Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones
December 7, 2020
The 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) temporarily authorized Opportunity Zone (OZ) tax
incentives, which are intended to encourage private investment in economically distressed
Sean Lowry
communities. OZ tax incentives are allowed for investments held by Qualified Opportunity
Analyst in Public Finance
Funds (QOFs) in qualified OZs. In 2018, the Community Development Financial Institutions

(CDFI) Fund in the Treasury Department designated qualified census tracts that are eligible for
OZ tax incentives after receiving recommendations from head executives (e.g., govern ors) at the
Donald J. Marples
state level. Qualified OZ designations for census tracts are in effect through the end of 2026.
Specialist in Public Finance

OZ tax incentives include (1) a temporary tax deferral for capital gains reinvested in a QOF, (2) a

step-up in basis for any investment in a QOF held for at least five years (10% basis increase) or
seven years (15% basis increase), and (3) a permanent exclusion of capital gains from the sale or exchange of an investment
in a QOF held for at least 10 years.
This report discusses (1) which census tracts have been designated as an OZ, (2) what types of entities are eligible as QOFs,
(3) the tax benefits of investments in QOFs, (4) a summary of IRS/Treasury regulations implementing OZs, (5) what
economic effects can be expected from OZ tax incentives, and (6) what policy issues Congress has raised with respect to
OZs.
This report also discusses several issues for Congress regarding the implementation of OZ tax incentives. First, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has determined that the list of census tracts designated as qualified OZs cannot be altered absent
enactment of new legislation. Second, given that Treasury and IRS have promulgated final regulations regarding tax-related
issues pertaining to OZ transactions, state and local governments are likely to play a larger role in the types of projects that
will be funded in OZs. Some states have enacted their own OZ tax incentives to further encourage investment in their
jurisdictions. Additionally, local government entities will be in charge of approving and permitting individual projects within
an OZ. Third, although state and local governments will likely now have a more direct role in individual OZ transactions, the
federal government may still be involved. For example, President Trump issued an execut ive order requiring executive
agencies to determine how they can prioritize or focus federal programs in economically distressed communities, including
OZs. Agencies were charged with reducing regulatory and administrative costs that could discourage public and private
investment in such areas. Fourth, Congress could consider extending deadlines for specific OZ tax benefits. Under current
law, an investor would have needed to roll over a capital gain by the end of 2019 in order to get seven years credit for holding
their investment in a QOF, for the purposes of the 15% basis adjustment. While an investor can still get a 10% basis
adjustment under current law, Congress could amend the law to provide for a larger incentive for post-2019 investment.
OZs have also been subject to a number of congressional oversight concerns. Based on the requests of individual Members of
Congress, the Treasury Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have conducted or are currently
conducting investigations regarding the qualified OZ designation process and potential effectiveness of OZs to spur
investment in low-income areas, respectively. Additionally, there has been a broader concern, from both Members of
Congress and commentators, on the lack of information and transparency regarding QOFs, their investments, and their
investors required under current law. More QOF disclosure on tax forms could aid the IRS in administering OZ tax incentives
as well as providing data that could be used to evaluate these p rovisions. Although current law would likely limit the IRS’s
ability to disclose detailed taxpayer-provided data to the public without taxpayer consent, it could release aggregated data,
such as amounts of OZ investments organized at state or local levels or the tax benefits claimed by income level. This
information could provide the public with a better idea of how the direct benefits of OZ tax incentives are distributed.
However, additional disclosure could increase compliance costs and could dissuade some investors from investing in OZs.
Congressional Research Service

Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones

he 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) temporarily authorized Opportunity Zone (OZ) tax
incentives, which are intended to encourage private investment in economical y distressed
T communities.1 In 2018, the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund
in the Treasury Department designated qualified census tracts that are eligible for OZ tax
incentives after receiving recommendations from a state’s chief executive officer (CEO),
general y the governor. Qualified OZ designations are in effect through the end of 2026.
Investments eligible for OZ tax incentives must be channeled through a qualified opportunity
fund (QOF). The tax benefits for these QOF investments include (1) a temporary tax deferral for
capital gains reinvested in a QOF, (2) a step-up in basis for any investment in a QOF held for at
least five years (10% basis increase) or seven years (15% basis increase), and (3) a permanent
exclusion of capital gains from the sale or exchange of an investment in a QOF held for at least
10 years. These incentives effectively increase the after-tax rate of return of QOF investments to
their investors.
This report describes what census tracts have been designated as an OZ, what types of entities are
eligible as QOFs, the tax benefits of investments in QOFs, what economic effects can be expected
from OZ tax incentives, and several issues for Congress regarding the implementation and
oversight of OZ tax incentives.
For further reading on the CDFI Fund’s other programs and analysis of related policy issues, see
CRS Report R42770, Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund: Programs
and Policy Issues, by Sean Lowry. (Throughout this report, the CDFI Fund is referred to simply
as “the Fund”.) For updated guidance regarding OZ tax incentives, including any Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) notices and proposed regulations, see websites created by the Fund and
IRS.2
Opportunity Zone Designations
Opportunity zones were nominated by states’ CEOs (e.g., governors) in early 2018. Specifical y,
states’ CEOs nominated, in writing, a limited number of census tracts to the Secretary of the
Treasury to be designated eligible for OZ tax incentives.3 These nominations were due by March
21, 2018.4 A nominated tract must have been either (1) a qualified low-income community (LIC),
using the same criteria as eligibility under the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC),5 or (2) a census
tract that was contiguous with a nominated LIC if the median family income of the tract did not
exceed 125% of that contiguous, nominated LIC.6 In principle, these requirements appear to have

