Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress
December 15, 2020
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a
poor human rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional
Mark P. Sullivan
concern since the 1959 Cuban revolution. Current Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel
Specialist in Latin
succeeded Raúl Castro in April 2018, but Castro wil continue to head Cuba’s
American Affairs
Communist Party until the next party congress, scheduled for April 2021. In 2019, a new
constitution took effect; it introduced some political and economic reforms but

maintained the state’s dominance over the economy and the Communist Party’s
predominant political role. A November 2020 government crackdown on the San Isidro Movement, a civil society
group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression, spurred a protest by several hundred Cubans and focused
international attention on Cuba’s poor human rights record. The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the
economic effects of the response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, reduced support from
Venezuela, and increased U.S. economic sanctions. The economy is forecast to contract 8.3% in 2020, and the
global contraction in economic growth, trade, foreign investment, and tourism likely wil slow post-COVID-19
economic recovery. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy
changes, but the slow pace of these reforms has not fostered sustainable growth and development. Amid the
pandemic, the government has implemented more reforms and on December 10, 2020, announced its dual-
currency system would be eliminated on January 1, 2021, a major reform that has long been debated.
U.S. Policy
Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions aimed at isolating
the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including by enacting
legislation strengthening—and at times easing—U.S. economic sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration
initiated a policy shift away from sanctions and toward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration
of diplomatic relations; the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; and an
increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes.
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017 that introduced new sanctions and rolled back some
of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations. In September 2017, the State Department reduced
the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response to unexplained health injuries of members of the
U.S. diplomatic community in Havana. The reduction affected embassy operations, especial y visa processing. In
November 2017, the Administration restricted financial transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban
military, intel igence, and security services; the “Cuba restricted list” has been updated several times, most
recently in September 2020. By 2019, the Administration had largely abandoned engagement and increased
sanctions to pressure the Cuban government on human rights and for its support of the Venezuelan government of
Nicolás Maduro. The sanctions included a wide array of restrictions, especial y on travel and remittances, as wel
as visa restrictions and sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil exports to Cuba and certain trade and financial
transactions. (See “Key Trump Administration Sanctions and Other Actions,” below.)
Legislative Activity in the 116th Congress
The 116th Congress has continued to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government sponsored
broadcasting to Cuba: $20 mil ion for democracy programs and $29.1 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2019 (P.L.
116-6) and $20 mil ion for democracy programs and $20.973 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94,
Division G). For FY2021, the Administration requested $10 mil ion for democracy programs and $12.973 mil ion
for broadcasting. Both the House-passed version of the FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil , Division A of H.R.
7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil and explanatory statement would
provide $20 mil ion for democracy programs and would fully fund the broadcasting request.
In other action, P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for State Department employees and dependents injured
while stationed in Cuba. The conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) to the FY2021 defense authorization bil , H.R.
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6395, approved by the House and the Senate on December 8 and 11, 2020, respectively, would extend such
benefits to personnel of other federal agencies. The Senate also approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, cal ing for the
unconditional release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer.
Several bil s introduced in the 116th Congress would ease or lift U.S. sanctions in Cuba: H.R. 213 (basebal ); S.
428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447 (U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overal embargo); and H.R. 3960/S. 2303
(travel). H.R. 4884 would direct the Administration to reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program.
S. 3977 would require reporting on countries with Cuban medical missions. S. 4635 would require reporting on
Cuba’s medical missions and would reinstate the Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMMP) program. S. 4973
would authorize compensation for certain U.S. government personnel who incur disabilities resulting from certain
injuries to the brain.
Several resolutions would address a variety of issues: H.Res. 1172, the release of Cuban political prisoner Silverio
Portal Contreras (who was ultimately released December 1, 2020); S.Res. 14 and H.Res. 136, Cuba’s medical
missions; H.Res. 92 and S.Res. 232, U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba; S.Res. 215, Cuban religious/political
freedom; S.Res. 531, Las Damas de Blanco human rights group; and H.Res. 971 and S.Res. 637, the 35th
anniversary of Cuba broadcasting. For more on legislative initiatives in the 116th Congress, see Appendix A.
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Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 73

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Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress

Introduction
Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located
90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many years.
Especial y since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping U.S.
policy toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA; P.L.
102-484, Title XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Both measures tightened U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba that had
first been imposed in the early 1960s; however, both measures also provided road maps for
normalization of relations, dependent on significant political and economic changes in Cuba.
Congress partial y modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba when it enacted the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L. 106-387, Title IX) al owing
for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
Over the past decade, much of the debate in
Cuba at a Glance
Congress over U.S. policy has focused on
U.S. sanctions. In 2009, Congress took
Population: 11.2 mil ion (2018, ONEI)
legislative action in an appropriations
Area: 42,426 square miles (ONEI), slightly smal er than
Pennsylvania
measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease restrictions on
family travel and travel for the marketing of
GDP: $106 bil ion (2019, nominal U.S. $ (EIU)
agricultural exports, marking the first
Real GDP Growth: 2.3% (2018); 0.5% (2019 est.);
-8.3% (2020 forecast) (EIU)
congressional action easing Cuba sanctions in
Key Trading Partners: Exports (2018): Canada,
almost a decade. The Obama Administration
22.3%; Venezuela, 19.5%; China, 19.2%; Spain 7.6%.
took further action in 2009 by lifting
Imports (2018): Venezuela, 23%; China, 13.4%; Spain,
restrictions on family travel and family
10.5%. (ONEI)
remittances and in 2011 by further easing
Life Expectancy: 78.7 years (2018, UNDP)
restrictions on educational and religious
Literacy (adult): 99.8% (2018, UNDP)
travel and remittances to other than family
Legislature: National Assembly of People’s Power,
members.
currently 605 members (five-year terms elected in
March 2018; next due in 2023).
President Obama announced a major shift in
Sources: National Office of Statistics and Information
U.S. policy toward Cuba in December 2014
(ONEI), Republic of Cuba; U.N. Development
that moved away from a sanctions-based
Programme (UNDP); Economist Intel igence Unit (EIU).
policy aimed at isolating Cuba toward a
policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy shift led to the restoration of
diplomatic relations, the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
terrorism, and the easing of some restrictions on travel and commerce with Cuba. There was
mixed reaction in Congress, with some Members of Congress supporting the change and others
opposing it. Legislative initiatives in the 114th Congress in 2015-2016 reflected this policy divide,
with some bil s introduced that would have further eased U.S. economic sanctions and others that
would have blocked the policy shift and introduced new sanctions; ultimately no action was taken
on either policy approach.
President Trump announced a new policy approach toward Cuba in June 2017 that partial y rolled
back efforts to normalize relations and imposed new sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on
the permissible category of people-to-people educational travel to Cuba and on transactions with
companies controlled by the Cuban military. Again, reaction in the 115th Congress in 2017-2018
was mixed, with legislative initiatives reflecting the policy divide between those wanting to
tighten sanctions and those wanting to ease them. Ultimately, the only legislative action taken
with regard to sanctions was a provision in the 2018 farm bil (P.L. 115-334) that permits funding
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for two U.S. agricultural exports promotion programs in Cuba. This marked the first time
Congress had eased Cuba sanctions, albeit slightly, in almost a decade.
Since 2019, the Trump Administration has significantly expanded U.S. economic sanctions on
Cuba by reimposing many restrictions eased under the Obama Administration and imposing a
series of strong sanctions designed to pressure the government on its human rights record and for
its support for the Nicolás Maduro government in Venezuela. These actions have included
al owing lawsuits against those trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government,
tightening restrictions on U.S. travel and remittances to Cuba, and engaging in efforts to stop
Venezuelan oil exports to Cuba.
Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba

Source: Congressional Research Service.
This report examines U.S. policy toward Cuba in the 116th Congress. It is divided into three major
sections analyzing (1) Cuba’s political and economic environment; (2) U.S. policy toward Cuba;
and (3) selected issues in U.S.-Cuban relations, including restrictions on travel and trade,
democracy and human rights funding for Cuba, U.S. government-sponsored radio and television
broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and T Martí), migration issues, antidrug cooperation, property
claims, and U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba. Relevant legislative initiatives in the 116th
Congress are noted throughout the report, and Appendix A lists enacted measures and other bil s
and resolutions. Appendix B provides links to U.S. government information and reports on Cuba.
Also see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview.
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Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment
Brief Historical Background1
Cuba became an independent nation in 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492 until the
Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, the country
became a major sugar producer, with slaves from Africa brought in increasing numbers to work
the sugar plantations. The drive for independence from Spain grew stronger in the second half of
the 19th century, but independence came about only after the United States entered the conflict,
when the USS Maine sank in Havana Harbor after an explosion of undetermined origin. In the
aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States ruled Cuba for four years until Cuba
was granted its independence in 1902. Nevertheless, the United States retained the right to
intervene in Cuba to preserve Cuban independence and maintain stability in accordance with the
Platt Amendment,2 which became part of the Cuban Constitution of 1901; the United States
established a naval station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1903, which continues in operation
today.3 The United States subsequently intervened militarily three times between 1906 and 1921
to restore order, but in 1934, the Platt Amendment was repealed.
Cuba’s political system as an independent nation often was dominated by authoritarian figures.
Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly
dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a
series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista
until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed
by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by
corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952,
and his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship that fueled popular unrest and set the stage for
Fidel Castro’s rise to power.
Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. After
a brief jail term, he went into exile in Mexico, where he formed the 26th of July Movement.
Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista dictatorship. His
revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra Mountains in eastern Cuba, and it
joined with other resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled the country on
January 1, 1959, leading to 47 years of rule under Fidel Castro until he stepped down from power
provisional y in 2006 because of poor health and ceded power to his brother Raúl Castro.
Although Fidel Castro had promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took
power, he instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute
thousands of opponents. Under the new revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradual y
displaced members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet
Union, and relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government

1 Portions of this background section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,” April 28,
2011. For further background, see Rex A. Hudson, ed., Cuba, A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002), at https://www.loc.gov/item/2002018893/; “ Country Profile: Cuba,” Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, September 2006, at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf; Leslie
Bethell, ed., Cuba, A Short History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Hugh T homas, Cuba:
The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).
2 U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriations bill that was approved by both houses
and enacted into law in 1901.
3 For background on the U.S. naval station, see CRS Report R44137, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and
Legal Issues Regarding Its Lease Agreem ents, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Daniel H. Else.
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expropriated U.S. properties. In April 1961, Castro declared that the Cuban revolution was
socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. Over the next
30 years, Cuba was a close al y of the Soviet Union and depended on it for significant assistance
until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Castro ruled by decree until 1976 when he became the country’s president (technical y, president
of the Council of State) under a new constitution that set forth the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC), which Castro headed, as the leading force in state and society. When Fidel stepped down
in July 2006 because of poor health, his brother Raúl, Cuba’s long-time defense minister and first
vice president, became provisional president. In 2008, after Fidel announced that he would not be
returning to government, Cuba’s National Assembly chose Raúl as president and he went on to
serve two five-year terms until April 2018. More than 10 years after stepping down from power,
Fidel Castro died in November 2016 at 90 years of age. While out of power, Fidel continued to
author essays published in Cuban media that cast a shadow on Raúl Castro’s rule, and many
observers believe that the former leader encouraged so-cal ed hard-liners in the party and
government bureaucracy to slow the pace of economic reforms advanced by Raúl.4
Raúl Castro’s government (2006-2018) stands out for two significant policy developments. First
the government implemented a series of gradual market-oriented economic policy changes
including authorization for limited private sector activity, the legalization of property rights, and
an opening to further foreign investment. Critics, however, maintain that the government did not
go far enough toward enacting deeper reforms needed to stimulate the Cuban economy and foster
sustainable economic growth. The second notable policy development was the rapprochement in
bilateral relations with the Obama Administration; this rapprochement led to the reestablishment
of diplomatic relations and government-to-government engagement and cooperation on a wide
range of issues.
Political Conditions
Current President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez succeeded Raúl Castro in April 2018 after Castro
completed his second five-year term. Cuba does not have direct elections for president; instead,
Cuba’s legislature, the National Assembly of People’s Power, selected Díaz-Canel as president of
the country’s then-31-member Council of State, which, pursuant to Cuba’s 1976 constitution
(Article 74), made Díaz-Canel Cuba’s head of state and government.5 Most observers saw Díaz-
Canel, who had been serving as first vice president since 2013, as the “heir apparent,” although
Raúl is continuing in his position as first secretary of the PCC until 2021.
Díaz-Canel, currently 60 years old, is an engineer by training. His appointment as first vice
president in 2013 made him the official constitutional successor in case Castro died or could not
fulfil his duties. His appointment also represented a move toward bringing about generational
change in Cuba’s political system; Raúl Castro was 86 years old when he stepped down as
president. Díaz-Canel became a member of the Politburo in 2003 (the PCC’s highest
decisionmaking body), held top PCC positions in two provinces, and was higher education
minister from 2009 until 2012, when he was tapped to become a vice president on the Council of
State.

4 Simon Gardner and Sarah Marsh, “Fidel Gone and T rump Looming, Cuban Businesses Count on More Reforms,”
Reuters News, November 29, 2016.
5 Cuba held elections for the 605-member National Assembly, as well as for 15 provincial assemblies, in March 2018.
Candidates were tightly controlled by candidacy commissions, and voters were presented with one candidate for each
position.
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Cuba’s 2018 political transition is notable because it is the first time since the 1959 Cuban
revolution that a Castro is not in charge of the government. A majority of Cubans today have only
lived under the rule of the Castros. Raúl’s departure can be viewed as a culmination of the
generational leadership change that began several years ago in the government’s lower ranks. It is
also the first time that Cuba’s head of government is not leader of the PCC. Raúl Castro,
however, has indicated that he expects Díaz-Canel to take over as first secretary of the PCC when
his term as party leader ends at the next party congress, expected in April 2021.6
Another element of the 2018 transition was change in the composition of the then-31-member
Council of State. The National Assembly selected 72-year-old Salvador Valdés Mesa as first vice
president—not from the younger generation, but also not from the historical revolutionary period.
Valdés Mesa, who already had been serving as one of five vice presidents and is on the PCC’s
Politburo, is the first Afro-Cuban to hold such a high government position. Several older
revolutionary-era leaders remained on the council, including Ramiro Valdés, aged 86, who
continued as a vice president.7 Nevertheless, the average age of Council of State members was
54, with 77% born after the 1959 Cuban revolution.8
Most observers did not anticipate immediate major policy changes under President Díaz-Canel,
but in December 2018 Díaz-Canel made several decisions that appeared to demonstrate his
independence from the Castro government and his responsiveness to public concerns and
criticisms. He eased forthcoming harsh regulations that were about to be implemented on the
private sector; many observers believed these regulations would have shrunk the sector (see
“Economic Conditions” section, below). His government eliminated a proposed constitutional
change that could have paved the way for same-sex marriage after strong public criticisms of the
provision. In a third action, the Díaz-Canel government backed away from full implementation of
controversial Decree 349, issued in July 2018 to regulate artistic expression. After the decree
triggered a flood of criticism from Cuba’s artistic community, the government announced the
measure would be implemented gradual y and applied with consensus. Nevertheless, opposition
to Decree 349 continued to grow in 2019 and 2020, as the government continued its clampdown
on artistic expression; this led to a November 2020 government crackdown against the San Isidro
Movement, which actively opposes Decree 349. (For more, see “Human Rights” section, below.)
When President Díaz-Canel named his Council of Ministers (or cabinet) in July 2018, a majority
of ministers were holdovers from the Castro government, including those occupying key
ministries such as defense, interior, and foreign relations. Nine of 26 ministers were new,
however, as wel as two vice presidents. In January 2019, Díaz-Canel replaced the ministers of
finance and transportation, who had been holdovers from the previous government.9

6 Anthony Failoa, “Castros’ Successor, Miguel Díaz-Canel, T akes Over in Cuba, Pledges ‘Continuity,’” Washington
Post, April 19, 2018.
7 “Members of the Council of State to the Ninth Legislature of the National Assembly of People’s Power,” Granma,
April 20, 2018; Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Diversifies Key Government Posts with Somewhat Younger But Loyal
Leadership,” Miam i Herald, April 27, 2018; and Nelson Acosta, “ Factbox: Who’s Who at the T op of Cuba’s New
Government,” Reuters News, April 19, 2018.
8 William LeoGrande, “Cuba’s New Generation T akes the Helm with an Immediate T est: the Economy,” World
Politics Review, April 24, 2018.
9 Sarah Marsh, Nelson Acosta, and Marc Frank, “Cuba’s New President Names Cabinet Resembling Castro’s” Reuters
News, July 21, 2018; Mimi Whitefield, “Continuity But Some New Faces as Cuba’s Parliament Selects Ministers,”
Miam i Herald, July 21 2018; and “ Cuban President Replaces Ministers in First Cabinet Reshuffle,” Reuters News,
January 10, 2019.
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Constitutional Changes in 2019
On February 24, 2019, almost 87% of Cubans approved a new constitution in a national
referendum. Original y drafted by a commission headed by Raúl Castro and approved by the
National Assembly in July 2018, the overhaul of the 1976 constitution was subject to public
debate in thousands of workplaces and community meetings into November 2018. After
considering public suggestions, the National Assembly made additional changes to the draft
constitution, and the National Assembly approved a new version in December 2018. One of the
more controversial changes made by the commission was the elimination of a provision that
would have redefined matrimony as gender neutral compared to the current constitution, which
refers to marriage as the union between a man and a woman. Cuba’s evangelical churches
orchestrated a campaign against the provision, and Cuban Catholic bishops issued a pastoral
message against it.10 The commission chose to eliminate the proposed provision altogether, with
the proposed constitution remaining silent on defining matrimony, and maintained that the issue
would be addressed in future legislation within two years.11
Among the provisions of the new constitution, which went into effect in April 2019, are the
addition of an appointed prime minster as head of government to oversee government
operations—to be proposed by the President and designated by the National Assembly (Articles
140 and 141); limits on the president’s tenure (two five-year terms) and age (60, beginning first
term) (Articles 126 and 127); the right to own private property (Article 22); and the
acknowledgement of foreign investment as an important element of the country’s economic
development (Article 28). The new constitution stil ensures the state’s control over the economy
and the role of centralized planning (Article 19), and the Communist Party is stil the only
recognized party (Article 5).12
Pursuant to the new constitution, Cuba’s National Assembly redesignated incumbent Díaz-Canel
as president of the republic and Salvador Valdés Mesa as vice president in October 2019. Under
the previous constitution, Díaz-Canel served as president of the Council of State; under the new
constitution, that body is headed by Juan Esteban Lazo, president of the National Assembly, along
with the vice president and the secretary of the National Assembly. The Council of State
represents the National Assembly between sessions, including enacting decree laws. In October
2019, the National Assembly selected the members of the new Council of State, which was
reduced from 31 to 21 members, including the removal of two long-serving historical
revolutionary commanders, Ramiro Valdés and Guil ermo Garcia Frias.13
President Díaz-Canel appointed Tourism Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz as Cuba’s prime minister
in December 2019; he reportedly wil serve as the president’s administrative right-hand man in
implementing government policy and heads the Council of Ministers, the country’s highest
executive and administrative organ. In appointing Marrero to the position, Díaz-Canel cited
Marrero’s experience with foreign investors and in building the country’s tourism sector over his

10 Nelson Acosta and Sarah Marsh, “In Rare Campaign for Cuba, Churches Advocate Against Gay Marriage,” Reuters
News, October 16, 2018; Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Asked for Public Feedback on a New Constitution. Now It’s
Deciding Which Suggestions to Include,” Miami Herald, December 3, 2018.
11 Sasha Ingber, “Cuba Scraps Words Establishing Same-Sex Marriage from Drafted Constitution,” NPR, December
19, 2018; Sarah Marsh, “Cuba Panel Closes Door on Gay Marriage Constitutional Amendment,” Reuters News,
December 19, 2018.
12 “Constitución de la República de Cuba,” Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, April 10, 2019.
13 “Cuba Reshuffles to Improve Governance, Old Guard Removed from Council of State,” Reuters News, October 10,
2019. For the membership of the Council of State, see CubaDebate, “ Consejo de Estado,” at http://www.cubadebate.cu/
cuba/consejo-estado/.
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16-year tenure as tourism minister.14 The new Council of Ministers also includes six vice prime
ministers (including the retained historical figures, Ramiro Valdés and Ricardo Cabrisas); a
secretary; and 26 other ministers and officials, including six new ministers representing a younger
generation.15
The new Cuban constitution also restored the position of governor (and vice governor) in each of
the country’s provinces in an effort to devolve more power and responsibility to the local level.
President Díaz-Canel selected a single candidate for governor and vice governor for each of the
provinces in December; delegates of the country’s 168 municipal assemblies then ratified these
candidates in January 2020.
Human Rights16
The Cuban government has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply
restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights since
the early years of the Cuban revolution. The government has continued to harass members of
human rights and other dissident organizations. These organizations include the Ladies in White
(Las Damas de Blanco), currently led by Berta Soler, formed in 2003 by the female relatives of
the “group of 75” dissidents arrested that year, and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), led
by José Daniel Ferrer, established in 2011 by several dissident groups with the goal of working
peacefully for civil liberties and human rights. Ferrer was imprisoned from October 2019 until
April 2020, when he was released to house arrest; he faced trial on assault charges, but human
rights activists assert his detention was related to his activism. In 2020, international attention has
focused on a government crackdown on the San Isidro Movement (Movimiento San Isidro, or
MSI), formed in 2018 to oppose the government’s attempt to restrict artistic expression not
authorized by the state (see text box below on the MSI). In December 2020, Human Rights Watch
issued a report documenting how the Cuban government has used regulations designed to prevent
the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) to harass and imprison government
opponents.17
Political Prisoners. In October 2018, the State Department’s U.S. Mission to the United Nations
launched a campaign to cal attention to the plight of Cuba’s “estimated 130 political prisoners.”18
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo wrote an open letter to Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez
in December 2018, asking for a substantive explanation for the continued detention of eight
specific political prisoners and an explanation of the charges and evidence against other
individuals held as political prisoners.19

14 “Cuba Names Manuel Marrero Cruz as First Prime Minister Since 1976,” Deutsche Welle, December 21, 2019; and
“Cuba Names Prime Minister in Move to Lighten Presidential Load,” Reuters News, December 21, 2019.
15 Domingo Amuchastegui, “T he New Chief Executive” No Division of Authority, Just a Division of T ask,” Cuba
Standard Monthly, December 2019 – January 2020. For the membership of the Council of Ministers, see CubaDebate,
“Consejo de Ministros,” at http://www.cubadebate.cu/cuba/consejo-ministros/.
16 Also see separate section on “ T rafficking in Persons and Cuba’s Foreign Medical Missions.”
17 Human Rights Watch, “Cuba: COVID-19 Rules Used to Intensify Repression,” December 7, 2020, at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/07/cuba-covid-19-rules-used-intensify-repression.
18 U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “U.S. Mission to the United Nations and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor to Launch Campaign on Cuba’s Political Prisoners at the United Nations,” press notice, October 12, 2018, at
https://cu.usembassy.gov/u-s-mission-to-the-united-nations-and-the-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor-to-
launch-campaign-on-cubas-political-prisoners-at-the-united/; “ Remarks at a U.S. Event Launching the ‘Jailed for
What?’ Campaign Highlight ing Cuba’s Political Prisoners,” October 18, 2018.
19 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, “An Open Letter to the Foreign Minister of the
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For many years, the Havana-based Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National
Reconciliation (CCDHRN) was an authoritative source for information on political prisoners and
the level of short-term detentions, but the group has not been active since early 2019. In January
2019, CCDHRN estimated that Cuba held some 130-140 political prisoners.20 In June 2018, the
CCDHRN issued a list with 120 people imprisoned for political reasons, consisting of 96
opponents or those disaffected toward the regime (more than 40 were members of UNPACU) and
24 accused of employing or planning some form of force or violence.21
More recently, the State Department has begun to cite figures on political prisoners from the
Spanish-based human rights organization Cuban Prisoners Defenders. In December 2020, the
human rights group issued a report listing 134 political prisoners, including 77 imprisoned for
“reasons of conscience,” 27 released prisoners of conscience stil under government restrictions,
and 30 other political prisoners.22
According to the State Department’s human rights report on Cuba covering 2019, issued in
March 2020, the lack of governmental transparency, along with systematic violations of due
process rights, masked the true nature of criminal charges, investigations, and prosecutions and
al owed the government to prosecute peaceful human rights activists for criminal violations or
“pre-criminal dangerousness.” The report also noted that the Cuban government refused
international humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
and the United Nations access to its prisons and detention centers, and that the government
closely monitored and often harassed domestic human rights organizations.23
Amnesty International (AI) has designated several political dissidents as prisoners of conscience
over the years. According to AI, those designated as such represent only a fraction of those likely
to be detained solely for the peaceful expression of their opinions or beliefs.24 Among those AI-
designated prisoners of conscience currently imprisoned are Josiel Guía Piloto, president of the
Republican Party of Cuba, imprisoned in December 2016 and serving a five-year sentence;
Mitzael Díaz Paseiro, member of the Orlando Zapata Tamayo Civic Resistance, imprisoned in
November 2017, serving a nearly four-year sentence; and Edilberto Ronal Arzuago Alcalá,
UNPACU activist, imprisoned in December 2018.25
On November 27, 2020, AI dubbed Cuban performance artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and
artist Anamely Ramos González as prisoners of conscience when they were detained after a
November 26 raid against the MSI (see textbox on the MSI).26 AI previously had dubbed Otero

Republic of Cuba,” December 7, 2018, at https://cu.usembassy.gov/an-open-letter-to-the-foreign-minister-of-the-
republic-of-cuba/.
20 Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional (CCDHRN), “Cuba: Algunos Actos de
Represión Polít ica en el Mes de Diciembre de 2018,” January 3, 2019.
21 CCDHRN, “Lista Parcial de Condenados o Procesados en Cuba por Razones Politicas en Esta Fecha,” June 11, 2018,
and “En Cuba hay 120 prisioneros por motivos políticos, según la CCDHRN,” 14ymedio.com , June 11, 2018.
22 Cuban Prisoners Defenders, “Cuban Prisoners Defenders Report,” December 1, 2020.
23 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019, March 11, 2020.
24 Amnesty International (AI) defines prisoners of conscience as those jailed because of their political, religious, or
other conscientiously held beliefs, ethnic origin, sex, color, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth,
sexual orientation, or other status, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence. Going beyond AI’s narrow
definition of prisoners of conscience, the Cuban government has held a larger number of political prisoners, generally
defined as a person imprisoned for his or her political activities.
25 AI, “Cuba: A Snapshot of Prisoners of Conscience Under the Government of President Miguel Díaz-Canel,” 2019.
26 AI, “Cuba: Amnesty International Calls for Release of T wo San Isidro Prisoners of Conscience,” November 27,
2020.
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Alcántara a political prisoner in March 2020, when he was detained for 13 days but released
following an outcry by Cuban artists.
The Cuban government has released several
San Isidro Movement (MSI)
AI-designated prisoners of conscience since
The San Isidro Movement (MSI) is a civil society group
2018. On December 1, 2020, the government formed in 2018 by independent artists, musicians,
released Silverio Portal Contreras, a former
writers, and scholars in response to the Cuban
activist with the Ladies in White human
government’s attempt to impose a decree-law restricting
artistic freedom. Named for the Old Havana
rights group; Portal Contreras had been
neighborhood of San Isidro, MSI recently has galvanized
imprisoned in June 2016 and sentenced to
international attention on freedom of expression in
four years in prison. In September 2020, the
Cuba, as the government has harassed and repressed the
government released independent journalist
group’s members.
Roberto de Jesús Quiñones Haces from
Arrested on November 9, 2020, Cuban rapper and MSI
prison after serving a one-year sentence; he
member Denís Solís was charged with “contempt for
public authority” and sentenced to eight months in
had been convicted of resistance and
prison, prompting MSI members to conduct a peaceful
disobedience in September 2019, while
protest that was disrupted by authorities. Several MSI
covering a trial involving homeschooling.27
members subsequently began a hunger strike at the
In August 2020, UNPACU member Eliécer
home of an MSI founder, Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara.
Bandera Barreras, imprisoned in September
Cuban authorities broke into the home on November
26, al eging violations of Coronavirus Disease 2019
2016 and sentenced to nearly five years, was
(COVID-19) protocols, and detained over a dozen
released on conditional parole. In May 2019,
people. As word spread by social media, including videos
the government released political activist Dr.
of the government’s repression, several hundred
Eduardo Cardet, leader of the Christian
Cubans, many young artists, gathered in protest at the
Liberation Movement, after spending more
Ministry of Culture overnight on November 27. Several
observers have dubbed the protest an awakening of civil
than two years in prison for publicly
society energized by social media.
criticizing Fidel Castro. In 2018, the
The government initial y responded by meeting with a
government released two political prisoners
protestor delegation and agreeing to continue talks,
after hunger strikes: in July, Dr. Ariel Ruiz
urgently review the case against Solís, and ensure
Urquiola, who had been sentenced in May to
independent artists would not be harassed. This
one year in prison for the crime of
agreement quel ed the protest, but the government
backtracked on its commitments within hours and
disrespecting authority (desacato),28 and, in
launched an assault on state media against MSI,
October, UNPACU activist Tomás Núñez
maintaining the protest was instigated by the United
Magdariaga, who had been sentenced to one
States. Artists and other activists who participated in the
year in jail for al egedly making threats to a
protest have been targeted for harassment and
security agent.
defamation, and some have been detained or subject to
29
house detention.
Freedom of Expression. In October 2018,
Sources: “The Movimiento San Isidro Chal enges
the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Cuba’s Regime,” Economist, December 5, 2020; Marc
Freedom of Expression and the Inter-
Frank, “Cuban Government Backtracks on Deal with
Protesters,” Reuters News, November 29, 2020; and Ed
American Commission on Human Rights—
Augustin, Natalie Kitroeff, and Frances Robles, “‘An
two human rights bodies affiliated with the
Awakening’: Cubans’ Access to the Internet Fosters
Organization of American States—issued an
Dissent,” New York Times, December 10, 2020.
extensive report on freedom of expression in
Cuba. The report concluded that Cuba continues to be the only country in the hemisphere where

