U.S. Role in the World:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated August 26, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44891

U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S.
participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world.
The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for
U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and
actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for
interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in
their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global
leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of
freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in
Eurasia.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could
have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could
significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense
plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, the United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world. Other
observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, while acknowledging that the
Trump Administration has changed U.S. foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies
pursued by the Obama Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been
less change and more continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has
substantially changed the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump
Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the
implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from
U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an
unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something
of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70
years.
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were
arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the
world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding
to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests,
particularly in terms of adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the
United States can accomplish, enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making
potential U.S. actions less predictable to potential adversaries, reestablishing respect for national
sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign policy and for organizing international affairs, and
encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend themselves.
Congress’s decisions regarding the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for
numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of
the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.
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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in
the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in
international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in
the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers
for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific
international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and
understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of more than 70 years
(i.e., since the end of World War II in 1945), the U.S. role in the world under the Trump
Administration has undergone a substantial change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could
have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could
significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense
plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. Congress’s decisions regarding
the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans,
programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in
U.S. foreign policymaking.
A variety of other CRS reports address in greater depth specific international issues mentioned in
this report. Appendix A provides a glossary of some key terms used in this report, such as
international order or regional hegemon. For convenience, this report uses the term U.S. role as a
shorthand for referring to the U.S. role in the world.
Background
Overview of Traditional U.S. Role: Four Key Elements
While descriptions of the traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in
their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements:
 global leadership;
 defense and promotion of the liberal international order;
 defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and
 prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.
The following sections provide brief discussions of these four key elements.
Global Leadership
The traditional U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II is generally described, first
and foremost, as one of global leadership, meaning that the United States tends to be the first or
most important country for identifying or framing international issues, taking actions to address
those issues, setting an example for other countries to follow, organizing and implementing
multilateral efforts to address international issues, and enforcing international rules and norms.
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Observers over the years have referred to U.S. global leadership using various terms, some of
which reflect varying degrees of approval or disapproval of this aspect of the U.S. role. Examples
of such terms (other than global leader itself) include leader of the free world, superpower,
indispensable power, system administrator, hyperpower, world policeman, or world hegemon.
The U.S. role of global leadership has resulted in extensive U.S. involvement in international
affairs, and this, too, has been described with various phrases. The United States has been
described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy; a foreign policy of global engagement or
deep engagement; a foreign policy that provides global public goods; a foreign policy of liberal
order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony; an interventionist foreign policy; or
a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony.
Defense and Promotion of Liberal International Order
A second key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that can
be viewed as inherently related to the first key element above—has been to defend and promote
the liberal international order1 that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the
years after World War II. Although definitions of the liberal international order vary, key elements
of it are generally said to include the following:
 respect for the territorial integrity of countries, and the unacceptability of
changing international borders by force or coercion;
 a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use
or threat of use of force or coercion, and in a manner consistent with international
law;
 respect for international law, global rules and norms, and universal values,
including human rights;
 strong international institutions for supporting and implementing international
law, global rules and norms, and universal values;
 the use of liberal (i.e., rules-based) international trading and investment systems
to advance open, rules-based economic engagement, development, growth, and
prosperity; and
 the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and
(more recently) cyberspace as international commons rather than domains subject
to national sovereignty.
Most of the key elements above (arguably, all but the final one) can be viewed collectively as
forming what is commonly referred to as a rules-based international order. A traditional antithesis
of a rules-based order is a might-makes-right order (sometimes colloquially referred to as the law
of the jungle), which is an international order (or a situation lacking in order) in which more
powerful countries routinely impose their will arbitrarily on less-powerful countries,
organizations, and individuals, with little or no regard to rules.

1 Other terms used to refer to the liberal international order include U.S.-led international order, postwar international
order, rules-based international order, and open international order. Observers sometimes substitute world for
international, or omit international or world and refer simply to the liberal order, the U.S.-led order, and so on. In the
terms liberal international order and liberal order, the word liberal does not refer to the conservative-liberal construct
often used in discussing contemporary politics in the United States or other countries. It is, instead, an older use of the
term that refers to an order based on the rule of law, as opposed to an order based on the arbitrary powers of hereditary
monarchs.
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Though often referred to as if it is a fully developed or universally established situation, the
liberal international order, like other international orders that preceded it, is
 incomplete in geographic reach and in other ways;
 partly aspirational;
 not fixed in stone, but rather subject to evolution over time;
 sometimes violated by its supporters;
 not entirely free of might-makes-right behavior;
 resisted or rejected by certain states and nonstate actors; and
 subject to various stresses and challenges.
Some observers, emphasizing points like those above, argue that the liberal international order is
more of a myth than a reality. Other observers, particularly supporters of the order, while
acknowledging the limitations of the order, reject characterizations of it as a myth and emphasize
its differences from international orders that preceded it.
As mentioned above, the liberal international order was created by the United States with the
support of its allies in the years immediately after World War II. At that time, the United States
was the only country with both the capacity and willingness to establish a new international order.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is generally viewed as reflecting a desire by U.S. policymakers to avoid repeating the deadly
major wars and widespread economic disruption and deprivation of the first half of the 20th
century—a period that included World War I, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and
fascism, the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust, and World War II.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is also generally viewed as an act of national self-interest, reflecting a belief among U.S.
policymakers that it would strongly serve U.S. security, political, and economic objectives.
Supporters of the liberal international order generally argue that in return for bearing the costs of
creating and sustaining the liberal international order, the United States receives significant
security, political, and economic benefits, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of
power on both a global and regional level, and a leading or dominant role in establishing and
operating global institutions and rules for international finance and trade. Indeed, some critics of
the liberal international order argue that it is primarily a construct for serving U.S. interests and
promoting U.S. world primacy or hegemony. The costs and benefits for the United States of
defending and promoting the liberal international order, however, are a matter of debate.
Defense and Promotion of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights
A third key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend
and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and
resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible. This element of the U.S.
role is viewed as consistent not only with core U.S. political values but also with a theory
advanced by some observers (sometimes called the democratic peace theory) that democratic
countries are more responsive to the desires of their populations and consequently are less likely
to wage wars of aggression or go to war with one another.
Defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights is additionally viewed as a key
component of U.S. soft power, because it can encourage like-minded governments, as well as
organizations and individuals in other countries, to work with the United States, and because it
has the potential to shape the behavior of authoritarian and illiberal governments that are acting
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against U.S. interests by shaming those governments and inspiring prodemocracy organizations
and individuals within those countries.
Prevention of Emergence of Regional Hegemons in Eurasia
A fourth element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that U.S.
policymakers do not often state explicitly in public—has been to oppose the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia. This objective reflects a U.S. perspective on geopolitics and grand
strategy developed by U.S. strategists and policymakers during and in the years immediately after
World War II that incorporates two key judgments:
 that given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, a
regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large
enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests; and
 that Eurasia is not dependably self-regulating in terms of preventing the
emergence of regional hegemons, meaning that the countries of Eurasia cannot
be counted on to be able to prevent, though their own actions, the emergence of
regional hegemons, and may need assistance from one or more countries outside
Eurasia to be able to do this dependably.2
Preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is sometimes also referred to as
preserving a division of power in Eurasia, or as preventing key regions in Eurasia from coming
under the domination of a single power, or as preventing the emergence of a spheres-of-influence
world, which could be a consequence of the emergence of one or more regional hegemons in
Eurasia.
U.S. actions that can be viewed as expressions of the U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
 U.S. participation in World War I,3 World War II, the Korean War, and the
Vietnam War;4
 U.S. alliances and security partnerships, including
 the NATO alliance, which was established in large part to deter and counter
attempts by the Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in
Europe;

2 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 Although the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons was not articulated in explicit terms (at least not
widely) by U.S. strategists until World War II and the years immediately thereafter, U.S. participation in World War I
against Germany can in retrospect be viewed as an earlier U.S. action reflecting this goal.
4 U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was justified in part by the so-called domino theory, which argued that a
victory by communist-ruled North Vietnam over South Vietnam could be followed by other countries in the region
falling, like dominos in a row, under communist control. Opponents of the domino theory challenged its validity and
argue that it was disproven when North Vietnam’s defeat of South Vietnam was not followed by other countries in the
region falling under communist control. The theory’s supporters argue that the theory was not disproven, because the
years-long U.S. effort to defend South Vietnam, though ultimately unsuccessful in preventing victory by North
Vietnam, gave other countries in the region time and space to develop their political institutions and economies enough
to deter or resist communist movements in their own countries. Valid or not, the domino theory’s use as a justification
links U.S. participation in the war to the goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon (in this case, a
communist hegemon of China and/or the Soviet Union).
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 U.S. alliances with countries in East Asia and the Pacific, which were
established in large part to deter and counter attempts by the Soviet Union or
China to become a regional hegemon in East Asia; and
 U.S. security partnerships with countries in the Persian Gulf region, which
were established in large part to deter or counter attempts by Iran or the
Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in that region; and
 additional U.S. political, diplomatic, and economic actions to contain and oppose
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, including the Marshall Plan and
subsequent U.S. foreign assistance programs.
In pursuing the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, U.S.
policymakers have sometimes decided to work with or support nondemocratic regimes that for
their own reasons view Russia, China, or Iran as competitors or adversaries. As a consequence,
the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Asia has sometimes been in tension
with defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Changes over Time
Although the traditional U.S. role in the world was generally stable over the past 70 years, the
specifics of U.S. foreign policy for implementing that role have changed frequently for various
reasons, including changes in administrations and changes in the international security
environment. Definitions of the U.S. role have room within them to accommodate some variation
in the specifics of U.S. foreign policy.
Long-Standing Debate over Its Merits
The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not
necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right
one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of
World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter
of long-standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the
public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world.
The most prominent dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to
continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead
adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of
the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a
more restrained U.S. role. (For additional discussion, see Appendix B.)
A second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or
combine the pursuit of narrowly defined material U.S. interests with the goal of defending and
promoting U.S. or universal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third major
dimension concerns the balance in U.S. foreign policy between the use of hard power and soft
power. Observers debating these two dimensions of the future U.S. role in the world stake out
varying positions on these questions.
Issues for Congress
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world has changed, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. The sections below provide
some discussion of this issue.
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Is the United States Changing Its Role?
There currently are multiple views on the question of whether the United States under the Trump
Administration has changed the U.S. role in the world, some of which are outlined briefly below.
Some Observers Believe the United States Is Changing Its Role
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, the United States has substantially changed the U.S. role in the world by altering
some or all of the four key elements of the U.S. role described earlier. Although views among
these observers vary in their specifics, a number of these observers argue that the
Administration’s America First construct, its emphasis on national sovereignty as a primary
guidepost for U.S. foreign policy, and other Administration actions and statements form a new
U.S. role characterized by
 a voluntary retreat from or abdication of global leadership,
 a greater reliance on unilateralism,
 a reduced willingness to work through international or multilateral institutions
and agreements,
 an acceptance of U.S. isolation or near-isolation on certain international issues,
 a more skeptical view of the value of alliances to the United States,
 a less-critical view of certain authoritarian or illiberal governments,
 a reduced or more selective approach to promoting and defending certain
universal values,
 the elevation of bilateral trade balances, commercial considerations, monetary
transactions, and ownership of assets such as oil above other foreign policy
considerations, and
 an implicit tolerance of the reemergence of aspects of a might-makes-right
international order.
In support of this view, these observers cite various Administration actions and statements,
including, among other things
 the Administration’s decisions to withdraw from certain international
agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade
agreement, the multilateral Paris climate agreement, and the Iran nuclear
agreement;
 its earlier proposals for reducing State Department funding and foreign assistance
funding, and delays in filling senior State Department positions;
 the President’s skeptical statements regarding the value to the United States of
certain U.S. alliances (particularly with European countries and South Korea) and
more generally his apparent transactional and monetary-focused approach to
understanding and managing alliance relationships;
 what these observers view as the President’s affinity for certain authoritarian or
illiberal leaders, as well as his apparent reluctance to criticize Russia and his
apparent continued desire to seek improved relations with Russia, despite
Russian actions judged by U.S. intelligence agencies and other observers to have
been directed against the United States and overseas U.S. interests;
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 the President’s decision, announced by the Administration on October 6, 2019, to
withdraw U.S. troops from northern Syria;
 the Administration’s focus on pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with various
countries (as opposed to regional or multilateral trade negotiations); and
 the Administration’s infrequent or inconsistent statements in support of
democracy and human rights, including the Administration’s reaction to the
killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the President’s statements regarding
the prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong.
Other Observers Disagree
Other observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, disagree with some or all of
the perspective above. While acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S.
foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration,
these observers argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been less change and more
continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. In support of this view, these observers cite,
among other things
 the Administration’s December 2017 national security strategy (NSS) document
and its January 2018 unclassified summary of its supporting national defense
strategy (NDS) document—large portions of which refer to U.S. leadership, a
general emphasis on great power competition with China and Russia, and strong
support for U.S. alliances;
 Administration statements reaffirming U.S. support for NATO, as well as
Administration actions to improve U.S. military capabilities in Europe for
deterring potential Russian aggression in Europe;
 the Administration’s willingness to impose and maintain a variety of sanctions on
Russia;
 the Administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) construct for guiding
U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region;
 the Administration’s more confrontational policy toward China, including its plan
to increase funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs to compete against
China for influence in Africa, Asia, and the Americas;
 U.S. trade actions that, in the view of these observers, are intended to make free
trade more sustainable over the long run by ensuring that it is fair to all parties,
including the United States; and
 the Administration’s (admittedly belated) support of Hong Kong’s prodemocracy
protestors, its criticism of China’s human rights practices toward its Muslim
Uyghur population, and its emphasis on religious freedom as a major component
of human rights.
Still Other Observers See a Mixed or Confusing Situation
Still other observers, viewing points made by both of the above sets of observers, see a mixed or
confusing situation regarding whether the United States under the Trump Administration has
changed the U.S. role in the world. For these observers, whether the U.S. role has changed is
difficult to discern, in part because what they view as incoherence or contradictions in the
Administration’s foreign policies and in part because the President’s apparent views on certain
issues—such as the value of U.S. alliances, the acceptability of certain actions by Russia or North
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Korea, and the importance of democracy and human rights as universal values—have frequently
been in tension with or contradicted by statements and actions of senior Administration officials
(particularly those who served during the first two years or so of the Administration), with the
President’s views being more consistent with the change in the U.S. role outlined by the first set
of observers above, and statements and actions of senior Administration officials frequently being
more consistent with a continuation of the U.S. role of the past 70 years outlined by the second
set of observers above.
Some Observers Argue That Change Began Earlier
Some observers argue that if the U.S. role has changed, that change started not under the Trump
Administration, but under the Obama Administration, particularly regarding the question of
whether the United States has reduced or withdrawn from global leadership. In support of this
view, these observers cite what they views as the Obama Administration’s
 focus on reducing the U.S. military presence and ending U.S. combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan in favor of focusing more on domestic U.S. rebuilding
initiatives,
 decision to announce but not enforce a “red line” regarding the behavior of the
Syrian government, and
 restrained response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and more
generally, its reluctance, for a time at least, to fully acknowledge and adapt to
less cooperative and more confrontational relationships with Russia and China.
