Trade Remedies: Antidumping
September 10, 2020
The U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the power to regulate trade with foreign nations and
levy tariffs. Since 1922, U.S. law and foreign policy have favored applying tariffs and duties
Christopher A. Casey
equally to all trading partners. This principle, known as most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment,
Analyst in International
has been central to the rules-based global trading system since 1947.
Trade and Finance

One of the most frequently invoked exceptions to MFN treatment are three “trade remedy” laws.
These laws are enforced primarily through administrative investigations of two U.S. government

agencies: the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) and the
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). Trade remedy laws enable the United States to impose additional duties
aimed at specific producers or countries to remedy unfair trade practices and to help domestic industries adjust to sudden
surges of fairly traded goods. The three types of laws traditionally classified as “trade remedies” are:
Antidumping (AD) laws provide relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, material injury caused by
imported goods sold in the U.S. market at prices that are shown to be less than fair market value. The relief provided is an
additional import duty placed on the dumped imports based upon calculations made by the ITA. Antidumping orders are the
most frequently used and the most controversial trade remedy.
Countervailing duty (CVD) laws give a similar kind of relief to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with,
material injury caused by imported goods that have been found to have received WTO-inconsistent government subsidies,
and can therefore be sold at lower prices than similar goods produced in the United States. The relief provided is an
additional import duty placed on the subsidized imports.
Safeguard (also referred to as escape clause) laws give domestic industries relief from surges of imported goods that are
fairly traded if serious injury is found or is threatened to the domestic industry. The most frequently applied safeguard law,
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, is designed to give domestic industry the opportunity to adjust to the new competition
and remain competitive. The relief provided is generally an additional temporary import duty, a temporary import quota, or a
combination of both. Safeguard laws also require presidential action in order for relief to be put into effect.
Economists have generally seen antidumping laws and policies as economically inefficient. Some, however, have
acknowledged the role that these economically inefficient policies have played in making trade liberalization more politically
feasible by providing protection for industries that might otherwise oppose such measures. In recent years, U.S. exports have
increasingly become a target of AD measures by several major emerging economies, including India and China.
Antidumping laws and policies have also been at the center of dozens of trade disputes between the United States and its
trading partners in the WTO. Reports issued by the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) on the subject have been one of the primary
targets of the U.S. Trade Representative’s criticisms of the AB mechanism in the broader WTO dispute settlement system. If
Congress wishes to maintain a functional dispute settlement system at the WTO it may consider either directing the President
to seek amendments to underlying WTO agreements such that U.S. practices are internationally compliant or direct the ITA
to bring its AD policies into conformity with the AB’s interpretation of the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement.

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Trade Remedies: Antidumping

Introduction
In general, the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), of which the United States is a
member, require each member to apply tariffs and duties equally to all other members. This
principle, known as unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, has been central to the
rules-based global trading system since 1947 and part of U.S. law and foreign policy since 1922.1
The WTO agreements allow exceptions to this treatment in certain circumstances, including to
remedy unfair trade practices and to help domestic industries adjust to sudden surges of fairly
traded goods. The three most frequently applied U.S. trade remedy laws permit the imposition of
antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguards. These laws are enforced through
administrative investigations and actions of two U.S. government agencies: the International
Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) and the U.S. International Trade
Commission (USITC).
The most commonly used of these remedies are antidumping (AD) laws. AD laws provide relief
to domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, material injury caused by imports
sold in the U.S. market at prices that are shown to be less than fair value. The relief provided is an
additional import duty, calculated by the ITA and placed on the dumped imports.2 Antidumping
orders are the most frequently used and the most controversial trade remedy.3
Background
Dumping Defined
In general, dumping occurs when manufacturers export goods for less than they sell similar goods
in their domestic market.4 The controlling international agreement in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) – the Antidumping Agreement (ADA) – defines dumping as the introduction
of a product “into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export
price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the
ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country.”5 U.S. law similarly defines dumping as the “sale or likely sale of goods [in the United

1 Unconditional MFN treatment came into being as a result of both legislative and executive action. First, Section 317
of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of 1922, P.L. 67-318 (September 21, 1922), 42 Stat. 858, empowered the
President to impose duties or exclude imports from any country that treated U.S. goods differently than another
country. Second, President Harding gave permission to his Secretary of State to conclude commercial treaties based on
unconditional MFN treatment. Foreign Relations of the United States 1923, v. 1, pp. 130-131.
2 The Tariff Act of 1930, P.L. 71-361, as amended, Title VII, subtitle B. Codified, as amended, at 19 U.S.C. §§1673 et
seq. Further references will be to the United States Code.
3 The reason for covering dumping and countervailing duties in separate reports is that although the procedures are
similar, as one scholar put it, “the policy discourses of antidumping and of countervailing duties are […] quite
different.” J.M. Finger, Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1993), p. 7.
4 See, e.g., Walter Goode, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
s.v. “dumping”; Jacob Viner, Dumping: A Problem of International Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1923), p. 1.
5 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201. “Comparable price”
refers to the “normal value,” that is the domestic price.
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States] at less than fair value,”6 with the fair value defined as “the price at which the foreign like
product is first sold … for consumption in the exporting country.”7 Simply put, dumping is the
sale of goods abroad for less than the price the goods would have commanded in the home
market.
The Origins of Dumping and Antidumping
Economists have long written about the practice of selling exports for a lower price than in the
home market.8 In 1776, Adam Smith noted the practice by manufacturers to export some of their
surplus goods for sale at a loss for the purpose of “[doubling] the price of their goods in the home
market.”9 Several years later, Alexander Hamilton expressed concern with the practice and its
potential to stymie the development of domestic industry.10 However, such mentions were
sporadic and generally isolated to economic treatises.11
As more countries industrialized in the late-nineteenth century, exporting goods for a price below
the price that could be commanded in the domestic market (whether at a loss or not) became an
economic strategy used to maintain domestic prices while establishing footholds in foreign
markets. The expansion of these practices resulted in more sustained scholarly and political
attention—not all negative.12 In 1880, for example, the U.S. Secretary of State encouraged cotton
manufacturers to “sacrifice profits for a time, if necessary, to secure trade-standing in … several
markets.”13 Twenty-five years later, the U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor was still
dispensing similar advice to manufacturers.14
Because of this strategic deployment of dumping, and the reemergence of state-directed trade
policies at the turn of the twentieth century, politicians and the public (if not always the
economists) began to argue that the practice was unfair. Accusations of using foreign markets as
“dumping-grounds” became frequent and the term “dumping” to describe the practice of selling
surplus goods abroad at a lower price began to be used more frequently.15 British industrialists
protested dumping from German and French manufacturers, while Canadian millers grumbled
about the dumping of American steel.16 While accusations of dumping were common, the actual
prevalence of the practice is hard to calculate, in part because there was no administrative

