U.S. Role in the World:
Background and Issues for Congress

Updated December 16, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44891




U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S.
participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world.
The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for
U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and
actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for
interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in
their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global
leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of
freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in
Eurasia.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could
have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could
significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense
plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, the United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world. Other
observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, while acknowledging that the
Trump Administration has changed U.S. foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies
pursued by the Obama Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been
less change and more continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has
substantially changed the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump
Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the
implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from
U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an
unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something
of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70
years.
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were
arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the
world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding
to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests,
particularly in terms of adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the
United States can accomplish, enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making
potential U.S. actions less predictable to potential adversaries, reestablishing respect for national
sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign policy and for organizing international affairs, and
encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend themselves.
Congress’s decisions regarding the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for
numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of
the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Overview of Traditional U.S. Role: Four Key Elements .......................................................... 1
Global Leadership ............................................................................................................... 1
Defense and Promotion of Liberal International Order ...................................................... 2
Defense and Promotion of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights ............................... 3
Prevention of Emergence of Regional Hegemons in Eurasia ............................................. 4
Changes over Time .................................................................................................................... 5
Long-Standing Debate over Its Merits ...................................................................................... 5

Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................................... 5
Has the United States Changed Its Role? .................................................................................. 6
Some Observers Believe the United States Has Changed Its Role ..................................... 6
Other Observers Disagree ................................................................................................... 7
Still Other Observers See a Mixed or Confusing Situation ................................................ 7
Some Observers Argue That Change Began Earlier ........................................................... 8
Potential Combined Perspectives ........................................................................................ 8

Implications of a Changed U.S. Role ........................................................................................ 8
Some Observers View Implications as Undesirable ........................................................... 8
Other Observers View Implications as Helpful .................................................................. 9
Some Related or Additional Issues.......................................................................................... 10
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic ................................................. 10
Costs and Benefits of Allies .............................................................................................. 10
U.S. Public Opinion ........................................................................................................... 11
Operation of U.S. Democracy ............................................................................................ 11
Potential Implications for Congress as an Institution ....................................................... 12
Reversibility of a Change in U.S. Role ............................................................................. 12

Additional Writings ................................................................................................................. 13

Appendixes
Appendix A. Glossary of Selected Terms ...................................................................................... 14
Appendix B. Past U.S. Role vs. More Restrained Role................................................................. 17
Appendix C. Additional Writings .................................................................................................. 21

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 49

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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in
the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in
international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in
the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers
for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific
international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and
understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of more than 70 years
(i.e., since the end of World War II in 1945), the U.S. role in the world under the Trump
Administration has undergone a substantial change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could
have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could
significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense
plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. Congress’s decisions regarding
the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans,
programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in
U.S. foreign policymaking.
A variety of other CRS reports address in greater depth specific international issues mentioned in
this report. Appendix A provides a glossary of some key terms used in this report, such as
international order or regional hegemon. For convenience, this report uses the term U.S. role as a
shorthand for referring to the U.S. role in the world.
Background
Overview of Traditional U.S. Role: Four Key Elements
While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in
their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements:
 global leadership;
 defense and promotion of the liberal international order;
 defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and
 prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.
The following sections provide brief discussions of these four key elements.
Global Leadership
The traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II is generally described, first
and foremost, as one of global leadership, meaning that the United States tends to be the first or
most important country for identifying or framing international issues, taking actions to address
those issues, setting an example for other countries to follow, organizing and implementing
multilateral efforts to address international issues, and enforcing international rules and norms.
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Observers over the years have referred to U.S. global leadership using various terms, some of
which reflect varying degrees of approval or disapproval of this aspect of the U.S. role. Examples
of such terms (other than global leader itself) include leader of the free world, superpower,
indispensable power, system administrator, hyperpower, world policeman, or world hegemon.
The U.S. role of global leadership has resulted in extensive U.S. involvement in international
affairs, and this, too, has been described with various phrases. The United States has been
described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy; a foreign policy of global engagement or
deep engagement; a foreign policy that provides global public goods; a foreign policy of liberal
order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony; an interventionist foreign policy; or
a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony.
Defense and Promotion of Liberal International Order
A second key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that can
be viewed as inherently related to the first key element above—has been to defend and promote
the liberal international order1 that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the
years after World War II. Although definitions of the liberal international order vary, key elements
of it are generally said to include the following:
 respect for the territorial integrity of countries, and the unacceptability of
changing international borders by force or coercion;
 a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use
or threat of use of force or coercion, and in a manner consistent with international
law;
 respect for international law, global rules and norms, and universal values,
including human rights;
 strong international institutions for supporting and implementing international
law, global rules and norms, and universal values;
 the use of liberal (i.e., rules-based) international trading and investment systems
to advance open, rules-based economic engagement, development, growth, and
prosperity; and
 the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and
(more recently) cyberspace as international commons rather than domains subject
to national sovereignty.
Most of the key elements above (arguably, all but the final one) can be viewed collectively as
forming what is commonly referred to as a rules-based international order. A traditional antithesis
of a rules-based order is a might-makes-right order (sometimes colloquially referred to as the law
of the jungle), which is an international order (or a situation lacking in order) in which more
powerful countries routinely impose their will arbitrarily on less-powerful countries,
organizations, and individuals, with little or no regard to rules.

1 Other terms used to refer to the liberal international order include U.S.-led international order, postwar international
order
, rules-based international order, and open international order. Observers sometimes substitute world for
international, or omit international or world and refer simply to the liberal order, the U.S.-led order, and so on. In the
terms liberal international order and liberal order, the word liberal does not refer to the conservative-liberal construct
often used in discussing contemporary politics in the United States or other countries. It is, instead, an older use of the
term that refers to an order based on the rule of law, as opposed to an order based on the arbitrary powers of hereditary
monarchs.
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Though often referred to as if it is a fully developed or universally established situation, the
liberal international order, like other international orders that preceded it, is
 incomplete in geographic reach and in other ways;
 partly aspirational;
 not fixed in stone, but rather subject to evolution over time;
 sometimes violated by its supporters;
 not entirely free of might-makes-right behavior;
 resisted or rejected by certain states and nonstate actors; and
 subject to various stresses and challenges.
Some observers, emphasizing points like those above, argue that the liberal international order is
more of a myth than a reality. Other observers, particularly supporters of the order, while
acknowledging the limitations of the order, reject characterizations of it as a myth and emphasize
its differences from international orders that preceded it.
As mentioned above, the liberal international order was created by the United States with the
support of its allies in the years immediately after World War II. At that time, the United States
was the only country with both the capacity and willingness to establish a new international order.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is generally viewed as reflecting a desire by U.S. policymakers to avoid repeating the deadly
major wars and widespread economic disruption and deprivation of the first half of the 20th
century—a period that included World War I, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and
fascism, the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust, and World War II.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is also generally viewed as an act of national self-interest, reflecting a belief among U.S.
policymakers that it would strongly serve U.S. security, political, and economic objectives.
Supporters of the liberal international order generally argue that in return for bearing the costs of
creating and sustaining the liberal international order, the United States receives significant
security, political, and economic benefits, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of
power on both a global and regional level, and a leading or dominant role in establishing and
operating global institutions and rules for international finance and trade. Indeed, some critics of
the liberal international order argue that it is primarily a construct for serving U.S. interests and
promoting U.S. world primacy or hegemony. The costs and benefits for the United States of
defending and promoting the liberal international order, however, are a matter of debate.
Defense and Promotion of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights
A third key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend
and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and
resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible. This element of the U.S.
role is viewed as consistent not only with core U.S. political values but also with a theory
advanced by some observers (sometimes called the democratic peace theory) that democratic
countries are more responsive to the desires of their populations and consequently are less likely
to wage wars of aggression or go to war with one another.
Defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights is additionally viewed as a key
component of U.S. soft power, because it can encourage like-minded governments, as well as
organizations and individuals in other countries, to work with the United States, and because it
has the potential to shape the behavior of authoritarian and illiberal governments that are acting
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against U.S. interests by shaming those governments and inspiring prodemocracy organizations
and individuals within those countries.
Prevention of Emergence of Regional Hegemons in Eurasia
A fourth element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that U.S.
policymakers do not often state explicitly in public—has been to oppose the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia. This objective reflects a U.S. perspective on geopolitics and grand
strategy developed by U.S. strategists and policymakers during and in the years immediately after
World War II that incorporates two key judgments:
 that given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, a
regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large
enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests; and
 that Eurasia is not dependably self-regulating in terms of preventing the
emergence of regional hegemons, meaning that the countries of Eurasia cannot
be counted on to be able to prevent, though their own actions, the emergence of
regional hegemons, and may need assistance from one or more countries outside
Eurasia to be able to do this dependably.2
Preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is sometimes also referred to as
preserving a division of power in Eurasia, or as preventing key regions in Eurasia from coming
under the domination of a single power, or as preventing the emergence of a spheres-of-influence
world, which could be a consequence of the emergence of one or more regional hegemons in
Eurasia.
U.S. actions that can be viewed as expressions of the U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
 U.S. participation in World War I,3 World War II, the Korean War, and the
Vietnam War;4
 U.S. alliances and security partnerships, including
 the NATO alliance, which was established in large part to deter and counter
attempts by the Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in
Europe;