Still others view the start of a change in the U.S. role as occurring even sooner, under the George
W. Bush Administration—when that Administration did not respond more strongly to Russia’s
2008 invasion and occupation of part of Georgia—or under the Clinton Administration.
For these observers, a change in the U.S. role in the world under the Trump Administration may
represent not so much a shift in the U.S. role as a continuation or deepening of a change that
began in a prior U.S. Administration.
Potential Combined Perspectives
The perspectives outlined in the preceding sections are not necessarily mutually exclusive—
assessments combining aspects of more than one of these perspectives are possible.
Implications of a Changed U.S. Role
Among observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years, there are multiple views regarding the potential implications of that change.
Some Observers View Implications as Undesirable
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration has
substantially changed the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump
Administration, and also some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the
implications of that change as undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from
U.S. global leadership and a gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an
unforced error of immense proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something
of great value to the United States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70
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years. More specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is
doing some or all of the following:
 reducing U.S. power and foreign-policy capacity, particularly by weakening or
hollowing out the State Department and reducing or devaluing elements of U.S.
soft power;
 weakening the U.S. ability to leverage its power and foreign-policy capacity in
international affairs—and isolating the United States on certain international
issues, effectively turning the concept of America First into “America Alone”—
by
 damaging long-standing and valuable U.S. alliance relationships,
 reducing U.S. participation in multilateral political and trade negotiations and
agreements, and
 making the United States look more erratic and impulsive as an international
actor, and less reliable as an ally and negotiating partner;
 weakening the U.S.-led international order and encouraging a reemergence of
aspects of a might-makes-right international order;
 slowing the spread of democracy and human rights, encouraging a moral
equivalency between the United States and authoritarian and illiberal countries,
and tacitly facilitating a reemergence of authoritarian and illiberal forms of
government;
 disregarding the costly lessons of the first half of the 20th century, and how the
U.S. role in the world of the last 70 years has been motivated at bottom by a
desire to prevent a repetition of the horrific events of that period; and
 creating vacuums in global leadership in establishing and maintaining global
rules and norms, on the disposition of specific disputes and other issues, and in
regional power balances that China and Russia as well as France, Turkey, Syria,
Iran, and other countries are moving to fill, often at the expense of U.S. interests
and values.
Other Observers View Implications as Helpful
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were
arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the
world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding
to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests. More
specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is doing some
or all of the following:
 adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the United
States can accomplish in the world today and in the future, particularly given
limits on U.S. resources and the reduction in U.S. economic and military
preponderance in recent decades as other countries have grown economically and
developed their militaries;
 enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making potential U.S.
actions less predictable to potential adversaries;
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 reestablishing respect for national sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign
policy and for organizing international affairs;
 encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend
themselves, thereby reducing U.S. costs and developing Eurasia’s potential to
become more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional
hegemons;
 placing an emphasis on countering and competing with China, which poses a
uniquely strong and multidimensional challenge to U.S. security and prosperity;
 working to strengthen the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region under
the FOIP construct;
 exploring possibilities for improving relations where possible with countries such
as Russia and North Korea; and
 making trade agreements more fair to the United States.
Some Related or Additional Issues
The following sections provide brief discussions of some related or additional issues for Congress
regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Pandemic
A new (i.e., since about March 2020) issue is the question of whether and how the global
COVID-19 pandemic might lead to profoundly transformative and long-lasting changes in the
U.S. role in the world in areas such as U.S. global leadership, China’s potential for acting as a
global leader, U.S. strategic competition with China, U.S. relations with allies, and U.S.
definitions of U.S. national security. Some observers argue that the COVID-19 pandemic is the
first major international crisis since World War II for which the United States has not served as
the global leader for spearheading, organizing, or implementing an international response.
Another CRS report provides an overview of the potential implications of the COVID-19
pandemic for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world, as well as a
list of CRS reports addressing various aspects of this issue and examples of other writings
addressing this issue from various perspectives,5 See also some of the more recent writings cited
in Appendix C of this CRS report.
Costs and Benefits of Allies
Within the overall debate over the U.S. role in the world, one longstanding specific question
relates to the costs and benefits of allies. As noted earlier, some observers believe that under the
Trump Administration, the United States has become more skeptical of the value of allies,
particularly those in Europe, and more transactional in managing U.S. alliance relationships.
Skeptics of allies and alliances generally argue that their value to the United States is overrated;
that allies are capable of defending themselves without U.S. help; that U.S. allies frequently act as
free riders in their alliance relationships with the United States by shifting security costs to the
United States; that in the absence of U.S. help, these allies would do more on their own to balance

5 CRS Report R46336, COVID-19: Potential Implications for International Security Environment—Overview of Issues
and Further Reading for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Michael Moodie.
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against potential regional hegemons; and that alliances create a risk of drawing the United States
into conflicts involving allies over issues that are not vital to the United States.
Supporters of the U.S. approach to allies and alliances of the past 70 years, while acknowledging
the free-rider issue as something that needs to be managed, generally argue that alliances are
needed and valuable for preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia and for
otherwise deterring potential regional aggression; that alliances form a significant advantage for
the United States in its dealings with other major powers, such as Russia and China (both of
which largely lack similar alliance networks); that although allies might be capable of defending
themselves without U.S. help, they might also choose, in the absence of U.S. help, to bandwagon
with would-be regional hegemons (rather than contribute to efforts to balance against them); that
in addition to mutual defense benefits, alliances offer other benefits, particularly in peacetime,
including sharing of intelligence, information, and technology and the cultivation of soft-power
forms of cooperation; and that a transactional approach to alliances, which encourages the merits
of each bilateral alliance relationship to be measured in isolation, overlooks the collective benefits
of maintaining alliances with multiple countries in a region.
U.S. Public Opinion
U.S. public opinion can be an important factor in debates over the future U.S. role in the world.
Among other things, public opinion can
 shape the political context (and provide the impulse) for negotiating the terms of,
and for considering whether to become party to, international agreements;
 influence debates on whether and how to employ U.S. military force; and
 influence policymaker decisions on funding levels for defense, international
affairs activities, and foreign assistance.
Foreign policy specialists, strategists, and policymakers sometimes invoke U.S. public opinion
poll results in debates on the U.S. role in the world. One issue relating to U.S. public opinion that
observers are discussing is the extent to which the U.S. public may now believe that U.S. leaders
have broken a tacit social contract under which the U.S. public has supported the costs of U.S.
global leadership in return for the promise of receiving certain benefits, particularly steady
increases in real incomes and the standard of living.
Operation of U.S. Democracy
Another potential issue for Congress is how the operation of democracy in the United States
might affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting
democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government.
During the Cold War, the effective operation of U.S. democracy at the federal level and lower
levels was viewed as helpful for arguing on the world stage that Western-style democracy was
superior, for encouraging other countries to adopt that model, and for inspiring people in the
Soviet Union and other authoritarian countries to resist authoritarianism and seek change in the
direction of more democratic forms of government. The ability of the United State to demonstrate
the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government was something that in today’s parlance
would be termed an element of U.S. soft power.
The end of the Cold War led to a diminution in the ideological debate about the relative merits of
democracy versus authoritarianism as forms of government. As a possible consequence, there
may have been less of a perceived need during this period for focusing on the question of whether
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the operation of U.S. democracy was being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other
countries.
The shift in the international environment over the past few years from the post-Cold War era to
an era of renewed great power competition6 has led to a renewed ideological debate about the
relative merits of Western-style democracy versus 21st-century forms of authoritarian and illiberal
government. Articles in China’s state-controlled media, for example, sometimes criticize the
operation of U.S. democracy and argue that China’s form of governance is more advantageous.
The potential issue for Congress is whether, in a period of renewed ideological competition, there
is now once again a need for focusing more on the question of whether the operation of U.S.
democracy is being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other countries.
Potential Implications for Congress as an Institution
Another issue for Congress is what implications a changed U.S. role in the world might have for
Congress as an institution, particularly regarding the preservation and use of congressional
powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic
policy, and more generally the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S.
foreign policymaking. Specific matters here include, among other things, the question of war
powers, the delegation of authority for imposing tariffs, and whether a change in the U.S. role
would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations.7
Reversibility of a Change in U.S. Role
Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role in the world would at
some point in the future be reversible, should U.S. policymakers in the future desire to return to a
U.S. role in the world more like that of the past 70 years. Potential questions for Congress include
the following:
 What elements of change in the U.S. role might be more reversible, less
reversible, or irreversible? What elements might be less reversible due to
technological developments, changes in international power dynamics, or
changes in U.S. public opinion?
 How much time and effort would be required to implement a return to a U.S. role
like that of the past 70 years?
 How might the issue of reversibility be affected by the amount of time that a
change in the U.S. role remains in place before an attempt might be made to
reverse it?
 How might decisions that Congress and the executive branch make in the near
term affect the question of potential downstream reversibility? What actions, if
any, should be taken now with an eye toward preserving an option for reversing
nearer-term changes in the U.S. role?
 What are the views of other countries regarding the potential reversibility of a
change in the U.S. role, and how might those views affect the foreign policies of
those countries?

6 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For additional discussion, see Kevin Kosar, ed., Congress and Foreign Affairs: Reasserting the Power of the First
Branch, R Street Institute, 2020, 64 pp.
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Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional reading, Appendix C presents a list of recent writings
reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump Administration is
changing the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change might be.

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Appendix A. Glossary of Selected Terms
Some key terms used in this report include the following:
Role in the world
The term role in the world generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the overall character,
purpose, or direction of a country’s participation in international affairs or the country’s overall
relationship to the rest of the world. A country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible
expression of its grand strategy (see next item). In this report, the term U.S. role in the world is
often shortened for convenience to U.S. role.
Grand strategy
The term grand strategy generally refers in foreign policy discussions to a country’s overall
approach for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national
instruments at its disposal, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools
(sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME). A country’s leaders might deem
elements of a country’s grand strategy to be secret, so that assessments, assumptions, or risks
included in the strategy are not revealed to potential adversaries. Consequently, a country’s
leaders might say relatively little in public about the country’s grand strategy. As mentioned
above, however, a country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible expression of its grand
strategy. For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or
interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues.
International order/world order
The term international order or world order generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the
collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, norms, and practices that are intended to
organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period.
International orders tend to be established by major world powers, particularly in the years
following wars between major powers, though they can also emerge at other times. Though often
referred to as if they are fully developed or firmly established situations, international orders are
usually incomplete, partly aspirational, sometimes violated by their supporters, rejected (or at
least not supported) by certain states and nonstate actors, and subject to various stresses and
challenges.
Unipolar/bipolar/tripolar/multipolar
In foreign policy discussions, terms like unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar are sometimes
used to refer to the number of top-tier world powers whose actions tend to characterize or give
structure to a given historical period’s international security situation. The Cold War that lasted
from the late 1940s to the late 1980s or early 1990s is usually described as a bipolar situation
featuring a competition between two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and
their allies. The post-Cold War era, which followed the Cold War, is sometimes described as the
unipolar moment, with the United States being the unipolar power, meaning the world’s sole
superpower.
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As discussed in another CRS report,8 observers have concluded that in recent years, there has
been a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new international security situation characterized by
renewed great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, leading
observers to refer to the new situation as a tripolar or multipolar world. Observers who might list
additional countries (or groups of countries, such as the European Union) as additional top-tier
world powers, along with the United States, China, and Russia, might also use the term
multipolar.
Eurasia
The term Eurasia is used in this report to refer to the entire land mass that encompasses both
Europe and Asia, including its fringing islands, extending from Portugal on its western end to
Japan on its eastern end, and from Russia’s Arctic coast on its northern edge to India on its
southern edge, and encompassing all the lands and countries in between, including those of
Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Eurasia’s fringing islands include,
among others, the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe, Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, the
archipelagic countries of Southeast Asia, and Japan. There are also other definitions of Eurasia,
some of which are more specialized and refer to subsets of the broad area described above.
Regional hegemon
The term regional hegemon generally refers to a country so powerful relative to the other
countries in its region that it can dominate the affairs of that region and compel other countries in
that region to support (or at least not oppose) the hegemon’s key policy goals. The United States
is generally considered to have established itself in the 19th century as the hegemon of the
Western Hemisphere.
Spheres-of-influence world
The term spheres-of-influence world generally refers to a world that, in terms of its structure of
international relations, is divided into multiple regions (i.e., spheres), each with its own hegemon.
A spheres-of-influence world, like a multipolar world, is characterized by having multiple top-tier
powers. In a spheres-of-influence world, however, at least some of those top-tier powers have
achieved a status of regional hegemon, while in a multipolar world, few or none of those major
world powers (other than the United States, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere)
have achieved a status of regional hegemon. As a result, in a spheres-of-influence world,
international relations are more highly segmented on a regional basis than they are in a multipolar
world.
Geopolitics
The term geopolitics is often used as a synonym for international politics or for strategy relating
to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features
on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that
places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features
involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of
countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers

8 CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads,
railways, and waterways.
Hard power and soft power
In foreign policy discussions, the term hard power generally refers to coercive power, particularly
military and economic power, while the term soft power generally refers to the ability to persuade
or attract support, particularly through diplomacy, development assistance, support for
international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of
cultural elements such as music, movies, television shows, and literature.
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Appendix B. Past U.S. Role vs. More
Restrained Role
This appendix provides additional discussion on the debate over whether the United States should
attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years,
or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs.
Among U.S. strategists and foreign policy specialists, advocates of a more restrained U.S. role
include (to cite a few examples) Andrew Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Ted Galen Carpenter, John
Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble, William Ruger, and Stephen Walt. These and
other authors have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role. Terms
such as offshore balancing, offshore control, realism, strategy of restraint, or retrenchment have
been used to describe some of these variations.9 These variations on the idea of a more restrained
U.S. role would not necessarily match in their details a changed U.S. role that might be pursued
by the Trump Administration.10
Arguments in Favor of a More Restrained U.S. Role
Observers advocating a more restrained U.S. role in the world make various arguments regarding
the United States and other countries. Arguments that they make relating to the United States
include the following:
 Costs and benefits. In terms of human casualties, financial and economic
impacts, diplomatic impacts, and impacts on domestic U.S. values, politics, and
society, the costs to the United States of defending and promoting the liberal
international order have been underestimated and the benefits have been
overestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia have
frequently been more costly and/or less successful than anticipated, making a
strategy of intervening less cost-effective in practice than in theory. U.S.
interventions can also draw the United States into conflicts involving other
countries over issues that are not vital or important U.S. interests.
 Capacity. Given projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt, the
United States in coming years will no longer be able to afford to play as
expansive a role in the world as it has played for the past 70 years.
Overextending U.S. participation in international affairs could lead to excessive

9 The terms offshore balancing and offshore control refer in general to a policy in which the United States, in effect,
stands off the shore of Eurasia and engages in the security affairs of Eurasia less frequently, less directly, or less
expansively. The term retrenchment is more often used by critics of these proposed approaches.
