Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy
October 23, 2020
Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the states that gained their
independence after the USSR collapsed in 1991. With a history of strong economic aid
Cory Welt
and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership with
Specialist in Russian and
Georgia since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S.
European Affairs
policy expressly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its

international y recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid to

Europe and Eurasia.
Many observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states in the post-Soviet region, even as the
country faces ongoing governance chal enges. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party (GD)
holds a dominant political position, with about 61% of seats in parliament. Parliamentary elections are scheduled
to be held on October 31, 2020. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy
entered a period of relatively strong growth in 2017. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Georgia’s
GDP wil decline by about 5% in 2020, due to the impact of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic.
The ruling GD party led a coalition to victory in parliamentary elections in 2012 amid growing dissatisfaction
with the former ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili’s center-right United National Movement, which came to power
as a result of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution. In August 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia to prevent
Saakashvili’s government from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which
broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates.
Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253) states that the United States “does not
recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the il egal invasions and occupations” of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. In September 2016, the House of Representatives passed
H.Res. 660, which condemns Russia’s military intervention and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On
October 22, 2019, the House passed the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 598) by voice vote. The bil expresses support
for Georgia’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as wel as for its democratic development, Euro-
Atlantic integration, and peaceful conflict resolution.
The United States provides substantial foreign and military aid to Georgia. Since 2010, U.S. nonmilitary aid to
Georgia has totaled $64 mil ion a year on average ($90 mil ion in FY2019), in addition to a five-year Mil ennium
Chal enge Corporation grant of $140 mil ion to support education. Since 2010, Georgia has received U.S. military
assistance primarily through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Coalition Support Funds, and Train and Equip
and other capacity-building programs. From FY2010 to FY2019, the United States provided Georgia almost $265
mil ion in FMF assistance. Defense assistance also includes a three-year training initiative, the Georgia Defense
Readiness Program.
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Introduction
Historical y located between empires, Georgia is in the South Caucasus, a region between the
Black and Caspian Seas that is separated from Russia by the Greater Caucasus mountain range
and also borders Iran and Turkey (see Figure 1). Various Georgian kingdoms and principalities
were incorporated into the Russian Empire beginning in the early 19th century. Georgia enjoyed a
brief period of independence from 1918 until its forcible incorporation into the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union) in 1921-1922. Georgia gained independence in 1991
with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Since independence, Georgia has coped with
Georgia at a Glance
two unresolved conflicts over the Russian-
occupied regions of Abkhazia and South
Population: 3.72 mil ion (2020 est.)
Ossetia. These regions, in addition to being
Comparative Area: slightly larger than West Virginia
home to ethnic Georgians, are home to
Capital: Tbilisi
minority ethnic groups that more closely
Ethnic Composition: 87% Georgian, 6% Azerbaijani,
identify with ethnic kin in Russia’s North
5% Armenian (2014 census)
Caucasus, located across the Greater Caucasus
Religion: 83% Georgian Orthodox, 11% Muslim, 3%
mountain range. After a short war with
Armenian Apostolic (2014 census)
Georgia in 2008, Russia unilateral y
GDP/GDP per capita: $17.7 bil ion/$4,764 (2019
est.)
recognized the independence of these
breakaway regions and stationed military
Top Exports: motor vehicles, copper ores, beverages,
iron and steel (2019)
forces on their territory.1
Leadership: Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia,
Georgians speak and write their own distinct
President Salome Zurabishvili, Defense Minister Irakli
Caucasian language, with a written literary
Garibashvili, Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani,
Parliamentary Chairman Archil Talakvadze
form that emerged at least as early as the fifth
Sources: National Statistics Office of Georgia (does
century. The Georgian Orthodox Church, to
not include the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
which most Georgians belong, is
autocephalous (independent), with roots that
date back to the fourth century.
Politics and Governance
In over a quarter century of independence, many observers have considered Georgia to have a
“hybrid” political system, containing both democratic and nondemocratic elements. The U.S.-
based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House currently assigns Georgia a “global
freedom” score of 61 out of 100 (“partly free”), the second-highest rating among the post-Soviet
states that gained their independence upon the dissolution of the USSR (after Ukraine, and not
including the Baltic States, whose annexation in 1940 the United States never recognized).2
Georgia has a parliamentary system of governance, shaped in large part by constitutional reforms
that came into effect in 2013 and 2018. The prime minister is formal y the country’s most

1 Georgia’s South Caucasus neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, also have been locked in territorial conflict for almost
three decades over the predominantly Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh, formally part of Azerbaijan.
2 Freedom House ranks all countries in the world by a “global freedom” score, which includes measures of political
rights and civil liberties. Freedom House also ranks post -Communist states by a “ democracy” score that ranges
between 1 (least democratic) and 7 (most democratic). Georgia’s “ democracy score” is 3.25 (transitional or hybrid
regime). Scores reflect the state of affairs at the start of the year. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020, and
Nations in Transit 2020.
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powerful executive. Georgia’s president is commander in chief of the armed forces and has the
power to veto legislation and dissolve parliament under certain circumstances. In addition, many
observers believe that bil ionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the chairman of the center-left Georgian
Dream-Democratic Georgia (GD) ruling party has a dominant behind-the-scenes role in
policymaking and personnel appointments.
Georgia’s prime minister, Giorgi Gakharia (aged 45), assumed office at the start of September
2019. Gakharia served as minister of internal affairs from November 2017. Before then, he served
as minister of economy and sustainable development, secretary of the Economic Council, and
business ombudsman. Gakharia entered government in 2013; previously, he worked abroad,
including in Russia.
Georgia’s unicameral parliament has 150 members who were elected in 2016 to a four-year term
by one of two methods: 77 by party list and 73 by majoritarian district. Constitutional reforms
adopted in 2018 established a fully proportional (i.e., party list) system from 2024. This change is
expected to lead to greater opposition representation in parliament.3
For the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 31, 2020, parliament voted in June
2020 to support an intraparty agreement that temporarily establishes a system by which 120 seats
wil be elected by party list and 30 seats wil be elected by majoritarian district (for more, see
“October 2020 Parliamentary Elections,” below). To secure a majority of seats, a party wil have
to win at least 40% of the party-list vote. Parties that receive at least 1% of the vote are to enter
parliament (the threshold in 2016 was 5%).4
The center-left GD currently holds 61% of parliamentary seats (91 of 150). GD came to power in
2012 as the leader of an electoral bloc of parties and since 2016 has governed alone. In 2016, GD
won 49% of the party-list vote and nearly al majoritarian races, leading to control of more than
75% of parliamentary seats (116 of 150 deputies). In 2019, GD experienced a series of
parliamentary defections, reducing its majority (see “Ruling Party Changes,” below).
GD’s main competitor in 2016 was the center-right United National Movement (UNM), the
former ruling party previously led by ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili. The UNM received 27%
of the party vote and, in total, 27 seats (18%). After months of infighting, the UNM fragmented in
2017; most of its deputies, including much of the party’s senior leadership, formed a new
opposition party cal ed European Georgia-Movement for Liberty.5 A third electoral bloc, the
nationalist-conservative Al iance of Patriots of Georgia-United Opposition, cleared the 5%
threshold to enter parliament with six seats.6
Georgia’s president, elected in November 2018, is Salome Zurabishvili (aged 68), a former
independent member of parliament and minister of foreign affairs.7 From 2023, as a result of