2 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 Although the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons was not articulated in explicit terms (at least not
widely) by U.S. strategists until World War II and the years immediately thereafter, U.S. participation in World War I
against Germany can in retrospect be viewed as an earlier U.S. action reflecting this goal.
4 U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was justified in part by the so-called domino theory, which argued that a
victory by communist-ruled North Vietnam over South Vietnam could be followed by other countries in the region
falling, like dominos in a row, under communist control. Opponents of the domino theory challenged its validity and
argue that it was disproven when North Vietnam’s defeat of South Vietnam was not followed by other countries in the
region falling under communist control. The theory’s supporters argue that the theory was not disproven, because the
years-long U.S. effort to defend South Vietnam, though ultimately unsuccessful in preventing victory by North
Vietnam, gave other countries in the region time and space to develop their political institutions and economies enough
to deter or resist communist movements in their own countries. Valid or not, the domino theory’s use as a justification
links U.S. participation in the war to the goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon (in this case, a
communist hegemon of China and/or the Soviet Union).
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 U.S. alliances with countries in East Asia and the Pacific, which were
established in large part to deter and counter attempts by the Soviet Union or
China to become a regional hegemon in East Asia; and
 U.S. security partnerships with countries in the Persian Gulf region, which
were established in large part to deter or counter attempts by Iran or the
Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in that region; and
 additional U.S. political, diplomatic, and economic actions to contain and oppose
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, including the Marshall Plan and
subsequent U.S. foreign assistance programs.
In pursuing the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, U.S.
policymakers have sometimes decided to work with or support nondemocratic regimes that for
their own reasons view Russia, China, or Iran as competitors or adversaries. As a consequence,
the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Asia has sometimes been in tension
with defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Changes over Time
Although the traditional U.S. role in the world was generally stable over the past 70 years, the
specifics of U.S. foreign policy for implementing that role have changed frequently for various
reasons, including changes in administrations and changes in the international security
environment. Definitions of the U.S. role have room within them to accommodate some variation
in the specifics of U.S. foreign policy.
Long-Standing Debate over Its Merits
The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not
necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right
one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of
World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter
of long-standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the
public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world.
The most prominent dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to
continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead
adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of
the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a
more restrained U.S. role. (For additional discussion, see Appendix B.)
A second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or
combine the pursuit of narrowly defined material U.S. interests with the goal of defending and
promoting U.S. or universal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third major
dimension concerns the balance in U.S. foreign policy between the use of hard power and soft
power. Observers debating these two dimensions of the future U.S. role in the world stake out
varying positions on these questions.
Issues for Congress
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. The sections below provide
some discussion of this issue.
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Has the United States Changed Its Role?
There currently are multiple views on the question of whether the United States under the Trump
Administration has changed the U.S. role in the world, some of which are outlined briefly below.
Some Observers Believe the United States Has Changed Its Role
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, the United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world by altering
some or all of the four key elements of the U.S. role described earlier. Although views among
these observers vary in their specifics, a number of these observers argue that the
Administration’s America First construct, its emphasis on national sovereignty as a primary
guidepost for U.S. foreign policy, and other Administration actions and statements form a new
U.S. role characterized by
 a voluntary retreat from or abdication of global leadership,
 a greater reliance on unilateralism,
 a reduced willingness to work through international or multilateral institutions
and agreements,
 an acceptance of U.S. isolation or near-isolation on certain international issues,
 a more skeptical view of the value of alliances to the United States,
 a less-critical view of certain authoritarian or illiberal governments,
 a reduced or more selective approach to promoting and defending certain
universal values,
 the elevation of bilateral trade balances, commercial considerations, monetary
transactions, and ownership of assets such as oil above other foreign policy
considerations, and
 an implicit tolerance of the reemergence of aspects of a might-makes-right
international order.
In support of this view, these observers cite various Administration actions and statements,
including, among other things
 the Administration’s decisions to withdraw from certain international
agreements—including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade
agreement, the multilateral Paris climate agreement, and the Iran nuclear
agreement—and from the World Health Organization (WHO);
 its earlier proposals for reducing State Department funding and foreign assistance
funding, and delays in filling senior State Department positions;
 the President’s skeptical statements regarding the value to the United States of
certain U.S. alliances (particularly with European countries and South Korea) and
more generally his apparent transactional and monetary-focused approach to
understanding and managing alliance relationships;
 what these observers view as the President’s affinity for certain authoritarian or
illiberal leaders, as well as his apparent reluctance to criticize Russia and his
apparent continued desire to seek improved relations with Russia, despite
Russian actions judged by U.S. intelligence agencies and other observers to have
been directed against the United States and overseas U.S. interests;
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 the President’s decision, announced by the Administration on October 6, 2019, to
withdraw U.S. troops from northern Syria, and the Administration’s initiatives to
reduce the U.S. military presence in Germany, Afghanistan, and Iraq;
 the Administration’s focus on pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with various
countries (as opposed to regional or multilateral trade negotiations); and
 the Administration’s infrequent or inconsistent statements in support of
democracy and human rights, including the Administration’s reaction to the
killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and some of the President’s statements
regarding the prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong.
Other Observers Disagree
Other observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, disagree with some or all of
the perspective above. While acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S.
foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration,
these observers argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been less change and more
continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. In support of this view, these observers cite,
among other things
 the Administration’s December 2017 national security strategy (NSS) document
and its January 2018 unclassified summary of its supporting national defense
strategy (NDS) document—large portions of which refer to U.S. leadership, a
general emphasis on great power competition with China and Russia, and strong
support for U.S. alliances;
 Administration statements reaffirming U.S. support for NATO, as well as
Administration actions to improve U.S. military capabilities in Europe for
deterring potential Russian aggression in Europe;
 the Administration’s willingness to impose and maintain a variety of sanctions on
Russia;
 the Administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) construct for guiding
U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region;
 the Administration’s more confrontational policy toward China, including its plan
to increase funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs to compete against
China for influence in Africa, Asia, and the Americas;
 U.S. trade actions that, in the view of these observers, are intended to make free
trade more sustainable over the long run by ensuring that it is fair to all parties,
including the United States; and
 the Administration’s (admittedly belated) support of Hong Kong’s prodemocracy
protestors, its criticism of China’s human rights practices toward its Muslim
Uyghur population, and its emphasis on religious freedom as a major component
of human rights.
Still Other Observers See a Mixed or Confusing Situation
Still other observers, viewing points made by both of the above sets of observers, see a mixed or
confusing situation regarding whether the United States under the Trump Administration has
changed the U.S. role in the world. For these observers, whether the U.S. role has changed is
difficult to discern, in part because of what they view as incoherence or contradictions in the
Administration’s foreign policies and in part because the President’s apparent views on certain
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issues—such as the value of U.S. alliances, the acceptability of certain actions by Russia or North
Korea, and the importance of democracy and human rights as universal values—have frequently
been in tension with or contradicted by statements and actions of senior Administration officials
(particularly those who served during the first two years or so of the Administration), with the
President’s views being more consistent with the change in the U.S. role outlined by the first set
of observers above, and statements and actions of senior Administration officials frequently being
more consistent with a continuation of the U.S. role of the past 70 years outlined by the second
set of observers above.
Some Observers Argue That Change Began Earlier
Some observers argue that if the U.S. role has changed, that change started not under the Trump
Administration, but under the Obama Administration, particularly regarding the question of
whether the United States has reduced or withdrawn from global leadership. In support of this
view, these observers cite what they views as the Obama Administration’s
 focus on reducing the U.S. military presence and ending U.S. combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan in favor of focusing more on domestic U.S. rebuilding
initiatives,
 decision to announce but not enforce a “red line” regarding the behavior of the
Syrian government, and
 restrained response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and more
generally, its reluctance, for a time at least, to fully acknowledge and adapt to
less cooperative and more confrontational relationships with Russia and China.
Still others view the start of a change in the U.S. role as occurring even sooner, under the George
W. Bush Administration—when that Administration did not respond more strongly to Russia’s
2008 invasion and occupation of part of Georgia—or under the Clinton Administration.
For these observers, a change in the U.S. role in the world under the Trump Administration may
represent not so much a shift in the U.S. role as a continuation or deepening of a change that
began in a prior U.S. administration.
Potential Combined Perspectives
The perspectives outlined in the preceding sections are not necessarily mutually exclusive—
assessments combining aspects of more than one of these perspectives are possible.
Implications of a Changed U.S. Role
Among observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years, there are multiple views regarding the potential implications of that change.
Some Observers View Implications as Undesirable
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has
substantially changed the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump
Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the
implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from
U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an
unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something
of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70
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years. More specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is
doing some or all of the following:
 reducing U.S. power and foreign-policy capacity, particularly by weakening or
hollowing out the State Department and reducing or devaluing elements of U.S.
soft power;
 weakening the U.S. ability to leverage its power and foreign-policy capacity in
international affairs—and isolating the United States on certain international
issues, effectively turning the concept of America First into “America Alone”—
by
 damaging long-standing and valuable U.S. alliance relationships,
 reducing U.S. participation in multilateral political and trade negotiations and
agreements, and
 making the United States look more erratic and impulsive as an international
actor, and less reliable as an ally and negotiating partner;
 weakening the U.S.-led international order and encouraging a reemergence of
aspects of a might-makes-right international order;
 slowing the spread of democracy and human rights, encouraging a moral
equivalency between the United States and authoritarian and illiberal countries,
and tacitly facilitating a reemergence of authoritarian and illiberal forms of
government;
 disregarding the costly lessons of the first half of the 20th century, and how the
U.S. role in the world of the last 70 years has been motivated at bottom by a
desire to prevent a repetition of the horrific events of that period; and
 creating vacuums in global leadership in establishing and maintaining global
rules and norms, on the disposition of specific disputes and other issues, and in
regional power balances that China and Russia as well as France, Turkey, Syria,
Iran, and other countries are moving to fill, often at the expense of U.S. interests
and values.
Other Observers View Implications as Helpful
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were
arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more-restrained U.S. role in the
world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding
to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests. More
specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is doing some
or all of the following:
 winding down U.S. participation in so-called endless wars (aka forever wars) in
places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and also not starting new wars;
 emphasizing religious freedom—a core U.S. value—as a central tenet in U.S.
foreign policy;
 adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the United
States can accomplish in the world today and in the future, particularly given
limits on U.S. resources and the reduction in U.S. economic and military
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preponderance in recent decades as other countries have grown economically and
developed their militaries;
 enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making potential U.S.
actions less predictable to potential adversaries;
 reestablishing respect for national sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign
policy and for organizing international affairs;
 encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend
themselves, thereby reducing U.S. costs and developing Eurasia’s potential to
become more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional
hegemons;
 placing an emphasis on countering and competing with China, which poses a
uniquely strong and multidimensional challenge to U.S. security and prosperity;
 working to strengthen the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region under
the FOIP construct;
 helping to broker breakthrough improvements in Israel’s relations with other
countries in the Middle East;
 exploring possibilities for improving relations where possible with countries such
as Russia and North Korea; and
 making trade agreements more fair to the United States.
Some Related or Additional Issues
The following sections provide brief discussions of some related or additional issues for Congress
regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic
A new (i.e., since about March 2020) issue is the question of whether and how the global
COVID-19 pandemic might lead to profoundly transformative and long-lasting changes in the
U.S. role in the world in areas such as U.S. global leadership, China’s potential for acting as a
global leader, U.S. strategic competition with China, U.S. relations with allies, and U.S.
definitions of U.S. national security. Some observers argue that the COVID-19 pandemic is the
first major international crisis since World War II for which the United States has not served as
the global leader for spearheading, organizing, or implementing an international response.
Another CRS report provides an overview of the potential implications of the COVID-19
pandemic for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world, as well as a
list of CRS reports addressing various aspects of this issue and examples of other writings
addressing this issue from various perspectives,5 See also some of the more recent writings cited
in Appendix C of this CRS report.
Costs and Benefits of Allies
Within the overall debate over the U.S. role in the world, one long-standing specific question
relates to the costs and benefits of allies. As noted earlier, some observers believe that under the

5 CRS Report R46336, COVID-19: Potential Implications for International Security Environment—Overview of Issues
and Further Reading for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Michael Moodie.
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Trump Administration, the United States has become more skeptical of the value of allies,
particularly those in Europe, and more transactional in managing U.S. alliance relationships.
Skeptics of allies and alliances generally argue that their value to the United States is overrated;
that allies are capable of defending themselves without U.S. help; that U.S. allies frequently act as
free riders in their alliance relationships with the United States by shifting security costs to the
United States; that in the absence of U.S. help, these allies would do more on their own to balance
against potential regional hegemons; and that alliances create a risk of drawing the United States
into conflicts involving allies over issues that are not vital to the United States.
Supporters of the U.S. approach to allies and alliances of the past 70 years, while acknowledging
the free-rider issue as something that needs to be managed, generally argue that alliances are
needed and valuable for preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia and for
otherwise deterring potential regional aggression; that alliances form a significant advantage for
the United States in its dealings with other major powers, such as Russia and China (both of
which largely lack similar alliance networks); that although allies might be capable of defending
themselves without U.S. help, they might also choose, in the absence of U.S. help, to bandwagon
with would-be regional hegemons (rather than contribute to efforts to balance against them); that
in addition to mutual defense benefits, alliances offer other benefits, particularly in peacetime,
including sharing of intelligence, information, and technology and the cultivation of soft-power
forms of cooperation; and that a transactional approach to alliances, which encourages the merits
of each bilateral alliance relationship to be measured in isolation, overlooks the collective benefits
of maintaining alliances with multiple countries in a region.
U.S. Public Opinion
U.S. public opinion can be an important factor in debates over the future U.S. role in the world.
Among other things, public opinion can
 shape the political context (and provide the impulse) for negotiating the terms of,
and for considering whether to become party to, international agreements;
 influence debates on whether and how to employ U.S. military force; and
 influence policymaker decisions on funding levels for defense, international
affairs activities, and foreign assistance.
Foreign policy specialists, strategists, and policymakers sometimes invoke U.S. public opinion
poll results in debates on the U.S. role in the world. One issue relating to U.S. public opinion that
observers are discussing is the extent to which the U.S. public may now believe that U.S. leaders
have broken a tacit social contract under which the U.S. public, and particularly the middle class,
has supported the costs of U.S. global leadership in return for the promise of receiving certain
benefits, particularly steady increases in real incomes and the standard of living.
Operation of U.S. Democracy
Another potential issue for Congress is how the operation of democracy in the United States
might affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting
democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government.
During the Cold War, the effective operation of U.S. democracy at the federal level and lower
levels was viewed as helpful for arguing on the world stage that Western-style democracy was
superior, for encouraging other countries to adopt that model, and for inspiring people in the
Soviet Union and other authoritarian countries to resist authoritarianism and seek change in the
direction of more democratic forms of government. The ability of the United State to demonstrate
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the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government was something that in today’s parlance
would be termed an element of U.S. soft power.
The end of the Cold War led to a diminution in the ideological debate about the relative merits of
democracy versus authoritarianism as forms of government. As a possible consequence, there
may have been less of a perceived need during this period for focusing on the question of whether
the operation of U.S. democracy was being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other
countries.
The shift in the international environment over the past few years from the post-Cold War era to
an era of renewed great power competition6 has led to a renewed ideological debate about the
relative merits of Western-style democracy versus 21st-century forms of authoritarian and illiberal
government. Articles in China’s state-controlled media, for example, sometimes criticize the
operation of U.S. democracy and argue that China’s form of governance is more advantageous.
The potential issue for Congress is whether, in a period of renewed ideological competition, there
is now once again a need for focusing more on the question of whether the operation of U.S.
democracy is being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other countries.
Potential Implications for Congress as an Institution
Another issue for Congress is what implications a changed U.S. role in the world might have for
Congress as an institution, particularly regarding the preservation and use of congressional
powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic
policy, and more generally the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S.
foreign policymaking. Specific matters here include, among other things, the question of war
powers, the delegation of authority for imposing tariffs, and whether a change in the U.S. role
would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations.7
Reversibility of a Change in U.S. Role
Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role in the world would at
some point in the future be reversible, should U.S. policymakers in the future desire to return to a
U.S. role in the world more like that of the past 70 years. Potential questions for Congress include
the following:
 What elements of a change in the U.S. role in the world should be reversed, and
what elements should be maintained?
 What elements of change in the U.S. role might be more reversible, less
reversible, or irreversible? What elements might be less reversible due to
technological developments, changes in international power dynamics, or
changes in U.S. public opinion?
 How much time and effort would be required to implement a return to a U.S. role
like that of the past 70 years?
 How might the issue of reversibility be affected by the amount of time that a
change in the U.S. role remains in place before an attempt might be made to
reverse it?

6 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For additional discussion, see Kevin Kosar, ed., Congress and Foreign Affairs: Reasserting the Power of the First
Branch
, R Street Institute, 2020, 64 pp.
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 How might decisions that Congress and the executive branch make in the near
term affect the question of potential downstream reversibility? What actions, if
any, should be taken now with an eye toward preserving an option for reversing
nearer-term changes in the U.S. role?
 What are the views of other countries regarding the potential reversibility of a
change in the U.S. role, and how might those views affect the foreign policies of
those countries?
Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional reading, Appendix C presents a list of recent writings
reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump Administration has
changed the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change might be.

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Appendix A. Glossary of Selected Terms
Some key terms used in this report include the following:
Role in the world
The term role in the world generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the overall character,
purpose, or direction of a country’s participation in international affairs or the country’s overall
relationship to the rest of the world. A country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible
expression of its grand strategy (see next item). In this report, the term U.S. role in the world is
often shortened for convenience to U.S. role.
Grand strategy
The term grand strategy generally refers in foreign policy discussions to a country’s overall
approach for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national
instruments at its disposal, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools
(sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME). A country’s leaders might deem
elements of a country’s grand strategy to be secret, so that assessments, assumptions, or risks
included in the strategy are not revealed to potential adversaries. Consequently, a country’s
leaders might say relatively little in public about the country’s grand strategy. As mentioned
above, however, a country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible expression of its grand
strategy. For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or
interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues.
International order/world order
The term international order or world order generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the
collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, norms, and practices that are intended to
organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period.
International orders tend to be established by major world powers, particularly in the years
following wars between major powers, though they can also emerge at other times. Though often
referred to as if they are fully developed or firmly established situations, international orders are
usually incomplete, partly aspirational, sometimes violated by their supporters, rejected (or at
least not supported) by certain states and nonstate actors, and subject to various stresses and
challenges.
Unipolar/bipolar/tripolar/multipolar
In foreign policy discussions, terms like unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar are sometimes
used to refer to the number of top-tier world powers whose actions tend to characterize or give
structure to a given historical period’s international security situation. The Cold War that lasted
from the late 1940s to the late 1980s or early 1990s is usually described as a bipolar situation
featuring a competition between two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and
their allies. The post-Cold War era, which followed the Cold War, is sometimes described as the
unipolar moment, with the United States being the unipolar power, meaning the world’s sole
superpower.
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As discussed in another CRS report,8 observers have concluded that in recent years, there has
been a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new international security situation characterized by
renewed great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, leading
observers to refer to the new situation as a tripolar or multipolar world. Observers who might list
additional countries (or groups of countries, such as the European Union) as additional top-tier
world powers, along with the United States, China, and Russia, might also use the term
multipolar.
Eurasia
The term Eurasia is used in this report to refer to the entire land mass that encompasses both
Europe and Asia, including its fringing islands, extending from Portugal on its western end to
Japan on its eastern end, and from Russia’s Arctic coast on its northern edge to India on its
southern edge, and encompassing all the lands and countries in between, including those of
Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Eurasia’s fringing islands include,
among others, the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe, Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, the
archipelagic countries of Southeast Asia, and Japan. There are also other definitions of Eurasia,
some of which are more specialized and refer to subsets of the broad area described above.
Regional hegemon
The term regional hegemon generally refers to a country so powerful relative to the other
countries in its region that it can dominate the affairs of that region and compel other countries in
that region to support (or at least not oppose) the hegemon’s key policy goals. The United States
is generally considered to have established itself in the 19th century as the hegemon of the
Western Hemisphere.
Spheres-of-influence world
The term spheres-of-influence world generally refers to a world that, in terms of its structure of
international relations, is divided into multiple regions (i.e., spheres), each with its own hegemon.
A spheres-of-influence world, like a multipolar world, is characterized by having multiple top-tier
powers. In a spheres-of-influence world, however, at least some of those top-tier powers have
achieved a status of regional hegemon, while in a multipolar world, few or none of those major
world powers (other than the United States, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere)
have achieved a status of regional hegemon. As a result, in a spheres-of-influence world,
international relations are more highly segmented on a regional basis than they are in a multipolar
world.
Geopolitics
The term geopolitics is often used as a synonym for international politics or for strategy relating
to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features
on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that
places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features
involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of
countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers

8 CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads,
railways, and waterways.
Hard power and soft power
In foreign policy discussions, the term hard power generally refers to coercive power, particularly
military and economic power, while the term soft power generally refers to the ability to persuade
or attract support, particularly through diplomacy, development assistance, support for
international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of
cultural elements such as music, movies, television shows, and literature.
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Appendix B. Past U.S. Role vs. More
Restrained Role
This appendix provides additional discussion on the debate over whether the United States should
attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years,
or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs.
Among U.S. strategists and foreign policy specialists, advocates of a more restrained U.S. role
include (to cite a few examples) Andrew Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Ted Galen Carpenter, John
Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble, William Ruger, and Stephen Walt. These and
other authors have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role. Terms
such as offshore balancing, offshore control, realism, strategy of restraint, or retrenchment have
been used to describe some of these variations.9 These variations on the idea of a more restrained
U.S. role would not necessarily match in their details a changed U.S. role that might be pursued
by the Trump Administration.10
Arguments in Favor of a More Restrained U.S. Role
Observers advocating a more restrained U.S. role in the world make various arguments regarding
the United States and other countries. Arguments that they make relating to the United States
include the following:
Costs and benefits. In terms of human casualties, financial and economic
impacts, diplomatic impacts, and impacts on domestic U.S. values, politics, and
society, the costs to the United States of defending and promoting the liberal
international order have been underestimated and the benefits have been
overestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia have
frequently been more costly and/or less successful than anticipated, making a
strategy of intervening less cost-effective in practice than in theory. U.S.
interventions can also draw the United States into conflicts involving other
countries over issues that are not vital or important U.S. interests.
Capacity. Given projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt, the
United States in coming years will no longer be able to afford to play as
expansive a role in the world as it has played for the past 70 years.
Overextending U.S. participation in international affairs could lead to excessive

