures. Appointment
structure considerations have included partisan balance, how to fil vacancies, and the time line
for making appointments.
Some commission statutes may directly designate members of the commission, such as a specific
Cabinet official or a congressional leader. In most cases, selected congressional leaders, often
with balance between the parties, appoint commission members. A third common statutory
scheme is to have selected leaders, such as committee chairs and ranking members, recommend
candidates to congressional leaders for appointment to a commission or make appointments
themselves. The appointers may act either in paral el or jointly, and when recommendations are
required they have been made to congressional leaders, such as the Speaker of the House and
President pro tempore of the Senate, or to the President.

No. 2021-EX,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/21T ables/exec/
html/EX.aspx.
30 H.R. 6429, §4(g); H.R. 6431, §208(a); H.R. 6440, §3(d); H.R. 6455, §2(j); H.R. 6548, §2(h)(1), H.R. 8358, §10(a);
S. 4132, §2(h)(1); S. 4666, §10(a).
31 H.R. 6429, §4(h); H.R. 6431, §208(b); H.R. 6455, §2(j); H.R. 6548, §2(h)(2), H.R. 8358, §10(b); S. 4132, §2(h)(2);
S. 4666, §10(b).
32 H.R. 6455, §2(c)(2)(B).
33 H.R. 6429, §4(b)(1); H.R. 6431, §203(b)(1); H.R. 6440, §3(b)(1); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(2)(A), H.R. 8358, §4(b)(1); S.
4132, §2(c)(2)(A); S. 4666, §4(b)(1).
34 T he use of formal partisan membership structures is somewhat more common in executive branch regulatory
commissions. For example, the statute establishing the Federal Election Commission (FEC) —an executive branch
agency, not an advisory commission—requires that no more than three commissioners may be affiliated with the same
political party (52 U.S.C. §30106(a)(1)). For more information on the Federal Election Commission and the partisan
balance provision, see CRS Report R45160, Federal Election Com m ission: Mem bership and Policym aking Quorum, In
Brief, by R. Sam Garrett .
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Each of the eight commission proposals would have delegated most or al appointment authority
to congressional leaders (including chamber, party, and committee leaders; see Table 1 for
details). Additional y, seven proposals—H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358,
S. 4132, and S. 4666—would have provided for one presidential appointment.35 H.R. 6429, H.R.
6431, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have had the President appoint the
commission’s chair.36 H.R. 6455’s membership would have been appointed by the chairs and
ranking members of designated House and Senate committees and the Joint Economic
Committee.37 H.R. 6455 would not have provided for any executive branch appointments.38
In general, a commission’s appointment scheme can affect both the commission’s ability to fulfil
its statutory duties and its final work product. For instance, if the commission’s statute only
provides for the appointment of Members of Congress, it arguably might not have the technical
expertise or diversity of knowledge to complete its duties within the time given by statute.
Similarly, if the appointment scheme includes qualifying provisos so specific that only a smal set
of private citizens could serve on the panel, the commission’s final work product may arguably
only represent a narrow range of viewpoints. None of the proposed COVID-19 commissions
specified whether Members of Congress might serve on the commission, although each would
have prohibited the appointment of federal officers or employees.39
Partisan Balance in Appointment Authority
Most previous congressional advisory commissions have been structured to be bipartisan, with
the congressional leaders of the two major parties appointing an even (or near-even) number of
members. By attempting to achieve a nonpartisan or bipartisan character, congressional
commissions may make their findings and recommendations more political y acceptable to
diverse viewpoints. The bipartisan or nonpartisan arrangement can give recommendations strong
credibility, both in Congress and among the public, even when dealing with divisive public policy
issues. Similarly, commission recommendations that are perceived as partisan may have difficulty
gaining support in Congress.
In some cases, however, bipartisanship also can arguably impede a commission’s ability to
complete its mandate. In situations where a commission is tasked with studying divisive or
partisan issues, the appointment of an equal number of majority and minority commissioners may
serve to promote partisanship within the commission rather than suppress it, raising the
possibility of deadlock where neither side can muster a majority to act.
Each of the eight proposals would have employed an appointment structure where leaders in both
the congressional majority and minority parties would have made appointments. H.R. 6429, H.R.

35 H.R. 6429, §4(a); H.R. 6431, §203(a); H.R. 6440, §3(a); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(1); H.R. 8358, §4(a); S. 4132, §2(c)(1); S.
4666, §4(a).
36 H.R. 6429, §4(a); H.R. 6431, §208(a); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(1); H.R. 8358, §4(a) S. 4132, §2(c)(1); S. 4666, §4(a).
37 H.R. 6455, §2(c)(1). T he committees that would have had appointments to the proposed commissions would have
been the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, the House Committee on Homeland Security, the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the House Committee on T ransportation and Infrastructure, the House Committee on Education and
Labor, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and T ransportation, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Joint Economic Committee.
38 H.R. 6455, §2(c)(1).
39 H.R. 6429, §4(b); H.R. 6431, §203(b); H.R. 6440, §3(b); H.R. 6455, §2(c)(2)(A); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(2); H.R. 8358,
§4(b)(2)(B); S. 4132, §2(c)(2); S. 4666, §4(b)(2)(B).
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6431, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have provided for five majority and five
minority appointments, including one for the President.40 H.R. 6440 would have included two
appointments each by the Senate majority leader, the Senate minority leader, and the Speaker of
the House, with one appointment by the House minority leader and one by the President; the chair
would have been appointed by the Speaker and the vice chair would have been appointed by the
Senate majority leader.41 H.R. 6455 would have had 12 majority and 12 minority appointments
made by the 12 committee chairs and ranking members of specified committees, and one member
would have been jointly appointed by the chair and vice chair of the Joint Economic
Committee.42
Vacancies
Al eight proposals would have provided that vacancies on the commission would not affect its
powers and would have been fil ed in the same manner as the original appointment.
Deadline for Appointments
Four of the bil s proposed specific deadlines for the appointment of commissioners. H.R. 6429,
H.R. 6548, and S. 4132 would have required that appointments were made between specific dates
in January or February 2021. Further, H.R. 6429 would have provided that commission members
could have been appointed in September 2020, if there was no longer a COVID-19 public health
emergency in effect—as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services—as of
August 31, 2020. H.R. 6440 would have required al appointments to be made by December 15,
2020. H.R. 6455 would have required appointments to be made within 45 days of enactment.
H.R. 8358 and S. 4666 would have required appointments to have been made within 30 days
“after the date of the expiration of the public health emergency declared by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
§247d) on January 31, 2020, with respect to COVID-19, and not earlier than such date of
expiration.” H.R. 6429, H.R. 6440, and H.R. 6548 would have started the commission’s work in
early 2021. H.R. 6429, however, would have provided that the proposed commission’s work
would have begun no later than October 31, 2020, if members had been appointed in September
2020. H.R. 6431 did not specify an appointment deadline.
Typical y, deadlines for appointment can range from several weeks to several months after
enactment. For example, the deadline for appointments to the Antitrust Modernization
Commission was 60 days after the enactment of its establishing act. The deadline for appointment
to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan was 120 days from the date
of enactment. The deadline for appointment to the 9/11 Commission was December 15, 2002, 18
days after enactment of the act.
Rules of Procedure and Operations
While most congressional advisory commission statutes do not provide detailed procedures for
how the commission should conduct its business, the statutory language may provide a general
structure, including a mechanism for selecting a chair and procedures for creating rules. None of
the eight COVID-19 commission proposals contained language that would have directed the