27 AI, “Cuba 2019,” at https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/report-cuba/; and AI, “Cuba: Prisoner of
Conscience Released: Roberto Quiñones Haces,” September 28, 2020.
28 AI, “Urgent Action, Environmentalist Conditionally Released,” July 11, 2018.
29 “Antes de morirme tengo que ver a mi país libre,” 14ymedio.com (Havana), October 16, 2018.
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there are no guarantees for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. According to the
report, the Cuban government has a monopoly on the media; legal y prohibits the establishment
of private media; and uses arbitrary detentions, threats, and acts of harassment or censorship
against journalists who disseminate ideas, opinion, and information critical of the government.30
The 2019 annual report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
maintained the Díaz-Canal administration has intensified the “harassment and systematic
persecution of independent journalists, human rights activists, and dissidents who disseminate
information and opinions on matters of public interest outside the control of the
state.”31According to Reporters Without Borders’ 2020 World Press Freedom Index, Cuba ranked
near the bottom, 171st out of 180 countries worldwide.32
Amid Cuba’s repressive media environment, various independent Cuban blogs and independent
media have been established over the past dozen years, although these outlets often are threatened
and harassed by government security agents. Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez has received
considerable international attention since 2007 for her website, Generación Y, which includes
commentary critical of the Cuban government. In 2014, Sánchez launched an independent digital
newspaper in Cuba, 14 y medio, available on the internet, but distributed through a variety of
methods in Cuba, including CDs, USB flash drives, and DVDs.33
Other notable online forums and independent or alternative media that have developed in recent
years include Periodismo del Barrio (focusing especial y on environmental issues), El Toque,
OnCuba (a Miami-based digital magazine and website with a news bureau in Havana), and
Tremenda Nota (focusing on the LGBT community).34 Another online forum, Cuba Posible
(founded by two former editors of the Catholic publication Espacio Laical), began operations in
2015 but closed in 2019 because of intense pressure and difficult conditions in Cuba.35
In recent years, the Cuban government has moved to expand internet connectivity through
“hotspots” first begun in 2015, the launching of internet capability on cel phones with 3G
technology in 2018, and the legalization of private Wi-Fi networks to access the internet and
connect computers in 2019. The increase in social media use in Cuba has opened up a new
avenue for freedom of expression and provided a means for Cubans to communicate their
concerns and complaints to government officials. Social media spurred an impromptu gay rights
march in June 2019 after the government cancel ed its annual gay pride march, and, in November
2020, was instrumental in bringing together several hundred Cubans to protest targeted repression
against the San Isidro Movement.36

30 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Freedom of Expression in Cuba, October 31, 2018, at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/docs/reports/Cuba-
en.pdf.
31 Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Annual Report of the Inter-Am erican Com m ission on Hum an Rights, Volume II, Annual Report of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,” February 24, 2020.
32 Reports Without Borders, 2020 World Press Freedom Index, Cuba, at https://rsf.org/en/cuba.
33 Sánchez’s blog is available at https://generacionyen.wordpress.com/, and her online digital newspaper is available at
https://www.14ymedio.com/. Access to both sites is usually blocked in Cuba by the government.
34 Periodismo del Barrio, at https://www.periodismodebarrio.org/; El Toque, at https://eltoque.com/; OnCuba, at
https://oncubanews.com/; and Trem enda Nota, at https://www.tremendanota.com/.
35 Cuba Posible, at https://cubaposible.com/; “Cuba Posible disuelve su junta directiva por circunstancias ‘demasiado
difíciles,’” 14ym edio.com, May 20, 2019.
36 Anthony Failoa, “With 3G and T witter, Cubans Unafraid to Complain,” Washington Post, July 8, 2019; and Ed
Augustin, Natalie Kitroeff, and Frances Robles, “On Social Media, T here Are T housands’: In Cuba, Internet Fuels Rare
Protests,” New York Times, December 9, 2020.
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Human Rights Reporting on Cuba
Amnesty International (AI), Cuba, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/.
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (Comisión Cubana de
Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional, CCDHRN), an independent Havana-based human rights
organization that produces a monthly report on short-term detentions for political reasons.
CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represión Política en el Mes de Marzo de 2019,” April 3, 2019, at
https://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/OVERVIEW-MARZO_CYMFIL20190409_0001.pdf.
CCDHRN, “Lista Parcial de Condenados o Procesados en Cuba por Razones Politicas en Esta Fecha,” June
11, 2018, at https://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/LISTA-PRESOS-JUNIO_CYMFIL20180611_0001.pdf.
Cuban Prisoners Defenders, https://www.prisonersdefenders.org.
14ymedio.com, independent digital newspaper, based in Havana, at http://www.14ymedio.com/.
Human Rights Watch (HRW), https://www.hrw.org/americas/cuba.
HRW’s 2020 World Report maintains that “the Cuban government continues to repress dissent and punish
public criticism,” at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cuba.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2019, April 6, 2020, Chapter IV has a
section on Cuba, at https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2019/docs/IA2019cap4bCU-en.pdf.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
Special Report on the Situation of Freedom of Expression in Cuba, October 2018, at http://www.oas.org/en/
iachr/expression/docs/reports/Cuba-en.pdf.
Annual Report, 2019, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, February
24, 2020, at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/reports/ENGIA2019.pdf.
U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2019, March 10, 2020, at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CUBA-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf.
2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Cuba, June 25, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-
persons-report/cuba/.
Economic Conditions amid COVID-19
Cuba’s economy continues to be largely state-controlled, with the government owning most
means of production and employing a majority of the workforce. Key sectors of the economy that
generate foreign exchange include the export of professional services (largely medical personnel);
tourism, which has grown significantly since the mid-1990s, with an estimated 4.7 mil ion
tourists visiting Cuba in 2018 (although this figure declined to almost 4.3 mil ion in 2019 due to
increased U.S. travel restrictions); nickel mining, with the Canadian mining company Sherritt
International involved in a joint investment project; and a biotechnology and pharmaceutical
sector that supplies the domestic health care system and has fostered a significant export industry.
Cash remittances from relatives living abroad, especial y from the United States, also have
become an important source of hard currency, amounting to some $3.7 bil ion in 2019 (although
remittances have fal en in 2020 due toCOVID-19 restrictions that have disrupted international
travel). The once-dominant sugar industry has declined significantly over the past three decades;
for the 2019-2020 harvest, Cuba produced just 1.2 mil ion metric tons and likely wil produce less
than that for the 2020-2021 harvest (for comparison, Cuba produced 8.4 mil ion MT of sugar in
1990).37

37 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Cuba,” November 22, 2019; Oficina Nacional de Estadística e
Información (ONEI), República de Cuba, “ T urismo. Llegadas de visitantes internacionales,” December 2019;
”COVID-19 puede hacer decliner las remesas a Cuba entre un 30 y 40% en 2020,” T he Havana Consulting Group and
T ech, March 20, 2020; and Marc Frank, “ Cuban Sugar Harvest Gets Underway Amid Crisis,” Reuters News,
December 4, 2020.
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For 20 years, Cuba has depended heavily on Venezuela for its oil needs. In 2000, the two
countries signed a preferential oil agreement (essential y an oil-for-medical-personnel barter
arrangement) that provided Cuba with some 90,000-100,000 barrels of oil per day, about two-
thirds of its consumption. Cuba’s goal of becoming a net oil exporter with the development of its
offshore deepwater oil reserves was set back in 2012, when the dril ing of three exploratory oil
wel s was unsuccessful. This setback, combined with Venezuela’s economic difficulties, raised
Cuban concerns about the security of the support received from Venezuela. Since 2015,
Venezuela has cut the amount of oil that it sends to Cuba, and Cuba has increasingly turned to
other suppliers for its oil needs, such as Algeria and Russia. In early 2019, Cuba reportedly
received between 40,000 and 50,000 barrels of oil per day from Venezuela, about one-third of its
consumption.38 Since April 2019, U.S. economic sanctions aimed at oil tankers and companies
involved in delivering Venezuelan oil to Cuba have further disrupted oil imports, leading to gas
shortages that have negatively affected economic activity, including the agriculture sector.39
The government of Raúl Castro implemented
COVID-19 in Cuba
a number of market-oriented economic
Cuba’s public health response to the pandemic appears
policy changes that were welcomed, although to have been effective. As of December 14, 2020, Cuba
economists were general y disappointed that
reported 137 deaths and 9,588 confirmed cases,
more far-reaching reforms were not
according to Cuba’s Ministry of Public Health
(https://salud.msp.gob.cu/). Cuba’s mortality rate as
undertaken. At the PCC’s seventh party
measured by deaths per 100,000 people was 1.21, among
congress, held in April 2016, Raúl Castro
the lowest in the Western Hemisphere, according to the
reasserted that Cuba would move forward
Johns Hopkins University (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/
with updating its economic model “without
data/mortality).
haste, but without pause.”40
Cuba imposed stringent COVID-19 restrictions in March
2020, banning foreign tourists from entering the island.
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the
In early April 2020, Cuba suspended the arrival and
Cuban economy was in poor shape, because
departure of international passenger flights. (The U.S.
of reduced support from Venezuela over the
State Department arranged several humanitarian charter
flights for U.S. citizens and eligible lawful permanent
past several years and increased U.S.
residents to leave Cuba.) Cuba began to loosen
economic sanctions under the Trump
restrictions in October (except in Havana, where cases
Administration. The Cuban economy grew
increased in August), and in November it opened its
1.8% in 2017, 2.3% in 2018, and an
main international airport to al commercial flights.
estimated 0.5% in 2019, according to the
Sources: “Cuba Opens Most of Country to Tourism as
Economist Intel igence Unit (EIU). Before
Enters ‘New Normality,’” Reuters News, October 8
2020; and “Cuba Reopens Havana Airport Ahead of
the pandemic’s onset, the EIU predicted the
Tourism High Season,” Reuters, December 4, 2020.
economy would contract 0.7% in 2020; now,
the EIU projects a steep decline of 8.3% due
to the extended shutdown of economic activity, including the tourism sector.41 Key factors that
wil affect Cuba’s post-COVID-19 economic recovery in 2021 include the global pace of

38 John Otis, “Venezuela Upheaval Fuels Cuban Concerns–Potential Collapse of Maduro Regime Would T hreaten to
End Crucial Oil-Barter Agreement,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2019; Nora Gámez T orres, “ U.S. Considers
Sanctions on Firms Facilitating Oil to Cuba,” Miami Herald, March 15, 2019.
39 “Cuba Economy: Quick View – Gas Shortages Affect Agriculture and Domestic Activity.” Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) ViewsWire, February 20, 2020.
40 Raúl Castro Ruz, “Full T ext of Central Report: T he development of the national economy, along with the struggle for
peace, and our ideological resolve, constitute the Party’s principal missions,” Granma, April 18, 2016, at
http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-04-18/the-development-of-the-national-economy-along-with-the-struggle-for-peace-
and-our-ideological-resolve-constitute-the-partys-principal-missions.
41 “Country Report, Cuba,” EIU, February and December 2020.
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economic recovery, the status of U.S. sanctions, and the Cuban government’s efforts to advance
substantive structural reforms.
Until recently, the Díaz-Canel government largely continued a gradualist and cautious approach
toward economic reform, largely due to concern about the potential effects on political stability.
Amid the economy’s precipitous decline in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the
government announced reforms in July. These reforms included authorizing the private sector to
conduct certain foreign trade operations, introducing adjustments to rules governing state-owned
enterprises, lifting the 10% tax on U.S. dollars, and opening dozens of stores al owing convertible
currency to be used to buy food and other goods. Most significantly, the government announced it
was preparing for the long-awaited unification of Cuba’s dual currency system in the shortest
possible time. Some analysts describe the reform efforts as only partial; others contend the
economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic helped overcome disagreement within the Cuban
leadership over the need to move forward.42
On December 10, 2020, in a televised address, President Díaz-Canel announced that on January
1, 2021, Cuba would eliminate its dual currency system, a reform that has been discussed for
some 20 years. The Cuban peso is to be fixed to a single exchange rate of 24 pesos per U.S.
dollar, and the Cuban convertible peso, currently pegged to the U.S. dollar and used for state
transactions and those visiting Cuba, is to be eliminated.43 The reform could have high costs in
the short term, marked by price instability and inflationary pressure, along with shocks to supply
chains and threats to the social safety net and social stability. Over the long term, however, the
action is expected to be positive for the economy, boosting productivity and development.44
Private Sector. The Cuban government employs a majority of the labor force, but the
government over the past decade, the government has permitted more private-sector activities. In
2010, the government opened up a wide range of activities for self-employment and smal
businesses to almost 200 categories of work. The number of self-employed, or cuentapropistas,
rose from 144,000 in 2009 to about 591,000 in May 2018 and, after a slight decline in 2018, stood
at almost 596,000 in June 2019 (although this number is likely significantly lower because of the
COVID-19 pandemic).45 Analysts contend that the government needs to do more to aid the
development of the private sector, including an expansion of authorized activities to include more
white-collar occupations and state support for credit to support smal businesses.46
In 2017, the Castro government took several steps that restricted private-sector development. It
closed a fast-growing cooperative that had provided accounting and business consultancy

42 Sources for the information in this paragraph include the following: “Country Report, Cuba,” EIU, December 2020;
“Díaz-Canel outlines phase one of ‘economic transformation process,” Cuba Briefing, T he Caribbean Council, July 20,
2020, Issue 1061; “Malmierca details new export/import regime for non -state enterprises,” Cuba Briefing, T he
Caribbean Council, July 27, 2020, Issue 1062; Ricardo T orres, “Cuba: Pursuing Halfway Economic Reforms,”
AULABLOG, December 9, 2020; William M. Leogrande, “ Cuba’s Economic Crisis Is Spurring Much -Needed Action
on Reforms,” World Politics Review, November 17, 2020; and Pavel Vidal and Johannes Werner, “Economic T rends
Report, T hird Quarter, 2020,” Cuba Standard, Economic Reports, 2020.
43 Marc Frank, “Cuba Announces First Devaluation Since Revolution from January,” Reuters News, December 11,
2020.
44 “Country Report, Cuba,” EIU, December 2020
45 “Cuba Economy: Quick View–Number of Self-Employed Shrinks in 2018,” EIU ViewsWire, February 14, 2019; and
“Cuba Cuenta Ya Con Casi 600.000 T rabajadores Privados,” EFE, June 21, 2019.
46 “Cuba: Stuck in the Past,” The Economist, April 1, 2017; Nora Gámez T orres,” Fear is Driving Raúl Castro to Punish
Cuba’s New Entrepreneurial Class,” Miami Herald, August 2, 2017; and “Cuba T ightens Regulations on Nascent
Private Sector,” Reuters News, December 21, 2017.
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link to page 38 Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress

services, put restrictions on construction cooperatives, and temporarily stopped issuing new
licenses for 27 private-sector occupations, including for private restaurants and for renting private
residences. The government maintains that it took the actions to “perfect” the functioning of the
private sector and curb il icit activities, such as the sale of stolen state property, tax evasion, and
labor violations.
In December 2018, the Díaz-Canel government implemented regulations that, among other
provisions, reduced and consolidated the permissible 200 categories of work to 123 categories.
The government had released regulations earlier in the year that would have limited an individual
to one business license; limited the size of private restaurants, bars, and cafeterias to 50 seats; and
required the self-employed to maintain a minimum balance in bank accounts equivalent to three
months of tax payments. However, before the regulations were to go into effect in December
2018, President Díaz-Canel eliminated the limitations on business licenses and the size of
restaurants and eased the requirement for maintaining a reserve for tax payments. 47 The aims of
the new regulations were to increase taxation oversight of the private sector and to control the
concentration of wealth and rising inequality. Many observers, however, believed the regulations
were aimed at stifling private-sector growth because of the government’s concerns regarding that
sector’s independence from the government.
Increased U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba negatively affected Cuba’s nascent private sector,
since many smal businesses sprang up to cater to increased American visitors. As discussed
below in the section on “Travel Restrictions,” the elimination of cruise ship travel, flights to and
from Cuban cities other than Havana, and people-to-people travel led to almost a 22% drop in
U.S. visitors to Cuba in 2019 (not including Cuban Americans visiting their families) compared
with the previous year. In the first two months of 2020, U.S. visitor travel to Cuba declined 64%
compared with the same period in 2019. Moreover, the economic fal out of the COVID-19
pandemic, with the shutdown of the tourist sector and related activity, has hit Cuba’s private and
overal economy hard, with some $3 bil ion in lost revenue.48
Foreign Investment. The Cuban government adopted a new foreign investment law in 2014 with
the goal of attracting increased levels of foreign capital to the country. The law cut taxes on
profits by half, to 15%, and exempts companies from paying taxes for the first eight years of
operation. It also eliminated employment or labor taxes, although companies stil must hire labor
through state-run companies, with agreed wages. A fast-track procedure for smal projects
reportedly streamlines the approval process, and the government agreed to improve the
transparency and time of the approval process for larger investments.49
A Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED Mariel) was established in 2014 near the port of
Mariel to attract foreign investment. To date, ZED Mariel has approved some 55 investment
projects at various stages of development, with 31 operating.50 In November 2017, Cuba
approved a project for Rimco (the exclusive dealer for Caterpil ar in Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and the Eastern Caribbean) to become the first U.S. company to be located in the ZED

47 “Government ‘Rectifies’ Self-Employment Regulations Following Disquiet,” Cuba Briefing, T he Caribbean Council,
December 10, 2018.
48 William M. Leogrande, “Cuba’s Economic Crisis Is Spurring Much-Needed Action on Reforms,” World Politics
Review, November 17, 2020.
49 “Cuba Approves New Foreign Investment Law,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America ,
April 2014; “What’s Changed in Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law,” Reuters News, March 29, 2014.
50 Yosley Carrero, “Roundup: Cuba Launches 2020-2021 Business Opportunities Portfolio,” Xinhua News Agency,
December 10, 2020.
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Mariel. Rimco plans to set up a warehouse and distribution center to distribute Caterpil ar
equipment. In September 2018, the Roswel Park Comprehensive Cancer Center of Buffalo, NY,
announced it was entering into a joint venture with Cuba’s Center for Molecular Immunology
focused on the development of cancer therapies; the joint venture wil be located in the ZED
Mariel.
According to Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment Malmierca, Cuba has the goal of
attracting $2 bil ion-$2.5 bil ion in foreign investment projects annual y. In November 2018,
Malmierca said Cuba had signed more than 200 investment projects valued at $5.5 bil ion since it
made changes to its investment law in 2014, with $1.5 bil ion of that in 2018, although some
observers maintain that the actual amount invested was much less.51 In November 2019,
Malmierca said Cuba has attracted $1.7 bil ion over the past year, with 25 investment projects; in
December 2020, the minister said Cuba had attracted $1.9 bil ion in investment over the past
year, with 34 projects approved.52 The Cuban government also updated its wish list for foreign
investment in December 2020, including 503 projects representing potential investment of $12.1
bil ion in such high-priority areas as tourism, energy, and food production.53 Malmierca also
announced in early December 2020 that Cuba would permit foreign investments with Cuban
minority participation and would permit the participation of investment funds.54
For Additional Reading on the Cuban Economy
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, annual proceedings, at http://www.ascecuba.org/
publications/annual-proceedings/.
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, “The Cuban Economy After Six Decades of Socialism: Changes, Continuities and the
Worsening Crisis,” in Cuba in Transition: Volume 29, July 2019, at https://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/
uploads/2020/01/v29-asce_2019_04mesolago.pdf.
Brookings Institution, at https://www.brookings.edu/topic/cuba/.
The Cuban Economy, La Economia Cubana, website maintained by Arch Ritter, from Carlton University,
Ottawa, Canada, available at https://thecubaneconomy.com/.
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (ONEI), República de Cuba (Cuba’s National Office of
Statistics and Information), at http://www.one.cu/.
U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., website at https://www.cubatrade.org/.
Foreign Relations
During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with, and support from, the Soviet Union,
which provided bil ions of dollars in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy. This subsidy
system helped to fund an activist foreign policy and support for guerril a movements and
revolutionary governments in Latin America and Africa. With an end to the Cold War, the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to
abandon its revolutionary activities abroad. As its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support,

51 “Cuba Says Investor Interest Up Despite U.S. Hostility,” Voice of America News, October 31, 2018.
52 Sarah Marsh, “Cuba Attracts $1.7 Billion in Foreign Investment Despite U.S. Sanctions,” Reuters News, November
6, 2019; and “Cuba Attracts $1.9 Bln in Foreign Investment Despite U.S. Sanctions,” Postmedia Breaking News,
December 8, 2020.
53 Yosley Carrero, “Roundup: Cuba Launches 2020-2021 Business Opportunities Portfolio,” Xinhua News Agency,
December 10, 2020.
54 Mario J. Pentón, “Cuba Says It Will Open Its Economy to Majority -Owned Foreign Investments,” Miami Herald,
December 10, 2020.
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Cuba was forced to open up its economy and engage in economic relations with countries
worldwide.
In ensuing years, Cuba diversified its trading partners, although Venezuela under populist leftist
President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) became one of Cuba’s most important partners, leading to
Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela for oil imports. In 2018, the leading sources of Cuba’s imports
in terms of value were Venezuela (23%), China (13.4%), and Spain (10.5%); the leading
destinations of Cuban exports were Canada (22.3%), Venezuela (19.5%), China (19.2%), and
Spain (7.6%).55
Russia. Relations with Russia, which had diminished significantly in the aftermath of the Cold
War, have strengthened somewhat in recent years. In 2014, Russia agreed to write off 90% of
Cuba’s $32 bil ion Soviet-era debt, with some $3.5 bil ion to be paid back by Cuba over a 10-year
period that would fund Russian investment projects in Cuba.56 Trade relations between Russia
and Cuba have not been significant. Although Russian exports to Cuba grew from $87 mil ion in
2015 to almost $373 mil ion in 2018, led by motor vehicles (and parts) and oil, they declined to
$187 mil ion in 2019.57 Russian energy companies Zarubezhneft and Rosneft are currently
involved in oil exploration in Cuba, and in 2017, Rosneft began shipping oil to Cuba amid Cuba’s
efforts to diversify its foreign oil sources because of Venezuela’s diminished capacity.58
Russian officials publicly welcomed the improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations under the Obama
Administration, although some analysts viewed the change in U.S. policy as a setback for Russian
overtures in the region. As U.S.-Cuban normalization talks were beginning in Havana in January
2015, a Russian intel igence ship docked in Havana (the ship also docked in Havana in 2014,
2017, and 2018).59 In December 2016, Russia and Cuba signed a bilateral cooperation agreement
for Russia’s support to help Cuba modernize its defense sector.60
Reports indicate that as U.S. relations with Cuba have deteriorated under the Trump
Administration, Russia has been attempting to increase its ties, including high-level meetings
between government officials and increased economic, military, and cultural engagement.61 For
Cuba, a deepening of relations with Russia could help economical y, especial y regarding oil, and
could serve as a counterbalance to the Trump Administration’s return to a sanctions-based policy
instead of engagement.62 President Díaz-Canel visited Russia in November 2018, and press

55 Statistics drawn from Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información, República de Cuba, Anuario Estadístico de
Cuba 2018, Sector Externo, Edición 2019.
56 Anna Andrianova and Bill Faries, “Russia Forgives $32B of Debt, Wants to Do Business in Cuba,” Bloomberg
News, July 13, 2014.
57 Statistics from Federal Customs Service of Russia, as presented by Global T rade Atlas.
58 “Russia Resumes Oil Shipments to Cuba, Helps Fill Venezuelan Breach,” Reuters News, May 3, 2017;
“Zarubezhneft Starts Drilling in Cuba,” NEFTE Compass, October 10, 2019; and Marc Frank, “Russia Moves In to Fill
Cuba’s U.S. Void,” Financial Times, January 2, 2020.
59 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “Russia: Defense Cooperation with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela,” report to
Congress, February 4, 2019.
60 “Russia to Help Cuba Upgrade Armed Forces,” T ASS World Service Wire, December 15, 2016; “Russia, Cuba Sign
Program on Defense T echnology Cooperation,” Sputnik News Service, December 8, 2016.
61 Nora Gámez T orres, “Amidst Growing T ensions with the U.S., Cuba Gets Cozier with Russia,” Miami Herald,
October 13, 2017; Nora Gámez T orres and Antonio Maria Delgado, “Goodbye Venezuela, Hello Russia. Can Vladimir
Putin Save Cuba?” Miami Herald, December 26, 2017; and Marc Frank, “Russia Moves In to Fill Cuba’s U.S. Void,”
Financial Tim es, January 2, 2020.
62 “Cuba Looks More to Russia as the Prospects for Better U.S. T ies Fade Under T rump,” (interview with William M.
LeoGrande) World Politics Review, January 2, 2018.
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reports indicate that Cuba received a $50 mil ion credit line for purchases of Russian military
weapons and spare parts, as wel as contracts to modernize three power plants and a metal
processing plant and to upgrade Cuba’s railway system.63 Díaz-Canel returned to Moscow in
October 2019 and praised Russia for its support amid escalating “U.S. aggression.”64
There has been concern in Congress about the role of Russia in Latin America, including in Cuba.
The conference report to the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019,
P.L. 115-232 (H.R. 5515) required the Defense Intel igence Agency to submit a report to
Congress on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba (as wel as between Russia and
Nicaragua and Venezuela). Among the areas of cooperation noted in the report, which was
submitted to Congress in February 2019, was a Russian-Cuban announcement in 2017 of a plan
to construct a GLONASS satel ite navigation station in Cuba, and a 2013 Russia-Cuba agreement
permitting Russian military vessels to refuel and resupply in Cuban ports. According to the report,
the Russian Navy currently uses Cuban ports for maintenance, minor repairs, and refueling, and
may seek to establish a permanent naval logistics facility in the country.65
China. During the Cold War, Cuba and China did not have close relations because of Sino-Soviet
tensions, but bilateral relations with China have grown closer over the past 15 years, resulting in a
notable increase in trade. Since 2004, Chinese leaders have made a series of visits to Cuba and
Cuban officials in turn have visited China, including a November 2018 visit by President Díaz-
Canel. During the visit, Chinese President Xi Jinping cal ed for a long-term plan to promote the
development of China-Cuba ties and welcomed Cuba’s participation in the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), which is focused on infrastructure development around the world. President Xi
cal ed on both countries to enhance cooperation on trade, energy, agriculture, tourism, and
biopharmaceutical manufacturing.66 While Cuba’s relationship with China undoubtedly has an
ideological component since both are the among the world’s remaining communist regimes,
economic linkages and cooperation appear to be the most significant component of bilateral
relations.
According to Chinese trade statistics, total Cuba-China trade in in 2019 was valued at almost $1.3
bil ion, down almost 18% from 2018 (and continuing a downward trend since a 2015 high of $2.3
bil ion in total trade). In 2019, Cuban exports to China were valued at $480 mil ion (up 2.5%
from 2018), whereas Cuban imports from China were almost $790 mil ion (down 27% from
2018). The decline in imports from China reflects Cuba’s difficult economic situation, as
Venezuelan support has diminished. In response to a cash crunch, the Cuban government has cut
imports and reduced the use of fuel and electricity.67
China reportedly had been reluctant to invest in Cuba because of the uninviting business
environment, but recently that has begun to change. In 2015, the Chinese cel phone company
Huawei reached an agreement with the Cuban telecommunications company ETECSA to set up
Wi-Fi hotspots at public locations, and is helping to wire homes.68 In 2016, the Chinese company