9 The terms offshore balancing and offshore control refer in general to a policy in which the United States, in effect,
stands off the shore of Eurasia and engages in the security affairs of Eurasia less frequently, less directly, or less
expansively. The term retrenchment is more often used by critics of these proposed approaches.
10 Debate about this dimension of the U.S. role in the world is not limited to one between those who favor continued
extensive engagement along the lines of the past 70 years and those who prefer some form of a more restrained role—
other options are also being promoted. For example, one analyst and former White House aide advocates an approach
that differs from both retrenchment and reassertion, an approach he labels “re-calibration” to the “geopolitical,
economic, technological and other dynamics driving the 21st-century world.” Such an approach, he argues, would entail
a reappraisal of U.S. interests, a reassessment of U.S. power, and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. (See Bruce
Jentleson, “Apart, Atop, Amidst: America in the World,” War on the Rocks, January 2017.)
As another example, a different analyst argues in favor of a U.S. role based on “a better nationalism”—what he
describes as a more benign and constructive form that “would not dismantle the post-war order and America’s post war
project, but would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests.” (Hal Brands, “U.S.
Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and it Alternatives,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017:
73-93.)
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amounts of federal debt and inadequately addressed domestic problems, leaving
the United States poorly positioned for sustaining any future desired level of
international engagement.
Past 70 years as a historical aberration. The U.S. role of the past 70 years is an
aberration when viewed against the U.S. historical record dating back to 1776,
which is a history characterized more by periods of restraint than by periods of
high levels of international engagement. Returning to a more restrained U.S. role
would thus return U.S. policy to what is, historically, a more traditional policy for
the United States.
Moral standing. The United States has not always lived up to its own ideals, and
consequently lacks sufficient moral standing to pursue a role that involves
imposing its values and will on other countries. Attempting to do that through an
interventionist policy can also lead to an erosion of those values at home.
Public opinion. It is not clear that U.S. public opinion supports the idea of
attempting to maintain a U.S. role in the world as expansive as that of the past 70
years, particularly if it means making trade-offs against devoting resources to
domestic U.S. priorities. In public opinion polls, Americans often express support
for a more restrained U.S. role, particularly on issues such as whether the United
States should act as the world’s police force, funding levels for U.S. foreign
assistance programs, U.S. participation in (and financial support for) international
organizations, and U.S. defense expenditures for defending allies.
Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
Growing wealth and power. Given the rapid growth in wealth and power in
recent years of China and other countries, the United States is no longer as
dominant globally as it once was, and is becoming less dominant over time,
which will make it increasingly difficult or expensive and/or less appropriate for
the United States to attempt to continue playing a role of global leadership.
Ideas about international order. Other world powers, such as China, have their
own ideas about international order, and these ideas do not match all aspects of
the current liberal international order. The United States should acknowledge the
changing global distribution of power and work with China and other countries to
define a new international order that incorporates ideas from these other
countries.
Eurasia as self-regulating. Given the growth in the economies of U.S. allies and
partners in Europe and Asia since World War II, these allies and partners are now
more capable of looking after their own security needs, and Eurasia can now be
more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons
in Eurasia. Consequently, the level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
can be reduced without incurring undue risk that regional hegemons will emerge
there. The current substantial level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
discourages countries in Eurasia from acting more fully on their own to prevent
the emergence of regional hegemons.
Hegemons and spheres of influence. Even if one or more regional hegemons
were to emerge in Eurasia, this would not pose an unacceptable situation for the
United States—vital U.S. interests could still be defended. Similarly, the
emergence of a spheres-of-influence world need not be unacceptable for the
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United States, because such a world would again not necessarily be incompatible
with vital U.S. interests.
Arguments in Favor of Continuing U.S. Role of the Past 70 Years
Observers who support a continuation of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years generally
reject the above arguments and argue the opposite. Arguments that these observers make relating
to the United States include the following:
Costs and benefits. Although the costs to the United States of its role in the
world over the past 70 years have been substantial, the benefits have been
greater. The benefits are so long-standing that they can easily be taken for
granted or underestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia,
though not without significant costs and errors, have been successful in
preventing wars between major powers and defending and promoting vital U.S.
interests and values. A more restrained U.S. role in the world might be less
expensive for the United States in the short run, but would create a risk of
damaging U.S. security, liberty, and prosperity over the longer run by risking the
emergence of regional hegemons or a spheres-of-influence world.
Capacity. Projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt need to be
taken into account, but even in a context of limits on U.S. resources, the United
States is a wealthy country that can choose to play an expansive role in
international affairs, and the costs to the United States of playing a more
restrained role in world affairs may in the long run be much greater than the costs
of playing a more expansive role. Projections regarding future U.S. budget
deficits and debt are driven primarily by decisions on revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures rather than by decisions on defense and foreign-policy-
related expenditures. Consequently, these projections are an argument for getting
the country’s fiscal house in order primarily in terms of revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures, rather than an argument for a more restrained U.S. role
in the world.
Past 70 years as a historical aberration. Although a restrained U.S. foreign
policy may have been appropriate for the United States in the 18th and 19th
centuries, the world of the 18th and 19th centuries was quite different. For
example, given changes in communication, transportation, and military
technologies since the 18th and 19th centuries, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are
much less effective as geographic buffers between the United States and Eurasia
today than they were in the 18th and 19th centuries. Experiences in more recent
decades (including World Wars I and II and the Cold War) show that a more
restrained U.S. foreign policy would now be riskier or more costly over the long
run than an engaged U.S. foreign policy.
Moral standing. The United States, though not perfect, retains ample moral
authority—and responsibility—to act as a world leader, particularly in
comparison to authoritarian countries such as China or Russia.
Public opinion. Other public opinion poll results show that Americans support a
U.S. global leadership role.
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Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
Growing wealth and power. Although the wealth and power of countries such
as China have grown considerably in recent years, future rates of growth for
those countries are open to question. China faces the prospect of declining rates
of economic growth and the aging and eventual shrinkage of its population, while
Russia has a relatively small economy and is experiencing demographic decline.
The United States has one of the most favorable demographic situations of any
major power, and retains numerous advantages in terms of economic and
financial strength, military power, technology, and capacity for innovation.
Although the United States is no longer as dominant globally as it once was, it
remains the world’s most powerful country, particularly when all dimensions of
power are taken into consideration.
Ideas about international order. The liberal international order reflects U.S.
interests and values; a renegotiated international order incorporating ideas from
authoritarian countries such as China would produce a world less conducive to
defending and promoting U.S. interests and values. Americans have long lived in
a world reflecting U.S. interests and values and would not welcome a world
incorporating Chinese values on issues such as the rule of law; the scope of civil
society; political and human rights; freedom of speech, the press, and
information; and privacy and surveillance.
Eurasia as self-regulating. Eurasia historically has not been self-regulating in
terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, and the idea that it will
become self-regulating in the future is a risky and untested proposition.
Hegemons and spheres of influence. A regional hegemon in Eurasia would have
enough economic and other power to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests. In
addition to threatening U.S. access to the economies of Eurasia, a spheres-of-
influence world would be prone to war because regional hegemons historically
are never satisfied with the extent of their hegemonic domains and eventually
seek to expand them, coming into conflict with other hegemons. Leaders of
regional hegemons are also prone to misjudgment and miscalculation regarding
where their spheres collide.
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Appendix C. Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional reading, this appendix presents a list of writings over the past
six months reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump
Administration has changed the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change
might be, listed in chronological order, with the most recent on top. Writings from more than six
months ago can be found in earlier versions of this report.
Samantha Power, “The Can-Do Power, America’s Advantage and Biden’s Chance,” Foreign
Affairs
, January/February 2021.
Helle C. Dale, “New Leadership Is Exactly What Voice of America Needs,” Heritage Foundation,
December 16, 2020.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “A New Way to Lead the Free World, The Authoritarian Tide Has
Risen, but a Global Alliance of Democracies Would Help Turn It Back,” Wall Street Journal,
December 15, 2020.
Luis Simon, “Biden and Europe’s Dilemmas,” War on the Rocks, December 15, 2020.
Jennifer Steinhauer and Michael Crowley, “Biden to Face a Confrontational Russia in a World
Changed From His Time in Office,” New York Times, December 15, 2020.
Loren Thompson, “Love Him Or Hate Him, President Trump’s Defense Legacy Is Profound,”
Forbes, December 15, 2020.
James Goldgeier and Bruce W. Jentleson, “A Democracy Summit Is Not What the Doctor
Ordered, America, Heal Thyself,” Foreign Affairs, December 14, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “Can Biden Find Clarity on China and Russia? Shared Interests Help Shape
Geopolitical Rivalries, but They Can’t Erase Them,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2020.
Alex Ward, “The Single Biggest Foreign Policy Decision Joe Biden Faces, Will Biden’s Foreign
Policy Be One Of Restoration, Reformation, Or Revolution?” Vox, December 14, 2020.
Andrew A. Michta, “America’s Fin de Siècle: How Unbound Liberalism Has Brought the
Country to Its Knees,” National Interest, December 13, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Joe Biden Might Have Good Instincts, But His Foreign Policy Team
Doesn’t,” American Conservative, December 11, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Biden Sees the A-Team. I See the Blob,” Foreign Policy, December 11, 2020.
Dan DePetris, “Milley Is Right—the U.S. Should Reevaluate Its Military Commitments,”
Defense News, December 10, 2020.
Mary Harris, “Maybe the U.S. Shouldn’t Be the World’s Leader,” Slate, December 10, 2020.
Emilie Kao and Brett D. Schaefer, “Can Human Rights Be Rescued From Human Rights
Activists’ Overreach?” Heritage Foundation, December 10, 2020.
Reuters staff, “U.S. Blacklists People in Russia, Haiti, Yemen for Rights Abuses,” Reuters,
December 10, 2020.
Ian Talley, “U.S. Sanctions Accused Human Rights Abusers in Several Countries,” Wall Street
Journal
, December 10, 2020.
Isaac Chotiner, “The Next Stage of the Ideological Struggle Between the U.S. and China,” New
Yorker
, December 9, 2020.
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Dan Lamothe, “Like Trump, Biden has promised to end the ‘forever wars.’ The landscape
remains complicated,” Washington Post, December 9, 2020.
Paul Sonne, “To Counter China and Russia, Biden Has Said He Will Strengthen Alliances,”
Washington Post, December 9, 2020.
Nick Wadhams and Saleha Mohsin, “Trump Set Record Sanctions Use That Biden Is Likely to
Keep,” Bloomberg, December 9, 2020.
Michael T. Klare, “Trump Is Leaving Us With a New Cold War,” Nation, December 8, 2020.
Simon Lester, “President Biden Must Restore American Trade Leadership,” Cato Institute,
December 8, 2020.
Danielle Pletka, “On Foreign Policy, Trump Created Opportunities for Biden, Will the President-
Elect Build on Them or Rush to Repudiate Trump’s Legacy?” Dispatch, December 8, 2020.
Alex Ward, “The Revenge of the Blob, Presidents Obama and Trump Kept the Nation’s Foreign
Policy Establishment at Arm’s Length. President-Elect Biden Has Warmly Embraced It,” Vox,
December 8, 2020.
Edward Alden, “Report Sheds Light on How Biden’s Future NSC Chief Wants to Reshape U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, December 7, 2020.
Ryan P. Burke, “The Hidden Dangers in Biden’s Foreign Policy, The President-Elect’s Stated
Agenda Will Antagonize China and Lead to Conflict,” Defense One, December 7, 2020.
Austin Doehler, “Great Power Competition Is Too Narrow a Frame, The United States Cannot
Hope to Prevail and Prosper Unless It Broadens Its Conception of the Global Struggle,” Defense
One
, December 6, 2020.
Michael Hirsh, “Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable,” Foreign
Policy
, December 5, 2020.
Evan Sankey, “Damage Done: Why Joe Biden Needs to Leave Trump’s Policies Alone,” National
Interest
, December 5, 2020.
Zachary Shore, “Divided We Fall: Why the ‘America First’ Policy Has Created New Problems,”
National Interest, December 4, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Blob Is Back And It’s Ready For War,” American Conservative, December
3, 2020.
Samuel Barnett, Natalie Thompson, and Sandy Alkoutami, “How Gen Z Will Shake Up Foreign
Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 3, 2020.
Niall Ferguson, “Cold War II,” National Review, December 3, 2020.
Thomas Joscelyn, “Trump’s Wish to End the ‘Endless Wars’ Denies Reality, ISIS Isn’t Dead, al-
Qaeda Is Not a ‘Shadow of Its Former Self,’ and the Taliban Is Not Our Counterterrorism
Partner,” Dispatch, December 3, 2020.
Amy Mackinnon, “Biden Expected to Put the World’s Kleptocrats on Notice, The U.S. President-
Elect and His Top Advisors Have Made the Fight Against Dirty Money One of Their Early
Priorities,” Foreign Policy, December 3, 2020.
Peter Beinart, “Biden Wants America to Lead the World. It Shouldn’t. U.S. ‘Leadership’ Is a
Favorite Trope of the Foreign Policy Establishment. It’s Outdated and Dangerous,” New York
Times
, December 2, 2020.
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Ted Galen Carpenter, “Why Can’t Europe Defend Itself?” National Interest, December 1, 2020.
Scott Cullinane, “Biden, the Transatlantic Relationship and a Changing America,” The Hill,
December 1, 2020.
Ash Jain and Alex Pascal, “Alliances First: Joe Biden’s Historic Opportunity to Reshape Global
Order,” National Interest, December 1, 2020.
Jonathan Stearns, “EU Leaders Plan Appeal to Biden to Rebuild Transatlantic Ties,” Bloomberg,
December 1, 2020.
Hannah Beech, “‘Trump Is Better’: In Asia, Pro-Democracy Forces Worry About Biden,” New
York Times
, November 230 (updated December 1), 2020.
Dolf Gielen and Morgan Bazilian, “How John Kerry Will Restore America’s Climate
Leadership,” National Interest, November 29, 2020.
James Marson, “Biden’s NATO Amity Sparks Debate Among European Allies,” Wall Street
Journal
, November 28, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Team Trump Determined to Drop Foreign Policy Bombs on the Way Out,” Cato
Institute, November 27, 2020.
David von Drehle, “Joe Biden Says America Is Back. Back to What?” Washington Post,
November 27, 2020.
Benjamin H. Friedman and Stephen Wertheim, “Say No, Joe, On U.S. Foreign Policy, There’s No
Going Back to the Status Quo,” Foreign Policy, November 25, 2020.
Colum Lynch, “Biden Likely to Lift Sanctions on ICC Chief Prosecutor,” Foreign Policy,
November 25, 2020.
Anne-Marie Slaughter and Alexandra Stark, “Crafting a Diplomacy-First US Foreign Policy,”
Strategist, November 25, 2020.
Dolf Gielen and Morgan Bazilian, “How Biden and Kerry Could Rebuild America’s Global
Climate Leadership,” The Conversation, November 24, 2020.
Michael R. Gordon, “National-Security Picks Combine Diverse Backgrounds, Singular Aims,”
Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2020.
Kim Hjelmgaard and Deirdre Shesgreen, “Even Trump’s Fiercest Critics Say He May Have
Gotten Some World Affairs Right,” USA Today, November 24, 2020.
Trevor Hunnicutt and Humeyra Pamuk, “Rejecting Trump's Foreign Policy Approach, Biden Says
‘America Is Back,’” Reuters, November 24, 2020.
Annie Karni and David E. Sanger, “Biden’s National Security Team Offers a Sharp Turn. But in
Which Direction?” New York Times, November 24, (updated December 8), 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “Aspects of Trump’s Foreign Policy Were Good for the U.S., Biden Should
Keep Them,” Washington Post, November 24, 2020.
Carol Morello, “Foreign Observers Shocked by Chaos over U.S. Election,” Washington Post,
November 24, 2020.
David Rothkopf, “Biden’s National Security Team Reveals He Has Learned from the Mistakes of
Past Presidents,” USA Today, November 24, 2020.
Frederic Wehrey, “How Joe Biden Can Rein in Donald Trump’s Reckless Middle East Policy,”
Politico, November 24, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Jorge G. Castañeda, “Biden Can Inspire Latin America, A Domestic Transformation of the United
States Would Have a Tremendous Impact in the Region,” New York Times, November 23, 2020.
Gregory D. Foster, “We Have Met the Enemy, and It Is Us: Restoring American Power, Getting
the Nation’s House in Order—Restoring Our Integrity and Dignity—is a Precondition for
Reestablishing Our Standing in the World,” Defense One, November 23, 2020.
Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Amy Mackinnon, “In Break From Trump, Biden Opts for
Experience, Expertise for Top National Security Jobs,” Foreign Policy, November 23, 2020.
Eli Lake, “Progressives May Not Like Biden’s Foreign Policy, The President-Elect’s National
Security Cabinet Will be Too Centrist for the Left Flank of His Party,” Bloomberg, November 23,
2020.
Matthew Lee, “Biden’s Choice for UN Envoy Signals Return to US Engagement,” Associated
Press
, November 23, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “Trump Aims to Box in Biden Abroad, but It May Not Work,” Associated Press,
November 23, 2020.
Charles V. Peña, “Why Joe Biden Should Lead a Reboot of NATO,” National Interest, November
23, 2020.
Kori Schake, Jim Mattis, Jim Ellis, and Joe Felter, “Defense In Depth, Why U.S. Security
Depends on Alliances—Now More Than Ever,” Foreign Affairs, November 23, 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump’s Overarching Middle East Strategy Reaches a Disastrous Dead End,”
Washington Post, November 22, 2020.
Thomas Wright, “The Fraught Politics Facing Biden’s Foreign Policy, His Presidency May be the
Establishment’s Last Best Chance to Demonstrate that Liberal Internationalism is a Superior
Strategy to Populist Nationalism,” Atlantic, November 22, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “President Joe Biden Confronts A Radically Different World Than When He Was
Veep, America’s Foreign Entanglements Are Unnecessary. Joe Biden Has a Chance to End
Them,” American Conservative, November 20, 2020.
Jason Blazakis, “Trump Abused U.S. Sanctions and Failed to Get Results. Biden Can Do Better,”
Foreign Policy, November 19, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Will Biden Jettison the Anti-Russia Hysteria?” Antiwar.com, November
19, 2020.
Daniel Fried and Benjamin Haddad, “Biden Knows Europe, and Europe Knows Biden. That’s
Not Enough. How to Start a New—and Overdue—Chapter of Trans-Atlantic relations,” Foreign
Policy
, November 19, 2020.
Sushma Raman, “Getting Human Rights Right, Before Biden Can Lead in the World, He’ll Have
to Lead at Home,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2020.
Jonathan Tepperman, “Can Biden End America’s Forever Wars? Delivering on His Promise Will
