Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea
September 8, 2020
Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
The Navy in FY2021 and beyond wants to develop and procure three types of large unmanned
Specialist in Naval Affairs
vehicles (UVs). These large UVs are called Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs),

Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles
(XLUUVs). The Navy is requesting $579.9 million in FY2021 research and development funding

for these large UVs and their enabling technologies.
The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a more distributed fleet architecture.
Compared to the current fleet architecture, this more distributed architecture is to include proportionately fewer large surface
combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers), proportionately more small surface combatants (i.e., frigates and Littoral Combat
Ships), and the addition of significant numbers of large UVs.
The Navy wants to employ accelerated acquisition strategies for procuring these large UVs, so as to get them into service
more quickly. The Navy’s desire to employ these accelerated acquisition strategies can be viewed as an expression of the
urgency that the Navy attaches to fielding large UVs for meeting future military challenges from countries such as China.
The Navy envisions LUSVs as being 200 feet to 300 feet in length and having full load displacements of 1,000 tons to 2,000
tons. The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships based on commercial ship designs, with
ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads,
meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missiles. Although referred to as UVs, LUSVs might be more accurately
described as optionally or lightly manned ships, because they might sometimes have a few onboard crew members,
particularly in the nearer term as the Navy works out LUSV enabling technologies and operational concepts. In marking up
the Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget, some of the congressional defense committees expressed concerns over whether the
Navy’s accelerated acquisition strategies provided enough time to adequately develop concepts of operations and key
technologies for these large UVs, particularly the LUSV. In response, the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission proposes to
modify the acquisition strategy for the LUSV program so as to provide more time for developing operational concepts and
key technologies before entering into serial production of deployable units. Under the Navy’s proposed modified LUSV
acquisition strategy, the Navy is proposing to use research and development funding to acquire two additional prototypes in
FY2021 and one more additional prototype in FY2022 before shifting in FY2023 to the use of procurement funding for the
procurement of deployable LUSVs at annual procurement rates in FY2023-FY2025 of 2-2-3.
The Navy defines MUSVs as being 45 feet to 190 feet long, with displacements of roughly 500 tons. The Navy wants
MUSVs, like LUSVs, to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships that can accommodate various payloads. Initial
payloads for MUSVs are to be intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) payloads and electronic warfare (EW)
systems. The Navy is pursuing the MUSV program as a rapid prototyping effort under what is known as Section 804
acquisition authority. The first MUSV prototype was funded in FY2019 and the Navy wants fund the second prototype in
FY2023. On July 13, 2020, the Navy announced that it had awarded “a $34,999,948 contract to L3 Technologies, Inc. for the
development of a single Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MUSV) prototype, with options to procure up to eight
additional MUSVs.”
The first five XLUUVs were funded in FY2019; they are being built by Boeing. The Navy wants procure additional
XLUUVs at a rate of two per year starting in FY2023. The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission does not include funding for
the procurement of additional XLUUVs in FY2021 or FY2022.
The Navy’s large UV programs pose a number of oversight issues for Congress, including issues relating to the analytical
basis for the more distributed fleet architecture; the Navy’s accelerated acquisition strategies for these programs; technical,
schedule, and cost risk in the programs; the proposed annual procurement rates for the programs; the industrial base
implications of the programs; potential implications for miscalculation or escalation at sea; the personnel implications of the
programs; and whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in FY2021 on the programs.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Navy USVs and UUVs in General ............................................................................................ 1
UVs in the Navy ................................................................................................................. 1
Navy USV and UUV Categories......................................................................................... 2
Large UVs and Navy Ship Count ....................................................................................... 2
Part of More Distributed Navy Fleet Architecture .............................................................. 4
Accelerated Acquisition Strategies and Enabling Technologies ......................................... 7
LUSV, MUSV, and LXUUV Programs in Brief ........................................................................ 8
LUSV Program ................................................................................................................... 8
MUSV Program ................................................................................................................ 15
XLUUV Program .............................................................................................................. 16
FY2021-FY2025 Funding ................................................................................................. 19
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 20
Analytical Basis for More Distributed Fleet Architecture ....................................................... 20
Accelerated Acquisition Strategies and Funding Method ....................................................... 20
Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk ........................................................................................ 20
Annual Procurement Rates ...................................................................................................... 22
Industrial Base Implications .................................................................................................... 22
Potential Implications for Miscalculation or Escalation at Sea ............................................... 23
Personnel Implications ............................................................................................................ 24
FY2021 Funding ..................................................................................................................... 24