3 Civil Georgia, “Key Points of Newly Adopted Constitut ion,” September 27, 2017; Civil Georgia, “Constitutional
Changes Passed on Final Reading,” March 24, 2018.
4 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Adopts Landmark Election Reform,” Eurasianet, June 29, 2020.
5 T he infighting concerned party tactics and relations with ex-President Saakashvili, who is under indictment and living
abroad. T hose who left the United National Movement (UNM) wanted to build a rebranded party without Saakashvili.
T hose who stayed in the UNM sought to remain faithful to Saakashvili’s legacy and believed the party should adopt a
more active means of opposition, including popular protest.
6 Salome Zurabishvili, who was elected president in 2018, ran as an independent member of parliament.
7 Prior to entering the Georgian government, Zurabishvili was a French national and diplomat. For the 2018
presidential election, GD did not nominate its own candidate, which possibly reflected a belief within the party
leadership that the powers of the presidency were too limited to warrant fielding a candidate for the position. After
some deliberation, GD supported Zurabishvili, an independent candidate.
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constitutional reforms that were adopted in 2018, Georgia is to have an indirectly elected
president chosen by a college of electors made up of parliamentary deputies and local government
representatives.
Domestic and international observers considered the 2018 presidential election to be competitive
but flawed. Observers noted instances of official pressure against state employees to support
Zurabishvili, as wel as incidents of bal ot box stuffing.8 The U.S. Department of State said it
shared the concerns of observers and indicated “these actions are not consistent with Georgia’s
commitment to fully fair and transparent elections.”9
Georgia’s Turbulent Transition: From the Rose Revolution to the Georgian Dream
Former USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze became Georgia’s leader in 1992 and was president from
1995 to 2003. In 2003, he resigned amid electoral protests known as the Rose Revolution and was replaced by
Mikheil Saakashvili, who was Georgia’s president until 2013. Observers general y considered Saakashvili a pro-
Western leader who pursued a program of anti-corruption and economic modernization. His United National
Movement (UNM) oversaw a period of economic growth and rebuilt state institutions. At the same time, UNM
opponents and critics accused Saakashvili’s government of authoritarian tendencies and blamed it for not
sufficiently fighting poverty and unemployment.
In 2012, bil ionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili established a new opposition coalition, Georgian Dream (GD). I vanishvili had
spent considerable time in Russia, where he built a fortune in metals and banking before moving to France and
eventual y Georgia, where he became known as a reclusive philanthropist. On the eve of the 2012 parliamentary
elections, a scandal related to prison abuse motivated mass protests against the UNM. GD won the election, and
Ivanishvili became prime minister.
In 2013, Ivanishvili fulfil ed a preelection promise to serve as a transitional figure and stepped down as prime
minister. Many in Georgia, however, believe Ivanishvili continued to exert influence behind the scenes. Former
Interior Minister Irakly Garibashvili served as his successor for two years but resigned in 2015, amid declining
popular support. In 2019, Garibashvili reentered politics as GD party secretary and subsequently minister of
defense.
After coming to power, the GD government prosecuted former officials, including former Prime Minister Vano
Merabishvili and former Tbilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava, for crimes including corruption and abuse of power; in
February 2020, Merabishvili was freed after almost 7 years in prison (Ugulava served 15 months). Some ob servers
considered the prosecutions to be political reprisal for actions the UNM government had taken against its
opponents. In 2014, ex-President Saakashvili was charged with abuse of power relating to, among other things, a
widely criticized 2007 crackdown on opposition protestors and media. He has been sentenced twice in absentia to
a total of nine years in prison.
Note: On Georgia’s Rose Revolution, see Lincoln A. Mitchel , Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia’s
Rose Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), and Cory Welt, “Georgia's Rose Revolution:
From Regime Weakness to Regime Col apse,” in Valerie Bunce, Michael A. McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss,
eds., Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Post-Communist World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2010), pp. 155-188.
October 2020 Parliamentary Elections
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 31, 2020. Public opinion polls suggest GD has
a substantial lead over al other parties. In two preelection polls, at least 33% of respondents

8 International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), “Widespread Intimidation Ahead of the Runoff
Presidential Elections in Georgia,” November 19, 2018; Civil Georgia, “NDI: Georgia Risks ‘Squandering’ Democratic
Asset,” November 29, 2018; Civil Georgia, “ ISFED Wants T imely Investigation into Recordings Depicting Alleged
Vote Stuffing,” December 18, 2018; OSCE, ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Georgia: Presidential Election, 28
October and 28 Novem ber 2018: Final Report, February 28, 2019, at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/
412724.
9 U.S. Department of State, “Georgia’s 2018 Presidential Election,” November 30, 2018.
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indicated that GD was their preferred party.10 GD’s popularity was declining prior to the onset of
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. However, domestic and international
approval of the government’s efforts to contain the pandemic and the relatively low spread of
COVID-19 in Georgia through August 2020 appeared to boost GD’s election prospects (see
“Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response,” below). In September 2020, Georgia suffered its first
major rise in COVID-19 cases; it is unclear how, if at al , the outbreak wil affect GD’s electoral
prospects.11
Several other parties appear popular enough to enter parliament. In the polls cited above, a UNM-
led bloc (Strength in Unity) was in second place, with at least 15% support. Other parties that
received between 1% and 5% support include European Georgia, For New Georgia – Strategy
Aghmashenebeli, the Al iance of Patriots, the Labor Party, Lelo for Georgia, and Girchi. At the
same time, party support remained in flux; 24%-30% of respondents either did not support any
party, did not know which party to support, or did not respond.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 Response
Through August 2020, the Georgian government received international praise and popular
support for its apparently successful efforts to contain the spread and impact of the coronavirus
pandemic within Georgia.12 As of August 31, 2020, Georgia reported less than 1,500 confirmed
cases of COVID-19 and 19 deaths attributed to the virus.13 In response to the pandemic, the
government declared a state of emergency on March 21, 2020, that lasted for two months and
adopted “lockdown” measures similar to those in other countries. These measures included
quarantining foreign travelers, restricting movement, and closing schools and businesses. The
government also provided stimulus payments and other forms of relief to individuals and
businesses. In July-August 2020, Georgia cautiously began to open its borders to foreign travelers
(Georgia’s growing tourism industry has suffered from the pandemic).14
Georgia’s success in limiting the spread of COVID-19 declined in September 2020. As the
government opened Georgia’s borders to some foreign travelers and encouraged domestic
summer travel, the number of COVID-19 cases rose dramatical y.15 In September and the first
three weeks of October, Georgia reported more than 17,000 new cases—more than 10 times the
total number of reported cases from February to August—and 124 new deaths attributed to the
virus. At the start of September 2020, the government delayed easing some restrictive measures
and reimposed a ban on certain large gatherings.16

10 Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute), “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of
Georgia,” August 4-21, 2020; JAM News, “Georgia: 70% of Voters Prefer a Coalition Government,” October 13, 2020.
11 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia’s Epidemiological Elections,” Eurasianet, July 23, 2020; Giorgi Lomsadze, “New Wave
of COVID Complicates Georgian Ruling Party’s Election Strategy,” Eurasianet, September 25, 2020.
12 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Gets Rare Plaudits for Coronavirus Response,” Eurasianet, March 20, 2020; Rayhan
Demytrie, “Coronavirus: How ‘T hree Musketeers’ Helped Georgia Fight Virus,” BBC News, July 6, 2020.
13 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) data is from the Johns Hopkins University of Medicine Coronavirus
Resource Center.
14 Margarita Antidze, “Coronavirus Hits Georgia’s Booming T ourism Industry,” Reuters, March 20, 2020; Agenda.ge,
“Georgia Opens Borders Unconditionally for Germany, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,” July 8, 2020; T amilla
Mammadova, “Georgia Welcomes First International T ourists in Country amid Coronavirus Pandemic,” Trend
(Azerbaijan), August 5, 2020.
15 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Experiences Its First Wave of COVID-19,” Eurasianet, September 18, 2020.
16 Reuters, “Georgia Bans Weddings, Other Ceremonies as Virus Cases Rise,” September 9, 2020.
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Other Political Developments
Ruling Party Changes
Since 2018, GD has exhibited some signs of internal tension and transformation. After stepping
down as prime minister in 2013, GD founder Ivanishvili formal y returned to politics as party
chairman in 2018, reportedly due to frustration with the party’s growing internal divides. Then-
Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili resigned less than two months later, citing “disagreements”
with Ivanishvili.17 Mamuka Bakhtadze, a former minister of finance and head of Georgian
Railways, succeeded Kvirikashvili in June 2018 but resigned in September 2019 for unclear
reasons. Current Prime Minister Gakharia succeeded Bakhtadze.
In 2019, GD lost the supermajority that it won in 2016. About one-fifth of GD’s parliamentary
deputies left the ruling faction. These defections occurred mainly in two rounds: first after a
dispute concerning judicial appointments and again after several GD deputies controversial y
backtracked from a prior party commitment to hold fully proportional parliamentary elections in
2020 (see below).
Police Clash with Protestors (June 2019)
The GD government faced a political crisis in June 2019, after police used tear gas and rubber
bullets against demonstrators, some of whom had confronted riot police in an attempt to forcibly
enter the Georgian parliament.18 Demonstrators were protesting the decision to al ow a Russian
member of parliament to deliver a speech from the parliamentary speaker’s chair in his capacity
as chairman of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, which the Georgian parliament
was hosting. Many protestors considered the decision a national affront, given Russia’s 2008
invasion of Georgia and occupation of parts of its territory (see “Relations with Russia and
Secessionist Regions,” below).
After the crackdown, the government made some concessions but maintained that the police
response was largely appropriate. The chairman of parliament resigned, although he did not take
direct responsibility for the incident. The government did not meet the protestors’ main demand
that then-Minister of Internal Affairs Giorgi Gakharia resign; instead, he was appointed prime
minister. About 20 protestors, including a UNM member of parliament, were charged with
participating in mass violence and resisting police.19
Protest and Compromise on 2020 Parliamentary Elections
One measure that GD party chairman Ivanishvili proposed to defuse tensions after the June 2019
protests was to accept the opposition’s demand to hold 2020 parliamentary elections entirely on
the basis of party lists (which was expected to lead to a greater opposition presence in
parliament). In November 2019, parliament failed to adopt the measure after several GD
members from majoritarian districts (who likely feared losing their mandates) declared opposition

