Section 232 Investigations: Overview and
August 24, 2020
Issues for Congress
Rachel F. Fefer,
President Trump has used Section 232 authority to apply new tariffs to steel and
Coordinator
aluminum imports and potentially to imports of automobiles and automobile parts and
Analyst in International
certain other goods. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862)
Trade and Finance
provides the President with the ability to impose restrictions on certain imports based on

an affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the
Keigh E. Hammond
product(s) under investigation “is being imported into the United States in such
Senior Research Librarian
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”

Congress has interest in Section 232 actions because they are a delegation of its
Vivian C. Jones
constitutional authority over tariffs and commerce with foreign nations, and raise a
Specialist in International
number of economic and policy issues. Some Members have introduced legislation to
Trade and Finance
revise Section 232 authorities.

Global overcapacity in steel and aluminum production, mainly driven by China, has
Brandon J. Murrill
Legislative Attorney
been an ongoing concern of Congress. While the United States has extensive

antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel imports to counter China’s
unfair trade practices, steel industry and other experts argue that the magnitude of
Michaela D. Platzer
Specialist in Industrial
Chinese production acts to depress prices globally. The George W. Bush, Obama, and
Organization and Business
Trump Administrations have each engaged in multilateral discussions to address global

steel capacity reduction through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and other international forums.
Brock R. Williams

Specialist in International
Effective March 23, 2018, President Trump applied 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively,
Trade and Finance
on certain steel and aluminum imports and, in February 2020, expanded the scope of

products subject to the additional tariffs. Permanent tariff exemptions in exchange for

quantitative limitations on U.S. imports were negotiated covering steel for Brazil and
South Korea, and both steel and aluminum for Argentina. Australia was permanently exempted from both tariffs,
with no quantitative restrictions. The United States removed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico
and Canada, in part to secure congressional support for the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA) and after the three countries agreed to establish an import monitoring mechanism. USMCA includes
side letters limiting potential Section 232 tariffs on autos and parts above a certain threshold of imports. In August
2020, citing a surge in imports, the United States reinstated tariffs on certain aluminum imports from Canada.
Canada plans to retaliate with tariffs on U.S. imports equal to a reciprocal amount.
Commerce is managing a process for exclusions of steel and aluminum products subject to Section 232 tariffs in
order to limit potential negative domestic effects of the tariffs on U.S. businesses and consumers. As of March 23,
2020, Commerce received 179,128 exclusion requests, 157,983 for steel and 21,145 for aluminum. Of those
requests, the agency granted 78,569 exclusions and denied 25,440. The remaining requests are pending. Several
Members of Congress and the Commerce Inspector General have raised issues and concerns about the exclusion
process.
Several U.S. trading partners are challenging the tariffs under World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
settlement rules and have threatened or enacted retaliatory measures. Some analysts view the U.S. unilateral
actions as potentially undermining WTO rules, which generally prohibit parties from acting unilaterally, but
provide exceptions, including when parties act to protect “essential security interests.” In turn, the United States
has initiated cases against other countries’ retaliatory measures under WTO rules. Some U.S. firms are also
challenging the Administration’s actions domestically.
Congress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront of national
debate. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 sets clear steps and timelines for Section 232 investigations and actions,
and allows the President to make a final determination over the appropriate action to take following an affirmative
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Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

finding by Commerce that the relevant imports threaten to impair national security. Prior to the Trump
Administration, there were 26 Section 232 investigations, resulting in nine affirmative findings by Commerce. In
six of those cases the President imposed a trade action.
After imposing the steel and aluminum tariffs, the Administration opened six additional Section 232
investigations, intensifying debate over potential legislation to revise the authority. The investigations covered
imports of:
 automobile and automobile parts, initiated May 23, 2018;
 uranium ore and related products, initiated July 18, 2018;
 titanium sponge, initiated March 4, 2019;
 transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel parts, initiated May 4, 2020;
 mobile cranes, initiated May 6, 2020; and
 vanadium, initiated June 3, 2020
Commerce determined imports of each of the first three products threaten to impair national security. The final
reports were submitted to the President, but have not been made public. The President chose not to impose
restrictions on uranium and titanium, but potential import restrictions on autos remain pending. The latter three
investigations are ongoing.
The President’s Section 232 tariff actions and investigations raise a number of potential issues for Congress. The
focus on imports from traditional U.S. allies has prompted some policymakers to raise questions about the proper
interpretation of threats to national security on which Section 232 investigations are based. The tariffs’ economic
effects—relatively higher domestic steel and aluminum prices and expansion in production in those sectors, and
higher costs for consumers and many end users (e.g., auto manufacturing and construction)—have also prompted
reactions from several Members, some in support of the measures and others voicing concerns. To date, Congress
has held hearings on the potential economic and broader policy effects of the tariffs, and legislation has been
introduced to override the tariffs that have already been imposed, or to revise or potentially limit the authority
previously-delegated to the President in future investigations.