40 H.R. 6429, §4(a); H.R. 6431, §203(a); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(1); H.R. 8358, §4(a); S. 4132, §2(c); S. 4666, §4(a).
41 H.R. 6440, §3(a).
42 H.R. 6455, §2(c)(1).
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process for potential y adopting rules of procedure. For a comparison of each proposed
commission’s specified rules of procedures and operations, see Table 1.
Chair Selection
Each bil would have provided for the selection of a chair and/or vice chair of the commission.
H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have had the chair
appointed by the President and the vice chair appointed by congressional leaders of the political
party opposite the President.43 H.R. 6440 would have had the chair appointed by the Speaker of
the House (in consultation with the Senate majority leader and the House minority leader) and the
vice chair appointed by the Senate majority leader (in consultation with the Speaker of the House
and the Senate minority leader).44 H.R. 6455 would have had the chair and vice chair chosen from
among commission members by a majority vote of the commission, and would have required the
chair and vice chair to have “significant experience” in areas to be studied by the commission.45
Initial Meeting Deadline
As with the timing of commission appointments, some authorizing statutes are prescriptive in
when the commission’s first meeting should take place. Three of the bil s would have provided
specific time lines for the commission’s first meeting. H.R. 6429 would have required the first
meeting to be no later than March 15, 2021, unless members had been appointed in September
2020 (if no public health emergency existed).46 H.R. 6455, H.R. 8358, and S. 4666 would have
required the first meeting within 45 days after the appointment of al commission members.47
H.R. 6548, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, and S. 4132 would have directed the commission to hold its
initial meeting “as soon as practicable,”48 but H.R. 6548 would have also required that the first
meeting not occur later than March 5, 2021.49 H.R. 6431 and H.R. 6440 did not provide for an
initial meeting deadline. Instead, they would have directed the commission to meet “as soon as
practicable.”
Quorum
Most commission statutes define a quorum for commission business. Usual y, this is defined as a
majority of commission members, but occasional y the statute requires a supermajority. Al eight
bil s would have established a quorum requirement. H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548,
H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have defined a quorum as 6 (of 10) members.50 H.R. 6455
would have required that a quorum was 18 of 25 members (72%).51

43 H.R. 6429, §4(a)(1)-(2); H.R. 6431, §203(a)(1)-(2); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(1)(A)-(B); H.R. 8358, §4(a); S. 4132, §2(c); S.
4666, §4(a).
44 H.R. 6440, §3(a)(1)-(2).
45 H.R. 6455, §2(d).
46 H.R. 6429, §4(e).
47 H.R. 6455, §2(e); H.R. 6431, §203(b)(4); H.R. 6440, §3(b)(5); H.R. 8358, §4(c)(1); S. 4666, §4(c)(1).
48 H.R. 6548, §2(c)(2)(E); S. 4132, §2(c)(2)(E).
49 H.R. 6548, §2(c)(2)(E).
50 H.R. 6429, §4(f); H.R. 6431, §203(c); H.R. 6440, §3(c); H.R. 6548, §2(c)(3); H.R. 8358, §4(c)(3); S. 4132, §2(j); S.
4666, §4(c)(3).
51 H.R. 6455, §2(f).
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Public Access
Al eight commission bil s would have required commission meetings to be open to the public.52
Each bil would also have required that reports were made publicly available.53
Formulating Other Rules of Procedure and Operations
Absent statutory guidance (either in general law or in the commission’s authorizing legislation),
advisory commissions have varied widely in how they adopt their rules of procedure. In general,
three models exist: formal written rules,54 informal rules,55 and the reliance on norms.56 Any
individual advisory entity might make use of al three of these models for different types of
decisionmaking.
The choice to adopt written rules or rely on informal norms to guide commission procedure may
be based on a variety of factors, such as the entity’s size, the frequency of meetings, member
preferences regarding formality, the level of collegiality among members, the commission’s
duration, and the amount of procedural guidance provided by the entity’s authorizing statute.
Regardless of how procedural issues are handled, protocol for decisionmaking regarding several
operational issues may be important for the commission to consider at the outset of its existence.
These include proxy rules; staff hiring, compensation, and work assignments; hearings, meetings,
and field visits; nonstaff expenditures and contracting; reports to Congress; budgeting; and
procedures for future rules modification. None of the eight COVID-19 commission proposals
would have specified that the proposed commissions would be required to adopt written rules.

52 H.R. 6429, §6(b)(1); H.R. 6431, §206(b)(1); H.R. 6440, §5(d)(1); H.R. 6455, §2(h); H.R. 6548, §2(f)(2)(A) and
§2(f)(3); H.R. 8358, §7(b)(1); S. 4132, §2(f)(2)(A); S. 4666, §7(b)(1).
53 H.R. 6429, §6(b)(2); H.R. 6431, §206(b)(2); H.R. 6440, §5(d)(2); H.R. 6455, §2(h); H.R. 6548, §2(f)(2)(B); H.R.
8358, §7(b)(2); S. 4132, §2(f)(2)(B); S. 4666, §7(b)(2).
54 Some advisory entities choose to formalize their procedures for meetings and hearings. For example, the United
States-China Economic and Security Review Commission (P.L. 106-398, §1238, 114 Stat. 1654A-334, October 30,
2000) established written rules of procedure for the conduct of both meetings of the commission and hearings held by
the commission. T he rules include procedures for the selection of chairs, proxy use, budget ing, expenditures of money,
hiring and firing of staff, commissioner ethics, and periodic revision of the rules. For more information, see United
States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Com m ission Rules, adopted June 6, 2003.
55 Some advisory entities adopt a set of processes for establishing rules piecemeal as the need arises. For example, the
National Surface T ransportation Policy and Revenue Commission ( P.L. 109-59, §1909(b), 119 Stat. 1471, August 10,
2005) did not establish formal written rules of procedure. However, the members of the commission did take
occasional votes to clarify a particular meeting’s procedures. For example, at the first meeting of the c ommission,
members voted by simple majority as to whether future votes of commission members could be conducted by proxy.
Information on the National Surface T ransportation Policy and Revenue Commission rules comes from an interview
conducted by Matthew E. Glassman, former CRS analyst, with Susan Binder, former executive director, National
Surface T ransportation Policy and Revenue Commission on July 10, 2008.
56 Many advisory entities choose not to create formal rules for commission meetings or hearings. Instead, they rely on a
collegial relationship between members and staff, and conduct the meetings in a procedurally flexible manner. In some
cases, deference to the wishes of the chair is followed for procedural matters. For instance, the Congressional -
Executive Commission on China reportedly does not operate within a system of formal rules of procedure. Commission
members make collective agreements about operational issues such as the recording of minutes or voting procedure,
but these agreements are created and enforced by collective norms and collegial interactions, not formal action or votes.
Information on the Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s procedures comes from an interview conducted
by Matthew E. Glassman, former CRS analyst, with Douglas Grob, staff director, July 10, 2008.
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FACA Applicability
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) mandates certain structural and operational
requirements, including formal reporting and oversight procedures, for certain federal advisory
bodies that advise the executive branch.57 Six proposed commissions (H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431,
H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666) would have specifical y exempted the proposed
commission from FACA.58 Of the remaining two, FACA would also likely not have applied to the
commission proposed in H.R. 6455 because its membership would have been appointed entirely
by Members of Congress, although the language would have only required that its final report
was public, not whether it would have been specifical y sent to Congress and/or the President.59
For the commission proposed by H.R. 6440, it is not clear that FACA would have applied.
Although H.R. 6440 would have included a presidential appointment and its report would have
been sent to both Congress and the President,60 its establishment clause would have specified that
the commission “is established in the legislative branch,”61 and that Congress would have
appointed a super-majority of its members.62
Duties and Reporting Requirements
Most congressional commissions are general y considered policy commissions—temporary
bodies that study particular policy problems and report their findings to Congress or review a
specific event.63
General Duties
Al eight of the proposed commissions would have been tasked with duties that are analogous to
past policy commissions. While the specific mandates would have differed somewhat, al eight
proposed commissions would have been tasked with investigating aspects of the COVID-19
pandemic and submitting one or more reports that included the commission’s findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for legislative action.64 Further, H.R. 6440 would have
specifical y required the commission to avoid unnecessary duplication of work that might be done
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), congressional committees, and executive
branch agency and independent commission investigations.65