1 T hese provisions amend the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) as Sections 1400Z-1 and 1400Z-2.
2 CDFI Fund, “Opportunity Zone Resources,” at https://www.cdfifund.gov/Pages/Opportunity-Zones.aspx; and IRS,
“Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions,” at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-
asked-questions.
3 For the purposes of OZ tax incentives, a “state” includes the District of Columbia and any U.S. possession.
4 IRS Rev. Proc. 2018-16, p. 3, at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-18-16.pdf.
5 See IRC Section 45D(e). Qualifying LICs, under the NMT C, include census tracts that have at least one of the
following criteria: (1) a poverty rate of at least 20%; (2) a median family income below 80% of the greater of the
statewide or metropolitan area median family income if the LIC is located in a metropolitan area; or (3) a median
family income below 80% of the median statewide family income if the LIC is located outside a metropolitan area. In
addition, designated targeted populations may be treated as LICs. For more information, see CRS Report RL34402,
New Markets Tax Credit: An Introduction, by Donald J. Marples and Sean Lowry.
6 See IRS Rev. Proc. 2018-16, p. 2, at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-18-16.pdf.
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Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones: In Brief

been intended to provide governors with the ability to identify LICs, or low - to moderate-income
areas adjacent to LICs, in which to direct OZ tax benefits.7
P.L. 115-97 explicitly limits the number of census tracts within a state that can be designated as
qualified OZs based on the following criteria:
 If the number of LICs in a state is less than 100, then a total of 25 census tracts
may be designated as qualified OZs.
 If the number of LICs in a state is 100 or more, then the maximum number of
census tracts that may be designated as qualified OZs is equal to 25% of the total
number of LICs.
 Not more than 5% of the census tracts designated as qualified OZs in a state can
be non-LIC tracts that are contiguous to nominated LICs. This effectively limits
the number of census tracts that are not economical y distressed or low income
from receiving the OZ designation.
The official list of designated Opportunity Zones was published in IRS Notice 2018-488 and IRS
Notice 2019-42.9
Qualified Opportunity Funds
P.L. 115-97 defined a QOF as any investment vehicle organized as a corporation or partnership
for the purpose of investing in a qualified opportunity zone property (other than another QOF)
and which holds at least 90% of its assets in qualified OZ property. A qualified OZ property can
be a stock or partnership interest in a business located within a qualified OZ or tangible business
property located in a qualified OZ. Examples of potential QOF investments in qualified OZ
property include purchasing a building located in a qualified OZ, purchasing stock in a business
located in a qualified OZ, or purchasing machinery used by a business located in a qualified OZ.
A qualified OZ property must have been acquired by the QOF after December 31, 2017. For each
month that a QOF fails to meet the 90% requirement it must general y pay a penalty. The penalty
is calculated based on the monthly shortage multiplied by an underpayment rate (short-term
federal interest rate plus three percentage points).
The IRS instructs a corporation or partnership seeking to become a QOF to self-certify its status
by fil ing out Form 8996 as part of its annual income tax filings.10 (This self-certification process
differs from the NMTC, in which the Fund takes prospective action to certify “community
development entities” (CDEs) before they can receive an NMTC al ocation.)

7 See Senator T im Scott, “Op-ed: Opportunity Zones Are Really Working,” Washington Examiner, October 18, 2019,
at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op -eds/sen-tim-scott-opportunity-zones-are-really-working. In his
op-ed, Senator Scott, who co-sponsored the original, standalone bill proposing OZs, says that “ …instead of taking a
top-down approach to addressing poverty, Opportunity Zones empower our community leaders, mayors, and governors
to come together to decide for themselves which of their neighborhoods should be designated to pa rticipate.” T hat
standalone bill in the 115th Congress was the Investing in Opportunity Act (H.R. 828; S. 293).
8 Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, Bulletin No. 2018-28, Washington, DC, July 9, 2018,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-18-48.pdf.
9 Internal Revenue Service, Internal Revenue Bulletin, Bulletin No. 2019-29, Washington, DC, July 15, 2019,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-19-42.pdf.
10 For more information, see IRS, “Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions,” at
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity -zones-frequently-asked-questions.
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Tax Benefits for Qualified OZ Investments
P.L. 115-97 provides three main tax incentives to encourage investment in qualified OZs. These
benefits are briefly summarized, followed by an il ustrative example showing how the three
benefits reduce the amount of capital gains subject to taxation for OZ investors:
1. Temporary deferral of capital gains that are reinvested in qualified OZ
property: Taxpayers can defer capital gains tax due upon sale or disposition of a
(presumably non-OZ) asset if the capital gain portion of that asset is reinvested
within 180 days in a QOF.11 Under current law, the deferral of gain is available
on qualified investments up until the earlier of (a) the date on which the
investment in the QOF is sold or exchanged, or (b) December 31, 2026.12
In other words, this deferral is only in effect until December 31, 2026. Any
reinvested capital gains in a QOF made before this date must be realized on
December 31, 2026. Thus, investors would realize the deferred gain in their 2026
income filings, even if they do not sel or dispose of their investment in a QOF.
Any reinvested capital gains in a QOF after this date are not eligible for deferral.
2. Step-up in basis for investments held in QOFs: If the investment in the QOF is
held by the taxpayer for at least five years, the basis on the original gain is
increased by 10% of the original gain. Basis is general y the value of capital gain
when the investment is sold, before it is reinvested in a QOF.13 (An increase in
basis, al else unchanged, reduces the amount of the investment subject to
taxation and hence reduces tax liability.) If the OZ asset or investment is held by
the taxpayer for at least seven years, the basis on the original gain is increased by
an additional 5% of the original gain.
3. Exclusion of capital gains tax on qualified OZ investment returns held for at
least 10 years: The basis of investments maintained (a) for at least 10 years and
(b) until at least December 31, 2026, wil be eligible to be marked up to the fair
market value of such investment on the date the investment is sold. Effectively,
this amounts to an exclusion of capital gains tax on any gains earned from the
investment in the QOF (over 10 years) when the investment is sold or disposed.
Table 1 il ustrates the tax benefits of a hypothetical investment of $100,000 in a QOF made in
2019. This investment could be $100,000 in capital gains earned from the sale or disposition of
another asset (e.g., real property) from outside of an OZ that is reinvested into a QOF within 180
days from the date of that sale or disposition. Taxes on these capital gains are deferred while the
investment is held in a QOF.
Column A shows the investment’s value over time, assuming a 7% annual y compounded rate of
return. This hypothetical investment is simplified to assume that an initial investment in a QOF is

