Russian Military Intelligence: Background and
November 24, 2020
Issues for Congress
Andrew S. Bowen
Following Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine in
Analyst in Russian and
2014, many observers have linked Russia to additional malicious acts abroad. U.S. and European
European Affairs
officials and analysts have accused Russia of, among other things, interfering in U.S. elections in

2016; attempting a coup in Montenegro in 2016; conducting cyberattacks against the World Anti-
Doping Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2016 and

2018, respectively; attempting to assassinate Russian intelligence defector Sergei Skripal in the
United Kingdom in 2018; and offering “bounties” to Taliban-linked fighters to attack U.S. personnel in Afghanistan.
Implicated in all these activities is Russia’s military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU), also
known as the GRU.
The United States has indicted GRU officers and designated the GRU for sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, cybercrimes, and election interference. The Department of Justice has indicted GRU officers for cyber-related
offenses against the World Anti-Doping Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, NotPetya
malware attacks in 2017, various cyberattacks against the 2018 Olympics, and interference in the 2016 U.S. elections. The
GRU as an agency has been designated for sanctions under Executive Order 13694, as amended, and Section 224 of the
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44/H.R. 3364, Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II).
The GRU is a large, expansive organization under the command of Russia’s Ministry of Defense and Defense Minister
Sergei Shoigu. Headed since 2018 by Admiral Igor Kostyukov, the GRU plays an important role in Russia’s foreign and
national security policies. As an arm of the military, the GRU is responsible for all levels of military intelligence, from
tactical to strategic. The GRU commands Russia’s spetsnaz (special forces) brigades, which conduct battlefield
reconnaissance, raiding, and sabotage missions, in addition to training and overseeing local proxies or mercenary units.
Additionally, the GRU conducts traditional intelligence missions through the recruitment and collection of human, signals,
and electronic assets. Beyond its traditional combat- and intelligence-related roles, the GRU conducts extensive cyber,
disinformation, propaganda, and assassination operations. These operations are often aggressive and brazen, leading to
publicity and the exposure of GRU culpability.
Congress and the executive branch continue to consider responses and countermeasures to malicious Russian activities.
Because the GRU continues to conduct cyberattacks, election interference, assassinations, and disinformation, understandin g
the agency’s structure and the position it occupies in Russian foreign and security policy can help identify what the GRU is
capable of and why it conducts particular operations. Understanding the GRU also offers insight into Russia’s wider use of
cyber, disinformation, and influence operations and can inform broader discussions of potential U.S. responses and
countermeasures.
This report addresses Russian military intelligence, including organizational structure and activities, and related U.S. policy.
For further background on Russia, see CRS Report R46518, Russia: Domestic Politics and Economy, by Cory Welt and
Rebecca M. Nelson; CRS In Focus IF11625, Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy, by Andrew S. Bowen;
and CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt.

Congressional Research Service

Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
Russia’s military intel igence agency is a large, expansive, and powerful organization responsible
for the collection of foreign intel igence and the operation of Russia’s special forces units (voiska
spetsialnogo naznacheniya, or spetsnaz). Since 2010, its official title has been the Main
Directorate (Glavnoye upravleniye) of the General Staff, formal y referred to in abbreviated form
as the GU although commonly referred to as the GRU (Glavnoye razvedyvatel’noye upravleniye,
or Main Intel igence Directorate).1
Due to its operations and responsibilities, the GRU is one of the most wel -known of Russia’s
intel igence agencies. It plays a large role in Russian foreign and security policy. By
understanding the GRU and its operations, Members of Congress may gain greater insight into
the conduct of Russian foreign and security policy, including the use of disinformation,
propaganda, and cyber strategies.
In recent years, reports have linked the GRU to some of Russia’s most aggressive and public
intel igence operations. Reportedly, the GRU played a key role in Russia’s occupation of
Ukraine’s Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine, the attempted assassination of former
Russian intel igence officer Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom, interference in the 2016 U.S.
presidential elections, disinformation and propaganda operations, and some of the world’s most
damaging cyberattacks. The GRU operates both as an intel igence agency, collecting human,
cyber, and signals intel igence, and as a military organization responsible for battlefield
reconnaissance and the operation of Russia’s spetsnaz forces.2
Analysts note the GRU has a distinct organizational identity due to its dual status as an
intel igence and military organization. Additional y, from its inception, the GRU has competed
with other Russian security organs for resources and responsibilities. Other intel igence agencies
have continual y sought to take over the GRU’s missions and responsibilities, leading to intense
competition and often a duplication of efforts. Analysts and researchers have noted that the
GRU’s unique organizational culture and competition with other agencies may factor into its
wil ingness to conduct aggressive and often reckless operations, as a way to justify the GRU’s
utility to Russia’s political leadership.3
This report focuses on the GRU’s origins, missions, documented or reported operations, and
related U.S. policy. It first addresses the GRU’s history and background to provide context for
understanding its organizational mindset and traditional responsibilities. It then examines the
GRU’s organizational structure; analyzes the GRU’s various missions, including intel igence
collection, control of spetsnaz units, and cyber capabilities and operations; and addresses related
U.S. policy and congressional action. The report concludes with a brief assessment of the GRU’s
future outlook.

1 T his report uses the abbreviation GRU.
2 Spetsnaz in this report refers to the military spetsnaz brigades under GRU command. T here are numerous other elite
units in Russia often referred to as spetsnaz that are not under the control of the GRU.
3 Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May
11, 2016, p. 2
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Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress

Background and History
Russian military intel igence traces its lineage to 1918 under Russian leader Leon Trotsky.4
Similar to civilian intel igence agencies created by the Bolsheviks (Communists) during the
Russian Civil War, Russian military intel igence initial y focused on protecting the regime from
“counterrevolutionaries” from abroad. First known as the Registration Department
(Razvedupravlenie, or Razvedupr), Russia’s military intel igence soon became known as the
Fourth Directorate of the Red Army. It gradual y expanded its focus to collecting intel igence
abroad and supporting Soviet foreign policy.5 Its activities included running human intel igence
assets, conducting propaganda and disinformation operations, and conducting sabotage operations
(also known as active operations). During the 1920s and 1930s, the Fourth Directorate developed
a reputation for aggressive and often careless operations, which led to numerous diplomatic
incidents.
The Fourth Department also developed rivalries with other Soviet intel igence agencies,
competing for missions, influence, and responsibilities.6 For instance, Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder
of the Cheka, a predecessor to the Committee for State Security (KGB), complained about “the
irresponsible activities of the Razvedupr, dragging us into conflict with neighboring states.”7 The
Fourth Directorate’s close connection with the Comintern (Communist International), through
which it conducted many activities and recruited agents, created friction with the Soviet Union’s
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs due to blowback from exposed operations and
activities.8
Due to continued infighting and the need to streamline operations, the Main Intel igence
Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) was created in 1942. During World War II, the GRU
supervised sabotage, resistance, and guerril a actions against the Nazis.9 After the war, the GRU
was placed under the direct command of the General Staff and, alongside the KGB’s First
Directorate, given responsibility for conducting both legal (under diplomatic cover) and
il egal/nonofficial (without diplomatic cover) intel igence operations abroad, primarily focused on
militarily relevant intel igence (such as acquiring Western technology and assessing strategic
military capabilities).10

4 T rotsky was a key leader of the Bolsheviks (the precursor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and member
of the Bolshevik (later Communist) Politburo. He also was the People’s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs from
1918 to 1925, and he was responsible for the creation of the Red Army. Raymond W. Leonard, “ Studying the
Kremlin’s Secret Soldiers: A Historiographical Essay on the GRU, 1918 –1945,” Journal of Military History, vol. 56,
no. 3 (1992), pp. 403–422; Jonathan Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).
5 Raymond W. Leonard, Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918 -1933 (Westport, CT :
Greenwood Press, 1999).
6 Leonard, Secret Soldiers, pp. 7, 17-19.
7 T he full name of the Cheka was the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and
Sabotage. Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors, p. 29.
8 T he Comintern (Communist International) was a Soviet organization dedicated to advancing Communism globally
through the coordination of national communist parties. Owen Matthews, An Im peccable Spy: Richard Sorge, Stalin ’s
Master Agent (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).
9 David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Intelligence in War (New York: Frank Cass, 1990).
10 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the Cold War
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2015), pp. 13-15, 46.
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Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress

