Updated December 30, 2020
Defense Primer: National Security Space Launch
Introduction
Background
The National Security Space Launch (NSSL) is a U.S.
The origins of the NSSL program date back to 1995, after
government program that enables acquisition of launch
years of concerns within the Air Force and space launch
services, aimed at ensuring continued access to space for
community over increasing cost and decreasing confidence
critical national security missions. The U.S. Air Force
in the continued reliability of national access to space. The
oversaw NSSL’s predecessor program, the Evolved
purpose of EELV was to provide the United States
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), and awarded four
affordable, reliable, and assured access to space with two
companies contracts to design a cost-effective launch
families of space launch vehicles. Initially only two
vehicle system. The Department of Defense (DOD)
companies competed: Boeing produced the Delta IV launch
acquisition strategy was to select one company to ensure
vehicle, and Lockheed Martin developed the Atlas V.
national security space (NSS) launches were affordable and
Overall, the program provided critical space lift capability
reliable. The EELV effort was prompted by significant
to support DOD and intelligence community satellites,
increases in launch costs, procurement concerns, and the
together known as NSS missions.
lack of competition among U.S. companies. Today, the
NSSL program’s main priority is mission success. A
The EELV program evolved modestly in response to
RAND study released April 2020 identified a magnitude of
changing circumstances, and the Air Force approved an
risk associated with assured access to space. As Congress
EELV acquisition strategy in November 2011, revising it in
continues its oversight of NSSL, it may consider examining
2013. That strategy was designed to (1) sustain two major
DOD’s plan on the prioritization of the launch-related risks
independent rocket-powered launch vehicle families to
to ensure continued access to space and 100% mission
reduce the chance of launch interruptions and to ensure
success.
reliable access to space; (2) license and stockpile the
Russian-made RD-180 heavy-lift rocket engine, a critical
A major concern in Congress and elsewhere over U.S.
component of the Atlas V; (3) pursue a block-buy
reliance on a Russian rocket engine (RD-180), used on one
commitment to a number of launches through the end of the
of the primary national security rockets for critical national
decade to reduce launch costs; and (4) increase competition
security space launches, was exacerbated by the Russian
to reduce overall launch costs. The Air Force and others
backlash over the 2014 U.S. sanctions against its actions in
viewed the overall EELV acquisition strategy as having
Ukraine. Moreover, significant overall NSSL program cost
successfully reduced launch costs while demonstrating
increases and unresolved questions over individual launch
highly reliable access to space for DOD and the intelligence
costs, along with legal challenges to the Air Force contract
community.
awards by space launch companies, prompted legislative
action. In the John S. McCain National Defense
NSSL Program Today
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019, Congress
The U.S. Space Force, the sixth branch of the Armed
directed the program to find non-Russian engines. It also
Forces, established on December 20, 2019, is responsible
renamed the EELV to the NSSL program to reflect a wider
for the military space launch mission. The NSSL program is
mission that would consider both reusable and expendable
managed by the Launch Enterprise Systems Directorate of
launch vehicles.
SMC, Los Angeles Air Force Base. The NSSL program
consists of four launch vehicles: Atlas V and Delta IV
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), together
Heavy (both provided by ULA of Denver, CO) and Falcon
with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), released a
9 and Falcon Heavy (both provided by SpaceX of
request for proposals in May 2019 to award two domestic
Hawthorne, CA).
launch service contracts. On August 7, 2020, the U.S. Space
Force competitively awarded two Firm-Fixed-Price,
NSS launches support the Space Force, Navy, and NRO.
Indefinite Deliver Requirement contracts to United Launch
More specifically, the Atlas V has launched commercial,
Alliance (ULA) and Space Exploration Technologies
civil, and NSS satellites into orbit, including commercial
Corporations (SpaceX) for Phase 2 of the NSSL program.
and military communications satellites, lunar and other
These two companies will share the responsibility for
planetary orbiters and probes, earth observation and
launching U.S. military and intelligence satellites through
military research satellites, weather satellites, missile
2027. ULA will receive approximately 60% of the contract
warning and NRO reconnaissance satellites, a tracking and
requirements, similarly SpaceX 40%. NSS launch has been
data relay satellite, and the X-37B space plane (a military
a leading legislative priority in the defense bills over the
orbital test vehicle). The Delta IV has launched commercial
past few years, and with the increasing number of
and military communications and weather satellites and
commercial launch providers and more competition, it will
missile warning and NRO satellites.
likely continue to be a legislative priority.
