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Updated October 28, 2020
Europe, COVID-19, and U.S. Relations
COVID-19 in Europe 
harder than the first wave. Although rising new infections 
Like most of the rest of the world, European governments 
may be due partly to increased testing, the second surge 
and the European Union (EU) have struggled to manage the 
follows the relaxation of restrictions on social and 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)  pandemic. 
economic activity in many European countries over the 
European leaders have characterized the pandemic as 
summer and the onset of colder weather. To date, death 
Europe’s biggest challenge since the Second World War, 
rates across Europe appear lower than during the first wave, 
with potentially far-reaching political, social, and economic 
but many public health officials predict these rates may 
consequences beyond the public health impact. COVID-19 
climb, given the rise in cases and hospitalizations. 
also has added new tensions to an already strained U.S.-
European partnership. Members of Congress may be 
European Responses 
interested in COVID-19’s implications for U.S. relations 
In March 2020, in response to the first wave of the 
with Europe, including in NATO and with the EU, and in 
pandemic, nearly all European governments imposed 
how the pandemic might alter certain U.S.-European 
national “lockdown” restrictions and social-distancing 
dynamics, especially vis-à-vis China. 
measures—including banning large gatherings, closing 
schools and nonessential businesses, and restricting 
Statistics 
movement—although these measures varied by country in 
The first wave of the pandemic in Europe occurred in 
strictness and other aspects. Most European governments 
spring 2020 but subsided in the summer. A second wave 
also enacted national border controls. Sweden took a 
began in early fall 2020. As of late October 2020, about 
notably different approach that trusted citizens to practice 
6.6 million confirmed COVID-19  infections and over 
social distancing and imposed few mandatory restrictions; 
215,000  deaths had been reported across the 27-member 
some public health experts remain skeptical about this 
EU, the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and Switzerland 
policy’s success in building immunity among the general 
(out of a combined population of roughly 527 million). 
public and contend it failed to protect the most vulnerable. 
European governments began implementing phased 
Table 1. COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Europe: 
reopening plans in mid-April and early May 2020. Most 
Top 10 Affected Countries 
European leaders stressed the need for continued social 
 (by number of cases, as of end of October 2020) 
distancing, and many governments required the use of 
facemasks, especially indoors. 
Deaths 
Case 
Country 
Cases 
Deaths 
per 
Fatality 
The pandemic has spurred serious economic difficulties 
100,000 
Rates 
throughout Europe. For 2020, the EU forecasts its total 
economy will contract by 8.3% and average unemployment 
France 
1,244,242 
35,582 
53.12 
2.9% 
across the bloc will rise to 9%. The UK’s economy entered 
Spain 
1,116,738 
35,298 
75.55 
3.2% 
into recession in August 2020. Measures enacted by 
European governments to mitigate the economic downturn 
UK 
920,664 
45,455 
68.36 
4.9% 
include loan programs and credit guarantees for companies, 
Italy 
564,778 
37,700 
62.38 
6.7% 
income subsidies for affected workers, tax deferrals, and 
debt repayment deferments. 
Germany 
463,419 
10,121 
12.20 
2.2% 
As COVID-19 cases began to increase again in early fall, 
Belgium 
333,718 
10,899 
95.42 
3.3% 
European governments initially attempted to avoid a second 
Netherlands 
318,152 
7,204 
41.81 
2.3% 
round of national lockdowns, opting instead for targeted 
restrictions on regional or local virus “hot spots” to 
Czech Rep. 
284,033 
2,547 
23.97 
0.9% 
preserve economic recovery and in light of growing 
Poland 
280,229 
4,615 
12.15 
1.6% 
“pandemic fatigue” and public protests. Most governments 
have kept schools open, but many have been implementing 
Romania 
217,216 
6,574 
33.76 
3.0% 
progressively more restrictive measures. These measures 
Source: Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus 
have included, for example, imposing curfews, closing or 
Resource Center, October 28, 2020, updated daily at 
restricting the operation of restaurants and bars, further 
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/. 
limiting social gatherings, and expanding mandatory mask 
usage. By the end of October, Belgium, the Czech 
As seen in Table 1, France, Spain, and the UK have 
Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and 
experienced the largest number of infections. The second 
others had reimposed national restrictions, although 
wave is hitting several Central and Eastern European 
measures in some countries are less stringent than during 
countries—including the Czech Republic and Poland—
the first wave. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Europe,  COVID-19,  and U.S.  Relations 
EU Actions 
Relations with China 
Although national governments retain control over most 
Despite current U.S.-European tensions, some experts 
aspects of health policy, the EU has sought to play a leading 
contend that COVID-19 could prompt a closer alignment of 
role in managing the European response to the pandemic. 
U.S. and European policy interests with respect to China. 