11 For more background on capital gains taxation, see CRS Report 96-769, Capital Gains Taxes: An Overview, by Jane
G. Gravelle; and p. 391 in CRS Committee Print CP10003, Tax Expenditures: Com pendium of Background Material
on Individual Provisions — A Com m ittee Print Prepared for the Senate Com m ittee on the Budget, 2018 , by Jane G.
Gravelle et al.
12 IRC Section 1400Z-2(b)(1).
13 For example, an investor buys a piece of commercial real estate for $500,000 and then sells it two years later for
$600,000. Although the investor realized $100,000 in capital gain on the sale of the real estate, the gain would not be
recognized (subject to tax) upon sale if reinvested within 180 days in a QOF. T he “ basis adjustments” would affect the
$100,000 reinvested capital gains. T his calculation is illustrated in Table 1.
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made in year one and the QOF constantly reinvests any returns to that initial investment (i.e., the
QOF does not pay out periodic dividends to the investor during the life of the investment).
Column B shows the increase in adjusted basis earned from holding that investment in a QOF
over time: 10% of the original capital gain of $100,000 after the investment is held in a QOF for
at least five years (10% of $100,000 = $10,000), and 15% after the capital gain is held for at least
seven years (15% of $100,000=$15,000).
Column C shows the mandatory recognition of reinvested capital gains at the end of 2026.14 Even
if the investor retains their investment in the QOF beyond 2026, they must stil recognize or pay
capital gains tax on $85,000 in capital gains under this hypothetical example. This adjustment
amount is calculated as $100,000 in capital gains initial y rolled over into the QOF in 2019 (i.e.,
tax deferred) minus the $15,000 in basis adjustment for holding their investment in the QOF for
seven years.
Column D shows the amount of capital gains subject to taxation if the investment in a QOF is
sold or disposed in any of the 10 years shown in the table. Of note, if the investment was sold
after being held for 10 years, then any capital gains earned on the initial y reinvested $100,000
would be completely excluded from tax. In the hypothetical example, the investor earned an
additional $96,715 from their initial investment of $100,000. Therefore, if they held that QOF
investment for 10 years and then sold it, they would not pay tax on the $96,715 in gains as wel as
not paying tax on $15,000 worth of the original investment. (They would have realized $85,000
in capital gains in 2026, and paid capital gains tax on that amount.) In other words, for their
investment valued at $196,715 in 2029, the investor would have paid tax on $85,000 of this
amount in 2026, with the remainder being tax-free. This calculation il ustrates that a major
economic incentive to investing in a QOF is the permanent exclusion of capital gains earned after
the acquisition of the QOF investment.15
Table 1. Illustration of Opportunity Zone (OZ) Tax Benefits
for a Hypothetical Investment of $100,000 in Reinvested Capital Gains Made in 2019
(Assuming an annual rate of return of 7%)

A
B
C
D
Mandatory
Recognition of
Reinvested Capital
Taxable Capital
Year
Investment Valuea
Basis Adjustment
Gain
Gains if Sold
2019
$100,000
$0
-
$100,000
2020
$107,000
$0
-
$107,000

14 Ibid.
15 After P.L. 115-97 was enacted, some commentators raised concerns that legislative text created an ambiguity as to
whether taxpayers could actually claim the exclusion of qualified OZ investment return gains after 10 years. T his was
because the capital gains tax exclusion on OZ investment returns provision requires the QOF to hold investments in an
OZ for 10 years. T he OZ designations were authorized by P.L. 115-97 through 2026. Thus, unless Congress extended
OZ designations in subsequent legislation, it would have only been possible for QOFs to hold investments in qualified
OZs for a maximum of nine years (i.e., 2018 through 2026). However, the Department of the Treasury released
proposed regulations on October 19, 2018, clarifying that the benefit available in year 10 would still be available even
if the designations expire at the end of 2026. T he proposed regulations state that the benefit will be available until
December 31, 2027. T reasury claims that this interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent of P.L. 115-97. See
Department of the T reasury, “Treasury, IRS Issue Proposed Regulations on New Opportunity Zone T ax Incentive,”
press release, October 19, 2018, at https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/treasury-irs-issue-proposed-regulations-on-new-
opportunity-zone-tax-incentive. The related passage is on p. 16 of the proposed regulation.
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A
B
C
D
Mandatory
Recognition of
Reinvested Capital
Taxable Capital
Year
Investment Valuea
Basis Adjustment
Gain
Gains if Sold
2021
$114,490
$0
-
$114,490
2022
$122,504
$0
-
$122,504
2023
$131,080
$0
-
$131,080
2024
$140,255
$10,000
-
$130,255
2025
$150,073
$10,000
-
$140,073
2026
$160,578
$15,000
$85,000
$60,578
2027
$171,819
-
-
$71,819
2028
$183,846
-
-
$83,846
2029
$196,715
-
-
$0b
Source: CRS calculations.
Notes:
a. This hypothetical calculates OZ tax benefits from an initial investment of $100,000 in capital gains earned
from outside of an OZ (e.g., sale of appreciated real property) that is rol ed over (i.e., not taxed) into a
qualified opportunity fund (QOF), assuming constant reinvestment over the life of the OZ investment (i.e.,
no periodic dividends issued from the qualified opportunity fund to the investor).
b. Investments maintained (a) for at least 10 years and (b) until at least December 31, 2026 , wil be eligible for
permanent exclusion of capital gains tax on any gains from the qualified OZ portion of the investment when
sold or disposed. In this hypothetical, the $196,715 in earnings over the 10 years that the investment is held
in a QOF would be excluded from capital gains tax, and tax would be due on the initial $100,000 in outsid e
capital gains rol ed over into the QOF after applying the OZ adjusted basis increase benefit of 15% (i.e., tax
due on $85,000 in capital gains).
Note that Table 1 only shows the tax-related benefits of investing in a QOF. It does not include
the economic benefits of temporarily deferring capital gains tax on the initial $100,000
investment, which would depend on the time value of money, which is the economic concept that
an amount of money available at the present time is general y worth more than the same amount
in the future. Accordingly, investors would prefer to defer paying tax because the money they
would use to otherwise pay the tax could be put to some other use with a higher rate of return
(e.g., investing in other assets) while their tax bil is deferred. From an income tax collection
perspective, though, deferral of capital gains tax just delays a tax liability from one period to
another.
Actual QOF investment structures could differ from the arrangement in Table 1. With a similar
tax benefit, the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC), investors have developed financial structures
that increase the amount of other funding from either private or public sources (i.e., increasing
leverage on the NMTC investment).16 Additional layers of financing structures could increase the
complexity of investment arrangements and costs attributed to fees and transactional costs instead