6 19 U.S.C. §1677(34). “Fair value” is determined by comparing the export price and the “normal value,” which is itself
defined as the either the price at which the good is sold in the domestic market or in a third country (so long as that
price is found to be representative.” 19 U.S.C. §1677b.
7 19 U.S.C. §1677b(a)(1)(B)(i).
8 J.M. Finger, “The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation,” in Robert Howse, ed., The World Trading
System vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 32.
9 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: Methuen, 1904) p. 2:19.
10 Alexander Hamilton, “Report on the Subject of Manufactures, 1791,” in F.W. Taussig, ed., State Papers and
Speeches on the Tariff (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1892), p. 31.
11 Viner, Dumping, ch. 4.
12 Ibid., ch. 4.
13 Qtd. in Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Statistics, “Foreign Markets for American Cotton
Manufactures,” Special Consular Reports 36 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1905), p. 45.
14 Ibid.
15 Viner, Dumping, p. 1.
16 Ibid., chs. 3-5.
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apparatus to investigate such complaints.17 Nevertheless, experts generally agree that there was,
in fact, at least a modest increase in the practice.18
There were several possible causes for whatever dumping existed at the time. First, higher tariffs
in general encouraged the practice. As a leading scholar of antidumping has argued, “These tariffs
provided national firms the opportunity to price monopolistically at home and at the same time
protected them from reimports of goods they sold competitively abroad.”19 Other observers have
noted that dumping was, in some respects, a natural development of trade in industrially advanced
countries as large manufacturers attempted to offset changes in domestic demand by selling large
surpluses abroad.20
During the first decades of the twentieth century, countries began to take action to prevent
dumping or, at least, protect their domestic industries from dumping. In 1904, Canada enacted the
world’s first modern antidumping (AD) law.21 By 1921, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
France, Japan, the United States, and Britain had proposed or enacted AD statutes or other
legislation giving administrative officials discretion to alter tariffs in response to influxes of
goods at abnormally low prices.22 Many of the statutes, including the American, were modeled on
the Canadian law.23 The Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations Secretariat
(the precursor to the United Nations) also commissioned studies on the issue to survey AD
legislation and see if there was a need for international regulation.24
U.S. AD law had precursors in late-nineteenth-century antitrust legislation.25 Some early
observers argued that dumping was a strategy used to injure or hinder development and maintain
monopolistic dominance over foreign countries. In 1916, Congress passed the Antidumping Act,
which imposed criminal and civil penalties on any person importing and selling articles in the
United States “at a price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such
articles” so long as they had the intent of injuring or preventing the establishment of an industry

17 United States Tariff Commission, Information Concerning Dumping and Unfair Foreign Competition in the United
States and Canada’s Antidumping Law (Washington, DC: GPO, 1919), p. 18.
18 Viner, Dumping, chs. 3-5; United States Tariff Commission, Information Concerning Dumping.
19 J.M. Finger, “The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation,” in The World Trading System: Critical
Perspectives on the World Economy vol. 3 (Administered Protection), edited by Robert Howse (London: Routledge,
1998), p. 35.
20 United States Tariff Commission, Information Concerning Dumping, p. 19.
21 Finger, “Origins and Evolution,” p. 32.
22 United States Tariff Commission, Information Concerning Dumping; Viner, Dumping. However, the law was rarely
applied in an anti-dumping context. Diane M. Keppler, “The Geneva Steel Co. Decision Raises Concerns in Geneva:
Why the 1916 Antidumping Act Violates the WTO Antidumping Agreement,” George Washington Journal of
International Law and Economics 32 (1999), pp. 293-294.
23 Finger, “Origins and Evolution,” p. 35. The American statute that was more directly modeled on the Canadian was
the Antidumping Act of 1921, P.L. 67-10 (May 27, 1921), Title II.
24 See, e.g., Jacob Viner, Memorandum on Dumping, Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the International
Economic Conference, Publications of the League of Nations, 1926.II.63 (Geneva: 1926); Ernst Trendelenburg,
Memorandum on the Legislation of Different States for the Prevention of Dumping, Submitted to the Preparatory
Committee for the International Economic Conference, Publications of the League of Nations, 1926.II.66 (Geneva:
1926).
25 Douglas A. Irwin, “The Rise of U.S. Anti-dumping Activity in Historical Perspective,” The World Economy 28, no. 5
(May 2005), p. 652.
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in the United States.26 The law was rarely applied, in part because it was difficult to prove such an
intent.27
U.S. antidumping law took its modern form with the passage of the Antidumping Act of 1921,
which adopted a more globally common administrative (rather than judicial) procedure that
enabled the imposition of additional duties on imports rather than civil or criminal penalties (as
the antitrust branch of legislation had).28
The Antidumping Act of 1921 became the textual basis for Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947,29 the multilateral trade agreement that established the post-
World War II rules-based trading system and which was later incorporated into the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements.30 As such, the U.S. model of antidumping has become the
global standard.
Since 1921, Congress has amended and adjusted U.S. antidumping law many times, but has
maintained the basic administrative framework and Article VI was clarified and amended by the
ADA as part of the establishment of the WTO in 1995.31

26 P.L. 64-271 (September 8, 1916), Title VIII. However, the law was rarely applied in an anti-dumping context and
later was found to violate U.S. trade obligations under the GATT. Appellate Body Report, US – 1916 Act, WTO Doc.
WT/DS136/AB/R; WT/DS162/AB/R (adopted September 26, 2000). See also Diane M. Keppler, “The Geneva Steel
Co. Decision Raises Concerns in Geneva: Why the 1916 Antidumping Act Violates the WTO Antidumping
Agreement,” George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics 32 (1999), pp. 293-294.
27 Irwin, “The Rise of U.S. Anti-dumping Activity in Historical Perspective.”
28 P.L. 67-10 (May 27, 1921), Title II: “[W]henever the Secretary of the Treasury … finds that an industry in the
United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason of the importation
into the United States of foreign merchandise, and that merchandise of such class or kind is being sold or is likely to be
sold in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value, he shall make such a finding public…. [I]f the purchase
price or the exporter’s sales price is less than the foreign market value (or, in the absence of such value, than the cost of
production) there shall be levied, collected, and paid, in addition to the duties imposed thereon by law, a special
dumping duty in an amount equal to such difference.”
29 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Irwin, “The Rise of U.S.
Anti-dumping Activity in Historical Perspective,” p. 654.
30 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154; GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) (hereinafter GATT
1994).
31 While originally its own act, the Trade Act of 1979 repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921 and amended the Tariff
Act of 1930 to include Countervailing and Antidumping Duties. Trade Act of 1979, P.L. 96-39 (July 26, 1979) §§101,
106.
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Present Day Antidumping Laws and Investigations
U.S. Statutes
Statutory authority for AD investigations and remedial actions is found in Subtitle B of Title VII
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (codified, as amended, at 19 U.S.C. §§1673 et seq.). The
law requires the imposition of an antidumping duty if (1) the International Trade Administration
of the Department of Commerce (ITA) determines that imported merchandise is being, or likely
to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value;32 and (2) the U.S. International Trade
Commission (USITC) determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured or is
threatened with material injury,33 or that the
establishment of an industry is materially
The International Trade Administration
retarded, by reason of imports of that
(ITA) and the U.S. International Trade
merchandise.
Commission (USITC)
34 The statute requires that the
AD duty equal the amount by which the
Two U.S. agencies are involved in antidumping
normal value (a calculation of the fair value)
investigations: The International Trade Administration
35
(ITA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
of the merchandise exceeds the export price of
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC).
the merchandise.36
International Trade Administration: Established in
1980, the ITA is an agency within the U.S. Department
U.S. International Obligations
of Commerce charged with promoting trade and
investment and enforcing trade laws and agreements.
The United States is a party to several
U.S. International Trade Commission: Established
international agreements that govern the use of
in 1916 as the U.S. Tariff Commission, the USITC is an
AD laws, including Article VI of the General
independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency
charged with investigating and making determinations in
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
proceedings involving unfair trade practices, providing
which was incorporated into the agreements
analysis and information on U.S. trade, and maintaining
establishing the WTO, and the WTO’s
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
Antidumping Agreement (ADA).37 Both of
(HTSUS).
these agreements were based upon U.S. AD
law and practice and the United States was a proponent of both agreements.38
All WTO members are subject to the terms of Article VI of the GATT and the Antidumping
Agreement. Article VI of GATT allows the imposition of antidumping duties in cases where
dumping “causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a
contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.”39 The ADA
elaborates on the basic principles established in Article VI of the GATT by providing more detail