57 For more information about the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), see CRS Report R44232, Creating a
Federal Advisory Com m ittee in the Executive Branch , by Meghan M. Stuessy.
58 H.R. 6429, §6(a); H.R. 6431, §206(a); H.R. 6548, §2(f)(1); H.R. 8358, §7; S. 4132, §2(f)(1); S. 4666, §7.
59 H.R. 6455, §2(b)(4).
60 H.R. 6440, §3(a) and H.R. 6440, §7.
61 H.R. 6440, §2.
62 H.R. 6440, §3(a).
63 For more information on policy commissions, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions: Overview and
Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus and William T . Egar. Other commissions are commemorative
commissions—entities established to commemorate a person or event, often to mark an anniversary. For more
information on commemorative commission, see CRS Report R41425, Com m emorative Com missions: Overview,
Structure, and Funding, by Jacob R. Straus.
64 H.R. 6429, §3; H.R. 6440, §4; H.R. 6455, §2(b); H.R. 6548, §2(d).
65 H.R. 6440, §4(b).
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Reports
Each proposed commission would have been tasked with issuing a final report detailing its
findings, conclusions, and recommendations.66 H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548,
H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have specified that the commission “may submit” interim
reports to Congress and the President, but would not have provided time lines on when interim
reports might be submitted. In each case, a majority of commission members would have had to
agree to the interim report.67 H.R. 6431 would have also required the commission to submit a
report on actions taken by the states68 and a report on essential products, materials, ingredients,
and equipment required to fight pandemics.69
H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548. H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 also would have
specified that the commission’s final report would have needed to be agreed to by a majority of
commission members.70 H.R. 6455 did not specify a vote threshold for approval of its report.71
None of the bil s would have specifical y required the inclusion of minority viewpoints in the
final report. Presumably, this would have left each commission with discretion on whether to
include or exclude minority viewpoints. Past advisory entities have been proposed or established
with a variety of statutory reporting conditions, including the specification of majority72 or super-
majority rules for report adoption73 and provisions requiring the inclusion of minority
viewpoints.74 In practice, advisory bodies that are not given statutory direction on these matters
have tended to work under simple-majority rules for report adoption.
Report Deadlines
H.R. 6429 would have required a final report one year after the commission’s initial meeting.75
H.R. 6431 and H.R. 6440 would have required a final report not later than 18 months after
enactment.76 H.R. 6455 would have required a final report to be published not later than 18
months after the commission’s first meeting.77 S. 4132 would have required a final report by
August 21, 2022.78

66 H.R. 6429, §9; H.R. 6440, §7; H.R. 6455, §2(b)(4); H.R. 6548, §2(j).
67 H.R. 6429, §9(a); H.R. 6431, §210(a); H.R. 6440, §7(a)(1); H.R. 6548, §2(j)(1); H.R. 8358, §12(a); S. 4132, §2(j)(1);
S. 4666, §12(a).
68 H.R. 6431, §210(d).
69 H.R. 6431, §210(c).
70 H.R. 6429, §9(b); H.R. 6431, §210(b); H.R. 6440, §7(a)(2); H.R. 6548, §2(j)(2); H.R. 8358, §12(b); S. 4132,
§2(j)(2); S. 4666, §12(b).
71 H.R. 6455, §2(b)(4).
72 For example, see National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education ( P.L. 105-18, §40002, 111 Stat. 207, June
12, 1997) and Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and T errorism ( P.L. 110-
53, §1851, 121 Stat. 501, August 3, 2007).
73 For example, see the proposed Bipartisan T ask Force for Responsible Fiscal Action, S. 2063 (110th Congress), which
would require a three-fourths approval of the commission for the adoption of the final report.
74 For example, see Human Spaceflight Independent Investigation Commission ( P.L. 109-155, §821, 119 Stat. 2941,
December 30, 2005).
75 H.R. 6429, §9(b).
76 H.R. 6431, §210(b); H.R. 6440, §7(a)(2).
77 H.R. 6455, §2(b)(4).
78 S. 4132, §2(j)(1).
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H.R. 6548 would have required a final report by October 15, 2021,79 and H.R. 8358 and S. 4666
would have required a final report within 18 months of the appointment of al commission
members.80 For H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, and S. 4666, the commission could have extended the
reporting deadline, if necessary. For H.R. 6548, the extension could have been for 90 days, upon a
vote of no fewer than 8 (out of 10) commissioners. For H.R. 8358 and S. 4666, the extension
could have been for 60 days, upon a vote of no fewer than 6 (out of 10) commissioners. Al three
commissions could have voted to extend the final report deadline up to three times, and would
have been required to notify Congress, the President, and the public of any such extension.81
While statutorily requiring a report on a specific date would have potential y given the
commission a defined period of time to complete its work, setting a particular date for report
completion could have created unintended time constraints. Any delay in the passage of the
legislation, or in the appointment process, could have reduced the amount of time the commission
had to complete its work, even with the opportunity for the commission to have potential y
extended its deadline.82
The length of time a congressional commission has to complete its work is arguably one of the
most consequential decisions when designing an advisory entity. If the entity has a short window
of time, the quality of its work product may suffer or it may not be able to fulfil its statutory
mandate on time. A short deadline may also affect the process of standing up a new commission.
The selection of commissioners, recruitment of staff, arrangement of office space, and other
logistical matters may require expedited action if short deadlines need to be met. On the other
hand, if the commission is given a long period of time to complete its work, it may undermine
one of a commission’s primary legislative advantages, the timely production of expert advice on a
current matter.
Report Submission
Most congressional advisory commissions are required to submit their reports to Congress, and
sometimes to the President or an executive department or agency head. For example, the National
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing’s final report was submitted to both
Congress and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.83
Of the eight proposed commissions, seven (H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548, H.R.
8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666) would have been directed to submit their reports to both Congress
and the President.84 H.R. 6455, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, S. 4666 would have required that the report
was made public.85

79 H.R. 6548 §2(j)(3).
80 H.R. 8358, §12(b); S. 4666, §12(b).
81 H.R. 6548 §2(j)(3); H.R. 8358, §12(b); S. 4666, §12(b).
82 H.R. 6548 §2(j)(3)(B).
83 P.L. 101-235, §504(d), 103 Stat. 2051, December 15, 1989.
84 H.R. 6429, §9(b); H.R. 6431, §210(b); H.R. 6440, §7(a)(2); H.R. 6548, §2(j)(2); H.R. 8358, §12(b); S. 4132,
§2(j)(2); S. 4666, §12(b).
85 H.R. 6455, §2(b)(4); H.R. 8358, §7(b)(2); S. 4132, §2(f)(2)(B); S. 4666, §7(b)(2).
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Commission Termination
Congressional commissions are usual y statutorily mandated to terminate. Termination dates are
often linked to either a fixed period of time after the establishment of the commission, the
selection of members, or the date of submission of the commission’s final report. Alternatively,
some commissions are terminated on a specific calendar date.
Al eight commission proposals would have provided for the commission to terminate within a
certain period of time following submission of its final report. Five commissions would have
terminated 60 days after final report submission (H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6455,
and S. 4132); one commission (H.R. 6548) would have terminated 90 days after submission; two
proposals (H.R. 8358 and S. 4666) would have specified that the commission must terminate
within 120 days after the final report is submitted.86
Commission Powers
Each of the eight bil s would have provided the proposed commission with certain powers to
carry out its mission (see Table 1 for specifics). One general issue for commissions is who might
be authorized to execute such specified powers. In some cases, the commission itself executes its
powers, with the commission deciding whether to devise rules and procedures for the general use
of such power. In other cases, the legislation specifical y authorizes the commission to give
discretionary power to subcommittees or individual commission members.87 Final y, the
legislation itself might grant certain powers to individual members of the commission, such as the
chair.88
Hearings and Evidence
Al eight bil s would have provided the proposed commission with the power to hold hearings,
take testimony, and receive evidence.89 Al eight commissions would also have been provided the
power to administer oaths to witnesses.90
Subpoenas
Seven of the bil s would have provided the commission with subpoena power. H.R. 6440 would
not have provided subpoena power to the commission. H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6548, H.R.
8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would have provided that subpoenas could only be issued by either