63 Scott B. McDonald, “Why Cuba Isn’t Getting Much from Russia or China,” The National Interest, November 27,
2018.
64 “Cuban Leader Hails Russian Support During Meeting with Putin,” Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications,
October 29, 2019.
65 Russia also inaugurated a GLONASS station in Nicaragua in 2017. See DIA, Russia: Defense Cooperation with
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, report to Congress, February 4, 2019.
66 “China Focus: Xi Holds T alks with Cuban President to Advance T ies,” Xinhua, November 8, 2018.
67 “China’s Exports to Cuban Slump as Island’s Cash Crunch Deepens,” Reuters News, December 6, 2017; and
“Chinese Exports to Cuba Hit Lowest Level in Decade Last Year,” Reuters News, January 27, 2020.
68 T he final report of the Cuba Internet T ask Force (established by the State Department in 2018) describes China as
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Haier set up a plant assembling laptops and tablets in Cuba. Over the past two years, Chinese
financing has been supporting the modernization of a port in Santiago. Other planned Chinese
investment projects reportedly include pharmaceuticals as wel as the tourism sector involving
two hotels and a golf course.69 In May 2019, Cuban officials identified three areas for cooperation
within the BRI framework: renewable energy, cybersecurity and technology, and biotechnology.70
European Union. After two years of talks, the European Union (EU) and Cuba reached a
Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement in 2016 covering political, trade, and development
issues. The agreement was submitted to the European Parliament, which overwhelmingly
endorsed the agreement in July 2017, welcoming it as a framework for relations and emphasizing
the importance of the human rights dialogue between the EU and Cuba. Although the agreement
wil enter into force in full after it has been ratified in al EU member states, the provisional
application of the agreement began in November 2017.71 In March 2020, Secretary of State
Pompeo and some Members of Congress urged the government of Lithuania, the remaining EU
state to ratify the agreement, to oppose the agreement, citing concerns about Cuba’s human rights
violations.72
The new cooperation agreement replaces the EU’s 1996 Common Position on Cuba, which stated
that the objective of EU relations with Cuba included encouraging “a process of transition to
pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The position also
had stipulated that full EU economic cooperation with Cuba would depend upon improvements in
human rights and political freedom.73 Nevertheless, the new agreement states that a human rights
dialogue wil be established within the framework of the overal political dialogue and has
numerous provisions related to democracy, human rights, and good governance. In October 2018,
the EU and Cuba held their first human rights dialogue under the agreement, with the meeting
addressing issues related to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and multilateral
cooperation.74 A second human rights dialogue under the agreement took place in October 2019,
with both sides discussing freedom of expression, access to information, gender equality, and the
rights of vulnerable people; the two sides reportedly agreed to collaborate through the exchange

playing a major role in Cuba’s telecommunications sector market. See U.S. Department of State, Cuba Internet Task
Force: Final Report, June 16, 2019.
69 “Cuba Welcomes More Chinese Investment, Visitors to Boost T ourism,” Xinhua, September 20, 2018; “China Piles
into Cuba as Venezuela Fades and T rump Looms,” Reuters News, February 14, 2017; Nathan Hodge and Josh Chin,
“China Apt to Fill U.S.-Cuba Breach,” Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2016; “Feature: China Helps Convert
Santiago de Cuba into Modernized Port,” Xinhuanet, August 8, 2017; and T ed Piccone, “T he Geopolitics of China’s
Rise in Latin America,” Brookings, November 2016, pp. 18 -19.
70 “Cuban Official Highlights Key Areas for Belt & Road Cooperation,” Belt & Road News, May 2, 2019.
71 European Council, Council of the European Union, “EU-Cuba: Council Opens New Chapter in Relations,” press
release, December 6, 2016, at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/12/06-eu-cuba-relations/;
and European Parliament, “EU-Cuba Relations: A New Chapter Begins,” July 18, 2017, at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/570485/EXPO_IDA(2017)570485_EN.pdf.
72 “U.S. Secretary of State, Senators Call on Lithuania Not to Ratify EU-Cuba Pact,” Baltic News Service, March 7,
2020; and U.S. Senate, Office of Marco Rubio, “Rubio Leads Bipartisan Letter to Lithuanian Ambassador Urging Him
to Stand with Cuban People,” press release, March 3, 2020.
73 European Union, Official Journal of the European Commission, “Common Position of 2 December 1996, Defined by
the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the T reaty on European Union, on Cuba,” (96/697/CFSP), December 2, 1996.
74 “First EU-Cuba In-Depth Exchange on Human Rights T akes Place,” Cuba Briefing, T he Caribbean Council, October
15, 2018; European Parliament, Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate General for External Policies of
the Union, “Rule of Law and Human Rights in Cuba and Venezuela and EU Engagement,” November 2018.
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of best practices, including on combating violence against women and improving access to the
internet.
Venezuela. For 20 years, Venezuela has been a significant source of support for Cuba. Dating
back to 2000 under populist President Hugo Chávez, Venezuela began providing subsidized oil
and investment to Cuba. For its part, Cuba has sent thousands of professional personnel to
Venezuela. Estimates of the number of Cuban personnel in Venezuela vary, but a 2014 Brookings
study estimated that there were some 40,000 Cuban professionals in Venezuela, with 75% of
those being healthcare workers.75 The roughly 30,000 healthcare personnel included doctors and
nurses, while the balance of Cuban personnel in Venezuela reportedly included teachers, sports
instructors, military advisers, and intel igence operatives. According to the Brookings study,
various sources estimate that the number of Cuban military and intel igence advisers in Venezuela
ranged from hundreds to thousands, coordinated by Cuba’s military attaché in Venezuela. Some
Cuban medical personnel in Venezuela al ege that their services were used to secure votes for the
Maduro regime.76 The extent to which the overal level of Cuban personnel in Venezuela has
declined because of the drop in Venezuelan oil exports to Cuba and Venezuela’s economic crisis
is uncertain, but the EIU estimates that Venezuela has currently has around 20,000 medical
personnel in Venezuela.77
Since the death of Chávez in 2013, Cuba has been concerned about the future of Venezuelan
financial support. Cuba’s concerns have intensified since 2014 as Venezuela’s mounting
economic and political chal enges have grown under the authoritarian regime of President Nicolás
Maduro. Oil imports from Venezuela have declined, due to both Venezuela’s severe economic
deterioration and U.S. sanctions aimed at impeding exports to Cuba, leading to Cuba’s imposition
of austerity measures and economic decline.
International and Regional Organizations. Cuba is an active participant in international
forums, including the United Nations (U.N.) and has received support over the years from the
United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, both of which have offices in Havana. Cuba is also a member of the U.N.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, also known by its Spanish
acronym, CEPAL), one of the five regional commissions of the U.N., and hosted ECLAC’s 37th
session in May 2018. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres attended the opening of the
conference, and ECLAC’s Executive Secretary reaffirmed the organization’s commitment to help
Cuba in its efforts toward achieving sustainable development.78
Since 1991, the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) has approved a resolution annual y criticizing
the U.S. embargo and urging the United States to lift it. In 2016, for the first time, the United
States abstained instead of voting against the resolution, but in 2017, the United States returned to
opposing the resolution. On November 1, 2018, the UNGA again approved the resolution by a
vote of 189-2, with Israel again joining the United States in opposing it. The United States also

75 T ed Piccone and Harold T rinkunas, “T he Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: T he Beginning of the End?” Latin America
Initiative Policy Brief, Brookings, June 2014, p. 3.
76 Nicholas Casey and Andrea Zarate, “T rading Lifesaving T reatment for Maduro Votes,” New York Times, March 17,
2019.
77 Harold T rinkunas, Stanford University, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere, hearing on “T he Venezuela Crisis: T he Malicious Influence of State and Criminal Actors,”
September 13, 2017, at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20170913/106398/HHRG-115-FA07-Wstate-
T rinkunasH-20170913.pdf; and “ Country Report Cuba,” EIU, May 2020 .
78 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, “ECLAC and Cuba Join in a Dialogue About Its
Path to Sustainable Development,” press release, May 7, 2018.
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proposed eight amendments to the 2018 resolution criticizing Cuba’s human rights record, but the
amendments were defeated by wide margins. In November 2019, for the 28th consecutive year,
the UNGA adopted another resolution cal ing for an end to the economic, commercial, and
financial embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba. Brazil and Israel joined the United
States in opposing the resolution, and 187 U.N. member states supported the measure.79 In 2020,
a UNGA vote on the embargo planned for October 2020 was postponed until May 2021 due to
the COVID-19 pandemic.80
Among other international organizations, Cuba was a founding member of the World Trade
Organization, but it is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the
Inter-American Development Bank. Cuba is a member of the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC), official y established in December 2011 to boost regional
cooperation, but without the participation of the United States or Canada.
Cuba was excluded from participation in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1962
because of its identification with Marxism-Leninism. In 2009, however, the OAS overturned that
policy in a move that eventual y could lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization in
accordance with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS. Although the Cuban
government welcomed the OAS vote to overturn the 1962 resolution suspending Cuba’s OAS
participation, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS.81
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations82
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is il ustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the il -fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis, in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerril a insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-cal ed Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Panama; and the 1996
shootdown by Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban-American
group Brothers to the Rescue, which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. crew members.
Beginning in the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba consisted largely of seeking to isolate the
island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and
financial transactions. President Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on trade between the United

79 “Cuba: U.N. Members Overwhelmingly Support End of U.S. Embargo, as Brazil Backs Washington,” U.N. News,
November 7, 2019.
80 “Cuba Says U.S. T rade Embargo Cost More than $5 Bln Last Year,” Reuters, October 22, 2020.
81 For further background, see section on “Cuba and the OAS” in CRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the 111th
Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan; also see CRS Report R42639, Organization of Am erican States: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer.
82 For additional background, see CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
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States and Cuba in February 1962,83 citing Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA), which authorizes the President “to establish and maintain a total embargo upon al trade
between the United States and Cuba.”84 At the same time, the Treasury Department issued the
Cuban Import Regulations to deny the importation into the United States of al goods imported
from or through Cuba.85 The authority for the embargo was later expanded in March 1962 to
include the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).86
In July 1963, the Treasury Department revoked the Cuban Import Regulations and replaced them
with the more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)—31 C.F.R. Part 515—
under the authority of TWEA and Section 620(a) of the FAA.87 The CACR, which include a
prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in
the United States, remain the main body of Cuba embargo regulations and have been amended
many times over the years to reflect changes in policy. They are administered by the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and prohibit financial transactions as wel
as trade transactions with Cuba. The CACR also require that al exports to Cuba be licensed or
otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS),
under the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (P.L. 96-72; 50
U.S.C. Appendix 2405(j)).88 The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are found at 15
C.F.R. Sections 730-774.89
Congress subsequently strengthened sanctions on Cuba with enactment of the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992 (CDA; P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L. 106-387, Title IX).
 Among its provisions, the CDA prohibits U.S. foreign subsidiaries from engaging
in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any seaborne
vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within
the previous 180 days unless licensed by the Treasury Department.90
 The LIBERTAD Act, enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting down two U.S.
civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of measures to increase
pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the
transition to democracy. Most significantly, the act codified the Cuban embargo
as permanent law, including al restrictions imposed by the executive branch
under the CACR. This provision is noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect

83 Presidential Documents, “Proclamation 3447, Embargo on All T rade with Cuba,” 27 Federal Register 1085,
February 7, 1962.
84 In October 1960 under the Eisenhower Administration, exports to Cuba were strict ly controlled under the authority
of the Export Cont rol Act of 1949 in response to the expropriation of U.S. properties. T his action in effect amounted to
an embargo on exports of all products with the exception of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
85 U.S. Department of the T reasury, 27 Federal Register 1116, February 7, 1962.
86 U.S. Department of the T reasury, 27 Federal Register 2765-2766, March 24, 1962.
87 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Control of Financial and Commercial T ransactions Involving Cuba or Nationals
T hereof,” 28 Federal Register 6974-6985, July 9, 1963.
88 31 C.F.R. §515.533.
89 See especially 15 C.F.R. §746.2 on Cuba, which refers to other parts of the EAR.
90 Pursuant to an October 2016 regulatory change, the Obama Administration eased the 180-day rule by issuing a
general license waiving the restriction if the items carried to Cuba would, if subject to the Export Administration
Regulations, be designated as EAR 99, meaning that the items are not on the Commerce Control List . According to the
Commerce Department, EAR items generally consist of low-technology consumer goods. 81 Federal Register 71372-
71378, October 17, 2016.
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on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. The executive branch is prevented from
lifting the economic embargo without congressional concurrence through
legislation until certain democratic conditions set forth in the law are met,
although the President retains broad authority to amend the regulations therein.
Two other significant sanctions include Title III of the law, which holds any
person or government that traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban
government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court, and Title IV,
which denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in the trafficking
of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. (For additional information, including
Trump Administration action on these sanctions, see “Property Claims and Titles
III and IV of the LIBERTAD Act,” below.)
 TSRA authorizes U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba, but it also
includes prohibitions on U.S. assistance and private financing and requires
“payment of cash in advance” or third-country financing for the exports. The act
also prohibits tourist travel to Cuba.
In addition to these acts, Congress enacted numerous other provisions of law over the years that
imposed sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and support from
international financial institutions. The State Department also designated the government of Cuba
as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1982 under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act and other laws because of the country’s al eged ties to international terrorism,
although as noted below, the Obama Administration rescinded Cuba’s designation in 2015.91
Beyond sanctions, another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for the
Cuban people. This support includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to
Cuba under the terms of the CDA, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and
U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. The enactment of TSRA by the 106th
Congress also led to the United States becoming one of Cuba’s largest commercial suppliers of
agricultural products. Authorization for purposeful travel to Cuba and cash remittances to Cuba
has constituted an important means to support the Cuban people, although significant
congressional debate has occurred over these issues for many years.
Despite the poor state of U.S.-Cuban relations, several examples of bilateral cooperation took
place over the years in areas of shared national interest. Three areas that stand out are alien
migrant interdiction (with migration accords negotiated in 1994 and 1995), counternarcotics
cooperation (with increased cooperation dating back to 1999), and cooperation on oil spil
preparedness and prevention (since 2011).
Obama Administration: Shift Toward Engagement
In December 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift in U.S. policy toward
Cuba, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and the normalization of
relations. President Obama said that his Administration would “end an outdated approach that, for
decades, has failed to advance our interests.” He maintained that the United States would
continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba but stated that “we can do
more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement.”92

91 See CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism —Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by
Dianne E. Rennack.
92 White House, “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,” December 17, 2014.
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The policy change included three major steps: (1) the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state
sponsor of international terrorism in May 2015; (2) the restoration of diplomatic relations in July
2015 (relations had been severed in January 1961 by the Eisenhower Administration); and (3)
steps to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. The third step required
the Treasury and Commerce Departments to amend the CACR and EAR respectively; the two
agencies issued five rounds of amendments to the regulations in 2015-2016 that eased restrictions
on travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and banking and financial services. They also
authorized certain U.S. companies or other entities to have a physical presence in Cuba, such as
an office, retail outlet, or warehouse.
After the restoration of relations, U.S. and Cuban officials negotiated numerous bilateral
agreements, including in the following areas: marine protected areas (November 2015);
environmental cooperation on a range of issues (November 2015); direct mail service (December
2015); civil aviation (February 2016); maritime issues related to hydrography and maritime
navigation (February 2016); agriculture (March 2016); health cooperation (June 2016);
counternarcotics cooperation (July 2016); federal air marshals (September 2016); cancer research
(October 2016); seismology (December 2016); meteorology (December 2016); wildlife
conservation (December 2016); animal and plant health (January 2017); oil spil preparedness and
response (January 2017); law enforcement cooperation (January 2017); and search and rescue
(January 2017). The United States and Cuba also signed a bilateral treaty in January 2017
delimiting their maritime boundary in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Bilateral dialogues were held
on al of these issues as wel as on other issues including counterterrorism, claims (U.S. property,
unsatisfied court judgments, and U.S. government claims), economic and regulatory issues,
human rights, renewable energy and efficiency, trafficking in persons, and migration.
President Obama visited Cuba in March 2016 with the goals of building on progress toward
normalizing relations and expressing support for human rights. In a press conference with Raúl
Castro, President Obama said that the United States would “continue to speak up on behalf of
democracy, including the right of the Cuban people to decide their own future.”93 During a speech
that was televised to the Cuban nation, President Obama spoke out for advancing human rights,
stating his belief that citizens should be free to speak their minds without fear and that the rule of
law should not include arbitrary detentions.94 In October 2016, President Obama issued a
presidential policy directive on the normalization of relations with Cuba. The directive set forth
the Administration’s vision for normalization of relations and laid out six medium-term
objectives: (1) government-to-government interaction; (2) engagement and connectivity; (3)
expanded commerce; (4) economic reform; (5) respect for universal human rights, fundamental
freedoms, and democratic values; and (6) Cuba’s integration into international and regional
systems.95
In January 2017, the Obama Administration also announced another significant policy change
toward Cuba. The Administration ended the so-cal ed wet foot/dry foot policy, under which
thousands of unauthorized Cuban migrants had entered the United States since the mid-1990s.
Pursuant to a 1995 bilateral migration accord, Cuban migrants intercepted at sea attempting to
reach the United States were returned to Cuba, whereas those who successfully reached U.S.
shore were general y permitted to stay in the United States. Under the 2017 change in policy,

93 White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Raúl Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference,” March
21, 2016.
94 White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba,” March 22, 2016.
95 White House, “Presidential Policy Directive–United States-Cuba Normalization,” October 14, 2016, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/14/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cuba-
normalization.
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Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States il egal y and do not qualify for
humanitarian relief are now subject to removal. (For more, see “Migration Issues, ” below.)
Trump Administration: Increased Sanctions
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017, introducing new sanctions and
rolling back some of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations. By 2019,
however, the Trump Administration had largely abandoned engagement by increasing economic
sanctions significantly to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights record and its
support for the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.
Initial Policy Changes and Some Continuity in 2017-2018
In June 2017, President Trump set forth his Administration’s policy in a speech in Miami, FL,
where he signed a national security presidential memorandum (NSPM) on Cuba replacing
President Obama’s October 2016 presidential policy directive that had laid out objectives for the
normalization process. The President cal ed for the Cuban government to end the abuse of
dissidents, release political prisoners, stop jailing innocent people, and return U.S. fugitives from
justice in Cuba. He stated that “any changes to the relationship between the United States and
Cuba wil depend on real progress toward these and other goals.” Once Cuba takes concrete steps
in these areas, President Trump said “we wil be ready, wil ing and able to come to the table to
negotiate that much better deal for Cubans, for Americans.”96
The new policy left many of the Obama-era policy changes in place, including the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations and a variety of eased sanctions to increase travel and
commerce with Cuba. The new policy also kept in place the Obama Administration’s action
ending the so-cal ed wet foot/dry foot policy toward Cuban migrants, which, according to the
NSPM, had “encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationals to risk their lives to travel
unlawfully to the United States.”97
The most significant policy changes set forth in President Trump’s 2017 NSPM included (1)
restrictions on financial transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military,
intel igence, or security services or personnel and (2) the elimination of people-to-people
educational travel by individuals. In November 2017, the Treasury and Commerce Departments
issued amended regulations to implement the new policy.98
In a demonstration of continuity in policy between the Trump and Obama Administrations, the
U.S. and Cuban governments continued to engage on various bilateral issues through meetings
and dialogues in 2017 and 2018. The two countries continued to hold semiannual migration talks,
which, since 1995, provided a forum to review and coordinate efforts to ensure safe, legal, and
orderly migration between Cuba and the United States; talks were held in April and December
2017, and in July 2018.

96 White House, “Remarks by President T rump on the Policy of the United States T oward Cuba,” June 16, 2017, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/16/remarks-president -trump-policy-united-states-towards-cuba.
97 Ibid; and U.S. Department of State, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States T oward Cuba,” 82 Federal
Register 48875-48878, October 20, 2017 (consists of the text of National Security Presidential Memorandum, NSPM-5,
issued by the President on June 16, 2017).
98 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 82 Federal Register 51998-52004,
November 9, 2017; and U.S. Department of Commerce, “ Amendments to Implement United States Policy T oward
Cuba,” 82 Federal Register, 51983-51986, November 9, 2017.
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The United States and Cuba also continued to hold Bilateral Commission meetings that began
under the Obama Administration in which the two governments reviewed priorities and areas for
engagement. Officials held a sixth Bilateral Commission meeting in September 2017 and a
seventh meeting in June 2018. According to the State Department, at the June 2018 meeting, the
two countries reviewed such areas for engagement as trafficking in persons, civil aviation safety,
law enforcement matters, agriculture, maritime safety and search and rescue, certified claims, and
environmental chal enges. The State Department maintained that the United States reiterated the
urgent need to identify the source of the “attacks” on U.S. diplomats and to ensure they cease (see
discussion below), expressed continued concerns about the arbitrary detention of independent
journalists and human rights defenders, and acknowledged Cuba’s progress in repatriating
Cubans with final removal orders while also emphasizing that Cuba needs to accept greater
numbers of returnees.99 Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained the meeting provided an
opportunity to review areas of exchange and cooperation, but it also criticized several aspects of
U.S. policy, including the “intensification” of the U.S. embargo and what Cuba viewed as the
“political manipulation of the al eged health cases” that became a “pretext” to reduce staff and
therefore affect embassy operations in both countries.100
In this period, both countries continued engagement on other bilateral issues. The U.S. Coast
Guard and the Cuban Border Guard participated in professional exchanges in July 2017 and
January 2018 covering a variety of topics, including search and rescue. The U.S. Departments of
State, Justice, and Homeland Security participated in law enforcement dialogues with Cuban
counterparts in September 2017 and July 2018; the 2018 dialogue included such topics as
fugitives and the return of Cuban nationals with final orders of removal. Additional bilateral
meetings and exchanges were held in 2018 on such topics as cybersecurity and cybercrime,
counternarcotics efforts, and counterterrorism in January; anti-money laundering efforts and
trafficking in persons in February; search and rescue in March; and agriculture and scientific
cooperation related to environmental disaster in April.101
Increased Sanctions in 2019 and 2020
Since 2019, the Administration has ramped up economic sanctions significantly to pressure the
Cuban government on its human rights record and its support for the government of Nicolás
Maduro in Venezuela. In particular, the Administration maintains it is targeting Cuba’s sources of
revenue (tourism and Cuba’s foreign medical missions) because of Cuba’s involvement in
Venezuela. According to a State Department official in January 2020:
The United States will cut off Cuba’s remaining sources of revenue in response to its
intervention in Venezuela. We’ve already eliminated visits to Cuba via passenger and
recreational vehicles. We suspended U.S. air carriers ’ authority to operate scheduled air
service between the U.S. and all Cuban airports other than Havana. This will further restrict
the Cuban regime from using resources to support its repression of the people of Cuba.
Countries in the region have also taken action regarding the Cuban Government ’s program
which traffics thousands of Cuban doctors around the world in order to enrich the regime.

99 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Seventh Bilateral Commission Meeting,” June 14, 2018.
100 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “Seventh Meeting of the Cuba-United States Bilateral Commission Held in
Washington D.C.,” June 14, 2018.
101 See U.S. Department of State, Releases Pertaining to Cuba, at https://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/cu/rls/index.htm; and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Embassy of Cuba in USA, at http://misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/usa.
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Brazil insisted on paying the doctors directly at a fair wage. The Cuban regime in response
withdrew the doctors from Brazil. Doctors have also now left Ecuador and Bolivia.102
The more confrontational policy stance was foreshadowed by a November 2018 address by then-
National Security Adviser John Bolton in Miami, FL, that strongly criticized the Cuban
government on human rights, stating that “we wil only engage with a Cuban government that is
wil ing to undertake necessary and tangible reforms—a government that respects the interests of
the Cuban people.” Bolton’s speech, full of anti-communist political discourse reminiscent of the
Cold War era, referred to Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua as a “troika of tyranny” and the “cause
of immense human suffering, the impetus of enormous regional instability, and the genesis of a
sordid cradle of communism in the Western Hemisphere.” He referred to the three countries’
leaders as “three stooges of socialism” and as “clownish pitiful figures.” Bolton asserted that the
Venezuelan regime’s repression has been “enabled by the Cuban dictatorship.”103
As the political situation in Venezuela deteriorated in 2019 and the United States increased
sanctions on the Maduro regime, the Trump Administration increased its criticism of Cuba’s
support for the regime. In a March 11, 2019, press briefing, Secretary of State Pompeo asserted
that “Cuban military and intel igence services are deeply entrenched in the Venezuelan state”, and
provide physical protection and other support to President Maduro and those around him. Pompeo
maintained that Cuba has trained Venezuela’s secret police “torture tactics, domestic spying
techniques, and mechanisms of repression that Cuban authorities have wielded against their own
people for decades.”104 In April 2019, President Trump threatened a “full and complete embargo”
on Cuba and “highest-level sanctions” unless Cuba ceased its military support for the Maduro
regime.105
Then-National Security Adviser Bolton subsequently stated in numerous interviews that Cuba has
some 20,000-25,000 security forces in Venezuela; regional experts say the figure is likely much
smal er and the Cubans there do not have combat capability.106 Cuban officials assert that the vast
majority of the Cuban personnel in Venezuela are medical workers.107 In a May 5, 2019,
television interview, Secretary Pompeo referred to a smal er number of 2,300 Cuban security
personnel in Venezuela, maintaining they were providing security for Maduro.108
U.S. sanctions imposed on Cuba since 2019 have included a wide array of restrictions overturning
some of the easing under the Obama Administration as wel as new prohibitions and limitations.
Restrictions on travel have included eliminating people-to-people educational travel, limiting air
travel between the United States and Cuba, prohibiting cruise ship travel, and prohibiting U.S.