32 19 U.S.C. §1673(1).
33 19 U.S.C. §1673(2)(A). “Material injury” is defined at 19 U.S.C. §1677(7) as “harm which is not inconsequential,
immaterial, or unimportant.”
34 19 U.S.C. §1673(2)(B).
35 19 U.S.C. §1677b.
36 19 U.S.C. §1673e(a)(1).
37 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.
38 Irwin, “The Rise of U.S. Anti-dumping Activity in Historical Perspective,” p. 654: “The United States was the main
proponent of including AD procedures in Article VI of the [GATT] in 1947. Indeed, the 1921 legislation formed the
textual basis for Article VI.”
39 GATT 1994 art. 6, para. 1.
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on several issues, including how WTO members may determine whether dumping is occurring,
how they determine whether there has been an injury to a domestic industry, what kinds of
evidence can be used, and other issues.40 WTO members whose antidumping laws or practices
violate the terms of the ADA may be subject to WTO dispute settlement proceedings.41
Antidumping Investigations and Measures42
Initiation
The ITA initiates antidumping investigations either on its own initiative or in response to a
petition filed by a representative of a domestic industry with the USITC and the ITA (Figure 1).43
If the ITA receives a petition, it must normally initiate an investigation within 20 days after it
receives a petition and determines that the petition contains the necessary elements for imposing a
duty.44
Preliminary Determinations
The USITC begins the investigation. The
Dumping Margins
central question of its investigation is whether
The term “dumping margin” means the amount by
there is a reasonable indication of an injury or
which the normal value (the ordinary price in the
likely injury to a domestic industry.47 If the
exporting country) exceeds the export price or
USITC’s preliminary determination is
constructed export price (the price paid in the
importing country) of the subject merchandise.45
negative or the USITC determines that
imports of the subject merchandise are
The term “weighted average dumping margin” means
“the percentage determined by dividing the aggregate
negligible, then proceedings end.48 In most
dumping margins determined for a specific exporter or
circumstances, the USITC must make a
producer by the aggregate export prices” of such an
preliminary determination no later than 45
exporter.46 For an example of this in practice, see
days after the start of the investigation.49
Table 4.

If the USITC’s preliminary determination is affirmative, then the ITA begins its preliminary
investigation to determine whether dumping exists. The ITA must make its determination within
140 days, or within 190 days at the petitioner’s request or if the case is extraordinarily
complicated.50

40 Antidumping Agreement arts. 2, 3, 6.
41 CRS In Focus IF10436, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Key Legal Concepts, by Brandon J.
Murrill.
42 See Figure 1. Section adapted from a report originally authored by Cathi Jones. Throughout the investigation, all
phases of an investigation are announced in the Federal Register, and any hearings are announced in advance so that all
interested parties have an opportunity to present their cases.
43 19 U.S.C. §1673a(a).
44 19 U.S.C. §1673a(c)(1)(A).
45 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35).
46 Ibid.
47 19 U.S.C. §1673b(a)(1).
48 19 U.S.C. §1673b(a)(1).
49 19 U.S.C. §1673b(a)(2). In cases that Commerce has taken extra steps to determine industry support, the ITC has 25
days from the time it is notified of Commerce’s initiation to make a preliminary determination.
50 19 U.S.C. §1673b(b) and (c). Expedited time lines are provided for Commerce to make its preliminary determination
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If the ITA’s preliminary determination is affirmative, then ITA also estimates a weighted-average
dumping margin for each exporter or producer individually investigated and an “all-others rate”
for all other exporters.51 The ITA publishes its preliminary results in the Federal Register and
orders U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to delay the final computation of all duties on
imports of the targeted merchandise (“suspend liquidation”) until the case is resolved and to
require the posting of cash deposits, bonds, or other appropriate securities to cover the duties
(plus the estimated dumping margin) for each subsequent entry into the U.S. market.52
If the ITA’s determination is negative, the ITA continues the investigation to the final stage
(without ordering a suspension of liquidation) and the USITC continues its investigation as well.
Because this is a preliminary determination, agencies may not have obtained all possible
evidence, and this allows interested parties a final opportunity to put information and evidence
before the two bodies.53
Final Determinations
Generally, the ITA must make its final determination within 75 days of the preliminary
determination.54 Before issuing a final determination, the ITA must hold a hearing upon request of
any party to the proceeding.55 If the ITA’s final determination is negative, the proceedings end,
and any suspension of liquidation is terminated, bonds and other securities are released, and
deposits are refunded.56 If the ITA’s final determination is affirmative, it orders the suspension of
liquidation if it has not already done so.57 The ITA will publish the order in the Federal Register
and direct CBP to continue or resume (if provisional measures expired) suspension of liquidation
and collection of cash deposits at the rate determined in the ITA’s final determination.

for short life cycle merchandise when foreign manufacturers are shown to be repeat offenders. 19 U.S.C.
§1673b(b)(1)(B).
51 19 U.S.C. §1673b(d). See Table 4.
52 19 U.S.C. §1673b(d)(2).
53 ITA: 19 C.F.R. §351.205; USITC: 19 C.F.R. §207.20
54 19 U.S.C. §1673d(a)(1). However, the ITA may postpone making a final determination to 135 days at the request of
the party to whom the preliminary determination was adverse. 19 U.S.C. §1673d(a)(2).
55 19 C.F.R. §351.310(c).
56 19 U.S.C. §1673(c)(2).
57 19 U.S.C. §1673d(c)(1)(C). Commerce would not suspend liquidation if its preliminary determination were negative.
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Figure 1. Antidumping Investigation Process and Timeline