16 Under the NMT C, the investor receives a credit equal to 5% of the total amount paid for the stock or capital interest
at the time of purchase. For the final four years, the value of the credit is 6% annually. Investors must retain t heir
interest in a qualified equity investment throughout the seven -year period. T he NMT C value is 39% of the cost of the
qualified equity investment and is claimed over a seven-year credit allowance period. For more information, see CRS
Report RL34402, New Markets Tax Credit: An Introduction, by Donald J. Marples and Sean Lowry.
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Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones: In Brief

of development, which could ultimately reduce investment in development projects, al else being
equal.17
OZ tax incentives are in effect from the enactment of P.L. 115-97 on December 22, 2017, through
December 31, 2026. There is no gain or deferral available with respect to any sale or exchange
made after December 31, 2026, and there is no exclusion available for investments in qualified
OZs made after December 31, 2026.
Implementing Regulations
The Department of the Treasury and IRS have issued multiple sets of proposed regulations related
to investments in a QOF (under Section 1400Z-2). Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
were published in the Federal Register on October 29, 2018, and May 1, 2019.18 The final
regulation was published in the Federal Register on January 13, 2020.19 These regulations inform
investors, QOFs, and other parties that have invested in or are considering investing in projects
located within qualified OZs. A comprehensive analysis of the lengthy, final regulation is outside
the scope of this report.20
With that said, commentators have noted that the final regulation provides guidance on a range of
transactional matters, such as what types of capital gains may be invested, what qualifies as
qualified OZ business property, when QOF transactions trigger or do not trigger recognition of
capital gain, when capital gains qualify for the purposes of the 10-year exclusion, and other exit
considerations for investors.21 Some of these positions are consistent with those established in the
regulations proposed in 2018 and 2019, whereas other positions in the final regulation represent a
change from the previous regulations.
The final regulation became official y effective on March 13, 2020, but commentators and
practitioners have noted that it appears to have mixed guidance for retroactive application. The
preamble of the final regulation notes that taxpayers may choose to either rely on the final
regulation or the proposed regulations, as long as they pick one or the other consistently.22

17 For more discussion, see Government Accountability Office (GAO), New Markets Tax Credit - Better Controls and
Data Are Needed to Ensure Effectiveness, GAO-14-500, July 2014, pp. 5-20, at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664717.pdf.
18 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of the Treasury, “Investing in Qualified Opport unity Funds,” 83 Federal
Register 54279-54296, October 29, 2018; and 84 Federal Register 18652-18693, May 1, 2019. The regulatory docket
(including public comments) on the May proposed rule is available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=IRS-
2019-0022-0001.
19 IRS, Department of the Treasury, “Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds,” 85 Federal Register 1866-2001,
January 13, 2020.
20 T he final regulation is 136 pages long in the triple-column version printed in the Federal Register, above, and is 544
pages long in the preliminary version posted on the IRS website at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/td-9889.pdf.
21 For shorter summaries of the final regulation, see Marie Sapirie, “Do You Hear the People Sing? A Guide to the
Final O-Zone Regs,” Tax Notes Federal, January 6, 2020; and John Sciarretti and Michael Novogradac, Final OZ
Regulations - Quick Take, Novogradac, December 19, 2019, https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/final-oz-
regulations-quick-take. For more detailed summaries of the final regulation, see Lisa M. Zarlenga, John Cobb, and
Caitlin R. T harp, Final Opportunity Zone Regulations Provide Som e Much -Needed Clarity, Steptoe & Johnson LLP,
December 27, 2019, at https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/final-opportunity-zone-regulations-provide-
some-much-needed-clarity.html; and Lisa M. Brill et al., Opportunity Zones: Final Regulations Provide Additional
Flexibility, Shearman & Sterling, January 14, 2020, at https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2020/01/opportunity-
zones-final-regulations-provide-additional-flexibility.
22 Some commentators have noted that this choice in applicable regulations could increase short -term complexity and
decisions for taxpayers. Stephanie Cumings, “O-Zone Rules Applicability Date Raises Dilemma for Investors,” Tax
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Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones: In Brief

Individual sections of the final regulation, though, appear to al ow a taxpayer to apply either the
final or a proposed version of the regulations on a section-by-section basis.23 IRS and Treasury
could clarify this issue in subsequent communications.
Expected Economic Effects of OZs
Because OZs are a relatively new tax benefit, there are limited data that can be used to assess
their specific impacts on economic development. Nonetheless, economic theory and examination
of several other geographical y targeted federal programs and incentives for economic
development may provide insights on the expected economic effects of OZs. Examples of similar
economic development incentives that are administered through the tax code include the
NMTC,24 the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC),25 and the tax credit for the rehabilitation of
historic structures.26 Below is a brief discussion of potential economic effects of OZs.
Effects on Employment
Current place-based economic development tax polices tend to be structured to directly benefit
owners of capital who invest in particular communities or in particular types of projects and to
indirectly benefit the residents of low-income communities. The OZ tax incentives follow this
structure by delivering a direct benefit to the owners of capital through capital gains tax relief.
Benefits delivered in this manner effectively reduce the cost of investment (i.e., the cost of
capital). Economic theory would predict that tax subsidies for capital would not directly benefit
workers (e.g., in the form of higher wages).27 While it is too soon for detailed analysis of the OZ
tax incentives, research on the NMTCs has shown limited effects on employment.28
Effects on Investment
Studies find that place-based economic development incentives tend to shift investment from one
area to another, rather than result in a net increase in aggregate economic activity.29 Previous
analysis of economic development tax incentives suggests that any one of these tax incentives on
its own might be insufficient to generate a positive investment return from an otherwise
unprofitable development project. However, developers may be able to “stack” the benefits of