102 U.S. Department of State, “Senior State Department Official on State Department 2019 Successes in the Western
Hemisphere Region,” special briefing, January 8, 2020.
103 T he White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Administration’s
Policies in Latin America,” November 2, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-
security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-administrations-policies-latin-america/.
104 U.S. Department of State, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, “Remarks to the Press,” March 11, 2019. For
background on Venezuela, see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
105 Franco Ordoñez, “T rump T hreatens ‘Full and Complete Embargo’ against Cuba for Meddling in Venezuela,” Miami
Herald, April 30, 2019.
106 Adam T aylor, “How Many Cuban T roops Are T here in Venezuela? T he U.S. Says Over 20,000. Cuba Says Zero.”
Washington Post, May 2, 2019; and Karen DeYoung, “ U.S. Officials Weigh Options for Venezuela, as T rump
Describes ‘Positive’ call with Putin,” Washington Post, May 3, 2019.
107 Matthew Lee and Michael Weissenstein, “No Cuban T roops in Venezuela, Cuban Diplomat T ells AP,” Associated
Press, May 1, 2019.
108 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Interview with Margaret Brennan of CBS F ace
the Nation,” May 5, 2019.
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travelers from staying at over 400 hotels and private residences for rent. Restrictions on
remittances limited family remittances, eliminated the category of donative remittances, and
implemented new regulations that resulted in Western Union (the major company used for
transmitting remittances to Cuba) ceasing its operations in Cuba. Other trade and financial
sanctions have restricted Cuba’s access to leased commercial aircraft, reimposed a license
requirement for third-country companies exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10% U.S.
origin, and eliminated the use of U-turn transactions that al owed banking institutions to process
certain funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States. Sanctions also have
targeted Venezuela’s oil exports to Cuba. Pursuant to the LIBERTAD Act, the Administration has
al owed lawsuits to go forward against those al eged to be trafficking in confiscated property in
Cuba. Visa restrictions also have been imposed on several high-ranking Cuban officials, including
Raul Castro, for human rights violations. (For more details, see “Key Trump Administration
Sanctions and Other Actions,” below.)
U.S. Sanctions and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, U.N. officials,
including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Michel e Bachelet, cal ed on the
United States to ease or lift restrictions that make it difficult for Cuba to acquire needed
equipment, supplies, and medicines to confront the pandemic.109 Eight nongovernmental
organizations supporting engagement with Cuba cal ed for a temporary suspension of sanctions to
facilitate the flow of needed humanitarian and medical supplies.110 U.S. officials, however,
indicated that the sanctions would not be eased, maintaining that U.S. sanctions already al ow for
such exports. According to a press report, Secretary of State Pompeo stated in a cal to reporters
on April 14, 2020, that “there are no restrictions on humanitarian assistance going into [Cuba].”111
The Treasury Department subsequently issued a fact sheet providing guidance highlighting
general and specific licensing available in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to al ow for
humanitarian relief and assistance to the Cuban people.112
Some Members of Congress, however, expressed concern about reports that some foreign
companies have been deterred from providing humanitarian items to Cuba because of
burdensome regulatory and reporting requirements and fear of prosecution or penalty under U.S.
law. In a letter, 27 members of the Senate and House cal ed on the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of the Treasury to confirm that “companies and humanitarians around the world are not
precluded under U.S. law, regulation, or policy from providing medical equipment, food, other
humanitarian items, and public health information to Cuba.”113

109 “Ease Sanctions Against Countries Fighting COVID-19; UN Human Rights Chief,” UN News, March 24, 2020; and
“Lift Cuba Embargo or Risk Many Lives Lost to COVID-19, UN Rights Experts Warn US,” UN News, April 30, 2020.
110 “Organizations Call for Cuba Sanctions Suspension to Facilitate Humanitarian and Medical Supplies amid COVID-
19 Pandemic,” Washington Office on Latin America, March 26, 2020.
111 Nora Gámez T orres, “U.S. Won’t Offer Sanctions Relief to Cuba Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, Here Is Why,”
Miam i Herald, April 16, 2020.
112 U.S. Department of the T reasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian
Assistance and T rade to Combat COVID-19,” April 16, 2020, at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/
covid19_factsheet_20200416.pdf.
113 U.S. Senate, Office of Patrick Leahy, “ Leahy And McGovern Lead Members Of Congress In Pressing Pompeo And
Mnuchin T o Confirm T hat U.S. Policy Does Not Preclude Shipments Of Medical Equipment T o Cuba T o Combat
COVID-19,” press release, May 5, 2020.
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Key Trump Administration Sanctions and Other Actions
 Restrictions on Transactions with the Cuban Military. Pursuant to the NSPM,
the State Department was tasked with identifying entities controlled by the
Cuban military, intel igence, or security services or personnel and publishing a
list of entities with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
benefit those services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private
enterprise in Cuba. The NSPM specifical y identified the Grupo de
Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), a holding company of the Cuban
military involved in most sectors of the Cuban economy, particularly the tourism
sector. The State Department issued a list of restricted entities in 2017, referred to
as the “Cuba restricted list,” which has been updated several times, most recently
in September 2020. The Treasury Department forbids financial transactions with
these entities, with certain exceptions, including transactions related to air or sea
operations supporting permissible travel, cargo, or trade; the sale of agricultural
and medical commodities; direct telecommunications or internet access for the
Cuban people; and authorized remittances.114 The list currently includes 230
entities and sub-entities, including two ministries, five holding companies and 54
of their sub-entities (including the Mariel Special Development Zone), 111
hotels, two tourist agencies, five marinas, 10 stores in Old Havana, and 41
entities serving defense and security sectors.115
 Restrictions on Travel. With regard to people-to-people educational travel, the
Treasury Department initial y amended the CACR in November 2017 to require
that such travel take place under the auspices of an organization specializing in
such travel, with travelers accompanied by a representative of the organization.
Individuals were no longer authorized to engage in such travel on their own.116 In
June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-people educational
travel altogether, and the Commerce Department general y prohibited cruise
ships, private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and fishing boats from going to
Cuba.117 The Transportation Department suspended commercial flights to cities
other than Havana in December 2019; charter flights to cities other than Havana
in January 2020; and private charter flights to Havana in October 2020. In
September 2020, the Treasury Department prohibited U.S. travelers from staying
at properties identified by the State Department as owned or controlled by the
Cuban government.118 (See “Travel Restrictions,” below.)

114 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Treasury, Commerce, and State Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanctions
Rules,” fact sheet, November 8, 2017 (effective November 9, 2017), at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_fact_sheet_11082017.pdf.
115 U.S. Department of State, “Updating the State Department’s List of Entities and Subentities Associated With Cuba
(Cuba Restricted List),” 85 Federal Register 61079-61082, September 29, 2020.
116 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 82 Federal Register 51998-52004,
November 9, 2017.
117 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 84 Federal Register 25995-25993, June 5,
2019; and U.S. Department of Commerce, “ Restricting the T emporary Sojourn of Aircraft and Vessels to Cuba,” 84
Federal Register 25986-25989, June 5, 2019.
118 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 85 Federal Register 60068-60072,
September 24, 2020; and U.S. Department of State, “ The State Department’s Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List,”
85 Federal Register 60855-60862, September 28, 2020.
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 Restrictions on Remittances. In September 2019, the Treasury Department
capped family remittances, which previously were not limited, to $1,000 per
quarter per Cuban national and prohibited such remittances to close family
members of prohibited Cuban officials and members of the Cuban Communist
Party. The Treasury Department also eliminated the category of donative
remittances.119 In June and September 2020, the State Department added to its
“Cuba restricted list” two Cuban companies that facilitate the processing of
remittances. On October 27, 2020, the Treasury Department prohibited, effective
November 26, the processing of remittances through any entities on the “Cuba
restricted list.”120 This resulted in Western Union—the major financial services
company used to transmit remittances to Cuba—announcing on November 13
that November 22 would be the last day to send money to Cuba until a solution
could be found to keep its services open. (See “Restrictions on Remittances”
section, below.)
 Efforts to Stop Venezuelan Oil Exports to Cuba. Since April 2019, the
Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on several shipping companies and
vessels that transported Venezuelan oil to Cuba.121 In July 2019, it imposed
sanctions on Cuba’s state-run oil import and export company, Cubametales.122
 Lawsuits Related to Confiscated Property. Effective May 2, 2019, the
Administration al owed the right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in
confiscated property in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act (P.L.
104-114). Lawsuits can be brought by any U.S. national, including those who
were not U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation. Some 29 lawsuits have
been filed against U.S. and foreign companies to date, although several lawsuits
have been dismissed. (For more, see “Property Claims and Titles III and IV of the
LIBERTAD Act,” below.)
 Efforts, Including Visa Restrictions, Against Cuba’s Medical Missions. Since
2019, the Trump Administration has increased efforts to highlight international y
al egations of coercive labor practices in Cuba’s foreign medical missions, a
major foreign exchange contributor to Cuba’s economy. In June 2019 and June
2020, the State Department placed Cuba on the Tier 3 in its Trafficking in
Persons Reports, a status referring governments that do not fully comply with the
minimum standards for combatting trafficking in persons and are not making
significant efforts to do so. The reports maintained that the Cuban government
did not take action to address al egations of forced labor in the country’s foreign
medical mission program. The State Department also announced in 2019 that it
had imposed visa restrictions on certain Cuban officials for the al eged
exploitative and coercive labor practices associated with Cuba’s overseas

119 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 84 Federal Register 47121-47123,
September 9, 2019.
120 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 85 Federal Register 67988-67989, October
27, 2020.
121 U.S. Department of State, “Venezuela-Related Sanctions,” at https://www.state.gov/venezuela-related-sanctions/,
for several press releases on sanctions against companies and vessels transporting Venezuelan oil to Cuba, including,
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “The United States T akes Action Against the Movement of Venezuelan Oil to
Cuba,” press statement, December 3, 2019.
122 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Treasury T argets Cuban Support for the Illegitimate Venezuelan Regime,” press
release, July 3, 2019.
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medical mission. Since 2019, the State Department has ramped up its criticism of
Cuba for these labor practices and warned other countries that might be
considering hosting Cuban medical personnel. (See section on “Trafficking in
Persons and Cuba’s Foreign Medical Missions,” below.)
 Other Trade and Financial Sanctions. In September 2019, the Treasury
Department ended the use of U-turn transactions, which al owed banking
institutions to process certain funds transfers originating and terminating outside
the United States.123 In October 2019, the Commerce Department restricted
Cuba’s access to leased commercial aircraft; reimposed a 10% de minimis rule
(from 25%) requiring a third-country-based company exporting goods to Cuba
with more than 10% U.S.-origin content to apply for a license; and imposed
licensing requirements for the export of certain donated items to organizations
controlled by the Cuban government or Communist Party and exported items for
telecommunications infrastructure (unless it was for individual Cubans or the
Cuban private sector).124
 Visa Restrictions Related to Alleged Human Rights Abuses. In 2019 and
2020, pursuant to a long-standing provision in the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOPS, currently in
Section 7031(c) of P.L. 116-94, Division G), the State Department imposed visa
restrictions on three high-ranking Cuban officials and their immediate family
members for credible information of their involvement in gross violation of
human rights, barring them from entry into the United States.125 In September
2019, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on Raúl Castro (and his
four children) for human rights violations in Cuba and in Venezuela under the
Maduro regime.126 Further 7031(c) visa restrictions were imposed on Cuban
Interior Minister Julio Cesar Gandaril a Bermejo (and his two children) in
November 2019 and on Cuban Defense Minister Leopoldo Cintra Frias (and his
two children) in January 2020 for gross human rights violations in Venezuela.127
 Visa Restrictions Related to Alleged Trafficking in Confiscated Property. In
February 2020, the Spanish hotel chain Meliá confirmed its chief executive
officer is prohibited from entering the United States pursuant to Title IV of the
LIBERTAD Act, related to the trafficking of property confiscated in Cuba. (For
more, see “Property Claims and Titles III and IV of the LIBERTAD Act,” below.)
 Internet Task Force. Pursuant to the NSPM, in January 2018, the State
Department announced the establishment of a Cuba Internet Task Force (CITF),
composed of U.S. government and non-U.S. government representatives, to

123 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” 84 Federal Register 47121-47123,
September 9, 2019.
124 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Restricting Additional Exports and Reexports to Cuba,” 84 Federal Register
56117-56121, October 21, 2019.
125 For background on Section 7031(c), see CRS In Focus IF10905, FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations:
Targeting Foreign Corruption and Hum an Rights Violations, by Liana W. Rosen and Michael A. Weber.
126 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Public Designation of Raúl Castro, Due to
Involvement in Gross Violations of Human Rights,” press statement, September 26, 2019.
127 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Public Designation of Julio Cesar Gandarilla
Bermjeo Under Section 7031(c) of the FY2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations List,” press statement,
November 16, 2019, and “Public Designation of Leopoldo Cintra Frias Due to Involvement in Gross Violations of
Human Rights,” press statement, January 2, 2020,
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examine the technological chal enges and opportunities for expanding internet
access and independent media in Cuba.128 The task force held two public
meetings in February and December 2018 and formed two subcommittees to
develop recommendations on the role of media and freedom of information in
Cuba and to explore technological chal enges and opportunities for expanding
internet access in Cuba.129 The CITF issued its final report in June 2019 that
identified four key chal enges to internet access in Cuba and recommendations to
overcome those chal enges. One of the identified chal enges was related to U.S.
entry into the Cuban market. The report noted that China’s major role in the
telecommunications sector is a chal enge to U.S. firms looking to enter the
market, and that U.S. companies maintain “they are often deterred from entering
the market by frequent changes to U.S. regulations” and that banks are reluctant
“to process payments in Cuba due to the U.S. embargo.”130
 Response to Health Injuries of U.S. Personnel in Havana. From November
2016 to May 2018, 26 U.S. Embassy community members suffered a series of
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues. The State
Department maintains the U.S. investigation has not reached a definitive
conclusion regarding possible cause of the injuries, although in early December
2020, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine publicly
released a report concluding that the most plausible mechanism for the health
symptoms was directed pulsed radio frequency energy. In response to the
injuries, the State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel
from the U.S. Embassy in September 2017 to minimize the risk of their exposure
to harm; embassy staff was reduced by about two-thirds. In October 2017, the
State Department ordered the departure of 15 diplomats from the Cuban Embassy
in Washington, DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson, the
action was taken because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S. diplomats in Havana
and to ensure equity in the impact on diplomatic operations. Cuba strongly denies
responsibility for the injuries. The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy affected
embassy operations, especial y visa processing, and made bilateral engagement
more difficult. (For more, see “U.S. Response to Health Injuries of U.S.
Personnel in Havana,” below.)
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overal objectives of U.S. policy
toward Cuba—to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island—there have
been different schools of thought about how to achieve those objectives. Some have advocated a
policy of keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while
continuing efforts to support the Cuban people. Others have argued for an approach, sometimes
referred to as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are
hurting the Cuban people and would move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Stil others have
cal ed for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo.

128 U.S. Department of State, “Creation of the Cuba Internet Task Force,” January 23, 2018.
129 U.S. Department of State, “Inaugural Meeting of the Cuba Internet T ask Force,” February 7, 2018.
130 U.S. Department of State, Cuba Internet T ask Force: Final Report, report, June 16, 2019, available at
https://www.state.gov/cuba-internet -task-force-final-report/. Also see “ U.S. Sanctions Put T elecoms Firms Off Cuba,
Internet T ask Force Says,” Reuters News, June 25, 2019.
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In light of Fidel Castro’s departure as head of government in 2006 and the gradual economic
changes made by Raúl Castro, some observers had cal ed for a reexamination of U.S. policy
toward Cuba. In this new context, two broad policy approaches were advanced to contend with
change in Cuba: an approach that cal ed for maintaining the U.S. dual-track policy of isolating the
Cuban government while providing support to the Cuban people and an approach aimed at
influencing the attitudes of the Cuban government and Cuban society through increased contact
and engagement.
The Obama Administration’s change of U.S. policy from isolation to engagement and movement
toward the normalization of relations highlighted divisions in Congress over Cuba policy. Some
Members of Congress lauded the Administration’s actions as in the best interests of the United
States and a better way to support change in Cuba, whereas other Members strongly criticized the
President for not obtaining concessions from Cuba to advance human rights. Some Members
vowed to oppose the Administration’s efforts toward normalization, whereas others introduced
legislation to normalize relations with Cuba by lifting the embargo in its entirety or in part by
easing some aspects of it.
The Trump Administration’s policy of rolling back some of the Obama-era changes and
introducing new sanctions on Cuba also has highlighted divisions in Congress over Cuba policy,
with some Members supporting the President’s action because of Cuba’s lack of progress on
human rights and others opposing it because of the potential negative effect on the Cuban people
and U.S. business interests.
Public opinion polls have shown a majority of Americans support normalizing relations with
Cuba.131 Among the Cuban American community in South Florida, however, a 2018 poll by
Florida International University showed an increase in those supporting a continuation of the U.S.
embargo compared to a 2016 poll. In the 2018 poll, although a majority of Cuban Americans in
South Florida supported diplomatic relations and unrestricted travel to Cuba by al Americans,
51% polled favored continuing the embargo and 49% opposed it. This contrasts with 2016, when
63% of Cuban Americans in South Florida favored ending the embargo and 37% supported it.132
In general, those who advocate easing U.S. sanctions on Cuba make several policy arguments.
They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba—through increased travel,
trade, and dialogue—then the seeds of reform would be planted, which would stimulate forces for
peaceful change on the island. They stress the importance to the United States of avoiding violent
change in Cuba, with the prospect of a mass exodus to the United States. They argue that since
the demise of Cuba’s communist government does not appear imminent (despite almost 60 years
of sanctions), the United States should espouse a more pragmatic approach in trying to bring
about change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy also point to broad international support for
lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities for U.S. businesses because of the unilateral
nature of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because of the
embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in its
policies with the world’s few remaining communist governments, including China and Vietnam.
On the other side, opponents of lifting U.S. sanctions maintain that the policy of isolating Cuba
but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support is the best means for realizing

131 See, for example, Pew Research Center, “Growing Public Support for U.S. T ies with Cuba–And an End to the T rade
Embargo,” July 21, 2015; Dalia Sussman, “ Most Americans Support Ending the Embargo, T imes Poll Finds,” New
York Tim es, March 21, 2016; and Florida International University, Cuba, 2016 FIU Cuba Poll, How Cuban Am ericans
in Miam i View U.S. Policies Toward Cuba , September 2016, at https://cri.fiu.edu/events/2016/the-2016-fiu-cuba-poll/
cuba-poll-web.pdf.
132 See the Florida International University’s Cuba polls at https://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/.
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political change in Cuba. They point out that the LIBERTAD Act sets forth the steps that Cuba
must take for the United States to normalize relations. They argue that softening U.S. policy
without concrete Cuban reforms boosts Cuba’s communist regime, political y and economical y,
and facilitates its survival. Opponents of softening U.S. policy argue that the United States should
stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rights in Cuba and that sustained
sanctions can work. Critics of loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba’s failed economic
policies, not the U.S. embargo, are the causes of Cuba’s difficult living conditions. More recently,
those supporting stronger sanctions on Cuba point to the Cuban government’s strong support for
the Maduro regime in Venezuela, particularly military advisers and intel igence assistance.
Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances133
Travel Restrictions
Permissible Cuba Travel: 12 Categories
Family Visits
Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a
Official Government Business
key and often contentious component of U.S.
Journalistic Activities
efforts to isolate Cuba’s communist
Professional Research and Professional Meetings
government for more than 50 years. The
embargo regulations set forth in the CACR
Educational Activities
do not ban travel itself, but place restrictions
Religious Activities
on financial transactions related to Cuba.
Public Performances, Clinics, Workshops, Athletic and
other Competitions, and Exhibitions
Numerous changes to the restrictions have
occurred over time, and for five years, from
Support for the Cuban People
1977 until 1982, there were no restrictions on
Humanitarian Projects
travel. In 2000, Congress prohibited travel to
Activities of Private Foundations or Research or
Cuba solely for tourist activities when it
Educational Institutes
enacted TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX); a
Exportation, Importation, or Transmission of
Information or Informational Materials
provision in the law prohibits travel-related
Authorized Export Transactions
transaction for tourist activities, which are
defined as any activity not expressly
Source: 15 C.F.R. 515.560
authorized in the 12 categories of travel in the
CACR). Under the George W. Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba
travel increased and restrictions on travel were tightened.
Congress took legislative action in March 2009 to ease restrictions on family travel and on travel
related to U.S. agricultural and medical sales to Cuba (P.L. 111-8, Sections 620 and 621 of
Division D). In April 2009, the Obama Administration went further when the President
announced that he was lifting al restrictions on family travel. In 2011, the Obama Administration
further eased travel related to religious, journalistic and educational activities, including people-
to-people travel exchanges, and al owed U.S. international airports to become eligible for
licensed charter flights to and from Cuba.
The Obama Administration’s December 2014 shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba included an easing
of U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. As part of the change in policy, the Treasury Department

133 For more information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
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amended the CACR in 2015 to include general licenses for the 12 existing categories of
permissible travel to Cuba set forth in the regulations (see text box above). Before the policy
change, travelers under several of these categories had to apply for a specific license.134 Under the
regulations, both travel agents and airlines are able to provide services for travel to Cuba without
the need to obtain a specific license.
In 2016, the Obama Administration further eased restrictions on travel to Cuba and increased
transportation opportunities between the United States and Cuba. In January, the Treasury
authorized travel and related transactions for professional media or artistic productions in Cuba
(movies, television, music recordings, and creation of artworks). In March, the Treasury
Department amended the travel regulations to permit travel to Cuba for individual people-to-
people educational travel. Regular air service between the United States and Cuba began in
November 2016 following the signing of a U.S.-Cuba bilateral arrangement earlier in that year
permitting regularly scheduled air flights as opposed to charter flights. Cruise ship service to
Cuba from the United States also began in 2016, and expanded significantly with some 10
companies offering cruises.
In contrast, the Trump Administration has reimposed certain restrictions on travel and limited
transportation to Cuba from the United States. As noted, the Trump Administration terminated
people-to-people educational travel (under the travel category of educational activities) that the
Obama Administration restored in 2011.135 As part of that policy change, in November 2017, the
Treasury Department eliminated the authorization for people-to-people travel for individuals,
requiring such travel to be under the auspices of an organization specializing in people-to-people
travel. Then, in June 2019, the Treasury Department eliminated people-to-people travel
altogether. Also in June 2019, the Commerce Department general y prohibited cruise ship travel
to Cuba from the United States and prohibited private and corporate aircraft, sailboats, and
fishing boats from going to Cuba. The Transportation Department suspended commercial flights
to cities other than Havana in December 2019, charter flights to cities other than Havana in
January 2020), and al private charter flights to Havana in October 2020 (public charter flights to
Havana remain permitted).
In September 2020, the Trump Administration took two actions that further restricted visits to
Cuba. First, the Treasury Department prohibited U.S. travelers from staying at properties
identified by the State Department as owned or controlled by the Cuban government. The ban
includes over 400 hotels (essential y al Cuban hotels) and privately owned residences for rent
(casas particulares), if they are controlled by a prohibited government official or Communist
Party member (or a close relative). Second, the Treasury Department eliminated general licenses
for attending or organizing professional meetings or conferences in Cuba and for participating in
public performances, clinics, workshops, certain athletic or nonathletic competitions, and
exhibitions. (A general license remains, however, for amateur and semiprofessional international
sports federation competitions.) Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for
transactions related to the above activities, although the amended regulations do not refer to
organizing professional meetings.

134 A general license provides the authority to engage in a transaction without the need to apply to the T reasury
Department for a license. In contrast, a specific license is a written document issued by the T reasury Department to a
person or entity authorizing a particular transaction in response to a written license application.
135 T he Clinton Administration had introduced people-to-people travel under a specific license in the CACR in 1999
until the George W. Bush Administration eliminated it in 2003. T he Obama Administration reauthorized people-to-
people travel in 2011 under a specific license, permitted such travel under a general in 2015, and then permitted such
travel for individuals in 2016,
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U.S. Travelers to Cuba. According to Cuban government statistics, the number of Americans
traveling to Cuba increased from 92,325 in 2014 to 637,907 in 2018. This figure is in addition to
thousands of Cuban Americans who visit family in Cuba each year; in 2018, almost 600,306
Cubans living outside the country visited Cuba, the majority from the United States.136
Beginning in 2019, the number of Americans traveling to Cuba began to fal significantly, as the
Trump Administration eliminated people-to-people travel, prohibited cruise ship travel to Cuba,
and restricted flights to Cuba. In 2019, the number of U.S. visitors traveling to Cuba declined by
almost 22% (to 498,067 travelers), although the number of Cubans visiting from abroad increased
by almost 4% (to 623,972 travelers). In the first two months of 2020, before the imposition of
travel restrictions because of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. travel to Cuba declined by 64% and
travel by Cubans living abroad declined by almost 4% compared with the same period in 2019.137
Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, three bil s have been introduced that would lift
restrictions on travel to Cuba. Identical bil s H.R. 3960 (McGovern) and S. 2303 (Leahy) would
prohibit most restrictions on travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens and legal residents or any
transactions incident to such travel. H.R. 2404 (Rush) would lift the overal embargo on Cuba,
including travel restrictions.
Restrictions on Remittances
Much like U.S. restrictions on travel, U.S. restrictions on sending cash remittances to Cuba have
been part of the U.S. sanctions regime and have changed over time. Cash remittances to Cuba
reportedly increased from almost $1.7 bil ion in 2009 to $3.7 bil ion in 2019, but they are
expected to decline to $2.9 bil ion in 2020 because of COVID-19 restrictions that closed Cuban
airports for months.138 In 2019, some 45% of remittances to Cuba reportedly were carried by
individuals; the remainder went through remittance forwarding companies.139
The Obama Administration took significant action to ease restrictions on remittances to Cuba. In
2009, the Treasury Department lifted the previous limitation of no more than $300 per quarter for
family remittances, imposing no limitation on the amount and frequency of these remittances. In
2011, the Treasury Department authorized remittances to any Cuban national (up to $500 per
quarter) and made it easier for religious institutions to send remittances for religious activities. In
2015, the Treasury Department lifted the dollar limit for remittances to any Cuban national,
referring to such remittances as “donative remittances to Cuban nationals.” The Treasury
Department also authorized by general license remittances to individuals and independent
nongovernmental organizations to support humanitarian projects; a rapid peaceful transition to
democracy; the strengthening of civil society;, and the development of private businesses,
including smal farms. In 2016, the Treasury Department narrowed the definition of “prohibited
Cuban government officials” and “prohibited members of the Cuban Communist party,” a
significant move because of the prohibition in the CACR against providing remittances to these
individuals.
By contrast, the Trump Administration has taken actions to restrict remittances to Cuba. In 2017,
the Treasury Department expanded the definition of “prohibited Cuban government officials,”

136 República de Cuba, Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información (ONEI), Anuar io Estadístico de Cuba 2018,
Capítulo 15: T urismo, Edición 2019;
137 República de Cuba, ONEI, “T urismo, Llegadas de visitantes internacionales,” December 2019 and February 2020.
138 “COVID-19 puede hacer decliner las remesas a Cuba entre un 30 y 40% en 2020,” T he Havana Consulting Group
and T ech, March 20, 2020; and “El envoi de remesas a Cuba cayó el 54.14% en 2020 pro la covid-19, Agencia EFE,
November 24, 2020.
139 “COVID-19 Crushes the ‘Mule’ Business,” Havana Consulting Group and T ech, May 28, 2020.
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resulting in the prohibition of remittances for such individuals. In 2019, the Treasury Department
eliminated the category of donative remittances to Cuban nationals, capped family remittances to
any one Cuban national to $1,000 per quarter, and prohibited family remittances to close family
members of prohibited Cuban government officials and Cuban Communist Party officials.
In 2020, the Trump Administration further restricted the flow of cash remittances to Cuba. In June
and September 2020, respectively, the State Department added to its “Cuba restricted list” two
Cuban financial services companies—FINCIMEX and American International Services—
involved in facilitating the processing of foreign remittances to Cuba. In October 2020, the
Treasury Department amended the CACR to prohibit, effective November 26, 2020, the
processing of remittances through any entities on the “Cuba restricted list.” The new regulations
resulted in Western Union, which has partnered with FINCIMEX since 2016, to announce that
November 22 would be the last day to send money to Cuba until a solution could be found to
keep its services open.140 Western Union has been the major financial services company used for
transmitting remittances to Cuba, with more than 400 offices on the island.
Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 2404 (Rush) would lift the overal embargo
on Cuba, including restrictions on remittances.
U.S. Exports and Sanctions
U.S. commercial medical exports to Cuba have been authorized since the early 1990s pursuant to
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA), and commercial agricultural exports have been
authorized since 2001 pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of
2000 (TSRA), but with numerous restrictions and licensing requirements. For medical exports to
Cuba, the CDA requires on-site verification that the exported item is to be used for the purpose
for which it was intended and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people. TSRA al ows for
one-year export licenses for sel ing agricultural commodities to Cuba, although no U.S.
government assistance, foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are
available to finance such exports. TSRA also denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial
financing or credit; al transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from
third countries. The 2018 farm bil , P.L. 115-334 (H.R. 2) permits funding for two U.S.
agricultural export promotion programs—the Market Access Program and the Foreign Market
Development Cooperation Program—for U.S. agricultural products in Cuba.
Regulatory changes made to the CACR and EAR in 2015-2016 include several actions designed
to facilitate commercial exports to Cuba:
 U.S. financial institutions are permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban
financial institutions to facilitate the processing of authorized transactions (31
C.F.R. 515.584).
 U.S. private export financing is permitted for al authorized export trade to Cuba,
except for agricultural goods exported pursuant to TSRA (31 C.F.R. 515.584).
 The definition of the term cash in advance for payment for U.S. exports to Cuba
was revised to specify that it means cash before transfer of title. The change
means that payment can occur before an export shipment is offloaded in Cuba
rather than before the shipment leaves a U.S. port (31 C.F.R. 515.533).