Prove Extremely Difficult—but So May the Consequences of Not Doing So,” Foreign Policy,
November 19, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “The World Is Never Going Back to Normal, Other Countries Are Learning to
Live without America. Biden Can’t Restore the Pre-Trump Status Quo,” Atlantic, November 18,
2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Walden Bello, “What Will a Biden Presidency Bring to the Asia Pacific?” Foreign Policy in
Focus, November 18, 2020.
Giselle Donnelly, “Can Joe Biden Save the World America Made? He May be the Last Man in
Position to Reverse the Wreck of US Post-Cold War Foreign Policy and Preserve What Remains
of the Liberal International Order,” National Interest, November 18, 2020.
Daniel Immerwahr, “Should America Still Police the World? On the Problem—and Potential—of
a Seventy-Year-Old Superpower,” New Yorker, November 18, 2020.
Corina Rebegea, “Inbox: Reviving the Transatlantic Democratic Agenda,” Center for European
Policy Analysis, November 18, 2020.
Andrew J. Bacevich and Adam Weinstein, “Trump Demands Afghan Withdrawal and Washington
Panics. But It’s Time to Leave, Now,” Responsible Statecraft, November 17, 2020.
Robin Emmott and John Irish, “After Trump, Europe Aims to Show Biden It Can Fight for Itself,”
Reuters, November 17, 2020.
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Najim Rahim and Fatima Faizi, “U.S. Troops Are Packing Up, Ready or
Not,” New York Times, November 17, 2020.
Robert A. Manning, “A Gaping Hole in US Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Hill, November 17, 2020.
Tom McTague, “Joe Biden Has a Barack Obama Problem, Many Leaders in Asia, in Particular,
Remain Unhappy with the Former President’s Foreign Policy,” Defense One, November 17,
2020.
William Ruger and Rajon Menan, “It’s Time to Withdraw from Afghanistan,” Washington Post,
November 17, 2020.
Josh Rogin, “Trump’s Latest Summit No-shows Are His Final Insult to America’s Asian Allies,”
Washington Post, November 17, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Trump Is in Denial—and America Is Unsafe, A House Divided against Itself
Can’t Compete on the World Stage,” Foreign Policy, November 17, 2020.
Alex Ward, “The 3 Elements of Trump’s Foreign Policy Biden Should Keep, Trump’s Foreign
Policy Was Terrible. But Biden should still follow parts of it,” Vox, November 17, 2020.
Katie Bo Williams, “Trump Orders Hasty Afghanistan, Iraq Drawdowns to Beat Biden
Inauguration,” Defense One, November 17, 2020.
Jordan Fabian and Jennifer Epstein, “Biden Vows to Rebuild U.S. Ties With World: ‘America Is
Back,’” Bloomberg, November 16, 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “For the West, There Is No Road Back to a Time Before Trump, Europeans
Are Relieved by Biden’s Victory But Will Be Very Disappointed If They Don’t Heed the Lessons
of the Past Four Years,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2020.
Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas, “French and German Foreign Ministers: Joe Biden Can
Make Transatlantic Unity Possible,” Washington Post, November 16, 2020.
Ania Nussbaum, “Macron Says EU Can’t Go Back to Relying on U.S. Under Biden,” Bloomberg,
November 16, 2020.
Eric Schmitt, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Charlie Savage, and Helene Cooper, “Trump Is Said to Be
Preparing to Withdraw Troops From Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia,” New York Times, November
16, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Ray Takeyh, “Trump’s Parting Gift to Biden: A More Stable Middle East, He Was Successful
Because Only an Iconoclastic President Could Have Rejected False Assumptions and Failed
Strategies,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2020.
Jeanne Whalen, “Biden Likely to Remain Tough on Chinese Tech Like Huawei, But with More
Help from Allies,” Washington Post, November 16, 2020.
Paola Tamma, “Europe’s Biden bind: Stick with US or go it alone? Continent Split Between
Wanting Close Ties to Washington and Desire to Develop Its Own Power,” Politico, November
15, 2020.
Luke McGee, “Joe Biden’s Victory Isn’t Enough on Its Own to Heal the Wounds Trump Inflicted
on Europe,” CNN, November 14, 2020.
Brandon Valeriano and Eric Gomez, “A Biden Foreign Policy: Restraint By Circumstance, Not
Design,” American Conservative, November 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Joe Biden Should Break Ranks and Stop the New Cold War With Russia,” Cato
Institute, November 13, 2020.
Tom McTague, “Europe Can’t Blame Donald Trump Anymore, The Question for the Continent’s
Leaders Now is Whether They Can Agree on What They Are Collectively For, Not Just What
They Are Against,” Defense One, November 13, 2020.
Tara Varma and Jeremy Shapiro, “The European Offers America Cannot Refuse,” War on the
Rocks
, November 13, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Will the Democrats and Biden Continue to Treat Russia as the Enemy?”
Cato Institute, November 12, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “What Will Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy Look Like? The President-Elect’s Emphasis
Will Be on Restoring U.S. Alliances. But is it Too Late for That?” Slate, November 12, 2020.
Suzanne Nossel, “Biden Must Restore America’s Reputation as a Beacon of Press Freedom, After
Four Years of Hostility to Journalists and a Free Press, the United States Must Repair the Damage
Trump Has Done at Home and Abroad,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2020.
Matthieu Vallières, “Joe Biden’s Empathy May Result in a ‘Therapeutic’ Foreign Policy,” The
Conversation
, November 12, 2020.
Paul D. Shinkman, “How President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Actually Help President-Elect
Biden, The Incoming Administration is Poised to Try to Undo Four Years of Trump’s Foreign
Policies. In Some Cases, Biden Would be Unwise to Even Try, Analysts Say,” U.S. News & World
Report
, November 11, 2020.
Robin Wright, “The Seven Pillars of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” New Yorker, November 11, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “When America’s Election Is Over, Americans Will Have to Address China,” Cato
Institute, November 10, 2020.
Theodore R. Bromund, “The U.S. Must Promote Democratic Leadership in Interpol,” Heritage
Foundation, November 10, 2020.
Michael Crowley, “An Obama Restoration on Foreign Policy? Familiar Faces Could Fill Biden’s
Team,” New York Times, November 9, 2020.
Richard Haass, “Repairing the World, The Imperative—and Limits—of a Post-Trump Foreign
Policy,” Foreign Affairs, November 9, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Sara Khorshid, “What Trump’s Loss Means for Authoritarian Leaders, From Cairo to Riyadh,
Autocrats Are Nervous about What a Biden Administration Might Mean for Their Relationship
with Washington,” Foreign Policy, November 9, 2020.
Charles V. Peña, “Biden Shouldn’t Toss All of Trump’s Foreign Policies, From Ending Forever
Wars to Pressing Allies to Shoulder More of Their Defense Loads, the Next President Should
Pursue at Least Some of His Predecessor’s Goals,” Defense One, November 9, 2020.
David E. Sanger, “The End of ‘America First’: How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the
World, Those Who Have Known President-Elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. for Decades Say They
Expect Him to Move Carefully, Providing Reassurance with a Few Big Symbolic Acts,” New
York Times
, November 9 (updated November 12), 2020.
Matthew Karnitschnig, “What Biden Means for Europe, On Key Issues from Climate Change to
China, How the Next US President Will Revamp Transatlantic Ties,” Politico, November 8, 2020.
Tom McTague, “Joe Biden Won’t Fix America’s Relationships, Serious Questions about
America’s Role in the World Will Not Go Away Just Because Donald Trump Was Defeated,”
Atlantic, November 8, 2020.
James Stavridis, “A Preview of Biden’s Foreign Policy,” Bloomberg, November 8, 2020.
Rick Gladstone, “Biden to Face Long List of Foreign Challenges, With China No. 1,” New York
Times
, November 7 (updated November 15), 2020.
Barry Pavel et al., “Joe Biden Just Won the Presidency: What Does that Mean for America’s Role
in the World?” Atlantic Council, November 7, 2020.
James Palmer, “Don’t Expect a Biden Win to Boost U.S. Favorability, Obama Won Hearts All
over the World, but People Have Been Burned Twice Now,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2020.
Anchal Vohra, “Trump Promised to End America’s Wars. Biden Might Actually Do It. The
Former Vice President Contributed to a Legacy of Failed Wars in the Middle East. Can He Fix
It?” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2020.
Peter Feaver, “What Trump’s Near-Victory Means for Republican Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Policy
, November 5, 2020.
Jessica T. Mathews, “Time for a New Approach to Foreign Affairs,” New York Review of Books,
November 5, 2020.
Josh Rogin, “The Election Has Already Changed the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Washington
Post
, November 5, 2020.
Valerie Volcovici and Kate Abnett, “U.S. Formally Exits Global Climate Pact amid Election
Uncertainty,” Reuters, November 4, 2020.
Liam Kennedy, “Has Donald Trump Tarnished America for Good?” National Interest, November
3, 2020.
Daniel Kochis, “NATO Allies Now Spend $50 Billion More on Defense Than in 2016,” Heritage
Foundation, November 3, 2020.
James M. Roberts, “Changing International Aid,” Heritage Foundation, November 3, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Another Alliance Trump Didn’t Break, U.S. and India Will Share Intelligence as
the China Threat Looms,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2020.
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Edith M. Lederer, “Over 70 ICC Nations Support Court and Oppose US Sanctions,” Associated
Press
, November 2, 2020.
National Security Council, “President Trump on China: Putting America First,” White House,
November 2, 2020.
Ishaan Tharoor, “When America Decided to Rule the World,” Washington Post, November 2,
2020.
Kurt Volker, “US Foreign Policy After November 3: More Continuity than Change,” Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), November 2, 2020.
Ryan Crocker, “The World Won’t Organize Itself, Biden Understands What Career Diplomats
Know: America’s Relationships Overseas Require Hands-on Management, and Conditions in the
Field Are Messier Than They Appear,” Atlantic, November 1, 2020.
Sumantra Maitra, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Legacy Is His Ability to Balance Chaos in Asia,
Trump’s Facilitating an Alliance with India and Arming Taiwan as a Frontier State Against a
Rising China Will Be His Defining Legacy, a Strategy That Will Likely Continue Even if Joe
Biden Wins the Presidency,” National Interest, November 1, 2020.
Patrick Mendis Joey Wang, “Can the United States Leave Behind the Partisan Politics of
‘America First’ in Foreign Relations?” National Interest, November 1, 2020.
Christopher Mott, “The Death of Exceptionalism and the Birth of a New Foreign Policy,”
National Interest, November 1, 2020.
Hillary Clinton, “A National Security Reckoning, How Washington Should Think About Power,”
Foreign Affairs, November/December 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “How China Outsmarted the Trump Administration, While the U.S. Is
Distracted, China Is Rewriting the Rules of the Global Order,” Atlantic, November 2020.
“End the War in Afghanistan and Unwind Post-9/11 Mistakes,” Defense Priorities, November
2020.
Peter Baker, “George Shultz Speaks Out for Renewing U.S. Leadership Overseas, At a Moment
When the United States Has Pulled Back from Its Allies, the Former Secretary of State Lamented
the Trump Administration’s Allergy to International Accords,” New York Times, October 31,
(updated November 2), 2020.
Michael Birnbaum and Loveday Morris, “Whether Trump or Biden Wins, Europe Doesn’t Think
It Can Depend on U.S.,” Washington Post, October 31, 2020.
Zack Brown, “The Myth of American Primacy, Does Global Armed Dominance Still Pay?”
National Interest, October 31, 2020.
Karen DeYoung and Steve Hendrix, “Trump Critics Hail Accords between Israel and Arab
Countries Even as Original Goal of Palestinian Peace Remains Unmet,” Washington Post,
October 31, 2020.
Farah N. Jan Kolby Kaller, “Trump’s Big Mistake: America Is Making China Great Again,
Beijing is Quietly Taking Advantage of American Isolationist Policies and is Advancing its Image
as the Next Global Leader,” National Interest, October 31, 2020.
Timothy McLaughlin, “Trump Is a ‘Necessary Evil’ for Some, Despite His Own Assault on
Democratic Norms, the President Is Lauded in Parts of Asia for His Hawkishness Toward China,”
Atlantic, October 31, 2020.
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Dakota Wood, “The Myth of Endless Wars,” National Interest, October 31, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Nation Building Overseas? America’s Own Neighborhood Is Becoming
More Violent, Mexico Is Descending Even Further into Carnage and Dysfunction. So Why Are
We So Focused on the Middle East?” American Conservative, October 30, 2020.
Thomas L. Friedman, “Trump Has Made the Whole World Darker,” New York Times, October 30,
2020.
Shalom Lipner, “Donald Trump’s Fire-Sale of International Peace Agreements, With Polls
Indicating a Likely Biden Win, International Leaders Are Lining up to Cut Last-Second Bargains
with a Highly Transactional President Trump,” National Interest, October 30, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The ‘Adults In The Room’ With Trump Weren’t Adults At All, A New Book Tour
by H.R. McMaster Shows How Little the Foreign Policy Professionals Have Learned from Two
Decades of Endless War,” American Conservative, October 29, 2020.
Roger Cohen, “How Trump Lowered America’s Standing in the World,” New York Times,
October 29, 2020.
Tom McTague and Peter Nicholas, “How ‘America First’ Became America Alone, In His
Desperation to Restore and Showcase American Strength, Donald Trump Has Made the Country
Weaker,” Atlantic, October 29, 2020.
Kori Schake, “Threats and Border Walls Are Destroying the United States’ Biggest Strategic
Advantage, Restoring a Common Purpose with Canada and Mexico is the Lowest-Hanging Fruit
in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, October 29, 2020.
Riley Walters, “How to Use the World Trade Organization to Deal with China,” Heritage
Foundation, October 29, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “The Fight Over the World Trade Organization Has Begun,” Heritage
Foundation, October 28, 2020.
Steven A. Cook, “Trump’s Middle East Legacy Is Failure, The President Has Had a Handful of
Successes—But Never Anything Approaching a Strategy,” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2020.
Melanie Israel and Grace Melton, “The Trump Administration Won’t Accept Abortion as a
Human Right,” Heritage Foundation, October 28, 2020.
Edward P. Joseph, “How Trump Lost the Balkans, The Administration’s See-No-Evil Diplomacy
Has Produced a Dangerous Unraveling Across the Region,” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2020.
Bonnie Kristian, “All U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Should Come Home by Christmas,” National
Interest
, October 28, 2020.
Willis Krumholz, “America Enforcing a Core NATO Pledge Does Not Mean It’s Abandoning
Allies,” Defense News, October 28, 2020.
Inu Manak, “WTO Director-General’s Race Shows the United States is Not Interested in
Reform,” Cato Institute, October 28, 2020.
James A. Winnefeld, Michael J. Morell, and Graham Allison, “Why American Strategy Fails,
Ending the Chronic Imbalance Between Ends and Means,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2020.
Joseph Bosco, “Trump Team Reinforces a Fundamental Reality: China Must Change,” The Hill,
October 27, 2020.
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Colum Lynch, Amy Mackinnon, Robbie Gramer, “Trump Appointee Seeks to Turn U.S. Media
Agency Into a Political Cheerleader,” Foreign Policy, October 27, 2020.
Will Moreland, “To Compete with China and Russia, America Needs a New Era of
Mmultilateralism, Progressives Want to Revive Global Cooperation. But the US Must Compete,
Not Just Cooperate,” Vox, October 27, 2020.
Rebecca Ray, “Donald Trump’s Trade Wars Did More Harm Than Good,” National Interest,
October 27, 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “What Americans Can Learn From Their Isolationist Past,” National
Interest
, October 26, 2020.
Michael Lind, “Why America First Is Here To Stay, Even if Donald Trump Is Defeated,” National
Interest
, October 26, 2020.
Philip Zelikow, “The U.S. Foreign Service Isn’t Suited for the 21st Century, Created for Another
Age, Washington’s Foreign-Policy Institutions Have Atrophied. The Next Administration Should
Rebuild and Reshape Them,” Foreign Policy, October 26, 2020.
Philip Rucker and Shane Harris, “Tumult at Home, Ailing Alliances Abroad: Why Trump’s
America Has Been a ‘Gift’ to Putin,” Washington Post, October 25, 2020.
Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Trump and Biden Are Both Touting Foreign-Policy
Failures as Achievements,” Foreign Policy, October 23, 2020.
Daniel Davis, “Risk to America of Maintaining Forever-War Status Quo Dangerously High,”
Military Times, October 23, 2020.
Editorial Board, “The Arab-Israeli Peace Cascade,” Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2020.
Van Jackson and Hunter Marston, “Trump, Not Biden, Wrecked American Power in the Pacific,
The Damage Done to U.S. Standing in Asia Will Take Decades to Repair,” Foreign Policy,
October 23, 2020.
Jeffrey A. Stacey, “The Era of Full-Spectrum War Is Here, China Won Round One, and Round
Two Went to Russia. Can the United States and Its Allies Take the Third?” Foreign Policy,
October 23, 2020.
Katie Bo Williams and Patrick Tucker, “What Would a Second Trump Term Mean For Foreign
Policy?” Defense One, October 23, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “America’s Language of Mass Destruction Convinces Nobody,” Foreign Policy,
October 22, 2020.
Matthew Duss, “U.S. Foreign Policy Never Recovered From the War on Terror, Only a
Reckoning With the Disastrous Legacy of 9/11 Can Heal the United States,” Foreign Affairs,
October 22, 2020.
Irene Entringer Garcia Blanes, Alexandra Murphy, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers, and Michael J.
Tierney, “Poll: How Biden and Trump Differ on Foreign Policy, A Survey of Academics
Underscores Sharp Divergences on Key Issues but Expects Bipartisan Alignment Next Year on
China, Cybersecurity, and counterterrorism,” Foreign Policy, October 22, 2020.
Steven Erlanger, “Europe Wonders if It Can Rely on U.S. Again, Whoever Wins, America’s
Deeply Polarized Politics Have Marked Foreign Policy, Too, Undermining Washington’s
Authority and Reputation for Reliability,” New York Times, October 22, 2020.
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Jamie McIntyre, “Trump’s Four-Year National Security Report Card: As, Bs, Cs, and Several
Incompletes,” Washington Examiner, October 22, 2020.
Rodger A. Payne and Kurt Mills, “Does Donald Trump’s America First Strategy Mean Human
Rights Last?” National Interest, October 22, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “Trump Or Biden Can Still Fix America’s Failing Foreign Policy,” National
Interest
, October 21, 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President, For All
the Talk of a New Administration Boldly Reengaging With the World After Four Years of
‘America First,’ Trump’s Strategic Retrenchment Can Only Be the Start,” Foreign Policy,
October 21, 2020.
Tom McTague and Peter Nicholas, “The World Order That Donald Trump Revealed, When It
Comes to Foreign Policy, the President’s Most Important Characteristic Is Not Amorality or a
Lack of Curiosity; It Is Naïveté,” Atlantic, October 20, 2020.
Loren Thompson, “Get Ready For President Biden To Throw U.S. Security Policies Into
Reverse,” Forbes, October 20, 2020.
Dan Caldwell, “The Politics of Restraint,” Real Clear World, October 19, 2020.
CAP National Security and International Policy Team, “The First 100 Days: Toward a More
Sustainable and Values-Based National Security Approach,” Center for American Progress
(CAP), October 19, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “It’s Not NATO, but Quad Group Can Get Results in Asia,” Heritage
Foundation, October 19, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “What Americans Want in Foreign Policy (No Matter if Biden or Trump Wins),”
National Interest, October 19, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “The Dangerous Decline of U.S. Diplomacy,” National Interest, October 19,
2020.
Michelle Fitzpatrick, “EU-US Alliance ‘On Life Support’ After Four Years of Trump,” Agence
France-Presse
, October 18, 2020.
Pranshu Verma, “Trump’s Sanctions on International Court May Do Little Beyond Alienating
Allies,” New York Times, October 18, 2020.
George Beebe, “Balancing Great Power Politics in 2021 and Beyond, The Distance Between U.S.
Aspirations for Dealing with Great Power Rivals and Its Capacity for Reaching Its Goals Has
Never Been Greater,” National Interest, October 17, 2020.
Hans Binnendijk, America Is Clearly in Decline. But It Can Be Reversed,” National Interest,
October 17, 2020.
Serge Schmemann, “The Foreign Policy That Wasn’t,” New York Times, October 16, 2020.
Eric Schmitt, “Trump’s Tweets on Troop Withdrawals Unnerve Pentagon, The President’s
Demands to Draw Down Forces in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria Seek to Fulfill a Campaign
Promise. But Officials Warn Rapid Troop Reductions Could Bolster Adversaries,” New York
Times
, October 15 (updated October 21), 2020.
Stephen Wertheim, “America Has No Reason to Be So Powerful, Eighty Years Ago, the United
States Made a Tragic Decision to Pursue Global Supremacy. The Project Has Outlived Its
Purpose,” New York Times, October 15, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