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Introduction
The Trump Administration has conducted eight investigations, two of which have led to
presidential proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum
products, using presidential powers granted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962.1 Section 232 authorizes the President to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an
affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the targeted
products are being imported into the United States “in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” The Constitution gives Congress
primary authority over international trade matters.2 In the case of Section 232, Congress has
delegated to the President broad authority to impose limits on imports in the interest of U.S.
national security. The statute does not require congressional approval of any presidential actions
that fall within its scope.3
Section 232 is one of several tools the United States has at its disposal to address trade barriers
and other foreign trade practices. Additional tools include (1) investigations and actions to
address import surges that are or threaten to be a “substantial cause of serious injury” to a U.S.
industry (Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974); (2) those that address violations or denial of U.S.
benefits under trade agreements (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974); and (3) antidumping and
countervailing duty laws (Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930) to counter injurious unfair trade
practices.
International trade is an important component of the U.S. economy, and Members often hear from
constituents when factories and other businesses are hurt by competing imports, or if exporters
face trade restrictions and other market access barriers overseas. Section 232 actions may affect
industries, workers, farmers, and consumers in congressional districts and states (both positively
and negatively). Following the steel and aluminum Section 232 actions, Commerce initiated
Section 232 investigations into imports of automobiles and automobile parts in May 2018,
uranium ore and product imports in July 2018, and titanium sponges in March 2019. Commerce
submitted the auto investigation report to the President in February 2019, the uranium report in
April, and the titanium sponges report in November, but none of the three reports has been made
public or reportedly shared with Congress. Commerce initiated three more investigations in
spring 2020 into imports of electrical transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel
components, mobile cranes, and vanadium; all three inquiries are ongoing. All of the Section 232
investigations potentially raise a number of economic and policy issues for Congress.
This report provides an overview of Section 232, analyzes the Trump Administration’s Section
232 investigations and actions, and considers select policy and economic implications and issues
for Congress. To provide context for the current debate, the report also includes a discussion of
previous Section 232 investigations and a brief legislative history of the statute.

1 P.L. 87-794; 19 U.S.C. §1862.
2 Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ....”
and “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises ....”
3 In the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, however, Congress amended Section 232 by creating a joint
disapproval resolution provision under which Congress can override presidential actions in the case of adjustments to
petroleum or petroleum product imports. P.L. 96-223, Section 402. For more information, see Appendix A.
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Overview of Section 232
Following an investigation by the Department of Commerce, Section 232 of the Trade Act of
1962 authorizes the President to impose imports restrictions on products, imported into the United
States “in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security.” The Trade Act of 1962, including Section 232, was enacted during the Cold War when
national security issues were at the forefront. Section 232 has been used periodically in response
to industry petitions, as well as through self-initiation by the executive branch. The Trade
Expansion Act establishes a clear process and timelines for a Section 232 investigation, but the
executive branch’s interpretation of “national security” and the potential scope of any
investigation can be expansive.
Key Provisions and Process
Upon request by the head of any U.S. department or agency, by petition by an interested party, or
by self-initiation, the Secretary of Commerce must commence a Section 232 investigation. The
Secretary of Commerce conducts the investigation in consultation with the Secretary of Defense
and other U.S. officials, as appropriate, to determine the effects of the specified imports on
national security. Public hearings and consultations may also be held in the course of the
investigation. Commerce has 270 days from the initiation date to prepare a report advising the
President as to whether or not the targeted product(s) is being imported “in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair” U.S. national security, and to provide
recommendations for action or inaction based on the findings. According to the statute, any
portion of the report that does not contain classified or proprietary information must be published
in the Federal Register. See Figure 1 for the Section 232 process and timeline.
While there is no specific definition of national security in the statute, it states that the
investigation must consider certain factors, such as domestic production needed for projected
national defense requirements; domestic capacity; the availability of human resources and
supplies essential to the national defense; and potential unemployment, loss of skills or
investment, or decline in government revenues resulting from displacement of any domestic
products by excessive imports.4
Once the President receives the report, he has 90 days to decide whether or not he concurs with
the Commerce Department’s findings and recommendations, and to determine the nature and
duration of the action he views as necessary to adjust the imports so they no longer threaten to
impair the national security (generally, imposition of some trade-restrictive measure). The
President may implement the recommendations suggested in the Commerce report, take other
actions, or decide to take no action. After making a decision, the President has 15 days to
implement the action and 30 days to submit a written statement to Congress explaining the action
or inaction; he must also publish his findings in the Federal Register. Presidential actions may
stay in place “for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its
derivatives so that such imports will not so threaten to impair the national security.”5 Congress
does not have to approve of a Section 232 determination or action.6