17 Before entering government , Kvirikashvili was the director of Cartu Bank, owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), “Georgian Prime Minister Resigns After Antigovernment Protests,” June 13, 2018.
18 RFE/RL, “ Furious Anti-Russia Protesters In T bilisi Demand Speaker’s Resignation, Clash With Police,” June 21,
2019; Giorgi Lomsadze, “ Violent Crackdown T hrows Georgian Ruling Party’s Survival Into Question,” Eurasianet,
June 21, 2019.
19 Civil Georgia, “T wo More Arrested for ‘Group Violence’,” July 27, 2019.
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to the reform. The reversal led several GD deputies who had supported the reform to leave the
party’s parliamentary faction. It also led to new protests that police eventual y dispersed.20
Negotiations among Georgia’s political parties led to an agreement in March 2020 to establish a
transitional electoral system for October 2020 elections (see above). The March agreement was
facilitated by the United States, Germany, the European Union, and the Council of Europe and
was widely praised by domestic and international stakeholders.21 In July 2020, the parliament
passed constitutional amendments to implement the agreed changes.
One obstacle to implementing the March agreement concerned the status of three opposition-
linked figures whom the opposition considered political prisoners. Opposition parties claimed the
March 8 agreement required their release; the government disagreed. In May 2020, President
Zurabishvili pardoned two of the individuals.22 President Zurabishvili did not pardon a third
individual, who subsequently was sentenced to four years in prison on il egal firearm charges
after participating in the June 2019 protests. As a result, UNM and European Georgia
parliamentary deputies boycotted the July 2020 vote.
Role of Ex-President Saakashvili
After leaving office in 2013, Saakashvili left Georgia. In 2014, he moved to Ukraine, where he
became an adviser to then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, acquired Ukrainian citizenship,
and, in 2015-2016, served as governor of Ukraine’s Odessa region. In 2015, the Georgian
government stripped Saakashvili of his Georgian citizenship, citing limitations on dual citizenship
(the Saakashvili government had taken a similar step against Ivanishvili before the 2012
elections).
Saakashvili grew critical of the Poroshenko government and eventual y entered into opposition.
In 2017, the Ukrainian government revoked Saakashvili’s citizenship and, in 2018, Saakashvili
was forcibly detained and deported. Saakashvili returned to Ukraine in 2019, after new Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky reinstated his citizenship. In May 2020, Zelensky appointed
Saakashvili head of the executive committee of the National Council of Reforms, a presidential
advisory body.
Saakashvili, who has been sentenced twice in absentia to a total of nine years in prison, remains
engaged in Georgian politics from abroad. Saakashvili formal y served as UNM chairman until
March 2019, when he was replaced by Grigol Vashadze, the UNM’s 2018 presidential candidate.
In September 2020, Vashadze said the UNM-led Strength in Unity bloc would nominate
Saakashvili as prime minister.23

20 Amy MacKinnon, “A Flickering Beacon of Democracy in Russia’s Backyar d,” Foreign Policy, November 27, 2019;
Hugo Miller and Helena Bedwell, “T bilisi T urmoil T hreatens Billionaire’s Dream with Nightmares,” Bloomberg,
November 30, 2019.
21 OC Media, “Georgian Government Reaches Agreement with Opposition Over 2020 Election,” March 9, 2020;
Council of Europe Office in Georgia, “Statement of the Political Dialogue Facilitators on Agreement,” March 8, 2020.
22 One of the individuals pardoned was former T bilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava, who in February 2020 received a new
38-month prison sentence ostensibly for crimes during his time in office prior to 2012 (Ugulava previously served 15
months in prison from 2015 to 2017 on similar charges). T he second was former Minister of Defense Irakly
Okruashvili, who in April 2020 was sentenced to five years in prison on charges relating to the June 2019 protests.
RFE/RL, “ Georgian Opposition Figure Sentenced to T hree More Years in Prison,” February 10, 2020.
23 Joshua Kucera, “Saakashvili Winds Back the Clock in Return to Georgian Politics,” Eurasianet, September 8, 2020.
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Government Cancels Major Port Project
In January 2020, the Georgian government canceled a contract to develop a major new deepwater
port and free industrial zone in Anaklia, located on Georgia’s Black Sea coast near the Russian-
occupied region of Abkhazia.24 The port project was considered Georgia’s largest-ever
infrastructure investment and was to be accompanied by major government investments in
Georgia’s road and rail infrastructure.25 Georgia has aspired to be a key transit hub for the
growing East-West overland trade route between China and Europe. Observers have speculated
about the government’s motives for canceling the contract and its level of commitment to the port
project.
Uncertainty regarding the future of the port project first arose in 2019. In July 2019, Mamuka
Khazaradze, the head of the Anaklia Development Consortium’s principal Georgian partner (TBC
Holding, an affiliate of Georgia’s largest bank) and his deputy were charged with money
laundering, in connection with what officials al eged were improper financial transactions from
more than a decade before.26 In August 2019, a U.S. partner in the consortium reportedly
withdrew from the project.27
Many observers have raised questions about the ongoing case against Khazaradze. The U.S.
government stated concerns “about the context and timing of [the] charges.”28 In January 2020,
the Georgian public defender (ombudsperson) filed an amicus curiae brief that stated that “the
case materials do not contain the elements necessary for assessing an action as a crime of money
laundering.”29
While under investigation, Khazaradze launched a new political movement, Lelo for Georgia,
which has fashioned itself as a “third force” between GD and UNM. Public opinion polls in
August 2020 suggest that Lelo has less than 5% popular support.
Controversy over Supreme Court Appointments
Georgia has adopted a series of judicial reforms in recent years that have restructured its judicial
institutions. As part of these reforms, a High Council of Justice oversees the appointment and
dismissal of judges. The council has 15 members, a majority of whom are selected by the
Conference of Judges, the judiciary’s self-governing body.
In December 2018, several GD members of parliament criticized the High Council’s nomination
of several judges to the Supreme Court whom they considered tainted by association with the

24 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Cancels Contract for Black Sea Megaport,” Eurasianet, January 9, 2020.
25 Shakhil Shah, “Georgia Makes Waves With Anaklia Deep-Sea Port,” Emerging Europe, March 5, 2018; Agenda.ge,
“Large-Scale Work on Anaklia Deep Sea Port Begins,” September 17, 2018.
26 Civil Georgia, “Key Points: T BC Bank Affair,” March 9, 2019; Margarita Antidze, “Georgia’s Prosecutors Charge
T BC Group’s Chairman with Money Laundering,” July 24, 2019.
27 Iulian Ernst, “US Partner ‘Has Pulled Out of Georgia’s Anaklia Deep Water Port Project’,” bne Intellinews, August
15, 2019.
28 T ransparency International Georgia, “Charges Against the Founders of T BC Bank Raise Many Questions about the
Investigation,” July 25, 2019; U.S. Embassy Georgia, “ T he U.S. Embassy Statement on Criminal Charges Against T BC
Bank Co-founders Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze,” July 25, 2019.
29 Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, “Amicus Curiae Brief Relating to Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri
Japaridze’s Case,” January 15, 2020.
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UNM. The dispute sparked debate within the ruling party, as wel as with NGOs that expressed
concern that some of the nominated judges could be susceptible to corruption.30
Although the government agreed to alter the rules of appointment, the new judicial selection
process remained controversial. The High Council of Justice submitted a revised (and expanded)
list of 20 candidates to parliament in September 2019. In December 2019, the parliament
approved the lifetime appointment of 14 new Supreme Court justices. Domestic and international
stakeholders criticized the process as nontransparent and counter to the intent of long-awaited
judicial reforms, and said that it did not lead to the appointment of a fully qualified and
independent roster of judges.31
Figure 1. Georgia

Sources: Map created by CRS. Map information generated using data from the National Geospatial Intel igence
Agency, DeLorme, Department of State, and Esri.
Economy
For more than two decades, Georgia has been recovering from the severe economic decline it
experienced after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.32 In 2019, Georgia’s gross domestic