10 Debate about this dimension of the U.S. role in the world is not limited to one between those who favor continued
extensive engagement along the lines of the past 70 years and those who prefer some form of a more restrained role—
other options are also being promoted. For example, one analyst and former White House aide advocates an approach
that differs from both retrenchment and reassertion, an approach he labels “re-calibration” to the “geopolitical,
economic, technological and other dynamics driving the 21st-century world.” Such an approach, he argues, would entail
a reappraisal of U.S. interests, a reassessment of U.S. power, and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. (See Bruce
Jentleson, “Apart, Atop, Amidst: America in the World,” War on the Rocks, January 2017.)
As another example, a different analyst argues in favor of a U.S. role based on “a better nationalism”—what he
describes as a more benign and constructive form that “would not dismantle the post-war order and America’s post war
project, but would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests.” (Hal Brands, “U.S.
Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and it Alternatives,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017:
73-93.)
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amounts of federal debt and inadequately addressed domestic problems, leaving
the United States poorly positioned for sustaining any future desired level of
international engagement.
 Past 70 years as a historical aberration. The U.S. role of the past 70 years is an
aberration when viewed against the U.S. historical record dating back to 1776,
which is a history characterized more by periods of restraint than by periods of
high levels of international engagement. Returning to a more restrained U.S. role
would thus return U.S. policy to what is, historically, a more traditional policy for
the United States.
 Moral standing. The United States has not always lived up to its own ideals, and
consequently lacks sufficient moral standing to pursue a role that involves
imposing its values and will on other countries. Attempting to do that through an
interventionist policy can also lead to an erosion of those values at home.
 Public opinion. It is not clear that U.S. public opinion supports the idea of
attempting to maintain a U.S. role in the world as expansive as that of the past 70
years, particularly if it means making trade-offs against devoting resources to
domestic U.S. priorities. In public opinion polls, Americans often express support
for a more restrained U.S. role, particularly on issues such as whether the United
States should act as the world’s police force, funding levels for U.S. foreign
assistance programs, U.S. participation in (and financial support for) international
organizations, and U.S. defense expenditures for defending allies.
Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
 Growing wealth and power. Given the rapid growth in wealth and power in
recent years of China and other countries, the United States is no longer as
dominant globally as it once was, and is becoming less dominant over time,
which will make it increasingly difficult or expensive and/or less appropriate for
the United States to attempt to continue playing a role of global leadership.
 Ideas about international order. Other world powers, such as China, have their
own ideas about international order, and these ideas do not match all aspects of
the current liberal international order. The United States should acknowledge the
changing global distribution of power and work with China and other countries to
define a new international order that incorporates ideas from these other
countries.
 Eurasia as self-regulating. Given the growth in the economies of U.S. allies and
partners in Europe and Asia since World War II, these allies and partners are now
more capable of looking after their own security needs, and Eurasia can now be
more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons
in Eurasia. Consequently, the level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
can be reduced without incurring undue risk that regional hegemons will emerge
there. The current substantial level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
discourages countries in Eurasia from acting more fully on their own to prevent
the emergence of regional hegemons.
 Hegemons and spheres of influence. Even if one or more regional hegemons
were to emerge in Eurasia, this would not pose an unacceptable situation for the
United States—vital U.S. interests could still be defended. Similarly, the
emergence of a spheres-of-influence world need not be unacceptable for the
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United States, because such a world would again not necessarily be incompatible
with vital U.S. interests.
Arguments in Favor of Continuing U.S. Role of the Past 70 Years
Observers who support a continuation of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years generally
reject the above arguments and argue the opposite. Arguments that these observers make relating
to the United States include the following:
 Costs and benefits. Although the costs to the United States of its role in the
world over the past 70 years have been substantial, the benefits have been
greater. The benefits are so long-standing that they can easily be taken for
granted or underestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia,
though not without significant costs and errors, have been successful in
preventing wars between major powers and defending and promoting vital U.S.
interests and values. A more restrained U.S. role in the world might be less
expensive for the United States in the short run, but would create a risk of
damaging U.S. security, liberty, and prosperity over the longer run by risking the
emergence of regional hegemons or a spheres-of-influence world.
 Capacity. Projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt need to be
taken into account, but even in a context of limits on U.S. resources, the United
States is a wealthy country that can choose to play an expansive role in
international affairs, and the costs to the United States of playing a more
restrained role in world affairs may in the long run be much greater than the costs
of playing a more expansive role. Projections regarding future U.S. budget
deficits and debt are driven primarily by decisions on revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures rather than by decisions on defense and foreign-policy-
related expenditures. Consequently, these projections are an argument for getting
the country’s fiscal house in order primarily in terms of revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures, rather than an argument for a more restrained U.S. role
in the world.
 Past 70 years as a historical aberration. Although a restrained U.S. foreign
policy may have been appropriate for the United States in the 18th and 19th
centuries, the world of the 18th and 19th centuries was quite different. For
example, given changes in communication, transportation, and military
technologies since the 18th and 19th centuries, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are
much less effective as geographic buffers between the United States and Eurasia
today than they were in the 18th and 19th centuries. Experiences in more recent
decades (including World Wars I and II and the Cold War) show that a more
restrained U.S. foreign policy would now be riskier or more costly over the long
run than an engaged U.S. foreign policy.
 Moral standing. The United States, though not perfect, retains ample moral
authority—and responsibility—to act as a world leader, particularly in
comparison to authoritarian countries such as China or Russia.
 Public opinion. Other public opinion poll results show that Americans support a
U.S. global leadership role.
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Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
 Growing wealth and power. Although the wealth and power of countries such
as China have grown considerably in recent years, future rates of growth for
those countries are open to question. China faces the prospect of declining rates
of economic growth and the aging and eventual shrinkage of its population, while
Russia has a relatively small economy and is experiencing demographic decline.
The United States has one of the most favorable demographic situations of any
major power, and retains numerous advantages in terms of economic and
financial strength, military power, technology, and capacity for innovation.
Although the United States is no longer as dominant globally as it once was, it
remains the world’s most powerful country, particularly when all dimensions of
power are taken into consideration.
 Ideas about international order. The liberal international order reflects U.S.
interests and values; a renegotiated international order incorporating ideas from
authoritarian countries such as China would produce a world less conducive to
defending and promoting U.S. interests and values. Americans have long lived in
a world reflecting U.S. interests and values and would not welcome a world
incorporating Chinese values on issues such as the rule of law; the scope of civil
society; political and human rights; freedom of speech, the press, and
information; and privacy and surveillance.
 Eurasia as self-regulating. Eurasia historically has not been self-regulating in
terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, and the idea that it will
become self-regulating in the future is a risky and untested proposition.
 Hegemons and spheres of influence. A regional hegemon in Eurasia would have
enough economic and other power to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests. In
addition to threatening U.S. access to the economies of Eurasia, a spheres-of-
influence world would be prone to war because regional hegemons historically
are never satisfied with the extent of their hegemonic domains and eventually
seek to expand them, coming into conflict with other hegemons. Leaders of
regional hegemons are also prone to misjudgment and miscalculation regarding
where their spheres collide.
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Appendix C. Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional reading, this appendix presents a list of writings over the past
six months reflecting various perspectives on whether the United States under the Trump
Administration is changing the U.S. role in the world and what the implications of such a change
might be, listed in chronological order, with the most recent on top. Writings from more than six
months ago can be found in earlier versions of this report.
Richard Haass, “Present at the Disruption, How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Affairs, September/October 2020.
Margaret MacMillan, “Which Past Is Prologue? Heeding the Right Warnings From History,”
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020.
Shivshankar Menon, “League of Nationalists, How Trump and Modi Refashioned the U.S.-Indian
Relationship,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020.
Ben Rhodes, “The Democratic Renewal, What It Will Take to Fix U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Affairs, September/October 2020.
Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion, Trump and the World as It Is,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2020.
Ganesh Sitaraman, “A Grand Strategy of Resilience, American Power in the Age of Fragility,
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2020.
Mark Cancian, “The Fuzzy Outlines Of Biden’s National Security Policies,” Breaking Defense,
August 26, 2020.
Emma Ashford, “Biden Wants to Return to a ‘Normal’ Foreign Policy. That’s the Problem.
America Can’t Go Back to Being Everywhere and Solving Every Problem,” New York Times,
August 25, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Pompeo Praises Trump, But Doesn’t Have Much to Point to,” Washington Post,
August 25, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “Pompeo’s Sudan Visit Shows the Way to Handle Rogue Regimes,” Washington
Examiner, August 25, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “GOP Leaders Promote Trump as a Wartime Commander Focused on Security and
Peace,” Military Times, August 25, 2020.
Nahal Toosi and Jacqueline Feldscher, “Pompeo Defends ‘America First’ Policies in
Controversial Convention Appearance,” Politico, August 25, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Trump’s Second-Term Plan Includes Stopping ‘Endless’ Wars, Boosting Military
Support,” Military Times, August 24, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “All Great-Power Politics Is Local, When It Comes to Building International
Power, There’s Growing Reason to Think That Foreign Policy Barely Matters,” Foreign Policy,
August 24, 2020.
Francis J. Gavin, “Blame It on the Blob? How to Evaluate American Grand Strategy,” War on the
Rocks, August 21, 2020.
Lanhee Chen, “Lead from the Front,” Washington Examiner, August 20, 2020.
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Victor David Hanson, “Goodbye—Sort of—to Germany? Why Should America Anchor
Germany's Defense? It Cuts Deals with Russia, Has Never Met Its NATO Commitment, and Is
the Most Anti-American Nation in Europe,” National Review, August 20, 2020.
Leo Shane III, “Biden Vows to Restore Global Respect, Military Integrity in Acceptance Speech,”
Military Times, August 20, 2020.
James Traub, “The Biden Doctrine Exists Already. Here’s an Inside Preview,” Foreign Policy,
August 20, 2020.
Aaron David Miller, “Opinion: Israel And UAE’s Accord Is A Big Win, But Don't Overplay It,”
NPR, August 19, 2020.
Klaus W. Larres, “Biden’s Long Foreign-Policy Record Signals How He’ll Reverse Trump,
Rebuild Old Alliances and Lead the Pandemic Response,” The Conversation, August 18 (updated
August 19), 2020.
Jonathan Schanzer and Mark Dubowitz, “The Dangerous Illusion of Restraining U.S. Power,
Isolationists Among Both Democrats and Republicans Want to Withdraw from Foreign
Entanglements. That Would Make the World Much Less Safe,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2020.
Alex Ward, “Joe Biden’s Plan to Fix the World, ‘He’s Looking at an Across-the-Board
Restoration Project,’ Said a former Obama Administration Official,” Vox, August 18, 2020.
Micah Zenko and Rebecca Lissner, “This Is What America Looks Like Without Grand Strategy,
The Verdict Is In: Donald Trump’s Shallow Approach to Foreign Policy Has Damaged the United
States,” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2020.
Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning, “What Happens When America Is No Longer the
Undisputed Super Power? Chief Among the Flawed Assumptions Undergirding American
Foreign Policy Is the Belief That Perpetual U.S. Primacy is Both Desirable and Possible, the
‘indispensable nation’—a Cliché Well Past Its Sell-by Date,” National Interest, August 17, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Israel-UAE Agreement Shows Trump’s Middle East Policy Succeeding,”
Heritage Foundation, August 17, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Alone Against the World, Pompeo’s Regime Change Obsession Has Left America
More Isolated Than Ever,” Slate, August 17, 2020.
William Ruger, “Why Americans Want a President Who Ends Endless Wars,” National Interest,
August 17, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer and Danielle Pletka, “How the WHO Can Earn Back U.S. Support,” Heritage
Foundation, August 17, 2020.
Jeremy Shapiro and Philip H. Gordon, “Trump and the Rise of Sadistic Diplomacy, His
Administration Spent Four Years Mostly Failing to Reach Diplomatic Agreements. What It Did
Instead Was Far More Disturbing,” Foreign Policy, August 17, 2020.
Anthony B. Kim and Terry Miller, “Secretary Mike Pompeo’s Ringing Call to Secure Human
Rights and Liberty,” Heritage Foundation, August 16, 2020.
Tiana Lowe, “Middle East Consolidates Against Iran, Disproving the Obama Doctrine,”
Washington Examiner, August 16, 2020.
Jared Kushner, “Jared Kushner: The Historic Deal Between Israel and the UAE Shows Trump’s
Strategy Is Paying Off,” Washington Post, August 15, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Olivia Enos, “3 Reasons the U.S. Should Prioritize Human Rights With China,” Heritage
Foundation, August 14, 2020.
John Hannah, “The Israel-UAE Deal Is Trump’s First Unambiguous Diplomatic Success, It’s a
Historic Achievement That Eluded Other Presidents. Trump Will Try to Make the Most of It,”
Foreign Policy, August 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The United States Can’t Handle China Alone, A Coordinated Strategy Is
Emerging Among Allies, Despite Trump’s Best Efforts,” Foreign Policy, August 13, 2020.
Economist, “The Dereliction of American Diplomacy, Donald Trump Dismisses It as the ‘Deep
State Department’. Yet America Needs It More Than Ever,” Economist, August 13, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump’s Mideast Breakthrough, The Israel-UAE Accord Discredits Obama’s
Regional Vision,” Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2020.
Richard Grenell, “Israel-UAE Breakthrough Proves Trump's Critics Wrong—Again,” The Hill,
August 13, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Trump Is Right. The Israel-UAE Agreement Is a Huge Achievement,”
Washington Post, August 13, 2020.
Dimitri K. Simes, “The Case For Trump, Donald Trump Isn’t the Better Choice to Secure
America’s Future. He Is the Only Choice,” National Interest, August 13, 2020.
Edward Wong, “Waning of American Power? Trump Struggles With an Asia in Crisis,” New York
Times, August 13, 2020.
Dov S. Zakheim, “The Case Against Trump, By the Time Trump’s Term Reaches Its Unhappy
Conclusion, He May Well Have Overtaken Andrew Johnson as the Most Dangerous Chief
Executive Ever to Occupy the Executive Mansion,” National Interest, August 13, 2020.
Jacob Helberg, “In the New Cold War, Deindustrialization Means Disarmament, Chinese Security
Threats Offer the Chance to Rethink the U.S. Economy,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “Pompeo Urges Europe’s Young Democracies to Embrace Freedoms,” Associated
Press, August 12, 2020.
Scott Lincicome, “We Can Finally Stop Pretending Trump Isn’t a Protectionist,” Cato Institute,
August 12, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “In Europe, Pompeo Warns of China, Russia Authoritarianism,” Associated Press,
August 11, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Putin Is Reckless Because We Allow Him to Be,” Washington Post, August 11,
2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Trump’s Latest Move in Europe Is a Betrayal of Foreign Policy Realism,”
National Interest, August 10, 2020.
Birgit Jennen and William Horobin, “Germany, France Balk at U.S. Bid to Overhaul WHO While
Leaving,” Bloomberg, August 10, 2020.
David Nakamura, “Once Reluctant to Hit China on Human Rights, Trump Moves to Use the Issue
as a Cudgel Amid Growing Tensions,” Washington Post, August 9, 2020.
Ashley Parker, “A President Ignored: Trump’s Outlandish Claims Increasingly Met with a
Collective Shrug,” Washington Post, August 9, 2020.
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Doug Bandow, “The Problem with Allies: It’s Time to Unfriend a Few Countries,” American
Spectator, August 8, 2020.