In addition, the GRU was responsible for the creation of special forces units known as spetsnaz.
Growing out of the Soviet experience during the Russian Civil War, both the NKVD (a KGB
precursor) and the GRU trained units in sabotage and guerril a-style operations, also known as
razvedchiki (literal y, “scouts”).11 This experience proved invaluable during World War II, when
the Soviets used partisan formations extensively. In 1950, these forces became the spetsnaz,
created to fulfil long-range battlefield reconnaissance and sabotage operations, specifical y
targeting NATO command and control and nuclear weapons.
Throughout the Cold War, the GRU spetsnaz gained extensive experience supporting, training,
and supervising local al ied forces in numerous conflicts.12 Spetsnaz units played key roles in the
Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. They also gained significant
experience and notoriety during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989). Spetsnaz units
conducted rapid-response, interdiction, and ambush operations and were involved in the 1979
assassination of Afghanistan’s leader, Hafizullah Amin.13
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the GRU, like the Ministry of Defense and
other intel igence services, struggled for financial and political support in Russia. As the KGB
was carved up into various organizations, the GRU fought for relevance and to prevent its
missions from being given to newly emerging security organizations.14 Despite massive personnel
losses and budget cuts, the GRU retained its foreign intel igence presence and its independence
under the General Staff.15 At the same time, GRU spetsnaz forces suffered heavily from budget
cuts and the lack of a clearly defined need, since conflict with NATO became unlikely. Many
officers saw better prospects in the Airborne Forces (VDV), which positioned itself as a more
capable and elite rapid-response unit. Some former spetsnaz al egedly worked for organized
crime.16 In wars against Russia’s breakaway region of Chechnya in the 1990s and 2000s, the
GRU and spetsnaz units participated in direct combat and managed local al ied Chechen forces.17

11 Mark Galeotti, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2015), pp. 8-11.
12 Mark Galeotti, “Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role,” Marshall Center
Security Insights, no. 46 (February 2020).
13 Galeotti, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, pp. 14-28.
14 Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB’s Successors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 119 -
120; Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the
Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), pp. 14, 21.
15 Amy Knight, “ T his Russian Spy Agency Is in the Middle of Everything,” Daily Beast, August 10, 2018.
16 Graham T urbiville, “Organized Crime and the Russian Armed Forces,” Transnational Organized Crime vol. 1, no. 4
(1995), pp. 57-104; Mark Galeotti, “ The Criminalisation of Russian State Security,” Global Crim e, vol. 7, no. 3-4
(2006), p. 472; Mark Galeotti, The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), pp. 207 -
208.
17 Galeotti, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces, pp. 31-35; Mark Kramer, “T he Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia’s
War in Chechnya,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 3 (2004/05), pp. 14, 18; Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars
1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Com bat (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
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Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress

Organizational Structure
Russian military intel igence headquarters is located in the Khoroshevsky District in Moscow.18
Currently, the GRU is headed by Admiral Igor Kostyukov.19 Under the command of the General
Staff and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the GRU maintains significant operational autonomy
and can brief Russian President Vladimir Putin directly.20

GRU Organizational Structure
The GRU is divided into 15 directorates—4 regional and 11 mission-specific. Within the directorates are multiple
sub-directorates or individual units. Individual GRU units are identified by their military postbox numbers. For
example, the GRU’s cyber capabilities are located within the Sixth Directorate and include Unit 26165 and Unit
74455.
The GRU’s true structure is a closely guarded secret. The structure described below is based on publicly available
reports and documents.
Regional Directorates (4)
Mission-Specific Directorates (11)
(1) First Directorate: European Union
(5) Fifth Directorate: Operational Intel igence
(2) Second Directorate: North and South America,
(6) Sixth Directorate: Electronic/Signals Intel igence
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand
(7) Seventh Directorate: NATO
(3) Third Directorate: Asia
(8) Eighth Directorate: Spetsnaz
(4) Fourth Directorate: Africa
(9) Ninth Directorate: Military Technology
(10) Tenth Directorate: Military Economy
(11) Eleventh Directorate: Strategic Doctrine
(12) Twelfth Directorate: Information Operations
(13) Space Intel igence Directorate
(14) Operational and Technical Directorate
(15) External Relations Department

Sources: Congressional Research Service (CRS) interview with Mark Galeotti; Viktor Suvorov, Inside the
Aquarium: The Making of a Top Soviet Spy (New York: MacMil an, 1985); Stanislav Lekarev, “Two Types of Russian
Intel igence Are Unified,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 31, 2001; Dani l Turovsky, “What Is the GRU? Who Gets
Recruited to Be a Spy? Why Are They Exposed So Often?,” Meduza, November 6, 2018; Mark Urban, The Skripal
Files: The Life and Near Death of a Russian Spy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2018); RFE/RL, “On the Trail
of the 12 Indicted Russian Intel igence Officers,” July 19, 2020.
Today, Russian military intel igence is responsible for the collection of foreign intel igence using
a full range of methods and sources (human, cyber, satel ite, and signals intel igence), intel igence
analysis, and battlefield reconnaissance and sabotage missions through its spetsnaz units. This

18 President of Russia, “ President Vladimir Putin visited the new headquarters of the Russian Armed Forces General
Staff Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU),” press release, November 8, 2006, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/36598.
19 T ASS, “First Naval Officer Nominated to Head Russia’s GRU,” November 22, 2018; T atiana Stanovaya, “New
Boss, Old Rules,” Riddle, November 28, 2018.
20 Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra,” p. 2.
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means the GRU oversees both strategic- and tactical-level intel igence collection.21 The GRU has
increased its cyber capabilities in recent years (conducting election interference, offensive
cyberattacks, and disinformation operations), in addition to its traditional electronic, signals, and
radio intel igence capabilities.22
Due to its dual role, the GRU has extensive capabilities and experience organizing proxy forces
and local al ies in numerous conflict zones, as wel as in conducting assassinations and other
targeted attacks. Despite overseeing both intel igence and spetsnaz operations, not al GRU
officers have spetsnaz backgrounds or vice versa.23 Analysts contend, however, that overseeing
both types of operations has led to a risk-acceptant and risk-taking culture, thereby contributing to
operations with a higher likelihood of exposure.24
Relationship to Other Russian Intelligence Agencies
Russia’s intel igence agencies are divided organizational y and across factional and personal
lines.25 Agencies compete with each other for greater responsibilities, budgets, and political
influence, often at the expense of other agencies.26 This competitive environment often
contributes to uncoordinated and duplicated intel igence efforts.27
The GRU operates alongside the Foreign Intel igence Service (SVR), Federal Security Service
(FSB), and Federal Protective Service (FSO).28 The GRU and the SVR are Russia’s primary
intel igence agencies responsible for the collection of foreign intel igence.29 Domestical y, the
FSB is responsible for counterintel igence. The FSB, however, has sought to gain a greater
foreign intel igence role and has international operations, especial y in Russia’s neighboring post-
Soviet states.30 This reportedly has caused significant friction within Russia’s intel igence
community, especial y with the GRU and SVR, which consider foreign intel igence collection
their primary responsibility.31 The FSO operates as an overseer of the various security services,

21 Andrew Roth, “How the GRU Spy Agency T argets the West, from Cyberspace to Salisbury,” Guardian, August 6,
2018; Guy Faulconbridge, “ What Is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?” Reuters, October 5, 2018.
22 T he GRU always had a large signals intelligence collection mission, but its capabilities were increased when it
acquired the radio-electronic intelligence capabilities of the now-defunct Federal Agency of Government
Communications and Information (FAPSI) in 2003. Gordon Bennett, “FPS and FAPSI —RIP,” Conflict Studies
Research Centre, Occasional Paper no. 96, p. 4.
23 Mark Galeotti, “Special T roops of GRU Will Be Growing Headache for the West,” Raamoprusland, September 28,
2018.
24 Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra,” p. 2.
25 Brian D. T aylor, State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); T atiana Stanovaya, “Why the Kremlin Can’t Keep Its Chekists in Check,” Riddle, July 25,
2019.
26 Peter Reddaway, Russia’s Domestic Security Wars: Putin’s Use of Divide and Rule Against His Hardline Allies
(London: Palgrave Pivot, 2018); Joss I. Meakins, “ Squabbling Siloviki: Factionalism Within Russia’s Security
Services,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 31, no. 2 (2018), pp. 235-270.
27 Mark Galeotti, “T he Intelligence and Security Services and Strategic Decision -Making,” Marshall Center Security
Insights, no. 30 (May 2019).
28 For more on Russia’s internal security and law enforcement agencies, see CRS In Focus IF11647, Russian Law
Enforcem ent and Internal Security Agencies, by Andrew S. Bowen; Mark Galeotti, “ Russian Intelligence and Security
Agencies Vie for Central Role,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 29, 2018.
29 T he Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) inherited the Committee for State Security’s (KGB’s) foreign intelligence
operations of its First Main Directorate.
30 Mark Galeotti, “T he Spies Who Love Putin,” Atlantic, January 17, 2017.
31 Andrei Soldatov, “Russian Foreign Intelligence Might Be in for a More Prominent Political Role,” Raamoprusland,
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Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress

helping to monitor infighting and the accuracy of intel igence reporting. Although the GRU can
directly brief the president, it does not have the same level of direct access as the SVR (the
primary agency responsible for foreign intel igence), the FSB (the primary agency responsible for
domestic security), or the FSO, which controls the Presidential Security Service.32 Analysts and
reporting therefore suggest the GRU’s influence is often relative to the ability of its chief to
develop personal relationships with Russia’s political leadership.33
2008 Georgian War to Present Day
In 2008, Russia fought a war with Georgia to prevent Georgia from asserting control over its
breakaway region of South Ossetia.34 While ultimately victorious, the Russian military performed
poorly, struggling with command-and-control issues, lack of coordination across service
branches, and a low level of accurate intel igence on Georgian military forces and capabilities.35
Low-quality intel igence led to the bombing of empty airfields and military instal ations, friendly
fire incidents, and a misunderstanding of the capabilities and morale of Georgian forces. Analysts
assessed that although intel igence provided by the GRU was inadequate, the spetsnaz brigades
performed adequately.36 Overal , Russia’s disappointment with its military performance led to a
program to modernize and reform the armed forces.37
Much of the blame for Russia’s military performance was placed on the GRU for providing faulty
intel igence.38 In response, competing security and intel igence agencies, along with other
branches of the military, sought to take advantage of the GRU’s weakened political position. Due
to its large size and expansive mission areas, the GRU suffered from the lack of a clearly defined
role in the wake of the Georgian war.39 In 2009, the GRU head, who had served since 1997, was
replaced by his deputy.40 Media reports al eged there was discussion of downgrading the GRU’s
status from a Main Directorate to a Directorate.41 By 2011, the GRU was downsized by over
1,000 officers, with many retiring or transferring to other positions; the size of the GRU’s foreign
intel igence operations also was reduced.42 Perhaps most significant were plans for the GRU to
lose control of the spetsnaz brigades to Russia’s military district commanders in 2010.43