Notes Federal, January 15, 2020.
23 For example, see Stephanie Cumings, “Confusion Looms About Which Set of O-Zone Regs to Apply,” Tax Notes
Today Federal, January 29, 2020.
24 See CRS Report RL34402, New Markets Tax Credit: An Introduction, by Donald J. Marples and Sean Lowry.
25 See CRS Report RS22389, An Introduction to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, by Mark P. Keightley.
26 See National Park Service, “T ax Incentives for Preserving Historic Properties,” at https://www.nps.gov/tps/tax-
incentives.htm.
27 Economic theory suggests that the substitution effect (the use of more capital, relative to labor) could offset the
benefits of the output effect (the use of more labor, due to more investment and expanded economic activity). The net
effect of these tax subsidies will depend on which effect is larger. For more discussion on the effects of economic
development policies targeting capital versus labor, see CRS Report R42770, Com m unity Developm ent Financial
Institutions (CDFI) Fund: Program s and Policy Issues, by Sean Lowry.
28 Harger, K., A. Ross, and H. Stephens, “What matters the most for economic development? Evidence from the
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund,” Papers in Regional Science 98, no. 2, pp. 883 -904, 2019.
29 For a discussion of the economic literature on geographically targeted development policies, see CRS Report
R42770, Com m unity Developm ent Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund: Program s and Policy Issues, by Sean Lowry.
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Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones: In Brief

multiple federal tax incentives (as wel as any state and local incentives). The sum of these
benefits could make a project located in one area more profitable than alternatives.
OZs and New Markets Tax Credit (NMTCs)
With limited information currently available on the economic effects of OZs, policymakers may compare them to
another economic development tax incentive—the NMTC. The NMTC is a nonrefundable tax credit intended to
encourage private capital investment in eligible, impoverished, low-income communities. NMTCs are al ocated by
the CDFI under a competitive application process. Investors who make qualified equity investments reduce their
federal income tax liability by claiming the credit.
While both the NMTC and OZs are geographical y targeted and provide tax incentives to investors, several
differences between OZs and NMTC discussed below may lessen the applicability of any findings on the NMTC
to OZs.
One key difference is that OZ tax benefits are available to most investment in OZs, whereas NMTC tax benefits
are available to a more limited set of approved investments. This fol ows from the NMTC being limited to a set
amount per year ($3.5 bil ion most recently) while the OZ benefits are uncapped.
A second difference is that there are no statutory requirements for outcome-based reporting of OZ tax benefits,
whereas NMTC tax benefits are subject to such reporting. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
found a lack of statutory authority for OZ data col ection.30 In contrast, NMTC investments are subject to more
statutory restrictions and structural layers of accountability to low-income populations and communities than
OZs. For example, the Fund evaluates NMTC applications based on a set of factors. One factor is the potential
impact that the investments supported wil have on “community outcomes,” including benefits to low-income
persons and jobs directly induced by the investments.31 Investments made by QOFs are eligible to benefit a broad
range of potential projects, regardless of their potential “community outcomes.”32 A final difference concerns
community focus (investment vehicles for OZs are not required to have a community focus, whereas those for
NMTCs are required to have a primary mission of serving or providing investment capital to low-income
communities).
As a result of these differences between NMTCs and OZs, research findings from the NMTC may not be
applicable to OZs. In addition, studying OZs is further complicated because they could direct more investment to
low-income communities than the NMTC (as a result of being uncapped), but the investment may be less focused
to achieve community outcomes.
Revenue Effects
The Joint Committee on Taxation initial y estimated that the OZ tax incentives would result in a
revenue loss to the federal government of $1.6 bil ion over 10 years.33 Subsequent tax
expenditure estimates were higher: a revenue loss of $8.2 bil ion over 5 years.34 The revenue loss
within the initial 10-year and most recent 5-year budget windows is due to the relatively smal

30 U.S. Government Accountability Office, OPPORTUNITY ZONES: Improved Oversight Needed to Evaluate Tax
Expenditure Perform ance, GAO-21-20, October 8, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-21-30#summary.
31 For examples of such criteria, see the “Community Outcomes” section of CDFI Fund, NMTC Program —Allocation
Application Frequently Asked Questions, June 7, 2018, at
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/Updated%202018%20NMT C%20Application%20FAQs%20Document%20-
For%20Posting%20MAST ER.pdf.
32 QOF investments made in the following categories are not eligible as investments in “qualified OZ business
property”: any private or commercial golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility,
racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or any store the principal business of which is the sale of alcoholic
beverages for consumption off premises. See IRC 1400Z-2 and IRC Section 144(c)(6)(B). Further, any capital gains
earned from investments from the above types of projects are not be eligible for OZ tax benefits.
33 Joint Committee on T axation, Estimated Revenue Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1, The “Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act,” JCX-67-17, December 18, 2017, p. 6, at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 .
34 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on T axation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2020-2024,
committee print, 116th Cong., October 5, 2020, JCX-23-20, at https://www.jct.gov/publications/2020/jcx-23-20/.
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revenue losses associated with the deferral of capital gains tax and the OZ basis adjustments in
years 5 and 7. The largest tax benefit associated with OZ tax incentives, the exclusion of capital
gains tax on qualified OZ investment returns in year 10, would fal outside of the 10-year budget
window. Those revenue losses would not be expected until 2028 (i.e., FY2028-FY2029).
Issues for Congress
Changing Designation of Qualified Opportunity Zones
Some Members of Congress have inquired whether Treasury or IRS have the authority to change
designation of qualified OZs from one eligible census tract to another. One potential reason to
change an OZ designation could be to support investment in an area that has more viable
development projects for investors. However, IRS has stated that such requests cannot be
accommodated, and that IRC Section 1400Z-1 authorized only one determination and designation
period for Treasury and IRS to certify and designate census tracts as qualified OZs.35 Under this
reasoning, new legislation would need to be enacted to change the amount of qualified OZs, open
a new round of OZ designations (e.g., using the most recent economic data), or change criteria for
qualified OZs.
Roles of Federal and Subnational Governments
The federal government played an active role in establishing the rules for OZs and continues to
administer the tax benefits to QOFs that engage in OZ-eligible activities. Congress enacted OZs
as part of the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97). The Fund formal y designated census tracts as
QOFs that were eligible under the statutory criteria and nominated by state governors. Treasury
and the IRS then promulgated regulations on qualified OZ designations and issued additional
transactional guidance. As discussed more in “Coordination of Federal Economic Development
Programs with Opportunity Zones,” other agencies could assume a larger role in providing
financial incentives for investment in qualified OZs.
Absent further congressional legislation, subnational governments wil likely play a larger role in
the types of individual projects and activities that wil be supported by OZ investment. For
example, governors and state legislatures could seek to promote OZs within their jurisdictions as
attractive options for investment, or enact state-level incentives to enhance potential private-
sector returns in OZs.36 Like state officials, local government entities can also provide further
incentives to attract OZ investments. Local zoning agencies and mayoral offices have the most
direct effect on what projects can proceed within specific OZs. These officials can approve or
deny building permits, or grant approval of permits based on the projects meeting certain
conditions (e.g., building height variances, promotion of certain goals about population density,
mixed-income housing units).