Max Bergmann and James Lamond, “Why Trump’s Troop Withdrawal from Germany Is Only the
Beginning, There Has Been a Clear and Consistent Pattern of Hostility from Donald Trump
Toward NATO and America’s Closest Democratic Allies in Europe,” National Interest, August 8,
2020.
Saeid Jafari, “Trump Has Pushed Iran Into China’s Arms,” Foreign Policy, August 8, 2020.
Andrew Roberts, “It’s Time to Revive the Anglosphere, The U.K. Should Form a New Union
with Canada, Australia and New Zealand to Work as a Global Partner of the U.S.,” Wall Street
Journal, August 8, 2020.
Matthew Kroenig, “Washington Needs a Better Plan for Competing With China,” Foreign Policy,
August 7, 2020.
Salvatore Babones, “Trump Has Alienated Allies—but Has Them Acting in America’s Interest
(and Their Own),” Foreign Policy, August 6, 2020.
Jim Sciutto, “Trump Advisers Hesitated to Give Military Options and Warned Adversaries over
Fears He Might Start a War,” CNN, August 6, 2020.
Daniel Dammann and Price Floyd, “To Rebuild America’s Weakened Alliances, Heal Its
Diplomatic Corps,” Defense One, August 5, 2020.
Paul R. Pillar, “Trump Administration Commission Caters to the Anti-Government Political
Right,” National Interest, August 4, 2020.
Riley Walters, “China: Trump Administration Needs to Align Trade Policies with Priorities,”
Heritage Foundation, August 4, 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Trump Has Wasted His Chance to Rally U.S. Allies Against China,” Washington
Post, August 2, 2020.
Robert C. O’Brien, “President Trump Is Committed to Defending the U.S., and Russia Knows It,”
Washington Post, August 2, 2020.
Anthony Vinci, “How to Stop China From Imposing Its Values, America’s Alliances Were Built
to Address a Soviet Military Threat. The Economic Bullying That Beijing Uses Requires a
Different Kind of Collective Self-Defense,” Atlantic, August 2, 2020.
Karen DeYoung, “Dissonance Between Trump and Administration Officials over Russia
Disguises Lack of Strategic Approach to Moscow,” Washington Post, August 1, 2020.
Ahmed Charai, “America Must Become a World Model Again, In Recent Years, America Has
Become a Country Engulfed in Turmoil, Withdrawn from the World, Wanting for Leadership,”
National Interest, July 31, 2020.
Conor Murray, “Is pulling US troops from Germany really a ‘gift to Russia’?” Vox, July 31, 2020.
David Shambaugh, “As the U.S. and China Wage a New Cold War, They Should Learn From the
Last One,” Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2020.
Wendy R. Sherman, “The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump,” Foreign
Policy, July 31, 2020.
Max Boot, “In a New Interview, Trump Again Shows That He’s Putin’s Puppet,” Washington
Post, July 29, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Editorial Board, “Trump’s Spite-Germany Plan,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 2020.
Philip H. Gordon and James Steinberg, “Trump’s Flip-Flops on China Are a Danger to National
Security,” Foreign Policy, July 29, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Trump’s Troop Tantrum, There’s No Strategy Behind the Decision to Withdraw
U.S. Troops from Germany. It’s About the President’s Anger and Ego,” Slate, July 29, 2020.
William Saletan, “Trump’s Dismissal of Russian Bounties Adds to His Record of Treachery,”
Slate, July 29, 2020.
Robin Wright, “Why Trump Will Never Win His New Cold War with China,” New Yorker, July
29, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “America Can’t Contain China, but Maybe Proliferation Can,” Cato Institute, July
28, 2020.
Daniel Schwammenthal, “To America, From a Worried European Friend, A Country Convinced
That It Is Irredeemably Racist Can’t Lead the World as the ‘Indispensable Nation,’” Wall Street
Journal, July 28, 2020.
Christopher Smart, “To Avoid a Coronavirus Depression, the U.S. Can’t Afford to Alienate the
World,” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2020.
Dan Balz, “America’s global standing is at a low point. The pandemic made it worse. Under
Trump, the United States Retreats from Collaborative Leadership at a Time of Global Crisis,”
Washington Post, July 26, 2020.
Joseph Bosco, “Pompeo’s Clarion Call on Communist China: ‘We Can't Ignore It Any Longer,’”
The Hill, July 25, 2020.
Richard Haass, “What Mike Pompeo Doesn’t Understand About China, Richard Nixon and U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, July 25, 2020.
By Roger Pilon and Aaron Rhodes, “A Missed Opportunity In the Struggle for Human Rights,”
Real Clear Markets, July 25, 2020.
Gary Schmitt, “Pompeo’s China Speech at Odds with Trump's ‘America First’ Foreign Policy,”
The Hill, July 25, 2020.
Edward Wong and Steven Lee Myers, “Officials Push U.S.-China Relations Toward Point of No
Return,” New York Times, July 25 (updated July 31), 2020.
Thomas Wright, “Pompeo’s Surreal Speech on China, An Ideological Struggle Is Under Way
Between Beijing and Free Societies, and the Trump Administration Is on the Wrong Side,”
Atlantic, July 25, 2020.
Editorial Board, “The New China Reality, The Tougher U.S. Policy Is More Than an Election-
Year Gambit,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2020.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, “The Sad Story of Superpower America’s Foreign Policy
Failures,” National Interest, July 24, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “Don’t Pick a Cold War You Can’t Win,” Slate, July 24, 2020.
James Palmer, “Pompeo’s Strategy Depends on Beijing’s Own Paranoia,” Foreign Policy, July
24, 2020.
Tom Rogan, “Mike Pompeo and the Threat of Xi Jinping's Dream,” Washington Examiner, July
24, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Bret Stephens, “The Two China Fires, Is America prepared for a Cold War with China?” New
York Times, July 24, 2020.
Cameron Stewart, “US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Calls on Free World to Unite Against
Chinese ‘Tyranny,’” Australian, July 24, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The U.S. Should Not Lead The World,” American Conservative, July 23, 2020.
Daniel DePetris, “Trump’s All-Stick, No-Carrot Approach Has Brought Two US Adversaries
Together, The Blooming China-Iran Bilateral Relationship Serve[s] as a Warning to U.S.
Policymakers,” Defense One, July 23, 2020.
Michael H. Fuchs, “A Foreign Policy for the Post-Pandemic World, How to Prepare for the Next
Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, July 23, 2020.
Seth Kaplan, “Human Rights Are in Recession. Can That Be Reversed?” Foreign Policy, July 23,
2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” Speech, Yorba Linda,
California, The Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, July 23, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “How to Ruin a Superpower, Washington’s Status as a Superpower Has Been
Declining for Years. Trump’s Handling of the Pandemic Is Killing It Off,” Foreign Policy, July
23, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Trump Threatens a New Troop Withdrawal. It Would Endanger Yet Another
U.S. Relationship,” Washington Post, July 22, 2020.
Max Boot, “No One Does More to Hurt America and Help China than Trump,” Washington Post,
July 21, 2020.
Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan, “Trump Is Determined to Bring Home U.S. Military Forces
from Somewhere,” Washington Post, July 21, 2020.
Clifford D. May, “Mike Pompeo’s Fight for Unalienable Rights, The Human Rights
Establishment Wants Him Out of the Marketplace of Ideas,” Washington Times, July 21, 2020.
Ian Bremmer, “Trump’s Biggest Foreign Policy Win So Far,” Time, July 20, 2020.
Gene Park and Mieczysław Boduszynski, “Trump Has Damaged the U.S.-Japan-South Korea
Alliance—And China Loves It,” National Interest, July 20, 2020.
Missy Ryan and Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. Remains on the Sidelines in Libya’s Conflict as
Russia Extends Its Reach,” Washington Post, July 20, 2020.
Ramon Marks, “America’s Days of International Policing are Over, The United States Can No
Longer Act as the Lone, Dominant Military Power Around the Globe,” National Interest, July 19,
2020.
Laura Kelly, “Democrats Raise Alarm about New US Human Rights Priorities,” The Hill, July 18,
2020.
Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders, “America Has Created a ‘China-Iran Collaboration’ Monster,
Beijing and Tehran Could Use the Prospects of Deeper Bilateral Cooperation to Generate
Leverage with Foreign Leaders—Leaving Washington Out in the Cold,” National Interest, July
18, 2020.
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Hunter Marston and Ali Wyne, “America’s Post-Coronavirus Diplomacy Needs Middle-Powers
Alliances, Focusing on China Alone Would Be Counterproductive,” Foreign Policy, July 17,
2020.
Jeremi Suri, “What American Century? Those Who Worry About—or Cheer—Its Demise Don’t
Realize That There Never Was One,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Countries Should Mind Their Own Business, Two Cheers for a Classic Idea
That’s Been Out of Fashion for Too Long: State Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2020.
Rori Kramer, “Mike Pompeo Wants to Nationalize Human Rights,” Washington Post, July 16,
2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “Unalienable Rights and the Securing of Freedom,” Speech, Philadelphia,
PA, National Constitution Center, July 16, 2020.
Ralph Reed, “Ralph Reed: Trump, Pompeo Human Rights Agenda Strong in Face of Abuses
Across the Globe,” Fox News, July 16, 2020.
Pranshu Verma, “Pompeo Says Human Rights Policy Must Prioritize Property Rights and
Religion,” New, York Times, July 16 (updated July 21), 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Allies Are Supposed to Help the US, but Americans Always Do the Paying,”
Antiwar.com, July 15, 2020.
William J. Burns, “The United States Needs a New Foreign Policy, The Global Order Is
Crumbling, Domestic Renewal Is Urgent, and America Must Reinvent Its Role in the World,”
Atlantic, July 14, 2020.
Pete Buttigieg and Philip H. Gordon, “Present at the Destruction of U.S. Power and Influence,”
Foreign Policy, July 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “George Washington Tried To Warn Americans About Foreign Policy Today,”
Antiwar.com, July 13, 2020.
Zachary Karabell, “The Anti-American Century, The Old U.S.-led Order Has Crumbled. What
Will Replace It May Be Just What the World—and the United States—Needs,” Foreign Policy,
July 13, 2020.
Ben Smith, “While America Looks Away, Autocrats Crack Down on Digital News Sites,” New
York Times, July 12 (updated July 14), 2020.
Robert D. Blackwill Thomas Wright, “Why COVID-19 Presents a World Reordering Moment,”
National Interest, July 11, 2020.
Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Ghost of Donald Trump Will Haunt Us For Years, Visions of Trump
Will Haunt All Interaction with the United States as Long as There Are People Alive Who
Remember Him,” National Interest, July 10, 2020.
Micah Zenko, “The Foreign-Policy Blob Is Structurally Racist,” Foreign Policy, July 10, 2020.
Luke Baker, Andreas Rinke, Philip Blenkinsop, “Post-Trump Era a Possibility, Europeans See No
Quick Fix to U.S. Ties,” Reuters, July 9, 2020.
Washington Examiner, “US Withdrawal from WHO Can’t Come Soon Enough,” Washington
Examiner, July 8, 2020.
Michael Auslin, “Trump’s New Realism in China, Critics Aside, the Administration Does Have a
Strategy, and It Is Based on Reciprocity,” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Hal Brands, “The Upside of a New Cold War With China, Competition with the Soviet Union
Brought Out the Best in American Democracy,” Bloomberg, July 7, 2020.
Matthew Karnitschnig, “Merkel Looks East as Ties Fray Between Germany and U.S., Berlin
Aims to Reenergize Commercial Links with Beijing Amid the Coronavirus Crisis,” Politico, July
7 (updated July 8), 2020.
Matthew M. Kavanagh, Mara Pillinger, “Leaving the WHO Will Hurt Americans’ Health,”
Foreign Policy, July 7, 2020.
Jeremy Shapiro, “Ask Not What Your Country Can Do for Foreign Policy,” War on the Rocks,
July 7, 2020.
Michael Schuman, “Why China Wants Trump to Win, Four More Years Might Present Tantalizing
Opportunities for Beijing to Expand Its Influence Around East Asia and the World,” Foreign
Policy, July 7, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Despite the Media’s Efforts, Trump Taking a Measured Approach to
Foreign Policy,” Heritage Foundation, July 6, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Michael Pack Will Need to Tackle America’s Great-Power Problem,”
National Interest, July 6, 2020.
Gregory Mitrovich, “Beware Declinism: America Remains Poised for Greatness,” National
Interest, July 5, 2020.
David B. Rivkin Jr. and George S. Beebe, “Why we need a little Skepticism, and More Evidence,
on Russian Bounties,” The Hill, July 5, 2020.
Oona Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, “Welcome to the Post-Leader World, The United States Has
Abdicated Its Dominant Role. Here’s How to Fill the Gap,” Foreign Policy, July 4, 2020.
Luke McGee, “Cracks in the Trump-Europe Relationship Are Turning into a Chasm,” CNN, July
4, 2020.
Paul Sonne, “Trump Remains Silent on Putin Despite Uproar Over Alleged Russian Bounty
Payments,” Washington Post, July 4, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “Trump Is Turning America Into the ‘S***hole Country’ He Fears, The
President’s Mindless Nationalism Has Come to This: Americans Are Not Welcome in Europe or
Mexico,” Atlantic, July 3, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Dancing With Dictators: Trump’s Human Rights Policy,” American
Conservative, July 3, 2020.
Kim Hjelmgaard, Tom Vanden Brook, and Deirdre Shesgreen, “Do ‘Bounties’ on US Troops in
Afghanistan Reflect a Line Crossed or ‘Nothing New’ in Long US-Russia history?” USA Today,
July 3, 2020.
Andrew Higgins and Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Denies Paying Bounties, but Some Say the U.S.
Had It Coming, Russia’s Grievances Against What It Sees as American Bullying and Expansion
into Its Own Zones of Influence Have Been Stacking Up for Decades,” New York Times, July 3
(updated July 13), 2020.
By Sue Mi Terry, “The Unraveling of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance, Trump Allows a
Cornerstone of U.S. Defense Strategy in Asia to Wither,” Foreign Affairs, July 3, 2020.
Robin Wright, “To the World, We’re Now America the Racist and Pitiful,” New Yorker, July 3,
2020.
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Wesley K. Clark, “The United States Has Nothing to Fear From the ICC,” Foreign Policy, July 2,
2020.
Richard Fontaine and Ely Ratner, “The U.S.-China Confrontation Is Not Another Cold War. It’s
Something New,” Washington Post, July 2, 2020.
Tim Weiner, “Putin Still Plays by the Ruthless Rules of the Cold War. Because Trump Lets Him,”
Washington Post, July 2, 2020.
Matthew Lee, “Trump’s Two Russias Confound Coherent US policy,” Associated Press, July 1,
2020.
Michael McFaul, “Trump Would Do Anything for Putin. No Wonder He’s Ignoring the Russian
Bounties,” Washington Post, July 1, 2020.
David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Trump’s New Russia Problem: Unread Intelligence and
Missing Strategy,” New York Times, July 1 (updated July 13), 2020.
Tori K. Smith and HyunJoo Lee, “Congress and the Administration Should Advance Free Trade
to Aid in COVID-19 Economic Recovery,” July 1, 2020.
Jonathan Spyer, “Trump’s Syria Policy Is Working, The Assad Regime Is Cracking under the
Pressure of Stalemate—Just Like the State Department Planned,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020.