James Jay Carafano, Luke Coffey, and Daniel Kochis, “A Golden Opportunity for the U.S. to
Lead NATO Into the Future,” Heritage Foundation, October 14, 2020.
Olivia Enos and Emilie Kao, “Religious Persecution in China Must Be Called Out,” Heritage
Foundation, October 14, 2020.
Robbie Gramer, “Trump’s Foreign-Policy Adventures Haven’t All Flopped, For All the Chaos,
the Trump Administration Has Notched Some Notable Victories Abroad. The Question Is
Whether They Outweigh Everything Else Trump Brought to Washington—and the World,”
Foreign Policy, October 14, 2020.
Ezra Klein, “The Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy, The President Has Shifted How Both Parties
Think About Trade, Alliances, Russia, and China. Is That a Good Thing?” Vox, October 14, 2020.
Scott Lincicome, “Calculating the True Cost of Trump’s ‘Trade Wars,’” Cato Institute, October
14, 2020.
Jamie McIntyre, “Trump Pledge to ‘End Endless Wars’ Reportedly Targets Somalia for Next US
Troop Withdrawal,” Washington Examiner, October 14, 2020.
James Jay Carafano and Ana Rosa Quintana, “U.S. Empowering Women to Bolster Peace and
Security,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 2020.
Luke Coffey, “Managing America’s Alliance System,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 2020.
Richard Fontaine, “America Must Promote Democracy, Despite Trump’s Disdain for It, Even If
2020 Marks a Low Point of U.S. Democratic Practice, Supporting Liberalism Abroad Must
Remain a Vital Element of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2020.
Nick Wadhams and Jennifer Jacobs, “Trump Demands a Plan to Withdraw U.S. Troops From
Somalia,” Bloomberg, October 13, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “A World of Geopolitical Opportunity, America’s Global Position Is
Stronger Today Than in 2016 in Some Important Ways,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2020.
Michael Crowley, “Trump’s Campaign Talk of Troop Withdrawals Doesn’t Match Military
Reality,” New York Times, October 11 (updated October 22), 2020.
David M. Halbfinger, Ben Hubbard, and Farnaz Fassihi, “For Trump, Defying Mideast Truisms
Produced Breakthroughs and Backfires, Disregarding Norms and Accepted Wisdom, President
Trump Went His Own Way in the Middle East and, in Some Cases, Got What He Wanted,” New
York Times
, October 11 (updated October 22), 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump’s Continuing Vandalism of the Voice of America,” Washington Post,
October 11, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Latest Rantings Will Please the Taliban, If No One Else,” Washington
Post
, October 9, 2020.
Ravi Agrawal, “Why the Quad Is the One Alliance Trump Cares About, The United States May
Shun Multilateralism, But It Is Successfully Uniting Australia, India, and Japan against China,”
Foreign Policy, October 8, 2020.
Lolita C. Baldor and Kathy Gannon, “Military Blindsided by Trump’s New Afghan Troop
Withdrawal,” Associated Press, October 8, 2020.
Joshua Keating, “Mike Pence and Donald Trump Have Two Different Foreign Policies, They
Only Occasionally Overlap,” Slate, October 8, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Josh Rogin, “U.S. Foreign Policy Might Be Too Broken for Biden to Fix,” Washington Post,
October 8, 2020.
Missy Ryan, Karen DeYoung, and Susannah George, “After Trump Promises a Swift Troop Exit
from Afghanistan, Confusion Grows About U.S. Stance,” Washington Post, October 8, 2020.
Lara Seligman and Connor O’Brien, “Trump Undercuts His National Security Adviser on Troop
Withdrawal,” Politico, October 8, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer, “Prioritizing Global Freedom and Prosperity at the United Nations and
International Organizations,” Heritage Foundation, October 8, 2020.
Philip Stephens, “Democracy Faces Bigger Threats Than Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, Western
Governments Must Counter Autocrat Aggression, But Saving Democracy Starts at Home,”
Financial Times, October 8, 2020.
Mike Gonzalez and Helle Dale, “The Axis of Disruption,” Heritage Foundation, October 7, 2020.
David Ignatius, “The Rest of the World Is Taking Advantage of a Distracted America,”
Washington Post, October 6, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “South Korea Doesn’t Need U.S. Military Babysitting,” Foreign Policy, October
2, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “How Our Pointless Wars Made Life Hell For Religious Minorities,” American
Conservative
, October 1, 2020.
Eric Brewer, “Why Trump’s Retreat from US Allies Could Have Nuclear Consequences, For
Decades, America Gave Allies and Partners Good Reason to Shelve Their Nuclear-Weapons
Efforts,” Defense One, October 1, 2020.
Lewis Libby and Hillel Fradkin, “The UAE/Bahrain–Israel Deal: A Time for Celebration and
Critical Self-Reflection,” National Review, October 1, 2020.
Grace Melton, “U.N. Should Recommit to Pro-Woman Agenda by Dropping Push for Abortion,”
Heritage Foundation, October 1, 2020.
Charles Ray and Kevin Green, “Needed: American Diplomacy, Defense, Democracy, In the Past
Century the World Has Seen What Happens When the United States Leads and When It Does
Not. We’re All Better Off When It Does,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2020.
Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, “Trump Officials Seek to Push Social Conservative Values in
International Agreements,” Foreign Policy, September 30, 2020.
Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “A Foreign Policy for the Day After Trump,
Reimagining—not Restoring—the Liberal International Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 30,
2020.
Wesley J. Smith, “Does Pompeo Care More about Chinese Catholics than the Pope Does?”
National Review, September 30, 2020.
Thomas Wright, “What a Second Trump Term Would Mean for the World,” Atlantic, September
30, 2020.
Jonathan Alter, “How the United States Learned to Love Human Rights,” Foreign Policy,
September 29, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Mike Pompeo’s South America Trip Demonstrates Need for Sustained
Commitment,” Heritage Foundation, September 29, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Amitai Etzioni, “America Has a Shameful Double Standard on Human Rights,” National Interest,
September 29, 2020.
Augusta Saraiva, “Washington’s ‘Blind Eye’ Toward Human Rights Abuses in Latin America,”
Foreign Policy, September 29, 2020.
Brett Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “The Human Rights Council Must Reform to Earn U.S. Re-
Engagement,” Heritage Foundation, September 29, 2020.
Alexander Vindman and John Gans, “Trump Has Sold Off America’s Credibility for His Personal
Gain,” New York Times, September 29, 2020.
Joschka Fischer, “The Transatlantic Tragedy,” Project Syndicate, September 28, 2020.
Seth J. Frantzman, “Can Trump’s ‘Transactional’ Diplomacy Get More Wins in the Middle East?
In One Sense This Transactional Diplomacy Is Not Entirely Foreign to the Nature of US Foreign
Policy Over the Last Two Hundred Years,” Jerusalem Post, September 28, 2020.
Susan B. Glasser, “Biden Will Restore America’s Moral Leadership,” New Yorker, September 28,
2020.
Donna Rachel Edmunds, “Pompeo: The Chinese Communist Party is re-writing the Bible,
Speaking at a Recent Summit, State Secretary Mike Pompeo Said That America Was Standing Up
for Religious Freedom Worldwide, As Where It Fails, Totalitarism [sic] Soon Follows,”
Jerusalem Post, September 27, 2020.
Charles A. Kupchan, “Isolationism Is Not a Dirty Word, Americans Have Lost Touch With a
Crucial Strain of Their Foreign-Policy Tradition,” Atlantic, September 27, 2020.
James Goldgeier and Bruce W. Jentleson, “The United States Is Not Entitled to Lead the World,
Washington Should Take A Seat at the Table—But Not Always at Its Head,” Foreign Affairs,
September 25, 2020.
Evan Osnos, “The TikTok Fiasco Reflects the Bankruptcy of Trump’s Foreign Policy,” New
Yorker
, September 25, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “Europe Makes Its Choice,” National Review, September 25, 2020.
William J. Burns, “The Blob Meets the Heartland, Foreign Policy Should Work Better for
America’s Middle Class,” Atlantic, September 24, 2020.
Kristine Lee, “The United States Can’t Quit on the UN, When America Withdraws, China Wins,”
Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2020.
Armstrong Williams, “How Donald Trump Is Shaping History, At the End of the Day, There Is
Only One Person in Charge, One Person to Whom We Can Credit This Deal That So Many
Doubters Thought Would Never Come. That Person is Donald Trump,” National Interest,
September 24, 2020.
William J. Burns and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “The Transformation of Diplomacy, How to
Save the State Department,” Foreign Affairs, September 23, 2020.
Zachary Cohen, “Trump Says He Likes Putin. US Intelligence Says Russia Is Attacking American
Democracy,” CNN, September 22, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Contempt for Truth Leaves a Toxic Legacy Around the World,”
Washington Post, September 22, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Jen Kirby, “At the UN, China’s Xi Showed He Understands the System Better Than Trump, The
US Is Ceding Leverage, Which Is Giving China the Influence It Craves,” Vox, September 22,
2020.
Grant Newsham, “Did Trump Really Spoil America’s Asia Alliances? In Reality, Trump Has
Moved US Closer to India, Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian Allies Than His Predecessor
Ever Did,” Asia Times, September 22, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer, “In U.N. Speech, Trump Highlights U.S. Response to COVID-19, Faults
China,” Heritage Foundation, September 22, 2020.
F. Cartwright Weiland, “Pompeo’s Critics Misrepresent the Commission on Unalienable Rights,
The NGOs and Activists Criticizing the Commission’s Inaugural Report Are Distorting Its
Contents,” Foreign Policy, September 22, 2020.
WSJ Staff, “Where Trump and Biden Stand on China, Hard Line on Beijing Likely to Continue
Regardless of U.S. Election Outcome,” Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2020.
Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Isolated at U.N. as Push to Ramp Up
Pressure on Iran Fails,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2020.
Nahal Toosi, “The Trump Foreign Policies Biden Might Keep,” Politico, September 21, 2020.
Nick Wadhams and David Wainer, “U.S. Issues New Iran Sanctions, But Most Nations Reject
Move at UN,” Bloomberg, September 21, 2020.
Douglas Bulloch, “A Method in the Madness? Donald Trump Restores ‘Interests’ to the Center of
U.S. Foreign Policy,” National Interest, September 20, 2020.
Warren P. Strobel and Michael R. Gordon, “Where Trump and Biden Stand on Foreign Policy,
President Has Questioned U.S. Alliances, While Democratic Challenger Wants to Rebuild
Relationships After the Election; Both Are Wary of Troop Deployments,” Wall Street Journal,
September 19, 2020.
Andrew Bacevich, “The Endless Fantasy of American Power, Neither Trump Nor Biden Aims to
Demilitarize Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, September 18, 2020.
Matthew Continetti, “How Trump Changed the World, Column: By Defying Conventional
Wisdom on the Middle East and China, He Reshaped Both Political Parties,” Washington Free
Beacon
, September 18, 2020.
Rich Lowry, “Jared Kushner Was Right,” National Review, September 18, 2020.
Yuki Tatsumi, “Needed: Restoration of U.S. Credibility in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Stimson
Center, September 18, 2020.
Dan Balz and Scott Clement, “Poll: Sharp Partisan Differences Now Exist on Foreign Policy,
Views of American Exceptionalism,” Washington Post, September 17, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Trump Challenges Pro-War Foreign Policy Elite,” American Conservative,
September 17, 2020.
Kevin Baron, “Nobody Wants America to Rule the World, Foreign Confidence in the U.S. Is
Sinking Even Faster Than the Share of Americans Who See the Benefits of Engagement Beyond
Our Borders,” Defense One, September 17, 2020.
David Harsanyi, “Why Trump’s Mideast Peace Deals Matter,” National Review, September 17,
2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