140 Western Union, “Cuba: A Letter to Our Customers,” November 13, 2020, at https://www.westernunion.com/blog/a-
letter-to-our-cuba-customers/.
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 Commercial exports to Cuba of certain goods and services to empower Cuba’s
nascent private sector are authorized, including for certain building materials for
private residential construction, and goods for use by private-sector Cuban
entrepreneurs (15 C.F.R. 740.21).
 Licenses for certain categories of exports are included under a “general policy of
approval.” These categories include exports for civil aviation and commercial
aircraft safety, telecommunications, U.S. news bureaus, human rights
organizations and nongovernmental organizations, environmental protection of
U.S. and international air quality, waters, and coastlines, and agricultural inputs
(such as insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides) that fal outside the scope of
those exports already al owed under TSRA (15 C.F.R. 746.2). In October 2019,
however, the Commerce Department amended the EAR to exclude the export or
reexport of aircraft leased to state-owned enterprise from its general policy of
approval for the export of items for civil aviation and commercial aircraft safety
and imposed licensing requirements for the export of certain donated items to
organizations controlled by the Cuban government or Communist Party and
exported items for telecommunications infrastructure (unless it was for individual
Cubans or the Cuban private sector).141
 Licenses for exports that wil be considered on a case-by-case basis include
certain items exported to state-owned enterprises, agencies, and other
organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services for the
use and benefit of the Cuban people (15 C.F.R. 746.2). In November 2017,
however, the Commerce Department amended the EAR to stipulate that export
licenses for exports to state-owned enterprises wil general y be denied to export
items for use by entities or sub-entities on the State Department’s list of restricted
entities associated with the Cuban military, police, intel igence, or security
services.
 Companies exporting authorized goods to Cuba are authorized to have a physical
presence in Cuba, such as an office, retail outlet, or warehouse (31 C.F.R.
515.573).
 Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction general y are authorized to enter into certain
contingent contracts for transactions currently prohibited by the embargo (31
515.534).
 Certain consumer goods sold directly to eligible individuals in Cuba for their
personal use general y are authorized (15 C.F.R. 740.21).
Cuba purchased $6.3 bil ion in U.S. products from 2001 to 2019, largely agricultural products.
For many of those years, the United States was Cuba’s largest supplier of agricultural products.
U.S. exports to Cuba rose from about $7 mil ion in 2001 to a high of $718 mil ion in 2008, far
higher than in previous years. This increase was in part because of the rise in food prices and
because of Cuba’s increased food needs in the aftermath of several hurricanes and tropical storms
that severely damaged the country’s agricultural sector. U.S. exports to Cuba declined
considerably from 2009 through 2011, rose again in 2012, and fel every year through 2015, when
U.S. exports amounted to $186 mil ion. U.S. exports increased in years after that, amounting to
$287 mil ion in 2019 (see Figure 2.) In 2020, however, as Cuba’s economic situation has

141 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Restricting Additional Exports and Reexports to Cuba,” 84 Federal Register
56117-56121, October 21, 2019.
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deteriorated amid the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. exports to Cuba have declined 49% from
January to September compared with the same period in 2019.142
Figure 2. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2002-2019

Source: Created by CRS using Commerce Department statistics as presented by Trade Data Monitor.
Looking at the composition of U.S. exports to Cuba from 2012 to 2019, the leading products were
poultry, soybean oilcake and other solid residue, soybeans, corn, and soybean oil. Poultry has
been the leading U.S. export to Cuba since 2012. Beyond agricultural products, other categories
of products in recent years have been parts for steam turbines, civilian aircraft engines and parts,
pesticides, calcium phosphates, and electrical apparatus and parts for telephone lines. In 2019,
leading U.S. exports to Cuba were poultry (66%), soybean oilcake (11%), soybeans (5%), and
parts for steam turbines (4%).
U.S. International Trade Commission (USTIC) Reports. The USITC has issued three studies
since 2007 examining the effects of U.S. restrictions on trade with Cuba, with its most recent
report issued in April 2016.143 According to the findings of its 2016 report, U.S. restrictions on
trade and travel reportedly have shut U.S. suppliers out of a market in which they could be
competitive on price, quality, and proximity. The most problematic U.S. restrictions cited are the
inability to offer credit, travel to or invest in Cuba, and use funds sourced and administered by the
U.S. government. Cuban nontariff measures and other factors also may limit U.S. exports to and
investment in Cuba if U.S. restrictions are lifted, according to the report. These factors include
Cuban government control of trade and distribution, legal limits on foreign investment and
property ownership, and political y motivated decisionmaking regarding trade and investment.
Absent U.S. restrictions, U.S. exports in several sectors likely would increase somewhat in the
short term, with prospects for larger increases in the longer term, subject to changes in Cuban
policy and economic growth. U.S. exports could increase further if Cuban import barriers were
lowered. If U.S. restrictions were removed, U.S. agricultural and manufactured exports to Cuba

142 T rade statistics in this section are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, as presented by T rade Data Monitor.
143 U.S. International T rade Commission (USIT C), U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S.
Restrictions, USIT C Publication 3932, July 2007, at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3932.pdf; USIT C, U.S.
Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Econom ic Effects of U.S. Restrictions, An Update, Office of Industries Working
Paper, by Jonathan R. Coleman, No. ID-22, June 2009, at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/ID-22.pdf; and
USIT C, “Overview of Cuban Imports of Goods and Services and Effects of U.S. Restrictions,” March 2016,
Publication 4597, released April 18, 2016, at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4597.pdf.
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could increase to almost $1.8 bil ion annual y; if both U.S. restrictions were removed and Cuban
barriers were lowered, U.S. exports could approach $2.2 bil ion annual y.
Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, several bil s have been introduced related to
restrictions on exports to Cuba. S. 428 (Klobuchar) would repeal certain provisions in the CDA,
the LIBERTAD Act, and TSRA as wel as regulatory provisions in the CACR and EAR that
restrict trade with Cuba. H.R. 1898 (Crawford) would modify the prohibition on U.S. assistance
and financing for certain exports to Cuba under TSRA. S. 1447 (Bennet) would amend TSRA to
al ow for the private financing by U.S. entities of agricultural commodities to Cuba. H.R. 2404
(Rush) would lift the overal embargo on Cuba.
Democracy and Human Rights Funding
Since 1996, the United States has provided assistance—through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the State Department, and the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED)—to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise to
Cuba. USAID and State Department efforts are funded largely through Economic Support Funds
(ESF) in the annual foreign operations appropriations bil . From FY1996 to FY2019, Congress
appropriated some $364 mil ion in funding for Cuba democracy efforts.144 In recent years, this
funding included $20 mil ion in each fiscal year from FY2014 through FY2019. For FY2018, the
Trump Administration, as part of its attempt to cut foreign assistance levels, did not request any
democracy and human rights assistance funding for Cuba, but Congress ultimately provided $20
mil ion. For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $10 mil ion to provide democracy and
civil society assistance for Cuba, but Congress again provided $20 mil ion.
Although USAID received the majority of this funding for many years, the State Department
began to receive a portion of the funding in FY2004 and in recent years has been al ocated more
funding than USAID. The State Department general y has transferred a portion of the Cuba
assistance that it administers to NED.
USAID’s Cuba program has supported a variety of U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations
with the goals of promoting a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, helping to develop civil
society, and building solidarity with Cuba’s human rights activists.145
NED is not a U.S. government agency but an independent nongovernmental organization that
receives U.S. government funding. Its Cuba program is funded by the organization’s regular
appropriations by Congress as wel as by funding from the State Department. According to
information provided by NED on its website, its Cuba funding from FY2016 through FY2019
amounted to $19.2 mil ion.146
FY2019 Appropriations. For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $10 mil ion for
democracy and civil society assistance in support of the Administration’s Cuba policy. In the
115th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee’s State Department and Foreign Operations
appropriations bil , H.R. 6385 (H.Rept. 115-829), would have provided $30 mil ion to promote
democracy and strengthen civil society in Cuba, with not less than $8 mil ion for the National
Endowment for Democracy. The report to the bil would have prohibited the obligation of funds

144 T he U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that Congress appropriated $205 million for Cuba
democracy programs from FY1996 through FY2011. See U.S. GAO, Cuba Dem ocracy Assistance, USAID’s Program
Is Im proved, But State Could Better Monitor Its Im plem enting Partners, GAO-13-285, January 2013.
145 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Cuba,” at https://www.usaid.gov/cuba.
146 See the grants database of the National Endowment for Democracy at https://www.ned.org/wp-content/themes/ned/
search/grant -search.php.
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for business promotion, economic reform, entrepreneurship, or any other assistance that was not
democracy-building. It also stipulated that grants exceeding $1 mil ion, or grants to be
implemented over a period of 12 months, would be awarded only to organizations with
experience promoting democracy inside Cuba. The Senate Appropriations version of the bil , S.
3108, would have provided $15 mil ion for democracy programs in Cuba. Since the 115th
Congress did not complete action on FY2019 appropriations, the task was left to the 116th
Congress, which in February 2019, enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-
6, H.J.Res. 31, conference report H.Rept. 116-9), which ultimately provided $20 mil ion for Cuba
democracy funding.
FY2020 Appropriations. For 2020, the Trump Administration requested $6 mil ion for Cuba
democracy funding, which would have been a 70% cut from the $20 mil ion provided annual y
since FY2014. Both House and Senate FY2020 foreign aid appropriations bil s included $20
mil ion in democracy funding for Cuba: H.R. 2839 (H.Rept. 116-78), included as Division D of
the House-passed minibus H.R. 2740, approved in June 2019; and S. 2583 (S.Rept. 116-126).
Ultimately, Congress appropriated $20 mil ion for Cuba democracy programs in the Further
Consolidated Appropriations, 2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division G), enacted in December 2019.
FY2021 Appropriations. For FY2021, the Trump Administration has requested $10 mil ion for
Cuba democracy programs, a 50% decrease from the amount appropriated in FY2020. Both the
House-passed version of the FY2021 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, Division A of H.R. 7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24,
2020, and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft bil and explanatory statement would
provide $20 mil ion for democracy programs, the same as appropriated in FY2020.
Radio and TV Martí147
U.S.-government-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba—Radio and TV Martí—
began in 1985 and 1990, respectively.148 Until October 1999, U.S.-government-funded
international broadcasting programs had been a primary function of the United States Information
Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished and its functions merged into the Department of
State at the beginning of FY2000, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) became an
independent agency that included such entities as the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). In August 2018, the BBG
official y changed its name to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).149
Today, OCB, which has been headquartered in Miami, FL, since 1998, manages Radio and TV
Martí, the radiotelevisionmart.com website and its social media platforms on YouTube,
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.150 According to the BBG’s 2021 Congressional Budget
Justification, the Martís reached 11.1% of Cubans on a weekly basis in 2017, with shortwave,
medium waver, direct-to-home satel ite, satel ite radio, internet, social media, flash drives, and
DVDs to help reach Cuban audiences. OCB administers a USAGM shortwave transmitting

147 For background on U.S. international broadcasting, including Radio and T V Martí, see CRS Report R43521, U.S.
International Broadcasting: Background and Issues for Reform , by Matthew C. Weed.
148 T he Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act (P.L. 98-111) was signed into law in October 1983, and the T elevision
Broadcasting to Cuba Act (P.L. 101-246, T itle II, Part D) was signed into law in February 1990.
149 With the new name, the agency also changed its website to https://www.usagm.gov/.
150 Available at https://www.martinoticias.com/, and now at https://www.radiotelevisionmarti.com/.
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station in Greenvil e, NC, which is being upgraded with refurbished transmitters that wil lower
cost and increase reliability.151
Congressional Funding. From FY1984 through FY2019, Congress appropriated about $911
mil ion for broadcasting to Cuba. Funding amounted to some $27-$29 mil ion in each fiscal year
from FY2014 to FY2019. For FY2018, Congress provided $28.936 mil ion for Cuba
broadcasting, $5.28 mil ion more than requested, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018
(P.L. 115-141; explanatory statement, Division K). For FY2019, the Trump Administration
requested $13.656 mil ion for the OCB, $15.3 mil ion less than the amount provided in FY2017.
The rationale for the proposed cut was to find efficiencies between OCB and the Voice of
America’s Latin American division.152 Congress ultimately took final action on FY2019
appropriations in February 2019 by enacting the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L.
116-6, H.J.Res. 31, conference report H.Rept. 116-9) that provided $29.1 mil ion for Cuba
broadcasting.
For FY2020, the Administration requested $12.973 mil ion for Cuba broadcasting, a 55% cut
from FY2019, with the proposed program decreases from staffing and contract reductions.153 The
House-passed FY2020 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS)
bil , Division D of H.R. 2740 (which references H.Rept. 116-78 to H.R. 2839) would have fully
funded the Administration’s request, whereas the Senate Appropriations Committee’s SFOPS bil ,
S. 2583 (S.Rept. 116-126) would provide $20.973 mil ion. Ultimately, in the Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division G), Congress went with the amount
in the Senate bil and provided $20.973 mil ion for Cuba broadcasting.
For FY2021, the Administration is again requesting $12.973 mil ion for Cuba broadcasting.
USAGM’s budget request indicates that in FY2020 and FY2021, OCB wil work to ensure that
its content production, workforce structure, and skil set align with ongoing reforms (discussed
below) aimed at improving content quality, strengthening journalistic integrity, and reaching
Cuban audiences effectively. Both the House-passed FY2021 SFOPS bil , Division A of H.R.
7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved in July 2020, and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s
FY2021 draft SFOPS bil and explanatory statement would fully fund the broadcasting request at
$12.973 mil ion. The explanatory statement to the Senate draft bil supports the reform of
broadcasting standards at OCB begun in 2019 (discussed below) and would require the USAGM
chief executive officer (CEO), in consultation with the OCB Director, to provide quarterly
updates to the appropriate congressional committees about the implementation of OCB reforms,
brief such committees on the reforms, and submit a cost-benefit analysis of relocating al or part
of OCB operations to USAGM headquarters in Washington, D.C.
2018 Anti-Semitic TV Martí Program and Subsequent Reform Efforts for OCB. In October
2018, media reports highlighted a disturbing TV Martí program original y aired in May 2018
(which remained on Radio and Television Martí’s website) that referred to U.S. businessman and
philanthropist George Soros as “the multimil ionaire Jew of Hungarian origin” and as a “non-
believing Jew of flexible morals.” The program espoused a number of conspiracy theories about
Soros, including that he was the architect of the 2008 financial crisis.154 Then-Senator Jeff Flake

151 See U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), United States Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), FY2021
Congressional Budget Justification, February 10, 2020.
152 BBG, 2019 Congressional Budget Justification, February 12, 2018.
153 USAGM, BBG, FY2020 Congressional Budget Justification, March 18, 2019.
154 T he original 15-minute program and shorter segments promoting it were taken down from the Radio and T elevision
Martí website after the media report of October 26, 2018, although portions of it are available on YouT ube. Initially, a
Cuba policy research blog reported on the program. See “George Soros, the Multimillio naire Jew,” T he Cuban
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spoke out against the TV Martí program, which he referred to as “taxpayer-funded anti-
Semitism.”155 He sent a letter to John Lansing, then-CEO of USAGM, asking for an investigation
into the program, including its evolution from initial inception to final approval, who produced
the program, and what review process was in place to ensure it met Voice of America journalistic
standards. Flake also cal ed for those approving anti-Semitic content to be removed from their
positions immediately, asserting that “lack of action on this matter wil further denigrate the
United States as a credible voice overseas, the repercussion of which wil be severe.”156
Then-OCB Director Tomás Regalado responded by pulling the original program and related
shorter segments from the OCB’s online website and acknowledging that the program “did not
have the required balance.”157 USAGM’s CEO Lansing took further action by issuing a statement
that the program about Soros “is
inconsistent with our professional
Office of Cuba Broadcasting and
standards and ethics.” He stated that
Broadcast Standards
those deemed responsible for the
The TV Martí program raised significant concerns about the
Office of Cuba Broadcasting’s (OCB’s) adherence to broadcast
production would be immediately
standards and questions about the program’s intended
placed on administrative leave pending
audience. TV Martí’s authorizing legislation, the Television
an investigation into their apparent
Broadcasting to Cuba Act (P.L. 101-246, Title II, Part D, 22
misconduct. Lansing also directed “an
U.S.C. 1465bb), has a provision stating that television
immediate, full content audit to identify
broadcasting to Cuba “shal be in accordance with al Voice of
America standards to ensure the broadcast of programs which
any patterns of unethical reporting at
are objective, accurate, balanced, and which present a variety of
the network” and asked Regalado to
views.”
“require ethics and standards refresher
U.S. law sets forth the fol owing principles for Voice of America
training for al OCB journalists.”158
(VOA) broadcasts: (1) VOA wil serve as a consistently reliable
and authoritative source of news. VOA news wil be accurate,
Lansing wrote a letter of apology to
objective, and comprehensive; (2) VOA wil represent America,
Soros in November 2018 in which he
not any single segment of American society, and wil therefore
said that the program “was based on
present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant
extremely poor and unprofessional
American thought and institutions; and (3) VOA wil present
the polices of the United States clearly and effectively and wil
journalism,” and “was utterly offensive
present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.
in its anti-Semitism and clear bias.”
These VOA principles and broader U.S. international
Lansing also stated in the letter that he
broadcasting standards and principles are set forth in 22 U.S.C.
had instructed OCB Director Regalado
6202 (P.L. 103-236, Title III, Section 303, and P.L. 103-415).
“to remove the offensive story from the
TV Martí website and social media” and “to hire a full time ‘standards and practices’ editor to
oversee al outgoing content with strict adherence to the highest professional standards of
journalism.”159 The audit of reporting at the network reportedly uncovered an earlier story about

T riangle, October 26, 2018, at http://cubantriangle.blogspot.com/2018/10/george-soros-multimillionaire-jew.html.
155 Jeff Flake @Jeff Flake, T witter, October 27, 2018, at https://twitter.com/JeffFlake/status/1056356869264920576.
156 U.S. Senator Jeff Flake, letter to John F. Lansing, Chief Executive Officer and Director, U.S. Agency for Global
Media, October 29, 2018.
157 Regalado’s comments were made to the publication Mother Jones in an email. See Aaron Wiener, “U.S.
Government -Funded News Network Ran a Hit Piece on Soros T hat Called Him a ‘Multimillionaire Jew,’” Mother
Jones, October 26, 2018. Also see Felicia Sonmez, “ U.S. Agency Vows to Investigate Broadcast Report that Called
George Soros a ‘Multimillionaire Jew,” Washington Post, October 30, 2018.
158 USAGM, “CEO Statement on Office of Cuba Broadcasting piece on George Soros,” October 29, 2018, at
https://www.usagm.gov/2018/10/29/ceo-statement-on-office-of-cuba-broadcasting-piece-on-george-soros/.
159 Letter from USAGM CEO Lansing to George Soros, November 7, 2018, as published by the Washington Post at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/politics/us-agency-apologizes-to-george-soros-after-program-that-
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Soros that included anti-Semitic language as wel as an anti-Muslim opinion piece published in
September 2018, that were also removed from the website.
In February 2019, Lansing reported that one employee and three contractors had been terminated
because of the anti-Semitic video segment and that the agency had initiated the standard
disciplinary process for four additional OCB employees. Lansing also noted that USAGM
commissioned a team of independent experts to conduct an objective third-party assessment of
OCB’s coverage in Spanish across al platform.160
USAGM issued its third-party assessment in May 2019, which included a panel of independent
experts examining “an extensive sample to identify and address any patterns of unethical,
unprofessional, biased, or sub-standard journalism.”161 The assessment highly criticized OCB’s
radio and television news shows and “the steady daily diet of political talk shows and background
reports” that were “peppered with bad journalism” and were “ineffective propaganda.” In its
review, the panel of experts made three substantive findings regarding OCB’s coverage:
 wel -established norms of objectivity in journalism are routinely disregarded in
favor of overtly propagandistic communications tactics;
 the content presentation on radio, via video, and online seems unlikely to succeed
in promoting freedom and democracy given the demography, culture, and
political circumstances of Cuba today; and
 shortcomings in both intention and implementation reflect the extent to which
Martí operates as an anachronism.
In response to the panel of experts’ review and an internal USAGM review of OCB’s journalist
standards editorial processes and personnel practices, then-CEO Lansing established a joint
USAGM-OCB working group to reform OCB. The working group is focusing on five areas: (1)
updating journalistic standards, reinforcing editorial processes, and producing relevant, engaging,
and balanced journalism; (2) clarifying strategy and strengthening leadership; (3) bolstering
workforce planning and personnel management; (4) ensuring the right balance of media platforms
and effective distribution of content into Cuba; and (5) deepening coordination and collaboration
with USAGM and its other networks.162
U.S. Response to Health Injuries of U.S. Personnel in Havana
As noted above, the State Department reported that 26 members of the U.S. diplomatic
community in Havana suffered a series of unexplained health injuries, including hearing loss and
cognitive issues, from November 2016 to May 2018. Twenty-four of the cases occurred from
November 2016 to August 2017, and in June 2018, two new cases stemming from occurrences in
May 2018 were confirmed after medical evaluations.163 According to the State Department, the

called-him-multimillionaire-jew/2349/?tid=a_inl_manual.
160 USAGM, “Statement from USAGM CEO John F. Lansing on OCB Soros Issue,” February 27, 2019. Also see
Aaron C. Davis, “Firings Sought Over Anti-Soros Broadcasts,” Washington Post,” February 28, 2019.
161 USAGM, BBG, “Embarking on Reform of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting,” May 21, 2019.
162 USAGM, BBG, “Embarking on Reform of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting,” May 21, 2019.
163 U.S. Department of State, DipNote, “Department of State Revises Assessment of Personnel Affected in Cuba,”
October 20, 2017, at https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2017/10/20/en/week-state-october-20-2017; U.S. Department of
State, Press Briefing, June 21, 2018; U.S. Department of State, Heather Nauert, Spokesperson, T weet, June 28, 2018;
and Mimi Whitefield, “Mystery Deepens in Havana as U.S. Confirms a 26 th Diplomat in Cuba Suffered Health
Symptoms,” Miami Herald, June 28, 2018.
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U.S. government personnel suffered from “attacks of an unknown nature,” at U.S. diplomatic
residences and hotels where temporary duty staff were staying, with symptoms including “ear
complaints, hearing loss, dizziness, headache, fatigue, cognitive issues, and difficulty
sleeping.”164 U.S. officials maintain that they do not know the mechanism used to cause the health
injuries, the source, who is responsible, or the motive behind the al eged “attacks.”165
In response to the health incidents, in September 2017, the U.S. Department of State ordered the
departure of nonemergency personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Havana, as wel as their
families, to minimize the risk of their exposure to harm.166 As a result, the embassy’s U.S. staffing
level, which numbered over 50, was reduced by about two-thirds. In March 2018, the State
Department began a permanent staffing plan at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, operating it as an
“unaccompanied post” without family members. The change took place because the temporary
“ordered departure” status for the embassy had reached its maximum al owable days. According
to the State Department, “the embassy wil continue to operate with the minimum personnel
necessary to perform core diplomatic and consular functions, similar to the level of emergency
staffing maintained during ordered departure.”167
The staff reduction at the U.S. Embassy in Havana has had implications for bilateral relations.
Most visa processing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana has been suspended. Most Cubans applying
for nonimmigrant visas must go to a U.S. embassy or consulate in another country, and
applications and interviews for immigrant visas are currently being handled at the U.S. Embassy
in Georgetown, Guyana. (For additional information, see “Migration Issues” below.)
In addition to downsizing U.S. Embassy Havana operations, in October 2017, the State
Department ordered the departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in
Washington, DC. According to then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson, the decision was made
because of Cuba’s failure to protect U.S. diplomats in Havana and to ensure equity in the impact
on respective diplomatic operations.168 State Department officials maintained that the United
States would need full assurances from the Cuban government that the “attacks” wil not continue
before contemplating the return of diplomatic personnel.169
The State Department initial y issued a travel warning in September 2017 advising U.S. citizens
to avoid travel to Cuba because of the potential risk of being subject to injury; in January 2018,
when the State Department revamped its travel advisory system, it set the advisory for Cuba at
Level 3, recommending that travelers reconsider travel to Cuba. By August 2018, however, the

164 Ibid and U.S. Department of State, “Background Briefing: State Department Official on Cuba,” Special Briefing,
October 3, 2017; and Anne Gearan, “State Department Reports New Instance of American Diplomats Harmed in
Cuba,” Washington Post, September 1, 2017.
165 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Hearing on U.S. Policy T oward
Cuba, “T estimony by Kenneth Merten, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, and Ambassador Peter W. Bodde, Health Incidents Response T ask Force,” September 6, 2018, available at
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20180906/108652/HHRG-115-FA07-Wstate-MertenK-20180906.pdf.
166 U.S. Department of State, Remarks by Secretary of State Rex W. T illerson, “Actions T aken in Response to Attacks
on U.S. Government Personnel in Cuba,” September 29, 2017.
167 U.S. Department of State, “End of Ordered Departure at U.S. Embassy Havana,” March 2, 2018.
168 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Rex W. T illerson, “On the Expulsion of Cuban Officials from the
United States,” press statement, October 3, 2017.
169 U.S. Department of State, “Background Briefing: State Department Official on Cuba,” Special Briefing, October 3,
2017.
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State Department eased its travel advisory to Level 2, recommending that travelers exercise
increased caution.170
In 2017 and 2018, 14 Canadians (diplomats, spouses and dependents) in Havana also experienced
similar health symptoms such as dizziness, headaches, nausea, and difficulty concentrating, with
another case confirmed in January 2019 after medical testing. In April 2018, the Canadian
government changed the designation of its embassy in Havana to an “unaccompanied post,”
similar to the status of the U.S. embassy. In January 2019, the government announced that it
would reduce by half its diplomatic staff in Havana, maintaining that “the Canadian government
continues to investigate the potential causes of the unusual health symptoms” but “to date, no
cause has been identified.”171
In 2018, several U.S. government personnel serving at the U.S. Consulate in Guangzhou, China,
reported health incidents and symptoms similar to those experienced by members of the U.S.
diplomatic community in Havana. In response, Secretary of State Pompeo announced the
establishment of a multiagency Health Incidents Response Task Force to serve as a coordinating
body for State Department and interagency activities, including identification and treatment of
affected personnel and family members abroad, investigation and risk mitigation, messaging, and
diplomatic outreach.172 In October 2020, Secretary of State Pompeo stated that “there is not yet
any complete U.S. Government analysis which definitively tel s us precisely how these [injuries]
al came to be, whether they’re part of a single cohort.”173
Potential Causes of the Health Incidents. In February 2018, an article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) reported that University of Pennsylvania physicians who
evaluated individuals from the U.S. Embassy community in Havana maintained that the
individuals “appeared to have sustained injury to widespread brain networks without an
associated history of head trauma.” The study, however, found no conclusive evidence of the
cause of the brain injuries. An accompanying editorial in JAMA cautioned about drawing
conclusions from the study, noting that the evaluations were conducted an average of 203 days
after the onset of the symptoms and that it was unclear whether individuals who developed
symptoms were aware of earlier reports by others.174 In August 2018, JAMA published several
letters that raised additional questions concerning the February 2018 study, including one that