4 19 U.S.C. §1862(d). The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at Commerce conducts the investigation in
accordance with federal regulations codified in 15 C.F.R. part 705 (Effect of Imported Articles on the National
Security).
5 Section 232(b).
6 For more information on TPA, see CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.
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Figure 1. Section 232 Investigation Process

Source: CRS graphic based on 19 U.S.C. §1862.
Section 232 Investigations to Date
The Commerce Department (or the Department of the Treasury before it) initiated a total of 31
Section 232 investigations between 1962 and 2019 (see Table B-1). In 16 of these cases,
Commerce determined that the targeted imports did not threaten to impair national security. In 14
cases, Commerce determined that the targeted imports threatened to impair national security and
made recommendations to the President (see Figure 2). The President took action nine times.
One case was terminated at the petitioner’s request before Commerce completed its investigation.
Prior to the Trump Administration, 10 Section 232 investigations were self-initiated by the
Administration. (For a full list of cases to date, see Appendix B.)
In eight investigations dealing with crude oil and petroleum products, Commerce decided that the
imports threatened to impair national security. The President took action in five of these cases. In
the first three cases on petroleum imports (1973-1978), the President imposed licensing fees and
additional supplemental fees on imports, which are no longer in effect, rather than adjusting
tariffs or instituting quotas. In two cases, the President imposed oil embargoes, once in 1979
(Iran) and once in 1982 (Libya). Both were superseded by broader economic sanctions in the
following years.7

7 The Section 232 petroleum embargo against Iran was revoked by Executive Order 12282 of January 19, 1981,
“Prohibitions Against Transactions Involving Japan, Revocation,” 46 Federal Register 7925, which established broader
sanctions against Iran.
The petroleum embargo against Libya was superseded by (1) Proclamation 5141 of December 22, 1983, “Imports of
Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” 48 Federal Register 56929, and (2) Executive Order 12538, “Imports of Refined
Petroleum Products from Libya,” 50 Federal Register 47527, November 15, 1985; and then was effectively revoked by
Executive Order 13357, “Termination of Emergency Declared in Executive Order 12543 With Respect to the Policies
and Actions of the Government of Libya and Revocation of Related Executive Order,” 69 Federal Register 56665,
September 20, 2004, and the corresponding Treasury regulation, Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, “Libyan Sanctions Regulations, Angola (UNITA) Sanctions Regulations, Rough Diamonds (Liberia)
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In the three most recent crude oil and petroleum investigations (from 1987 to 1999), Commerce
determined that the imports threatened to impair national security, but did not recommend
presidential action to adjust imports. In the first of these reports (1987), Commerce recommended
a series of steps to increase domestic energy production and ensure adequate oil supplies rather
than imposing quotas, fees, or tariffs because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and,
in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.”8 In the latter two investigations
(1994 and 1999), Commerce found that existing government programs and activities related to
energy security would be more appropriate and cost effective than import adjustments. By not
acting, the President in effect followed Commerce’s recommendation.
Prior to the Trump Administration, a president arguably last acted under Section 232 in 1986. In
that case, Commerce determined that imports of metal-cutting and metal-forming machine tools
threatened to impair national security. In this case, the President sought voluntary export restraint
agreements with leading foreign exporters, and developed domestic programs to revitalize the
U.S. industry.9 These agreements predate the founding of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which established multilateral rules prohibiting voluntary export restraints.10
The Trump Administration has initiated eight Section 232 investigations to date. In addition to the
two cases on steel and aluminum, on May 23, 2018, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced
the initiation of a Section 232 investigation to determine whether imports of automobiles,
including SUVs, vans and light trucks, and automotive parts threaten to impair national security.11
In January 2018, two U.S. uranium producers petitioned for an investigation into uranium
imports.12 On July 18, 2018, Commerce announced the initiation of a Section 232 investigation
on these imports and informed the Secretary of Defense.13 In September 2018, a U.S. titanium
company petitioned for an investigation into titanium sponge imports. In March 2019, Commerce
announced the initiation of a Section 232 investigation on these imports and informed the
Secretary of Defense.14 In May 2020, Commerce initiated two separate investigations into
imports of electrical transformers and certain grain-oriented electrical steel components15 and