Francis Wilkinson, “Trump Is Testing Putin’s Campaign Strategy,” Bloomberg, July 1, 2020.
Robert M. Gates, “The Overmilitarization of American Foreign Policy, The United States Must
Recover the Full Range of Its Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2020.
H.R. McMaster, “The Retrenchment Syndrome, A Response to ‘Come Home, America?’”
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020.
Carl Bernstein, “From Pandering to Putin to Abusing Allies and Ignoring His Own Advisers,
Trump's Phone Calls Alarm US officials,” CNN, updated June 30, 2020.
Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “World Rebukes U.S. Over Ian, With Trump’s Re-election
Prospects Up in the Air, a Heated U.N. Meeting on Iran Shows World Powers’ Fading Fear of
Confronting the United States,” Foreign Policy, June 30, 2020.
Susan E. Rice, “Why Does Trump Put Russia First?” New York Times, June 30, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War,” Foreign
Policy, June 30, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “It’s Time to Stop Defending the Status Quo of Foreign Policy Failure,”
National Interest, June 29, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Trump Doesn’t Understand That Putin Is in the Payback Business,” Washington
Post, June 29, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Now Is The Time To Shed Our Middle Eastern Burdens,” American
Conservative, June 27, 2020.
Abraham Denmark and Matthew Rojansky, “American Success Abroad Is Anchored to Problem-
solving at Home,” War on the Rocks, June 25, 2020.
Jessica Lee, “The Korean War Started the Trend of Endless Wars for America. How Do We
Change Course?” National Interest, June 25, 2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “A New Transatlantic Dialogue,” Speech, Washington, DC, German
Marshall Fund’s Brussels Forum, June 25, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Aaron Rhodes, “How ‘Collective Human Rights’ Undermine Individual Human Rights,” Heritage
Foundation, June 25, 2020.
Tom McTague, “The Decline of the American World, Other Countries Are Used to Loathing
America, Admiring America, and Fearing America (Sometimes All at Once). But Pitying
America? That One Is New,” Atlantic, June 24, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “The Voice of America Will Sound Like Trump,” Atlantic, June 22, 2020.
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Ending America’s Grand Strategic Failures,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), June 22, 2020.
Editors, “Trump’s Ill-Considered Germany Troop Cut,” National Review, June 22, 2020.
Gary J. Schmitt and Giselle Donnelly, “Bad Policy, Worse Reasons, The Trump Administration
Finally Offers a Rationale for the German Troop Drawdown. It Doesn’t Make Sense,” American
Interest, June 22, 2020.
James Stavridis, “Trump’s Retreat From Germany Is a Victory for Putin,” Bloomberg, June 22,
2020.
Michael Crowley, “Trump Says He Avoided Punishing China Over Uighur Camps to Protect
Trade Talks,” New York Times, June 21, 2020.
Robert C. O’Brien, “Why the U.S. Is Moving Troops Out of Germany,” Wall Street Journal, June
21, 2020.
David E. Sanger, “On North Korea and Iran, Bolton Blames ‘the Split Between Trump and
Trump,’” New York Times, June 21, 2020.
Associated Press, “Top US Diplomat Calls UN Rights Body ‘A Haven for Dictators,’” Associated
Press, June 20, 2020.
Travis L. Adkins and Judd Devermont, “The Legacy of American Racism at Home and Abroad,
Domestic Racism Has Long Impacted U.S. Foreign Policy. It’s Time to Open Up About It,”
Foreign Policy, June 19, 2020.
Robert Burns, “Trump Troop Cut in Germany Fits a Pattern of Hitting Allies,” Associated Press,
June 19, 2020.
Luke Coffey, “U.S. Should Keep Troops in Germany,” Heritage Foundation, June 19, 2020.
Benjamin H. Friedman and Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Defund the Europeans,” Defense One, June 19,
2020.
Ronald J. Granieri and Mitchell A. Orenstein, “How White Supremacy Weakens the United
States, The Trump Administration’s Agenda on Race Undermines the Country’s Military,
Alliances, and Security,” Foreign Policy, June 19, 2020.
David Nakamura and John Hudson, “Bolton Revelations Undercut Trump’s Reelection Message
of Toughness on China,” Washington Post, June 19, 2020.
Laurence Norman, “Trump Moves Have Damaged Trans-Atlantic Ties, Says EU Foreign Policy
Chief,” Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “Europe and the China Challenge,” Speech, Virtual Copenhagen Democracy
Summit, June 19, 2020.
James Jay Carafano et al., “After COVID-19, Only U.S. Can Lead Way on Economic Recovery,”
Heritage Foundation, June 18, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Rosalind S. Helderman and Tom Hamburger, “Russia. Ukraine. China. Bolton Account
Highlights Pattern of Trump Welcoming Foreign Political Help,” Washington Post, June 18, 2020.
Colum Lynch, “It’s Not Just Trump. The World Worries America Is Broken. Protests Against
Police Brutality and Systemic Racism Highlight What Is Seen as the United States’ Accelerated
Decline,” Foreign Policy, June 18, 2020.
James Traub, “The Free World’s Leader Isn’t Free Anymore, As the Quality of U.S. Democracy
Erodes, the Reasons Are Dwindling for Anyone to Look to It for Guidance,” Foreign Policy, June
18, 2020.
Edward Wong and Michael Crowley, “The Biggest Obstacle to China Policy: President Trump,”
New York Times, June 18, 2020.
John Bolton, “John Bolton: The Scandal of Trump’s China Policy,” Wall Street Journal, June 17,
2020.
James Jay Carafano, “James Carafano: US should back India after China kills at least 20 Indian
troops,” Fox News, June 17, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Why Can’t America Let South Korea Defend Itself?” National Interest,
June 17, 2020.
Roman Darius, “US Primacy Will Survive Covid-19 and Trump,” Strategist, June 17, 2020.
Josh Dawsey, “Trump Asked China’s Xi to Help Him Win Reelection, According to Bolton
Book,” Washington Post, June 17, 2020.
Seth J. Frantzman, “With US Global Leadership in Decline, Others Step in As Conflicts Grow,
With Every Step the US Takes Back from Various Hot Spots, Its Footprints Are Filled with Iran,
Turkey, Russia or Others,” Jerusalem Post, June 17, 2020.
Henry Olsen, “Trump Is Right to Reduce Troops in Germany,” Washington Post, June 17, 2020.
Akila Radhakrishnan and Elena Sarver, “Trump’s Chilling Blow to the ICC,” Foreign Policy,
June 17, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “U.S. Leads A Coalition Of One Against China, Washington Is Falling
Dangerously Short in Its Search for Allies to Defend Hong Kong and Taiwan,” American
Conservative, June 16, 2020.
David Harsanyi, “Freeloading Germany Is a Terrible Ally,” National Review, June 16, 2020.
Alexis Mrachek, “U.S. State Department Rightly Condemns Russia’s Continued Borderization of
Georgia,” Heritage Foundation, June 16, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “America Should Stop Defending the Philippines Like It Was a Vital Interest,”
Antiwar.com, June 15, 2020.
Kathrin Hille, Edward White, Primrose Riordan, and John Reed, “The Trump Factor: Asian Allies
Question America’s Reliability,” Financial Times, June 15, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer, “Trump Administration Right to Reject Jurisdiction of International Criminal
Court,” Heritage Foundation, June 15, 2020.
Paul R. Pillar, “Why Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Moves Are Completely Confusing,
Understanding Donald Trump’s Policies Require[s] Setting Aside the Stated Ends and Identifying
the Actual Objectives,” National Interest, June 13, 2020.
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Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Will U.S. Protests and Crackdowns Damage America’s
Global Image?” Foreign Policy, June 12, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Washington Complains: China Is Doing What We Always Do!” American
Conservative, June 12, 2020.
Peter Beinart, “The Protesters Are Upholding America’s Moral Authority Abroad,” Atlantic, June
12, 2020.
Mathew J. Burrows and Christopher A. Preble, “The Urgent Need to Adjust America’s Approach
to the World,” National Interest, June 12, 2020.
Matthew Continetti, “Flight of the Superpower, Column: America Accelerates Its Withdrawal
from the World,” Washington Free Beacon, June 12, 2020.
Sara Khorshid, “The World Is Watching America’s Reaction to the George Floyd Protests, Pro-
Democracy Activists in Authoritarian Countries Always Pointed to the United States As a Model.
After Police Attacks on Protesters, It Has Become Increasingly Hard to Do So,” Foreign Policy,
June 12, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “The International Criminal Court Goes Too Far,” National Review, June 12, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Warning a Rogue Court, A Trump Order Defends the U.S. and Israel Against
Foreign Prosecutors,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2020.
Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Trump Order Treats International Prosecutors Like War
Criminals,” Foreign Policy, June 11, 2020.
Jimmy Quinn, “Withdrawal from WHO Is Not Inevitable,” National Review, June 11, 2020.
Nina Shea, “A Big Step for Religious Freedom, A New Executive Order Puts the Neglected Issue
at the Heart of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2020.
Sam Wilkins, “Does Great-Power Competition Favor Autocracies?” National Interest, June 11,
2020.
Erik Brattberg and Ben Judah, “Forget the G-7, Build the D-10, The Moment Is Right for a
Summit of Democracies,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2020.
Stephen Bryen and Shoshana Bryen, “The U.S. Troop Reduction in Germany Is Not About
NATO,” Washington Times, June 10, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Trump's Drawdown of Troops from Germany Is No Reason to Panic (The
USSR Is Gone),” National Interest, June 10, 2020.
Paul Carrel, “Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Germany Defends Troop Withdrawal Plan,” Reuters,
June 10, 2020.
David Kaye, “America the Unexceptional, Long a Promoter of Rights and Democracy Abroad,
the United States Would Be Wise to Look Within,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2020.
Caitlin McFall, “Pompeo: China Engaging in Decades-Long ‘War on Faith,’” Fox News, June 10,
2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “The Thinking Behind Trump’s Troop Cut in Germany, It Appeals to Three
Sorts of Pro-Trump Intellectuals: Neo-Mercantalists, Realists and Neo-Nationalists,” Wall Street
Journal, June 10, 2020.
George F. Will, “Trump’s Foreign Policy of Petulance,” Washington Post, June 10, 2020.
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James Jay Carafano, “James Carafano: Reduce Forces in Europe? America Would Suffer. Here’s
How,” Fox News, June 9, 2020.
Daniel Kochis, “Basing Troops in Europe Is About U.S. Security. A Pullout Would Be Unwise.”
Heritage Foundation, June 9, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Can We Finally Stop Trying to Police the World?” American Spectator, June 8,
2020.
Doug Bandow, “Time To Pull the Troops From NATO: What Good Is an Alliance Full of Cheap-
Riders?” Antiwar.com, June 8, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Washington and China Both Would Lose in A New Cold War,” China US Focus,
June 7, 2020.
Michael Hirsh, “Welcome Back to Kissinger’s World, Neoconservatism Has Died, and Liberal
Internationalism Is Discredited. Perhaps It’s Time to Return to the Ideas of One of the Last
Century’s Greatest Realists,” Foreign Policy, June 7, 2020.
James Marson and Thomas Grove, “Trump’s Order to Pull U.S. Troops From Germany Alarms
European Allies,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2020.
William J. Burns, “Polarized Politics Has Infected American Diplomacy, Foreigners Aren’t
Laughing at Us. They Pity and Discount us,” Atlantic, June 6, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “U.S. vs. China: 5 Smart Ways to Keep Pushing Back,” Heritage
Foundation, June 6, 2020.
Lawrence J. Haas, “Trump’s WHO Withdrawal Too Hasty by Half,” The Hill, June 6, 2020.
Lara Jakes and Edward Wong, “U.S. Diplomats Struggle to Defend Democracy Abroad Amid
Crises at Home,” New York Times, June 6 (updated June 8), 2020.
Jack Butler, “America Hasn’t Failed (Yet), And Even Its Harshest Critics Should Hope That It
Doesn’t,” National Review, June 5, 2020.
Richard Haass, “Foreign Policy By Example, Crisis at Home Makes the United States Vulnerable
Abroad,” Foreign Affairs, June 5, 2020.
Walter Lohman, Thomas Spoehr, and Terry Miller, “President Trump's New China Strategy is
Just the Realism We Need,” National Interest, June 5, 2020.
Iain Marlow, “Lawmakers in Eight Countries Form New Alliance to Counter China,” Bloomberg,
June 5, 2020.
Daniel DePetris, “Cool It With the ‘America In Decline’ Talk,” Defense One, June 4, 2020.
Andrew Higgins, “Russia Jumps on Floyd Killing as Proof of U.S. Hypocrisy,” New York Times,
June 4 (updated June 9), 2020.
Yen Nee Lee, “China Grows ‘More Assertive’ in World Politics As the U.S. Leaves Behind a
Vacuum, Ex-diplomat Says,” CNBC, June 4, 2020.
Siobhán O'Grady, “U.S. Rivals Seize on Protest Crackdowns to Turn Tables on Human Rights
Criticism,” Washington Post, June 4, 2020.
Rong Xiaoqing, “Why Some Tiananmen Protesters Support Trump,” National Review, June 4,
2020.
Max Boot, “Trump Has Turned America into a Pitiful Pariah,” Washington Post, June 2, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Nahal Toosi, “Adversaries Delight in America’s Convulsions, While U.S. Diplomats Despair,”
Politico, June 2, 2020.
Ryan Heath, “Alarm Mixed with Glee As World Is Glued to U.S. Protest Coverage,” Politico,
June 1, 2020.
Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “With Scenes of Police Brutality, America’s Beacon to the
World Winks Out,” Foreign Policy, June 1, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “The World Waits Out Trump, The Belief in Beijing, Moscow and Berlin Is
That the U.S. Can No Longer Lead the Globe,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2020.
David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Edward Wong, “As Virus Toll Preoccupies U.S., Rivals Test
Limits of American Power,” New York Times, June 1 (updated June 2), 2020.
Tara Sonenshine, “Americans Should Fight Propaganda, Like We Used To,” Defense One, June 1,
2020.
Ishaan Tharoor, “A Wave of Protests Puts a Spotlight on U.S. Hypocrisy,” Washington Post, June
1, 2020.
Robin Wright, “Fury at America and Its Values Spreads Globally,” New Yorker, June 1, 2020.
Paul B. Stares et al., Perspectives on a Changing World Order, Council on Foreign Relations,
June 2020, 38 pp.
Rana Foroohar, “We May Be Heading Towards a Post-Dollar World,” Financial Times, May 31,
2020.
David Klion, “Rethinking American History in Trump’s Shadow,” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2020.
Emma Ashford, “Build a Better Blob, Foreign Policy Is Not a Binary Choice Between Trumpism
and Discredited Elites,” Foreign Affairs, May 29, 2020.
Andrew Restuccia and Kate O’Keeffe, “Trump Takes Steps Meant to Punish Beijing Over Hong
Kong,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2020.
Vincent Bevins, “The ‘Liberal World Order’ Was Built With Blood, As the United States Reckons
with its Decline, It Should Understand Where Its Power Came From in the First Place,” New York
Times, May 29, 2020.
Inu Manak, “The New NAFTA and the End of U.S. Leadership in Trade,” Cato Institute, May 29,
2020.
Doug Bandow, “Want to Fix the Deficit? Bring Home the Troops,” Foreign Policy, May 28,
2020.