86 H.R. 6429, §9(c); H.R. 6431, §210(e); H.R. 6440, §7(b); H.R. 6455, §2(l); H.R. 6548, §2(k); H.R. 8358, §12(d); S.
4132, §2(k); S. 4666, §12(d).
87 For example, the National Commission on Defense and National Security ( P.L. 101-511, §3, 104 Stat. 1899,
November 5, 1990) provided that “Any member or agent of the Commission may, if so authorized by the Commission,
take any action which the Commission is authorized to take by this section” [§8(b)].
88 For example, the Women’s Progress Commemoration Commission (P.L. 105-341, §3, 112 Stat. 3197, October 31,
1998) provided that “The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as
the Commission considers necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. At the request of the Chairperson of the
Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission” (emphasis
added) [§5(b)].
89 H.R. 6429, §5; H.R. 6431, §205; H.R. 6440, §5; H.R. 6455, §2(g); H.R. 6548, §2(e); H.R. 8358, §6(a)(1); S. 4132,
§2(e)(1)(A); S. 4666, §6(a)(1).
90 H.R. 6429, §5(a)(1)(A); H.R. 6431, §205(a)(1)(A); H.R. 6440, §5(a); H.R. 6455, §2(g)(1)(A)(i); H.R. 6548,
§2(e)(1)(A)(i); H.R. 8358, §6(a)(1)(A); S. 4132, §2(e)(1)(A)(i); S. 4666, §6(a)(1)(A).
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(1) agreement of the chair and vice chair, or (2) the affirmative vote of 6 (of 10) commission
members.91 H.R. 6455 would have required that a subpoena could only be issued by either (1)
agreement of the chair and vice chair, or (2) an affirmative vote of 18 (of 25) commission
members.92 The seven bil s that would have provided subpoena authority note that such power
would be substantial y similar to judicial methods of subpoena enforcement.93
Administrative Support
Al eight of the bil s would have provided that the commission may obtain administrative support
from the General Services Administration (GSA). The GSA provides administrative support to
dozens of federal entities, including congressional advisory commissions.94 Each of the eight bil s
would have provided that the commission reimburse GSA for its services.95 Each bil also would
have provided that other departments or agencies could have provided the commission funds,
facilities, staff, and other services.96
Other Powers
Without explicit language authorizing certain activities, commissions often cannot engage in
specific actions. These might include information gathering, contracting, using the U.S. mail in
the same manner as an executive branch entity, or accepting donations or gifts. H.R. 8358 and S.
4666 would have required the commission to preserve commission records and provide records to
the National Archives not later than 120 days after final report submission,97 and to hire an ethics
counsel and submit to Congress a detailed plan to identify and resolve conflicts of interest.98
Al eight bil s would have directed that federal agencies provide information to the commission
upon request.99 H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666 would also
have provided that the commission could use the U.S. mails in the same manner as any
department or agency,100 enter into contracts,101 and accept gifts or donations of services or
property.102

91 H.R. 6429, §5(a)(2)(A); H.R. 6431, §205(a)(2)(A); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(1)(B); H.R. 8358, §6(a)(2); S. 4132,
§2(e)(1)(B); S. 4666, §6(a)(2).
92 H.R. 6455, §2(g)(1)(B)(i).
93 H.R. 6429, §5(a)(2)(B); H.R. 6431, §205(a)(2)(B); H.R. 6455, §2(g)(1)(B)(ii); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(1)(C); H.R. 8358,
§6(a)(2); S. 4132, §2(e)(1)(B); S. 4666, §6(a)(2).
94 U.S. General Services Administration, “Presidential & Congressional Commission, Boards or Small Agencies,” at
https://www.gsa.gov/resources-for/presidential-congressional-commissions-boards-or-small-agencies.
95 H.R. 6429, §5(d)(1); H.R. 6431, §205(d)(1); H.R. 6440, §5(c)(1); H.R. 6455, §2(g)(3)(A); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(4)(A);
H.R. 8358, §6(d)(1); S. 4132, §2(e)(4)(A); S. 4666, §6(d)(1).
96 H.R. 6429, §5(d)(2); H.R. 6431, §205(d)(2); H.R. 6440, §5(c)(2); H.R. 6455, §2(g)(3)(B); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(4)(B);
H.R. 8358, §6(d)(2); S. 4132, §2(e)(4)(B); S. 4666, §6(d)(2).
97 H.R. 8358, §8; S. 4666, §8.
98 H.R. 8358, §4(b)(3); S. 4666, §4(b)(3).
99 H.R. 6429, §5(d)(2); H.R. 6431, §205(c); H.R. 6440, §5(b); H.R. 6455, §2(e)(3); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(3); H.R. 8358,
§6(c); S. 4132, §2(e)(3); S. 4666, §6(c).
100 H.R. 6429, §5(f); H.R. 6431, §205(f); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(6); H.R. 8358, §6(f); S. 4132, §2(e)(6); S. 4666, §6(f).
101 H.R. 6429, §5(b); H.R. 6431, §205(b); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(2); H.R. 8358, §6(b); S. 4132, §2(e)(2); S. 4666, §6(b).
102 H.R. 6429, §5(e); H.R. 6431, §205(e); H.R. 6548, §2(e)(5); H.R. 8358, §6(e); S. 4132, §2(e)(5); S. 4666, §6(e).
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Staffing
The proposed COVID-19 commissions contained staffing provisions commonly found in
congressional advisory commission legislation. Congressional advisory commissions are usual y
authorized to hire staff. Most statutes specify that the commission may hire a lead staffer, often
referred to as a “staff director,” “executive director,” or another similar title, in addition to
additional staff as needed. Rather than mandate a specific staff size, many commissions are
instead authorized to appoint a staff director and other personnel as necessary, subject to the
limitations of available funds.
Most congressional commissions are also authorized to hire consultants, procure intermittent
services, and request that federal agencies detail personnel to aid the commission’s work.
Director and Commission Staff
Seven of the bil s would have provided that the commission may hire staff without regard to
certain competitive service laws.103 H.R. 6440 did not specifical y exempt the commission from
such laws.104 Seven bil s (H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6455, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and
S. 4666) would have authorized, but not required, the commission to hire a staff director and
additional staff, as appropriate.105 Seven proposals would have limited staff salaries to level V of
the executive schedule.106 Six of the bil s would have specifical y designated staff as federal
employees for the purposes of certain laws, such as worker’s compensation, retirement, and other
benefits.107 H.R. 6440 would have required that the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995
apply to the commission and its employees.108
Detailees
When authorized, some commissions may have federal agency staff detailed to the commission.
Al eight bil s would have provided that federal employees could be detailed to the commission.
Seven bil s would have provided that the commission would not reimburse the detailee’s home
agency.109 H.R. 6440 would have al owed detailees on a reimbursable basis.110

103 H.R. 6429, §7; H.R. 6431, §207; H.R. 6455, §2(g); H.R. 6548, §2(i); H.R. 8358, §9(a); S. 4132, §2(g)(1); S. 4666,
§9(a).
104 H.R. 6440, §6(a).
105 H.R. 6429, §7(a)(1); H.R. 6431, §207(a); H.R. 6455, §2(i)(1)(A); H.R. 6548, §2(g)(1)(A); H.R. 8358, §9(a); S.
4132, §2(g)(1); S. 4666, §9(a).
106 H.R. 6429, §7(a)(1); H.R. 6431, §207(a)(1); H.R. 6455, §2(i)(1)(A); H.R. 6548, §2(g)(1)(A); H.R. 8358, §9(a)(1); S.
4132, §2(g)(1)(A); S. 4666, §9(a)(1). For 2020, level V of the Executive Schedule is $160,100. For 2021, level V of the
Executive Schedule is $161,700. For more information, see U.S. Office of Personal Management, “Salary T able No.
2020-EX,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2020/EX.pdf; and
“Salary T able No. 2021-EX,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/
21T ables/exec/html/EX.aspx.
107 H.R. 6429, §7(a)(2); H.R. 6431, §207(a)(2); H.R. 6548, §2(g)(1)(B); H.R. 8358, §9(a)(2)(A); S. 4132,
§2(g)(1)(B)(i); S. 4666, §9(a)(2)(A).
108 H.R. 6440, §5(e).
109 H.R. 6429, §7(b); H.R. 6431, §207(b); H.R. 6455, §2(i)(2); H.R. 6548, §2(g)(2); H.R. 8358, §9(b); S. 4132,
§2(g)(2); S. 4666, §9(b).
110 H.R. 6440, §6(c).
Congressional Research Service