Critics contend the EU lacked a coherent plan in the early 
The Trump Administration and some in Congress have 
stages of the crisis and member states initially pursued 
voiced apprehension about China’s efforts to enhance its 
disparate strategies, but many analysts assess that the EU 
influence in Europe. Notwithstanding initial concerns that 
has made progress in overcoming internal discord. The EU 
China’s so-called facemask diplomacy would build 
coordinated the imposition of bloc-wide travel restrictions 
goodwill, many analysts now assess that the pandemic and 
on most foreign visitors; worked to ensure the provision of 
its aftermath—including China’s waging of a pandemic-
sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE) and other 
related disinformation campaign in Europe—may harden 
medical supplies across Europe; and is supporting research 
European attitudes toward China. For some Europeans, the 
and development (R&D) of treatments, diagnostics, and 
pandemic has highlighted Europe’s overreliance on China 
vaccines, in part through leading international donor efforts. 
in global supply chains and the vulnerability of its critical 
infrastructure and companies to foreign takeover. China’s 
Promoting economic recovery has been another area of EU 
COVID-19-related actions appear to be contributing to 
focus. The EU approved a €540 billion (about $640 billion) 
making some European governments—such as those in the 
financial aid package for workers, businesses, and member 
UK and France—more hesitant about involving Chinese 
states. It is planning longer-term support through a €750 
telecommunications company Huawei in building out their 
billion (around $890 billion) recovery fund—which would 
fifth generation (5G) wireless networks. The Trump 
include issuing EU bonds backed jointly by member 
Administration has urged European allies to exclude 
states—attached to a €1.1 trillion (roughly $1.3 trillion) 
Huawei for security reasons. The United States and the EU 
seven-year budget. The European Central Bank, which 
launched a new dialogue on China in October 2020 to 
manages the EU’s common currency (the euro) used by 19 
discuss both common concerns and policy differences. 
members, launched an emergency bond-buying program 
totaling €1.35 trillion (about $1.6 trillion) as of June 2020. 
Congressional Interests 
Many Members of Congress retain a long-standing interest 
NATO’s Role 
in European affairs and the transatlantic partnership, despite 
NATO and allied military personnel, including from the 
periodic foreign policy, security, or trade differences. Some 
United States, have taken an active role in assisting civilian 
analysts argue that the pandemic requires more robust U.S.-
responses to COVID-19 in Europe and beyond. Although 
European cooperation. Potential areas for congressional 
NATO traditionally focuses on military threats, the alliance 
consideration may include the following: 
possesses command and control and logistics capabilities to 
coordinate multilateral responses to a range of security 
  The extent of U.S.-European collaboration on COVID-
challenges, including natural disasters and the COVID-19 
19 in existing forums, such as NATO or the G-7, and 
pandemic. Among other measures, NATO officials report 
possible new initiatives, such as a U.S.-EU dialogue 
that allied military forces have flown over 350 flights to 
and/or an early warning system on global health threats. 
transport equipment and thousands of medical personnel 
  Possibilities for enhancing U.S.-European economic 
and have helped to build over 1,000 field hospitals across 
cooperation to help promote financial recovery on both 
the alliance. In an effort to bolster its pandemic response 
sides of the Atlantic, including through potential new 
capacities, in June 2020, NATO agreed to establish a 
U.S.-EU and U.S-UK free trade agreements. 
stockpile of medical equipment and a new fund to enable 
rapid distribution of medical supplies and services. 
  Ways in which the United States and Europe might 
work together to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities for 
Impact on U.S.-European Relations 
PPE and other medical equipment, for example by 
Under the Trump Administration, significant U.S.-
deepening existing U.S.-EU regulatory cooperation on 
European divisions exist on trade and tariffs, defense 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
spending, the role of multilateral institutions, and key 
foreign policy concerns (including with respect to Russia, 
  Options for countering COVID-19 disinformation 
China, and the Middle East). Pandemic-related travel bans; 
campaigns that have targeted the United States and its 
competition for PPE, medical equipment, and the R&D of 
European allies and are believed to be backed by China, 
vaccines and treatments; and the U.S. decision to withdraw 
Russia, and other foreign powers. 
from the World Health Organization have generated further 
  Prospects for and challenges to greater U.S.-European 
transatlantic friction. Many analysts consider U.S. and 
coordination in addressing China’s geopolitical and 
European leadership as instrumental in managing past 
economic rise. 
global public health crises, such as the 2014-2016 Ebola 
outbreak, but view diplomatic cooperation on the COVID-
Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs    
19 pandemic as largely lacking. The Trump Administration 
Paul Belkin, Analyst in European Affairs    
maintains that it is working closely with European partners 
Sarah E.  Garding, Analyst in European Affairs   
to address various aspects of the pandemic, including in 
Derek E. Mix, Acting Section Research Manager   
NATO and the Group of 7 (G-7)  leading industrialized 
democracies. U.S. and EU scientific and regulatory experts 
IF11635
also have established technical dialogues on pandemic-
related issues. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov 
Europe,  COVID-19,  and U.S.  Relations 
 
 
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