May 24, 2019.
32 Mark Galeotti, “Spooks in the Kremlin,” Foreign Policy, April 27, 2019.
33 Galeotti, “Spooks in the Kremlin.”
34 Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, and Vyacheslav T seluiko, Tanks of August, ed. Ruslan Pukhov (Moscow: Center
for Analysis of Strategies and T echnologies, 2010).
35Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011); Michael Kofman, “Russian Performance in the Russo -Georgian War Revisited,”
War On The Rocks, September 4, 2018.
36 Cohen and Hamilton, Russian Military and the Georgia War; Kofman, “Russian Performance in the Russo-Georgian
War Revisited.”
37 For more see CRS In Focus IF11603, Russian Armed Forces: Military Modernization and Reforms, by Andrew S.
Bowen
38 T or Bukkvoll, “Russia’s Military Performance in Georgia,” Military Review vol. 89, no. 6 (2009), pp. 57-62.
39 Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Secret Weapon,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2014.
40 Mark Galeotti, “Korabelnikov Leaves Russian Military Intelligence,” In Moscow’s Shadows, April 26, 2009.
41 T his would represent a serious demotion that would limit the GRU’s influence, autonomy, and political importance.
It would have limited the GRU’s direct access to the president and increased the General Staff’s direct control.
42 Brian Whitmore, “Resetting the Siloviki,” RFE/RL Power Vertical, October 21, 2011; Denis T elmanov, “GRU Chief
to be Fired Upon Leaving Hospital,” Izvestia, September 27, 2011.
43 Roger McDermott, “Bat or Mouse? T he Strange Case of Reforming Spetsnaz,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 2,
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The GRU’s fortunes began to change with the appointment of Igor Sergun as GRU head in
2011.44 Sergun presided over a revitalization of the GRU’s prestige. In contrast to previous GRU
heads, analysts reportedly viewed Sergun (who had a background as a defense attaché and an
intel igence officer) as a political y astute leader able to lobby for the agency’s interests.45 The
GRU and Sergun prioritized the agency’s abilities to conduct “active measures,” or aggressive
operations such as assassinations, control ing proxy forces, political subversion, and eventual y
cyber operations.46The Russian military also abandoned plans in 2013 to move spetsnaz to the
control of the ground forces due to a combination of bureaucratic hurdles and resistance.47
The GRU demonstrated its importance during Russia’s 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea
region and invasion of eastern Ukraine.48 Russia’s Crimea operation relied heavily upon GRU
intel igence and spetsnaz forces to seize strategic points across the peninsula.49 The GRU’s
success continued in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine by creating,
supervising, and monitoring the numerous proxy and local rebel forces fighting against the
Ukrainian government.50
The GRU’s experience in managing proxy forces continued to prove useful as Russia intervened
in Syria.51 Spetsnaz proved instrumental in training, advising, and coordinating air strikes with
Syrian government and pro-government militia forces.52 The traditional spetsnaz mission of
battlefield reconnaissance was particularly important for Russia’s air campaign, which helped the
Syrian government retake crucial areas and urban centers.53

2010.
44 Denis T elmanov, “GRU Headed by Igor Sergun,” Izvestia, December 26, 2011.
45 Roger McDermott, “Russian Military Intelligence: Shaken but Not Stirred,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 7,
2012; Mark Galeotti, “We Don’t Know What to Call Russian Military Intelligence and T hat May Be a Problem,” War
On The Rocks, January 19, 2016; Galeotti, “ Putin’s Hydra,” p. 13.
46 Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra,” p. 7.
47 T his also roughly coincided with the reversal of many of the initial military reforms and the remova l of Anatoly
Serdyukov, Minister of Defense, and General Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, who initiated the wide -
ranging reform program. Mark Galeotti, “T he Rising Influence of Russian Special Forces,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
November 24, 2014; Alexander Golts, “ Reform: T he End of the First Phase – Will T here Be a Second?” Journal of
Slavic Military Studies, vol. 27, no. 1 (2014), pp. 131-146.
48 Charles K. Bartles and Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Military Operation in Crimea: Road T esting Rapid Reaction
Capabilities,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 61, no. 6 (2014), pp. 46-63; Galeotti, “Putin’s Secret Weapon”;
Michael Kofman et al., Lessons From Russia’s Operations in Crim ea and Eastern Ukraine, RAND, 2014.
49 Anton Lavrov, “Russian Again: T he Military Operation for Crimea,” in Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the
Crisis in Ukraine, ed. Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, vol. 2 (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, 2015), pp. 157-
186.
50 Sam Jones, “Photos and Roses for GRU’s ‘Spetsnaz’ Casualties,” Financial Times, August 8, 2014; Roger
McDermott, “Russian Spetsnaz Personnel Detained in Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 20, 2015; T or Bukkvoll,
“Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas,” Parameters, vol. 46., no. 2 (2016), pp. 18-20; T im Ripley
and Mark Galeotti, “Donbass Conflict Offers Pointers for Future Russian Military Action,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
June 18, 2019.
51 Sarah Fainberg, “Russian Spetsnaz, Contractors, and Volunteers in the Syrian Conflict,” Russie.nei Visions, IFRI,
December 2017; Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington, “ T he Military Campaign,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth
G. Jones (CSIS, 2020), pp. 18-40.
52 Mark Galeotti, “T he T hree Faces of Russian Spetsnaz in Syria,” War on the Rocks, March 21, 2016; T homas
Gibbons-Neff, “ How Russian Special Forces Are Shaping the Fight in Syria,” Washington Post, March 29, 2016.
53 Anton Lavrov, “Russian Aerial Operat ions in the Syrian War,” in Russia’s War in Syria: Assessing Russian Military
Capabilities and Lessons Learned, ed. Robert E. Hamilton, Chris Miller, Aaron Stein (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 2020), p. 95.
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As the GRU was reasserting its role and missions, it began to invest in cyber capabilities.54
Development of these types of capabilities would al ow the GRU to operate in an environment
marked by confusion and low attribution.55 Contested environments, such as in Ukraine and the
cyber arena, have provided the GRU another way to justify and demonstrate its importance to the
political leadership.56
In recent years, several GRU operations were uncovered (see “Attempted Hacking of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,” below), exposing Russian complicity
and complicating diplomatic relations.57 Some analysts question whether these exposures are a
result of GRU incompetence and amateurishness.58 Other analysts suggest competing Russian
security agencies may have undermined the GRU’s position for their own benefit.59 The GRU
also suffered numerous leadership changes; then-GRU head Sergun died in late 2015 and was
replaced by Igor Korobov, who himself died in 2018.60
There is no outward indication the GRU has fal en into disfavor, despite these setbacks.61 At its
100th anniversary celebration in 2018, shortly after the attempted assassination of former GRU
intel igence officer Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom, Putin thanked the agency and stated,
“As supreme commander, I of course know with no exaggeration about your unique abilities
including in conducting special operations.”62 Although it is unclear exactly how Russia’s
political leadership views the GRU, the agency’s operations and publicly available information
indicate the GRU remains a valued asset, especial y for aggressive and risky operations.
Intelligence Collection
The GRU and the SVR share responsibility for the collection of foreign intel igence.63 This
includes the use of intel igence officers operating both under legal (diplomatic) cover out of
Russia’s embassies and under il egal or nonofficial (without diplomatic) cover.64 GRU