Legislative Activity for FY2021 .................................................................................................... 24
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding Request .......................................... 24
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/S. 4049) ........................................ 25
House ................................................................................................................................ 25
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 26
FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 7617) ...................................................................... 32
House ................................................................................................................................ 32

Figures
Figure 1. Navy USV Systems Vision .............................................................................................. 3
Figure 2. Navy UUV Systems Vision .............................................................................................. 3
Figure 3. Navy Briefing Slide on Surface Combatant Force Architecture ...................................... 4
Figure 4. Enabling Technologies for USVs and UUVs ................................................................... 8
Figure 5. Sea Hunter Prototype Medium Displacement USV ......................................................... 9
Figure 6. Prototype and Notional LUSVs and MUSVs................................................................. 10
Figure 7. LUSV Prototype .............................................................................................................. 11
Figure 8. LUSV prototype ............................................................................................................. 12
Figure 9. Rendering of L3Harris Design Concept for MUSV ...................................................... 16
Figure 10. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV ......................................................................................... 18
Figure 11. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV ......................................................................................... 18

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Figure 12. Boeing Echo Voyager UUV ......................................................................................... 19

Tables
Table 1. FY2021-FY2025 Requested and Programmed Funding for Large UVs ......................... 19
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2021 Large UV Funding Request ....................................... 25

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 32

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Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles

Introduction
This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress for three types of
large unmanned vehicles (UVs) that the Navy wants to develop and procure in FY2021 and
beyond:
 Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs);
 Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs); and
 Extra-large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs).
The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a new fleet
architecture (i.e., a new combination of ships and other platforms) that is more widely distributed
than the Navy’s current fleet architecture. The Navy is requesting $579.9 million in FY2021
research and development funding for these large UVs and their enabling technologies.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s acquisition strategies
and FY2021 funding requests for these large UVs. The Navy’s proposals for developing and
procuring them pose a number of oversight issues for Congress. Congress’s decisions on these
issues could substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the shipbuilding
and UV industrial bases.
In addition to the large UVs covered in this report, the Navy also wants to develop and procure
smaller USVs and UUVs, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of various sizes. Other
U.S. military services are developing, procuring, and operating their own types of UVs. Separate
CRS reports address some of these efforts.1
Background
Navy USVs and UUVs in General
UVs in the Navy
UVs are one of several new capabilities—along with directed-energy weapons, hypersonic
weapons, artificial intelligence, and cyber capabilities—that the Navy says it is pursuing to meet
emerging military challenges, particularly from China.2 UVs can be equipped with sensors,
weapons, or other payloads, and can be operated remotely, semi-autonomously, or (with
technological advancements) autonomously.3 They can be individually less expensive to procure

1 See, for example, CRS Report R45519, The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Andrew Feickert, and CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and
Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress
, coordinated by Andrew
Feickert.
2 See, for example, Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget, inside front
cover (“The Bottom Line”). For a CRS report on Navy lasers, electromagnetic railguns, and the gun-launched guided
projectile (also known as the hypervelocity projectile), see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-
Launched Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a CRS report on
advanced military technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M.
Sayler.
3 For more on autonomous UVs, see CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous
Weapon Systems
, by Kelley M. Sayler.
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than manned ships and aircraft because their designs do not need to incorporate spaces and
support equipment for onboard human operators. UVs can be particularly suitable for long-
duration missions that might tax the physical endurance of onboard human operators, or missions
that pose a high risk of injury, death, or capture of onboard human operators. Consequently UVs
are sometimes said to be particularly suitable for so-called “three D” missions, meaning missions
that are “dull, dirty, or dangerous.”4
The Navy has been developing and experimenting with various types of UVs for many years, and
has transitioned some of these efforts (particularly those for UAVs) into procurement programs.
The Department of the Navy states, for example, that its inventory of 4,094 aircraft at the end of
FY2019 included 99 UAVs, that its projected inventory of 3,912 aircraft at the end of FY2020
will include 45 UVs, and that its projected inventory of 4,075 aircraft at the end of FY2021 will
include 57 UVs.5 Even so, some observers have occasionally expressed dissatisfaction with what
they view as the Navy’s slow pace in transitioning UV development efforts into programs for
procuring UVs in quantity and integrating them into the operational fleet.
Navy USV and UUV Categories
As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the Navy organizes its USV acquisition programs into four
size-based categories that the Navy calls large, medium, small, and very small, and its UUV
acquisition programs similarly into four size-based categories that the Navy calls extra-large,
large, medium, and small. The large UVs discussed in this CRS report fall into the top two USV
categories in Figure 1 and the top UUV category in Figure 2.
The smaller UVs shown in the other categories of Figure 1 and Figure 2, which are not covered
in this report, can be deployed from manned Navy ships and submarines to extend the operational
reach of those ships and submarines. The large UVs covered in this CRS report, in contrast, are
more likely to be deployed directly from pier to perform missions that might otherwise be
assigned to manned ships and submarines.
Large UVs and Navy Ship Count
Because the large UVs covered in this report can be deployed directly from pier to perform
missions that might otherwise be assigned to manned ships and submarines, some observers have
a raised a question as to whether the large UVs covered in this report should be included in the
top-level count of the number of ships in the Navy. Navy officials state that they have not yet
decided whether to modify the top-level count of the number of ships in the Navy to include these
large UVs.6