15

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 116th Congress

Experts and Consultants
Al eight bil s would have provided the commission with the authority to hire experts and
consultants. Seven of the bil s would have limited the rate of pay for consultants to level IV of the
Executive Schedule.111 H.R. 6440 would not have specified a specific compensation limit.112
Security Clearances
Seven bil s would have required that federal agencies and departments cooperate with the
commission to provide members and staff appropriate security clearances.113 H.R. 6440 did not
contain a security clearance provision.
Funding and Costs
Commissions general y require funding to meet their statutory goals. When designing a
commission, policymakers might consider both how the commission wil be funded and how
much funding the commission wil be authorized to receive. Factors that might affect commission
expenditures, and therefore funding, include member and staff salaries and benefits, contracting,
administrative support reimbursement, and travel expenditures. The duration of a commission can
also significantly affect its cost; past congressional commissions have been designed to last
anywhere from several months to several years.114 Seven of the eight proposals would have
specified a funding mechanism for the commission.
Four of the bil s (H.R. 6429, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6548, S. 4132) would have authorized the
appropriation of “such sums as may be necessary” for the commission, to be derived in equal
amounts from the contingent fund of the Senate and the applicable accounts of the House of
Representatives.115 H.R. 6455 would have authorized a $4 mil ion appropriation.116 H.R. 8358
and S. 4666 would have authorized a $50 mil ion appropriation.117 H.R. 6431 did not include an
authorization of appropriations. Further, H.R. 6429, H.R. 6548, H.R. 6455, H.R. 8358, S. 4132,
and S. 4666 would have provided that funds would have been available until the commission
terminated.118 H.R. 6440 did not include a provision on the availability of funds.

111 H.R. 6429, §7(c); H.R. 6431, §207(c); H.R. 6455, §2(i)(3); H.R. 6548, §2(g)(3); H.R. 8358, §9(c); S. 4132,
§2(g)(3); S. 4666, §9(c). For 2020, level IV of the Executive Schedule is $170,800. For 2021, level IV of the Executive
Schedule is $172,500. For more information, see U.S. Office of Personnel Ma nagement, “ Salary T able No. 2020-EX,”
at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/pdf/2020/EX.pdf; and “ Salary
T able No. 2021-EX,” at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/21T ables/
exec/html/EX.aspx.
112 H.R. 6440, §6(b).
113 H.R. 6429, §8; H.R. 6431, §209; H.R. 6455, §2(k); H.R. 6548, §2(i); H.R. 8358, §11; S. 4132, §2(i); S. 4666, §11.
114 For more information on commission funding, see CRS Report R45826, Congressional Commissions: Funding and
Expenditures, by William T . Egar.
115 H.R. 6429, §10(a); H.R. 6440, §8, H.R. 6548, §2(l)(1); S. 4132, §2(l)(1).
116 H.R. 6455, §2(m).
117 H.R. 8358, §13 (a); S. 4666, §13(a).
118 H.R. 6429, §10(b); H.R. 6548, §2(l)(2); H.R. 6455, §2(m); H.R. 8358, §13(b); S. 4132, §2(l)(2); S. 4666, §13(b).
Congressional Research Service

16

link to page 22 link to page 22 Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 116th Congress

Comparison of Proposals to Create a COVID-19
Commission
Table 1 provides a side-by-side comparison of major provisions of the eight proposals. For each
bil , Table 1 compares the membership structure, appointment structure, rules of procedure and
operation, duties and reporting requirements, proposed commission powers, staffing provisions,
and funding.

Congressional Research Service

17

Table 1. Comparison of 116th Congress Proposals to Create a Congressional Advisory Commission on COVID-19

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
Commission
National
National
National
National
National
Commission on National
Commission on
Name
Commission on
Commission on Commission on
Commission
Commission on
the
Commission on
the
COVID-19 in
United States
the COVID-19
Regarding the
the COVID-19
Coronavirus
the COVID–19
Coronavirus
the United
Preparedness
Pandemic
2019 Novel
Pandemic in the Pandemic in the Pandemic in the Pandemic in the
States
for National
Coronavirus
United States
United States
United States
United States
Emergencies
COVID-19
Pandemic
Total Members
10
10
10
25
10
10
10
10
Appointments
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
-1 appointed by -1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
chair) by the
chair) by the
chair) by the
the chair, and 1
chair) by the
chair) by the
chair) by the
chair) by the
President;
President;
Speaker of the
by the ranking
President;
President;
President;
President;
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
House, in
member of
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
-1 (to serve as
vice chair) by
vice chair) by
consultation
each of the
vice chair) by
vice chair) by
vice chair) by
vice chair) by
the leader of
the leader of
with the Senate
fol owing
the leaders of
the leader of
the leader of
the leader of
the House of
the Senate of
majority leader
House
the Senate of
the Senate of
the Senate of
the Senate of
the party
the Democratic
and House
committees:
the party
the party
the party
the party
opposite the
Party (majority
minority leader;

Oversight
opposite the
opposite the
opposite the
opposite the
President
or minority
-1 (to serve as
and
President
President, in
President, in
President, in
(majority or
leader, as the
vice chair) by
Reform;
(majority or
consultation
consultation
consultation
minority leader,
case may be), in the Senate

minority leader,
with the leader
with the leader
with the leader
as the case may
consultation
majority leader,

Homeland
Security;
as the case may
of the House of of the House of
of the House of
be), in
with the leader
in consultation
be), in
the party
the party
the party
consultation
of the House of with the

Permanent consultation
opposite the
opposite the
opposite the
with the leader
the Democratic
Speaker and
Select
with the leader
President;
President;
President;
of the Senate of
Party (majority
the Senate
Committe
of the House of
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
the party
or minority
minority leader;
e on
the party
member of the
member of the
member of the
opposite the
leader, as the
Intel igenc
-2 by the
opposite the
Senate
Senate
Senate
President
case may be);
Senate majority
e;
President
Democratic
Democratic
Democratic
(majority or
-2 by the senior
leader;

Energy and (majority or
leadership;
leadership;
leadership;
minority leader
member of the
Commerc
minority leader
as the case may
-2 by the
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
Senate
e;
as the case may
be);
Senate minority
member of the
member of the
member of the
leadership of
be);
leader;

Foreign
Senate
House
Senate
the Democratic
Affairs;
-2 by the senior
Republican
Republican
Republican
Party;
-Two by the
member of the
Speaker;
leadership;
leadership;
leadership;
Senate
CRS-18

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
-2 by the
-2 by the senior


Transport
leadership of
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
Speaker of the
member of the
-1 by the
ation and
the Democratic
member of the
member of the
member of the
House;
House
House minority
Infrastruct
Party
House
Senate
House
-2 by the
leadership of
leader; and
ure; and
-2 by the senior
Democratic
Republican
Democratic
House minority
the Republican
-1 by the

leadership;
leadership;
leadership;

Education
member of the
leader;
Party;
President.
and Labor.
House
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
-2 by the senior
-2 by the
-2 by the senior
§3(a)

leadership of
member of the
member of the
member of the
Senate majority
member of the
-1 appointed by the Republican
House
House
House
leader; and
Senate
the chair, and 1
Party;
Republican
Democratic
Republican
leadership of
leadership.
leadership.
leadership.
-2 by the
by the ranking
-2 by the senior
the Republican
§4(a)
§2(c)
§4(a)
Senate minority
member of
member of the
Party; and
leader.
each of the
Senate
§4(a)
-2 by the senior
fol owing
leadership of
member of the
Senate
the Republican
House
Committees:
Party; and
leadership of

-2 by the senior
the Democratic

Homeland
Security
member of
Party.
and
House
§203(a)
Governme
leadership of
ntal
the Democratic
Affairs;
Party.