170 T he State Department’s August 23, 2018 travel advisory stated “Exercise increased caution in Cuba due to attacks
targeting U.S. Embassy Havana employees resulting in the drawdown of embassy staff” and that travelers should avoid
the Hot el Nacional and the Hotel Capri, where some of the incidents occurred. On November 21, 2019, the State
Department updated its advisory without using the word “attacks.” T he travel advisory now st ates: “Exercise increased
caution in Cuba due to demonstrable and sometimes debilitating injuries to members of our diplomatic community
resulting in the drawdown of embassy staff.” See U.S. Department of State, Cuba T ravel Advisory, November 21,
2019, at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/cuba-travel-advisory.html .
171 Government of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, “Statement by Global Affairs Canada on Ongoing Health and
Security Situation of Canadian Diplomatic Staff and Dependents in Havana,” April 16, 2018, “Statement on the Health
and Security of Canadian Diplomatic Staff in Havana, Cuba,” November 18, 2018, and “Statement on Health and
Security of Canadian Diplomatic Staff in Havana, Cuba,” January 30, 2019.
172 U.S. Department of State, “Establishment of the Health Incidents Response T ask Force,” June 5, 2018.
173 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability,” remarks, October 21, 2020; and
“Pompeo Says U.S. Still Working to Determine What Caused ‘Havana Syndrome,’ Reuters, October 21, 2020.
174 Randel L. Swanson II, DO, PhD, et al., “Neurological Manifestations Among US Government Personnel Reporting
Directional Audible and Sensory Phenomena in Havana, Cuba,” JAMA, March 20, 2018 (published online February 15,
2018); Christopher C. Muth, MD and Steven L. Lewis, MD, “Neurological Symptoms Among US Diplomats in Cuba,”
editorial, JAMA, March 20, 2018 (published online February 15, 2018); Karen DeYoung, “ Neurological Injuries Found
in U.S. Staff in Cuba,” Washington Post, February 15, 2018; and Gina Kolata, “Diplomats in Cuba Suffered Brain
Injuries, Experts Still Don’t Know Why,” New York Tim es, February 16, 2018.
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asserted mass psychogenic il ness could not be discounted; the study’s authors, however, pushed
back against the criticism, maintaining that a complex constel ation of neurological symptoms
was consistent across the cohort that was studied.175
In July 2019, JAMA published a follow-up study by University of Pennsylvania researchers who
conducted brain-imaging studies of the effected U.S. Embassy community members compared
with healthy individuals. The study found significant differences in the volume and connectivity
in the auditory and visuospatial areas of the brain but not in the executive control network of the
brain. The study itself noted that the clinical importance of the brain differences was uncertain
and may require further study.176 A JAMA editor’s note also stated that the clinical relevance of
the brain-image differences was uncertain and that the exact nature of any potential exposure and
the underlying cause of the patients’ symptoms remain unclear.177
Several other studies examined various aspects of the health incidents. A March 2018 University
of Michigan report by three computer scientists concluded that the sounds recorded in Cuba could
have been caused by two eavesdropping devices placed in close proximity to each other. The
study concluded that the sounds could have been inadvertently produced without malicious
intent.178 In December 2018, a group of doctors from the University of Miami and the University
of Pittsburgh published a study maintaining that those diplomats exhibiting symptoms suffered
from ear damage as opposed to brain injury.179 In January 2019, a group of biologists from the
University of California Berkeley and the U.K’s University of Lincoln issued a study on a
recording of the al eged sounds heard by some U.S. Embassy employees that had been released
by the Associated Press in October 2017. The study maintains that the sound matched the echoing
cal of a Caribbean cricket.180 In October 2019, a study in the Journal of the Royal Society of
Medicine argued that high levels of stress among the diplomats contributed to psychogenic
il ness.181
On December 5, 2020, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM)
publicly released a report, requested by the Department of State, examining potential explanations

175 “Neurological Symptoms in US Government Personnel in Cuba,” JAMA, August 12, 2018. Also see Ian Sample,
“Cuban ‘Acoustic Attack’ Report on US Diplomats Flawed, Say Neurologists,” The Guardian, August 14, 2018.
176 Ragini Verma PhD, et al, “Neuroimaging Findings in U.S. Government Personnel With Possible Exposure to
Directional Phenomena in Havana, Cuba,” JAMA, July 23/30, 2019.
177 Christopher C. Muth, MD and Phil B. Fontanaros, MD, MBA, “Advanced Neuroimagin g Findings in U.S.
Government Personnel With Possible Directional Phenomenon Exposure in Havana, Cuba,” editor’s note, JAMA, July
23/30, 2019. Also see Benedict Carey, “Study Reports T rauma In Brains of Diplomats,” New York Times, July 24,
2019; Brianna Abbot, “Brain Images Deepen Mystery of Diplomat Ills,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2019; and “Scans
Show Changes to Brains of ‘Injured’ Havana U.S. Embassy Workers,” Reuters, July 23, 2019.
178 Chen Yan, Kevin, Fu, and Wenyuan Xu, On Cuba, Diplomats, Ultrasound, and Intermodulation Distortion ,
University of Michigan, T echnical Report CSE-T R-001-18, March 1, 2018.
179 Frances Robles, “‘T hese People Were Injured,’ Doctors Conclude, After Studying U.S. Diplomats,” New York
Tim es, December 13, 2018; Doug Stanglin, “ U.S. Staff in Cuba Suffered Ear Damage, Study Says,” USA Today,
December 14, 2018; Michael E. Hoffer, “Acute Findings in an Acquired Neurosensory Dysfunction,” Laryngoscope
Investigative Otolaryngology, December 2018.
180 Josh Lederman, “Scientists Say Recording of Sound Heard by U.S. Diplomats in Cuba Matches Crickets,” NBC
News, January 8, 2019, at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/scientists-say-recording-sound-heard-u-
s-diplomats-cuba-matches-n956441.
181 Robert E. Bartholomew and Robert W. Baloh, “Challenging the Diagnosis of ‘Havana Syndrome’ as a Novel
Clinical Entity,” Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, January 2020 (first published October 31, 2019). Also see
Elizabeth Payne, “Case of the Cuban Conundrum; New Paper Adds to Havana Syndrome Mystery, Suggest Cause Was
Stress,” Ottowa Sun, November 25, 2019.
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for the health effects suffered by personnel associated with the U.S Embassy in Havana.182
According to several press articles from October 2020, the NASEM submitted the report to the
State Department in early August 2020 and the report’s authors expressed frustration that the
report had not been released to Congress or the public.183 Significantly, the NASEM study
concluded the most plausible mechanism for the health symptoms was directed pulsed radio
frequency energy.184
The NASEM report does not cover who might be responsible for such directed attacks, although
it notes there was significant research in Russia (Soviet Union) into the effects of pulsed radio
frequency exposure.185 Various press articles have raised the specter of Russia’s potential
involvement in the health injuries, including al egations by a former Central Intel igence Agency
official who maintains he was targeted in Moscow in 2017.186
Cuba’s Response. The Cuban government denies responsibility for the injuries of U.S.
personnel, maintaining that it would never al ow its territory to be used for any action against
accredited diplomats or their families.187 In the aftermath of the order expel ing its diplomats,
Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement strongly protesting the U.S. action,
asserting that it was motivated by politics and arguing that ongoing investigations have reached
no conclusion regarding the incidents or the causes of the health problems.188 The statement noted
that Cuba had permitted U.S. investigators to visit Cuba and reiterated the government’s
wil ingness to continue cooperating on the issue.
In September 2018, a delegation of Cuban scientists visited the United States to have meetings
with the State Department, the National Academy of Sciences, and on Capitol Hil . The director
of the Cuban Neuroscience Center, Dr. Mitchel Joseph Valdés-Sosa, maintains that there could be
various reasons why the diplomats became sick (such as hypertension, stress, other preexisting
conditions, and psychogenesis) but that Cuban scientists have not seen any credible evidence that
some type of high-tech weapon was used. The Cuban delegation expressed disappointment that
U.S. officials have not shared more medical and clinical data on the il nesses experienced by the
U.S. diplomats.189 In November 2018, Dr. Valdés-Sosa coauthored a letter in Science magazine

182 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM), An Assessment of Illness in U.S.
Governm ent Em ployees and Their Fam ilies at Overseas Em bassies, David A. Relman and Julie A. Pavlin, Editors,
2020, 76 pages, (hereafter NASEM report), available at https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2020/12/new-report -
assesses-illnesses-among-us-government -personnel-and-their-families-at-overseas-embassies. Cases from China were
also to be covered, but as noted in the report (p. 9) information made available from the China cases was “ too sparse
and fragmentary to be able to draw any substantive conclusions.”
183 Ana Swanson, Edward Wong, and Julian E. Barnes, “As U.S. Diplomats Fell Sick, Washington Minimized the
Danger,” New York Times, October 21, 2020; Amy Mackinnon and Robbie Gramer, “What’s Behind the Mysterious
Illness of U.S. Diplomats and Spies?” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2020; and Julia Ioffe, “ T he Mystery of the
Immaculate Concussion,” GQ, October 20, 2020.
184 NASEM report, p. 2.
185 NASEM report, p. 18.
186 Ana Swanson, Edward Wong, and Julian E. Barnes, “As U.S. Diplomats Fell Sick, W ashington Minimized the
Danger,” New York Times, October 21, 2020; Julia Ioffe, “T he Mystery of the Immaculate Concussion,” GQ, October
20, 2020; Ben Macintyre, “Is Russia Microwaving American Spies?” The Times (London), October 31, 2020; and
“NBC: Russia the Main Suspect in US Diplomats’ Illness in Cuba,” Voice of America News, September 11, 2018.
187 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba,” August 9, 2017, at
http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/statement -ministry-foreign-affairs-cuba-1.
188 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “ Declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba,” October 10, 2017, at
http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/declaration-ministry-foreign-affairs-cuba.
189 Mimi Whitefield, “Cuban Scientists Visit U.S., Say, Yes, U.S. Diplomats Were Sick but there were No Attacks,”
Miam i Herald, September 14, 2018; Gardiner Harris, “ Cuban Experts Insist No Proof Exists of Attack on Diplomats,”
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with a professor from the University of Pennsylvania’s Department of Bioengineering
maintaining that some “scientists have al owed speculation about the causes of these health issue
to outpace the evidence” and that “there is insufficient evidence to guess about the cause of the
sounds.”190
The Cuban government also responded to the July 2019 study by University of Pennsylvania
researches published in JAMA. Dr. Valdés-Sosa maintained that the study does not prove the
diplomats serving in Cuba suffered brain damage. He reiterated that, although there may be sick
individuals, there needs to be more coherent scientific explanations. He also cal ed for transparent
scientific discussion and exchanges. The Deputy Director General for the United States at Cuba’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Johana Tablada, cal ed for the U.S. government “to put an end to the
manipulation and use of this issue as a pretext to impose more new measures of aggression
against the integrity of our country, its economy, and its people.”191
Legislative Action. In the 116th Congress, a provision in the Further Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division J, Title IX, Section 901), signed into law in December 2019,
includes benefits for Department of State personnel injured while stationed in Cuba (and China).
In 2020, both the House- and Senate-passed versions of the FY2021 National Defense
Authorization Act, H.R. 6395 (Section 1110) and S. 4049 (Section 6091), had a provision that
would extend workers’ compensation payments for federal government personnel under chief of
mission authority in Cuba (and China) working for other federal agencies beyond the Department
of State. The conference report to H.R. 6395, H.Rept. 116-617, approved by the House and
Senate on December 8 and 11, respectively, includes the provision in Section 1110.
On December 8, 2020, a bipartisan group of 10 Senators introduced S. 4973, which would
authorize the provision of compensation to personnel of the Central Intel igence Agency and the
Department of State who incur disabilities resulting from certain injuries to the brain.192
P.L. 116-94, in Section 7019(e), also included several reporting requirements set forth in H.Rept.
116-78 to H.R. 2839, the House Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2020 SFOPS bil ,
and in S.Rept. 116-126 to S. 2583, the Senate Appropriations Committee’s version of the SFOPS
bil .
 H.Rept. 116-78 directed the State Department to submit a strategy for U.S.
businesses operating in Cuba, including a timeline for the safe return of staff at
the U.S. Embassy in Havana to previous levels. As submitted to Congress in
March 2020, the State Department strategy stated that “until the Department
knows more about how the injuries to our personnel occurred, it is not possible to

New York Tim es, September 14, 2018; and Katanga Johnson, “ U.S., Cuba Officials Discuss Mysterious Embassy
Health Incidents,” Reuters News, September 13, 2018. Also see Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Cuba, “Executive Summary of the Assessment by the Cuban Scientific Panel of Medical Reports Regarding the Health
of U.S. Diplomats and T heir Families Previously Stationed in Havana,” September 13, 2018, at
http://misiones.minrex.gob.cu/en/articulo/executive-summary-assessment -cuban-scientific-panel-medical-reports-
regarding-health-us.
190 Mitchell Joseph Valdés-Sosa and Kenneth R. Foster, “Halt Speculation on U.S. Embassy in Cuba,” Science,
November 19, 2018, at http://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6416/758.2.
191 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “Cuba reiterates to the government of the United States to put an end to the
manipulation and use of health symptoms as an excuse to impose new measures against its economy and its people,”
July 24, 2019.
192 Office of Senator Susan Collins, “Bipartisan Group Introduces Bill to Support Victims of ‘Havana Syndrome,” press
release, December 8, 2020, at https://www.collins.senate.gov/newsroom/bipartisan-group-introduces-bill-support -
victims-‘havana-syndrome’.
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say when Embassy Havana can expect to return to normal staffing levels.” The
State Department also maintained that its “response continues to be guided by
medical facts” and that “world-class specialists and other scientists at the
University of Pennsylvania, the National Institutes of Health, and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention continue to examine the medical data to gain a
better understanding of the nature and mechanism of injury that caused these
patients’ symptoms.”193
 S.Rept. 116-126 required the Secretary of State, not later than 90 days after
enactment, to submit a report to the committee, in classified form if necessary,
detailing any evidence of those responsible for, and the cause or causes of, the
health il nesses suffered by U.S. government personnel in Cuba.
For FY2021, H.Rept. 116-444 to the House-passed SFOPS bil (Division A of H.R. 7608),
approved in July 2020, would require the State Department to provide an update of its Cuba
policy strategy as directed in FY2020 in H.Rept. 116-78, including progress toward returning
staffing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana to previous levels and an update on the impact of the
staffing reductions on embassy operations in prior years, including visa processing. The
explanatory statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft FY2021 SFOPS bil also
would require an update of the report required in S.Rept. 116-126, in classified form if necessary,
detailing any evidence of those responsible for, and the cause or causes of, il nesses suffered by
U.S. government personnel in Cuba.
Migration Issues194
In January 2017, the Obama Administration ended the so-cal ed “wet foot/dry foot” policy under
which thousands of unauthorized Cuban migrants entered the United States since the mid-1990s.
Under that policy, Cuban migrants interdicted at sea general y were returned to Cuba whereas
those reaching U.S. land were al owed entrance into the United States and general y permitted to
stay. Under the new policy, Cuban nationals who attempt to enter the United States il egal y and
do not qualify for humanitarian relief are now subject to removal. The Cuban government agreed
to begin accepting the return of Cuban migrants who have been ordered removed.195 President
Trump’s NSPM on Cuba stated that the Administration would not reinstate the “wet foot/dry
foot” policy, maintaining that the policy had “encouraged untold thousands of Cuban nationals to
risk their lives to travel unlawfully to the United States.”196
Background on the 1994 and 1995 Migration Accords. Cuba and the United States reached
two migration accords in 1994 and 1995 designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting
to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the 1980 Mariel
boatlift, in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with the approval of Cuban officials.
In response to Fidel Castro’s threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S.
resolve not to al ow another exodus. Amid escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, in August 1994,

193 U.S. Department of State, “Strategy for Providing Certainty for U.S. Busin esses Legally Operating in Cuba,” report
to Congress, March 4, 2020.
194 For additional background, see CRS Report R44714, U.S. Policy on Cuban Migrants: In Brief, by Andorra Bruno.
195 White House, “Statement by the President on Cuban Immigration Policy,” January 12, 2017; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, “Statement by Secretary Johnson on the Continued Normalization of our Migration Relationship
with Cuba,” January 12, 2017; U.S Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Changes to Parole and Expedited
Removal Policies Affecting Cuban Nationals,” January 12, 2017.
196 U.S. Department of State, “Strengthening the Policy of the United States T oward Cuba,” 82 Federal Register
48875-48878, October 20, 2017 (consists of the text of National Security Presidential Memorandum, NSPM -5, issued
by the President on June 16, 2017).
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President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. immigration policy, under which Cubans attempting to
flee their homeland were al owed into the United States; he announced that the U.S. Coast Guard
and Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued to flee in large numbers.
As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a
bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United States by boat. In the
agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderly Cuban
migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The United States
agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimum of
20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.
In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States
would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States but
would intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and return
them to Cuba. In January 1996, the Department of Defense announced that the last of some
32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S. naval station, most
having been paroled into the United States.
Figure 3. Maritime Interdictions of Cubans by the U.S. Coast Guard
(FY2010-FY2018)

Source: Created by CRS using information provided to CRS by the U.S. Coast Guard, July 2018, and “ U.S.
Department of State, Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords, (April 2019 to October 2019), report to
Congress, October 8, 2019.
Maritime Interdictions. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted
thousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to their country. Until the change in U.S. policy
toward Cuban migrants in January 2017, those Cubans who reached the U.S. shore were al owed
to apply for permanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966
(P.L. 89-732). In short, under the wet foot/dry foot policy, most interdictions resulted in a return
to Cuba, even those in U.S. coastal waters, whereas those Cubans who touched shore were
al owed to stay in the United States. Some had criticized this policy as encouraging Cubans to
risk their lives to make it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling.
Over the years, the number of Cubans interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard has fluctuated
annual y, influenced by several factors, including the economic situations in Cuba and the United
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States. From FY2010 through FY2016, the number of Cubans interdicted by the Coast Guard
increased each year, from 422 in FY2010 to an al -time high of 5,230 in FY2016. The increase in
the flow of maritime migrants in 2015 and 2016 was driven by concerns among Cubans that the
favorable treatment granted to Cuban migrants would end. With the change in U.S. immigration
policy toward Cuba in January 2017, the number of Cubans interdicted by the Coast Guard
dropped to a trickle. In FY2017, the Coast Guard interdicted 2,109 Cubans, with the majority of
these interdictions occurring before the policy change. In FY2018, the Coast Guard interdicted
384 Cubans at sea, and in FY2019, through August 8, 2019, the Coast Guard interdicted 464
Cubans at sea.197 (See Figure 3.)
Unauthorized Cuban Migrants. Beginning around FY2013, according to the State Department,
unauthorized Cuban migrants began to favor land-based routes to enter the United States,
especial y via U.S. ports of entry from Mexico. Since that time and until the change in U.S.
immigration policy in January 2017, the number of unauthorized Cubans arriving by land
increased significantly, with a majority entering through the Southwest border.198 According to
statistics from the Department of Homeland Security, the number of unauthorized Cubans
entering the United States both at U.S. ports of entry and between ports of entry rose from almost
8,170 in FY2010 to a high of 58,269 in FY2016. In FY2017, that number declined to 20,955,
with the majority entering before the change in U.S. immigration policy. In FY2018, 7,355
unauthorized Cubans arrived in the United States at or between ports of entry, about a 65%
decline from FY2017.199
The number of unauthorized Cubans arriving by land again increased significantly in FY2019 but
fel in FY2020. Statistics from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) show that the number
of inadmissible Cubans arriving at ports of entry at the Southwest border increased from 7,079 in
FY2018 to 21,499 in FY2019, over a 200% increase. In FY2020, however, the number of
inadmissible Cubans arriving at Southwest border ports of entry declined significantly. CBP
statistics show 3,461 inadmissible Cubans reported in the first seven months of FY2020 (through
April 2020), with decreasing amounts each month.200 The decline stems from a new U.S. policy
requiring asylum seekers who arrive at the Southwest border to wait in Mexico while their claims
are being processed. The policy change led to thousands of Cubans waiting in Mexican cities
such as Ciudad Juárez.201 Moreover, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, CBP and the

197 U.S. Department of State, “Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords, (April 2019 to October 2019),” report to
Congress, October 8, 2019.
198 U.S. Department of State, Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords, reports to Congress, May 7, 2014;
November 6, 2014; April 30, 2015; November 3, 2015; April 29, 2016; and October 21, 2016.
199 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Congressional Affairs, April
10, 2017; and U.S. Department of State, Cuban Com pliance with the Migration Accords, reports to Congress, October
18, 2017, April 12, 2018, October 4, 2018, April 30, 2019, and October 8, 2019.
200 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Southwest Border Inadmissibles by Field Office Fiscal Year 2020,”
May 7, 2020, at https://web.archive.org/web/20200516090914/https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-
migration/ofo-sw-border-inadmissibles. According to CBP, “ inadmissibles refers to individuals encountered at ports of
entry who are seeking lawful admission into the United States but are determined to be inadmissible, individuals
presenting themselves to seek humanitarian protection under our laws, and individuals who withdraw an application for
admission and return to their countries of origin within a short timeframe.” U.S. CBP, “ CBP Enforcement Statistic
Fiscal Year 2020,” at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics-fy2020.
201 Mary Beth Sheridan, “At Border, Cubans Face a Reversal,” Washington Post, November 7, 2019. Also see
Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera and Elliot Spagat, U.S. Im m igration Policy for Cubans: From Revolution to COVID-19,
T he Wilson Center, October 2020.
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued orders in March 2020 that further restricted the
entrance of certain foreign nationals into the United States at U.S. borders.202
Meanwhile, U.S. deportations of Cubans have increased. According to statistics from U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 1,179 Cubans were deported in FY2019,
compared with 463 in FY2018.203 Press reports indicate that in FY2020, as of February 24, 2020,
ICE had removed 1,208 Cubans, more than in al of FY2019.204 Approximately 41,000 Cuban
nationals in the United States have final orders of removal.205
Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program. In January 2017, at the same time that it ended
the “wet foot/dry foot policy,” the Obama Administration announced that it was ending the
special Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMPP) program. Established in 2006 and
administered by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the CMPP program al owed Cuban medical professionals in third
countries to be approved for entry into the United States.206 The program reportedly benefitted
more than 8,000 Cuban medical professionals who defected from Cuba’s medical missions in
third countries.207 (For information regarding al egations of forced labor in Cuba’s foreign
medical mission program, see “Trafficking in Persons and Cuba’s Foreign Medical Missions”
section, below.)
Effect of Downsizing of U.S. Embassy. As noted above, most visa processing at the U.S.
Embassy in Havana was suspended because of the U.S. Embassy staff reduction in 2017. USCIS
suspended operations at its field office at the embassy in 2017, and then permanently closed its
offices in Havana in December 2018.208 Most Cubans applying for nonimmigrant visas must go to
a U.S. embassy or consulate in another country, and al applications and interviews for immigrant
visas are currently being handled at the U.S. Embassy in Georgetown, Guyana.
The suspension of most nonimmigrant visa processing in Havana made it more difficult and
expensive for Cubans visiting family in the United States and for Cuban cuentapropistas (private
sector workers) traveling to the United States to bring back inputs for their businesses. In 2013,
the United States had begun granting multiple entry visas, good for five years, for Cubans visiting
the United States. As those visas expire, Cubans wil need to travel to a third country to request a
new visa if they want to visit the United States.
In addition, the State Department announced that as of March 18, 2019, it would no longer issue
multiple entry B2 visas (for tourism, family visit medical treatment, and similar travel purposes)
for Cuban nationals, but instead would only issue single entry B2 visas for a stay of two months,
with the possibility of a 30-day extension.209 The action wil likely have a significant effect on

202 See CRS Insight IN11308, COVID-19: Restrictions on Travelers at U.S. Land Borders, by Audrey Singer.
203 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fiscal Year 2019
Enforcement and Removal Operations Report,” December 11, 2019.
204 Monique P. Madan, “Feds Deport 119 Cubans Back to Havana on Miami Flight,” Miami Herald, March 3, 2020.
205 U.S. Department of State, Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords, report to Congress, October 6, 2020.
206 For information from the Department of Homeland Security on the termination of the program, see
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/cuban-medical-professional-parole-cmpp-program.
207 Mario J. Pentón, “Cuban Physicians Still Abandoning Missions Abroad Despite End to U.S. Parole Program,”
Miam i Herald, March 12, 2018.
208 USCIS, “USCIS Closes Havana Field Office on Dec. 10, 2018,” December 10, 2018; U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “U.S.
Embassy Havana on USCIS Announcement,” media note, December 12, 2018.
209 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Cuba, “Decreasing B2 Visa Validity for Cuban Nationals,” media note,
March 15, 2019.
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family travel from Cuba and those traveling from Cuba to support their private sector businesses,
and could also negatively affect U.S.-Cuban academic, cultural, and civil society engagement.210
The embassy staff reduction has negatively affected the United States’ ability to meet its
commitment under the 1994 bilateral migration accord to issue travel documents for 20,000
Cubans annual y (not including immediate relatives). As a result, the United States did not meet
its annual commitment in FY2018 or FY2019. For FY2020, as of the end of June 2020, 2,866
Cubans received travel documents under the migration accords.211 In past years, around 75% of
the immigrant travel documents issued annual y for Cuban nationals pursuant to the 1994 accord
were issued under the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program (CFRP), a program
established in 2007 by USCIS to help the United States meet its annual obligation of travel
documents.212
Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 4884 (Mucarsel-Powel ) would direct the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to reinstate the
CFRP and, to the extent practicable, to make available to applicants under the program video
teleconference capabilities. The bil also would require the Secretary of State to assign
appropriate temporary duty personnel to the U.S. Embassy in Havana to support the reinstatement
of the parole program.
Some Members of Congress also have cal ed on the Trump Administration to reestablish the
CMPP program. In the 116th Congress, one bil , S. 4635 (Menendez) would, among its provisions,
reinstate the CMPP. Two resolutions, S.Res. 14 (Menendez) and H.Res. 136 (Sires), would
express the sense of the Senate and House, respectively, that the CMPP program should be
reestablished. (For more, see “Trafficking in Persons and Cuba’s Foreign Medical Missions”
section, below.)
Antidrug Cooperation
Cuba is not a major producer or consumer of il icit drugs, but its location and extensive shoreline
make it susceptible to narcotics-smuggling operations. Drugs that enter the Cuban market are
largely the result of onshore wash-ups from smuggling by high-speed boats moving drugs from
Jamaica to the Bahamas, Haiti, and the United States, or by smal aircraft from clandestine
airfields in Jamaica. For a number of years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns about the
use of their waters and airspace for drug transit and about increased domestic drug use. The
Cuban government has taken a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including
legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel,
and cooperation with a number of countries on antidrug efforts. Since 1999, Cuba’s Operation
Hatchet has focused on maritime and air interdiction and the recovery of narcotics washed up on
Cuban shores. Since 2003, Cuba has aggressively pursued an internal enforcement and
investigation program against its incipient drug market with an effective nationwide drug
prevention and awareness campaign.
Over the years, there have been varying levels of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on antidrug efforts. In
1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizure of almost six metric tons
of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick, a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned over the