4 See, for example, Ann Diab, “Drones Perform the Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous Work,” Tech.co, November 12, 2014;
Bonnie Robinson, “Dull, Dirty, Dangerous Mission? Send in the Robot Vehicle,” U.S. Army, August 20, 2015;
Bernard Marr, “The 4 Ds Of Robotization: Dull, Dirty, Dangerous And Dear,” Forbes, October 16, 2017.
5 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget, Figure 3.7 on page 3-7.
6 For additional discussion of this question, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles

Figure 1. Navy USV Systems Vision

Source: Slide 3 of briefing by Captain Pete Small, Program Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems (PMS 406),
entitled “Unmanned Maritime Systems Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Small.pdf?ver=
2019-01-15-165105-297.
Figure 2. Navy UUV Systems Vision

Source: Slide 2 of briefing by Captain Pete Small, Program Manager, Unmanned Maritime Systems (PMS 406),
entitled “Unmanned Maritime Systems Update,” January 15, 2019, accessed May 22, 2019, at
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/Exhibits/SNA2019/UnmannedMaritimeSys-Small.pdf?ver=
2019-01-15-165105-297.
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Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles

Part of More Distributed Navy Fleet Architecture
The Navy wants to acquire the large UVs covered in this report as part of an effort to shift the
Navy to a new fleet architecture that is more widely distributed than the Navy’s current
architecture. Compared to the current fleet architecture, this more distributed architecture is to
include proportionately fewer large surface combatants (or LSCs, meaning cruisers and
destroyers), proportionately more small surface combatants (or SSCs, meaning frigates and
Littoral Combat Ships), and the addition of significant numbers of large UVs.
Figure 3 provides, for the surface combatant portion of the Navy,7 a conceptual comparison of
the current fleet architecture (shown on the left as the “ship centric force”) and the new, more
distributed architecture (shown on the right as the “distributed/nodal force”). The figure does not
depict the entire surface combatant fleet, but rather a representative portion of it.
Figure 3. Navy Briefing Slide on Surface Combatant Force Architecture
Each sphere represents a ship or a USV

Source: Il ustration accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy Testing
as NAVSEA Moves Forward with Draft RFP,” USNI News, April 29, 2019. The il ustration was also included as
Slide 2 in a Navy briefing entitled “Designing & Building the Surface Fleet: Unmanned and Small Combatants,” by
Rear Admiral Casey Moton at a June 20, 2019, conference of the American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE).
Notes: Each sphere represents a ship or a USV. LSC means large surface combatant (i.e., cruiser or destroyer),
and SSC means small surface combatant (i.e., frigate or Littoral Combat Ship). As shown in the color coding, the
LSCs and SSCs are equipped with a combination of sensors (green), command and control (C2) equipment (red),