§2(c)(1)

Commerc
e, Science,
and
Transport
ation;

Select
Committe
e on
Intel igenc
e;

Health,
Education,
Labor, and
Pensions;
and
CRS-19

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666

Foreign
Relations.

-One appointed
jointly by the
Chair and Vice
Chair of the
Joint Economic
Committee.
§2(c)(1)
Commissioner
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Compensation
members may
members may
members may
members may
members may
members may
members may
members may
and Travel
receive
receive
receive
receive
receive
receive
receive
receive
Expenses
compensation,
compensation,
compensation,
compensation,
compensation,
compensation,
compensation,
compensation,
limited at level
limited at level
limited at level
limited at level
limited at level
limited at level
limited at level
limited at level
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Schedule
Schedule
Schedule
Schedule
Schedule.
Schedule
Schedule
Schedule
§4(g)
§208(a)
§3(d)
§2(j)
§2(h)(1)
§10(a)
§2(h)(1)
§10(a)

Travel
Travel
—
—
Travel
Travel
Travel
Travel
expenses
expenses
expenses
expenses
expenses
expenses
reimbursed
reimbursed
reimbursed
reimbursed
reimbursed
reimbursed
§4(h)
§208(b)
§2(h)(2)
§10(b)
§2(h)(2)
§10(b)
Partisan
Not more than
Not more than
Not more than
Not more than
Not more than
Not more than
Not more than
Not more than
Balance
5 members
5 members
5 members
13 members
5 members
5 members
5 members
5 members
(out of 10)
(out of 10)
(out of 10)
(out of 25)
(out of 10)
(out of 10)
(out of 10)
(out of 10)
from the same
from the same
from the same
from the same
from the same
from the same
from the same
from the same
political party.
political party.
political party.
political party.
political party.
political party
political party
political party
§4(b)(1)
§203(b)(1)
§3(b)(1)
§2(c)(2)(B)
§2(c)(2)
§4(b)(1)
§2(c)(2)(A)
§4(b)(1)
Other
No officers or
No officers or
No officers or
No officers or
No officers or
No officers or
No officers or
No officers or
Commissioner
employees of
employees of
employees of
employees of
employees of
employees of
employees of
employees of
Qualifications
federal, state,
federal, state,
federal, state,
the federal
federal, state,
federal, state,
federal, state,
federal, state,
or local
or local
or local
government.
or local
local, tribal, or
or local
local, tribal, or
governments.
governments.
governments.

governments.
territorial
governments
territorial

governments

governments
CRS-20

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666

Sense of

Each individual

Sense of

Sense of
Congress that
Sense of
shal be a
Sense of
No individuals
Congress that
No individuals
Congress that
commissioners
Congress that
United States
Congress that
who have held
commissioners
who have held
commissioners
should be
that
person with
commissioners
a federal
should be
a federal
should be
prominent U.S.
commissioners
significant
should be
position that
prominent U.S.
position that
prominent U.S.
citizens, with
should be
expertise in
“prominent
plans,
citizens with
plans,
citizens, with
national
prominent U.S.
one or more of
United States
coordinates, or
national
coordinates, or
national
recognition and citizens, with
10 listed areas
citizens, with
implements
recognition and
implements
recognition and
significant
national
of expertise.
national
federal
significant
federal
significant
depth of
recognition and

recognition and
response to
depth of
response to
experience and
experience in
significant
experience in
At least one
significant
COVID-19
public health
expertise in
such
depth of
such
commissioner
depth of
public health
emergencies
such
professions as
experience in
professions as
shal be an
experience in
emergency
§4(b)(2)(B)
professions as
health,
such
public health,
individual with
such
§4(b)(2)(B)
governmental
manufacturing,
professions as
medicine,

significant
professions as
service, public
agriculture,
governmental

governmental
expertise in
public health,
Commissioners
health,
emergency
service,
service,
each of 10
medicine
Commissioners
should include
medicine,
planning,
biological
academia,
listed areas of
(including
should include
at least one
emergency
governmental
science, and
homeland
expertise.
epidemiology),
at least one
former
management or
service, law
higher
security, the

governmental
former
governor,
response,
enforcement,
education, and
service,
governor,
armed services,
public health
public
the armed
that members
At least 18
academia,
public health
emergency
expert, and
administration,
services, law,
should include
commissioners,
homeland
expert, and
preparedness
economic
logistics, and
public
individuals with
in an equal y
security, the
economic
and
policy expert
organizational
administration,
expertise in the
divided manner, armed services, policy expert
management,
appointed by
management.
commerce, and
medical
shal be
emergency
appointed by
law, public
each party’s
§4(b)
disaster relief.
community,
individuals with
preparedness
each party’s
administration,
leadership;
§203(b)
including
significant
and
leadership;
and intel igence.
§4(b)(4)(A)
hospital experts
experience in
management,
§4(b)(4)(A)
§2(c)(2)

and
public health
law, public

Sense of
administrators.
preparedness,
administration,
Sense of
Congress that
§3(b)
response and
and
recovery
Congress that
commissioners
intel igence.”
operations; and
commissioners
should be
§2(c)(2)
administration
should be
prominent U.S.
of emergency
prominent U.S.
citizens, with
preparedness,
citizens, with
national
response, and
national
recognition and
recovery
recognition and
significant
CRS-21

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
operations.
significant
depth of
§2(c)(2)
depth of
experience in
experience in
such
such
professions as
professions as
governmental
governmental
service, public
service, public
health, scientific
health, scientific
research, public
research, public
administration,
administration,
intel igence
intel igence
gathering,
gathering,
commerce,
commerce,
national
national
security, and
security, and
foreign affairs.
foreign affairs.
§4(b)(4)(B)
§4(b)(4)(B)
Deadline for
Appointments
Not specified.
Appointments
Appointments
Appointments
Appointments
Appointments
Appointments
Appointments
to be made
to be made by
to be made
to be made
to be made
to be made
to be made
during period
December 15,
within 45 days
during period
within 30 days
during the
within 30 days
between
2020.
of enactment.
between
after the date
period between
after the date
January 21,
§3(b)(4)
§2(c)(3)
January 21,
of the
January 21,
of the
2021, and
2021, and
expiration of
2021, and
expiration of
February 19,
February 5,
the public
February 5,
the public
2021.
2021.
health
2021.
health

§2(c)(2)(D)
emergency
§2(c)(2)(D)
emergency
declared by the
declared by the
Exception: If
Secretary of
Secretary of
the
Health and
Health and
determination
Human Services
Human Services
by the
pursuant to 41
pursuant to 41
Secretary of
U.S.C. 247d on
U.S.C. 247d on
Health and
January 31,
January 31,
Human Services
2020.
2020.
that a public
§4(b)(5)
§4(b)(5)
health
emergency
exists as a
result of
CRS-22

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
COVID-19 is
not in effect as
of August 31,
2020, then
members of the
commission are
to be appointed
between
September 1,
2020, and
October 1,
2020.
§4(c)
Chairperson
Chair
Chair
Chair chosen
Chair and vice
Chair
Chair
Chair
Chair
Selection
appointed by
appointed by
by the Speaker,
chair both shal
appointed by
appointed by
appointed by
appointed by
President.
President.
in consultation
(1) be chosen
President.
President
President
President

with the Senate
from among

Vice chair
Vice chair
majority leader
commission
Vice chair
Vice chair
Vice chair
Vice chair
appointed by
appointed by
and House
members, by a
appointed by
appointed by
appointed by
appointed by
the leader of
leader of the
minority leader.
majority vote
the leaders of
the leader of
the leader of
the leader of
the House from
Senate

of the
the Senate of
the Senate of
the Senate of
the Senate of
the party
(majority or
Vice chair
commission;
the party
the party
the party
the party
opposite the
minority leader
chosen by the
(2) have
opposite the
opposite the
opposite the
opposite the
President, in
as the case may
Senate majority
particular
President
President, in
President, in
President, in
consultation
be) from the
leader, in
specified
(majority or
consultation
consultation
consultation
with the leader
Democratic
consultation
expertise as
minority leader,
with the leader
with the leader
with the leader
of the Senate
Party, in
with the
specified and
as the case may
of the House of of the House of of the House of
from the party
consultation
Speaker and
(3) shal be of
be), in
the party
the party
the party
opposite the
with the leader
Senate minority
different
consultation
opposite the
opposite the
opposite the
President.
of the House
leader.
political parties.
with the leader
President.
President.
President.
§4(a)(1)
(majority or
§3(a)
§2(d)
of the House of
§4(a)(1)-(2)
§2(c)(1)
§4(a)(1)-(2)
minority leader,
the party
as the case may
opposite the
be) from the
President
Democratic
(majority or
Party.
minority leader
§203(a)
as the case may
CRS-23

