Energy and Water Development
December 8, 2020
Appropriations for Defense Nuclear
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Nonproliferation: In Brief
Specialist in
Nonproliferation
The Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) nonproliferation and national security programs

provide technical capabilities to support U.S. efforts to “prevent, counter, respond” to
the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide, including by both states and non-state

actors. These programs are administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semi-
autonomous agency established within DOE in 2000. NNSA is responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile, providing nuclear fuel to the Navy, nuclear and radiological emergency response, and nuclear
nonproliferation activities. NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is funded under the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) account.
This report addresses the programs in the DNN account, appropriated by the Energy and Water appropriations bill.
The FY2021 request for DNN appropriations was $2.031 billion. The proposal included unobligated prior year
balances. The reduction continues an earlier trend to reduce prior-year carryover balances. According to the
budget justification, the decrease of 6.2% from the FY2020-enacted level is due to “completion of funding for
contractual termination” of the mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) project at the Savannah River Site.
The FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) funded the NNSA DNN accounts at $2.164
billion. The FY2021 Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-159) continued funding at this level through
December 11. As in past years, the FY2020 appropriations included a provision prohibiting funds in the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation account for certain activities and assistance in the Russian Federation. Appropriations
bills have prohibited this since FY2015.
The FY2021 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill was been included as Division C in a seven-bill
“minibus” (H.R. 7617) that passed the House on July 31. The House bill approved DNN appropriations at $2.24
billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee majority draft bill for FY2021 energy and water development
appropriations includes $2.095 billion for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, $30 million designated for the
Uranium Reserve Program.

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Contents
Budget Structure ............................................................................................................................. 1
FY2021 Request .............................................................................................................................. 2
U.S. Plutonium Disposition ....................................................................................................... 3
FY2021 Appropriations ................................................................................................................... 3
House ........................................................................................................................................ 3
Senate ........................................................................................................................................ 4

Tables
Table 1. DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Appropriation, FY2018-FY2021 ....................... 2

Contacts
Author Information .......................................................................................................................... 4

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Energy & Water Development Appropriations for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Budget Structure
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs were reorganized starting with the
FY2016 request. There are two main mission areas under the DNN appropriation: the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response
Program (NCTIR). NCTIR was previously funded under Weapons Activities. According to the
FY2016 budget justification, “These transfers align all NNSA funding to prevent, counter, and
respond to nuclear proliferation and terrorism in one appropriation.”
The DNN Program is now divided into six functional areas:
Materials Management and Minimization (M3) conducts activities to reduce
and, where possible, eliminate stockpiles of weapons-useable material around the
world. Major activities include conversion of reactors that use highly enriched
uranium (useable for weapons) to low enriched uranium, removal and
consolidation of nuclear material stockpiles, and disposition of excess nuclear
materials.
Global Material Security has three major program elements: international
nuclear security, radiological security, and nuclear smuggling detection and
deterrence. Activities toward achieving those goals include the provision of
equipment and training, workshops and exercises, and collaboration with
international organizations.
Nonproliferation and Arms Control implements programs that aim to
strengthen international nuclear safeguards, control the spread of dual-use
technologies and expertise, and verify nuclear reductions and compliance with
treaties and agreements. This program conducts reviews of nuclear export
applications and technology transfer authorizations.
National Technical Nuclear Forensics Research and Development (NTNF
R&D) examines and evaluates nuclear materials and devices, nuclear test
explosions or radiological dispersals, and post-detonation debris through nuclear
forensics development at the national laboratories. The program includes a field
capability to assist the interagency response in the event of a nuclear or
radiological incident.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D)
advances U.S. capabilities to detect and characterize global nuclear security
threats such as foreign nuclear material and weapons production, diversion of
special nuclear material, and nuclear detonations.
 The Nonproliferation Construction program consists of the Surplus Plutonium
Disposition Project (SPD) and the Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility
(MFFF), which was to be built in South Carolina to convert surplus weapons
plutonium into nuclear reactor fuel. This project was terminated and replaced
with a different disposal method (see below).
The Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program (NCTIR) evaluates nuclear and
radiological threats and develops emergency preparedness plans, including organizing scientific
teams to provide rapid response to nuclear or radiological incidents or accidents worldwide.
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Table 1. DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Appropriation, FY2018-FY2021
($ thousands)
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2021