54 Anton T roianovski and Ellen Nakashima, “How Russia’s Military Intelligence Agency Became the Covert Muscle in
Putin’s Duels with the West,” Washington Post, December 28, 2018.
55 Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin ’s Most Dangerous Hackers
(New York: Doubleday, 2019), pp. 237 -242; Bilyana Lilly and Joe Cheravitch, “ T he Past, Present, and Future of
Russia’s Cyber Strategy and Forces,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 12th International
Conference on Cyber Conflict (2020), pp. 140-142.
56 Roth, “How the GRU Spy Agency T argets the West, from Cyberspace to Salisbury.”
57 Sarah Rainsford, “Have Russian Spies Lost T heir T ouch?,” BBC, October 6, 2018.
58 Karina Orlova, “Russia’s Intelligence Failures,” American Interest, October 10, 2018; Luke Harding, “A Chain of
Stupidity: T he Skripal Case and the Decline of Russia’s Spy Agencies,” Guardian, June 23, 2020.
59 T atiana Stanovaya, “GRU Exposure: A Sign of Internal Power Struggles?,” Riddle, October 16, 2018.
60 Ivan Nechepurenko, “Igor D. Sergun, Chief of Russian Military Intelligence, Dies at 58,” New York Times, January
5, 2016; T ASS, “Head of Russian Military Intelligence GRU Igor Korobov Dies—Source,” November 21, 2018.
61 Mark Galeotti, “Russia’s Military Intelligence Agency Isn’t Stupid,” Foreign Policy, September 6, 2018.
62 T om Balmforth, “Putin Praises Skills of GRU Spy Agency Accused of UK Poison Attack,” Reuters, November 2,
2018; RFE/RL, “Putin Praises GRU Spy Agency Blamed for Spy Attacks in West,” Nov ember 3, 2018.
63 Faulconbridge, “What Is Russia’s GRU Military Intelligence Agency?”
64 Daniil T urovsky, “ What Is the GRU? Who Gets Recruited to Be a Spy? Why Are T hey Exposed So Often?,”
Meduza, November 6, 2018.
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intel igence officers are trained at the Military Diplomatic Academy of the General Staff.65 In
each embassy, the GRU and the SVR operate individual y, with separate command structures.66
The GRU nominal y focuses on the collection of militarily relevant information, such as the size
and capabilities of foreign militaries and decisionmaking, as wel as technology acquisition. This
focus does not preclude the collection of political intel igence, which is the primary focus of the
SVR.67 However, as analyst Mark Galeotti has opined, “Russian collection operations are not just
highly active but also extremely professional. Tasking, though, appears less impressive. While the
Foreign Intel igence Service and GRU have a strong sense of the military and technical secrets
they are meant to uncover, their political objectives are sometimes naive.”68 Analysts contend this
tendency may reflect a poor understanding of democratic political systems.
Recent arrests of GRU agents and assets il ustrate the level of GRU activity. The 2019 annual
report of Estonia’s Foreign Intel igence Service stated that five GRU assets were uncovered from
2014 to 2018.69 In 2020, uncovered GRU assets included French and Austrian military officers, as
wel as a former U.S. Special Forces officer.70
Spetsnaz
The GRU oversees Russia’s spetsnaz brigades.71 Spetsnaz are an elite light infantry force
designed to conduct battlefield reconnaissance, sabotage, and smal unit direct action missions.
They are organized into seven regular Independent Special Designation Brigades, a naval
spetsnaz unit for each of Russia’s fleets, a brigade used for testing new weapons and equipment,
and an independent regiment in occupied Crimea. Despite efforts to professionalize the force,
units are stil composed of some conscripts.

65 T urovsky, “ What Is the GRU?”; Richard Framingham, “Career T raining Program, GRU Style,” Central Intelligence
Agency, September 18, 1995, at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol10no4/
html/v10i4a04p_0001.htm.
66 Mark Urban, The Skripal Files: The Life and Near Death of a Russian Spy (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
2018).
67 Amie Ferris-Rotman and Ellen Nakashima, “Estonia Knows a Lot About Battling Russian Spies, and the West Is
Paying Attention,” Washington Post, November 1, 2018.
68 Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra,” p. 7.
69 Michael Weiss, “T he Hero Who Betrayed His Country,” Atlantic, June 26, 2019; Estonian Foreign Intelligence
Service, International Security and Estonia, Annual Report (2019), pp. 45-46.
70 RFE/RL, “Retired Austrian Army Colonel Found Guilty of Spying for Russia,” June 10, 2020; U. S. Department of
Justice, “Former Army Special Forces Officer Charged in Russian Espionage Conspiracy,” press release, August 21,
2020; Victor Mallet, “French Military Officer Held on Suspicion of Spying,” Financial Times, August 30, 2020.
71 T hey are nominally on loan to the Military District Commanders across Russia.
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Spetsnaz
Spetsnaz operate as Russia’s primary military reconnaissance force. They are similar in structure, mission, and
training to U.S. Army Rangers. The below structure is recreated from publicly available sources.
Spetsnaz Units
Naval Spetsnaz
 2nd Brigade (Promezhitsa, Pskov)
 42nd Independent Naval Reconnaissance

Spetsnaz Point (Vladivostok, Pacific Fleet)
3rd Guards Brigade (Tolyatti)


10th Brigade (Molkino)
420th Independent Naval Reconnaissance
Spetsnaz Point (Severomorsk, Northern Fleet)
 14th Brigade (Usurisk)
 431st Independent Naval Reconnaissance
 16th Brigade (Chuchkogo/Tambov, Moscow)
Spetsnaz Point (Sevastopol, Black Sea Fleet)
 22nd Guards Brigade (Aksai/Stepnoi)
 561st Independent Naval Reconnaissance
 24th Brigade (Irkutsk)
Spetsnaz Point (Parusnoe, Kaliningrad, Baltic Fleet)
 100th Brigade (Mozdok)
 25th Independent Spetsnaz Regiment (Stavropol)

Sources: Mark Galeotti, “Spetsnaz: Operational Intel igence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role,” Marshal
Center, Security Insights no. 46 (February 2020); Russian Military Capability in a Ten Year Perspective-2019, eds. Fredrik
Westerlund and Susanne Oxenstierna (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI, 2019).
Supervising Proxy Forces
The GRU and spetsnaz have gained significant experience creating and managing local al ied
proxy forces. Often these proxy forces are composed of organized criminals, warlords, or former
rebels. Most often, spetsnaz operators act as overseers and trainers, helping to create new units
directly subordinated to the GRU. This gives the GRU greater direct control over local proxies,
which helps limit the influence of competing security agencies and increases leverage over local
politicians.72
During Russia’s Second Chechen War (1999-2009), the GRU—along with other agencies, such
as the FSB—managed several local pro-Russian Chechen units, which proved effective against
Chechen rebels.73 The most famous units were Special Battalions Zapad and Vostok, which also
participated in Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia.74
During Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the GRU relied heavily upon its experience
managing proxies. During the course of the conflict, media reporting documented the presence of
the Vostok Battalion, reportedly reconstituted after being demobilized in 2008, and identified
GRU officer Oleg Ivannikov as al egedly responsible for transporting the anti-aircraft system that
shot down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in 2014.75 Ukraine also was used as a testing ground for

72 Other Russian security and intelligence agencies also create their own local units to compete for influence and
control.
73 Emil Souleimanov, “An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s Policy of Chechenization,”
Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 31, no. 2 (2015), pp. 91-114.
74 T omas Smid and Miroslav Mares, “Kadyrovtsy: Russia’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and the Wars of Paramilitary
Clans,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38, no. 5 (2015), pp. 650-677.
75 Claire Bigg, “Vostok Battalion, a Powerful New Player in Eastern Ukraine,” RFE/RL, May 30, 2014; Andrew Roth,
“A Separatist Militia in Ukraine with Russian Fighters Holds a Key,” New York Times, June 4, 2014; Bellingcat,
“MH17 - Russian GRU Commander ‘Orion’ Identified as Oleg Ivannikov,” May 25, 2018.
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Russian private military companies, including the Wagner Group, which reportedly was closely
tied to the GRU.76
Spetsnaz also played a key role in Russia’s intervention in Syria.77 Spetznaz forces conducted
battlefield reconnaissance and acted as trainers and advisers for the Syrian army and various pro-
government militia forces, such as the 5th Assault Corps.78
Assassinations and Targeted Attacks
The GRU’s military capabilities have enabled it to carry out targeted attacks abroad. The GRU is
implicated in numerous attempted and successful assassinations or targeted attacks (see “Targeted
Overseas Attacks Linked to GRU Since 2014: Role of Unit 29155,” below). Some of these
attacks were uncovered due to careless or lackluster spycraft, leading to accusations of
incompetence on the part of the GRU.79 Some analysts, however, contend that the intent behind
some targeted attacks is to send a message rather than to hide complicity.80 If so, exposure is not a
failure if the attack succeeds in conveying Russia’s ability and wil ingness to carry out targeted
attacks.81
One of the GRU’s most notorious and high-profile assassinations occurred in 2004; former
Chechen separatist president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and his 13-year-old son were kil ed in a car
bomb attack while living in exile in Qatar.82 Eventual y, Qatar convicted two Russian agents of
his murder, while a third was released due to his status as first secretary of the Russian Embassy,
with diplomatic immunity.83 The men reportedly were GRU agents. They were repatriated to
Russia to serve out their sentence but disappeared upon their return.84
Targeted Overseas Attacks Linked to GRU Since 2014: Role of Unit 29155
According to information compiled from multiple media outlets, Unit 29155 is an elite GRU unit
that conducts sensitive foreign operations, including assassinations and targeted attacks.85 Unit
29155 is reportedly connected to Russia’s elite Special Operations Forces Command headquarters
unit, based in Senezh, outside of Moscow.86 The reported head of Unit 29155 is Major General