Phil Levy and Chad P. Bown, “All Roads to a Better Trade Deal Lead Through the WTO,”
Foreign Policy, May 28, 2020.
Christopher A. Preble, “Regarding a “Strategic Approach” to China,” Cato Institute, May 28,
2020.
William Ruger, “President Trump Is Right On Afghanistan,” National Interest, May 28, 2020.
Eric Gomez, Christopher A. Preble, Lauren Sander, and Brandon Valeriano, “Threat Inflation and
Its Consequences,” Cato Institute, May 27, 2020.
Richard Haass, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Doctrine? The Withdrawal Doctrine,” Washington Post,
May 27, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Keith Johnson, “U.S. Effort to Depart WTO Gathers Momentum,” Foreign Policy, May 27, 2020.
Francis P. Sempa, “Forget About a ‘New’ Cold War. The Old One Never Ended,” Diplomat, May
27, 2020.
Seth J. Frantzman, “How to Avoid a China-Led World Order,” National Review, May 25, 2020.
Robert D. Kaplan, “Saving Republican Internationalism,” National Interest, May 25, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “A Disruptive President in a Storm of Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, May 25,
2020.
Hal Brands and Jake Sullivan, “China Has Two Paths to Global Domination,” Foreign Policy,
May 22, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “U.S. Demands on WHO Have Made a Critical Difference,” Heritage
Foundation, May 22, 2020.
Michael M. Rosen, “Do Autocracies Really Have an Advantage over Democracies?” National
Review, May 22, 2020.
Elizabeth Shackelford, “The Price of American Arrogance, It’s Not Just Trump. We Need to
Overhaul Our Approach to Foreign Policy to Avoid Another Disaster Like the Coronavirus,”
Slate, May 22, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Regime Change Is A Hard Habit To Break,” American Conservative, May 21,
2020.
Brett D. Schaefer, “WHO Is a Mess, but America Can’t Reform It Alone,” Heritage Foundation,
May 21, 2020.
Hal Brands, “What Does China Really Want? To Dominate the World,” Bloomberg, May 20,
2020.
Adam Bienkov, “Europe Is Abandoning Trump on the World Stage As It Turns Away from the US
Toward China,” Business Insider, May 20, 2020.
Simon Lester, “US Shouldn’t Leave the WTO Over China,” The Hill, May 19, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Trump Administration Kills Coldly in Yemen, Putting Jobs Before Lives,”
Antiwar.com, May 18, 2020.
Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Is the U.S. Government Back in the Business of Regime
Change?” Foreign Policy, May 15, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Sane Way to Challenge Xi Jinping’s China,” Foreign Policy, May 15, 2020.
James Jay Carafano et al., “International Organizations are the Devil’s Playground of Great
Power Competition,” National Interest, May 15, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Foreign Policy Blob Strikes Back: We’re Just Fine, Proclaim Architects of
Endless Wars,” Antiwar.com, May 14, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Time For A New National Defense Strategy,” American Conservative, May 14,
2020.
Michael Brendan Dougherty, “Trump’s Illusory Hard Line on China,” National Review, May 13,
2020.
Matthew Kroenig, “The United States Should Not Align With Russia Against China,” Foreign
Policy, May 13, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Hal Brands, “China Rivalry May Put the U.S. Back in the Coup Business,” Bloomberg, May 12,
2020.
Doug Bandow, “Ten Years After Regime Change: Libyans Are Dying Because of American
Arrogance,” Antiwar.com, May 11, 2020.
Dan Ikenson, “Let’s Have That Much Needed Debate About The World Trade Organization,”
Forbes, May 8, 2020.
Editorial Board, “Donald Trump’s Erratic China Policy Undermines Western Unity,” Financial
Times, May 7, 2020.
Jose W. Fernandez, “In the Coronavirus Era, Trump’s ‘America First’ Means ‘Latin America
Alone,’” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2020.
Joel Gehrke, “US and Western allies offer disjointed response to China coronavirus calamity,”
Washington Examiner, May 6, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Making China Pay Would Cost Americans Dearly,” Foreign Policy, May 5,
2020.
Hal Brands, “Can a Broke America Fight a Cold War With China? The Coronavirus Has United
Americans Against Beijing’s Aggressions, But It Will Also Devastate the Pentagon Budget,”
Bloomberg, May 5, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “How to Keep the Free World From Becoming a Suburb of Beijing,”
Heritage Foundation, May 5, 2020.
Ben Doherty, “The Indispensable Nation? Covid-19 Tests the US-Australian Alliance,” Guardian,
May 5, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “The United States Forgot Its Strategy for Winning Cold Wars,” Foreign
Policy, May 5, 2020.
Ali Wyne, “Can China Use the Pandemic to Displace the US?” Defense One, May 5, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Two Decades of War in Afghanistan Is Enough,” Cato Institute, May 4, 2020.
William Booth, Carolyn Y. Johnson, and Carol Morello, “The World Came Together for a Virtual
Vaccine Summit. The U.S. Was Conspicuously Absent,” Washington Post, May 4, 2020.
Matthew Petti, “Trump Administration Defends No-Show At Global Coronavirus Conference,”
National Interest, May 4, 2020.
Deb Riechmann and Zeke Miller, “Trump’s anti-China rhetoric aimed at boosting US leverage,”
Associated Press, May 4, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “The Rest of the World Is Laughing at Trump, The President Created a
Leadership Vacuum. China Intends to Fill It,” Atlantic, May 3, 2020.
Edward Fishman, “The World Order Is Dead. Here’s How to Build a New One for a Post-
Coronavirus Era,” Politico, May 3, 2020.
Charlotte Klein, “Trump’s ‘America First’ Mentality May Hamper Global Race For Coronavirus
Vaccine,” Vanity Fair, May 3, 2020.
Nahal Toosi and Natasha Bertrand, “Fears Rise that Trump Will Incite a Global Vaccine Brawl,
The President’s ‘America First’ Philosophy Courts Disaster for Entire Regions of the World,
Diplomats Warn,” Politico, May 3, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Trump’s New Marshall Plan,” National Interest, May 2, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Daniel F. Runde, “Competing and Winning in the Multilateral System: U.S. Leadership in the
United Nations,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1, 2020.
Daniel F. Runde and Conor M. Savoy, “Covid-19 Has Consequences for U.S. Foreign Aid and
Global Leadership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1, 2020.
Kori Schake, “America’s Built-in Protection Against Bad Leadership, For All Its Failures, the
U.S. Has Structural Advantages Over Rival Powers—and Will Come Out of the Pandemic Even
Stronger,” Atlantic, May 1, 2020.
Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller, “The End of Grand Strategy,
America Must Think Small,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2020.
H. R. McMaster, “How China Sees the World, And How We Should See China,” Atlantic, May
2020.
Walter Lohman and James Jay Carafano, “10 Steps America Should Take Now to Respond to the
China Challenge,” Heritage Foundation, April 30, 2020.
Henry R. Nau, “What Trump Gets Right About U.S. Foreign Policy,” National Interest, April 30,
2020.
Carisa Nietsche and Martijn Rasser, “Washington’s Anti-Huawei Tactics Need a Reboot In
Europe,” Foreign Policy, April 30, 2020.
Bradley A. Thayer and Lianchao Han, “Why Was the U.S. So Late to Recognize the China
Threat,” Real Clear Defense, April 30, 2020.
Colum Lynch, “WHO Becomes Battleground as Trump Chooses Pandemic Confrontation Over
Cooperation,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2020.
Michael Morell, Avril Haines, and David S. Cohen, “Trump’s Politicization of U.S. Intelligence
Agencies Could End in Disaster,” Foreign Policy, April 28, 2020.
J. Stephen Morrison and Anna Carroll, “WHO and President Trump on the Ledge,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 28, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Time to Get the Hell out of Korea,” Cato Institute, April 27, 2020.
Jeffrey Becker, “COVID-19 Offers a Golden Opportunity to Reengage with the Indo-Pacific,”
Defense One, April 27, 2020.
Joseph S. Nye, “How COVID-19 Is Testing American Leadership,” East Asia Forum, April 26,
2020.
Jacob Stokes, “How the United States Can Cooperate While Competing With China,” Lawfare,
April 26, 2020.
John Hudson, Josh Dawsey, and Souad Mekhennet, “Trump Expands Battle with WHO Far
Beyond Aid Suspension,” Washington Post, April 25, 2020.
Daniel F. Runde, “Defending the 'Global Spoils System' of Leadership Jobs in Multilaterals Is in
the U.S. Interest,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 24, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Withdraw US Support From Saudi Arabia,” Cato Institute, April 23, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Challenge China and the WHO—But Not While the Pandemic Rages,” The Hill,
April 23, 2020.
Katrin Bennhold, “‘Sadness’ and Disbelief From a World Missing American Leadership,” New
York Times, April 23, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

David Brunnstrom and Humeyra Pamuk, “Pompeo Says U.S. May Never Restore WHO Funds
after Cutoff over Pandemic,” Reuters, April 23, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Coronavirus: 3 Ways for Us to Be Smart and Still Make China Regret
Unleashing Pandemic,” Heritage Foundation, April 23, 2020.
Julianne Smith and Garima Mohan, “In a Crisis, a Fumbling America Confirms Europe’s Worst
Fears,” War on the Rocks, April 23, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “There’s No Such Thing as Good Liberal Hegemony, It’s Not Just That the
United States Has Made Mistakes—the Very Idea of U.S. Global Leadership Is Broken from the
Ground Up,” Foreign Policy, April 21, 2020.
Riley Walters and Dean Cheng, “How to Hold China Accountable for COVID-19,” Heritage
Foundation, April 21, 2020.
Hal Brands, “Don’t Let Great Powers Carve Up the World, Spheres of Influence Are Unnecessary
and Dangerous,” Foreign Affairs, April 20, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The United States Can’t Ditch China Yet, Fraying Ties Need Not Spell the End
of the U.S.-China Relationship,” Foreign Policy, April 20, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “The Great U.S.-China Divorce Has Arrived,” National Interest, April 20,
2020.
Gordon Lubold and Dion Nissenbaum, “With Trump Facing Virus Crisis, U.S. Warns Rivals Not
to Seek Advantage,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020.
Bradley A. Thayer and Lianchao Han, “Kissinger's Folly: The Threat to World Order is China,”
The Hill, April 19, 2020.
James Holmes, “How Donald Trump Should Make China Pay for Coronavirus,” National
Interest, April 18, 2020.
Sharon Tennison, David Speedie, and Krishen Mehta, “Is NATO Still Necessary?” National
Interest, April 18, 2020.
Daniel P. Vajdich, “The Geopolitical Cost of Battling the Coronavirus Separately (China Will
Win),” National Interest, April 18, 2020.
Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig, “Will Trump’s Decision to Cut WHO Funding Accomplish
Anything?” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2020.
Ilan Berman, “Trump Puts U.S. Public Diplomacy on Notice,” National Interest, April 17, 2020.
Philippe Rater with Agence France-Presse bureaus, “As US Pulls Back, China Builds Influence
At UN,” Barron’s, April 17, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “We Could Sue Beijing, but Careful America What You Wish For,” American
Conservative, April 16, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Coronavirus Should Not Become an Excuse to Decouple,” China US Focus,
April 16, 2020.
Olivia Enos, “Why the Pandemic Is the Right Time to Issue an Atrocity Determination for
Rohingya,” Heritage Foundation, April 16, 2020.
Richard Fontaine, “We Need an Atlantic Charter for the Post-coronavirus Era,” Atlantic, April 16,
2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Brett D. Schaefer, “How Best to Leverage Trump’s Halt to WHO Funding Over COVID-19
Missteps,” Heritage Foundation, April 16, 2020.
Salvatore Babones, “Donald Trump Is Right To Dump the WHO,” National Interest, April 15,
2020.
Kevin Baron, “Don’t Be Fooled. Trump’s Cuts to WHO Aren’t About the Coronavirus,” Defense
One, April 15, 2020.
Robert Burns, “Military Sees No Quick Exit from ‘New World’ of Coronavirus,” Associated
Press, April 15, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Trump’s Meddling In The Balkans Has Led To A Super Kosovo Fail,”
American Conservative, April 15, 2020.
Michael Green and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Pandemic Won’t Make China the World’s Leader,”
Foreign Affairs, April 15, 2020.
Todd Harrison, “DoD Must Identify Its ‘Crown Jewels’ in Preparation for Fiscal Uncertainty,”
Defense News, April 15, 2020.
Jamey Keaten and Maria Cheng, “WHO, Allies Lament Trump Cut to US Funding as Virus
Rages,” Associated Press, April 15, 2020.
Bonnie Kristian, “The Coronavirus Shows How US ‘Diplomacy’ Is Anything But: Absolutist,
America-First Approaches Isolate Us and Make Us Less Safe,” Defense One, April 15, 2020.
Eli Lake, “Trump Is Punishing the WHO for China’s Deceptions,” Bloomberg, April 15, 2020.
Kristine Lee, “It’s Not Just the WHO: How China Is Moving on the Whole U.N.,” Politico, April
15, 2020.
James Palmer, “Why Chinese Embassies Have Embraced Aggressive Diplomacy,” Foreign
Policy, April 15, 2020.
Ionut Popescu, “It's Time to Get Real About Great-Power Politics,” National Interest, April 15,
2020.
Emily Rauhala, “Trump’s Critique of WHO May Be a Diversion, But It Resonates Beyond the
White House,” Washington Post, April 15, 2020.
David E. Sanger, “Analysis: Will Pandemic Make Trump Rethink National Security?” New York
Times, April 15, 2020.
Brett D. Schaefer, “Now Is Not (Yet) the Time to Cut Funding to the World Health Organization,”
Heritage Foundation, April 15, 2020.
Nahal Toosi, “Trump Hobbles Foreign Aid as Coronavirus Rips Around the World,” Politico,
April 15, 2020.
Salvatore Babones, “In the Post-Coronavirus World, Chinese Power is Overrated: A Global
Resurgence in National Self-Reliance Might Actually Be a Good Thing for America’s Place in the
World.” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2020.
Daniel DePetris, “NATO’s New Panel Needs to Think Beyond Cold War Assumptions,” Defense
News, April 14, 2020.
Stéphanie Fillion, “In Canada, Patience Wearing Thin Over Trump’s Antics, A Threat to
Militarize the Border and Attempts to Hold Up Lifesaving Medical Supplies Have Roiled the
Calmest of Countries.” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Steve Holland, “Trump to Convene G7 Leaders in Video Call to Discuss Pandemic,” Reuters,
April 14, 2020.
David D. Kirkpatrick, “The White House Blessed a War in Libya, but Russia Won It,” New York
Times, April 14 (updated April 15), 2020.
Martijn Rasser, “Technology alliances will help shape our post-pandemic future,” C4ISRnet,
April, 14, 2020.
John Lee Cheong Seong, “Beijing Tried to Use the Coronavirus Crisis to Enhance Its Global
Standing. It’s Not Working,” South China Morning Post, April 14, 2020.
Edward Wong and Paul Mozur, “China’s ‘Donation Diplomacy’ Raises Tensions With U.S.,” New
York Times, April 14, 2020.
Mohammed Ayoob, “How the Coronavirus Could Undercut China’s Global Standing,” National
Interest, April 13, 2020.