30 Civil Georgia, “Ruling Party MPs Divided Over Supreme Court Appointments,” January 9, 2019; Civil Georgia,
“Watchdogs Rally for Free Courts, Slam GDDG,” February 7, 2019; T ransparency International Georgia, “Open Letter
to the Diplomatic Missions,” February 21, 2019.
31 Andy Heil, “Supreme Court Power Play ‘Raises Stakes’ on T ense Georgian Landscape,” RFE/RL, December 13,
2019; U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy’s Statement on Supreme Court Nominees,” December 12, 2019;
European Union (EU) External Action Service, “Statement by the Spokesperson on the Appointment of Judges to the
Supreme Court of Georgia,” December 13, 2019.
32 According to World Bank estimates, Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 45% in 1992, 29% in
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product (GDP) was around $17.7 bil ion (approximately 11 times less than that of Oklahoma,
which has a similar population size). Its per capita GDP ($4,764) is midsized in comparison to
Russia and other post-Soviet states.
In 2017, Georgia’s economy entered a period of relatively strong growth. After average growth of
around 3% a year from 2013 to 2016, Georgia’s GDP grew by around 5% a year from 2017 to
2019. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Georgia’s GDP wil decline by
about 5% in 2020, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.33
Prior to the onset of the pandemic, the IMF characterized Georgia as having “resilient” economic
growth, a historical y low current account deficit, strong revenue growth, and a healthy banking
sector. The IMF also noted “rising inflationary pressures” and indicated that “advancing financial
sector and sectoral reforms would make the economy more resilient to shocks and sustain
medium-term growth.”34 In September 2020, the IMF underlined the pandemic’s significant
economic impact but also indicated that Georgia’s “policy response … has been so far successful
in containing the economic and social impact of the pandemic.”35
Poverty has declined in recent years, although it is stil relatively high. According to official data,
20% of the population lived in poverty in 2019 (down from 35% a decade before). In 2019,
recorded unemployment was 12%, although some surveys suggest a higher rate of
unemployment.36 About 38% of Georgian laborers work in agriculture, a sector of the economy
that accounts for less than 10% of GDP.37
Georgia’s economy depends in part on remittances from labor migration. From 2015 to 2019,
remittances were estimated to make up about 9% of Georgia’s GDP. In 2019, the National Bank
of Georgia reported that Russia was the source of about 25% of remittances, followed by Italy
(14%), Greece (11%), the United States (10%), and Israel (9%).38
In 2017, the IMF approved a three-year Extended Fund Facility arrangement to provide Georgia
with around $285 mil ion in loans to support economic reforms focusing, among other things, on
financial stability and infrastructure investment. The IMF noted the need for Georgia to increase
its agricultural productivity, improve its business environment, and reform its education system.39
To help Georgia address the coronavirus pandemic, the IMF disbursed about $200 mil ion,
including about $160 mil ion in new assistance, in May 2020.40

1993, and 10% in 1994. In the three years before the 2008 global financial crisis, Georgia achieved annual growth rates
of 9% or higher. After a 4% decline in 2009, Georgia achieved gr owth of 6%-7% from 2010 to 2012.
33 IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual Visit to Georgia,” press release, September 15, 2020.
34 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Fifth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility for Georgia,” press release, December 17, 2019; IMF, Country Report No. 19/372, December 2019, pp. 4-7.
35 IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual Visit to Georgia,” press release, September 15, 2020.
36 Official data are from Geostat, Georgia’s national statistics office, at https://www.geostat.ge/en. In one regular
survey of social and political views, 22% of respondents said they were unemployed in autumn 2019 (prior to the onset
of the coronavirus pandemic). Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute), “ Public
Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia,” September-October 2019.
37 Geostat, at https://www.geostat.ge/en.
38 National Bank of Georgia, at https://nbg.gov.ge.
39 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Approves US$285.3 Million Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility
for Georgia,” press release, April 12, 2017; and IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017.
40 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Completes the Sixth Review under the Extended Fund Facility and Approves the
Request for Augmentation of Access to Support Georgia Address the COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, May 1,
2020.
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Georgia suffered from energy shortages and gas cutoffs in the past, but it has improved its energy
security in recent years. Almost al of Georgia’s natural gas supplies come from neighboring
Azerbaijan. Georgia has rehabilitated hydropower plants and constructed new ones, although
some key hydropower development plans have engendered local and NGO opposition.41
In 2019, Georgia’s largest merchandise trading partner was the EU, which accounted for about
23% of total trade ($3.0 bil ion). Individual y, Georgia’s four largest trading partners were Turkey
($1.8 bil ion, or 14% of Georgia’s trade), Russia ($1.5 bil ion, 11%), China ($1.1 bil ion, 8%),
and Azerbaijan ($1.1 bil ion, 8%). More than half of Georgia’s merchandise exports (51%) went
to five countries: Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. Its main exports were
motor vehicles, copper ores, beverages (wine, water, and spirits), iron and steel, and
pharmaceuticals.42
Free trade agreements with the EU (signed in 2014) and China (signed in 2017) may improve
Georgia’s prospects for export-led growth. Georgia is also exploring a trade agreement with
India. However, Georgia’s manufacturing sector is smal , and its top exports include used foreign
cars and scrap metal, which provide low added value. In 2017, the IMF indicated that Georgia
could further diversify its agricultural exports but noted the need to improve quality and
standards.43
Tourism to Georgia has increased in recent years, and annual tourism-related income has more
than tripled since 2011. In 2019, the number of international visitors who stayed in the country
overnight was around 5.1 mil ion, a 277% increase since 2011. Most tourists are from
neighboring countries: Azerbaijan, Russia, Armenia, and Turkey.44 In September 2020, the IMF
noted that “tourism revenues have come to a virtual standstil ” due to the pandemic.45
From 2015 to 2019, foreign direct investment (FDI) averaged $1.6 bil ion a year. About 60% of
the total amount came from Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Turkey.
During this period, most FDI was in transport (24%); other leading sectors were finance (15%),
energy (12%), and construction (9%).46 In 2017, the IMF noted that attracting FDI to sectors with
high export potential, including tourism and agriculture, is “crucial to ensure growth in foreign
markets.”47
Relations with the European Union and NATO
The Georgian government has long made closer integration with the EU and NATO a priority.
According to recent polls, more than 75% of the Georgian population supports membership in the
EU and about 70% supports membership in NATO.48

41 Giorgi Lomsadze, “T roubled Dams on Georgia’s Waters,” Eurasianet, February 19, 2020; Rosamund Brennan,
“Critics Call Out Financial and Social Costs of Georgia Hydro Dam,” Al Jazeera, June 22, 2020; Andrew Barry and
Evelina Gambino, “Unsustainable T ransition? Hydropower and the Post -Covid Recovery in Georgia,” openDemocracy,
July 30, 2020.
42 Geostat, as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
43 IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017, pp. 8, 43; EIU, Country Report: Georgia, August 2017, p. 7.
44 Georgian National T ourism Administration, at https://gnta.ge/statistics/.
45 IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Virtual Visit to Georgia,” press release, September 15, 2020.
46 Geostat, at https://www.geostat.ge/en.
47 IMF, Country Report No. 17/97, April 2017, p. 45.
48 CRRC Georgia (for the National Democratic Institute), “Public Attitudes in Georgia: Results of June 2020 Survey.”
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In 2014, Georgia concluded an association agreement with the EU that included a Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and encouraged harmonization with EU laws and
regulations.49 The EU granted Georgia visa-free travel in 2017. The EU also is a major provider
of foreign aid to Georgia, providing on average about €130 mil ion (about $154 mil ion) a year in
2018 and 2019.50
As of 2019, the benefits of the EU free-trade agreement for Georgia remain unclear. In 2019, the
total value of Georgian exports to the EU was about 32% greater than in 2014. Exports to the EU
as a share of Georgia’s total exports, however, were the same in 2019 as they were in 2014
(21%).51 In January 2019, the European Commission stated that Georgia is “reaping the benefits
of economic integration” with the EU but noted that “further efforts are needed to stimulate
exports and improve the trade balance.”52
Georgia has close relations with NATO, which considers Georgia one of its “closest partners.”53 A
NATO-Georgia Commission was established in 2008. At its 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders
established a “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package” to help Georgia bolster its defense
capabilities, including capacity-building, training, exercises, and enhanced interoperability.
Georgia also is one of NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners, a cooperative status currently
granted to six of NATO’s close strategic partners.54 In 2015, Georgia joined the NATO Response
Force, a rapid reaction force.
Georgia is one of the top troop contributors (and the top non-NATO contributor) in the NATO-led
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. At its height, Georgia’s deployment to NATO’s
previous International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan reached over
1,500 troops, who served with no operational caveats. As of August 2020, Georgia is the fifth-
largest contributor to the Resolute Support Mission, with 860 troops.55
In 2015, NATO opened a Joint Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia to provide training,
evaluation, and certification opportunities to enhance interoperability and operational readiness.
The center hosted its second joint NATO-Georgia exercise in March 2019 (the first one was held
in 2016). Some NATO member states also participate in two sets of regular U.S.-Georgia led
military exercises: Agile Spirit and Noble Partner (see “Military Aid Since the August 2008 War,”
below). NATO also has established a Defense Institution Building School for professional
development and training.