76 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11650, Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs), by Andrew S.
Bowen.
77 Anton Mardasov, “What Are Russian Special Operations Forces Doing in Idlib?,” Al Jazeera, August 29, 2019.
78 Gregory Waters, “T he Lion and the Eagle: T he Syrian Arab Army’s Destruction and Rebirth,” Middle East Institute,
July 18, 20919; Anton Lavrov, “The Efficiency of the Syrian Armed Forces: An Analysis of Russian Assistance,”
Carnegie Middle East Center, March 26, 2020.
79 Bellingcat, “305 Car Registrations May Point to Massive GRU Security Breach,” October 4, 2018.
80 David V. Gioe, Michael S. Goodman, and David S. Frey, “Unforgiven: Russian Intelligence Vengeance as Political
T heater and Strategic Messaging,” Intelligence and National Security, vol. 34, no. 4 (2019), pp. 561-575.
81 Galeotti, “Russia’s Military Intelligence Agency Isn’t Stupid.”
82 Nick Paton Walsh, “T op Chechen Separatist Dies in Qatar Bomb Blast,” Guardian, February 13, 2002.
83 Steven Lee Myers, “Qatar Court Convicts 2 Russians in T op Chechen ’s Death,” New York Times, July 1, 2004.
84 Sarah Rainsford, “Convicted Russia Agents ‘Missing,’” BBC, February 17, 2005; Soldatov and Borogan, The New
Nobility, pp. 193-200.
85 Michael Schwirtz, “T op Secret Russian Unit Seeks to Destabilize Europe, Security Officials Say,” New York Times,
October 8, 2019; Bellingcat, “ Skripal Poisoner Attended GRU Commander Family Wedding,” October 14, 2019.
86 RFE/RL, “On the T rail of the 12 Indicted Russian Intelligence Officers,” July 29, 2018. For more on the Special
Operations Forces Command, see Roger McDermott, “ Russia’s Special Operations Forces Command and t he Strategy
of Limited Actions,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 21, 2019.
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Andrey Averyanov.87 Anatoliy Chepiga—a suspected attacker in the 2018 poisoning of Sergei
Skripal and his daughter in the United Kingdom—was photographed at the wedding of
Averyanov’s daughter in 2017.88 Many operatives of Unit 29155 also appear to have backgrounds
in GRU spetsnaz brigades—including unit commander Averyanov. Further information
supporting the unit’s operational nature is its reported headquarters at the 161st Special Purpose
Specialist Training Center, a spetsnaz training facility.89
In recent years, prosecutors and journalists have linked Unit 29155 to numerous malign activities
across Europe, including
 Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014;
 the poisonings of Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev in 2015;
 a coup attempt in 2016 to overthrow and replace a pro-Western prime minister in
Montenegro, potential y to prevent the country from joining NATO; and
 the poisoning of Russian intel igence defector Sergei Skripal in 2018.90
In addition, Unit 29155 operatives were traced to Switzerland around the time other GRU units
hacked the World Anti-Doping Agency and planned hacks on the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which were investigating state-sponsored doping in sports and
Russia’s use of chemical weapons, respectively.91 Spain also has opened an investigation of travel
by known Unit 29155 operative Denis Sergeev to Barcelona in 2017 around the time Catalan
separatists organized an il egal referendum on independence.92
In 2019, French newspaper Le Monde reported that European intel igence agencies had tracked
GRU operatives from Unit 29155 who appeared to be using France’s Haute-Savoie region in the
Alps as a base to conduct operations.93

87 Reportedly, Averyanov and the two suspected assassins of Sergei Skripal were awarded Russia’s highest medal—
Hero of Russia. Bellingcat, “ T he Dreadful Eight: GRU’s Unit 29155 and the 2015 Poisoning of Emilian Gebrev,”
November 23, 2019; Bellingcat, “ An Officer and a Diplomat: T he Strange Case of the GRU Spy with a Red Notice,”
February 25, 2020.
88 BBC News, “Russian Spy Poisoning: Woman ‘Identifies’ Suspect as Anatoliy Chepiga,” September 29, 2018;
Bellingcat, “ Skripal Poisoner Attended GRU Commander Family Wedding,” October 14, 2019.
89 Schwirtz, “T op Secret Russian Unit Seeks to Destabilize Europe.”
90 For more on the Skripal poisoning and U.S. sanctions imposed in response, see CRS In Focus IF10962, Russia, the
Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory Welt ; David Bond, Henry Mance, and Henry
Foy, “UK Blames Russian Military Intelligence Agents for Skripal Attack,” Financial Times, September 5, 2018;
Crown Prosecution Service, “ CPS Statement – Salisbury,” September 5, 2018; Bellingcat, “T he GRU Globetrotters:
Mission London,” June 28, 2019; Michael Schwirtz, “ How a Poisoning in Bulgaria Exposed Russian Assassins in
Europe,” New York Tim es, December 22, 2019; Shaun Walker, “ Alleged Russian Spies Sentenced to Jail over
Montenegro Coup Plot,” Guardian, May 9, 2019; RFE/RL, “ Bulgaria Charges T hree Russians In Absentia Over
Attempted Murders in 2015,” January 23, 2020; RFE/RL, “ Poisons, Patents, Phone Logs: Records Reveal Russian
Scientists’ T ies to Military Intelligence,” October 23, 2020; Bellingcat, “Russia’s Clandestine Chemical Weapons
Programme and the GRU’s Unit 29155,” October 23, 2020.
91 U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers with International Hacking and Related Influence
and Disinformation Operations,” press release, October 4, 2018 ; Bellingcat, “GRU Globetrotters 2: T he Spies Who
Loved Switzerland,” July 6, 2019.
92 Oscar Lopez-Fonseca, Lucia Abellan, Maria R. Sahuquillo, “ Western Intelligence Services T racked Russian Spy in
Catalonia,” El Pais, November 22, 2019.
93 See Ken Dilanian and Michele Neubert , “Russian Agents Planned Hit from Assassins’ Lairs in French Alps, Say
Intel Officials,” NBC News, December 5, 2019; Alla Hurska, “ Europe Ensnared in a Web of Russian Spies,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, December 11, 2019 (citing Le Monde, “ La Haute-Savoie camp de base d’espions russes specialises dans
les assassinats cibles,” December 4, 2019, in French).
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In June 2020, media organizations reported that U.S. intel igence officials had concluded that
GRU agents had offered payments to Taliban-linked militants to attack U.S. and other
international forces in Afghanistan. Reportedly, U.S. intel igence sources believed the unit
responsible for facilitating these payments was GRU Unit 29155, also identified in numerous
incidents across Europe and the Balkans.94
In addition to the GRU and Unit 29155, Russia’s other intel igence services reportedly operate
clandestine teams for sensitive operations abroad. The FSB controls Russia’s elite antiterrorist
teams, Alpha and Vympel, located within the FSB’s Special Purpose Center.95 Alpha is Russia’s
primary counterterrorist force. Vympel is responsible for external operations, including sabotage,
al eged assassinations, and covert surveil ance. Vympel reportedly is linked to the 2019 daytime
assassination of former Chechen military commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin.96 The
SVR also reportedly has an elite operational unit known as Zaslon; little public information is
available about the unit, although its presence was reportedly documented in Syria.97
Cyberespionage and Disinformation Activities
In his 2018 confirmation hearing to head U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security
Agency, General Paul K. Nakasone said, “as the most technical y advanced potential adversary in
cyberspace, Russia is a full-scope cyber actor, employing sophisticated cyber operations tactics,
techniques, and procedures against U.S. and foreign military, diplomatic, and commercial targets,
as wel as science and technology sectors.”98 Most observers believe the GRU is responsible for
many of these types of operations.
Since 2008, the GRU has developed significant cyber capabilities, complementing its long-
standing experience in conducting psychological and information operations.99 The development
of GRU cyber capabilities coincided with two broader developments in Russian security and
military thinking: the role of nonviolent tools in conflict and information warfare.100 Since the
early 2000s, Russian military doctrine has adopted an evolving view of warfare, in which the line
between peace and conflict is increasingly blurred and the utility of nonviolent tools is
increasingly important.101 The Russian military understands cyber operations as an effective and