Tony Bertuca, “Global Pandemic Threatens to Hobble National Defense Strategy,” Inside
Defense, April 13, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “After Coronavirus—We Still Need Europe and They Need Us. Here’s What
Has to Happen,” Heritage Foundation, April 13, 2020.
Derek Chollet, Michał Baranowski, and Steven Keil, “Where is NATO? And Where is Trump?
The Virus Is Destroying Economies and Paralyzing Societies in Ways Russian Military Planners
Could Only Dream.” Defense One, April 13, 2020.
Jack Detsch, “U.S. Official: Beware of Chinese Leaders Bearing Coronavirus Gifts,” Foreign
Policy, April 13, 2020.
Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, “The Atlantic Alliance Had Preexisting Conditions. The
Pandemic Will Worsen Them,” War on the Rocks, April 13, 2020.
Robbie Gramer, “Outgoing USAID Chief Says Pandemic Underscores Importance of Foreign
Aid,” Foreign Policy, April 13, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “The End of American Leadership, The Coronavirus Pandemic May Mark the Final
Shift of Global Power Away from the United States.” Slate, April 13, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “The United States Is Getting Infected With Dictatorship,” Foreign Policy,
April 13, 2020.
Chi Wang, “How China is Losing the World’s Trust Following Its Cover-up of the Coronavirus
Crisis,” South China Morning Post, April 13, 2020.
Michael Birnbaum and Terrence McCoy, “As Leaders Seize Powers to Fight coronavirus, Fear
Grows for Democracy,” Washington Post, April 12, 2020.
Michael Shoebridge, “Why America Will Emerge Stronger From the Coronavirus Crisis,”
National Interest, April 12, 2020.
Renée DiResta, “For China, the ‘USA Virus’ Is a Geopolitical Ploy,” Atlantic, April 11, 2020.
Lee Drake, “What the Trump Administration Needs to Learn from the Plague that Destroyed
Athens,” National Interest, April 11, 2020.
Bradley A. Thayer and Lianchao Han, “China Is Using The Coronavirus Crisis To Gain Political
Capital Against America,” National Interest, April 11, 2020.
Trevor Wilson, “Strategic Challenges of China’s Rise,” East Asia Forum, April 11, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Janusz Bugajski, “Mind the Gap, And Don’t Succumb to Transatlantic Fever,” Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), April 10, 2020.
Karen DeYoung, “Foreign Policy Challenges Persist for a Distracted U.S. in the Midst of
Pandemic,” Washington Post, April 10, 2020.
Catie Edmondson, “China Hawks in Congress See an Opportunity in Coronavirus,” New York
Times, April 10 (updated April 14), 2020.
Bill Ong Hing, “Trump Has Achieved His Goal of Abolishing Asylum: The Pandemic Has Added
One More Insurmountable Hurdle for Asylum Seekers.” Slate, April 10, 2020.
Colin H. Kahl and Ariana Berengaut, “Aftershocks: The Coronavirus Pandemic and the New
World Disorder,” War on the Rocks, April 10, 2020.
Sophia Becker, Christian Mölling, and Torben Schütz, “The Coronavirus Threatens NATO. Let’s
Move to Protect the Alliance.” Defense News, April 9, 2020.
Ryan Girdusky, “Bad Ideology, Not Bad Leadership, Caused Our China Problem,” Washington
Examiner, April 9, 2020.
David Ignatius, “The Coronavirus Is Already Reshaping Defense Strategies,” Washington Post,
April 9, 2020.
Benjamin Jensen, “When Systems Fail: What Pandemics and Cyberspace Tell Us About the
Future of National security,” War on the Rocks, April 9, 2020.
Josh Rogin, “The Pandemic Means the Trump Administration Must Stop Mistreating USAID,”
Washington Post, April 9, 2020
Alireza Ahmadi, “The Trump Era Has Created a New Challenge for China,” National Interest,
April 8, 2020.
Lanhee J. Chen, “Lost in Beijing: The Story of the WHO, China Broke the World Health
Organization. The U.S. Has to Fix It or Leave and Start Its Own Group.” Wall Street Journal,
April 8, 2020.
Michèle A. Flournoy and Lisa O. Monaco, “Now’s Not the Time for Isolationism, Countries
Need to Work Together to Fight Coronavirus, and the U.S. Should Step Up to Lead Those Efforts,
Not Back Off From Them.” Politico, April 8, 2020.
Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Pandemic Stymies Congressional Check on Trump’s Foreign
Policy,” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2020.
Colum Lynch, “Can the United Nations Survive the Coronavirus? In the Absence of U.S.
Leadership, the U.N. Is Struggling to Carve Out a Role in the Face of What May Be the Greatest
Threat Since Its Founding.” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2020.
Christopher Preble, “How will COVID-19 Change US National Security Strategy?” Responsible
Statecraft, April 8, 2020.
Todd Prince, “Pompeo Touts U.S. Foreign Help Against Pandemic As Trump Threatens WHO
Funding,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 8, 2020.
Keith B. Alexander and Jamil N. Jaffer, “While the World Battles the Coronavirus, Our
Adversaries Are Planning Their Next Attack,” The Hill, April 7 2020.
Joe Buccino, “The US Must Lead the World Out of This, If the Coronavirus Pandemic Only
Causes Us to Look Inward, China Wins.” Defense One, April 7, 2020.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Helle C. Dale, “Even in Pandemic, America Still the Global Leader,” Heritage Foundation, April
7, 2020.
Daniel L. Davis, “Coronavirus Means No More Money for Forever Wars,” National Interest,
April 7, 2020.
Glenn S. Gerstell and Michael Morell, “Four Ways U.S. Intelligence Efforts Should Change in the
Wake of the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Washington Post, April 7, 2020.
Oona A. Hathaway, “After COVID-19, We Need to Redefine ‘National Security,’ The Post-9/11
Era Is Over.” Slate, April 7, 2020.
James Kraska Sumantra Maitra, “The Coronavirus Crisis Has Highlighted America's Failed
Foreign Policy Tactics,” National Interest, April 7, 2020.
John Pomfret, “Does the Future Still Belong to the U.S. and China?” Washington Post, April 7,
2020.
Harrison Schramm, Kevin A. Chlan, Peter Kouretsos, COVID-19, Analysis and Policy
Implications, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2020 (released April 7, 2020), 31
pp.
Robert B. Zoellick, “The World Is Watching How America Handles Coronavirus, The Trump
Administration Has Failed to Convey An Impression of Strong International Leadership.” Wall
Street Journal, April 7, 2020.
Ted Anthony, “After Virus, How Will Americans’ View of the World Change?” Washington Post,
April 6, 2020.
Timofey V. Bordachev, “Visions Of The Post-Coronavirus World: Russian Expert On Europe
Bordachev: The Liberal World Order Will Not Survive,” MEMRI, April 6, 2020.
Zachery Tyson Brown, “America’s National Security Software Needs an Upgrade, The Outdated
U.S. Security Apparatus Was Completely Unprepared for the Coronavirus Pandemic.” Foreign
Policy, April 6, 2020.
William J. Burns, “A Make-or-Break Test for American Diplomacy, The Post-Pandemic World
Will Pose a Massive Test for U.S. Statecraft, the Biggest Since the End of the Cold War.”
Atlantic, April 6, 2020.
Kyle Harper, “The Coronavirus Is Accelerating History Past the Breaking Point, Every Era Gets
the Infectious Diseases—and the Resulting Political Upheaval—It Has Coming.” Foreign Policy,
April 6, 2020.
Matthew Karnitschnig and Judith Mischke, “Berlin Lets Mask Slip on Feelings for Trump’s
America, The Crisis Has Convinced Germans That Trump Puts Other Countries at Risk.”
Politico, April 6 (updated April 7), 2020.
James Lamond, “Authoritarian Regimes Seek To Take Advantage of the Coronavirus Pandemic,”
Center for American Progress, April 6, 2020.
Mark Payumo, “Why China’s Coronavirus Lies Don’t Matter If It Plays the Long Information
Game, Washington Can Still Beat Beijing’s Information Warfare Campaign, But It Needs to Stop
Thinking Short-Term.” National Interest, April 6, 2020.
Ben Rhodes, “The 9/11 Era Is Over, The Coronavirus Pandemic and a Chapter of History That
Should Have Expired Long Ago,” Atlantic, April 6, 2020.
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Jason Sherman, “Analyst: Pandemic Will Squeeze Defense Spending As Nation's Focus Shifts to
Health Care,” Inside Defense, April 6, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “President Should Begin Halting Endless Wars With Iraq Withdrawal,” American
Spectator, April 5, 2020.
Victor Davis Hanson, “Don’t Be Fooled: Trump Is Leading the World Against Coronavirus,”
National Interest, April 5, 2020.
Nadia Schadlow, “Consider the Possibility That Trump Is Right About China, Critics Are Letting
Their Disdain for the President Blind Them to Geopolitical Realities.” Atlantic, April 5, 2020.
Stratfor Worldview, “Will the Coronavirus Ruin Countries’ Ability to Wage War?” National
Interest, April 5, 2020.
Anthony Vinci and Nadia Schadlow, “Time for the US to declare independence from China,”
Washington Examiner, April 5, 2020.
Andy Blatchford, “Trump's Moves to Hold Medical Supplies Tip Trudeau to China,” Politico,
April 4 (updated April 5), 2020.
Anthony Faiola, Lindzi Wessel, and Shibani Mahtani, “Coronavirus Chills Protests from Chile to
Hong Kong to Iraq, Forcing Activists to Innovate,” Washington Post, April 4, 2020.
Seth J. Frantzman, “Coronavirus Is Empowering Dictators And Changing The World Order,”
National Interest, April 4, 2020.
Lara Jakes, “When the Face of America Falls Ill: A Virus’s Toll on Diplomats,” New York Times,
April 4, 2020.
Matthew Lee and Edith M. Lederer, “Global Diplomacy Under the Gun in The Time of
Ccoronavirus,” Associated Press, April 4, 2020.
Stratfor Worldview, “How the Coronavirus Pandemic Is Changing the World—and the Future,”
National Interest, April 4, 2020.
Bradley A. Thayer and Lianchao Han, “The Consequences of the Pandemic for China and the
World,” National Interest, April 4, 2020.
Thomas Wright, “Stretching the International Order to Its Breaking Point, The Greatest Error
That Geopolitical Analysts Can Make May Be Believing That the Crisis Will Be Over in Three to
Four Months.” Atlantic, April 4, 2020.
Emma Ashford and Matthew Kroenig,” Will Trump’s Pandemic Response Help or Harm U.S.
Power? Russia and China Are Stepping in While the United States and Europe Fumble.” Foreign
Policy, April 3, 2020.
Vanda Felbab-Brown, “What Coronavirus Means for Online Fraud, Forced Sex, Drug Smuggling
and Wildlife Trafficking,” Lawfare, April 3, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “America's Post-Coronavirus China Syndrome,” Heritage Foundation, April
3, 2020.
Henry A. Kissinger, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order,” Wall Street
Journal, April 3, 2020.
Gregory D. Koblentz and Michael Hunzeker, “National Security in the Age of Pandemics,”
Defense One, April 3, 2020.
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Matthew Kroenig, “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China, The Faith in Autocratic Ascendance
and Democratic Decline Is Contrary to Historical Fact.” Atlantic, April 3, 2020.
Joshua Kurlantzick, “Dictators Are Using the Coronavirus to Strengthen Their Grip on Power,”
Washington Post, April 3, 2020.
Edward Lucas, “China Was Once the Cradle of the Coronavirus Pandemic But It Has Bounced
Back with Astonishing Speed, Writes Edward Lucas As He Reveals the Country May Have Won
the War for Global Supremacy As Well,” Daily Mail (UK), April 3, 2020.
Bruno Maçães, “China Wants to Use the Coronavirus to Take Over the World,” National Review,
April 3, 2020.
Minxin Pei, “China’s Coming Upheaval, Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of Xi
Jinping,” Foreign Affairs, April 3, 2020.
Nahal Toosi, “‘Lord of the Flies: PPE Edition’: U.S. Cast As Culprit in Global Scrum Over
Coronavirus Supplies,” Politico, April 3, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “The United States Can Still Win the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Foreign Policy,
April 3, 2020.
Riley Walters, “Decreasing U.S.-China Trade Is Worrisome,” Heritage Foundation, April 3, 2020.
Cara Anna, “Extremists See Global Chaos from Virus As An Opportunity,” Associated Press,
April 2, 2020.
Ryan Broderick, “After The Coronavirus Passes, Your World Will Not Go Back To Normal,
Before the Pandemic Began, the Systems That Govern Our World Were Brittle. Today, They Are
Broken. When We Emerge, the World Will Be Different, and So Will We.” Buzzfeed News, April
2, 2020.
Rick Gladstone, “U.N. Security Council ‘Missing In Action’ in Coronavirus Fight,” New York
Times, April 2, 2020.
Susan B. Glasser, “The Coronavirus Is the World’s Only Superpower, Trump’s America? Not so
Much.” New Yorker, April 2, 2020.
Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, “In Global Leadership Void on Pandemic, Critics Ask:
Where’s Pompeo?” Foreign Policy, April 2, 2020.
Ash Jain, “Trump Just Missed a Perfect Opportunity to Reassert American Leadership, The G-20
helped beat Ebola. Why can’t it do the same for the coronavirus?” Foreign Policy, April 2, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Coronavirus and Regime Change—Will This Plague Topple Nations Great
and Small?” Heritage Foundation, April 1, 2020.
John Haltiwanger, “The Coronavirus Just Created a New Dictator in Europe and Has Emboldened
the Toxic Behavior of Authoritarians Worldwide,” Business Insider, April 1, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “The Trump-Russia Showdown Over Oil,” Wall Street Journal, April 1,
2020.
Luke McGee, “Power-Hungry Leaders Are Itching to Exploit the Coronavirus Crisis,” CNN,
April 1, 2020.
Jacob Mchangama and Sarah McLaughlin, “Coronavirus Has Started a Censorship Pandemic,”
Foreign Policy, April 1, 2020.
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Tom O’Connor and Naveed Jamali, “As U.S. Struggles to Fight Coronavirus, China, Russia See
Opportunity to Gain Global Power,” Newsweek, April 1, 2020.
Matthew Petti, “Pompeo: China Will Be ‘True Strategic Competitor’ After Coronavirus,”
National Interest, April 1, 2020.
Jeff M. Smith, “How America Is Leading the "Quad Plus" Group of 7 Countries in Fighting the
Coronavirus,” Heritage Foundation, April 1, 2020.
Adam Tooze, “America Is Ailing—and Leading the World, The Coronavirus Pandemic Has Been
a Humiliation for the United States—and Confirmation of Its Unmatched International Power.”
Foreign Policy, April 1, 2020.
Philip Wen and Drew Hinshaw, “China Asserts Claim to Global Leadership, Mask by Mask,”
Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2020.
George Packer, “The President Is Winning His War on American Institutions,” Atlantic, April
2020.
Robert C. Rubel, “Canary In The Coal Mine: The US Navy’s Dilemmas As An Indication Of A
Culminating Point In National Grand Strategy,” Journal of Political Risk, April 2020.
David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “After the Pandemic: America and National Security in a
Changed World,” War on the Rocks, March 31, 2020.