7 Other major parts of the Navy include submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, logistics (resupply) ships, and
support ships.
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and payloads other than sensors and C2 equipment, meaning principally weapons (blue). LUSVs and MUSVs, in
contrast, are equipped primarily with weapons (blue) or sensors (green).
In the figure, each sphere represents a manned ship or USV. (Since the illustration focuses on the
surface combatant force, it does not include UUVs.) As shown in the color coding, under both the
current fleet architecture and the more distributed architecture, the manned ships (i.e., the LSCs
and SSCs) are equipped with a combination of sensors (green), command and control (C2)
equipment (red), and payloads other than sensors and C2 equipment, meaning principally
weapons (blue).
Under the more distributed architecture, the manned ships would be on average smaller (because
a greater share of them would be SSCs), and this would be possible because some of the surface
combatant force’s weapons and sensors would be shifted from the manned ships to USVs, with
weapon-equipped LUSVs acting as adjunct weapon magazines and sensor-equipped MUSVs
contributing to the fleet’s sensor network.
As shown in Figure 3, under the Navy’s current surface combatant force architecture, there are to
be 20 LSCs for every 10 SSCs (i.e., a 2:1 ratio of LSCs to SSCs), with no significant contribution
from LUSVs and MUSVs. This is consistent with the Navy’s current force-level objective, which
calls for achieving a 355-ship fleet that includes 104 LSCs and 52 SSCs (a 2:1 ratio). Under the
more distributed architecture, the ratio of LSCs to SSCs would be reversed, with 10 LSCs for
every 20 SSCs (a 1:2 ratio), and there would also now be 30 LUSVs and 40 MUSVs. A January
15, 2019, press report states
The Navy plans to spend this year taking the first few steps into a markedly different future,
which, if it comes to pass, will upend how the fleet has fought since the Cold War. And it
all starts with something that might seem counterintuitive: It’s looking to get smaller.
“Today, I have a requirement for 104 large surface combatants in the force structure
assessment; [and] I have [a requirement for] 52 small surface combatants,” said Surface
Warfare Director Rear Adm. Ronald Boxall. “That’s a little upside down. Should I push
out here and have more small platforms? I think the future fleet architecture study has
intimated ‘yes,’ and our war gaming shows there is value in that.”8
Another way of summarizing Figure 3 would be to say that the surface combatant force
architecture (reading vertically down the figure) would change from 20+10+0+0 (i.e., a total of
30 surface combatant platforms, all manned, and a platform ratio of 2-1-0-0) for a given portion
of the surface combatant force, to 10+20+30+40 (i.e., a total of 100 surface combatant platforms,
70 of which would be LUSVs and MUSVs, and a platform ration of 1-2-3-4) for a given portion
of the surface combatant force. The Navy refers to the more distributed architecture’s
combination of LSCs, SSCs, LUSVs, and MUSVs as the Future Surface Combatant Force
(FSCF).
Figure 3 is conceptual, so the platform ratios for the more distributed architecture should be
understood as notional or approximate rather than exact. The point of the figure is not that
relative platform numbers under the more distributed architecture would change to the exact
ratios shown in the figure, but that they would evolve over time toward something broadly
resembling those ratios.
Some observers have long urged the Navy to shift to a more distributed fleet architecture, on the
grounds that the Navy’s current architecture—which concentrates much of the fleet’s capability
into a relatively limited number of individually larger and more expensive surface ships—is

8 David B. Larter, “US Navy Moves Toward Unleashing Killer Robot Ships on the World’s Oceans,” Defense News,
January 15, 2019.
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increasingly vulnerable to attack by the improving maritime anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
capabilities (particularly anti-ship missiles and their supporting detection and targeting systems)
of potential adversaries, particularly China.9 Shifting to a more distributed architecture, these
observers have argued, would
 complicate an adversary’s targeting challenge by presenting the adversary with a
larger number of Navy units to detect, identify, and track;
 reduce the loss in aggregate Navy capability that would result from the
destruction of an individual Navy platform;
 give U.S. leaders the option of deploying USVs and UUVs in wartime to sea
locations that would be tactically advantageous but too risky for manned ships;
and
 increase the modularity and reconfigurability of the fleet for adapting to changing
mission needs.10
For a number of years, Navy leaders acknowledged the views of those observers but continued to
support the current fleet architecture. More recently, however, Navy have shifted their thinking,
with comments from Navy officials like the one quoted above and Navy briefing slides like
Figure 3 indicating that Navy leaders now support moving the fleet to a more distributed
architecture. The views of Navy leaders appear to have shifted in favor of a more distributed
architecture because they now appear to believe that such an architecture will be
 increasingly needed—as the observers have long argued—to respond effectively
to the improving maritime A2/AD capabilities of other countries, particularly
China;
 technically feasible as a result of advances in technologies for UVs and for
networking widely distributed maritime forces that include significant numbers
of UVs; and
 no more expensive, and possibly less expensive, than the current architecture.
The more distributed architecture that Navy leaders now appear to support may differ in its
details from distributed architectures that the observers have been advocating, but the general idea
of shifting to a more distributed architecture, and of using large UVs as a principal means of
achieving that, appears to be similar. The Navy’s FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan mentions a
new overarching operational concept for the Navy (i.e., a new general concept for how to employ
Navy forces) called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO).11 A December 2018 document from
the Chief of Naval Operations states that the Navy will “continue to mature the Distributed
Maritime Operations (DMO) concept and key supporting concepts” and “design and implement a
comprehensive operational architecture to support DMO.”12 While Navy officials have provided
few details in public about DMO,13 the Navy does state in its FY2021 budget submission that