94 Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt and Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Secretly Offered Afghan Militants Bounties to Kill U.S.
T roops, Intelligence Says,” New York Times, June 26, 2020; Charlie Savage et al., “Suspicions of Russian Bounties
Were Bolstered by Data on Financial T ransfers,” New York Tim es, June 30, 2020.
95 T hese units are known officially as Directorate-A and Directorate-V. For more, see Boris Volodarsky, “License to
Kill,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 2006; Mark Galeotti, Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces Since 1991
(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), pp. 35 -42.
96 T he Federal Security Service (FSB) also is linked to numerous assassinations of ex -Chechen fighters and Islamists in
T urkey. BBC News, “ Have Russian Hitmen Been Killing with Impunity in T urkey?” December 13, 2016; Bellingcat,
“‘V’ For ‘Vympel’: FSB’s Secretive Department ‘V’ Behind Assassination of Georgian Asylum Seeker in Germany,”
February 17, 2020; Bellingcat, “ FSB’s Magnificent Seven: New Links Between Berlin and Istanbul Assassinations,”
June 29, 2020.
97 Galeotti, “T he T hree Faces of Russian Spetsnaz in Syria.”
98 Paul Nakasone, “Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Paul Nakasone, USA Nominee for Commander,
U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service,” U.S. Senate Armed
Services Committee, March 1, 2018.
99 Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Sanctions Russian Lab T hat Built What Experts Say Is Potentially the World’s Deadliest
Hacking T ool,” Washington Post, October 23, 2020.
100 Lilly and Cheravitch, “Past, Present, and Future of Russia’s Cyber Strategy and Forces,” pp. 130-134.
101 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11625, Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy, by Andrew S.
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relatively cheap tool (in part due to deniability and difficulty in attribution) to undermine, subvert,
and manipulate an adversary.102 Cyber tools have become an increasingly crucial component in
Russia’s efforts to accomplish a range of tasks in the larger informational struggle between
adversaries.103
Attempted Hacking of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
On March 4, 2018, former GRU officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter were exposed to a high ly toxic and
potential y lethal chemical weapon agent in Salisbury, United Kingdom (UK). Russia and the GRU were quickly
blamed for the attack, despite repeated denials from Russian authorities. GRU agents eventual y were identified in
Salisbury and charged for the attack. UK authorities also identified the chemical weapon as a Novichok, a class of
nerve agent developed in the Soviet Union.
To help confirm these findings, samples were sent to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) in The Hague, Netherlands. The OPCW also was investigating claims of an al eged gas attack in Syria by
the Bashar al Asad regime against the town of Douma.
On April 10, 2018, four GRU agents traveling on diplomatic passports entered the Netherlands. Between April 11
and April 12, the agents conducted reconnaissance of the area around OPCW headquarters and booked rooms at
a hotel directly next to the OPCW. Working with UK intel igence, Dutch security services arrested the four men
on April 13. Discovered in a GRU agent’s car was high-tech equipment, which could be used to hack into OPCW
Wi-Fi networks, a so-cal ed “close access hack.” The equipment was confiscated and the agents were expel ed
from the country.
The Netherlands and the UK held a joint press conference on October 4, 2018, detailing the GRU operation and
identifying the agents. At the same time, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and NATO released statements
supporting the identification of malicious cyber activity from Russia and condemned Russian actions. On the same
day, the U.S. Department of Justice released indictments against seven GRU officers for the attempted OPCW
hack, as wel as for hacking the World Anti-Doping Agency (and other anti-doping agencies) in 2016; the agencies
were investigating Russia’s use of performance-enhancing drugs during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. In
response to the Skripal attack and the attempted OPCW hack, more than 26 countries expel ed more than 150
Russian diplomats. The UK expel ed 23 diplomats; the United States expel ed 60 officials and closed the Russian
consulate in Seattle and two recreational facilities al egedly used for intel igence col ection in Maryland and Long
Island.
Sources: CRS In Focus IF10962, Russia, the Skripal Poisoning, and U.S. Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack and Cory
Welt; Government of the Netherlands, “Netherlands Defence Intel igence and Security Service Disrupts Russian
Cyber Operation Targeting OPCW,” press release, October 4, 2018; Government of the Netherlands, “Joint
Statement by Prime Minister May and Prime Minister Rutte on Cyber Activities of the Russian Military Intel igence
Service, the GRU,” press release, October 4, 2018; U.S. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian GRU
Officers with International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation Operations,” press release, October
4, 2018; U.S. v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, 2:18-cr-00263-MRH (United States District Court Western District of
Pennsylvania 2018); UK National Cyber Security Centre, “Reckless Campaign of Cyber Attacks by Russian Military
Intel igence Service Exposed,” press release, October 3, 2018; Mark Odel , “How Dutch Security Service Caught
Al eged Russian Spies,” Financial Times, October 4, 2018.
At the same time, Russian security and military doctrines view information and disinformation
operations as a crucial foreign policy tool.104 Russian authorities, and their Soviet predecessors,
have long recognized the importance of psychological operations, but their views have evolved in

Bowen.
102 T imothy L. T homas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control T heory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol.
17, no. 2 (2004), pp. 237-256.
103 Stephen Blank, “Cyber War and Information War a la Russe,” in Understanding Cyber Conflict, ed. George
Perkovich and Ariel E. Levite (Washington , DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), pp. 81 -98; Michael Connell and
Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare,” CNA, March 2017; Andrew Radin, Alyssa Demus, and Krystyna
Marcinek, “ Understanding Russian Subversion: Patterns, T hreats, and Responses,” RAND, February 2020, pp. 12-16.
104 Roland Heickero, Emerging Cyber Threats and Russian Views on Information Warfare and Information Operations,
Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), March 2020.
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recognition of the changing information landscape since the 1990s.105 The ease of access to
information presents both dangers and opportunities to Russia’s leaders.
On the one hand, Russia’s leadership is concerned with the destabilizing effects of the free flow
of information, such as instigating popular protests and stoking societal discontent.106 These
effects are more dangerous due to the Russian belief that Western governments have manipulated
information to overthrow unfriendly regimes.107 During recent protests in Belarus against
President Alexander Lukashenko, Russian SVR chief Sergei Naryshkin accused the West of
conducting a “poorly disguised attempt to organize another ‘color revolution’ and an anti-
constitutional coup.”108 Russia sees itself as the target of such information operations, and
Russia’s security and military doctrines describe the dangers posed by foreign manipulation of
domestic audiences.109
On the other hand, the use and manipulation of information provides opportunities for Russia.110
Many analysts note that due to a perception by Russian policymakers that the West targets Russia
with information operations, Russian intel igence and security services in response seek to
actively disrupt and undermine the domestic politics of adversaries, while at the same time
disrupting and obfuscating any accusations of Russian culpability.111 The Russian government
seeks to manipulate domestic audiences and undermine faith in democratic systems of
government. Often, instead of seeking a particular outcome, the goal for Russian information
operations is to cause chaos and weaken the domestic legitimacy of an adversary’s government.
Additional y, Russia has offensively used cyber operations to further Russian foreign policy
objectives and inflict punishment on adversaries.112 These efforts have included offensive attacks
against foreign electrical networks, banking sectors, government institutions, and even sporting
events. These attacks may be in service to a range of Russian foreign policy objectives. In an
October 2020 indictment against GRU Unit 74455, U.S. Assistant Attorney General for National
Security John C. Demers stated, “No country has weaponized its cyber capabilities as maliciously
or irresponsibly as Russia, wantonly causing unprecedented damage to pursue smal tactical
advantages and to satisfy fits of spite.”113

105 Herbert Romerstein, “Disinformation as a KGB Weapon in the Cold War,” Journal of Intelligence History, vol. 1,
no. 1 (2001), pp. 54–67; T homas Rid, Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinform ation and Political Warfare
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020).
106 Karrie J. Koesel and Valerie J. Bunce, “Diffusion Proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular
Mobilizations Against Authoritarian Rulers,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 11. no. 3 (2013), pp. 753-768.
107 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Countering Color Revolutions: Russia’s New Security Strategy and Its Implications for U.S.
Policy,” PONARS Eurasia, no. 342 (September 2014); T racey German, “Harnessing Protest Potential: Russian
Strategic Culture and the Colored Revolutions,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 41, no. 4 (2020), pp. 541-563.
108 T om Balmforth, “Russia Accuses U.S. of Promoting Revolution in Belarus, T oughens Stance,” Reuters, September
16, 2020.
109 Nicolas Bouchet, “Russia’s ‘Militarization’ of Colour Revolutions,” Center for Security Studies, Policy
Perspectives, vol. 4, no. 2 (January 2016).
110 Martin Kragh and Sebastian Asberg, “Russia’s Strategy for Influence T hrough Public Diplomacy and Active
Measures: T he Swedish Case,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 40, no. 6 (2017), pp. 773-816; Clint Watts, “Russia’s
Active Measures Architecture: T ask and Purpose,” Alliance for Securing Democracy, May 22, 2018.
111 Peter Pomerantsev, “Russia and the Menace of Unreality,” Atlantic, September 9, 2014; Renee Diresta and Shelby
Grossman, “Potemkin Pages and Personas: Assessing GRU Online Operations, 2014 -2019,” Stanford Internet
Observatory Cyber Policy Center, 2019.
112 Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, and Ryan Maness, “Fancy Bears and Digital T rolls: Cyber Strategy with a
Russian T wist,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 42, no. 2 (2019), pp. 212-234; Greenberg, Sandworm, pp. 46-49.
113 U.S. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with Worldwide Deployment of
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Media reporting and federal indictments indicate that to develop its cyber capabilities, the FSB
has relied on co-opting, coercing, and recruiting talented individuals from Russia’s cyber-
criminal community, often under threat of criminal prosecution.114 In contrast, the GRU
apparently has sought to cultivate talent internal y and developed multiple recruiting pathways.115
Due to its history in conducting signals intel igence and disinformation operations, the GRU was
able to develop its capabilities into cyber operations.
GRU Cyber Operations and October 2020 U.S. Indictment
The GRU has conducted numerous aggressive, malicious, and wide-ranging cyber operations against multiple
targets. In 2015, GRU officers reportedly hacked the Bundestag, Germany’s national parliament. Germany issued
an arrest warrant for GRU officer Dmitry Badin, who is an accused member of Unit 26165 and indicted by the
United States for his role in 2016 election interference. In October 2020, the European Union and the United
Kingdom sanctioned Badin and GRU head Igor Kostyukov over the hack.
Also in October 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted six GRU officers for a range of cyberattacks. In the
indictment, Unit 74455, also known in media reports as Sandworm, al egedly is responsible for multiple
cyberattacks, including the fol owing:

2015 attacks on Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure, Ministry of Finance, and State Treasury Service

a 2017 hack-and-leak effort targeting French President Emmanuel Macron’s emails and interference in
France’s presidential election

a 2017 malware attack, commonly known as NotPetya, which infected computers global y and caused an
estimated $10 bil ion in damage

a 2018 hacking attack against the PyeongChang Winter Olympics in South Korea, in which GRU hackers
attempting to disguise themselves as North Korean hackers used malware to disrupt the opening
ceremony

a 2018 hacking campaign against UK, European, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons investigations into the nerve agent attack against Sergei Skripal and his daughter

a 2018-2019 cyber campaign against Georgian media companies and the Georgian parliament.
Sources: Andy Greenberg, “The US Blames Russia’s GRU for Sweeping Cyberattacks in Georgia,” Wired,
February 20, 2020; Kate Connol y, “Russian Hacking Attack on Bundestag Damaged Trust, Says Merkel,” Guardian,
May 13, 2020; Catherine Stupp, “Germany Seeks EU Sanctions for 2015 Cyberattack on Its Parliament,” Wal
Street Journal, June 11, 2020; U.S. v. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al., 20316 (United States District Court of
Western Pennsylvania 2020); U.S. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged in Connection with
Worldwide Deployment of Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace,” press release,
October 19, 2020; Robin Emmott, “EU Imposes Sanctions on Russian Military Intel igence Chief,” Reuters,
October 22, 2020.

Destructive Malware and Other Disruptive Actions in Cyberspace,” press release, October 19, 2020.
114 Soldatov and Borogan, The New Nobility, pp. 227-238; Cory Bennett, “Kremlin’s T ies to Russian Cyber Gangs Sow
US Concerns,” The Hill, October 11, 2015; Daniil T urovsky, “It’s Our T ime to Serve the Motherland: How Russia’s
War in Georgia Sparked Moscow’s Modern-Day Recruitment of Criminal Hackers,” Meduza, August 7, 2018; Liliya
Yapparova, “ T he FSB’s Personal Hackers” Meduza, December 12, 2018; Joseph Marks, “Evil Corp Indictments Show
Cybercrime Pays—For T hose At T he T op,” Washington Post, December 6, 2019; Mike Eckel, “ More Glimpses of
How Russian Intelligence Utilized Hackers Revealed in U.S. T rial,” RFE/RL, March 16, 2020.
115 T roianovski and Nakashima, “How Russia’s Military Intelligence Agency Became the Covert Muscle in Putin ’s
Duels with the West.”
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Unit 26165
Unit 26165 was established as the 85th Main Special Service Center during the Cold War,
responsible for military intel igence’s cryptography.116 Often referred to as APT 28 or Fancy
Bear, Unit 26165 is one of two units identified by the U.S. government responsible for hacking
the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Democratic National
Committee (DNC), and the presidential campaign of Hil ary Clinton (see “2016 Election
Interference,” below).117 The other hacking team involved in election interference is known as
APT 29 or Cozy Bear, believed to be operated by the FSB or SVR.
Unit 74455
Unit 74455 appears to be a newer unit created to help support and expand the GRU’s cyber
capabilities.118 Unit 74455 also is known as the Main Center for Special Technologies and is
commonly referred to by media reports as Sandworm. This cyber unit is linked to some of
Russia’s most brazen cyber operations, such as the 2017 NotPetya attack in Ukraine.119 On
October 19, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed indictments against six members of
Unit 74455 for attacks on various international targets (see text box on “GRU Cyber Operations
and October 2020 Indictment,” above).
Unit 54777
This unit, also known as the 72nd Special Service Center, is reportedly responsible for the GRU’s
psychological operations.120 This includes operating in support of other GRU cyber units and
operating on the tactical level by conducting electronic warfare and psychological operations.
2016 Election Interference
According to U.S. Special Counsel Robert Muel er, the intel igence community (the IC,
comprising the Central Intel igence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of
Investigation Intel igence Branch, and fourteen other statutory elements), and subsequent
investigations by the House and Senate Intel igence Committees, Russia conducted an extensive
effort to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.121 Then-Director of National Intel igence

116 Lilly and Cheravitch, “Past, Present, and Future of Russia’s Cyber Strategy and Forces,” p. 145.
117 Director of National Intelligence, “Background to ‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S.
Elections’: T he Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution ,” January 6, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, “ Grand
Jury Indicts 12 Russian Intelligence Officers for Hacking Offenses Related to the 2016 Election,” press release, July
13, 2018; Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation , GRIZZLY STEPPE—Russian
Malicious Cyber Activity, Joint Analysis Report, December 29, 2016; Rick Noack, “ T he Dutch Were a Secret U. S. Ally
in War Against Russian Hackers, Local Media Reveal,” Washington Post, January 26, 2018; Estonian Foreign
Intelligence Service, International Security and Estonia, Annual Report (2018), p. 55; Mike Eckel, “ T he Return of
Cozy Bear: Russian Hackers in the Crosshairs of Western Intelligence Agencies—Again,” RFE/RL, July 18, 2020.
118 Lilly and Cheravitch, “Past, Present, and Future of Russia’s Cyber Strategy and Forces,” pp. 145-146.
119 Ellen Nakashima, “Russian Military was Behind ‘NotPetya’ Cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA Concludes,” Washington
Post, January 12, 2018; Greenberg, Sandworm , pp. 179-220.
120 T roianovski and Nakashima, “How Russia’s Military Intelligence Agency Became the Covert Muscle in Putin’s
Duels with the West ”; RFE/RL, “ On the T rail of the 12 Indicted Russian Intelligence Officer s.”
121 Director of National Intelligence, “Background to ‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US
Elections’: T he Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution,” January 6, 2017 ; David E. Sanger, “ Putin Ordered
‘Influence Campaign’ Aimed at U.S. Election, Report Says,” New York Times, January 6, 2017; Ken Dilanian,
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Dan Coats stated, “Russia conducted an unprecedented influence campaign to interfere in the
U.S. electoral and political process.”122 The IC’s assessment was affirmed subsequently by then-
Speaker of the House Paul D. Ryan, who said “They did interfere in our elections—it’s real y
clear,” while Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnel cited, “indisputable evidence,” that
Russia interfered in the 2016 election.123
According to then-U.S. Special Counsel Robert Muel er and investigations by the Senate Select
Committee on Intel igence (SSCI), as wel as numerous media reports, Units 26165 and 74455
were directly responsible for Russia’s “hack-and-leak” operation.124 Unit 26165 conducted an
extensive effort to hack the emails and systems of the “DCCC and DNC, as wel as email
accounts of individuals affiliated with the [Hil ary] Clinton Campaign.”125 These investigations
document Unit 74455 as responsible for releasing tens of thousands of the stolen documents
through various fictitious online personas and in coordination with WikiLeaks.126
According to the Special Counsel, SSCI, and the IC, beginning in March 2016, the GRU
conducted an extensive spearphishing and malware campaign to hack the networks and email
accounts of the DNC, DCCC, and Clinton campaign, including the email account of campaign
chairperson John Podesta.127 The GRU stole tens of thousands of documents and emails from
these accounts until at least September 2016.128 Using numerous social media aliases, including
“DCLeaks” and “Guccifer 2.0,” Unit 74455 coordinated the release of stolen documents to
interfere in the 2016 election.129 According to SSCI, the GRU used these aliases to communicate
with WikiLeaks to transmit stolen documents, which WikiLeaks then released for “maximum
political impact” starting on the eve of the 2016 Democratic National Convention.130