Sanctions Regulations,” 61 Federal Register 16042, March 30, 2006.
8 Department of Commerce, The Effect of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Product Imports on the National Security,
January 1989.
9 U.S. President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry” Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, vol. 22 (December 16, 1986), p. 1654.
10 Article 11 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards stipulates that “a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any
voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import
side. These include actions taken by a single Member as well as actions under agreements, arrangements and
understandings entered into by two or more Members.” There are exceptions to this prohibition, including for “[a]n
import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and this
Agreement.” For more information, see https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm#fnt-3.
11 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Auto
Imports,” May 23, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/05/us-department-commerce-initiates-
section-232-investigation-auto-imports.
12 Energy Fuels Resources (USA) Inc. and Ur-Energy USA Inc., “Petition for Relief under Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 from Imports of Uranium Products that Threaten National Security,” January 16, 2018.
13 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Uranium
Imports,” July 18, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2018/07/us-department-commerce-initiates-
section-232-investigation-uranium.
14 U.S. Department of Commerce, March 2019, “U.S. Department of Commerce Initiates Section 232 Investigation into
Titanium Sponge Imports,” https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/03/us-department-commerce-
initiates-section-232-investigation-titanium.
15 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross to Initiate Section 232 Investigation into
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mobile cranes;16 in June, the Administration initiated one into vanadium imports.17 The latter two
investigations were in response to industry petitions.
Figure 2. Section 232 Investigations

Source: CRS Graphic based on BIS data (https://www.bis.doc.gov/).
Notes: For a detailed list of cases, see Appendix B.
Relationship to WTO
While unilateral trade restrictions may appear to be counter to U.S. trade liberalization
commitments under the WTO agreements, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which was one of the foundational agreements of the WTO, allows WTO
members to take measures to protect “essential security interests.” Broad national security
exceptions are also included in international trade obligations at the bilateral and regional levels,
and could potentially limit the ability of countries to challenge such actions by trade partners.
Historically, exceptions for national security have been rarely invoked and multiple trading
partners have challenged recent U.S. actions under the WTO agreements (see “WTO Cases ”).
Section 232 Actions on Steel and Aluminum
In April 2017, two presidential memoranda instructed Commerce to give priority to two self-
initiated investigations into the national security threats posed by imports of steel and
aluminum.18 In conducting its investigation, Commerce held public hearings and solicited public