49 T he free-trade agreement was applied provisionally in 2014 and entered into force in 2016. T he text of the
association agreement and the corresponding agenda for 2017-2020 are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/
georgia/9740/eugeorgia-association-agreement_en. More information on the free-trade agreement is available from the
Georgian government at http://www.dcfta.gov.ge/en/home.
50 European Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Staff Working Document: Association
Im plem entation Report on Georgia, February 6, 2020, p. 16.
51 Georgian imports from the EU in 2019 (24%) made up a slightly smaller share of total imports than in 2014 (26%).
EU data do not include data from the United Kingdom. Geostat, as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
52 European Commission and EEAS, Joint Staff Working Document: Association Implementation Report on Georgia ,
January 30, 2019, p. 18.
53 NAT O, “Relations with Georgia,” updated March 26, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm.
54 NAT O’s Enhanced Opportunity Partners are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden, and Ukraine. NAT O,
“Partnership Interoperability Initiative,” updated June 12, 2020, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_132726.htm.
55 Georgia also contributed more than 2,250 troops to the NAT O-led Kosovo Force, or KFOR, between 1999 and 2008.
NAT O, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” updated August 2020; U.S. Department of State,
“U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020.
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Many observers consider that closer integration with the EU and NATO has not enabled Georgia
to improve its near-term prospects for membership in these organizations. The EU is unlikely to
consider Georgia a candidate for membership soon, given the EU’s internal chal enges and a lack
of support for enlargement among many members. In 2008, NATO members agreed that Georgia
and Ukraine would become members of NATO, but Georgia has not been granted a clear path to
or timeline for membership.56
Many observers attribute Georgia’s lack of a clear path to NATO membership to some members’
concerns that Georgia’s membership could lead to a heightened risk of war with Russia, which
occupies around 18% of Georgia’s territory. Many believe that NATO wil not move forward with
membership as long as Russia occupies Georgian territory and the conflict remains unresolved.
Relations with Russia and Secessionist Regions
The Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia sought to break away from Georgia in the
early 1990s, during and after Georgia’s pursuit of independence from the USSR.57 At the time,
many observers believed Soviet and, later, Russian authorities instigated the conflicts and/or
assisted local forces to halt Georgia’s efforts to distance itself from Russia. After the conflicts
ended, Russian peacekeeping forces remained in both regions.
Since the 1990s, Georgia’s relations with Russia have remained tense. Tbilisi has blamed
Moscow for obstructing Georgia’s Western integration. Many observers believe that Moscow
supports Abkhazia and South Ossetia to prevent Georgia from joining NATO.
Since 2012, however, the Georgian government has sought to improve economic relations with
Russia. In 2013, Moscow lifted an embargo on popular Georgian exports (including wine and
mineral water) that had been in place since 2006.58 As a result, Russia again became one of
Georgia’s main trading partners. The share of Georgia’s merchandise exports to Russia as a
percentage of its total exports rose from 2% in 2012 to 13% in 2019.59 The annual number of
Russians visiting Georgia more than tripled from 2012 to 2019.60
Improved relations with Russia do not appear to have led to greater public support in Georgia for
closer integration with Russia. Several overtly pro-Russian parties performed poorly in the 2016
parliamentary elections. One electoral bloc critical of Georgia’s European integration, the
nationalist-conservative Al iance of Patriots, cleared the 5% threshold to enter parliament, but
even this bloc’s leadership did not campaign for membership in the Russia-led Eurasian
Economic Union. In August 2020, a Russian NGO al eged the Al iance of Patriots was receiving

56 In the Bucharest Summit Declaration of April 2008, heads of state and government of NAT O member countries
declared that “NAT O welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NAT O. We
agreed today that these countries will become members of NAT O.” NAT O, “ Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3,
2008.
57 T he South Ossetia conflict occurred in 1991-1992; the Abkhazia conflict occurred in 1992-1993.
58 Also in 2006, Russia forcibly deported more than 2,000 Georgian migrant workers, seemingly in response to
Georgia’s arrest of four Russian military officers on espionage-related charges. In 2014, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) ruled that the deportation violated the European Convention of Human Rights but did not make a ruling
regarding compensation. In 2019, the ECHR ruled that Russia should pay €10 million (currently almost $ 12 million) in
compensation to the deportees; as of September 2020, Russia had not complied with the ruling. Civil Georgia, “ CoE
Concerned with Russia’s Failure to Pay to Deportation Victims,” September 5, 2020.
59 T he share of Georgian merchandise imports from Russia also increased, from 6% in 2012 to 11% in 2019. Geostat,
as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
60 Georgian National T ourism Administration, at https://gnta.ge/statistics/.
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Russian financial and technical support.61 In preelection polls, the Al iance of Patriots has
received support from 3% of respondents.62
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are smal but strategical y located regions of Georgia (see Figure 1).
Abkhazia accounts for more than half of Georgia’s Black Sea coastline. South Ossetia is located
astride a major transportation route to Russia and close to Georgia’s main east-west highway.
Authorities in Abkhazia al ege that the region’s population in 2011 was around 240,000 (51%
Abkhaz, 19% Georgian, 17% Armenian, 9% Russian). Most Georgians—who were previously the
largest ethnic group in Abkhazia—were forced to flee Abkhazia during the 1992-1993 war and
became internal y displaced persons, or IDPs (Abkhazia’s population in the 1989 Soviet census
was around 525,000, of which 46% were ethnic Georgians and 17% ethnic Abkhaz).
The Georgian government has estimated that about 40,000 ethnic Georgians stil live in Abkhazia.
Many observers note these Georgians face chal enges regarding freedom of movement, political
rights, and native-language education.63 In 2020, a new local government came to power in
Abkhazia and indicated it may seek to restore certain rights to the region’s ethnic Georgian
population.64
Authorities in South Ossetia al ege that the region’s population in 2015 was around 54,000 (90%
Ossetian, 7% Georgian). South Ossetia’s population in the 1989 Soviet census was around 98,000
(66% Ossetian, 29% Georgian). Most ethnic Georgians that remained in the region after the 2008
war (see below) are residents of the easternmost Akhalgori region, which was under Georgia’s
direct control until the 2008 war.
As in occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia has provided citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Observers note that Russia justified its 2008 invasion of Georgia in part by
al eging the need to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia.65
2008 Russia-Georgia War
Georgia’s relations with Russia worsened after ex-President Saakashvili came to power in 2003
and sought to accelerate Georgia’s integration with the West. The Georgian government
established greater control over Georgian-populated vil ages in South Ossetia and the remote and
thinly-populated Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In 2004, new clashes between Georgian and local
forces occurred. After another round of escalation in 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to prevent the
Georgian government from reestablishing control over South Ossetia. The five-day war in August

61 Civil Georgia, “Russian Watchdog: Kremlin Interferes in Georgia Polls, Aids Alliance of Patriots,” August 25, 2020;
Civil Georgia, “Russian Watchdog’s Second Report on Moscow’s Meddling in Georgian Elections,” September 1,
2020.
62 Center for Insights in Survey Research (International Republican Institute), “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of
Georgia,” August 4-21, 2020; JAM News, “Georgia: 70% of Voters Prefer a Coalition Government,” October 13, 2020.
63 Giorgi Menabde, “Georgians in Abkhazia: A Choice Between Assimilation and Emigration,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
August 6, 2019; Olesya Vartanyan, “Easing T ravel Between Georgia and Breakaway Abkhazia,” International Crisis
Group, September 5, 2019.
64 OC Media, “Abkhazian HR Commissioner Condemns T orture, Eth nic Discrimination, and Domestic Violence,” June
30, 2020; Civil Georgia, “Abkhazia’s Ankvab: ‘Gali Georgians Are Our Citizens,’” August 14, 2020.
65 Yuri Zoria, “Is Russia’s Passport Scheme in Donbas a Harbinger of Full-Scale Invasion Like in 2008 Georgia?”
Euromaidan Press, May 14, 2019.
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2008 led to the deaths of more than 800 civilians and military personnel, the expulsion of some
20,000 Georgian residents from South Ossetia and the destruction of their vil ages, and Georgian
loss of control over the Akhalgori region.66 In Abkhazia, local forces took control of the Kodori
Gorge. Russian forces temporarily occupied Georgian territory outside Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and recognized the latter as independent states.
After the 2008 War and Recent Developments
Since 2008, Moscow has tightened control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has
established military bases and border guard outposts in the two regions that reportedly house
around 3,500-5,000 military and 1,500 border guard personnel in each region.67 Russian and local
authorities have constructed boundary fences, imposed transit restrictions, and frequently
detained Georgian citizens for “il egal” crossings.68
In 2019, new tensions arose around South Ossetia. In an apparent effort to harden and extend the
boundary line, Russian and local authorities erected new fencing within two Georgian-populated
vil ages and established border markers in another area within Georgian-controlled territory.
Georgian authorities responded by establishing a new police checkpoint near the boundary line,
after which authorities in South Ossetia closed the crossing point for the Akhalgori region (with
an estimated resident population of under 2,000 and approximately 400 daily crossings). Locals
said the closure led to the death of at least 10 residents who were unable to be transported for
medical care.69 In January 2020, local authorities temporarily opened the crossing point for
residents to receive medical care and pensions.70 In February 2020, local authorities enacted new
crossing point closures, ostensibly related to coronavirus concerns.71
Conflict Resolution
The 2008 war ended with a six-point cease-fire plan brokered by then-French President Nicolas
Sarkozy and a follow-on implementation plan. The six-point plan included a non-use of force