Enacted
Enacted
Enacted
Request
House
Material Management and
308,594
293,794
363,533
400,711
400,711
Minimization
Global Material Security
390,108
407,108
442,909
400,480
508,939
Nonproliferation and Arms
134,703
129,703
140,000
138,708
148,000
Control
National Technical Nuclear
0
0
0
40,000
40,000
Forensics R&D
Defense Nuclear
556,504
575,570
533,163
531,651
601,900
Nonproliferation R&D
Nonproliferation
335,000
220,000
299,000
148,589
148,589
Construction
Nuclear Counterterrorism
282,360
319,185
372,095
377,513
377,513
Legacy Contractor Pensions
40,950
28,640
13,700
14,348
14,348
Subtotal
2,048,219
1,949,000
2,164,400
2,031,000
2,240,000
Use of Prior Year Balances
0
-25,000
0
-21,000
0
Rescission of Prior Year
-49,000
-19,000
0
0
0
Balances
Total
1,999,219
1,930,000
2,164,400
2,031,000
2,240,000
Source: Department of Energy Congressional Budget Requests, Volume 1; H.Rept. 116-449.
FY2021 Request
The FY2021 request for DNN appropriations totaled $2.031 billion, reflecting a 6.2% decrease
from FY2020-enacted levels. The budget justification says that this decrease is mainly due to the
“completion of funding for contractual termination” of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility
(MOX) project at the Savannah River Site. Funding for that program would decrease by 50%
(-$150 million).
A $42 million, or 9.65%, decrease to the Global Material Security program was due to an increase
in FY2020 funds for the Cesium Irradiator Replacement Program.
The budget proposal requests a $37.2 million, or 10%, increase in funding for the Material
Management Minimization program. The increase is mainly in the conversion subprogram, which
is working to establish molybdenum-99 production technologies in the United States that do not
use high enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used for nuclear weapons.
The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Research and Development (NTNF R&D) is a new
program in FY2021. The budget request says that the program would allow NNSA to “take on a
more active leadership role” in nuclear forensics. The $40 million in funding for NTNF was
moved from the DNN R&D Nuclear Detonation Detection subprogram.
As in past years, the FY2020 appropriations included a provision prohibiting funds in the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation account from being used for certain activities and assistance in the
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Russian Federation. Appropriations bills have prohibited this since FY2015, although a waiver is
possible.1
U.S. Plutonium Disposition
The FY2021 budget justification requests funds related to the U.S. plutonium disposition program
in the M3 Material Disposition subprogram and Nonproliferation Construction Surplus Plutonium
Disposition subprogram. The United States pledged to dispose of 34 metric tons of U.S. surplus
weapons plutonium, which was originally to be converted into fuel for commercial power
reactors.2 The U.S. facility for this purpose was to be the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility
(MFFF), which had been under construction at the DOE Savannah River site in South Carolina.
The MFFF faced sharply escalating construction and operation cost estimates, and the Obama
Administration proposed to terminate it in FY2017. After congressional approval, in 2018 DOE
ended MFFF construction and began pursuing a replacement disposal method, Dilute and Dispose
(D&D), for this material.
The D&D method consists of “blending plutonium with an inert mixture, packaging it for safe
storage and transport, and disposing of it in a geologic repository,” according to the FY2021
request. The Nonproliferation Construction account’s proposed decrease of $150 million in
FY2021 is due to the final steps in ending construction of the MFFF. In her testimony before the
House Appropriations Committee, NNSA Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty said that decrease
reflects the completion of the MOX contractual termination settlement. She said that the
requested $148.6 million would be used for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project, in
support of the D&D method. FY2021 activities would include “execution of early site preparation
and long lead procurements activities, as well as continuing the maturation of the design for all
major systems supporting the plutonium processing gloveboxes.”
FY2021 Appropriations
House
The House passed the FY2021 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill July 31, 2020,
as part of the second FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 7617). The House-passed
measure includes DNN appropriations of $2.24 billion, the same as recommended by the House
Appropriations Committee and an increase of $209 million (10%) over the Administration
request. The Senate has not acted on the bill.
The House Appropriations Committee report on the FY2021 Energy and Water Development
funding bill (H.Rept. 116-449) says that it does not provide any funds for transfer of plutonium
from South Carolina to Nevada and recommends “efforts to engage the interagency and
international partners as appropriate on mutually beneficial plutonium disposition protocols.”

1 See the 2017 version of this report for more detailed background information.
2 Disposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and
the Russian Federation. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form
that could not be returned to nuclear weapons, to begin in 2018. Russia suspended its participation in the agreement in
October 2016 due to what it called “hostile actions” by the United States. Both countries appear to be continuing their
plans for surplus plutonium disposition. See CRS Report R43125, Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium
Disposition: Management and Policy Issues
, by Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
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The committee report also recommends
 not less than $5 million for “research and engagement on applications of nuclear
security, safeguards and export controls for advanced nuclear reactor designs”;
 $21.5 million for the Green Border Security Initiative within NSDD and
“recognizes the importance of improving the security of border crossings to
prevent nuclear smuggling and accelerating partnerships, particularly within
Eastern Europe”;
 $25 million within the Domestic Radiological Security account for the Cesium
Irradiator Replacement Program and up to $10 million to address a 2019
container breach in Seattle, WA, and notes “the importance of accelerating the
removal of cesium devices to permanently reduce the risk of terrorist use of a
radiological dispersal device in the U.S.”; and
 $60 million within Material Management and Minimization for “a new
competitively awarded funding opportunity to expedite the establishment of a
stable domestic source of Mo-99” and requests a report to the committee
detailing costs and plans to establish a domestic capability to produce Mo-99
without the use of HEU.
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee majority draft bill for FY2021 energy and water
development appropriations allocates $2.095 billion for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, to
include $30 million for the uranium reserve program.3




Author Information

Mary Beth D. Nikitin

Specialist in Nonproliferation


3 See CRS In Focus IF11505, Uranium Reserve Program Proposal: Policy Implications, by Lance N. Larson.
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