“Intelligence Director Says Agencies Agree on Russian Meddling,” NBC News, July 21, 2017; Special Counsel Robert
S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election , U.S.
Department of Justice, vol I of II, Washington, DC, March 2019; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, “ Volume 5: Counterintelligence T hreat/Vulnerabilities” in Russian Active Measures Cam paigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, 116th Cong., 2020.
122 Karen Yourish and T roy Griggs, “8 U.S. Intelligence Groups Blame Russia for Meddling, but T rump Keeps
Clouding the Picture,” New York Times, August 2, 2018.
123 Michael Collins, Nicole Guadiano, and Eliza Collins, “Congressional GOP Leadership: No Doubt T hat Russia
Meddled in 2016 Presidential Election,” USA Today, July 17, 2018.
124 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in
the 2016 U.S. Election, p. 176.
125 T his effort included the targeting of state and local election officials. Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Report
on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election , pp. 37, 50.
126 U.S. v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al., 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (United States District Court for the District of
Columbia 2018); T homas Rid, “How Russia Pulled Off the Biggest Election Hack in U.S. History,” Esquire, October
20, 2016.
127 U.S. v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al., 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ.
128 U.S. v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al., 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Cam paigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election , p. 171.
129 U.S. v. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al., 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ; U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Cam paigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election , pp. 183-183, 188.
130 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in
the 2016 U.S. Election, pp. 172-173, 199.
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Current Cyber Activities
The GRU appears to be continuing and adapting its cyber operations abroad, despite numerous
indictments and the exposure of multiple operations. In September 2020, FBI Director
Christopher Wray stated Russia had “very active efforts” to interfere in the 2020 elections.131 The
U.S. government and media reporting implicates the GRU as central to these Russian efforts to
hack into political campaigns and U.S. government agencies.132 Further reporting and private-
sector cybersecurity firms al eged the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Ukrainian
natural gas company Burisma, where Joe Biden’s son, Hunter Biden, previously was a board
member.133
U.S. Policy Responses and Issues for Congress134
The United States has been proactive in countering GRU operations and activities. The U.S.
government has demonstrated a wil ingness to “name and shame” the GRU and its operations.
Detailing substantial information regarding GRU personnel and operations potential y may
dissuade or deter further actions due to the high risk of public exposure.135
Since the 2016 presidential election, the U.S. Department of Justice has pursued three indictments
against a total of 21 GRU officers for malicious cyber activity, including interference in the 2016
U.S. presidential election, disinformation and information campaigns, and offensive cyber
operations leading to bil ions of dollars in losses.136 The indictments detail the officers
themselves; identify their units; and closely describe the operations, activities, and methods used
by the GRU.
The U.S. government also has imposed sanctions on the GRU and 21 GRU officers for the same
and additional malign activities abroad.137 Sanctions designations were made pursuant to
Executive Order (EO) 13694, as amended, and Section 224 of the Countering Russian Influence

131 Kyle Cheney, “Wray Says Russia Engaged in ‘Very Active Efforts’ to Interfere in Election, Damage Biden,”
Politico, September 17, 2020.
132 Meg Kelly and Elyse Samuels, “How Russia Weaponized Social Media, Got Caught and Escaped Consequences,”
Washington Post, November 18, 2019; Andy Greenberg, “ Russia’s Fancy Bear Hackers Are Hitting US Campaign
T argets Again,” Wired, September 10, 2020; Julian E. Barnes and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Accuses Russian Military
Hackers of Attack on Email Servers,” New York Times, May 28, 2020; National Security Agency, “Exim Mail T ransfer
Agent Actively Exploited by Russian GRU Cyber Actors,” press release, May 28, 2020; Andy Greenberg, “Russia’s
Fancy Bear Hackers Likely Penetrated a US Federal Agency,” Wired, October 1, 2020; Raphael Satter, Christopher
Bing, and Joel Schectman, “Russian Hackers T argeted California, Indiana Democratic Parties,” Reuters, October 30,
2020.
133 Nicole Perlroth and Matthew Rosenberg, “Russian Hacked Ukrainian Gas Company at Center of Impeachment,”
New York Tim es, January 13, 2020.
134 T his section partially draws on CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia, coordinated by Cory Welt .
135 T he sharing of biometric information among allies also could potentially degrade operatives’ freedom and ability to
travel and conduct operations.
136 Four GRU officers are indicted twice. U.S. Department of Justice, “Grand Jury Indicts 12 Russian Intelligence
Officers for Hacking Offenses Related to the 2016 Election,” press release, July 13, 2018; U.S. Department of Justice,
“U.S. Charges Russian GRU Officers with International Hacking and Related Influence and Disinformation
Operations,” press release, October 4, 2018; U.S. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged.”.
137 T hirteen GRU officers are both indicted and designated for sanctions. T he GRU and four GRU officers are
designated twice.
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in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44, Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II).138
U.S. sanctions designations against the GRU and its officers include the following:
 In December 2016, the Obama Administration designated the GRU and four
GRU officers (as wel as the FSB) for activities related to election interference,
pursuant to EO 13694, as amended.139
 In March 2018, the Trump Administration designated the GRU, the four GRU
officers first designated in 2016, and two more GRU officers (as wel as the FSB)
for “destructive cyberattacks,” including the 2017 NotPetya malware attack,
pursuant to Section 224 of CRIEEA. 140
 In December 2018, the Trump Administration designated nine GRU officers for
activities related to election interference; four GRU officers for cyber-enabled
operations against the World Anti-Doping Agency and the OPCW; and two GRU
officers for the nerve agent attack on Sergei Skripal and his daughter, pursuant to
Section 224 of CRIEEA.141
Congress, the Administration, and analysts continue to debate the effectiveness of indictments
and sanctions.142 Media reporting suggests that in addition to “name and shame” strategies of
indictments and sanctions, the U.S. government has authorized more aggressive and offensive use
of cyber capabilities to thwart and deter Russian operations. Media reports al ege the United
States has conducted operations to disrupt internet access from an al eged Russian “troll farm”
and conducted incursions and surveil ance of Russia’s electric power grid.143 Although not
specifical y directed at the GRU, these actions may be intended to signal capabilities and
potential costs, should Russia continue to conduct brazen cyber operations.
The U.S. government also appears to be increasing its communication and coordination with
private-sector actors to counter Russian and GRU cyber activity. In the recent October 2020
indictment (see text box on “GRU Cyber Operations and October 2020 U.S. Indictment,” above),
U.S. Department of Justice officials thanked “Google, including its Threat Analysis Group
(TAG); Cisco, including its Talos Intel igence Group; Facebook; and Twitter, for the assistance
they provided in this investigation.”144 Additional y, media reporting suggests U.S. Cyber

138 Executive Order (EO) 13694 was amended by EO 1375 7. EO 13694 of April 1, 2015, “ Blocking the Property of
Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” 80 Federal Register 18077, April 2,
2015; EO 13757 of December 28, 2016, “ T aking Additional Steps to Address the National E mergency With Respect to
Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” 82 Federal Register 1.
139 White House, “Fact Sheet: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment,” December
29, 2016.
140 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for Interference with the 2016 U.S.
Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks, press release, March 15, 2018.
141 Although the attack on Sergei Skripal was not cyber-related, the Office of Foreign Assets Control used Section 224
(on undermining cybersecurity) to designate these officers as agents of the previously designated GRU. U.S.
Department of the T reasury, “ Treasury T argets Russian Operatives over Election Interference, World Anti-Doping
Agency Hacking, and Other Malign Activities,” press release, December 19, 2018.
142 Jack Goldsmith, “T he Puzzle of the GRU Indictment,” Lawfare, October 21, 2020.
143 Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian T roll Factory on Day of
2018 Midterms,” Washington Post, February 27, 2019; David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Escalates Online
Attacks on Russia’s Power Grid,” New York Times, June 15, 2019.
144 U.S. Department of Justice, “Six Russian GRU Officers Charged.”
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Command has closely coordinated with private companies in operations against Russian
disinformation and cyber operations.145
Outlook
Congress and other interested stakeholders continue to debate the effectiveness of sanctions,
indictments, and other “name and shame” strategies to counter malign Russian military
intel igence activities. Due to its position, roles, and capabilities, the GRU prides itself on
conducting aggressive and high-risk operations. Therefore, some observers argue, specific actions
directed solely against the GRU may not have the desired level of impact. As a result, some
observers argue that the exposure of the GRU and its operations is not necessarily a deterrent, as
long as Russia’s political leadership finds it useful to have such an agency capable and wil ing to
conduct such operations.
Nonetheless, the exposure of GRU operations has led to some media reports of infighting among
Russian security agencies seeking to take advantage of GRU exposure, thereby undermining
Russian capabilities. After the 2018 attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the UK, the
United States and several al ies enacted sanctions and expel ed Russian diplomats and suspected
intel igence officers. Some reports suggest these measures not only created tensions within the
Russian government, which blamed the GRU for its situation, but also may have limited Russian
intel igence operations by expel ing potential intel igence officers. Some observers argue that a
full range of responses targeting other actors and sectors beyond the GRU may produce, or at
least encourage, more desired Russian behavior. In addition to the wide range of options
available, coordinating responses with al ies could increase the costs to Russia and the
effectiveness of policy options, while isolating Russia and the GRU in response to their
aggressive actions.

Author Information

Andrew S. Bowen

Analyst in Russian and European Affairs

Acknowledgments
Cory Welt, Specialist in Russian and European Affairs, contributed valuable assistance to this report.

145 David E. Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “As Election Nears, Government and T ech Firms Push Back on Russia (and
T rump),” New York Times, October 20, 2020.
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Disclaimer
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
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