Source: United States International Trade Commission.
Critical Circumstances
Congress enacted the critical circumstances provision in order “to provide prompt relief to
domestic industries suffering from large volumes, or a surge over a short period, of imports and to
deter exporters whose merchandise is subject to an investigation from circumventing the intent of
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the law by increasing their exports to the United States during the period between initiation of an
investigation and a preliminary determination by the [ITA].”58
If a petitioner alleges that critical circumstances exist in an antidumping case (which would
impose additional retroactive AD duties that one would not normally obtain), then the ITA
determines whether
 (1)(a) there is a reasonable basis to suspect that there is a history of dumping
(combined with material injury due to the imports), or (b) that the importer knew
or should have known that the exporter was selling the merchandise at less than
fair value, and also knew that there was likely to be material injury due to the
sales;59 and
 (2) whether massive imports of the merchandise have occurred over a relatively
short period.60
If the ITA makes an affirmative critical circumstances finding, it extends the suspension of
liquidation of any unliquidated entries of merchandise (entries for which estimated AD duties
have not been paid) into the United States retroactively to 90 days before the suspension of
liquidation was first ordered or the date on which notice of the determination to initiate the
investigation is published in the Federal Register, whichever is later.61
Whether or not the ITA’s initial critical circumstances determination is affirmative, if its final
determination on subsidies or dumping is affirmative, the ITA must also include a final
determination on critical circumstances. If the final determination on critical circumstances is
affirmative, retroactive duties, if not yet ordered, are ordered on unliquidated entries at this time.62
If the critical circumstances determination is negative, all retroactive suspension of liquidation is
terminated, and bonds, securities, or cash deposits related to the retroactive action are released.63
If the ITA makes an affirmative determination of critical circumstances, the USITC’s final
determination must include a finding as to whether the subject imports are likely to undermine
seriously the remedial effect of the AD order.64 If both the USITC and the ITA make affirmative
critical circumstances determinations, any AD duty order applies to the goods for which the
retroactive suspension of liquidation was ordered.65 If the final critical circumstances
determination of either agency is negative, any retroactive suspension of liquidation is terminated,
bonds and securities are released, and any cash deposits are refunded.66

58 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Trade Agreements Act of 1979, report to accompany H.R.
4537, 96th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 96-317 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1979), p. 63.
59 When determining whether importers knew, or should have known, the exporter was selling the merchandise at less
than fair value, the ITC generally considers estimated margins of 25% or greater on sales to unrelated parties and
margins of 15% or greater on sales through related parties to constitute constructive knowledge of sales at less than fair
value. Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished or
Unfinished, From Italy, 52 Federal Register 24198-02, June 29, 1987. Notice of Preliminary Critical Circumstances
Determination: Honey From the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 60 Federal Register 29824-01, June 6, 1995.
60 19 U.S.C. §1673b(e)(1).
61 19 U.S.C. §1673b(e)(2).
62 19 U.S.C. §1673d(c)(4).
63 19 U.S.C. §1673d(b)(3).
64 19 U.S.C. §1673d(b)(4).
65 19 U.S.C. §1673d(c)(4).
66 19 U.S.C. §1673d (c)(3).
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Termination of Investigation and Suspension Agreements
The ITA or the USITC may terminate an investigation if the petitioner withdraws the petition or
of its own accord if the ITA self-initiated the investigation.67 Additionally, the ITA may, in certain
circumstances, suspend an antidumping investigation in favor of an agreement with foreign
exporters (known as “suspension agreements”) that either eliminates the sales of less than fair
value or the injurious effect.68 One example of such an agreement is the recent suspension
agreement between the various Mexican growers associations and the United States with respect
to fresh tomatoes.69 The United States agreed to suspend its antidumping investigation in
exchange for a promise by various Mexican growers associations accounting for substantially all
imports of fresh tomatoes from Mexico not to sell fresh tomatoes in the United States at a price
less than an established reference price.70
Administrative and Sunset Reviews
Periodic Review
Each year, during the anniversary month of the publication of a final AD order, any interested
party may request an administrative review of the order. The ITA may also self-initiate a review.71
During the review process, the ITA recalculates the dumping margin and may adjust the amount
of AD duties on the subject merchandise.72 Suspension agreements are also monitored for
compliance and reviewed in a similar fashion. The ITA must make a preliminary determination
within 245 days after the last day of the anniversary month of the order or suspension agreement
under review, and must make a final determination within 120 days after the publication date of a
preliminary determination.73 New exporters, who were not part of the original review, may also
request an expedited review.74
Changed Circumstances Review
An interested party may also request a “changed circumstances” review from the ITA or the
USITC at any time. Under current regulations, upon receipt of such a request, the ITA must
determine within 45 days whether to conduct the review. If the ITA decides that there is good
cause to conduct the review, the results must be issued within 270 days of initiation, or within 45
days of initiation if all interested parties agree to the outcome of the review.75

67 19 U.S.C. §1673c(a)(1)(A).
68 19 U.S.C. §1673c(b)-(c).
69 International Trade Administration, “Fresh Tomatoes From Mexico: Suspension of Antidumping Duty
Investigation,” 84 Federal Register 49987, September 24, 2019; Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Duty
Investigation on Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, September 19, 2019, available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/tomato/
2019-agreement/Mexican_Tomatoes_Suspension_Agreement.pdf; U.S. Commerce Department, “U.S. Department of
Commerce Finalizes Suspension Agreement on Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico,” September 19, 2019, available at
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/09/us-department-commerce-finalizes-suspension-agreement-
fresh-tomatoes.
70 Agreement Suspending the Antidumping Duty Investigation on Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico.
71 19 U.S.C. §1675(a).
72 19 U.S.C. §1675.
73 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(3)(A).
74 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(2)(B).
75 19 C.F.R. §351.216.
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Sunset Reviews
Sunset reviews must be conducted on each AD order no later than once every five years after its
publication.76 In such a review, the ITA determines whether dumping would likely continue or
resume if an order were to be revoked or a suspension agreement terminated, and the USITC
conducts a similar review to determine whether injury to the domestic industry would be likely to
continue or resume. If both determinations are affirmative, the duty or suspension agreement
remains in place. If either determination is negative, the order is revoked, or the suspension
agreement is terminated.77
Trends
Historical Trends (1947-1995)
During the first two decades of the GATT, countries infrequently imposed antidumping measures.
Only four parties—the United States, the European Union (EU),78 Canada, and Australia—made
use of the practice, and even that was infrequent.79 Scholars have given several non-exclusive
explanations for the relative dearth of antidumping measures in this period in both the
international and U.S. contexts.
In the international context, ambiguity within Article VI of the GATT may have discouraged
GATT members from making use of the antidumping provisions. Specifically, Article VI does not
specify a methodology for deciding whether a product is dumped nor does it set out procedures
for AD investigations. Additionally, tariff rates among GATT members were still relatively high,
which may have dampened the need for industries to petition for protection through antidumping
measures.80
Table 1. Administrative Responsibilities in Antidumping Policy

Dumping Determination
Injury Determination
1921-1954
Treasury Department
Treasury Department
1954-1979
Treasury Department
Tariff Commission (Predecessor to
the USITC)
1979-Present
Commerce Department (ITA)
U.S. International Trade
Commission (USITC)
Source: Douglass Irwin, “U.S. Antidumping Activity in Historical Perspective,” p. 655.
Likewise, in the United States, the Antidumping Act of 1921 was enacted during a period when
tariff rates were relatively high, which may have limited the usefulness of AD duties as a form of
protection.81 Administrative exigencies may have also been a factor. For example, one historian