210 Mario Pentón, “Visas for Cubans Have a New Limit,” Miami Herald, March 18, 2019; and Marc Frank, “Cubans
Frustrated over U.S. Move to End Five-year Visitor Visas,” Reuters News, March 18, 2019.
211 U.S. Department of State, Cuban Compliance with the Migration Accords, report to Congress, October 6, 2020.
212 For background on the CFRP program, see USCIS, “T he Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program,” at
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/cuban-family-reunification-parole-program.
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cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecution
of two defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999, when
U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving antidrug cooperation. Cuba
accepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.
Coast Guard as wel as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard drug interdiction specialist at the
U.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests
Section in September 2000.
After the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 2015, U.S. antidrug cooperation
increased further, with several dialogues and exchanges on counternarcotics issues. In December
2015, U.S. and Cuban officials held talks at the headquarters of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) in Washington, DC, with delegations discussing ways to stop the il egal
flow of narcotics and exploring ways to cooperate on the issue.213 In April 2016, Cuban security
officials toured the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) based in Key West,
FL. JIATF-South has responsibility for detecting and monitoring il icit drug trafficking in the
region and for facilitating international and interagency interdiction efforts. At a July 2016
dialogue in Havana with U.S. officials from the State Department, DEA, the U.S. Coast Guard,
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Homeland Security Investigations, Cuba and the
United States signed a counternarcotics arrangement to facilitate cooperation and information
sharing.214 Technical exchanges between the U.S. Coast Guard and Cuba’s Border Guard on
antidrug efforts and other areas of cooperation also occurred periodical y, with the most recent
exchange on antidrug efforts in January 2018.215
According to the State Department’s 2020 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR), issued in March 2020, Cuba has 40 bilateral agreements for antidrug cooperation with
countries worldwide, which includes the 2016 U.S.-Cuban agreement noted above.216 According
to the 2020 INCSR, Cuban authorities and the U.S. Coast Guard share information related to
vessels transiting through Cuban territorial waters suspected of trafficking and coordinate
responses between operation command centers. The report maintained that Cuban and U.S. law
enforcement officials maintain some working-level communications and that Cuba continues to
cooperate with U.S. authorities on some law enforcement matters.
The State Department’s 2019 INCSR, issued in March 2019, provided more detail on U.S.-Cuban
law enforcement cooperation related to drug trafficking.217 The report noted that direct
communications were established in July 2016 between the U.S. DEA and Cuban counterparts
within the Ministry of Interior’s National Anti-Drug Directorate; as a result, DEA had received
approximately 20 requests for information related to drug investigations in addition to

213 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Counter-Narcotics Dialogue,” media note, December 2,
2015.
214 U.S. Department of State, “Counternarcotics Arrangement Signed During T hird Counternarcotics T echnical
Exchange Between the United States and Cuba,” media note, July 22, 2016.
215 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “T echnical Exchange Held Between Cuba’s Border Guard T roops and the U.S.
Coast Guard Service,” January 24, 2018. In March 2018, the Coast Guard also participated in a search -and-rescue
tabletop exercise with Cuban officials and a meeting with Cuban officials on cooperation against maritime spills
(hydrocarbons and other hazardous substances). In addition, the United States and Cuba held an exchange on
cooperation to prevent and combat money laundering in February 2018 and a broader law enforcement dialogue in July
2018 that included the topic of drug trafficking.
216 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2020, Volume I: Drug and Chemical
Control, March 2020, p. 129.
217 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2019, Volume I: Drug and Chemical
Control, March 2019, p. 146.
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cooperation leading to Cuba’s arrest of a fugitive wanted in the United States. More broadly, the
State Department reported in the 2019 INCSR that Cuba provided assistance to U.S. state and
federal prosecutions by providing evidence and information, and demonstrated a wil ingness to
cooperate on law enforcement matters.
Property Claims and Titles III and IV of the LIBERTAD Act
An important issue in the process of normalizing relations is Cuba’s compensation for the
expropriation of thousands of properties of U.S. companies and citizens in Cuba dating back to
the 1960s. The Foreign Claim Settlement Commission (FCSC), an independent agency within the
Department of Justice, has certified 5,913 claims for expropriated U.S. properties in Cuba valued
at $1.9 bil ion in two different claims programs; with accrued interest, the properties’ value would
be some $8 bil ion. In 1972, the FCSC certified 5,911 claims of U.S. citizens and companies that
had their property confiscated by the Cuban government through April 1967, with 30 U.S.
companies accounting for almost 60% of the claims.218 In 2006, the FCSC certified two
additional claims in a second claims program covering property confiscated after April 1967.
Many of the companies that original y filed claims have been bought and sold numerous times.
There are a variety of potential alternatives for restitution or compensation schemes to resolve the
outstanding claims, but resolving the issue likely would entail considerable negotiation and
cooperation between the two governments.219
Although Cuba has maintained that it would negotiate compensation for the U.S. claims, it does
not recognize the FCSC valuation of the claims or accrued interest. Instead, Cuba has emphasized
using declared taxable value as an appraisal basis for expropriated U.S. properties, which would
amount to almost $1 bil ion, instead of the $1.9 bil ion certified by the FCSC.220 Moreover, Cuba
general y has maintained that any negotiation should consider losses that Cuba has accrued from
U.S. economic sanctions. Cuba estimates cumulative damages of the U.S. embargo at $144
bil ion in current prices as of March 2020.221
U.S. and Cuban officials held three meetings on claims issues between December 2015 and
January 2017. The first meeting took place in December 2015 in Havana, with talks including
discussions of the FCSC-certified claims of U.S. nationals, claims related to unsatisfied U.S.
court judgments against Cuba (reportedly 10 U.S. state and federal judgments totaling about $2
bil ion), and some claims of the U.S. government. The Cuban delegation raised the issue of
claims against the United States related to the U.S. embargo.222 A second claims meeting was held
in July 2016, in Washington, DC. According to the State Department, the talks al owed for an

218 “A Road Map for Restructuring Future U.S. Relations with Cuba,” policy paper, Atlantic Council, June 1995,
Appendix D.
219 Matías F. T ravieso-Díaz, “Alternative Recommendations for Dealing with Expropriated U.S. Property in Post -
Castro Cuba,” in Cuba in Transition, Volume 12, Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, 2002.
220 T imothy Ashby, “U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal Reality and Likely Settlement Mechanisms,” Inter-
Am erican Law Review, March 2009.
221 Republic of Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Relations, Cuba vs. Blockade, Cuba’s Report On Resolution 74/7 of the
United Nations General Assembly, “Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Blockade Imposed
by the United States of America Against Cuba,” July 2020, at http://www.minrex.gob.cu/en/report-cuba-resolution-
747-united-nations-general-assembly-necessity-ending-economic-commercial-and.
222 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Claims T alks in Havana,” media note, December 7, 201 5;
Frances Robles, “Competing Claims in Havana,” New York Times, December 14, 2015.
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exchange of views on historical claims-settlement practices and processes going forward.223 A
third claims meeting was held in Havana in January 2017.
Title III Lawsuits. As noted above, Title III of the LIBERTAD Act holds any person or
government that traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary
damages in U.S. federal court. Until January 2019, pursuant to provisions of the law, al
Administrations suspended the right to file law suits at six-month intervals. For the suspension,
the President (since 2013, the Secretary of State) must determine that it is necessary to the
national interests of the United States and wil expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. In
June 2018, Secretary of State Pompeo made a determination effective from August 1, 2018,
through January 2019.224
On January, 16, 2019, Secretary Pompeo issued another determination suspending the right to file
lawsuit, but for only an additional 45 days, as opposed to six months, as provided in the law.
Pompeo maintained that the extension would permit a careful review that would include such
factors as “the Cuban regime’s brutal oppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms and
its indefensible support for increasingly authoritarian and corrupt regimes in Venezuela and
Nicaragua.”225
On March 4, 2019, Secretary Pompeo partial y suspended the right to file lawsuits for an
additional 30 days (through April 17) but al owed lawsuits, beginning March 19, against an entity
or sub-entity on the State Department’s “Cuba restricted list” controlled by the Cuban military,
intel igence, or security service. In its announcement, the State Department stated that they would
continue to study the impact of the suspension on the human rights situation in Cuba.226 Lawsuits
could be brought by any U.S. national, including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time of
the confiscation. However, lawsuits could not be brought against third-country foreign investors
in Cuba. State Department officials acknowledged that they engaged with al ies in the European
Union, Canada, and elsewhere, and that these countries’ concerns were a factor in Secretary
Pompeo’s decision-making process.227
Nevertheless, on April 17, 2019, Secretary Pompeo announced that, effective May 2, 2019, the
Administration would al ow the right to file lawsuits against al those trafficking in confiscated
property in Cuba pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, not limiting lawsuits to those
against entities on the “Cuba Restricted List.”228 In addition, as noted above, lawsuits can be
brought by any U.S. national, including those who were not U.S. nationals at the time of the
confiscation. The European Union and Canada criticized the Administration’s action, vowing to
ban enforcement or recognition of any judgement, al ow counterclaims in European and Canadian
courts, and potential y seek action in the World Trade Organization.
To date, some 29 lawsuits have been filed by both FCSC-certified and noncertified claimants
against U.S. and Cuban and other foreign companies, including cruise ship operators, airlines,

223 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Claims Discussion,” Miami Herald, July 28, 2016.
224 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary’s Determination of Six Months’ Suspension Under T itle III of LIBERT AD
Act,” June 28, 2018.
225 U.S. Department of State “Secretary’s Determination of 45 -Day Suspension Under T itle III of LIBERT AD Act.”
January 16, 2019.
226 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Enacts 30-Day Suspension of T itle III (LIBERT AD Act) With an Exception,”
March 4, 2019.
227 U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere: Senior State Department Official on T itle III of the LIBERT AD
Act,” special briefing, March 4, 2019.
228 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Remarks to the Press,” April 17, 2019.
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travel booking companies, and hotels; several lawsuits have been dismissed by federal courts or
by plaintiffs.229 The first lawsuits were filed in May 2019 against the Miami-based Carnival
Corporation by descendants of two families who owned port facilities in Cuba confiscated in
1960 and against Cuba’s state-owned oil company and a state-owned holding company by Exxon
Mobil Corporation (formerly Standard Oil) for the expropriation of an oil refinery, product
terminals, and service stations in 1960.
Before the full implementation of Title III, some observers expressed concerns that U.S. federal
courts could be flooded with lawsuits if Title III were fully al owed to be implemented. In
addition to the claims of thousands of certified U.S. claimants, a 1996 report to Congress by the
State Department required by the LIBERTAD Act estimated that there could be some 75,000 to
200,000 claims by Cuban Americans with the value running into the tens of bil ions of dollars.230
As defined in the LIBERTAD Act, however, the term property does not include “real property
used for residential purposes” (unless the claim is a certified claim held by a U.S national), and
there is a $50,000 threshold for the amount in controversy for the right to file a lawsuit under
Title III. While the smal number of lawsuits filed to date is somewhat surprising, some observers
maintain that plaintiffs’ lawyers may not be wil ing to file high-cost lawsuits for smal er claims
and that some potential plaintiffs may be unwil ing to sue companies with whom they have or
hope to have a business relationship.231
When the LIBERTAD Act was enacted in 1996, the intent of Title III was to prevent foreign
investment in properties confiscated by the Cuban government. However, since some U.S.
companies have entered into transactions or investment projects with Cuban companies in recent
years as a result of the U.S. engagement process with Cuba, those U.S. companies could be
susceptible to Title III legal action. A significant number of the lawsuits filed to date have been
cases against U.S. companies or against at least one American defendant.232
When the LIBERTAD Act was passed in 1996, several foreign governments strongly objected,
and some (Canada, EU, and Mexico) enacted countermeasures to block enforcement of the U.S.
sanctions. The EU had pursued WTO dispute against the LIBERTAD Act, which it suspended in
1998 when it reached an understanding on the issue with the United States that included the
presumption of continued suspension of Title III.233
Title IV Visa Restrictions. Title IV of the LIBERTAD Act denies admission to the United States
to aliens involved in the confiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated
U.S. property in Cuba. This includes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with a
controlling interest in an entity involved in the confiscation of U.S. property or trafficking of U.S.
property. It also includes the spouse, minor child, or agent of aliens who would be excludable
under the provision. Current Title IV visa restrictions against executives of Sherritt International

229 For information on the lawsuits, see the website of the U.S.-Cuba T rade and Economic Council at
https://www.cubatrade.org/.
230 U.S. Department of State, Settlement of Outstanding United States Claims to Confiscated Property in Cuba, Report
to Congress Under Section 207 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Septe mber 1996.
231 John B Bellinger, III, John P. Barker, T al R. Machnes, T om McSorley, Elizabeth T .M. Fitzpatrick, “Calm Before
the Storm? What We Can Learn From the Slow Start to Helms-Burton Cases,” Arnold & Porter, July 17, 2019.
232 John B. Bellinger, III et al., “T he Helms-Burton Act’s Unexpected Boomerang Effect: Most Lawsuits Have
T argeted U.S. Companies,” Arnold & Porter, March 4, 2020.
233 Peters, Phil, “Activating T itle III: Yet Another T rade Dispute–and Much More,” Cuba Standard Monthly, 9/2018,
Vol. 26, No. 9. For background on the EU-U.S. understanding, see Joaquín Roy, “ T he ‘Understanding’ Between the
European Union and the United States Over Investments in Cuba,” Cuba in Transition: Volume 10, Association for the
Study of the Cuban Economy, Papers and Proceedings of the T enth Annual Meeting, 2000.
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Corporation, a Canadian mining and energy company date to 1996. More recently, in February
2020, the Spanish hotel chain Meliá confirmed that its chief executive officer is prohibited from
entering the United States pursuant to Title IV.234
U.S. Fugitives from Justice
U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba include convicted murderers and numerous hijackers, most of
whom entered Cuba in the 1970s and early 1980s.235 For example, Joanne Chesimard, also known
as Assata Shakur, was added to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Most Wanted
Terrorist list in May 2013. Chesimard was part of militant group known as the Black Liberation
Army. In 1977, she was convicted for the 1973 murder of a New Jersey State Police officer and
sentenced to life in prison. Chesimard escaped from prison in 1979 and, according to the FBI,
lived underground before fleeing to Cuba in 1984.236 Another fugitive, Wil iam “Guil ermo”
Morales, who was a member of the Puerto Rican militant group known as the Armed Forces of
National Liberation, reportedly has been in Cuba since 1988 after being imprisoned in Mexico for
several years. In 1978, both of his hands were maimed by a bomb he was making. He was
convicted in New York on weapons charges in 1979 and sentenced to 10 years in prison and 5
years’ probation, but he escaped from prison the same year.237 In addition to Chesimard and other
fugitives from the past, a number of U.S. fugitives from justice wanted for Medicare and other
types of insurance fraud have fled to Cuba in recent years.238
With the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 2015, the United States held several law
enforcement dialogues that reportedly included discussion of the issue of U.S. fugitives from
justice; the most recent dialogue was held in July 2018.239 The State Department’s Country
Reports on Terrorism 2019, issued in June 2020, stated that Cuba “harbors several U.S. fugitives
from justice wanted on charges of political violence, many of who have resided in Cuba for
decades.” The report raised the Chesimard and Morales cases (noted above) and three other
fugitive cases.240
Although the United States and Cuba have an extradition treaty in place dating to 1905, in
practice the treaty has not been used. Instead, for more than a decade, Cuba has returned wanted
fugitives to the United States on a case-by-case basis. For example, in 2011, U.S. Marshals
picked up a husband and wife in Cuba who were wanted for a 2010 murder in New Jersey,241 and

234 “Melia Hotels Says CEO Banned from U.S. Over Hotels in Cuba,” Reuter News, February 5, 2020.
235 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, April 30, 2008.
236 FBI, Most Wanted T errorists, Joanne Deborah Chesimard, poster, at http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/
joanne-deborah-chesimard/view.
237 James Anderson, “Living in Exile, Maimed Guerrilla Maintains Low-Key Profile in Cuba,” Fort Worth Star-
Telegram , January 16, 2000; Vanessa Bauza, “ FBI’s Fugitive Is Cuba’s Political Refugee,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel,
May 26, 2002; Mary Jordan, “Fugitives Sought by U.S. Find a Protect or in Cuba,” Washington Post, September 2,
2002; FBI, Wanted by the FBI, William “Guillermo” Morales, poster, at https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/dt/william-
guillermo-morales.
238 For example, see the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Florida, “T hirty-Three Defendants Charged in
Staged Automobile Accident Scheme,” press release, May 16, 2013; and Jay Weaver, “ Grandma Rips Off Medicare,
Skips T own, Latest Fraud Fugitive Likely Fled to Cuba,” Miam i Herald, January 5, 2017.
239 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba Hold Fourth Law Enforcement Dialogue in Washington, DC,”
media note, July 10, 2018.
240 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 2020, “Cuba section” at https://www.state.gov/
reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/cuba/.
241 George Mast, “Murder Suspects Caught in Cuba,” Courier-Post (New Jersey), September 30, 2011.
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in April 2013, Cuba returned a Florida couple who al egedly had kidnapped their own children
(who were in the custody of the mother’s parents) and fled to Havana.242 In August 2018, Cuba
arrested and returned to the United States a long-sought U.S. fugitive from justice wanted in
connection with ecoterrorism who had stopped in Cuba on his way to Russia.243 In November
2018, Cuba returned to the United States a New Jersey man wanted on murder charges.244 In
another case demonstrating U.S.-Cuban law enforcement cooperation, Cuba successfully
prosecuted a Cuban national in February 2018 who had fled to Cuba after murdering a doctor in
Florida in 2015—the main witness was a Palm Beach detective.245
Cuba general y, however, has refused to render to U.S. justice any fugitive judged by Cuba to be
“political,” such as Chesimard, who they believe could not receive a fair trial in the United States.
In the past, Cuba has responded to U.S. extradition requests by making approval contingent upon
the United States returning wanted Cuban criminals from the United States.
Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, H.Res. 92 (King) and S.Res. 232 (Menendez)
would cal for the immediate extradition or rendering to the United States of convicted felons
Wil iam Morales, Joanne Chesimard, and al other fugitives from justice who are receiving safe
harbor in Cuba in order to escape prosecution or confinement for criminal offenses committed in
the United States.
Trafficking in Persons and Cuba’s Foreign Medical Missions
In 2019 and 2020, the State Department placed Cuba on Tier 3 in its annual Trafficking in
Persons Report (TIP report), a status that refers to countries whose governments do not fully
comply with the minimum standards for combatting trafficking and are not making significant
efforts to do so.246 According to the State Department’s 2020 TIP report, human trafficking
problems include sex trafficking in Cuba and Cuban government-sponsored labor export
programs. The 2020 TIP report stated that the Cuban government took some steps to investigate,
prosecute, and convict sex traffickers and sex tourists, as wel as to identify and assist victims. In
contrast, the 2020 TIP report maintained there were strong indications of forced labor in the
government’s foreign medical missions. The report al eged the Cuban government did not
improve the transparency of the foreign medical missions program or address labor and
trafficking concerns, despite al egations from observers, former participants, and foreign
governments. The Cuban government reportedly failed to inform participants of the terms of their
contracts, confiscated their documents and salaries, and threatened participants and their family
members if participants left the program. As described in the 2020 TIP report, the Cuban
government has said it employs between 34,000 and 50,000 health care professionals in more

242 Paul Haven and Peter Orsi, “Cuba Says It Will Give U.S. Florida Couple Who Allegedly Kidnapped Children,”
Associated Press, April 9, 2013.
243 “Suspected Eco-T errorist Arrested in Cuba after 20 Years as a Fugitive,” CBS News, August 11, 2018.
244 Mimi Whitefield, “Cuba Extradites a 55-Year-Old American Lawyer to Face Murder Charges in New Jersey,”
Miam i Herald, November 7, 2018.
245 Mimi Whitefield, “T his Florida Murder Case Was T ried in Cuba. And Local Prosecutors Got to Watch,” Miami
Herald, August 30, 2018.
246 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2019, Cuba, June 24, 2019, at https://www.state.gov/
reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/cuba/, and Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, Cuba, June 25, 2020, at
https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/cuba/. For more information, see CRS Report
R44953, The State Departm ent’s Trafficking in Persons Report: Scope, Aid Restrictions, and Methodology , by Michael
A. Weber, Katarina C. O'Regan, and Liana W. Rosen . From 2015 through 2018, Cuba had been placed on the T ier 2
Watch List, a status that refers to countries whose governments, despite making significant efforts, do not fully comply
with the minimum standards and still have some specific problems or whose governments have made commitments to
take additional anti-trafficking steps over the next year.
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than 60 countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe through contracts
with foreign governments and, in some countries, international organizations serving as
intermediaries.
Cuba’s foreign medical diplomacy has long been a source of national pride and an example of
Cuba’s soft power worldwide to promote humanitarianism and generate political goodwil . The
diplomacy has included short-term initiatives for disaster relief and epidemic control as wel as
longer-term initiatives, such as providing primary health care, staffing hospitals, and establishing
health care facilities.
Cuba’s first medical support abroad dates to 1960, when Cuba sent a medical brigade to Chile
following an earthquake; a long-term medical aid program in Algeria began in 1963. By 1978,
Cuba had some 2,300 medical personnel abroad; by 2008, that number had increased to over
37,000. In 1998, Cuba responded with medical brigades in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in
Central America. In 1999, Cuba began training Central Americans in Cuba to become doctors;
this was the origin of the current-day Latin American School of Medicine (or ELAM) that
graduated its first class in 2005 and has graduated thousands of doctors from countries
worldwide, including from the United States. Cuba’s medical support to Haiti began in 1998 and
ramped up significantly in the aftermath of the country’s 2010 earthquake and subsequent cholera
outbreak. Cuban medical teams played an important role in the 2014 worldwide effort to combat
Ebola in West Africa. Cuba’s largest medical support program abroad has been in Venezuela. The
program began under populist President Chávez, who in 2003 established social missions
providing free health and eye care clinics in historical y marginalized areas staffed by thousands
of Cuban medical personnel. In exchange, Venezuela has provided Cuba with extensive financial
support, largely in the form of oil.247
Cuba’s foreign medical mission program is not a solely humanitarian-based grant but a program
in which the Cuban government benefits economical y from countries that that can pay for the
medical services. Cuban government statistics show that in 2018 (latest year available) Cuba
generated $6.4 bil ion for the export of health services, making it the country’s largest earner of
foreign exchange.248 Cuba maintains that the proceeds from the foreign medical missions are used
to fund Cuba’s domestic health care system as wel as the foreign medical missions offered to
many countries for which it receives no payment.249 According to the World Bank, Cuba has 8.4
physicians per 1,000 people (2018, latest available), far higher than most countries worldwide.250
Critics of Cuba’s medical diplomacy program argue that Cuba is exploiting its medical personnel
by forcing their participation in the program, with some critics, including OAS Secretary General
Luis Almagro, dubbing the program a form of modern slavery.251 The Spanish-based human

247 Sources for this paragraph include Julie M. Feinsilver, “Fifty Years of Cuba’s Medical Diplomacy: From Idealism
to Pragmatism,” Cuban Studies, Vol. 41 (2010), pp. 85-104; John M. Kirk, “Cuba’s Medical Internationalism:
Development and Rationale,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2009, pp. 497-511; Sarah A. Blue,
“Cuban Medical Internationalism: Domestic and International Impacts,” Journal of Latin American Geography,
Volume 9, No. 1, 2010, pp. 31-49; Pascal Fletcher, “ Cuban Medics a Big Force on Haiti Cholera Frontline,” Reuters
News, December 10, 2010; and Monica Mark, “Cuba Leads Fights Again st Ebola in Africa as West Frets about Border
Security,” The Guardian, October 11, 2014.
248 ONEI, República de Cuba, Anuario Estadístico de Cuba 2018, Sector Externo, Edición 2019.
249 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “T he U.S. Crusade Against Cuba’s International Medical Cooperation,
Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba,” December 5, 2019.
250 World Bank, Word Development Indicators, at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-
indicators.
251 “’Basta ya!’: medicos denuncian en la OEA ‘trabjo escalvo’ en misiones cubanas,” Infobae, December 18, 2019.
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rights group Cuban Prisoners Defenders al eges, based on information from over 100 Cuban
medical personnel who served abroad, that a majority of participants in the medical missions
were watched over by Cuban security officials while on their mission and asked to report
information about their colleagues. Of these medical personnel, 41% said their passports were
withheld during their time of service, over half said the mission was not voluntary, and 39% said
they felt strongly pressured to serve abroad.252
While Cuban medical personnel
Cuba’ s Medical Mission in Brazil, 2013-2018
serving abroad are compensated
In 2013, Cuba began deploying thousands of doctors to rural areas
significantly more than those
and underserved poor urban areas in Brazil in a program known as
working in Cuba, in most cases they
Mais Médicos, facilitated by the Pan American Health Organization
are paid far less than other medical
(PAHO), with Cuba earning hard currency for supplying the
medical personnel.
personnel in the countries where
Cuban-Brazilian relations have changed considerably under right-
they work. In Qatar, for example,
wing populist Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, inaugurated in
Cuban officials reportedly make just
January 2019. Before his inauguration, Bolsonaro espoused a more
over $1,000 a month, about 10% of
confrontational policy approach toward Cuba; he warned that he
what other foreign medical
may break diplomatic relations with Cuba and abolish the medical
professionals can make while
assistance program. Bolsonaro strongly criticized the medical
program, maintaining that Cuban doctors should be able to receive
working in Qatar.253 Cuban medical
100% of the money Brazil pays Cuba for them (instead of the 25%
personnel also general y receive far
they receive) and should be able to bring their families with them
less in compensation than what host
to Brazil. Cuba responded by ending the program and bringing its
governments pay the Cuban
more than 8,000 medical personnel home by late December 2018.
government. For example, in Brazil,
A provision in P.L. 116-94, Division G, Section 7019(e) (which
before Cuba’s medical personnel left
references S.Rept. 116-126) required the Secretary of State, not
later than 90 days after enactment, to submit a report to the
the country in 2018, they reportedly
appropriate congressional committees on the Pan American
were being paid 25% of what the
Health Organization’s role, if any, in facilitating agreements
Brazilian government paid the
between foreign medical professionals from Cuba and other
Cuban government for each worker
countries.
(see text box).
Sources: “Life in ‘Slavery’ or as a Refugee? Cuban Doctors’
Stark Choice in Brazil,” Reuters News, December 12, 2018;
Engagement between U.S. and
and “Cuba Says Nearly Al Its Doctors Have Returned from
Cuban officials on anti-trafficking
Brazil,” Reuters News, December 21, 2018.
issues had been increasing in recent
years. In January 2017, U.S. officials met with Cuban counterparts in their fourth such exchange
to discuss bilateral efforts to address human trafficking.254 Later that month, the United States and
Cuba signed a broad memorandum of understanding on law enforcement cooperation in which
the two countries stated their intention to collaborate on the prevention, interdiction, monitoring,
and prosecution of transnational or serious crimes, including trafficking in persons.255 In February

T he OAS hosted a conference in December 2019 entitled “ T he Dark Reality Behind the Cuban Medical Missions.”
252 “T he Hidden World of the Doctors Cuba Sends Overseas,” BBC, May 14, 2019. More recently, Cuban Prisoners
Defenders also issued a statement on Cuba’s medical missions. See “Institutional Statement Regarding Slavery in the
Internationalization Missions of Cuba” Cuban Prisoners Defenders, March 12, 2020.
253 Peter Pattisson, “Cuba’s Secret Deal with Qatar to T ake up to 90% of Doctor’s Wages,” The Guardian, November
8, 2019.
254 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba to Hold Meeting to Fight T rafficking in Persons,” media note,
January 11, 2017.
255 U.S. Department of State, “United States and Cuba to Sign Law Enforcement Memorandum of Understanding,”
media note, January 16, 2017.
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2018, the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security hosted meetings in
Washington, DC, with Cuban officials on efforts to combat trafficking in persons.256
In 2019, the Trump Administration pressed a campaign to shed light on al egations of coercive
labor practices in Cuba’s foreign medical missions.257 The State Department cal ed for countries
that host Cuba’s medical missions to ensure that labor rights are protected; it hosted a Foreign
Press Center briefing on the issue in New York in September 2019.258 In addition to downgrading
Cuba to Tier 3 in its June 2019 TIP report, the State Department imposed targeted visa restrictions
against Cuban officials. In July and September 2019, the State Department announced, pursuant
to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, that it had imposed visa
restrictions against certain Cuban officials for al eged “exploitative and coercive labor practices”
associated with Cuba’s overseas medical missions programs.259
Amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Cuba has dispatched over 3,700 medical personnel to
almost 40 countries worldwide, an action that has been criticized by the Trump Administration
and some Members of Congress. In April 2020, Secretary Pompeo asserted that the Cuban
government “has taken advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to continue its exploitation of
Cuban medical workers”; praised Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia for “not turning a blind eye to
these abuses”; and asked al countries to do the same, including South Africa and Qatar.260 In late
April 2020, the State Department issued a fact sheet warning countries that might host Cuban
medical personnel to consider questions about the al eged “abusive conditions” under which the
personnel work.261 Some Members of Congress also criticized Cuba’s foreign medical missions
and cal ed for the State Department to deliver a demarche to governments that have accepted
Cuba’s medical missions in recent months “to inform them about the Cuban regime’s forced labor
practices.”262 For many countries, however, Cuban doctors are viewed as a key resource for their
overwhelmed health care systems, and many have turned to Cuba because of its track record of
providing such humanitarian support.263