35 Letter 2019-0025 from William A. Jackson, Chief, Branch 5, IRS Office of Associate Chief Counsel, to Honorable
Donald Norcross, Member, U.S. House of Representatives, September 27, 2019, at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/19-
0025.pdf.
36 For example, see J. Brian Charles, “States, Cities Add Sweeteners to Attract 'Opportunity Zone' Investors,”
Governing, April 17, 2019, at https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov -opportunity-zones-extra-incentives.html;
and Novogradac, “State Opportunity Zones Legislation,” at https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-
zones-resource-center/state-opportunity-zones-legislation.
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Coordination of Federal Economic Development Programs with
Opportunity Zones
In 2018, President Trump issued an executive order that developed the interagency White House
Opportunity and Revitalization Council, whose goal was to “encourage public and private
investment in urban and economical y distressed areas, including qualified opportunity zones
[sic].”37 This council, chaired by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, was tasked with assessing actions that each federal agency could take under its
existing authority to prioritize or focus federal programs in economical y distressed communities,
including qualified OZs, and reduce regulatory and administrative costs that could discourage
such public and private investment. Pursuant to the President’s executive order, some agencies
have promulgated regulations or issued press releases explaining how they are working toward
these goals.38
Proponents of such activities could argue that federal coordination of benefits could enhance the
incentive effects of OZs. Examinations of past federal economic development incentives, such as
the NMTC, have indicated that one federal incentive, alone, might not be sufficient to drive
private-sector investment in distressed communities.39 By “stacking” multiple government
benefits in qualified OZs, though, economic development assistance could be more successful in
driving private and public investment in qualified OZs. Critics of this approach, though, could
argue that such coordination could undermine assessments of the OZ tax incentives, and could
make the OZ tax incentives appear to be more effective in increasing economic outcomes than
they would otherwise if measured in isolation.
Timeline of Tax Benefits
In order to benefit from the 15% step-up in basis for capital gains rolled over into a QOF and held
for seven years, investors would have needed to roll over their capital gains into a QOF by the
end of calendar year 2019. By doing so, investors would be able to obtain a full seven years
holding period needed for the 15% basis adjustment. (Investments made after 2019 can stil
benefit from a 10% step-up in basis.)
Congress could decide that two calendar years (2018 and 2019) were not sufficient time for QOFs
to form and raise money from investors, who might have waited to participate in OZ investments
until they conducted more research or reviewed developing regulations. To al ow for more
investments to qualify for the 15% step-up in basis, the mandatory recognition of deferred capital
gains in IRC 1400Z-2 could be delayed (e.g., to December 31, 2027). Critics of such a proposal,
however, could oppose such a policy, citing a concern that the OZ tax incentives largely benefit
investors, rather than low-income communities and their current residents.

37 Executive Order 13853, “Establishing the White House Opportunity and Revitalization Council,” 83 Federal
Register 65071, December 18, 2018, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/12/18/2018 -
27515/establishing-the-white-house-opportunity-and-revitalization-council.
38 For example, see U.S. Department of Commerce, “Review of DOC Policy in Opportunity Zones,” 84 Federal
Register 45946-45949, September 3, 2019.
39 For example, see p. 34 in U.S. Government Accountability Office, Tax Policy: New Markets Tax Credit Appears to
Increase Investm ent by Investors in Low-Incom e Com m unities, but Opportunities Exist to Better Monitor Com pliance ,
GAO-07-296, January 2007, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07296.pdf.
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Congressional Oversight
Congressional oversight of OZs has focused on how they are designated, their efficacy as a means
to increase investment in low-income areas, and their reporting requirements. Each issue is
discussed below.
Designation of Qualified Opportunity Zones
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that certain individuals with ties to the
Administration could have had an unfair or improper influence on the geographical designation of
certain census tracts as qualified OZs. These reports have been published in various media
outlets.40 While engagement and lobbying with state and federal officials on tax incentives are not
unusual activities, some Members have raised concern that the qualified OZ designation process
could have been conducted in a way “to enrich political supporters or personal friends of senior
administration officials.”41 For example, Representative Bil Pascrel wrote a separate letter to
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin requesting a response to the media reports and questions
related to meetings held by the Secretary and his staff with certain types of potential stakeholders
in OZ investments. Senator Cory Booker, Representative Emmanuel Cleaver, and Representative
Ron Kind sent a letter to Acting Treasury Inspector General (IG) Richard Delmar asking that the
designation process be investigated.42 The Treasury IG has reportedly accepted that request,
although the exact scope of the investigation has not been publicly disclosed.43
Efficacy of OZs to Improve Economic Conditions of Low -Income Areas
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Richard E. Neal, Senate Finance Committee
Ranking Member Ron Wyden, Former Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Chairman John
Lewis, and Senator Cory Booker wrote a letter to GAO requesting it to “study the program to
review its effectiveness in spurring investment in low-income areas compared to other federal
incentives, zone designations and program compliance.”44 Among several research questions, the
request asks GAO to compare OZ tax incentives to other economic development tax incentives,
such as the NMTC and the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC), and analyze the
characteristics of census tracts that were eligible but not designated to those that were designated.
GAO issued its final report in October 2020 and found that OZs have fewer limits on permissible