David Ignatius, “The Middle East’s Winners and Losers After Trump’s First Term Are Telling,”
Washington Post, September 17, 2020.
Eli Lake, “The Kurds Have Paid Dearly for Trump’s Recklessness, A New Report Details the
Horrific Consequences of the U.S. Withdrawal from Syria Last Year,” Bloomberg, September 17,
2020.
David McKean and Bart M. J. Szewczyk, “The World Still Needs a United West, How Europe
and the United States Can Renew Their Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, September 17, 2020.
Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm, Divided We Stand,
Democrats and Republicans Diverge on US Foreign Policy, Results of the 2020 Chicago Council
Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy
, Chicago Council on Global Affairs,
undated, released September 17, 2020, 47 pp.
Sylvie Kauffmann, “Can Biden Fix What Trump Broke? E.U. Leaders Are Still Learning to
Navigate a World Ever More Dangerous for Them, While Relations with the United States Grow
More and More Awkward,” New York Times, September 16, 2020.
Kevin D. Willioamson, “The World Sours on Washington, Our Credibility Is Waning, and We
Should Care,” National Review, September 16, 2020.
Jon B. Alterman, “Stumbling Out of the Middle East is No Better Than Stumbling In,” Defense
One
, September 15, 2020.
Joseph Bosco, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Successes Confound His Detractors,” The Hill,
September 15, 2020.
Alison Durkee, “U.S. Popularity Plummets Worldwide Amid Widely Criticized Coronavirus
Response, Poll Finds,” Forbes, September 15, 2020.
Rich Lowry, “How Trump Defied the Experts and Forged a Breakthrough in the Middle East,”
National Review, September 15, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “When the United States Stands Alone,” National Review, September 15, 2020.
Oma Seddiq, “Trump Is Less Trusted Than Putin and Xi and the US Is Hitting Historic Lows of
Approval from Its Closest Allies,” Business Insider, September 15, 2020.
Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Faced with Russia Crises, Trump and Top Aides Strike Different
Tones,” Washington Post, September 15, 2020.
Adam Taylor, “Global Views of U.S. Plunge to New Lows Amid Pandemic, Poll Finds,”
Washington Post, September 15, 2020.
Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, and Mara Mordecai, “U.S. Image Plummets Internationally as
Most Say Country Has Handled Coronavirus Badly,” Pew Research Center, September 15, 2020.
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Alexander Vindman: Trump Is Putin’s ‘Useful Idiot,’” Atlantic, September 14,
2020.
Joseph Krauss, “Trump’s Mideast Deals Tout ‘Peace’ Where There Was Never War,” Associated
Press
, September 14, 2020.
Bret Stephens, “A Rare Middle East Triumph, And—Yes—A Triumph for Trump, Too,” New York
Times
, September 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Trump Is Right To Be Antiwar,” American Spectator, September 12, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Samuel Ramani, “France and the United States Are Making West Africa’s Security Situation
Worse,” Foreign Policy, September 12, 2020.
Michael Brendan Dougherty, “Bring Them Home, If We Want to End These Wars, We Can Look
to Trump and Say: ‘Do It, or We’ll Find Someone Who Will,’” National Review, September 11,
2020.
Christopher A. Preble and Mathew Burrows, “Foreign Policy Elites Ignore Public Sentiment at
Their Peril,” National Interest, September 11, 2020.
Paul R. Pillar, “Donald Trump Is Putting America on the Wrong Side of War Crimes,” National
Interest
, September 10, 2020.
Russell A. Berman, “The Kosovo-Serbia Agreement: Another Step Forward for Trump Foreign
Policy,” National Interest, September 9, 2020.
Robert Burns and Zeke Miller, “US Withdrawing Thousands of Troops from Iraq and
Afghanistan,” Associated Press, September 9, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “James Carafano: US Troop Withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan Show
Progress in Resolving ‘Endless Wars,’” Fox News, September 9, 2020.
Joseph J. Collins, “Assessing Trump’s National Security Record, How Has He Done Against
Four Main Threats Our Nation Faces?” Defense One, September 9, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “America’s Alliance with NATO Needs to Change,” National Interest,
September 9, 2020.
Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Allison Meakem, “Trump Administration Orders U.S.
Diplomats to Curtail Contact With WHO,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2020.
Lara Seligman, “General Announces Iraq, Afghanistan Troop Drawdowns as Trump Looks to
Fulfill Campaign Pledge,” Politico, September 9, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “New Book Accuses Trump of Blasting Top Military Generals as ‘P******’ for
Defending Foreign Alliances,” Military Times, September 9, 2020.
Jamil Aderlini, “China’s Middle East Strategy Comes at a Cost to the US, Beijing Gains in Oil
and Influence as Successive Presidents in Washington Withdraw,” Financial Times, September 8,
2020.
Sebastian Sprenger, “German Defense Leaders Place a Somber Bet on the US Election,” Defense
News
, September 8, 2020.
Matthew Choi, “Trump Says Pentagon Chiefs Are Accommodating Weapons Makers,” Politico,
September 7, 2020.
Brittany Bernstein, “Trump Oversees ‘Breakthrough’ Serbia-Kosovo Agreement to Normalize
Economic Relations,” National Review, September 4, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “The Surprisingly Pragmatic Plan for WHO Withdrawal, The Trump
Administration Is Walking a Tightrope on the WHO,” National Review, September 4, 2020.
Michael Crowley, “Allies and Former U.S. Officials Fear Trump Could Seek NATO Exit in a
Second Term,” New York Times, September 3, 2020.
Michael Crowley and Maggie Haberman, “As Others Condemn Putin Critic’s Poisoning, Trump
Just Wants to ‘Get Along,’” New York Times, September 3, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Anne Gearan and Paul Sonne, “Trump Administration Denounces Attack on Russian Dissident,
Hints at Sanctions,” Washington Post, September 3, 2020.
Katie Bo Williams, “As Russia Provokes, Trump Remains Silent,” Defense One, September 3,
2020.
Colum Lynch, Robbie Gramer, and Jack Detsch, “Trump Appointee Takes ‘Slash and Burn’
Approach to Key USAID Bureau,” Foreign Policy, September 2, 2020.
Katrina vanden Heuvel, “Trump Hasn’t Ended Endless Wars. Congress Must Use the War Powers
Resolution,” Washington Post, September 1, 2020.
Richard Haass, “Present at the Disruption, How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Affairs
, September/October 2020.
Margaret MacMillan, “Which Past Is Prologue? Heeding the Right Warnings From History,”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020.
Shivshankar Menon, “League of Nationalists, How Trump and Modi Refashioned the U.S.-Indian
Relationship,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020.
Ben Rhodes, “The Democratic Renewal, What It Will Take to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Affairs
, September/October 2020.
Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion, Trump and the World as It Is,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2020.
Ganesh Sitaraman, “A Grand Strategy of Resilience, American Power in the Age of Fragility,
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020.
Doug Bandow, “When Will Donald Trump Stop Even One Endless War? Time To Halt America’s
Illegal Occupation of Syria,” Antiwar.com, August 31, 2020.
William J. Burns, “‘America First’ Enters Its Most Combustible Moment, If the Next 150 Days
Turn Out to Be Trump’s Final Days in Office, He Could Still Wreak a Lot of Havoc on American
Foreign Policy,” Atlantic, August 29, 2020.
Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Is Trump Touting His Diplomatic Achievements to Get
Reelected?” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2020.
James Jay Carafano and Kiron K. Skinner, “Why Donald Trump Needs a Supportive State
Department,” National Interest, August 28, 2020.
Chuck DeVore, “Biden Majors in the Minors. Trump Focuses on Existential Threats | Opinion,”
Newsweek, August 28, 2020.
Richard Grenell, “How to Remake the Foreign Service and Embassies for Today’s World,” The
Hill
, August 28, 2020.
Eli Lake, “Trump Doctrine: End Wars But Keep Threatening Enemies, The RNC Tried to Sell
Voters on a Foreign Policy of Strength without Entanglements,” Bloomberg, August 28, 2020.
Thomas Wright, “Will Trumpism Change Republican Foreign Policy Permanently?” Defense
One
, August 28, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Despite Military Resistance, Our Footprint In Iraq Is Finally Shrinking,”
American Conservative, August 27, 2020.
Philip H. Gordon, “What the Republican National Convention Tells Us About Trump’s Foreign
Policy,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Klaus W. Larres, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Is Still ‘America First’—What Does That Mean,
Exactly?” The Conversation, August 27, 2020.
Kenneth Roth, “Pompeo’s Commission on Unalienable Rights Will Endanger Everyone’s Human
Rights,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Trump Vows to Continue Military Rebuild, Halt Endless Wars in Convention
Finale,” Military Times, August 27, 2020.
Richard Sisk, “At Conventions, Both Parties Endorse Military Pay Raises and Decry ‘Endless
Wars,’” Military.com, August 27, 2020.
James Traub, “Biden Is Getting Ready to Bury Neoliberalism, The Potential Next Democratic
Administration Is Preparing to Upend Decades of Dogma on Globalization,” Foreign Policy,
August 27, 2020.
Mark Cancian, “The Fuzzy Outlines Of Biden’s National Security Policies,” Breaking Defense,
August 26, 2020.
Alex Ward, “‘America First, But on Steroids’: What Trump’s Second-Term Foreign Policy Might
Look Like,” Vox, August 26, 2020.
Emma Ashford, “Biden Wants to Return to a ‘Normal’ Foreign Policy. That’s the Problem.
America Can’t Go Back to Being Everywhere and Solving Every Problem,” New York Times,
August 25, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Pompeo Praises Trump, But Doesn’t Have Much to Point to,” Washington Post,
August 25, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “Pompeo’s Sudan Visit Shows the Way to Handle Rogue Regimes,” Washington
Examiner
, August 25, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “GOP Leaders Promote Trump as a Wartime Commander Focused on Security and
Peace,” Military Times, August 25, 2020.
Nahal Toosi and Jacqueline Feldscher, “Pompeo Defends ‘America First’ Policies in
Controversial Convention Appearance,” Politico, August 25, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Trump’s Second-Term Plan Includes Stopping ‘Endless’ Wars, Boosting Military
Support,” Military Times, August 24, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “All Great-Power Politics Is Local, When It Comes to Building International
Power, There’s Growing Reason to Think That Foreign Policy Barely Matters,” Foreign Policy,
August 24, 2020.
Francis J. Gavin, “Blame It on the Blob? How to Evaluate American Grand Strategy,” War on the
Rocks
, August 21, 2020.
Lanhee Chen, “Lead from the Front,” Washington Examiner, August 20, 2020.
Victor David Hanson, “Goodbye—Sort of—to Germany? Why Should America Anchor
Germany’s Defense? It Cuts Deals with Russia, Has Never Met Its NATO Commitment, and Is
the Most Anti-American Nation in Europe,” National Review, August 20, 2020.
Thomas Joscelyn, “Endless Jihad, The Problem with Pledging to End Our ‘Endless Wars,’”
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 20, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Biden Vows to Restore Global Respect, Military Integrity in Acceptance Speech,”
Military Times, August 20, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