76 19 U.S.C. §1675(c).
77 19 U.S.C. §1675(c); 19 C.F.R. §351.218. These sunset reviews are required in the ADA (Article 11.3).
78 While this entity was referred to as the European Communities (EC) at the time, European Union (EU) is used here
for simplicity.
79 Mark Wu, “Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants,” Harvard International Law Journal 53 (2012), p. 8.
80 Ibid., p. 8 n.24.
81 Irwin, “The Rise of U.S. Anti-dumping Activity,” p. 655; Wendy L. Hansen and Thomas J. Prusa, “Cumulation and
ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole,” Economic Inquiry 34 (October 1996), pp. 746-
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has noted that the Carter Administration shifted responsibility for making the less than fair value
determination from the Treasury Department to the Department of Commerce because the
“perceived indifference of Treasury to the plight of petitioning firms” may have led to fewer
findings of dumping and thus fewer measures.82
Finally, countries, particularly those who were not GATT signatories, had higher average tariff
rates and were able to impose other non-tariff barriers to trade to reduce importation of allegedly
dumped products, which made resorting to AD measures unnecessary. Over the subsequent
decades, dozens of developing countries entered the rules-based trading order, which restricted
the use of many non-tariff barriers to trade and encouraged the reduction of tariffs. The reduction
of tariffs may have led to an increase in the use of AD measures as an alternative form of
protection.83
Global Antidumping Trends, 1995-2018
The Growth of Antidumping Investigations and Measures
AD investigations and actions were uncommon in the decades following the establishment of the
GATT. Before the 1990s, the United States, the European Union,84 Canada, and Australia were
responsible for more than 95% of AD actions. Many developing countries did not even have AD
laws and procedures.85 Beginning in the 1990s, however, the number of countries with AD laws
multiplied; approximately half of all AD laws in effect today were implemented after 1990.86
With the increase in the number of countries with AD laws, the major users of AD measures have
changed dramatically. In 1994, for instance, India had zero AD measures in force.87 Twenty-five
years later, in 2019, India had 275 AD measures in force, ranking second behind the United
States.88 Between 2008 and 2018, India ranked first in terms of the number of AD measures
imposed per year, followed by the United States, Brazil, China, and Argentina.89 Of the top five
users of AD measures prior to 1995, only the United States remains in that top five (see Table 2).

748.
82 Irwin, “The Rise of U.S. Anti-dumping Activity,” p. 655. At the time of the change, the House Ways and Means
Committee had expressed that it had “long been dissatisfied with the administration of the antidumping and
countervailing duty statutes by the Treasury Department. Investigations and determinations are often too lengthy, and
assessment and collection of duties are often unreasonably delayed…. Given Treasury’s performance over the past 10
years, many have questioned whether the dumping and countervail investigations and policy functions should remain in
the Treasury Department.” U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
report to Accompany H.R. 4537, 96th Cong., 1st sess., July 3, 1979, H.Rept. 96-317 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1979), p.
24.
83 See, e.g., J. Michael Finger, Francis Ng, and Sonam Wangchuck, “Antidumping as Safeguard Policy,” World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 2730 (December 2001); Bruce A. Blonigen and Thomas J. Prusa, “Antidumping,” in
E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds., Handbook of International Trade (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). See also the
discussion below.
84 While this entity was referred to as the European Communities (EC) at the time, European Union (EU) is used here
for simplicity.
85 Blonigen and Prussa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” NBER Working Paper 21573 (September 2015) pp. 15-
16.
86 Zanardi, “Anti-dumping: What Are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?” p. 408; Blonigen and Prussa, “Dumping and
Antidumping Duties,” NBER Working Paper 21573 (September 2015) pp. 15-16.
87 WTO Statistics on AD Measures in Force.
88 WTO Statistics on AD Measures by Reporting Member.
89 WTO Statistics on AD Measures by Reporting Member.
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However, if adjusted for per-dollar imports, both the United States and the EU are relatively light
users of AD measures.90
As more countries have begun to use AD measures, the total number of AD measures in force has
increased by more than 600%, jumping from 264 measures in force in 1994 to 1,860 in 2018.91
Current Users and Targets of Antidumping Investigations and Measures
Many of the largest users of AD investigations and measures are also among the top targets of AD
investigations and measures. China, the United States, and India, are among the top users of AD
investigations and measures and are, likewise, the top targets of AD investigations and measures.
AD measures are imposed primarily on heavy industrial products from the base-metal and
chemical industries. Figure 4.
Table 2. Initiations of Antidumping Investigations, Imposition of Antidumping
Measures, and Measures in Force, 2009-2018
Measures in
Country
Total Initiations
Total Measures
Force in 2018
India
358
304
275
United States
275
195
361
Brazil
246
173
168
China
113
102
106
Argentina
139
93
97
Australia
143
76
64
Turkey
89
75
182
European Union
120
70
121
Pakistan
102
65
45
Sources: WTO Statistics on AD Measures by Reporting Member; WTO Statistics on AD Initiations by
Reporting Member; WTO Statistics on AD Measures in Force.

90 Finger et al., “Antidumping as Safeguard Policy,” p. 16.
91 WTO Statistics on AD Measures in Force.
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Figure 2. Imposition of Antidumping Measures, 1995-2018

Source: WTO Statistics on AD Measures by Reporting Member; WTO Statistics on AD Initiations by Reporting
Member.
Table 3. Targets of Antidumping Investigations and Imposition of Antidumping
Measures, 1995-2018
Country
Initiations Against
Measures Against
China
1,269
926
Republic of Korea
417
262
United States
283
181
India
227
130
Thailand
221
146
Japan
215
152
Indonesia
208
130
Russian Federation
162
122
Brazil
148
101
Source: WTO Statistics on AD Measures by Exporter; WTO Statistics on AD Initiations by Exporter.
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Figure 3. Targets of Antidumping Measures, 1995-2018

Source: WTO Statistics on AD Measures by Exporter; WTO Statistics on AD Initiations by Exporter.
Figure 4. Percentage of Measures by Industry, 1995-2018

Source: WTO Statistics on AD Measures by Industry.
The Cause of the Growth in Antidumping Investigations and Measures
The adoption of AD laws and the imposition of measures generally occur following moments of
increased market integration and trade liberalization, which may explain their expanded use. In
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effect, AD measures blunt the impact of new imports.92 For example, many developing countries
reduced their tariffs significantly following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which
created the WTO.93 With significantly lower tariffs and fewer other means available to restrict
trade, developing countries (like their developed counterparts before them) may have turned to
AD laws and AD measures as a preferred means of protecting select domestic industries during
their adjustment to the lower average tariff rate.94 For example, since their entry into the WTO,
India, Brazil, China, and Argentina have collectively reduced their tariffs by an average of 63%
from a 17.6% applied weighted mean for all products to 6.5%. In that same time, those four
countries increased their use of AD measures dramatically. In 1995, those countries had 13
measures in force. By 2018, they had a total of 646 measures in force, an increase of more than
4,800%. Figure 5.
As for AD measures being used rather than some other trade remedy, at least one scholar has
argued that AD measures are the most attractive alternative legal form of contingent protection.95
In general, AD measures are easier to impose.
Benefits of AD over Countervailing Duties and Safeguards

AD measures are subject to a more deferential standard of review in the WTO than
countervailing duties and safeguards. Specifically, the ADA provides that dispute settlement panels are
limited to determining “whether the authorities’ establishment of facts was proper and whether their
evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective.” If the establishment of the facts was unbiased and
objective, then a panel may not overturn the AD evaluation “even though the panel might have reached a
different conclusion.”96 Countervailing duties do not receive such a deferential review.