40 For example, see Jeff Ernsthausen and Justin Elliott, “One T rump Tax Cut Was Meant to Help the Poor. A
Billionaire Ended Up Winning Big,” ProPublica, June 19, 2019, at https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-inc-
podcast -one-trump-tax-cut-meant-to-help-the-poor-a-billionaire-ended-up-winning-big; Eric Lipton and Jesse Drucker,
“Symbol of ’80s Greed Stands to Profit From T rump T ax Break for Poor Areas,” NY Times, October 26, 2019, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/business/michael-milken-trump-opportunity-zones.html; and Jeff Ernsthausen
and Justin Elliott, “How a T ax Break to Help the Poor Went to NBA Owner Dan Gilbert,” ProPublica, October 24,
2019, at https://www.propublica.org/article/how-a-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went -to-nba-owner-dan-gilbert.
41 Senator Cory Booker, “Following Allegations of Misconduct, Booker, Cleaver, Kind Urge T reasury Inspector
General for “Complete Review” of T reasury’s Implementation of Opportunity Zones,” press release, October 31, 2019,
at https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1005 . See also Representative Bill Pascrell, “ Pascrell Assails
Mnuchin T reasury Corruption,” press release, October 29, 2019, at
https://pascrell.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=4051 .
42 See Letter from Sen. Booker et al. (October 31, 2019).
43 Justine Coleman, “T reasury Watchdog to Investigate T rump Opportunity Zone Program ,” The Hill, January 15,
2020, at https://thehill.com/policy/finance/478521-treasury-watchdog-to-investigate-trump-opportunity-zone-program.
44 House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Richard Neal, “Neal, Wyden, Lewis, Booker Request GAO Study on
Opportunity Zone Program,” press release, November 6, 2019, at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/neal-wyden-lewis-booker-request -gao-study-opportunity-zone-program.
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Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones: In Brief

project types and controls to limit revenue losses. GAO also found that insufficient data were
being collected to evaluate OZ performance. GAO found that addressing the latter concern may
require congressional action.
Related to this issue, the Urban Institute previously analyzed the census tracts designated by the
CEOs of the states and the District of Columbia, “scoring” each against measures of the
investment flows they are receiving and the socioeconomic changes they have already
experienced.45 Tracts that were selected by the state’s respective CEO and designated as QOZs
were compared with eligible, nondesignated tracts not selected by the CEO. CEOs in Montana,
DC, Alaska, and Georgia selected areas with the lowest levels of preexisting investment.46
Conversely, CEOs in Hawai , Vermont, Nebraska, and West Virginia selected areas with the
highest levels of preexisting investment. Additional y the researchers found
Designated [OZ] tracks [sic] do have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, and higher
unemployment rates than eligible nondesignated tracts (and the US overall average, which
is as expected given eligibility criteria). Housing conditions trend in similar ways, with
lower home values, rents, and homeownership rates. The designated tracts are also notably
less white and more Hispanic and black than eligible no ndesignated tracts. Age
compositions are comparable. Education levels are somewhat lower among designated
tracts than eligible nondesignated tracts.... In terms of this program, there appears to be no
targeting on the basis of urbanization.47
Some Members of Congress have also introduced bil s that are intended to limit the benefits of
OZ tax incentives. For example, H.R. 5042 would modify the eligibility criteria for qualified OZs
and replace existing OZs that do not conform to those criteria with new designations. H.R. 5042
also retroactively prohibits (effective as if enacted as part of P.L. 115-97) qualified OZ
investments in self-storage property, stadiums, and residential rental property unless 50% or more
of the residential units of such property are both rent-restricted and occupied by individuals
whose income is 50% or less of area median income.
Data and Reporting Requirements on Beneficial Investors and Projects
Testimony before some committees has reinforced suggestions that Congress lacks adequate
information for oversight of OZ tax benefits and that further data-reporting requirements are
needed.48 QOFs are not required by statute to provide periodic public reports on the locations of
their investments or economic impacts of those investments on low -income communities. The
ability of the IRS and Treasury to disclose such information is currently limited by general
provisions protecting taxpayer confidentiality absent the taxpayer’s consent.49 However, Treasury
or Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) economists could conduct an in-house study measuring the
effects of the tax provision without publicly disclosing confidential taxpayer data, and Congress
could amend taxpayer confidentiality rules to permit disclosure.

45 Brett T heodos, Brady Meixell, and Carl Hedman, Did States Maximize Their Opportunity Zone Selections? Urban
Institute, May 21, 2018, at https://www.urban.org/research/publication/did-states-maximize-their-opportunity-zone-
selections. State-by-state comparisons are available in a spreadsheet on the linked page.
46 Ibid., at 4.
47 Ibid., at 8.
48 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Economic Growth, T ax,
and Capital Access, Can Opportunity Zones Address Concerns in the Sm all Business Econom y? 116th Cong., October
17, 2019, at https://smallbusiness.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?Ev entID=2901. All of the witnesses in that
hearing recommended additional data collection.
49 See IRC Section 6103.
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Under its existing authority, the IRS has sought public input on ways to modify the Form 8996,
which is filed annual y by taxpayers that have self-elected QOF status, to increase the amount of
data collected on OZ investments.50 Starting with the 2019 tax year (2020 tax filing season), the
IRS now asks for more data on the value and location of qualified OZ property owned or leased
by the QOF, as wel as any qualified OZ stock or partnership interests.51
Currently, data and metrics on investment in OZs are provided by nongovernmental, private
industry sources. For example, Novogradac, an accounting and consulting firm that focuses on
economic development tax incentives, reported that a total of 580 QOFs nationwide had raised
$12.05 bil ion in equity as of September 1, 2020.52 The names, contact information, and
investment focus area of QOFs that elected to provide such information are also listed on
Novogradac’s website, as wel as other third-party sites.53 Some of these third-party data sources
also indicate the minimum investment required for an investor to participate in a particular QOF.
Several bil s introduced in the 116th Congress are intended to promote oversight and transparency
of OZs. For example, S. 1344/H.R. 2593 would require the Department of the Treasury to collect
data and report to Congress on investments held by QOFs. These bil s would also require the
Treasury to make certain information regarding these investments publicly available.
Additional y, S. 2787 would require QOFs to file an annual report disclosing specific information
on its investments and investors, and require that QOFs publicly disclose such information.
More QOF disclosure on tax forms could aid the IRS in ensuring the proper administration of OZ
tax incentives. Although IRS would likely be limited to disclosing such taxpayer-provided data to
the public without the taxpayer’s consent, it could release some aggregated amounts of OZ
investments organized at state or local levels or the tax benefits claimed by income level in order
to provide the public with a better idea of how the direct benefits of OZ tax incentives are
distributed. If substantial disclosure, public or private, were required by investors or QOFs,
though, then that could be a disincentive for some participation in OZ-related investments. More
detailed forms could also increase compliance costs for QOFs.

