August 27, 2020
Biometric Entry-Exit System: Legislative History and Status
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is statutorily
May 2002: The Enhanced Border Security and Visa
required to develop and implement an automated biometric
Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173), Section 302, required
(i.e., physical characteristics such as fingerprints, face, or
the AG, in developing the integrated entry-exit system at
irises) entry-exit system for foreign nationals (referred to as
POEs, to use the technology standard under the PATRIOT
aliens in immigration law) traveling into and out of the
Act, establish an arrival and departure database, and make
United States. The goals of this system are to strengthen
all alien admissibility security databases interoperable (i.e.,
national security and help enforce immigration law without
able to share data with other databases).
disrupting the flow of authorized travel and commerce. The
December 2004: The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
biometric entry system is said to be fully operationalized,
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Section 7208,
whereas the biometric exit system is still being
required DHS (which was created in late 2002 and assumed
implemented.
responsibility for the nation’s entry-exit system) to develop
Legislative History
a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated
biometric entry-exit system.
Since mandating the development of an automated entry-
exit system in 1996, Congress has amended the system’s
August 2007: The Implementing Recommendations of the
requirements and deadlines on several occasions, including
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), Section 711,
by adding a biometric component in 2001. A timeline of
required DHS to establish a biometric exit system to record
related laws includes the following:
the departure of all Visa Waiver Program air travelers by
August 2008.
September 1996: The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-
September 2008: The DHS Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L.
208), Section 110, required the Attorney General (AG) to
110-329) withheld certain funding for the legacy United
develop an automated entry-exit system that would collect
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
records of alien arrivals and departures by September 1998.
(US-VISIT) program until DHS planned, piloted, and
reported on a biometric air exit program.
October 1998: Two appropriations acts (P.L. 105-259 and
P.L. 105-277) amended Section 110 of IIRIRA to extend
December 2015: The Consolidated Appropriations Act,
the deadline for implementing the entry-exit system to
2016 (P.L. 114-113) authorized fee increases on L-1 and H-
October 1998 for airports and to March 2001 for land and
1B visas to provide up to $1 billion dollars for DHS to
sea ports of entry (POEs).
implement a biometric exit system beginning in FY2017.
June 2000: The Immigration and Naturalization Service
Executive Orders
Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-
The executive branch has also recently been involved in
215) amended IIRIRA Section 110 to describe the entry-
influencing the development of a biometric entry-exit
exit system in greater detail and imposed new deadlines of
system. Action by the Trump Administration includes the
December 2003 for implementation of the entry-exit system
following:
at all U.S. airports and seaports, December 2004 for
implementation at the 50 busiest land POEs as defined by
March 2017: Executive Order 13780, Protecting the Nation
the AG, and December 2005 for making data from the
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, ordered
system available to immigration officers at all POEs.
DHS to “expedite the completion and implementation of a
biometric entry-exit tracking system.”
October 2000: The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act
(P.L. 106-396), Section 205, required the AG to develop
Biometric Entry System
and implement a fully automated entry-exit system to
In December 2006, DHS fully implemented a biometric
collect arrival and departure records for travelers under the
Visa Waiver Program at sea and air POEs by October 2001.
entry system for foreign nationals . It is part of the primary
inspection at U.S. POEs. During primary inspection, U.S.
October 2001: The Uniting and Strengthening America by
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers conduct a
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
brief interview with travelers, examine travel documents,
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act; P.L. 107-56),
and check travelers against the Interagency Border
Section 414, required the AG to implement the IIRIRA
Inspection System (IBIS), a database of alleged and
entry-exit system “with all deliberate speed.” The act also
convicted criminals. Officers also conduct identity
directed the AG, in the development of the system, to focus
verification by entering some of the travelers’ biographical
on utilization of biometric technology and tamper-resistant
(e.g., passport information) and biometric (e.g., finger scans
documents. The law also required that the entry-exit system
and digital photographs) identification into the US-VISIT
interface with certain law enforcement databases to identify
system. U.S. citizens are not required to provide biometrics
individuals who may pose a threat to national security.
upon entry to the United States.
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link to page 2 Biometric Entry-Exit System: Legislative History and Status
Biometric Exit System
pose potentially less of a security risk, though they present
Unlike the entry system, the biometric exit system has yet
unique challenges. In the event of a non-match, a traveler’s
to be fully operationalized. The Government Accountability
identity is checked manually, and the technology’s error
Office (GAO) has periodically reported on the “various
can be corrected—although it could delay or disrupt travel.
longstanding planning, infrastructure, and staffing
challenges” to developing and implementing the biometric
A December 2019 National Institute of Science and
exit system. DHS, and then CBP (which took over the
Technology study found that FRT algorithms’ accuracy
biometric entry-exit mission in 2013), piloted an array of
rates can vary by demographic factors such as age, sex, and
programs using various biometric technologies (e.g.,
race. However, when examining TVS’s accuracy, DHS
fingerprints, facial recognition, and iris scans). CBP
reported that “CBP analysis found a negligible effect in
determined that facial recognition technology (FRT) was
regards to biometric matching based on citizenship, age, or
the optimal approach because it can be performed relatively
gender.” (CBP does not collect race/ethnicity data, so it
quickly and with a relatively high degree of accuracy (see
uses citizenship as a proxy.)