9 For more on China’s maritime A2/AD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
11 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2020
, March 2019, pp. 3, 4, 7, 8, 15, 17, 24.
12 U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, December 2018,
pp. 8, 10.
13 Then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, in explaining DMO, stated in December 2018 that “Our
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“MUSV and LUSV are key enablers of the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO)
concept, which includes being able to forward deploy and team with individual manned
combatants or augment battle groups. Fielding of MUSV and LUSV will provide the Navy
increased capability and necessary capacity at lower procurement and sustainment costs, reduced
risk to sailors and increased readiness by offloading missions from manned combatants.”14
Accelerated Acquisition Strategies and Enabling Technologies
The Navy wants to employ accelerated acquisition strategies for procuring large UVs, so as to get
them into service more quickly. The Navy’s desire to employ these accelerated acquisition
strategies can be viewed as an expression of the urgency that the Navy attaches to fielding large
UVs for meeting future military challenges from countries such as China.15
The LUSV and MUSV programs are building on USV development work done by the Strategic
Capabilities Office (SCO) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). SCO’s effort to
develop USVs is called Ghost Fleet, and its LUSV development effort within Ghost Fleet is
called Overlord.
As shown in Figure 4, the Navy has identified five key enabling groups of technologies for its
USV and UUV programs.16 Given limitations on underwater communications (most radio-
frequency electromagnetic waves do not travel far underwater), technologies for autonomous
operations (such as artificial intelligence) will be particularly important for the XLUUV program
(and other UUV programs).17
In May 2019, the Navy established a surface development squadron to help develop operational
concepts for LUSVs and MUSVs. The squadron will initially consist of a Zumwalt (DDG-1000)
class destroyer and one Sea Hunter prototype medium displacement USV (Figure 5). A second
Sea Hunter prototype will reportedly be added around the end of FY2020, and LUSVs and
MUSVs will then be added as they become available.18

fundamental force element right now in many instances is the [individual] carrier strike group. We’re going to scale up
so our fundamental force element for fighting is at the fleet[-wide] level, and the [individual] strike groups plug into
those [larger] numbered fleets. And they will be, the strike groups and the fleet together, will be operating in a
distributed maritime operations way.” (Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, as quoted in Megan
Eckstein, “Navy Planning for Gray-Zone Conflict; Finalizing Distributed Maritime Operations for High-End Fight,”
USNI News, December 19, 2018.)
14 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 2 of 5, Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation
, February 2020, PDF page 90 of 1,538. The statement also appears on PDF page 324
of 1,538. See also Kevin Eyer and Steve McJessy, “Operationalizing Distributed Maritime Operations,” Center for
International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), March 5, 2019; Christopher H. Popa et al., Distributed Maritime
Operations and Unmanned Systems Tactical Employment
, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2018, 171 pp. (Systems
Engineering Capstone Report); Lyla Englehorn, Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Warfare Innovation
Continuum (WIC) Workshop September 2017 After Action Report
, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2017, 99 pp.
15 A number of other DOD acquisition programs are also employing rapid or accelerated acquisition strategies of one
kind or another, in some cases using special acquisition authorities that Congress has granted to DOD. For additional
discussion, see CRS Report R45068, Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts
(NDAAs)
, by Moshe Schwartz and Heidi M. Peters.
16 For additional discussion of some of the enabling technologies shown in Figure 4, see Pete Small, “Empowering the
Unmanned Maritime Revolution,” Undersea Warfare, Spring 2019: 12-13.
17 For more on the use of artificial intelligence in defense programs, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence
and National Security
, by Kelley M. Sayler.
18 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Stands Up Surface Development Squadron for DDG-1000, Unmanned
Experimentation,” USNI News, May 22, 2019; David B. Larter, “With Billions Planned in Funding, the US Navy
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