AD measures are less likely to create international controversy than countervailing duties.
Specifically, countervailing duty cases require a finding that a foreign government is providing an il icit subsidy.
In contrast, AD cases only require making a finding about the pricing practices of foreign producers.

Long term AD measures are cheaper than safeguards. The WTO Safeguards Agreement requires
that a country imposing a safeguard measure “endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of
concessions and other obligations” between it and the exporting Members which would be affected by such a
measure.97 Should a country fail to maintain such concessions, retaliation is authorized after three years.98

AD measures are easier to impose than safeguards. The WTO AB has held that safeguards may only
be used to manage surges in trade that were unforeseen at the time a tariff concession was negotiated.99

92 Blonigen and Prusa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” p. 14.
93 See, e.g., Wu, “Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants,” p. 15: “It was only after the Uruguay Round that
antidumping measures became a relatively attractive instrument for most developing countries. … [The Uruguay
Round] dramatically lowered tariffs and severely constrained the ability of countries to use non-tariff instruments to
protect domestic industry.”
94 Two prominent scholars in their survey on antidumping noted “that waves in AD law adoption occurred when there
were substantial market integration events occurring in the world economy. The first wave occurred during, and in the
wake of, a number of initial successful GATT rounds, as well as the beginning integration of developed Europe. The
second wave was in the wake of substantial trade liberalizations in the developing world, the successful conclusion of
the Uruguay Round, and the rising membership of countries to GATT/WTO.” Blonigen and Prusa, “Dumping and
Antidumping Duties,” p. 14.
95 Wu, “Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants,” pp. 15-16.
96 ADA art. 17.6(i).
97 Agreement on Safeguards, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, Legal Instruments, 33 ILM 1125 (Safeguards Agreement) art. 8.
98 Ibid.
99 Safeguards Agreement, art. 19; Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products ¶85, WT/DS98/AB/R (December 14, 1999).
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
AD measures can be kept in place longer than safeguards. Safeguards can be in place for a maximum
of eight years.100 AD measures in contrast can remain in place indefinitely so long as the government
conducts a review of the measures every five years.
Figure 5. Average Tariff Rates and AD Measures in Force for Top Developing Country
Users of AD Measures

Sources: WTO Statistics on Tariff Rates; WTO Statistics on AD Measures in Force.
Notes: Tariff rate, applied, weighted mean, all products. Gaps indicate no reported rates for that year.

100 Safeguards Agreement, art. 7.3.
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Figure 6. Total Number of AD Measures in Force

Source: WTO Statistics on AD Measures in Force.
U.S. Antidumping Trends, 1995-2018
The United States and Antidumping Investigations and Measures
As of February 2020, the United States has 384 AD orders in place affecting imports from 53
countries.101 The oldest order, which places AD duties on pressure sensitive tape from Italy, has
been in place continually since 1977. Seventy-five of the orders have been in place since before
the turn of the millennium. The United States is alone among the original four users of AD
measures (U.S., EU, Canada, and Australia) in significantly increasing its use of AD measures
over the past two decades. The U.S. currently has the highest number of AD measures in force in
its history. In comparison, the other three original users have kept the number of measures in
force at or below levels reached around the millennium.

101 USITC, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in Place.
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Figure 7. AD Measures in Force Among Historical Users

Source: WTO Statistics on AD Measures in Force.
The United States as the Target of Antidumping Investigations and Measures
The United States has been a frequent target of AD investigations initiated by other countries.
Between 1995 and 2017, the United States was the target of 296 investigations, 181 (61%) of
which led to the imposition of AD measures.102 The largest user of AD measures against the
United States is China (37), with India (30), Brazil (24), Mexico (23), and Canada (12) rounding
out the rest of the top five. The reasons for the targeting of the United States are uncertain. They
may, however, relate to the use of AD measures as a form of protection during a period of trade
liberalization or be viewed as retaliation for the United States’ heavy use of AD measures against
these countries.
Issues for Congress
The Economics of Antidumping
Some argue that antidumping measures constitute “the first and best line of defense for the U.S.
economy against companies and countries that resort to predatory and mercantilist tactics to make
trade gains.”103 Most empirical research, however, has found that such predatory pricing is rare.104
Furthermore, most academic analysts are highly critical of U.S. AD law and practice.105
Economic analysts in particular note that AD policy is trade distorting. For example, AD duties

102 WTO, Statistics on Anti-Dumping, Anti-dumping initiations: by exporter; WTO, Statistics on Anti-Dumping, Anti-
dumping measures: by exporter.
103 Greg Mastel, Antidumping Laws and the U.S. Economy (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 5.
104 See, e.g., P.K. Matthew Tharakan, “Predatory Pricing and Anti-dumping” in George Norman and Jacque-François
Thisse, eds., Market Structure and Competition Policy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.71;
Blonigen and Prusa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” p. 22.
105 Writing in 2003, Bruce A. Blonigen and Thomas J. Prusa argued that “over the past 25 years antidumping (AD) has
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deflect trade, by causing exporters to seek out markets where their goods are not subject to AD
duties.106 As one pair of economists noted, the suspension agreement on fresh tomatoes from
Mexico caused Mexico to make more tomato paste to ship to the United States and to ship more
fresh tomatoes to Canada, which in turn shipped more fresh tomatoes to the United States.107
Many scholars also conclude that AD duties depress consumer activity by raising costs for
consumers and propping up unproductive businesses.108
AD laws are also expensive. According to one survey, AD policies globally affect somewhere
between 3% and 8% of a country’s total imports, making them one of the most costly commercial
policies.109 Additionally, many economists argue that AD duties, when analyzed economically
without consideration of their political benefits for encouraging trade liberalization, depress
overall trade.110
While much of the extant literature is skeptical of AD duties, some economists have argued that
such duties, when applied at certain levels, may provide a modest economic welfare gain to the
U.S. economy.111
Congress has generally been supportive of AD duties, and reform efforts have been limited
despite the generally negative view of the practice held by many economists. Phillip Swagel, the
now-director of the Congressional Budget Office and former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Economic Policy, recently referred to antidumping as the “third rail of trade policy,” arguing
that “few politicians of either party [are] willing to point out its broadly negative impact.”112
While many argue that AD laws are economically inefficient if evaluated on their face, some of
those critics have conceded “that even if AD is the largest and most frequently used contingent
trade remedy (and the most costly single commercial policy), AD may nevertheless be a desirable
policy as it serves an important role in promoting overall trade liberalization by acting as a
pressure release valve.”113
As Congress considers its overall goals with respect to trade policy, it might weigh dumping’s
economic costs against its potential role in supporting trade liberalization. Congress could, for
example, encourage (in committee hearings) or direct (through legislation) Commerce to change