66 For more on the 2008 war, see Cory Welt, “T he T hawing of a Frozen Conflict: T he Internal Security Dilemma and
the 2004 Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, 1 (2010), pp. 63-97; Report of the Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (Council of the European Union), (3 volumes),
September 2009; Ruslan Pukhov, ed., The Tanks of August (Moscow: Centre for Analysis of Strategies and
T echnologies, 2010); Gerard T oal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
67 International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, p. 190; T estimony of Amb. David Bakradze,
in U.S. Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia’s Occupation of Georgia and the
Erosion of the International Order, hearings, 115th Congress, 2nd sess., July 17, 2018.
68 At least four Georgian citizens have been killed or died under suspicious circumstances while in detention or in
incidents involving local armed forces. In 2018, the Georgian government compiled a list of human rights offenders in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili list) and called for international sanctions. Agenda.ge, “ 327
Detained Illegally By Occupying Forces in Georgia Between 2017 -19,” February 26, 2019; Civil Georgia,
“Independent Expert Speaks of Preliminary Details of Kvaratskhelia’s Forensic Examination,” March 17, 2019; Civil
Georgia, “Government Unveils T atunashvili-Otkhozoria List,” June 27, 2018.
69 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Russia Advances Its Great Wall of Georgia,” Eurasianet, August 15, 2019; EU Monitoring
Mission in Georgia, “Situation at the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia,” press release, September 16,
2019; Human Rights Center (Georgia), State of Hum an Rights Along the Dividing Lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia ,
2019; Georgia T oday, “Occupied Akhalgori Faces Humanitarian Crisis,” January 16, 2020.
70 Civil Georgia, “T skhinvali T emporarily Opens Crossing Point for Certain Group of Akhalgori Residents,” January
24, 2020; IPN, “ Occupation Forces Close Entrance to Akhalgori,” February 7, 2020.
71 Georgia Today, “Occupied T skhinvali, Abkhazia Close Entrances to Rest of Georgia,” February 28, 202 0.
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pledge and the return of Russia’s armed forces to the positions they held prior to the start of
hostilities.72 Regular Russian forces withdrew from areas they had occupied outside South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, but within the two regions they deployed new forces in greater numbers and
outside preexisting peacekeeping formats. As a result, many international observers consider
Russia not to be in compliance with the six-point plan.
Al parties to the conflict, together with the United States, the EU, the U.N., and the OSCE,
participate in the Geneva International Discussions, convened quarterly to address issues related
to the conflict. Parties to the conflict, together with the U.N. and OSCE, also have participated in
joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) to address local security issues and
build confidence. Abkhaz and South Ossetian representatives periodical y suspend their
participation in the IPRMs, which have not convened since June 2018 for Abkhazia and did not
convene from August 2019 to July 2020 for South Ossetia.73 The EU leads an unarmed civilian
Monitoring Mission in Georgia that monitors compliance with the cease-fire; Russian authorities
do not permit it to operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.74
U.S.-Georgia Relations
Georgia is one of the United States’ closest partners among the post-Soviet states. With a history
of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States and Georgia have deepened
their strategic partnership since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
A U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, signed in 2009, provides the framework for
much of the two countries’ bilateral engagement. A Strategic Partnership Commission convenes
annual plenary sessions and working groups to address political, economic, security, and people-
to-people issues.75
Before the 2008 war, the United States supported granting Georgia a NATO Membership Action
Plan and backed NATO’s April 2008 pledge that Georgia eventual y would become a member of
NATO. In August 2017, U.S. Vice President Michael Pence said in Tbilisi that the Trump
Administration “stand[s] by the 2008 NATO Bucharest statement, which made it clear that
Georgia wil one day become a member of NATO.”76 At a press conference after the July 2018
NATO summit in Brussels, President Trump said that “at a certain point [Georgia wil ] have a
chance” to join NATO, if “not right now.”77
U.S. officials have frequently expressed support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity. In a 2017 visit to Georgia, Vice President Pence said the United States “strongly
condemns Russia’s occupation on Georgia’s soil.”78 In 2018, the State Department indicated that

72 Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Volume III, pp. 587-594.
73 T he Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) for Abkhazia also did not convene from 2012 to 2016.
T amar Svanidze, “ Breakaway Abkhazia to Resume IPRM Borderline Meetings after 4 Year Break ,” Georgia Today,
March 24, 2016; EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), “ Positive Atmosphere as 96th Incident Prevention and Response
Mechanism Meeting T akes Place in Ergneti,” press release, July 30, 2020; Civil Georgia, “ Geneva T alks Co-Chairs
Hold Meetings in T bilisi, T skhinvali, Sokhumi,” September 17, 2020.
74 For more, see the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia website, at https://eumm.eu.
75 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission,” at https://www.state.gov/u-s-georgia-
strategic-partnership-commission/.
76 White House, “ Remarks by the Vice President and Georgian Prime Minister in a Joint Press Conference,” August 1,
2017.
77 White House, “ Remarks by President T rump at Press Conference After NAT O Summit,” July 12, 2018.
78 White House, “ Remarks by the Vice President and Georgian Prime Minister in a Joint Press Conference,” August 1,
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“the United States’ position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia is unwavering: The United States
fully supports Georgia’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.”79
The United States cal s on Russia to comply with the terms of the 2008 cease-fire agreement,
including withdrawal of its forces to prewar positions, and to reverse its recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as independent states.80 U.S. officials have criticized Russian efforts at
hardening and extending the boundary lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.81 The U.S.
government has expressed support for Georgia’s “commitment to dialogue and a peaceful
resolution to the conflict,” and in 2018 the State Department welcomed a new peace initiative that
the government of Georgia unveiled.82
The United States has criticized recent cyberattacks against Georgia. In February 2020, Secretary
of State Michael Pompeo condemned a cyberattack he attributed to Russian military intel igence
that “disrupted operations of several thousand Georgian government and privately-run websites
and interrupted the broadcast of at least two major television stations.”83 Secretary Pompeo said
that the United States would “offer additional capacity building and technical assistance to help
strengthen Georgia’s public institutions and improve its ability to protect itself from these kinds
of activities.”
In September 2020, the U.S. Embassy in Georgia said that it was “appal ed” by reports of an
unattributed cyberattack that “attempted to il egal y access [COVID-19] pandemic management
information,” including from Georgia’s Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research. The
Lugar Center is a government laboratory that was established with U.S. financial support and
houses the Georgian National Center for Disease Control and Public Health, as wel as the U.S.
Army Medical Research Directorate-Georgia, an “overseas infectious disease laboratory of the
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.”84
The United States has strongly supported democracy and governance reforms in Georgia for
many years. In June 2020, the State Department stated that “the United States applauds Georgia’s
historic adoption of constitutional amendments that establish a more proportional electoral
system.”85 The next month, Secretary Pompeo spoke by phone to Georgian Prime Minister
Gakharia. According to the State Department, Secretary Pompeo “highlighted the importance of
holding free, fair, and transparent parliamentary elections […] and stressed the importance of
rigorous implementation of recently passed electoral reforms.” The Secretary also “urged
continued efforts to strengthen the independence of Georgia’s judiciary as an essential step for