256 U.S. Department of State, “Western Hemisphere: United States and Cuba Meet to Combat T rafficking in Persons,”
February 14, 2018.
257 Peter Beaumont and Ed Augustin, “T rump Puts Cuban Doctors in Firing Line as Heat T urned up on Island
Economy,” The Guardian, February 11, 2020.
258 U.S. Department of State, “A Call to Action: First -Hand Accounts of Abuses in Cuba’s Overseas Medical
Missions,” Foreign Press Center Briefing, September, 26, 2019.
259 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “Visa Actions Against Cuban Officials,” press
statement, July 26, 2019, and “Visa Actions Against Cuban Officials Exploiting Cuban Doctors,” press statement,
September 30, 2019. In September 2019, the Cuban government maintained that the Trump Administration denied a
visa to its health minister to attend a Pan-American Health Organization meeting in Washington D.C. See Sarah Marsh,
“U.S. Denies Cuba Health Minister Visa to Attend Health Meeting in Washington,” Reuters News, September 30,
2019.
260 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability,” remarks to the press, April 29,
2020.
261 U.S. Department of State, “The T ruth About Cuba’s Medical Missions,” April 27, 2020, at
https://share.america.gov/the-truth-about-cubas-medical-missions/ .
262 “Menendez, Rubio Raise Concerns about Cuba’s Forced Labor Scheme, Urge Pompeo to Direct U .S. Embassies to
Engage Host Government,” Congressional Documents and Publications, U.S. Government Publishing Office, May 6,
2020.
263 Nora Gámez T orres and Jacqueline Charles, “Despite U.S. Warnings, Cuba’s Medical Diplomacy T riumphs in the
Caribbean During Pandemic,” Miam i Herald, April 15, 2020; Carlos Batista and Moises Avila, “ Pandemic Gives Shot
in the Arm to Cuba’s Medical Missions,” Agence France Presse, April 9, 2020; and Andrea Rodriguez, “Cuban Docs
Fighting Coronavirus Around World, Defying U.S.,” Palm Beach Daily Business Review, April 7, 2020.
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The Cuban government has spoken out against the Trump Administration’s campaign of criticism
of its foreign medical missions, al eging that U.S. influence and actions led to the termination of
missions in Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia. A December 2019 Cuban foreign ministry statement
maintains that the “Cuban technicians and professionals who participate in these programs do so
absolutely of their own free wil .” It notes that during the performance of their foreign missions,
Cuban medical professionals “continue to receive their full salary in Cuba, and also a stipend in
the country of destination, along with other benefits.” The statement maintains that when Cuba
receives compensation from host countries, the funding contributes to the sustainability of Cuba’s
health care system and covers the costs for its foreign medical missions that provide health care
services at no cost to many countries worldwide.264 In late April 2020, Cuban Foreign Minister
Bruno Rodriguez denounced what he characterized as U.S. lies about Cuba’s medical missions,
maintaining that “in the context of COVID-19, they threaten other people’s health instead of
joining cooperative efforts for the good of al .”265
Legislative Initiatives. In the 116th Congress, two bil s and two resolutions have been introduced
related to Cuba’s foreign medical missions. S. 4635 (Menendez) would, among its provisions,
reinstate the CMPP program, which from 2006 to 2017 and al owed Cuban medical professionals
in third countries to be approved for entry into the United States (see “Migration Issues,” above.)
The bil also would require two reports: (1) an annual State Department report identifying
countries that host Cuban government foreign medical missions and determining whether Cuban
personnel are subjected to conditions that qualify as severe forms of trafficking in persons and (2)
a State Department/Health and Human Services Department report reviewing the Pan American
Health Organization’s (PAHO’s) role in Cuba’s involvement in Brazil’s Mais Médicos program,
corrective actions taken by PAHO, and recommendations for further corrective actions. S. 3977
(Scott, Rick) would require the State Department to publish a list of countries that contract with
Cuba’s medical mission program and to consider, when determining a country’s ranking for the
annual TIP report, whether the country participated in programs with foreign governments and
organizations that involve or enable trafficking in persons.
Similar resolutions S.Res. 14 (Menendez) and H.Res. 136 (Sires) would affirm that Cuba’s
medical missions constitute human trafficking. The resolutions also would cal on the State
Department to downgrade Cuba to Tier 3 in its annual TIP report (an action the Administration
took in June 2019), and it would cal for the reestablishment of the CMMP program.
Outlook
When Miguel Díaz-Canel, currently 60 years of age, succeeded Raúl Castro as president in April
2018, a leader from a new generation came to power. However, Raúl Castro, currently 89 years of
age, remained in the political y influential position of first secretary of Cuba’s Communist Party.
Castro is expected to step down from that position at the next party congress, scheduled for April
2021, and Díaz-Canel is expected to become the new head of the party. Cuba’s next national
elections are to take place in 2023, and Díaz-Canel would be eligible for a second five-year
presidential term.
Cuba enacted a new constitution in 2019. This constitution included the addition of an appointed
prime minister to oversee government operations; limits on the president’s tenure (two terms) and

264 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “T he U.S. Crusade Against Cuba’s International Medical Cooperation,
Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba,” December 5, 2019.
265 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, “Cuban FM Denounces the United States’ Lies About Medical Missions,”
April 29, 2020.
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age (no older than 60 years of age, beginning first term); and market-oriented economic reforms,
including the right to private property and the promotion of foreign investment. The new
constitution, however, also ensured the state’s dominance over the economy and the Communist
Party’s predominant role. The constitution refers to numerous complementary laws that wil have
to be enacted, such as a new electoral law, criminal code, family code, and business law, which
could establish a role for smal and medium-sized businesses; to date, implementation of these
reforms has been slow.
The Cuban economy is being been hard-hit by the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
reduced support from Venezuela, and increased U.S. economic sanctions. An economic
contraction of more than 8% is forecast for 2020, with gradual recovery in subsequent years
depending on such factors as the pace of a post-COVID global economic recovery, the direction
of U.S. sanctions policy under the next U.S. Administration, and Cuba’s economic reform efforts.
For many years, the Cuban government has been extremely cautious in implementing reforms
that could jeopardize the power of the state and the party. The recently announced currency
unification to begin on January 1, 2021, is a major reform that many economists have been
advocating for years to lay the foundation for increased productivity and development. The move,
however, likely wil bring increased economic stress to Cubans in the short term (in the forms of
inflation, bankruptcy of inefficient state enterprises, and potential threats to the social safety net),
at a time when the country is facing a very difficult economic situation.
Cuba’s recent strong crackdown on the San Isidro Movement that opposes government
restrictions on artistic expression spurred hundreds of Cubans to engage in a peaceful protest and
demonstrated the power of access to the internet and social media that has been growing in Cuba
in recent years. The crackdown also focused world attention on Cuba’s continued poor human
rights record and its efforts to suppress freedom of expression.
Since 2019, the Trump Administration’s ramped-up sanctions on Cuba—aimed at punishing Cuba
for its human rights record and deterring Cuba’s support for Venezuela—have heightened
tensions in bilateral relations, stymied U.S. business engagement in Cuba, and negatively affected
Cuba’s nascent private sector. The downsizing of the staff at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, done
in response to the unexplained injuries to U.S. diplomatic personnel in Cuba, resulted in the
suspension of most visa processing at the embassy and reduced other embassy operations.
As in past Congresses, there have been diverse opinions in the 116th Congress regarding the
appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba, with some Members supporting the
Administration’s actions and others preferring a policy of engagement. With the exception of
congressional opposition to funding cuts for Cuba democracy programs in annual appropriations
measures, no congressional action has been taken opposing the Administration’s imposition of
various sanctions on Cuba.
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Appendix A. Legislative Initiatives in the 116th
Congress
Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions
P.L. 116-6 (H.J.Res. 31). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019. Introduced January 22, 2019.
House passed (231-180) January 24; Senate passed, amended, by voice vote January 25.
Conference report (H.Rept. 116-9 ) filed February 13, 2019. House approved conference (300-
128) February 14; Senate approved conference (83-16) February 14. Signed into law February 15,
2019. The conference report provided $20 mil ion in Cuba democracy assistance ($10 mil ion
more than requested) and $29.1 mil ion for Cuba broadcasting ($15.4 mil ion more than
requested). In Division F, the measure continues two longstanding Cuba provisions: Section 7007
prohibits direct funding for the government of Cuba, including direct loans, credits, insurance,
and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents; Section 7015(f) prohibits the obligation
or expending of assistance for Cuba except through the regular notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations.
P.L. 116-92 (S. 1790). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Introduced June
11, 2019. Conference report, H.Rept. 116-333, approved by the House and Senate in December
2019. Signed into law December 20, 2019. Section 1045 extends the prohibition on the use of
funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
P.L. 116-93 (H.R. 1158). Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020. Original y introduced as the
DHS Cyber Incident Response Act of 2019, this bil became the vehicle for the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2020, which the House and Senate approved in December 2020. Signed into
law December 20, 2019. In Division A (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020),
Section 8122 provides that none of the funds made available by the act may be used to carry out
the closure or realignment of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
P.L. 116-94 (H.R. 1865). Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020. Original y introduced
as the National Law Enforcement Museum Commemorative Coin Act in March 2019, this bil
also became the vehicle for the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, in December
2019. House passed October 28, 2019; Senate passed, amended, November 12, 2019; House
agreed (297-120) to the Senate amendment December 17, 2019, with an additional amendment
incorporating language from seven appropriations bil s; Senate agreed (71-23) to the House
amendment December 19, 2019. Signed into law December 20, 2019.
Division F (Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2020), Section 127, provides that none of the funds made available by the act may be used to
carry out the closure or realignment of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
In Division G (Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2020), the measure continues two long-standing provisions: Section 7007 prohibits direct
funding for the government of Cuba, including direct loans, credits, insurance, and guarantees of
the Export-Import Bank or its agents; Section 7015(f) prohibits the obligation or expending of
assistance for Cuba except through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations. The joint explanatory statement to the measure provides $20 mil ion for Cuba
democracy programs and $20.973 mil ion for Cuba broadcasting for FY2020.
In Division J, Title I (Venezuela), Section 164, the measure requires, not later than 90 days after
enactment, a classified briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on activities of
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certain foreign governments and actors in Venezuela, including the full extent of cooperation by
Cuba (as wel as Russia, China, and Iran) with the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
Division J, Title IX (Other Matters), Section 901, includes benefits for Department of State
personnel and dependents injured while stationed in Cuba.
The measure, in Section 7019(e), also includes by reference several directives and reporting
requirements set forth in H.Rept. 116-78 to H.R. 2839, the House Appropriations Committee’s
version of the FY2020 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations (SFOPS) bil , and in S.Rept. 116-126 to S. 2583, the Senate Appropriations
Committee’s version of the SFOPS bil .
 H.Rept. 116-78 directs the State Department, not later than 90 days after
enactment, to submit a clear and concise strategy for providing certainty for U.S.
businesses operating in Cuba, consistent with the objective of avoiding negative
impacts on U.S. businesses. The strategy should include (1) how the State
Department intends to ensure that U.S.-Cuban engagement advances the interest
of the United States and the Cuban people, including encouraging the growth of a
Cuban private sector independent of government control; (2) the impact of the
U.S. Embassy Havana staff reduction on embassy operations, including visa
processing; and (3) a timeline for the safe return of staff at the U.S. Embassy in
Havana to previous levels.
 S.Rept. 116-126 requires a report, not later than 90 days after enactment, from
the Secretary of State to the appropriate congressional committees that assesses
the physical condition of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba, and details plans,
including cost estimates, to address any maintenance or security needs.
 S.Rept. 116-126 requires a report from the chief executive officer (CEO) of the
U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), not later than 90 days after enactment,
to the appropriate congressional committees on the feasibility and cost of
delivering satel ite-based broadband internet services to the Cuban people and on
the establishment of a Martí website to serve as an access point and news
aggregator service. The report is also to review the potential for, and cost
effectiveness of, increasing access to firewal circumvention tools and providing
space-based communications technologies that are resistant to jamming.
 S.Rept. 116-126 requires the USAGM CEO, in consultation with the Office of
Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) Director to (1) provide quarterly updates to the
appropriate congressional committees on implementation of OCB reforms to
broadcasting standards and (2) brief such committees on reform efforts. The
report also requires, prior to the obligation of funds appropriated for OCB, the
OCB Director and the USAGM CEO to certify and report in writing to the
appropriate congressional committees that USAGM and OCB are implementing
reforms necessary to ensure that OCB is adhering to the journalistic values of
accuracy, fairness, and balance.
 S.Rept. 116-126 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 90 days after
enactment, to submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the
Pan American Health Organization’s (PAHO’s) role, if any, in facilitating
agreements between foreign medical professionals from Cuba and other
countries. The report is to include (1) a description of the contracts signed by the
parties to such foreign medical professional missions; (2) proceeds rec eived by
PAHO, if any; (3) a description of the medial activities and health services
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provided during missions; and (4) and other relevant records related to such
agreements.
 S.Rept. 116-126 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 90 days after
enactment, to report to the committee on the impact that the closure of consular
services in Havana, Cuba, has had on Cubans’ ability to obtain nonimmigrant
visas to the United States, including the number of Cubans granted such visas in
2019 compared with the number in 2017.
 S.Rept. 116-126 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 90 days after
enactment, to update the report on Cuba required in S.Rept. 115-282 related to
internet access.
 S.Rept. 116-126 requires the Secretary of State, not later than 90 days after
enactment, to submit a report to the committee, in classified form if necessary,
detailing any evidence of those responsible for, and the cause or causes of, the
health il nesses suffered by U.S. government personnel in Cuba.
S.Res. 454 (Menendez). Resolution cal s for the immediate release of Cuban democracy activist
José Daniel Ferrer, commends his efforts to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Cuba, and cal s for the immediate and unconditional release of al members of the Patriotic Union
of Cuba (UNPACU) who have been arbitrarily imprisoned. S.Res. 454 introduced December 12,
2019; Senate approved, amended, June 11, 2020. A similar resolution, H.Res. 774 (Diaz-Balart),
introduced in the House December 19, 2019, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Bills
H.R. 213 (Serrano). Basebal Diplomacy Act. The bil would waive certain prohibitions with
respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professional basebal .
Introduced January 3, 2019; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1683 (Wasserman Schultz)/S. 756 (Menendez). No Stolen Trademarks Honored in
America Act. Identical bil s would modify a 1998 prohibition (Section 211 of Division A, Tile II,
P.L. 105-277) on recognition by U.S. courts of certain rights to certain marks, trade names, or
commercial names. The bil would apply a fix so the sanction would apply to al nationals and
would bring the sanction into compliance with a 2002 World Trade Organization dispute
settlement ruling. H.R. 1683 introduced March 12, 2019; referred to Committee on the Judiciary.
S. 756 introduced March 12, 2019; referred to Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1898 (Crawford). Cuba Agricultural Exports Act. The bil would modify the prohibition on
U.S. assistance and financing for certain exports to Cuba under the Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L. 106-387, Title IX) and would permit persons
subject to U.S. jurisdiction to make an investment with respect to the development of an
agricultural business in Cuba under certain conditions. Introduced March 27, 2019; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services and
Agriculture.
H.R. 2404 (Rush). United States-Cuba Relations Normalization Act. The bil would remove
provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba; authorize common carriers to
instal and repair telecommunications equipment and facilities in Cuba and otherwise provide
telecommunications services between the United States and Cuba; prohibit restrictions on travel
to and from Cuba and on transactions incident to such travel; cal on the President to conduct
negotiations with Cuba for the purpose of settling claims of U.S. nationals for the taking of
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property by the Cuban government and engage in bilateral dialogue with the Cuban government
to secure the protection of international y recognized human rights; extend nondiscriminatory
trade treatment to the products of Cuba; and prohibit limits on remittances to Cuba. Introduced
May 20, 2019; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in addition to the Committees on
Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Agriculture, and Financial Services.
H.R. 2839 (Lowey)/H.R. 2740 (DeLauro) and S. 2583 (Graham). Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Appropriations Act, 2020. H.R. 2839 introduced and
reported by the House Appropriations Committee May 20, 2019, H.Rept. 116-78. House passed a
“minibus” measure, H.R. 2740, on June 19, 2019, which included FY2020 SFOPS legislation in
Division D and referred to H.Rept. 116-78. S. 2583 introduced and reported by Senate
Appropriations Committee on September 26, 2019, S.Rept. 116-126.
H.R. 2839/H.R. 2740 would have provided $12.973 mil ion for Cuba broadcasting, the same as
the Administration’s request, while S. 2583 would have provided $20.973 mil ion. H.R.
2839/H.R. 2740 and S. 2583 would have provided $20 Cuba democracy programs ($14 mil ion
more than the Administration’s request). Both H.Rept. 116-78 and S.Rept. 116-126 also contained
several directives and reporting requirements regarding Cuba. For final action, see Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94) above.
H.R. 3960 (McGovern)/S. 2303 (Leahy). Freedom for Americans to Travel to Cuba Act of 2019.
Identical bil s would prohibit most restrictions on travel to or from Cuba by U.S. citizens and
legal residents or any transactions incident to such travel. H.R. 3960 introduced July 25, 2019;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. S. 2303 introduced July 29, 2019; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.R. 4884 (Mucarsel-Powell). Cuban Family Reunification Act. The bil would direct the
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to reinstate the
Cuban Family Reunification Program, and to the extent practicable, make available to applicants
under the program video teleconference capabilities. The bil would also require the Secretary of
State to assign appropriate temporary duty personnel to the U.S. Embassy in Havana to support
the reinstatement of the parole program. Introduced October 28, 2019; referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary.
H.R. 6395 (Smith, Adam)/S. 4049 (Inhofe). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021. H.R. 6395 introduced March 26, 2020; House passed (295-125) July 21, 2020. S. 4049
introduced June 23, 2020; Senate passed (86-14) July 23, 2020. On November 16, 2020, the
Senate approved H.R. 6395, amended, by voice vote, substituting the language of S. 4049.
Conference report, H.Rept. 116-617, to H.R. 6395 filed December 3. House agreed (335-78) to
the conference report December 8. Senate agreed (84-13) to the conference on December 11,
2020.
The conference report included several Cuba-related provisions:
 Section 1044 would extend a prohibition on the use of funds to close or
relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 Section 1110 would extend workers’ compensation payments for federal
government personnel under chief of mission authority in Cuba (and China)
working for other federal agencies beyond the Department of State.
 Section 1299Q, would, among its provisions, express the sense of Congress that
the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) should remain an independent entity of
the U.S. Agency for Global Media and continue taking steps to ensure OCB is
fulfil ing its core mission of promoting freedom and democracy by providing the
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people of Cuba with objective news and information programming. The section
also would require annual content reviews of OCB and would provide that the
head of OCB may be appointed or removed only if such action has been
approved by a majority of the Advisory Board.
H.R. 7608 (Lowey)/ Senate draft bill (Graham). State, Foreign Operations, Agriculture, Rural
Development, Interior, Environment, Military Construction, and Veterans Affairs Appropriations
Act, 2021. Original y introduced and reported by the Appropriations Committee on July 13, 2020
(H.Rept. 116-444), as the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2021, the SFOPS bil subsequently became the vehicle for three other
appropriations measures. House passed (224-189) July 24, 2020. As approved, in Division A,
Section 7007 would continue a provision prohibiting direct funding for the government of Cuba
and Section 7015(f) would continue a provision prohibiting the obligation of funding for Cuba
except through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
The report to the House bil would provide $20 mil ion for democracy programs and $12.973
mil ion for Cuba broadcasting. The report also would direct the Secretary of State to update a
required report from H.Rept. 116-78 on implementing a comprehensive strategy on Cuba,
including how the strategy avoids negative impacts on American businesses and supports the
growth of a Cuban private sector independent of government control; in addition, the report is to
update progress toward returning staffing levels at the U.S. Embassy in Havana to previous levels
and the impact of the reduction on embassy operations, including visa processing.
The Senate Appropriations Committee released its draft FY2021 bil on November 10, 2020.
Similar to the House bil , the Senate bil would, in Section 7007, continue a provision prohibiting
direct funding for the government of Cuba and, in Section 7015(f), continue a provision
prohibiting the obligation of funding for Cuba except through the regular notification procedures
of the Committees on Appropriations. The Senate bil also would appropriate $12.973 for Cuba
broadcasting, and the draft explanatory statement accompanying the bil would recommend $20
mil ion for Cuba democracy programs.
The draft explanatory statement to the Senate bil also would support the reform of broadcasting
standards at the Office of Cuba Broadcasting begun in 2019 and require the USAGM CEO, in
consultation with the OCB Director, to provide quarterly updates to the appropriate congressional
committees about the implementation of OCB reforms, brief such committees on the reforms, and
submit a cost-benefit analysis of relocating al or part of OCB operations to USAGM
headquarters in Washington, DC. The explanatory statement would require the State Department
to update several reports required in S.Rept. 116-126 for FY2020 (see P.L. 116-94 above)
regarding the physical condition of the U.S. Embassy in Havana; Cuban foreign medical
missions; consular services; internet access;, and any evidence of those responsible for, and the
causes of, the health il nesses suffered by U.S. government personnel in Cuba.
S. 428 (Klobuchar). Freedom to Export to Cuba Act of 2019. The bil would repeal or amend
many provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba, including certain
restrictions in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA; P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), and TSRA.
Introduced February 7, 2019; referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
S. 1447 (Bennet). Agricultural Export Expansion Act of 2019. The bil would amend TSRA to
al ow private financing by U.S. persons of sales of agricultural commodities to Cuba. Introduced
May 14, 2019; referred to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
S. 3977 (Scott, Rick). Cut Profits to the Cuban Regime Act of 2020. Introduced June 17, 2020;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The bil would require the State Department to
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publish a list of countries that contract with Cuba’s medical mission program and to consider,
when determining a country’s ranking for the annual Trafficking in Persons Report, whether the
country participated in programs with foreign governments and organizations that involve or
enable trafficking in persons.
S. 4635 (Menendez). Combating Trafficking of Cuban Doctors Act of 2020. Introduced
September 21, 2020; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The bil would require
 the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress identifying
countries hosting Cuban medical personnel who are participating in Cuban
government foreign medical missions and determining whether such personnel in
each country are subjected to conditions that qualify as severe forms of
trafficking in persons;
 the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State,
to reinstate the Cuban Medical Professional Parole (CMMP) program;
 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to submit
a report to Congress that includes a review and findings of the role of the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO) in Brazil’s Mais Médicos program
between 2013 and 2019, corrective actions taken by PAHO, and
recommendations for further corrective actions; and
 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Health and Human Services to take al
necessary steps to ensure PAHO undertakes governance reforms that strengthen
internal oversight and risk management for future programs.
S. 4973 (Collins). The bil would authorize the provision of compensation to personnel of the
Central Intel igence Agency and the Department of State who incur disabilities resulting from
certain injuries to the brain. Introduced December 8, 2020; referred to Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.
Resolutions
S.Res. 14 (Menendez)/H.Res. 136 (Sires). Similar resolutions would affirm that Cuba’s medical
missions constitute human trafficking. The resolutions express the sense of each respective body
that the State Department should downgrade Cuba to Tier 3 in its annual Trafficking in Persons
Report and should reestablish the Cuban Medical Professional Parole program. S.Res. 14
introduced January 10, 2019; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. H.Res. 136
introduced February 14; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H.Res. 92 (King, Peter)/ S.Res. 232 (Menendez). Similar but not identical resolutions would
cal for the immediate extradition or rending to the United States of al fugitives from justice who
are receiving safe harbor in Cuba, urge the international community to continue to press for the
immediate extradition or rendering of al fugitives from justice that are receiving safe harbor in
Cuba, and cal on the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to continue to press for the
immediate extradition or rendering of al fugitives from U.S. justice so they may be tried and, if
convicted, serve out their sentences. H.Res. 92 introduced January 30, 2019; referred to House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. S.Res. 232 introduced June 5, 2019; referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.
H.Res. 971 (Diaz-Balart)/S.Res. 637 (Rubio). Similar but not identical resolutions would
commemorate the 35th anniversary of U.S. broadcasting to Cuba. H.Res. 971 introduced May 15,
2020; referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. S.Res. 637 introduced June 23, 2020;
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
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H.Res. 1172 (Mucarsel-Powell). Resolution would cal for the release of Cuban political
prisoner Silverio Portal Contreras and the provision of urgently needed medical attention;
condemn the political y motivated imprisonment of dissidents in Cuba and cal for the release of
al those who have been arbitrarily detained due to their advocacy for human rights and
democracy; and urge the lifting of al legal restrictions that impose limitations on the exercise of
freedom of expression and association in Cuba. Introduced October 1, 2020; referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Note: Silverio Portal Contreras was released from prison on
December 1, 2020.)
S.Res. 215 (Braun). Resolution would cal for greater religious and political freedom in Cuba
and for other purposes, including for the continued implementation of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. Introduced May 21, 2019; referred to Committee on Foreign
Relations.
S.Res. 531 (Rubio). Resolution would honor Las Damas de Blanco for their work in support of
freedom and human rights in Cuba and would cal for the release of al political prisoners in
Cuba. Introduced March 5, 2020; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

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Appendix B. Links to U.S. Government Reports
U.S. Relations with Cuba, Fact Sheet, Department of State
Date: November 22, 2019
Link: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2020, Appendix 2, Department
of State
Date: May 22, 2019
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/State-and-USAID-Appendix-2.pdf
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2021, Appendix 2
Date: August 2020
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FY21-CBJ-Appendix-2-FINAL-2.pdf
Congressional Budget Justification FY2021, U.S. Agency for Global Media, United States
Broadcasting Board of Governors
Date: February 10, 2020
Link: https://www.usagm.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FINAL-USAGM-FY-2021-
Congressional-Budget-Justification_2_9_2020.pdf
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019, Cuba, Department of State
Date: March 11, 2020
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CUBA-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-
REPORT.pdf
Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, Cuba, Department of State

Date: June 24, 2020
Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/cuba/
Cuba web page, Department of State
Link: https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/cuba/
Cuba web page, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security
Link: https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-
destinations/cuba
Cuba web page, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service
Link: https://www.fas.usda.gov/regions/cuba
Cuba Sanctions web page, Department of State
Link: https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/
Cuba Sanctions web page, Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control
Link: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-
country-information/cuba-sanctions
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International Religious Freedom Report for 2019, Cuba, Department of State
Date: June 10, 2010
Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/cuba/
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2020, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control,
p. 129, Department of State
Date: March 2, 2020
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Tab-1-INCSR-Vol.-I-Final-for-Printing-
2-25-20-508.pdf
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2020, Volume II, Money Laundering, pp. 86-
88, Department of State
Date: March 2, 2020
Link: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Tab-2-INCSR-Vol-2-508.pdf
Overview of Cuban Imports of Goods and Services and Effects of U.S. Restrictions, U.S.
International Trade Commission, Publication 4597
Date: March 2016
Link: https://www.usitc.gov/sites/default/files/publications/332/pub4597_0.pdf
Trafficking in Persons Report 2019, Cuba, Department of State
Date: June 24, 2019
Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-trafficking-in-persons-report-2/cuba/
Trafficking in Persons Report 2020, Cuba, Department of State
Date: June 25 2020
Link: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/cuba/

Author Information

Mark P. Sullivan

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

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