emerged as the most widespread impediment to trade” and observed that “AD no longer has anything to do with
predatory pricing […and] all but AD’s staunchest supporters agree that AD has nothing to do with keeping trade
‘fair.’” Blonigen and Prusa, “Antidumping,” pp. 251-253. In 2015, Blonigen surveyed the literature with respect to
antidumping and found that the literature, in general, found that the newest research into antidumping continued to find
that the policies were highly distortionary. Blonigen and Prusa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” pp. 42-61.
106 Chad Bown and Meredith A. Crowley, “Trade Deflection and Trade Depression,” Journal of International
Economics 72, no. 1 (2007); Chad Bown and Meredith A. Crowley, “Policy Externalities: How U.S. Antidumping
Affects Japanese Exports to the E.U.,” European Journal of Political Economy 22, no. 3 (2006).
107 Kathy Balis and Jeffrey M. Perloff, “Trade Diversion from Tomato Suspension Agreements,” Canadian Journal of
Economics 43, no. 1 (2010), p. 129. The economists estimated that 84% of the Mexican tomatoes turned back by the
trade barrier made their way back into the United States through trade diversion.
108 See, e.g., Blonigen and Prusa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” p. 46: “Put bluntly, AD protection appears to be
good for bad firms, but bad for good firms.”
109 Ibid., p. 47.
110 Bown and Crowley, “Policy Externalities.”
111 Adam Rose, Zhenhua Chen, and Dan Wei, “Estimating US Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Enforcement
Benefits,” in Development Studies in Regional Science (Singapore: Springer, 2020), p. 470.
112 N. Gregory Mankiw and Phillip L. Swagel, “Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade Policy,” Foreign Affairs (July
2015).
113 Blonigen and Prusa, “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” p. 47.
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the de minimis thresholds for finding that dumping has taken place or that the dumped goods have
caused an injury. Such changes could reduce or encourage the use of the policy.
Antidumping, Zeroing, and the WTO Appellate Body
During the negotiations over the establishment of the WTO, the United States persistently
advocated for the establishment of robust dispute settlement provisions and Congress required the
President to ensure that dispute resolution provisions were included in the final agreement.114 As a
result, the agreements establishing the WTO included the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU), which provides for an enforceable means by which members can resolve disputes over
WTO commitments and obligations.115
In recent years, however, several administrations have been critical of the WTO’s dispute
settlement system in general and with the role of the Appellate Body (AB) in particular. In
December, the AB ceased to function as the United States continued to block the appointment of
new AB members to replace those whose terms had expired. U.S. AD policies have been at the
center of that dispute and Congress might consider reevaluating those policies or renegotiating
the agreement underlying the WTO DSU and ADA if it wishes to maintain a functional dispute
settlement system at the WTO.
The United States has generally been successful in DSU proceedings with the exception of one
area—trade remedies. Indeed, trade remedy cases in general make up the largest portion of the
WTO’s dispute settlement docket, with AD being the most frequently disputed policy.116 Time
and time again dispute settlement (DS) Panels and the AB have found U.S. AD policy to conflict
with its international commitments. The United States is not alone. Other WTO members have
also been unsuccessful in defending challenges to their implementation of the ADA.117
The AD policy that has been at the center of many (although not all) of these disputes is a
calculation method referred to as “zeroing.” In general, when calculating the dumping margin to
determine whether the imposition of antidumping measures on exporters of a product is justified,
the ITA will usually average together numerous comparisons between sales in the United States
(the export prices) and sales in the home market (the normal value). The ITA will aggregate
hundreds or even thousands of individual transactions together in this process. The amount by
which the normal value exceeds the export price of a given product is the dumping margin.
However, if the export price exceeds the normal value (that is, if the price in the United States is
greater than the domestic price) and thus produces a negative result, the United States, in certain
circumstances, will adjust the negative values to zero. As an economist at the Department of
Justice put it, “The use of ‘zeroing’ will almost always increase the level of any antidumping

114 The legislative authority for the negotiations over the establishment of the WTO directed the executive “to ensure
that such mechanisms within the GATT and GATT agreements provide for more effective and expeditious resolution
of disputes and enable better enforcement of United States rights.” Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
P.L. 100-418 (August 23, 1988). See also CRS In Focus IF10645, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and U.S. Trade
Agreements, by Ian F. Fergusson.
115 See also CRS In Focus IF10645, Dispute Settlement in the WTO and U.S. Trade Agreements, by Ian F. Fergusson.
116 Blonigen et al., “Dumping and Antidumping Duties,” p. 41.
117 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed
Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (March 1, 2001) (DS141); There have been at least 71 cases as of January 1, 2020
that dealt with antidumping and resulted in an adverse finding against the respondent leading either to implementation,
the authorization of retaliation, or compliance proceedings finding non-compliance. Of those 71, the United States was
a respondent in 27. See also Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes, Why Trump Shot the Sheriffs: The End of WTO
Dispute Settlement 1.0, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 20-4 (March 2020).
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duty, and will sometimes create a duty where none would have been imposed, had the
methodology not been used.”118
Consider the following simplified example: the average home market price and export price for a
product for the entire month were both $100. As such, the dumping margin and weighted average
dumping margin when averaged without zeroing were both zero because the transaction on
September 7, for example, was offset by the transaction on September 25. However, when
zeroing is applied, the September 25 transaction is set to zero. When this is applied across all
values, the aggregate dumping margin is $55 leading to a weighted average dumping margin of
7.85%. One pair of economists determined in 2010 that if the United States were to stop zeroing,
“then perhaps as much as half of all U.S. AD measures would be removed and the duties in the
other cases would fall significantly.”119
Table 4. Example of Zeroing
Home Market
Export
Dumping
Dumping
Transaction
Transaction
Margin:
Margin:
Sales Date
(“Normal Value”)
(“Export Price”)
No Zeroing
Zeroing
09/02/2020
$80
$70
$10
$10
09/07/2020
$100
$80
$20
$20
09/08/2020
$90
$95
-$5
$0
09/14/2020
$110
$100
$10
$10
09/20/2020
$120
$105
$15
$15
09/25/2020
$100
$120
-$20
$0
09/30/2020
$100
$130
-$30
$0
Aggregate Export Prices
$700
$700

Wtd. Avg. Price
$100
$100

Aggregate Dumping Margin

$0
$55
Weighted Average

0.0%
7.85%
Dumping Margin
Source: Adapted from Chad P. Bown and Thomas J. Prusa, “U.S. Antidumping: Much Ado about Zeroing,”
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5352 (June 2010), p. 17.
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) asserts that this method allows the United States to “focus
on those transactions in which dumping occurs.”120 Under the relevant WTO agreements, the
USTR argues, “Members may calculate a margin of dumping on a transaction-by-transaction
basis, and, thus, collect duties only on dumped imports, while collecting no duties on non-
dumped imports. There is no requirement to offset dumped transactions with transactions in