2017.
79 U.S. Department of State, “ Russia’s Violations of Georgian Sovereignty,” January 26, 2018.
80 U.S. Department of State, “Russia’s Violations of Georgian Sovereignty,” January 26, 2018.
81 U.S. Department of State, “ Military Buildup in the Russian-occupied Georgian Region of South Ossetia,” August 30,
2019; U.S. Embassy of Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Shooting/Detention Along South Ossetia Administrative
Boundary Line,” July 12, 2020.
82 U.S. Department of State, “United States Welcomes Georgia Peace Initiative,” April 4, 2018.
83 U.S. Department of State, “The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia,”
February 20, 2020.
84 U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “U.S. Embassy Statement on September 1, 2020 Cyberattack against Georgian Ministry of
Health,” September 3, 2020; U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Lugar Center Supports Georgian NCDC on COVID -19
Response,” April 9, 2020.
85 U.S. Department of State, “On the Passage of Georgian Constitutional Reform,” June 29, 2020.
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attracting foreign investment and cautioned against politicization of Georgia’s judicial and
electoral processes.”86
Congressional Action
Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253)
states that the United States “supports the policy known as the ‘Stimson Doctrine’ and thus does
not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the il egal invasions and
occupations” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia.87
Since FY2017, foreign operations appropriations have prohibited foreign assistance to
governments that recognize the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia and have restricted
funds from supporting Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (P.L. 116-94,
§7047(c)).88 The 2014 Ukraine Freedom Support Act (P.L. 113-272) provides for sanctions
against Russian entities that transfer weapons il egal y to the territory of Georgia and other states.
On October 22, 2019, during the 116th Congress, the House passed the Georgia Support Act (H.R.
598) by voice vote.89 The bil expresses support for Georgia’s sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity, as wel as for its democratic development, Euro-Atlantic and European
integration, and peaceful conflict resolution. If passed, the bil would require the Secretary of
State to submit to Congress reports on U.S. security assistance to Georgia, U.S.-Georgia
cybersecurity cooperation, and a strategy to enhance Georgia’s capabilities to combat Russian
disinformation and propaganda. The bil also would require the President to impose sanctions on
those responsible for serious human rights abuses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The House version of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395) would
express the sense of Congress that the United States “should reaffirm support for an enduring
strategic partnership” with Georgia, support Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
“continue support for multi-domain security assistance” (§1245). The act also would express the
sense of Congress that the United States should support “Georgia’s continued development of
democratic values, path to electoral reform, commitment to combating corruption, and efforts to
ensure the Georgian private sector upholds international recognized standards” (§1299C). In
addition, the act would require the Secretary of State to submit reports to Congress on the status
of democratic reform in Georgia and on internal y displaced persons in Georgia, as wel as in
Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan (§§1299C, 1281).
The House-passed FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 7608) would withhold 15% of
economic and development assistance funds to Georgia until the Secretary of State determines
and reports to Congress that the government is “taking effective steps” to strengthen democratic
institutions, combat corruption, and “ensure the rule of law in the private sector is consistent with
international y recognized standards” (§7046). At the same time, the House Committee on

86 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Georgian Prime Minister Gakharia,” July 27, 2020.
87 As noted in a proposed concurrent resolution introduced in September 2008 (H.Con.Res. 430), the Stimson Doctrine
is named for Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who “declared in 1932 that the United States would not recognize
territorial changes effected by force following th e seizure of Manchuria by Japan.”
88 Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria have joined Russia in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as
independent states. In 2014, T uvalu retracted its earlier recogniH.Res. 1166tion of these regions’ independence.
Vanuatu, which recognized the independence of Abkhazia but not South Ossetia, appears to have changed its policy
over time.
89 T he House passed a similar bill (H.R. 6219) by unanimous consent during the 115th Congress.
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Appropriations “applaud[ed] the adoption of constitutional amendments … enacted as a result of
an agreement among a majority of Georgian political parties.”90
Many Members of Congress have expressed their support for Georgia in House and Senate
resolutions. In 2016, during the 114th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660,
which expressed support for Georgia’s territorial integrity, in a 410-6 vote. The resolution
condemned Russia’s military intervention and occupation, cal ed upon Russia to withdraw its
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, and urged the U.S. government
to declare unequivocal y that the United States wil not recognize Russia’s de jure or de facto
sovereignty over any part of Georgia under any circumstances.91
The Senate and House have passed other resolutions in support of Georgian sovereignty and
territorial integrity: in 2011-2012 (S.Res. 175, H.Res. 526), in September 2008 (S.Res. 690), and,
before the conflict, in May-June 2008 (H.Res. 1166S.Res. 391, S.Res. 550) and December 2007
(S.Res. 391).
In 2019 and 2020, Members of Congress sent several letters to Georgian leadership, cal ing on
the Georgian government to maintain democratic reforms and adhere to the rule of law.92
Foreign Aid
Since independence, Georgia has been a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid in Europe and
Eurasia. In the 1990s (FY1992-FY2000), the U.S. government provided more than $860 mil ion
in total aid to Georgia ($96 mil ion a year on average).93 In the latter part of the decade, the
United States began to provide Georgia with increased amounts of aid to improve border and
maritime security and to combat transnational crime, including through the development of
Georgia’s Coast Guard.94
In the 2000s, Georgia became the largest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia.
From FY2001 to FY2007, total aid to Georgia amounted to more than $945 mil ion ($135 mil ion
a year, on average).95 In 2005, Georgia also was awarded an initial five-year (2006-2011) $295
mil ion grant from the U.S. Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation (MCC) for road, pipeline, and
municipal infrastructure rehabilitation, as wel as for agribusiness development.96

90 H.Rept. 116-444 to accompany H.R. 7608.
91 A parallel resolution (S.Res. 106) was introduced in the Senate during the 115th Congress.
92 A list of congressional letters sent to Georgian leadership from November 2019 to February 2020 is available at Civil
Georgia, “U.S. Congressman Weber Concerned Over Georgia’s ‘Backsliding from Democratic Values,’” February 12,
2020.
93 Foreign aid totals from FY1992 to FY2000 include all agencies and accounts. Over 40% of this total was for
humanitarian food assistance. See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Governm ent Assistance to and Cooperative Activities
with the New Independent States of the Form er Soviet Union , FY2000 Annual Report (Appendix), at https://2009-
2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10250.htm.
94 In total, the United States provided around $166 million for the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
program, which existed from FY1998 to FY2011. Another $34 million in border security assistance was provided to
Georgia through the Export and Border Security program. International Business and T echnical Consultants, Maritim e
Security Special Them atic Report, Georgia Monitoring Project, submitted to U.S. Department of State, April 2012, p. 3,
at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/193597.pdf.
95 CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s annual U.S. Government Assistance to
and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2001 to FY2007, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/
c10250.htm.
96 U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), “Georgia Compact,” at https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/
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The United States gave increased amounts of military aid to Georgia after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. At the time, the George W. Bush Administration considered Georgia part of
a “second stage” in the “war on terror,” together with Yemen and the Philippines, and supported
Georgia with a two-year Train and Equip Program.97 This program was fol owed by a
Sustainment and Stability Operations Program through 2007 that supported a Georgian troop
deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
After Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, the United States substantial y increased its
assistance to Georgia. The U.S. government immediately provided over $38 mil ion in
humanitarian aid and emergency relief, using U.S. aircraft and naval and coast guard ships.98 In
September 2008, then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a total aid package worth
at least $1 bil ion.99 Total U.S. assistance to Georgia for FY2008-FY2009 amounted to $1.04
bil ion, including $634 mil ion in supplemental funds.100 Georgia also received an additional $100
mil ion in MCC funds (taking the total amount of Georgia’s first MCC grant to $395 mil ion).101
Since the 2008 war, Georgia has continued to be a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the
Europe and Eurasia region. Nonmilitary aid totaled $64 mil ion a year on average from FY2010
to FY2019 ($89.8 mil ion in FY2019).102 In addition, Georgia received a second five-year (2014-
2019) MCC grant of $140 mil ion to support educational infrastructure and training, and to
improve the study of science and technology.103 Separate nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance administered by the Department of Defense, including to support the establishment of
the Lugar Center for Public Health Research, has amounted to over $266 mil ion in obligated
funds since FY2011.104