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Defense Primer: National Security Space Launch
DOD expects to achieve cost saving through acquisitions
Implications for Congress
and operability improvements through use of common
Although widespread support for the NSS requirement to
components and infrastructure, standard payload interfaces,
promote robust competition and assured access to space
standardized launch pads, and reductions in on-pad
exists across Congress and national space community
processing. To improve acquisitions, the program offers
stakeholders, challenges to achieving these goals remain.
block buys of launch vehicles and competition between
The recurring challenge since the start of the NSSL
certified providers. The competitions are conducted through
program has been how best to pursue this requirement
two contract vehicles: Launch Service Agreements (LSA)
while driving down costs through competition and ensuring
and Launch Service Procurement (LSP) awards:
launch reliability and performance. The Space Force
decision to select only two launch providers and award two
Launch Service Agreement (LSA) awards are a set of
separate LSP contracts in August 2020 is not without
three Air Force Research, Development, Test, and
potential implications and could have second- and third-
Evaluation awards intended to facilitate the
order effects on operational capabilities.
development of three domestic launch system
prototypes. DOD awarded LSA’s to ULA, Northrop
Congress may consider whether the strategy’s cost-benefit
Grumman, and Blue Origin in October 2018.
analysis warrants further research. Since only two launch
Launch Service Procurement (LSP) is an ongoing
providers were chosen for LSP contracts in Phase 2, and the
procurement competition that awarded its Phase 2
companies not selected (Northrop Grumman and Blue
contracts on August 7, 2020—a five-year procurement
Origin) lose their LSA funds received from the Air Force,
of approximately 34 launches starting in 2022.
these companies could potentially be faced with (1) the
choice of abandoning NSSL development to focus on
United Launch Alliance, Northrop Grumman, SpaceX, and
competing in the commercial launch sector, or (2) investing
Blue Origin submitted bids for Phase 2, with each company
vast company reserves to continue development on its own.
proposing its rocket design: Vulcan, OmegA, Falcon, and
Furthermore, DOD selection of only two launch providers
New Glenn, respectively. Northrop Grumman and Blue
could mean fewer options for an increasingly diverse range
Origin were not selected to receive Phase 2 contracts.
of NSS mission demands and possibly limit competition in
Previously, Phase 1 and Phase 1A awards were given to
the launch market once again. Congress may consider
ULA and SpaceX. DOD has identified 18 active contracts
for the NSSL program, with obligations awarded to six
directing the Space Force to provide a report on the
companies (see Figure 1).
cost-benefit analysis of selecting more than two launch
providers in future phases;
Figure 1. Selected NSSL Contract Obligations, by
Company, 2012-2019
drafting language in future NDAAs to authorize
additional funds that allow the Space Force to diversify
its launch provider options by continuing to provide
development funds through LSA awards to launch
companies not selected for LSP contracts in Phase 2;
and/or
directing the Space Force to provide a report on the cost
saving and associated risk of using reusable launch
vehicles for future solicitations.
Lastly, efforts to transition away from the RD-180 to a
domestic U.S. alternative engine or launch vehicle are not
without technical, program, or schedule risks. Even with a
smooth, on-schedule transition away from the RD-180 to an
alternative engine or launch vehicle, the performance and
reliability record achieved with the RD-180 to date would
likely not be replicated until well beyond 2030; the RD-180
has approximately 81 consecutive successful civil,
commercial, and NSS launches since 2000.
CRS Products
CRS Report R46211, National Security Space Launch, by
Stephen M. McCall
Source: CRS analysis of the Federal Procurement Data System.
Notes: Totals as of July 2019, in mil ions of dol ars. Northrop
Grumman has acquired Orbital-ATK, previously known as Al iant
Techsystems.
Stephen M. McCall, Analyst in Military Space, Missile
Defense, and Defense Innovation
ULA and SpaceX are currently the only space launch
providers certified to launch NSS payloads into orbit.
IF11531
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Defense Primer: National Security Space Launch
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