118 William W. Nye, “The Implications of ‘Zeroing’ on Enforcement of U.S. Antidumping Law,” Economic Analysis
Group Discussion Paper, EAG 08-10, Department of Justice (August 10, 2008).
119 Chad P. Bown and Thomas J. Prusa, “U.S. Antidumping: Much Ado about Zeroing,” World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 5352 (June 2010), p. 10. See also the example in Edwin Vermulst, The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement:
A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 51.
120 United States Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (February
2020), p. 10.
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which dumping did not occur.”121 The U.S. Trade Representative has asserted that this is a
common-sense method of calculating the extent of dumping that is injuring a domestic
industry”122 and that the elimination of zeroing “artificially reduces the margin of dumping,”123
Opponents of zeroing argue that its effect is to artificially increase dumping margins and increase
the likelihood that AD measures will be imposed.124 Specific concerns include that “zeroing
makes it extremely difficult for a firm to avoid dumping” because the reasons for price variation,
such as seasonality, exchange rates, and variations in shipping costs, are not taken into account.125
As a result, products subject to greater price variation will be more frequently subject to AD
duties.126 As the United States is the only country to actively zero, it seems unlikely that zeroing
is strictly necessary to ensure that AD policy is effective at preventing dumping. One economist
estimated in 2008 that “zeroing could add perhaps 3-4 % to the typical U.S. antidumping duty
with a cost to the U.S. of around $150 million per year when all existing U.S. antidumping orders
were determined by zeroing.”127
Since 1995, more than 30 Panel and Appellate Body (AB) decisions have found the use of
zeroing in specific AD investigations to be inconsistent with the ADA;128 the AB has held more
than a dozen times that zeroing in one form or another cannot be used.129 In all but two cases
involving zeroing, the United States has been the respondent. In two early cases, the EU was the
respondent, but it changed its practices after the AB found its implementation of the practice to be
inconsistent with the terms of the ADA.130
The United States has been a respondent in more than 150 disputes before the WTO. Fifty-six of
those involved the ADA and many of those cases involved zeroing.131 In all the finalized cases,
the United States lost or settled.132 Indeed, CRS analysis has found that nearly half of all cases

121 Ibid., p. 97.
122 Ibid., p. 2.
123 Ibid., p. 10.
124 Bown and Prusa, “Antidumping,” pp. 20-22.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. This exacerbates an already problematic margin determination that is biased against seasonal or cyclical
products. See James Rude and Jean-Phillipe Gervais, “Biases in Calculating Dumping Margins: The Case of Cyclical
Products,” Review of Agricultural Economics 31, no. 1 (Spring 2009); Bown and Prusa, “Antidumping,” 23; Courtney
Cox, “International Trade’s Zero-Sum Game: How Zeroing in Accordance with the Tariff Act of 1930 Harms the
American Economy and Why it Must Go,” Loyola Consumer Law Review 28, no. 1 (2015).
127 Nye, “The Implications of ‘Zeroing’ on Enforcement of U.S. Antidumping Law.”
128 Petros C. Mavroidis and Thomas J. Prusa, “Die Another Day: Zeroing in on Targeted Dumping: Did the AB Hit the
Mark in US – Washing Machines?” European University Institute Working Papers (2018), pp. 4-5.
129 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam,
WT/DS429/AB/R (July 4, 2015); Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/AB/R (January 9, 2005). See also Chad P. Bown and Thomas J. Prusa, “U.S.
Antidumping: Much Ado about Zeroing,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5352 (June 2010), p. 3.
However, a dispute panel recently upheld the use of zeroing when applied through the weighted average-to-transaction
(W-T) methodology provided in the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which can only
be used in certain exception circumstances. Panel Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures Applying
Differential Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS534/R (September 4, 2019). Although, its
application was still further restricted to a specific set of circumstances. See Mavroidis and Prusa, “Die Another Day,”
pp. 4-5.
130 Bown and Prusa, “Antidumping,” p. 4; Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/R (January 3, 2001).
131 Mavroidis and Prusa, “Die Another Day,” p. 7; WTO Index of Disputes by Agreement.
132 In one of the 49, the authority for the panel lapsed. Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG)
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where the WTO found a U.S. practice to not be in compliance with WTO obligations involved
dumping.
Much of the U.S. criticism levied at the WTO’s AB over the past decade, some have argued, has
been primarily the result of cases involving U.S. implementation of the ADA.133 In a recent report
listing U.S. concerns about the AB, the USTR identified six areas of “Appellate Body errors in
interpreting WTO agreements” that it argues have “raised substantive concerns and undermine the
WTO.”134 Five of the six concerned trade remedies, including dumping.135 Indeed, “dump” was
the most common trade-related verb in the report.136 With respect to zeroing, the USTR argues,
“The Appellate Body’s invention of a prohibition on the use of “zeroing” to determine dumping
margins has diminished the ability of WTO members to address dumped imports that cause or
threaten injury to a domestic industry.”137

from Mexico, DS282.
133 This has been a common contention of Chad Bown, one of the premier scholars of zeroing, who goes further to
assert that the AB’s approach to zeroing has been a central motivation for U.S. skepticism of the body. See, e.g., Bown
and Prusa, “Antidumping,” p. i: “The United States use of ‘zeroing’ in its [AD] procedures has become a political flash
point threatening the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement system;” Chad Bown, “Can we Save the WTO
Appellate Body,” (testimony, European Parliament Committee on International Trade, December 3, 2019): “The
United States places a political priority on maintaining vibrant access to antidumping. Antidumping is often referred to
as the ‘third rail’ of U.S. trade policy….[while there are many U.S. procedural concerns about the WTO AB] to some
in America, there is a much bigger concern. Beginning in 1995, trading partners filed a lot of WTO disputes over U.S.
use of trade defense instruments, and the [AB] simply did not show the deference that the Americans anticipated they
had negotiated. There have been dozens of WTO disputes over ‘zeroing’ alone. Many more disputes challenge how US
investigating authorities have conducted other aspects of AD investigations;” Chad Bown and Soumaya Keynes,
“Zeroing: The Biggest WTO Threat You’ve Never Heard Of,” April 9, 2019, Trade Talks, podcast, https://piie.com/
experts/peterson-perspectives/trade-talks-episode-80-zeroing-biggest-wto-threat-youve-never-heard; Chad Bown and
Soumaya Keynes, “Tarrified of Trade Talks?” (lecture, 2020 Washington International Trade Conference, Washington,
DC, February 4, 2020); Chad Bown and Soumaya Keynes (lecture, 20th Judicial Conference of the United States Court
of International Trade, November 18, 2019).
134 United States Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (February
2020), pp. iii-iv. Capitalization altered.
135 Ibid.
136 Textual analysis done by CRS.
137 United States Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (February
2020), pp. iii-iv. Capitalization altered.
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The WTO AB’s approach to trade remedies in general, and antidumping in particular, have been
central in USTR’s critique of the AB and thus has likely played a significant role in its decision to
block appointments to the AB. However, WTO DSB debates are not over. The USTR has
approvingly cited a recent DSB decision that upheld the use of zeroing in certain limited
circumstances.138
As Congress considers the future U.S. relationship with the WTO and the multilateral rules-based
trading order, it might address the role that antidumping has played in straining that relationship.
For example, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) expires in 2021. Should Congress decide to
reauthorize TPA, it may choose to direct the President to seek revisions to the WTO’s DSU of the
ADA to address some of these issues. Alternatively, Congress could encourage or direct
Commerce to address some of the WTO members’ and Appellate Body’s concerns. For example,
the EU and Canada once employed zeroing in antidumping investigations, but no longer do so.

Author Information

Christopher A. Casey

Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

138 United States Trade Representative, “United States Prevails on “Zeroing” Again: WTO Panel Rejects Flawed
Appellate Body Findings,” April 9, 2019, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2019/april/united-states-prevails-%E2%80%9Czeroing%E2%80%9D. Panel Report, United States—Anti-
Dumping Measures Applying Differential Pricing Methodology to Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS534/R
(April 9, 2019).
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