program/georgia-compact .
97 In March 2002, President George W. Bush said: “Now that the T aliban are gone and al Qaeda has lost its home base
for terrorism [in Afghanistan], we have en tered the second stage of the war on terror—a sustained campaign to deny
sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world.” He named the Philippines,
Georgia, and Yemen as three sites of this second stage. White House, “President Bush T hanks the World Coalition for
Anti-T errorism Efforts,” March 11, 2002, at https://2001-2009.state.gov/coalition/cr/rm/2002/8729.htm.
98 T estimony of Daniel Fried, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Georgia and Implications for
U.S. Policy, hearings, 110th Congress, 2nd sess., September 9, 2008, at https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/
109345.htm.
99 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks on U.S. Economic Support Package for Georgia,” September 3, 2008, at
https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/09/109129.htm.
100 CRS calculations, based on data available in the U.S. Department of State’s annual U.S. Government Assistance to
and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia reports for FY2008 and FY2009, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/
c10250.htm. For details on the $1 billion aid package, see testimony of S. Ken Yamashita, in U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Georgia: One Year After the August War, hearings, 111th Congress, 1st sess., August
4, 2009.
101 U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), “Georgia Compact,” at https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/
program/georgia-compact .
102 T his total includes all State Department and USAID bilateral assistance, except for Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and International Military Education and T raining (IMET ).
103 MCC, “Georgia Compact II,” at https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/georgia-compact-ii.
104 Nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance refers to obligated funds from the Cooperative T hreat Reduction
(CT R) account, as reported by USAID. USAID Foreign Aid Explorer, at https://explorer.usaid.gov/. On the Lugar
Center support, see U.S. Embassy in Georgia, “Lugar Center Supports Georgian NCDC on COVID-19 Response,”
April 9, 2020.
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For FY2020, the State Department al ocated $89.8 mil ion in nonmilitary aid.105 The president’s
FY2021 nonmilitary aid request for Georgia was $41.3 mil ion, and the House Appropriations
Committee recommended $94.8 mil ion.106
Military Aid Since the August 2008 War
Since FY2010, Georgia has received U.S. military assistance primarily through Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), Coalition Support Funds, and Train and Equip and other capacity-building
programs. These funds have been used to support Georgia’s deployments to Afghanistan in ISAF
and the follow-on Resolute Support Mission (around $200 mil ion since 2010), as wel as for
Georgian border and maritime security, counterterrorism, and defense readiness. From FY2010 to
FY2019, the United States provided Georgia almost $265 mil ion in FMF assistance.107
In 2017, the Department of Defense launched a three-year, $35 mil ion training initiative, the
Georgia Defense Readiness Program, which is scheduled to conclude in 2021. This initiative is
intended to improve Georgia’s capacity “to generate, train and sustain forces to defend [its]
territorial integrity and deter Russia.”108
For FY2020, the State Department al ocated $40 mil ion in FMF assistance and $2.2 mil ion in
IMET funds.109 Additional planned military assistance was to be provided under the Department
of Defense’s “Section 333” (global train-and-equip) authority. For FY2021, the President
requested $20 mil ion in FMF assistance and $2.2 mil ion in IMET assistance for Georgia; the
House Appropriations Committee recommended $35 mil ion in FMF assistance and $2.2 mil ion
in IMET assistance for Georgia.110
In recent years, U.S.-Georgia security cooperation has focused increasingly on improving
Georgia’s homeland defense capabilities. In a 2012 visit to Georgia, then-Secretary of State
Hil ary Clinton said that increased cooperation would help improve Georgia’s self-defense
capabilities, promote defense reform and modernization, and provide training and equipment to
support Georgia’s ISAF deployment and NATO interoperability.111 The Obama Administration
refrained from approving major lethal arms sales to Georgia after the 2008 war. Observers
considered various reasons for this hesitation, including doubts regarding the deterrent effect of
such weaponry, concerns about encouraging potential Georgian offensives to retake territory, and
a desire to avoid worsening relations with Russia as the Administration embarked on a new
“reset” policy with Moscow.112

105 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020.
106 H.Rept. 116-444 to accompany H.R. 7608.
107 FMF assistance for Georgia includes bilateral funds, as well as funds allocated through the Europe and Eurasia
Regional account and the Countering Russian Influence Fund. U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Security Cooperation
with Georgia,” June 16, 2020; CRS calculations.
108 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Georgia,” June 16, 2020.
109 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data, June 15, 2020.
110 H.Rept. 116-444 to accompany H.R. 7608.
111 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at Omnibus Session of the Strategic Partnership Commission,” June 5, 2012, at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/06/191784.htm.
112 In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a year after Russia’s invasion, then -Assistant Secretary of
Defense Alexander Vershbow characterized U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia as “a methodical, yet patient,
strategic approach … [focused] on building defense institutions, assisting defense sector reform, and building the
strategic and educational foundations” for training and reform. He said the United States was “carefully examining
each step [of its military assistance program] to ensure it would not be count erproductive to our goals of promoting
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In 2016, the United States and Georgia concluded a three-year framework agreement on security
cooperation focusing on “improving Georgia’s defense capabilities, establishing [an] effective
and sustainable system of defense, enhancing interoperability of the Georgian Armed Forces with
NATO, and ensuring effective military management.”113 The framework agreement led to the
establishment of the Georgia Defense Readiness Program (noted above). In November 2019, the
United States and Georgia signed a new three-year Security Cooperation Framework “that
reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Georgia strategic relationship and prioritized bilateral
security cooperation focused on Georgian defense readiness and interoperability.”114
The Trump Administration has approved the provision of major defensive lethal weaponry to
Georgia. In November 2017, the Department of Defense notified Congress of a Foreign Military
Sale to Georgia of over 400 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles, as wel as launchers, associated
equipment, and training, at a total estimated cost of $75 mil ion.115
The United States and Georgia have held regular joint military exercises in Georgia since 2011.
Initial exercises, dubbed Agile Spirit, began as a counterinsurgency and peacekeeping operations
training exercise and shifted to a “conventional warfare focus” in 2015, the year after Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine.116 That year, Agile Spirit began to include other NATO partners. A second
bilateral exercise, Noble Partner, was launched in 2015 and was designed “to enhance regional
partnerships and increase U.S. force readiness and interoperability in a realistic, multinational
training environment.”117
Trade
In 2019, the United States was Georgia’s seventh-largest source of merchandise imports and
eighth-largest destination for exports. The value of Georgia’s merchandise imports from the
United States—mainly vehicles, copper ores and concentrates, and industrial machinery—was
$389 mil ion in 2019. The value of merchandise exports to the United States—mainly iron and
steel—was $132 mil ion in 2019.118
Since 2012, the United States and Georgia periodical y have discussed the possibility of a free-
trade agreement. The two countries have signed a bilateral investment treaty and a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement. They also have established a High-Level Dialogue on Trade
and Investment. During Vice President Pence’s August 2017 visit to Georgia, he expressed the
United States’ “keen interest in expanding our trade and investment relationship with Georgia.”119
The Georgia Support Act (H.R. 598), which the House passed by voice vote on October 22, 2019,

peace and stability in the region.” T estimony of Alexander Vershbow, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Georgia: One Year After the August War, hearings, 111th Congress, 1st sess., August 4, 2009.
113 Ministry of Defense of Georgia, “ Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Security Sector Concluded Between the
U.S. and Georgia,” December 7, 2016.
114 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-Georgia Security Working Group,” December 6, 2019.
115 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Georgia—Javelin Missiles and Command Launch Units,” T ransmittal No.
17-59, November 20, 2017; Civil Georgia, “ Javelin Missiles Arrive in Georgia,” January 23, 2018.
116 U.S. Marine Corps, “Exercise Agile Spirit Ends with Bang,” July 27, 2015.
117 U.S. Army, “Exercise Noble Partner 2015 Demonstrates Bilateral Cooperation,” May 1, 2015; U.S. Army Europe,
“Exercise Noble Partner 2020 Begins,” August 26, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing on Exercise Noble
Part ner 2020,” September 15, 2020.
118 Geostat, as reported in T rade Data Monitor.
119 White House, “ Remarks by the Vice President and Georgian Prime Minister in a Joint Press Conference,” August 1,
2017.
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would express the sense of Congress that “the United States Trade Representative should make
progress toward negotiations with Georgia to enter a bilateral free trade agreement with Georgia.”
In 2019, the United States expressed support for Georgia’s deepwater port project in Anaklia
prior to the government’s cancel ation of the project contract (see “Government Cancels Major
Port Project,” above). Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Manisha
Singh said that the port would “grow Georgia’s economy, make Georgia an even stronger trading
partner to the United States, and provide greater connectivity between Europe and the entire
Caspian region.”120 Secretary of State Pompeo expressed “hope that Georgia completes the port
project [which] wil enhance Georgia’s relationship with free economies and prevent Georgia
from fal ing prey to Russian or Chinese economic influence.”121

Author Information

Cory Welt

Specialist in Russian and European Affairs

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120 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Fourth Annual T rans-Caspian Forum,” May 23, 2019.
121 U.S. Department of State, “ Statements to the Press with Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze as Part of the
U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission,” June 11, 2019.
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