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
be).
§2(c)(1)
First Meeting
As soon as
As soon as
As soon as
Not later than
As soon as
Within 45 days
As soon as
Within 45 days
practicable, but
practicable.
practicable
45 days after
practicable, but
after the
practicable.
after the
not later than
§203(b)(4)
after
appointment of
not later than
appointment of
§2(c)(2)(E)
appointment of
March 15,
appointment of
final
March 5, 2021.
al commission
al commission
2021, if
its members.
commission
§2(c)(2)(E)
members.
members.
members
§3(b)(5)
member.
§4(c)(1)
§4(c)(1)
appointed
§2(e)
during period
between
January 21 and
February 19,
2021; or
October 31,
2020, if
members
appointed
subject to
during period
between
September 1
and October 1,
2020.
§4(e)
Rules of
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Procedure
shal meet upon shal meet upon shal meet upon shal meet upon shal meet upon shal meet upon shal meet upon shal meet upon
the cal of the
the cal of the
the cal of the
the cal of the
the cal of the
the cal of the
the cal of the
the cal of the
chair, or a
chair, or a
chair, or a
chair, or a
chair, or a
chair or a
chair or a
chair or a
majority of
majority of
majority of
majority of
majority of
majority of
majority of
majority of
members.
members.
members.
members.
members.
members.
members.
members.

§4(c)(2)

§4(c)(2)
Six members
Six members
Six members
Eighteen
Six members

shal constitute
shal constitute
shal constitute
members shal
shal constitute
Six members
Six members
Six members
a quorum.
a quorum.
a quorum.
constitute a
a quorum.
constitute a
constitute a
constitute a

quorum.

quorum.
quorum.
quorum.
Findings,
Findings,
§4(c)(3)
§2(c)(3)
§4(c)(3)
CRS-24

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
conclusions,
Findings,
conclusions,

Meetings to be

and
conclusions,
and
Proxy voting
conducted in
Findings,
Finding,
Findings,
recommendatio
and
recommendatio
permitted.
person “unless
conclusions,
conclusions and conclusions,
ns contained in
recommendatio
ns contained in
§2(f)
such in-person
and
recommendatio
and
interim and
ns contained in
interim and
meetings would
recommendatio
ns for
recommendatio
final reports
interim and
final reports
pose a health
ns for
corrective
ns for
must be agreed
final reports
must be agreed
risk or
corrective
measures in
corrective
to by a majority
must be agreed
to by a majority
significant
action in
interim and
action in
of members.
to by a majority
of members.
practical
interim and
final reports
interim and
§4(f); §9(a);
of members.
§3(c); §7(a)
chal enges.”
final reports
must be agreed
final reports
§9(b)
§203(c); §210

must be agreed
to by a majority
must be agreed
Findings,
to by a majority
of members.
to by a majority
conclusions,
of members.
§2(j)
of members.
and
§12(a)-(b)
§12(a)-(b)
recommendatio
ns contained in
interim and
final reports
must be agreed
to by a majority
of members.
§2(c)(3);
§2(j)(1); §2(j)(2)
Powers
Hold hearings
Hold hearings
Hold hearings
Hold hearings
Hold hearings
Hold hearings
Hold hearings
Hold hearings
and gather
and gather
and gather
and gather
and gather
and gather
and gather
and gather
evidence
evidence
evidence
evidence
evidence
evidence
evidence
evidence

Issue
Issue
Obtain
Issue
Issue
Issue
Issue
Issue
subpoenas
subpoenas
information
subpoenas
subpoenas
subpoenas
subpoenas
subpoenas

from federal

Contracting
Contracting
agencies
Obtain
Contracting
Contracting
Contracting
Contracting
authority
authority

information
authority
authority
authority
authority

Obtain
from federal

Obtain
Obtain
administrative
agencies
Obtain
Obtain
Obtain
Obtain
information
information
support from

information
information
information
information
from federal
from federal
GSA and other
Obtain
from federal
from federal
from federal
from federal
administrative
agencies
agencies
agencies
CRS-25

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
agencies
agencies
agencies
support from
agencies

§5
GSA and other

Obtain
Obtain
Obtain
Obtain
Obtain
agencies
Obtain
administrative
administrative
administrative
administrative
administrative
§2(g)
administrative
support from
support from
support from
support from
support from
support from
GSA and other
GSA and other
GSA and other
GSA and other
GSA and other
GSA and other
agencies
agencies
agencies
agencies
agencies
agencies

Accept and use
Accept and use
Accept and use
Accept and use
Accept and use
Accept and use
gifts of services
gifts of services
gifts of services
gifts of services
gifts of services
gifts of services
and property
and property
and property
or property
or property
or property

Utilize postal
Utilize postal
Utilize postal
Utilize postal
Utilize postal
Utilize postal
service in the
service in the
service in the
service in the
service in the
service in the
same manner
same manner
same manner
same manner
same manner
same manner
as federal
as federal
as federal
as federal
as federal
as federal
agencies
agencies
agencies
agencies
agencies
agencies
§6
§2(e)
§6
§5
§205
§2(e)
Subpoena
Subpoenas may
Subpoenas may
—
Subpoenas may
Subpoenas may
Subpoenas may
Subpoenas may
Subpoenas may
Process
be issued with
be issued with
be issued with
be issued with
be issued with
be issued with
be issued with
the agreement
the agreement
the agreement
the agreement
the agreement
agreement of
the agreement
of the chair and
of the chair and
of the chair and of the chair and
of the chair and the chair and
of the chair and
vice chair, or a
vice chair, or a
vice chair, or a
vice chair, or a
vice chair, or a
vice chair, or a
vice chair, or a
vote of six
vote of six
vote of 18
vote of six
vote of six
vote of six
vote of six
members.
members.
members.
members.
members.
members.
members.
§5(a)(2)(A)
§205(a)(2)(A)
§2(g)(1)(B)(i)
§2(e)(1)(B)
§6(a)(2)
§2(e)(1)(B)
§6(a)(2)
Reporting
Final report to
Final report,
Final report to
Public report to Final report to
Final report to
Final report
Final report to
Requirements
be submitted to along with two
be submitted to be published
be submitted to be submitted to submitted to
be submitted to
Congress and
additional
Congress and
not later than
Congress,
Congress and
Congress and
Congress and
the President
reports, to be
the President
18 months after President, and
the President
the President
the President
within one year
submitted to
not later than
initial meeting.
the public by
not later than
not later than
not later than
of initial
Congress and
18 months after §2(b)(4)
October 15,
18 months after August 31,
18 months after
meeting.
the President
enactment.
2021, unless
the date of
2022.
the date of
May submit
not later than

not fewer than
appointment of
§2(j)(2)
appointment of
interim reports
18 months after May submit
eight
al commission

al commission
to Congress
interim reports
commission
members,
members,
members vote
unless not
unless not
CRS-26

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
and the
enactment.
to Congress
to extend
fewer than 6
May submit
fewer than 6
President.

and the
deadline by 90
commission
interim reports
commission
§9
May submit
President.
days;
members vote
to Congress
members vote
interim reports
§7
Commission
to extend the
and the
to extend the
to Congress
may not make
report deadline
President.
report by 90
and the
more than
by 90 days;
§2(j)(1)
days;
President.
three
Commission
Commission
§210
extensions.
may not make
may not make

more than
more than
May submit
three
three
interim reports
extensions.
extensions.
to Congress
§12(b)
§12(b)
and the