James Traub, “The Biden Doctrine Exists Already. Here’s an Inside Preview,” Foreign Policy,
August 20, 2020.
Aaron David Miller, “Opinion: Israel And UAE’s Accord Is A Big Win, But Don't Overplay It,”
NPR, August 19, 2020.
Klaus W. Larres, “Biden’s Long Foreign-Policy Record Signals How He’ll Reverse Trump,
Rebuild Old Alliances and Lead the Pandemic Response,” The Conversation, August 18 (updated
August 19), 2020.
Jonathan Schanzer and Mark Dubowitz, “The Dangerous Illusion of Restraining U.S. Power,
Isolationists Among Both Democrats and Republicans Want to Withdraw from Foreign
Entanglements. That Would Make the World Much Less Safe,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2020.
Alex Ward, “Joe Biden’s Plan to Fix the World, ‘He’s Looking at an Across-the-Board
Restoration Project,’ Said a former Obama Administration Official,” Vox, August 18, 2020.
Micah Zenko and Rebecca Lissner, “This Is What America Looks Like Without Grand Strategy,
The Verdict Is In: Donald Trump’s Shallow Approach to Foreign Policy Has Damaged the United
States,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2020.
Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning, “What Happens When America Is No Longer the
Undisputed Super Power? Chief Among the Flawed Assumptions Undergirding American
Foreign Policy Is the Belief That Perpetual U.S. Primacy is Both Desirable and Possible, the
‘indispensable nation’—a Cliché Well Past Its Sell-by Date,” National Interest, August 17, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Israel-UAE Agreement Shows Trump’s Middle East Policy Succeeding,”
Heritage Foundation, August 17, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Alone Against the World, Pompeo’s Regime Change Obsession Has Left America
More Isolated Than Ever,” Slate, August 17, 2020.
William Ruger, “Why Americans Want a President Who Ends Endless Wars,” National Interest,
August 17, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “How the WHO Can Earn Back U.S. Support,” Heritage
Foundation, August 17, 2020.
Jeremy Shapiro and Philip H. Gordon, “Trump and the Rise of Sadistic Diplomacy, His
Administration Spent Four Years Mostly Failing to Reach Diplomatic Agreements. What It Did
Instead Was Far More Disturbing,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2020.
Anthony B. Kim and Terry Miller, “Secretary Mike Pompeo’s Ringing Call to Secure Human
Rights and Liberty,” Heritage Foundation, August 16, 2020.
Tiana Lowe, “Middle East Consolidates Against Iran, Disproving the Obama Doctrine,”
Washington Examiner, August 16, 2020.
Jared Kushner, “Jared Kushner: The Historic Deal Between Israel and the UAE Shows Trump’s
Strategy Is Paying Off,” Washington Post, August 15, 2020.
Olivia Enos, “3 Reasons the U.S. Should Prioritize Human Rights With China,” Heritage
Foundation, August 14, 2020.
John Hannah, “The Israel-UAE Deal Is Trump’s First Unambiguous Diplomatic Success, It’s a
Historic Achievement That Eluded Other Presidents. Trump Will Try to Make the Most of It,”
Foreign Policy, August 14, 2020.
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Doug Bandow, “The United States Can’t Handle China Alone, A Coordinated Strategy Is
Emerging Among Allies, Despite Trump’s Best Efforts,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2020.
Economist, “The Dereliction of American Diplomacy, Donald Trump Dismisses It as the ‘Deep
State Department’. Yet America Needs It More Than Ever,” Economist, August 13, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Mideast Breakthrough, The Israel-UAE Accord Discredits Obama’s
Regional Vision,” Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2020.
Richard Grenell, “Israel-UAE Breakthrough Proves Trump’s Critics Wrong—Again,” The Hill,
August 13, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Trump Is Right. The Israel-UAE Agreement Is a Huge Achievement,”
Washington Post, August 13, 2020.
Dimitri K. Simes, “The Case For Trump, Donald Trump Isn’t the Better Choice to Secure
America’s Future. He Is the Only Choice,” National Interest, August 13, 2020.
Edward Wong, “Waning of American Power? Trump Struggles With an Asia in Crisis,” New York
Times
, August 13, 2020.
Dov S. Zakheim, “The Case Against Trump, By the Time Trump’s Term Reaches Its Unhappy
Conclusion, He May Well Have Overtaken Andrew Johnson as the Most Dangerous Chief
Executive Ever to Occupy the Executive Mansion,” National Interest, August 13, 2020.
Jacob Helberg, “In the New Cold War, Deindustrialization Means Disarmament, Chinese Security
Threats Offer the Chance to Rethink the U.S. Economy,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “Pompeo Urges Europe’s Young Democracies to Embrace Freedoms,” Associated
Press
, August 12, 2020.
Scott Lincicome, “We Can Finally Stop Pretending Trump Isn’t a Protectionist,” Cato Institute,
August 12, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “In Europe, Pompeo Warns of China, Russia Authoritarianism,” Associated Press,
August 11, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Putin Is Reckless Because We Allow Him to Be,” Washington Post, August 11,
2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Trump’s Latest Move in Europe Is a Betrayal of Foreign Policy Realism,”
National Interest, August 10, 2020.
Birgit Jennen and William Horobin, “Germany, France Balk at U.S. Bid to Overhaul WHO While
Leaving,” Bloomberg, August 10, 2020.
David Nakamura, “Once Reluctant to Hit China on Human Rights, Trump Moves to Use the Issue
as a Cudgel Amid Growing Tensions,” Washington Post, August 9, 2020.
Ashley Parker, “A President Ignored: Trump’s Outlandish Claims Increasingly Met with a
Collective Shrug,” Washington Post, August 9, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Problem with Allies: It’s Time to Unfriend a Few Countries,” American
Spectator
, August 8, 2020.
Max Bergmann and James Lamond, “Why Trump’s Troop Withdrawal from Germany Is Only the
Beginning, There Has Been a Clear and Consistent Pattern of Hostility from Donald Trump
Toward NATO and America’s Closest Democratic Allies in Europe,” National Interest, August 8,
2020.
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Saeid Jafari, “Trump Has Pushed Iran Into China’s Arms,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2020.
Andrew Roberts, “It’s Time to Revive the Anglosphere, The U.K. Should Form a New Union
with Canada, Australia and New Zealand to Work as a Global Partner of the U.S.,” Wall Street
Journal
, August 8, 2020.
Matthew Kroenig, “Washington Needs a Better Plan for Competing With China,” Foreign Policy,
August 7, 2020.
Salvatore Babones, “Trump Has Alienated Allies—but Has Them Acting in America’s Interest
(and Their Own),” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2020.
Jim Sciutto, “Trump Advisers Hesitated to Give Military Options and Warned Adversaries over
Fears He Might Start a War,” CNN, August 6, 2020.
Daniel Dammann and Price Floyd, “To Rebuild America’s Weakened Alliances, Heal Its
Diplomatic Corps,” Defense One, August 5, 2020.
Paul R. Pillar, “Trump Administration Commission Caters to the Anti-Government Political
Right,” National Interest, August 4, 2020.
Riley Walters, “China: Trump Administration Needs to Align Trade Policies with Priorities,”
Heritage Foundation, August 4, 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump Has Wasted His Chance to Rally U.S. Allies Against China,” Washington
Post
, August 2, 2020.
Robert C. O’Brien, “President Trump Is Committed to Defending the U.S., and Russia Knows It,”
Washington Post, August 2, 2020.
Anthony Vinci, “How to Stop China From Imposing Its Values, America’s Alliances Were Built
to Address a Soviet Military Threat. The Economic Bullying That Beijing Uses Requires a
Different Kind of Collective Self-Defense,” Atlantic, August 2, 2020.
Karen DeYoung, “Dissonance Between Trump and Administration Officials over Russia
Disguises Lack of Strategic Approach to Moscow,” Washington Post, August 1, 2020.
Ahmed Charai, “America Must Become a World Model Again, In Recent Years, America Has
Become a Country Engulfed in Turmoil, Withdrawn from the World, Wanting for Leadership,”
National Interest, July 31, 2020.
Conor Murray, “Is pulling US troops from Germany really a ‘gift to Russia’?” Vox, July 31, 2020.
David Shambaugh, “As the U.S. and China Wage a New Cold War, They Should Learn From the
Last One,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2020.
Wendy R. Sherman, “The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump,” Foreign
Policy
, July 31, 2020.
Max Boot, “In a New Interview, Trump Again Shows That He’s Putin’s Puppet,” Washington
Post
, July 29, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Spite-Germany Plan,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2020.
Philip H. Gordon and James Steinberg, “Trump’s Flip-Flops on China Are a Danger to National
Security,” Foreign Policy, July 29, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Trump’s Troop Tantrum, There’s No Strategy Behind the Decision to Withdraw
U.S. Troops from Germany. It’s About the President’s Anger and Ego,” Slate, July 29, 2020.
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William Saletan, “Trump’s Dismissal of Russian Bounties Adds to His Record of Treachery,”
Slate, July 29, 2020.
Robin Wright, “Why Trump Will Never Win His New Cold War with China,” New Yorker, July
29, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “America Can’t Contain China, but Maybe Proliferation Can,” Cato Institute, July
28, 2020.
Daniel Schwammenthal, “To America, From a Worried European Friend, A Country Convinced
That It Is Irredeemably Racist Can’t Lead the World as the ‘Indispensable Nation,’” Wall Street
Journal
, July 28, 2020.
Christopher Smart, “To Avoid a Coronavirus Depression, the U.S. Can’t Afford to Alienate the
World,” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2020.
Dan Balz, “America’s global standing is at a low point. The pandemic made it worse. Under
Trump, the United States Retreats from Collaborative Leadership at a Time of Global Crisis,”
Washington Post, July 26, 2020.
Joseph Bosco, “Pompeo’s Clarion Call on Communist China: ‘We Can't Ignore It Any Longer,’”
The Hill, July 25, 2020.
Richard Haass, “What Mike Pompeo Doesn’t Understand About China, Richard Nixon and U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, July 25, 2020.
By Roger Pilon and Aaron Rhodes, “A Missed Opportunity In the Struggle for Human Rights,”
Real Clear Markets, July 25, 2020.
Gary Schmitt, “Pompeo’s China Speech at Odds with Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy,”
The Hill, July 25, 2020.
Edward Wong and Steven Lee Myers, “Officials Push U.S.-China Relations Toward Point of No
Return,” New York Times, July 25 (updated July 31), 2020.
Thomas Wright, “Pompeo’s Surreal Speech on China, An Ideological Struggle Is Under Way
Between Beijing and Free Societies, and the Trump Administration Is on the Wrong Side,”
Atlantic, July 25, 2020.
Editorial Board, “The New China Reality, The Tougher U.S. Policy Is More Than an Election-
Year Gambit,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2020.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, “The Sad Story of Superpower America’s Foreign Policy
Failures,” National Interest, July 24, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Don’t Pick a Cold War You Can’t Win,” Slate, July 24, 2020.
James Palmer, “Pompeo’s Strategy Depends on Beijing’s Own Paranoia,” Foreign Policy, July
24, 2020.
Tom Rogan, “Mike Pompeo and the Threat of Xi Jinping’s Dream,” Washington Examiner, July
24, 2020.
Bret Stephens, “The Two China Fires, Is America prepared for a Cold War with China?” New
York Times
, July 24, 2020.
Cameron Stewart, “US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Calls on Free World to Unite Against
Chinese ‘Tyranny,’” Australian, July 24, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The U.S. Should Not Lead The World,” American Conservative, July 23, 2020.
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Daniel DePetris, “Trump’s All-Stick, No-Carrot Approach Has Brought Two US Adversaries
Together, The Blooming China-Iran Bilateral Relationship Serve[s] as a Warning to U.S.
Policymakers,” Defense One, July 23, 2020.
Michael H. Fuchs, “A Foreign Policy for the Post-Pandemic World, How to Prepare for the Next
Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, July 23, 2020.
Seth Kaplan, “Human Rights Are in Recession. Can That Be Reversed?” Foreign Policy, July 23,
2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” Speech, Yorba Linda,
California, The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, July 23, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “How to Ruin a Superpower, Washington’s Status as a Superpower Has Been
Declining for Years. Trump’s Handling of the Pandemic Is Killing It Off,” Foreign Policy, July
23, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump Threatens a New Troop Withdrawal. It Would Endanger Yet Another
U.S. Relationship,” Washington Post, July 22, 2020.
Max Boot, “No One Does More to Hurt America and Help China than Trump,” Washington Post,
July 21, 2020.
Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “Trump Is Determined to Bring Home U.S. Military Forces
from Somewhere,” Washington Post, July 21, 2020.
Clifford D. May, “Mike Pompeo’s Fight for Unalienable Rights, The Human Rights
Establishment Wants Him Out of the Marketplace of Ideas,” Washington Times, July 21, 2020.
Ian Bremmer, “Trump’s Biggest Foreign Policy Win So Far,” Time, July 20, 2020.
Gene Park and Mieczysław Boduszynski, “Trump Has Damaged the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
Alliance—And China Loves It,” National Interest, July 20, 2020.
Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. Remains on the Sidelines in Libya’s Conflict as
Russia Extends Its Reach,” Washington Post, July 20, 2020.
Ramon Marks, “America’s Days of International Policing are Over, The United States Can No
Longer Act as the Lone, Dominant Military Power Around the Globe,” National Interest, July 19,
2020.
Laura Kelly, “Democrats Raise Alarm about New US Human Rights Priorities,” The Hill, July 18,
2020.
Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders, “America Has Created a ‘China-Iran Collaboration’ Monster,
Beijing and Tehran Could Use the Prospects of Deeper Bilateral Cooperation to Generate
Leverage with Foreign Leaders—Leaving Washington Out in the Cold,” National Interest, July
18, 2020.
Hunter Marston and Ali Wyne, “America’s Post-Coronavirus Diplomacy Needs Middle-Powers
Alliances, Focusing on China Alone Would Be Counterproductive,” Foreign Policy, July 17,
2020.
Jeremi Suri, “What American Century? Those Who Worry About—or Cheer—Its Demise Don’t
Realize That There Never Was One,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Countries Should Mind Their Own Business, Two Cheers for a Classic Idea
That’s Been Out of Fashion for Too Long: State Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2020.
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Rori Kramer, “Mike Pompeo Wants to Nationalize Human Rights,” Washington Post, July 16,
2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “Unalienable Rights and the Securing of Freedom,” Speech, Philadelphia,
PA, National Constitution Center, July 16, 2020.
Ralph Reed, “Ralph Reed: Trump, Pompeo Human Rights Agenda Strong in Face of Abuses
Across the Globe,” Fox News, July 16, 2020.
Pranshu Verma, “Pompeo Says Human Rights Policy Must Prioritize Property Rights and
Religion,” New, York Times, July 16 (updated July 21), 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Allies Are Supposed to Help the US, but Americans Always Do the Paying,”
Antiwar.com, July 15, 2020.
William J. Burns, “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy, The Global Order Is
Crumbling, Domestic Renewal Is Urgent, and America Must Reinvent Its Role in the World,”
Atlantic, July 14, 2020.
Pete Buttigieg and Philip H. Gordon, “Present at the Destruction of U.S. Power and Influence,”
Foreign Policy, July 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “George Washington Tried To Warn Americans About Foreign Policy Today,”
Antiwar.com, July 13, 2020.
Zachary Karabell, “The Anti-American Century, The Old U.S.-led Order Has Crumbled. What
Will Replace It May Be Just What the World—and the United States—Needs,” Foreign Policy,
July 13, 2020.
Ben Smith, “While America Looks Away, Autocrats Crack Down on Digital News Sites,” New
York Times
, July 12 (updated July 14), 2020.
Robert D. Blackwill Thomas Wright, “Why COVID-19 Presents a World Reordering Moment,”
National Interest, July 11, 2020.
Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Ghost of Donald Trump Will Haunt Us For Years, Visions of Trump
Will Haunt All Interaction with the United States as Long as There Are People Alive Who
Remember Him,” National Interest, July 10, 2020.
Micah Zenko, “The Foreign-Policy Blob Is Structurally Racist,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2020.
Luke Baker, Andreas Rinke, Philip Blenkinsop, “Post-Trump Era a Possibility, Europeans See No
Quick Fix to U.S. Ties,” Reuters, July 9, 2020.
Washington Examiner, “US Withdrawal from WHO Can’t Come Soon Enough,” Washington
Examiner
, July 8, 2020.
Michael Auslin, “Trump’s New Realism in China, Critics Aside, the Administration Does Have a
Strategy, and It Is Based on Reciprocity,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2020.
Hal Brands, “The Upside of a New Cold War With China, Competition with the Soviet Union
Brought Out the Best in American Democracy,” Bloomberg, July 7, 2020.
Matthew Karnitschnig, “Merkel Looks East as Ties Fray Between Germany and U.S., Berlin
Aims to Reenergize Commercial Links with Beijing Amid the Coronavirus Crisis,” Politico, July
7 (updated July 8), 2020.
Matthew M. Kavanagh, Mara Pillinger, “Leaving the WHO Will Hurt Americans’ Health,”
Foreign Policy, July 7, 2020.
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Jeremy Shapiro, “Ask Not What Your Country Can Do for Foreign Policy,” War on the Rocks,
July 7, 2020.
Michael Schuman, “Why China Wants Trump to Win, Four More Years Might Present Tantalizing
Opportunities for Beijing to Expand Its Influence Around East Asia and the World,” Foreign
Policy, July 7, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Despite the Media’s Efforts, Trump Taking a Measured Approach to
Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation, July 6, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Michael Pack Will Need to Tackle America’s Great-Power Problem,”
National Interest, July 6, 2020.
Gregory Mitrovich, “Beware Declinism: America Remains Poised for Greatness,” National
Interest
, July 5, 2020.
David B. Rivkin Jr. and George S. Beebe, “Why we need a little Skepticism, and More Evidence,
on Russian Bounties,” The Hill, July 5, 2020.
Oona Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, “Welcome to the Post-Leader World, The United States Has
Abdicated Its Dominant Role. Here’s How to Fill the Gap,” Foreign Policy, July 4, 2020.
Luke McGee, “Cracks in the Trump-Europe Relationship Are Turning into a Chasm,” CNN, July
4, 2020.
Paul Sonne, “Trump Remains Silent on Putin Despite Uproar Over Alleged Russian Bounty
Payments,” Washington Post, July 4, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “Trump Is Turning America Into the ‘S***hole Country’ He Fears, The
President’s Mindless Nationalism Has Come to This: Americans Are Not Welcome in Europe or
Mexico,” Atlantic, July 3, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Dancing With Dictators: Trump’s Human Rights Policy,” American
Conservative
, July 3, 2020.
Kim Hjelmgaard, Tom Vanden Brook, and Deirdre Shesgreen, “Do ‘Bounties’ on US Troops in
Afghanistan Reflect a Line Crossed or ‘Nothing New’ in Long US-Russia history?” USA Today,
July 3, 2020.
Andrew Higgins and Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Denies Paying Bounties, but Some Say the U.S.
Had It Coming, Russia’s Grievances Against What It Sees as American Bullying and Expansion
into Its Own Zones of Influence Have Been Stacking Up for Decades,” New York Times, July 3
(updated July 13), 2020.
By Sue Mi Terry, “The Unraveling of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance, Trump Allows a
Cornerstone of U.S. Defense Strategy in Asia to Wither,” Foreign Affairs, July 3, 2020.
Robin Wright, “To the World, We’re Now America the Racist and Pitiful,” New Yorker, July 3,
2020.
Wesley K. Clark, “The United States Has Nothing to Fear From the ICC,” Foreign Policy, July 2,
2020.
Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner, “The U.S.-China Confrontation Is Not Another Cold War. It’s
Something New,” Washington Post, July 2, 2020.
Tim Weiner, “Putin Still Plays by the Ruthless Rules of the Cold War. Because Trump Lets Him,”
Washington Post, July 2, 2020.
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Matthew Lee, “Trump’s Two Russias Confound Coherent US policy,” Associated Press, July 1,
2020.
Michael McFaul, “Trump Would Do Anything for Putin. No Wonder He’s Ignoring the Russian
Bounties,” Washington Post, July 1, 2020.
David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Trump’s New Russia Problem: Unread Intelligence and
Missing Strategy,” New York Times, July 1 (updated July 13), 2020.
Tori K. Smith and HyunJoo Lee, “Congress and the Administration Should Advance Free Trade
to Aid in COVID-19 Economic Recovery,” July 1, 2020.
Jonathan Spyer, “Trump’s Syria Policy Is Working, The Assad Regime Is Cracking under the
Pressure of Stalemate—Just Like the State Department Planned,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020.
Francis Wilkinson, “Trump Is Testing Putin’s Campaign Strategy,” Bloomberg, July 1, 2020.
Robert M. Gates, “The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy, The United States Must
Recover the Full Range of Its Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2020.
H.R. McMaster, “The Retrenchment Syndrome, A Response to ‘Come Home, America?’”
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020.
Carl Bernstein, “From Pandering to Putin to Abusing Allies and Ignoring His Own Advisers,
Trump’s Phone Calls Alarm US officials,” CNN, updated June 30, 2020.
Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “World Rebukes U.S. Over Ian, With Trump’s Re-election
Prospects Up in the Air, a Heated U.N. Meeting on Iran Shows World Powers’ Fading Fear of
Confronting the United States,” Foreign Policy, June 30, 2020.
Susan E. Rice, “Why Does Trump Put Russia First?” New York Times, June 30, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War,” Foreign
Policy
, June 30, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “It’s Time to Stop Defending the Status Quo of Foreign Policy Failure,”
National Interest, June 29, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Trump Doesn’t Understand That Putin Is in the Payback Business,” Washington
Post
, June 29, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Now Is The Time To Shed Our Middle Eastern Burdens,” American
Conservative
, June 27, 2020.
Abraham Denmark and Matthew Rojansky, “American Success Abroad Is Anchored to Problem-
solving at Home,” War on the Rocks, June 25, 2020.
Jessica Lee, “The Korean War Started the Trend of Endless Wars for America. How Do We
Change Course?” National Interest, June 25, 2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “A New Transatlantic Dialogue,” Speech, Washington, DC, German
Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum, June 25, 2020.
Aaron Rhodes, “How ‘Collective Human Rights’ Undermine Individual Human Rights,” Heritage
Foundation, June 25, 2020.
Tom McTague, “The Decline of the American World, Other Countries Are Used to Loathing
America, Admiring America, and Fearing America (Sometimes All at Once). But Pitying
America? That One Is New,” Atlantic, June 24, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “The Voice of America Will Sound Like Trump,” Atlantic, June 22, 2020.
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Anthony H. Cordesman, “Ending America’s Grand Strategic Failures,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), June 22, 2020.
Editors, “Trump’s Ill-Considered Germany Troop Cut,” National Review, June 22, 2020.
Gary J. Schmitt and Giselle Donnelly, “Bad Policy, Worse Reasons, The Trump Administration
Finally Offers a Rationale for the German Troop Drawdown. It Doesn’t Make Sense,” American
Interest
, June 22, 2020.
James Stavridis, “Trump’s Retreat From Germany Is a Victory for Putin,” Bloomberg, June 22,
2020.
Michael Crowley, “Trump Says He Avoided Punishing China Over Uighur Camps to Protect
Trade Talks,” New York Times, June 21, 2020.
Robert C. O’Brien, “Why the U.S. Is Moving Troops Out of Germany,” Wall Street Journal, June
21, 2020.
David E. Sanger, “On North Korea and Iran, Bolton Blames ‘the Split Between Trump and
Trump,’” New York Times, June 21, 2020.
Associated Press, “Top US Diplomat Calls UN Rights Body ‘A Haven for Dictators,’” Associated
Press
, June 20, 2020.
Travis L. Adkins and Judd Devermont, “The Legacy of American Racism at Home and Abroad,
Domestic Racism Has Long Impacted U.S. Foreign Policy. It’s Time to Open Up About It,”
Foreign Policy, June 19, 2020.
Robert Burns, “Trump Troop Cut in Germany Fits a Pattern of Hitting Allies,” Associated Press,
June 19, 2020.
Luke Coffey, “U.S. Should Keep Troops in Germany,” Heritage Foundation, June 19, 2020.
Benjamin H. Friedman and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Defund the Europeans,” Defense One, June 19,
2020.
Ronald J. Granieri and Mitchell A. Orenstein, “How White Supremacy Weakens the United
States, The Trump Administration’s Agenda on Race Undermines the Country’s Military,
Alliances, and Security,” Foreign Policy, June 19, 2020.
David Nakamura and John Hudson, “Bolton Revelations Undercut Trump’s Reelection Message
of Toughness on China,” Washington Post, June 19, 2020.
Laurence Norman, “Trump Moves Have Damaged Trans-Atlantic Ties, Says EU Foreign Policy
Chief,” Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “Europe and the China Challenge,” Speech, Virtual Copenhagen Democracy
Summit, June 19, 2020.
James Jay Carafano et al., “After COVID-19, Only U.S. Can Lead Way on Economic Recovery,”
Heritage Foundation, June 18, 2020.
Rosalind S. Helderman and Tom Hamburger, “Russia. Ukraine. China. Bolton Account
Highlights Pattern of Trump Welcoming Foreign Political Help,” Washington Post, June 18, 2020.
Colum Lynch, “It’s Not Just Trump. The World Worries America Is Broken. Protests Against
Police Brutality and Systemic Racism Highlight What Is Seen as the United States’ Accelerated
Decline,” Foreign Policy, June 18, 2020.
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James Traub, “The Free World’s Leader Isn’t Free Anymore, As the Quality of U.S. Democracy
Erodes, the Reasons Are Dwindling for Anyone to Look to It for Guidance,” Foreign Policy, June
18, 2020.
Edward Wong and Michael Crowley, “The Biggest Obstacle to China Policy: President Trump,”
New York Times, June 18, 2020.
John Bolton, “John Bolton: The Scandal of Trump’s China Policy,” Wall Street Journal, June 17,
2020.
James Jay Carafano, “James Carafano: US should back India after China kills at least 20 Indian
troops,” Fox News, June 17, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Why Can’t America Let South Korea Defend Itself?” National Interest,
June 17, 2020.
Roman Darius, “US Primacy Will Survive Covid-19 and Trump,” Strategist, June 17, 2020.
Josh Dawsey, “Trump Asked China’s Xi to Help Him Win Reelection, According to Bolton
Book,” Washington Post, June 17, 2020.
Seth J. Frantzman, “With US Global Leadership in Decline, Others Step in As Conflicts Grow,
With Every Step the US Takes Back from Various Hot Spots, Its Footprints Are Filled with Iran,
Turkey, Russia or Others,” Jerusalem Post, June 17, 2020.
Henry Olsen, “Trump Is Right to Reduce Troops in Germany,” Washington Post, June 17, 2020.
Akila Radhakrishnan and Elena Sarver, “Trump’s Chilling Blow to the ICC,” Foreign Policy,
June 17, 2020.



Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke
Michael Moodie
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Assistant Director and Senior Specialist in Foreign

Affairs, Defense and Trade

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