“Accuracy,” below). Its solution is called the Traveler
Verification Service (TVS), which currently captures
U.S. Citizens’ Ability to Opt-Out
roughly 60% of in-scope travelers (i.e., foreign nationals
U.S. citizens are allowed to opt-out of biometric exit
aged 14-79) departing the United States via commercial air
participation and can instead undergo manual review of
carriers. CBP’s goal is to capture 97% of all in-scope
travel documents. CBP notifies travelers of this option
departing commercial air travelers by 2022.
through physical signs posted at POEs and verbal
announcements. They also provide an FAQ sheet upon
Traveler Verification Service
request. In addition, there is information about TVS on
CBP, in partnership with the Transportation Security
CBP’s website. However, in a letter to DHS, discussed
Administration, deploys TVS to verify travelers’ identities
below, some policymakers expressed concern that CBP
utilizing FRT. TVS is a public-private partnership between
may not provide U.S. citizens with adequate notice about
the federal government and private airlines, airports, and
TVS or explain opt-out procedures clearly.
cruise lines. CBP envisions that TVS “can replace manual
checks of travel document across the travel continuum” at
Data Retention and Security
air, land, and sea POEs . TVS currently operates in 27
CBP stores photographs of foreign nationals for 14 days in
airports, 7 seaports, and 5 land border locations across the
the Automated Targeting System (ATS) Unified Passenger
United States, as well as 4 preclearance locations.
Module (UPAX). After 14 days, photographs are
transmitted to the Automated Biometric Identification
A Matching Technology
System (IDENT), where they are retained for up to 75
TVS compares the travelers’ live photograph (e.g., taken by
years. In contrast, photographs of U.S. citizens are to be
a gate agent) to a gallery of photographs. The content of
immediately deleted after the matching process. All
these comparison galleries depends on the travel context.
photographs are to be purged from the TVS cloud after 12
For air and sea travelers, CBP uses biographic data (e.g.,
hours, regardless of citizenship status.
gender, date of birth, travel document type and number,
nationality) obtained from flight and ship manifests via the
During the July 2019 and February 2020 House Committee
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to gather
on Homeland Security hearings about DHS’s use of FRT,
all associated facial images from DHS holdings (e.g.,
many Members expressed concerns about data security and
photographs from U.S. passports, U.S. visas, CBP entry
liability. In addition, on June 13, 2019, a few days after
inspections, and other DHS encounters) into the gallery. For
CBP announced a breach of data held by one of their
pedestrians and vehicle travelers, the gallery consists of
subcontractors, over 20 House Members signed a letter to
photographs of frequent crossers at that POE. TVS provides
then-Acting DHS Secretary McAleenan expressing concern
a match or no match result within two seconds. In case of a
about CBP’s use of FRT. Among other things, the letter
no match, the traveler’s identity is checked manually by an
inquired about the nature of the contracts with private
agent.
partners, the legal liability of the private partners, and how
CBP audits partner systems to ensure that they are purging
Accuracy
the photographs consistent with aforementioned timelines.
In contrast to other types of FRT that can provide numerous
possible matches (e.g., FRT used by police to generate
Issues for Consideration
potential investigative leads), TVS is a binary (match or no
As the creation of a fully operational biometric entry-exit
match) technology. As such, TVS can produce two types of
system has been mandated by Congress, policymakers may
mistakes: false positives and false negatives. According to
choose to conduct oversight over the speed and methods by
CBP internal analysis, TVS’s false positive rate is .0103%
which DHS and CBP continue to implement the system. Of
(it did not report the false negative rate). The accuracy rate
particular interest may be the system’s development
is affected by a number of factors, including the
timeline, concerns about the accuracy of FRT, and privacy
composition of the gallery against which a face is
issues related to the capture and retention of photographs.
compared. Notably, the TVS galleries are relatively small
because they are created for a specific flight, ship, or POE.
Abigail F. Kolker, Analyst in Immigration Policy
False matches pose potential security risks, as they may not
IF11634
flag a traveler using a false identity. False non-matches
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Biometric Entry-Exit System: Legislative History and Status


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11634 · VERSION 1 · NEW

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