50 Department of the Treasury, “Request for Information on Data Collection and T racking for Qualified Opportunity
Zones,” 84 Federal Register 18648-18649, May 2, 2019. Regulatory docket available at
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=T REAS-DO-2019-0004-0001.
51 For the most recent official version see, IRS, “Form 8996 – Qualified Opportunity Fund,” at
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8996.pdf.
52 Novogradac, “Opportunity Funds Listing” (accessed December 7, 2020), at https://www.novoco.com/resource-
centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/opportunity-funds-listing.
53 For example, see OpportunityDb, “Opportunity Zone Fund Directory,” at https://opportunitydb.com/funds/.
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link to page 18 Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones: In Brief

Appendix A. Illustration of CDFI OZ Mapping Tool
Figure A-1 provides an il ustrative screenshot of the Fund’s online mapping tool. This image
displays census tracts that have been designated as a qualified OZ in the Southeast, primarily
Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. Designated OZs are shown in blue. A complete list of
qualified OZs has been published as an IRS Internal Revenue Bulletin and is available on the
Fund’s “Opportunity Zone” website.54

54 See CDFI Fund, “List of Designated Qualified Opportunity Zones,” at https://www.cdfifund.gov/Pages/Opportunity-
Zones.aspx. Qualified OZs are also published in IRS Notice 2018 -48, Designated Qualified Opportunity Zones Under
Internal Revenue Code § 1400Z-2, at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-18-48.pdf; and IRS Notice 2019-42,
Amplification of Notice 2018-48 to Include Additional Puerto Rico Designated Qualified Opportunity Zones, at
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-19-42.pdf.
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Figure A-1. CDFI Fund Mapping Tool Showing Designated Opportunity Zones (OZs) in the Southeast

Source: CRS screenshot of CDFI Fund, CIMS mapping tool, accessed November 11, 2018, at https://www.cims.cdfifund.gov/preparation/?config=config_nmtc.xml.
Notes: Designated OZs are shown in blue. Congressional district borders have been enabled in the above screenshot
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link to page 19 Tax Incentives for Opportunity Zones

Appendix B. Number of Census Tracts Eligible in
Each State for Qualified OZ Designation
Table 2 displays the maximum number of census tracts in each state or territory that were eligible
for OZ designation under each of the two nomination criteria. These data, from February 27,
2018, were posted on the Fund’s website before the qualified OZ recommendations issued by
state or territory CEOs were certified.
Table 2. Maximum Number of Census Tracts Eligible
for Opportunity Zone Designation, by State or Territory, 2018

A
B
C
Maximum Number of
Maximum Number of
Tracts That Can Be
Eligible Non-LIC
Nominated (the
Contiguous Tracts
Total Number of Low-
Greater of 25% of All
That Can Be
Income Community
LICs or 25 If State Has
Nominated (5% of
State/Territory
(LIC) Tracts in State
Fewer Than 100 LICs)
Column B)
Alabama
629
158
8
Alaska
55
25
2
American Samoa
16
25
See Notes
Arizona
671
168
9
Arkansas
340
85
5
California
3,516
879
44
Colorado
501
126
7
Connecticut
286
72
4
Delaware
80
25
2
District of Columbia
97
25
2
Florida
1,706
427
22
Georgia
1,039
260
13
Guam
31
25
2
Hawai
99
25
2
Idaho
109
28
2
Il inois
1,305
327
17
Indiana
621
156
8
Iowa
247
62
4
Kansas
295
74
4
Kentucky
573
144
8
Louisiana
597
150
8
Maine
128
32
2
Maryland
593
149
8
Massachusetts
550
138
7
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A
B
C
Maximum Number of
Maximum Number of
Tracts That Can Be
Eligible Non-LIC
Nominated (the
Contiguous Tracts
Total Number of Low-
Greater of 25% of All
That Can Be
Income Community
LICs or 25 If State Has
Nominated (5% of
State/Territory
(LIC) Tracts in State
Fewer Than 100 LICs)
Column B)
Michigan
1,152
288
15
Minnesota
509
128
7
Mississippi
399
100
5
Missouri
641
161
9
Montana
90
25
2
Nebraska
176
44
3
Nevada
243
61
4
New Hampshire
105
27
2
New Jersey
676
169
9
New Mexico
249
63
4
New York
2,055
514
26
North Carolina
1,007
252
13
North Dakota
50
25
2
Northern Mariana Islands
20
25
See Notes
Ohio
1,280
320
16
Oklahoma
465
117
6
Oregon
342
86
5
Pennsylvania
1,197
300
15
Puerto Rico
835
See Notes
See Notes
Rhode Island
78
25
2
South Carolina
538
135
7
South Dakota
69
25
2
Tennessee
702
176
9
Texas
2,510
628
32
Utah
181
46
3
Vermont
48
25
2
Virgin Islands
13
25
See Notes
Virginia
847
212
11
Washington
555
139
7
West Virginia
220
55
3
Wisconsin
479
120
6
Wyoming
33
25
2
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Source: CDFI Fund, “Opportunity Zones Information Resources,” February 27, 2018, at
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Pages/Opportunity-Zones.aspx.
Notes: These data are not available on the CDFI Fund website, above, and were accessed before publication of
earlier versions of this CRS report.
Puerto Rico: The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) deemed each census tract in Puerto Rico that is a
low-income community to be certified and designated as a qualified OZ. As of the time these data were posted,
the maximum number of tracts that can be nominated by Puerto Rico as wel as the maximum number of Eligible
Non-LIC Contiguous Tracts that could have been included in that nomination was being determined by the Fund.
USVI: The U.S. Virgin Islands could nominate Eligible Non-LIC Contiguous Tracts, provided that the nominated
non-LIC tracts do not exceed 5% of al nominated tracts (both low-income communities and nominated
contiguous tracts). Thus the USVI could nominate no more than one of its Eligible Non-LIC Contiguous Tracts.
Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa: Neither the Northern Mariana Islands nor American Samoa had
any Eligible Non-LIC Contiguous Tracts.

Author Information

Sean Lowry
Donald J. Marples
Analyst in Public Finance
Specialist in Public Finance

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service
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