Max Boot, “Covid-19 is Killing Off Our Traditional Notions of National Defense,” Washington
Post, March 31, 2020.
Nic Cheeseman, “The Coronavirus Could Topple Governments Around the World,” Foreign
Policy, March 31, 2020.
Ian Goldin and Robert Muggah, “End of International Cooperation? How Coronavirus Has
Changed the World Permanently,” National Interest, March 31, 2020.
Ruchir Sharma, “The Comeback Nation, U.S. Economic Supremacy Has Repeatedly Proved
Declinists Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2020.
Carolyn Whitzman, “Could Coronavirus Lead To a Fairer World?” National Interest, March 31,
2020.
Doug Bandow, “Donald Trump Needs to Focus on Coronavirus (Not Fighting with China and the
EU),” National Interest, March 30, 2020.
Florian Bieber, “Authoritarianism in the Time of the Coronavirus, The Pandemic Offers
Dictators—and Democracies Alike—an Opportunity for Abuse.” Foreign Policy, March 30,
2020.
Daniel W. Drezner, “The Most Counterintuitive Prediction about World Politics and the
Coronavirus, What If Nothing Changes?” Washington Post, March 30, 2020.
Selam Gebrekidan, “For Autocrats, and Others, Coronavirus Is a Chance to Grab Even More
Power,” New York Times, March 30, 2020.
Daniel J. Ikenson, “The Coronavirus Crisis Is the Worst Time For Trump To Put Up Trade
Barriers,” National Interest, March 30, 2020.
Elizabeth Kolbert, “Pandemics and the Shape of Human History, Outbreaks Have Sparked Riots
and Propelled Public-Health Innovations, Prefigured Revolutions and Redrawn Maps.” New
Yorker, March 20, 2020.
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Simon Lester, “The Coronavirus Crisis Is the Right Time For Free Trade,” National Interest,
March 30, 2020.
Simon Mair, “Why Coronavirus May Change the World (For Better or Worse),” National Interest,
March 30, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “U.S. Leadership Will Survive Coronavirus,” Wall Street Journal, March
30, 2020.
Chris Murphy, “The U.S. Government Must Prepare Now for the Next Pandemic,” Foreign
Policy, March 30, 2020.
Matthew Petti, “Lincoln Chafee: Stop Endless Wars To Deal With Coronavirus Pandemic,”
National Interest, March 30, 2020.
Josh Rogin, “The National Security Council Sounded Early Alarms about the Coronavirus,”
Washington Post, March 30, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “Washington Post’s Broadside against Mike Pompeo Is Wildly Unfair,”
Washington Examiner, March 30, 2020. (Responds to the March 29, 2020, writing below by
Jackson Diehl.)
Jeff M. Smith, “How America Is Leading the ‘Quad Plus’ Group of Seven Countries in Fighting
the Coronavirus,” National Interest, March 30, 2020.
Jackson Diehl, “Pompeo’s Pandemic Performance Ensures His Place Among the Worst
Secretaries of State Ever,” Washington Post, March 29, 2020. (For a response, see the March 30,
2020, writing above by Michael Rubin.)
Brett McGurk, “America Should Build an International Coalition Now; The United States Has an
Urgent Interest in Filling the Global Leadership Void During This Stateless Scourge.” Atlantic,
March 29, 2020.
Nahal Toosi, “Coronavirus Rattles America’s National Security Priesthood,” Politico Pro, March
29, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Donald Trump Offered to Help North Korea on Coronavirus. Why Not
Iran?” National Interest, March 27, 2020.
David Frum, “The Coronavirus Is Demonstrating the Value of Globalization,” Atlantic, March 27,
2020.
Doug Bandow, “Now’s The Time To Become A Truly ‘America First’ Military, With Coronavirus
Killing the Economy, We Can No Longer Afford to Project Power Everywhere.” American
Conservative, March 26, 2020.
Zack Beauchamp, “The Myth of Authoritarian Coronavirus Supremacy,” Vox, March 26, 2020.
Fred Kaplan, “The Coronavirus Hasn’t Stopped Trump From Undermining Our National
Security,” Slate, March 26, 2020.
Nicholas Mulder, “The Coronavirus War Economy Will Change the World,” Foreign Policy,
March 26, 2020.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “COVID-19’s Painful Lesson about Strategy and Power,” War on the Rocks,
March 26, 2020.
Paul R. Pillar, “Donald Trump's Nationalist Response to the Coronavirus,” National Interest,
March 26, 2020.
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Josh Rogin, “America’s $2 Trillion Coronavirus Stimulus Package Ignores the Rest of the
World,” Washington Post, March 26, 2020.
Ali Wyne, “Why China and the U.S. Can’t Cooperate to Fight Coronavirus,” Washington Post,
March 26, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “How the Coronavirus Shows North Korea Doesn’t Matter That Much to
America,” National Interest, March 25, 2020.
Noah Barkin, “Germany’s Strategic Gray Zone With China,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, March 25, 2020.
Kevin Baron, “Trump Could Have Led the World Against the Coronavirus,” Defense One, March
25, 2020.
Pete McKenzie, “America’s Allies Are Becoming a Nuclear-Proliferation Threat,” Defense One,
March 25, 2020.
Peter Rough, “How China is Exploiting the Coronavirus to Weaken Democracies,” Foreign
Policy, March 25, 2020.
Micah Zenko, “The Coronavirus Is the Worst Intelligence Failure in U.S. History,” Foreign
Policy, March 25, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Great Power Competition After the Coronavirus Crisis: What Should
America Do?” National Interest, March 24, 2020.
Paul Haenle and Lucas Tcheyan, “U.S.-China Cooperation on Coronavirus Hampered by
Propaganda War,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 24, 2020.
Mark Hannah, “Will America’s Coronavirus Response Inspire Countries to Follow China’s
Model?” National Interest, March 24, 2020.
Jonathan Marcus, “Coronavirus: US-China Battle Behind the Scenes,” BBC News, March 24,
2020.
Mira Rapp-Hooper, “China, America, and the International Order After the Pandemic,” War on
the Rocks, March 24, 2020.
Brett Schaefer and Charles Stimson, “How the U.S. Should Respond to the ICC’s Decision to
Investigate Americans,” Heritage Foundation, March 24, 2020.
Anne Applebaum, “The People in Charge See an Opportunity, Around the World, Rulers Are
Using the Pandemic As An Excuse to Grab More Power. And the Public Is Going Along with It.”
Atlantic, March 23, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “A War of Words With China Helps Nobody,” Foreign Policy, March 23, 2020.
Dan Blumenthal, “Donald Trump’s China Problem Has Arrived,” National Interest, March 23,
2020.
Elisabeth Braw, “As the West Panics, Putin Is Watching,” Foreign Policy, March 23, 2020.
Emily de La Bruyere and Nathan Picarsic, “Competition Meets Crisis: China’s Perverse
Opportunity and a Strategic Response,” National Interest, March 23, 2020.
Editorial Board, “The Coronavirus Pandemic May Mark a Decline in U.S. Leadership,”
Washington Post, March 23, 2020.
Olivia Enos, “The U.S. Should Do More to Tackle Forced Labor in Xinjiang,” Heritage
Foundation, March 23, 2020.
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Azeem Ibrahim, “China’s Debt Diplomacy Will Get a Coronavirus Boost,” Foreign Policy,
March 23, 2020.
Matthew Kroenig, “Pandemics Can Fast Forward the Rise and Fall of Great Powers,” National
Interest, March 23, 2020.
Stephen S. Roach and Daniel J. Arbess, “US Lives and Economic Stability Are Threatened by
Coronavirus Conflict with China,” The Hill, March 23, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “The Death of American Competence, Washington’s Reputation for Expertise
Has Been One of the Greatest Sources of Its Power. The Coronavirus Pandemic May End It for
Good.” Foreign Policy, March 23, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Coronavirus Means America Is Really Broke. Trump Should Get the Hell Out of
Syria.” National Interest, March 22, 2020.
Gordon G. Chang, “Donald Trump Can't Cooperate with China on Coronavirus,” National
Interest, March 22, 2020.
Michael Crowley, Edward Wong and Lara Jakes, “Coronavirus Drives the U.S. and China Deeper
Into Global Power Struggle,” New York Times, March 22, 2020.
Melinda Haring and Doug Klain, “Why Autocrats Love Coronavirus,” National Interest, March
22, 2020.
Ronald E. Neumann and Marc Grossman, “More US Diplomats Need to Be Overseas to Best
Serve America,” The Hill, March 22, 2020.
Stratfor Worldview, “Coronavirus Could Lead To Lots of This in the Near Future,” National
Interest, March 22, 2020. (The article discusses potential actions by non-state actors.)
John Allen et al., “How the World Will Look after the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Foreign Policy,
March 20, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Saving the World’s International Organizations,” Heritage Foundation,
March 20, 2020.
Ari Cicurel, “'Endless Wars’ and Political Warfare,” The Hill, March 20, 2020.
Steven Erlanger, “Another Virus Victim: The U.S. as a Global Leader in a Time of Crisis,” New
York Times, March 20 (updated March 22), 2020.
Richard Fontaine, “Virus Competition Is Wrecking China-U.S. Cooperation Hopes, Coronavirus
Efforts Are A New Battlefront—and Beijing Is the Only One in the Game.” Foreign Policy,
March 20, 2020.
James Holmes, “Beware of Pandemic America, Note to China and Russia: Despite Appearances,
the Time of Coronavirus May Not Be an Opportune Time for You to Chisel Away at America’s
Global Standing.” National Interest, March 20, 2020.
Yang Jiang, “China’s Moment of Vindication,” Danish Institute for International Studies, March
20, 2020.
Suzanne Nossel, “China Is Fighting the Coronavirus Propaganda War to Win,” Foreign Policy,
March 20, 2020.
Kori Schake, “The Damage That ‘America First’ Has Done,” Atlantic, March 20, 2020.
Gary J. Schmitt, “National Security and the Pandemic of 2020,” American Interest, March 20,
2020.
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Katie Bo Williams, “US-China Tensions Heat Up As Beijing Seeks Leadership Role,” Defense
One, March 20, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “On Iraq, Is Donald J. Trump Morphing Into George W. Bush?” American
Conservative, March19, 2020.
David Ignatius, “The Coronavirus Is A Test of Our National Character,” Washington Post, March
19, 2020.
David E. Sanger, David D. Kirkpatrick, Sui-Lee Wee, and Katrin Bennhold, “Search for
Coronavirus Vaccine Becomes a Global Competition, The United States, China and Europe are
battling to be the first to find a cure, bringing a nationalist element to a worldwide crisis.” New
York Times, March 19, 2020.
Morten Soendergaard Larsen and Robbie Gramer, “China Casts Itself as Global Savior While
U.S. and EU Focus on Virus at Home,” Foreign Policy, March 19, 2020.
Bradley A. Thayer and Lianchao Han, “China’s Coronavirus Plan: Create a ‘Silk Road’ of Health
Care Leading Towards World Dominance,” National Interest, March 19, 2020.
Alan Crawford and Peter Martin, “China Showers Europe With Virus Aid While Sparring With
Trump,” Bloomberg, March 19, 2020.
Daniel B. Baer, “The Virus Has Exposed the Recklessness of Trump’s ‘America First,’” Foreign
Policy, March 18, 2020.
Dan Blumenthal, “Coronavirus and the Future of US-China Geopolitical Competition: What We
Know So Far,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, 2020.
Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order, China Is
Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States Falters,” Foreign Affairs, March
18, 2020.
Joseph Haboush, “The US Must Remain Engaged in Lebanon or Risk Russian and Chinese
Gains,” Middle East Institute, March 18, 2020.
Walter Russell Mead, “Beijing Escalates the New Cold War,” Wall Street Journal, March 18,
2020.
Mie Oba, “Coronavirus and the Future of Globalization,” Diplomat, March 18, 2020.
Wilson VornDick, “America Must Have a Grander Strategy for China,” National Interest, March
16, 2020.
Eva Siewert, “How China Is Expanding Beyond Western Institutions,” Diplomat, March 16,
2020.
Dov S. Zakheim, “NATO’s Budget Virus: How the Pandemic Could Slash Military Spending,”
The Hill, March 16, 2020.
Joshua Meservey and Alexander St. Leger, “America’s Opportunity to Quell Russian Meddling in
Libya,” Heritage Foundation, March 13, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Not Even South Korea Deserves Unlimited Defense From America,” American
Conservative, March 12, 2020.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Bernie Sanders Is a Foreign Policy Disappointment; A Sanders Presidency
Would Likely Have Been a Major Disappointment to Americans Who Want a More Restrained
and Sensible Foreign Policy.” National Interest, March 12, 2020.
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Philippe Legrain Marc, “The Coronavirus Is Killing Globalization as We Know It,” Foreign
Policy, March 12, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “Syria Is the War Nobody Wins, Except Maybe Trump,” Heritage
Foundation, March 11, 2020.
James Andrew Lewis, “Strategy After Deterrence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
March 11, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Trump Administration Policy Inadvertently Aids the Xi Government,” Cato
Institute, March 10, 2020.
David Ignatius, “Trump’s Pushback Against China Pays Off with An Important Win,” Washington
Post, March 10, 2020.
Daniel Kochis, “Recent EU Strategic Autonomy Advances Threaten the Transatlantic Link,”
Heritage Foundation, March 9, 2020.
Patrick Tyrrell and Anthony B. Kim, “Foreign Aid Should Go to Those in Need, Not Ruling
Elites,” Heritage Foundation, March 9, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “The Brutal Tragedy of Idlib: Why the U.S. Should Stay out of Syria and Dump
NATO,” National Interest, March 7, 2020.
Doug Bandow, “Trump’s Policy Inadvertently Aids the Xi Government,” China-US Focus,
March 6, 2020.
James Jay Carafano and Daniel Kochis, “The Quiet Success of Trump’s Politically Appointed
Ambassadors in Europe,” Heritage Foundation, March 5, 2020.
Michael Rubin, “Pompeo’s State Department Keeps Supporting Islamic Extremists,” National
Interest, March 3, 2020.
Clark Packard, Scott Lincicome, Kimberly Clausing, and Mary Lovely, “How to Make America’s
Next Trade Policy,” Bulwark, March 2, 2020.
Stephen M. Walt, “Grow Up About Dictators, America!” Foreign Policy, March 2, 2020.
Peter Harris, “America Alone: Why the Trump Administration Will Pay for Alienating Its
Strategic Partners,” National Interest, February 28, 2020.
Michael R. Pompeo, “The State Department Is Winning For America,” Speech, Gaylord National
Resort and Conference Center, National Harbor, Maryland, American Conservative Union
Foundation, February 28, 2020.
James Jay Carafano, “3 Big Takeaways From Trump’s Successful Trip to India,” Heritage
Foundation, February 27, 2020.
Svante E. Cornell and Brenda Shaffer, “The United States Needs to Declare War on Proxies,”
Foreign Policy, February 27, 2020.
Scott Lincicome, “Who Are the Real Trade ‘Fundamentalists’?” Dispatch, February 27, 2020.
Philip Stephens, “Donald Trump’s America Is Threatening the Nuclear Peace,” Financial Times,
February 27, 2020.

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Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke
Michael Moodie
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Assistant Director and Senior Specialist in Foreign

Affairs, Defense and Trade

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