President.
May submit
May submit
§2(j)
interim reports
interim reports
to Congress
to Congress
and the
and the
President.
President.
§12(a)
§12(a)
Staff
Chair, in
Chair, in
Chair, in
Chair, in
Chair, in
Chair, in
Chair, in
Chair, in
consultation
consultation
consultation
consultation
consultation
consultation
consultation
consultation
with vice chair
with vice chair
with vice chair
with vice chair
with vice chair
with vice chair
with vice chair
with vice chair
and in
and in
and in
and in
and in
and in
and in
and in
accordance
accordance
accordance
accordance
accordance
accordance
accordance
accordance
with rules set
with rules set
with rules set
with rules set
with rules set
with rules
with rules
with rules
by the
by the
by the
by the
by the
agreed upon by
agreed upon by
agreed upon by
commission,
commission,
commission,
commission,
commission,
the
the
the
may appoint
may appoint
may appoint
may appoint
may appoint
commission,
commission,
commission,
and fix
and fix
and fix
and fix
and fix
may appoint
may appoint
may appoint
compensation
compensation
compensation
compensation
compensation
and fix
and fix
and fix
of staff, without
of staff, without of staff.
of staff, without of staff, without
compensation
compensation
compensation
regard to
regard to
§6(a)
regard to
regard to
of staff, without of staff, without
of staff, without
certain civil
certain civil
certain civil
certain civil
regard to
regard to
regard to
service laws.
service laws.
service laws.
service laws.
certain civil
certain civil
certain civil

service laws.
service laws.
service laws.
Staff
Staff
Staff
Staff

compensation
compensation
compensation
compensation
Staff
Staff
Staff
may not exceed
may not exceed
may not exceed may not exceed
compensation
compensation
compensation
CRS-27

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
level V of the
level V of the
level V of the
level V of the
may not exceed may not exceed
may not exceed
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
level V of the
level V of the
level V of the
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
Executive
Executive
Executive
§7(a)
§207(a)
§2(i)(1)
§2(g)(1)
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
§9(a)
§2(g)(1)
§9(a)
Detailees
Federal
Federal
Federal
Federal
Federal
Federal
Federal
Federal
employees may
employees may
employees may
employees may
employees may
employees may
employees may
employees may
be detailed to
be detailed to
be detailed to
be detailed to
be detailed to
be detailed to
be detailed to
be detailed to
the commission
the commission
the commission
the commission
the commission
the commission
the commission
the commission
without
without
on a
without
without
without
without
without
reimbursement
reimbursement
reimbursable
reimbursement
reimbursement
reimbursement
reimbursement
reimbursement
to their home
to their home
basis.
to their home
to their home
to their home
to their home
to their home
agency.
agency.
§6(c)
agency.
agency.
agency.
agencies.
agency.
§7(b)
§207(b)
§2(i)(2)
§2(g)(2)
§9(b)
§2(g)(2)
§9(b)
Consultants
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
Commission
may procure
may procure
may procure
may procure
may procure
may procure
may procure
may procure
services of
services of
services of
services of
services of
services of
services of
services of
experts and
experts and
experts and
experts and
experts and
experts and
experts and
experts and
consultants at
consultants at
consultants.
consultants at
consultants at
consultants at
consultants at
consultants at
daily rates not
daily rates not
§6(b)
daily rates not
daily rates not
daily rates not
daily rates not
daily rates not
to exceed level
to exceed level
to exceed level
to exceed level
to exceed level
to exceed level
to exceed level
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
IV of the
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Executive
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
Schedule.
§7(c)
§207(c)
§2(i)(3)
§2(g)(3)
§9(c)
§2(g)(3)
§9(c)
Termination
60 days after
60 days after
60 days after
60 days after
90 days after
120 days after
60 days after
120 days after
final report
final report
final report
final report
final report
final report
final report
final report
submitted.
submitted.
submitted.
submitted.
submitted.
submitted.
submitted.
submitted.
§9(c)
§210(e)
§7(b)
§2(l)(1)
§2(k)(1)
§12(d)
§2(k)
§12(d)
Funding
Authorize
Not specified
Authorize
Authorize
Authorize
Authorize
Authorize
Authorize
appropriation
appropriation
appropriation
appropriation
appropriations
appropriation
appropriations
of such sums as
of such sums as
of $4 mil ion}.
of such sums as
of $50 mil ion.
of such sums as
of $50 mil ion.
necessary,
necessary,
§2(m)(1)
necessary,
§13(a)
necessary,
§13(a)
which shal be
derived in equal
which shal be

derived in equal

derived in equal
amounts from
derived in equal
Funds available
amounts from
Funds available
parts from the
the contingent
parts from the
for the life of
the contingent
for the life of
CRS-28

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
Senate
fund of the
Senate
the
fund of the
the
contingent fund
Senate and the
contingent fund
commission.
Senate and the
commission.
and the
applicable
and the
§13(b)
applicable
§13(b)
applicable
account of the
applicable
account of the
account of the
House of
account of the
House of
House of
Representatives
House of
Representatives
Representatives
.
Representatives
§2(l)(1)
.
§8
.

§10(a)
§2(l)
Funds available
for the life of
the
commission.
§2(l)(2)
FACA
FACA shal not
FACA shal not
Not specified.
Not specified.
FACA shal not
FACA shal not
FACA shal not
FACA shal not
Applicability
apply to the
apply to the
apply to the
apply to the
apply to the
apply to the
commission.
commission.
commission.
commission.
commission.
commission.
§6
§206(a)
§2(f)
§7
§2(f)(1)
§7
Other Features
Hold public
Hold public
Hold public
Hold public
Hold public
Hold public
Hold public
Hold public
hearings and
hearings and
hearings and
hearings and
hearings and
hearings and
hearings and
hearings and
meetings to the
meetings to the meetings to the
meetings to the meetings to the
meetings to the meetings to the
meetings to the
extent
extent
extent
extent
extent
extent
extent
extent
appropriate.
appropriate.
appropriate.
appropriate.
appropriate.
appropriate.
appropriate.
appropriate.

§ 7(b)
§2(f)(2)-(3)
§ 7(b)
Release public
Release public
Release public
Release public
Release public

versions of
versions of
versions of
version of final
versions of
Preserve the
Release public
Preserve the
reports.
reports.
reports.
report.
reports.
records of the
versions of
records of the
§6(b)
§206(b)
commission
reports.
commission

§2(b)(4); §2(h)
§2(f)
and provide to
§2(f)(2)(B)
and provide to
Congressional
National
National
Accountability
Archives not
Archives not
Act of 1995
later than 120
later than 120
shal apply to
days after final
days after final
the commission
report
report
and its
submission.
submission.
employees.
§8
§8
§5(d)(1); §5(e)

Hire an ethics
Hire an ethics
counsel and
counsel and
CRS-29

H.R. 6429
H.R. 6431
H.R. 6440
H.R. 6455
H.R. 6548
H.R. 8358
S. 4132
S. 4666
submit to
submit to
Congress a
Congress a
detailed plan
detailed plan
for identifying
for identifying
and resolving
and resolving
conflicts of
conflicts of
interest.
interest.
§4(b)(3)
§4(b)(3)

Federal
Federal
agencies wil
agencies wil
help with
help with
security
security
clearances for
clearances for
members and
members and
staff.
staff.
§11
§11
Sources: CRS analysis of H.R. 6429, H.R. 6431, H.R. 6440, H.R. 6455, H.R. 6548, H.R. 8358, S. 4132, and S. 4666.

CRS-30

Proposals for a COVID-19 Congressional Advisory Commission in the 116th Congress

Author Information

Jacob R. Straus

Specialist on the Congress

Acknowledgments
This report was initially coauthored with former CRS analyst William Egar. The listed author is available
to answer questions from congressional clients about its content.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service
R46330 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED
31