Imports of Laminations and Wound Cores for Incorporation into Transformers, Electrical Transformers, and
Transformer Regulators,” May 4, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/05/us-secretary-
commerce-wilbur-ross-initiate-section-232-investigation.
16 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Department of Commerce to Initiate Section 232 Investigation into Mobile
Crane Imports,” May 6, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/05/us-department-commerce-
initiate-section-232-investigation-mobile-crane.
17 U.S. Department of Commerce, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation into
Imports of Vanadium,” June 2, 2020, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/06/us-secretary-commerce-
wilbur-ross-initiates-section-232-investigation.
18 U.S. President (Trump), “Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National Security,” Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, April 20, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-
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comments via the Federal Register and consulted with the Secretary of Defense and other
agencies, as required by the statute.19 In addition to the hearings, stakeholders submitted
approximately 300 comments regarding the Section 232 investigation and potential actions. Some
parties (mostly steel producers) supported broad actions to limit steel imports, while others
(mostly users and consuming industries such as automakers) opposed any additional tariffs or
quotas on imports. The U.S. aluminum industry held differing views of the global aluminum
tariff, with most parties opposing it.20 Some stakeholders in the steel and aluminum industries
sought a middle ground, endorsing limited actions to target the underlying issues of overcapacity
and unfair trade practices. Still others focused on the process, voicing caution in the use of
Section 232 authority and warning against an overly broad definition of “national security” for
protectionist purposes.21
The Commerce investigations analyzed the importance of certain steel and aluminum products to
national security, using a relatively broad definition of “national security,” defining it to include
“the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national
defense requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and
government.”22 The scope of the investigations extended to current and future requirements for
national defense and to 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as electric transmission,
transportation systems, food and agriculture, and critical manufacturing, including domestic
production of primary metals (e.g., production of iron and steel and aluminum) machinery,
transportation equipment, and electrical equipment.23 The reports also examined domestic
production capacity and utilization, industry requirements, current quantities and circumstances
of imports, international markets, and global overcapacity. Commerce based its definition of
national security on a 2001 investigation on iron ore and semi-finished steel.24 Section 232
investigations prior to 2001 generally used a narrower definition considering U.S. national
defense needs or overreliance on foreign suppliers. Commerce has continued to use the broader

201700259.pdf, and U.S. President (Trump), “Memorandum on Aluminum Imports and Threats to National Security,”
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 27, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201700284/
pdf/DCPD-201700284.pdf.
19 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments and Public
Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Steel,” 82 Federal Register 19205, April 26,
2017, and Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Notice of Request for Public Comments and
Public Hearing on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Aluminum,” 82 Federal Register 21509,
May 9, 2017.
20 CRS In Focus IF10998, Effects of U.S. Tariff Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing, by Michaela D. Platzer.
21 “The case for and against 232 action on steel: Three principal positions,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 12, 2017, and
“Awaiting an aluminum decision: some key comment takeaways,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 3, 2017.
22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National
Security,” p. 1, January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
the_effect_of_imports_of_steel_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180111.pdf. (hereinafter, Steel
Report).
23 In addition to being labeled as one of the “critical infrastructure sectors,” both steel and aluminum industry
organizations seek designation as an “essential industry” to allow continuation of operations in the event of federal
emergencies such as during the Covid-19 pandemic. See American Iron and Steel Institute, “AISI Urges
Administration to Designate Steel as Essential Industry,” March 20, 2020, and Aluminum Association, “American
Aluminum an Essential Industry in a Moment of National Emergency,” March 19, 2020.
24 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, “The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi-
Finished Steel on the National Security,” October 2001, https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents?task=
doc_download&gid=81.
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definition for national security for the other Section 232 investigations under the Trump
Administration.
Commerce Findings and Recommendations
The final reports, submitted to the President on January 11 and January 22, 2018, respectively,
concluded that imports of certain steel mill products25 and certain types of primary aluminum and
unwrought aluminum26 “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States. The
Secretary of Commerce asserted that “the only effective means of removing the threat of
impairment is to reduce imports to a level that should ... enable U.S. steel mills to operate at 80
percent or more of their rated production capacity” (the minimum rate the report found necessary
for the long-term viability of the U.S. steel industry and, separately, for the aluminum industry).
The Secretary further recommended the President “take immediate action to adjust the level of
these imports through quotas or tariffs” and identified three potential courses of action for both
steel and aluminum imports, including tariffs or quotas on all or some steel imports from specific
countries.
The Secretary of Defense, while concurring with Commerce’s “conclusion that imports of foreign
steel and aluminum based on unfair trading practices impair the national security,” recommended
targeted tariffs and that “an inter-agency group further refine the targeted tariffs, so as to create
incentives for trade partners to work with the U.S. on addressing the underlying issue of Chinese
transshipment” in which Chinese producers ship goods to another country to reexport.27 He also
noted, however, that “the U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum each only represent
about three percent of U.S. production.”28
Presidential Actions
On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing duties on U.S. imports of
certain steel and aluminum products, based on the Secretary of Commerce’s findings.29 The
proclamations outlined the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on
aluminum imports effective March 23, 2018, but provided for flexibility in regard to country and
product applicability of the tariffs (see below). The new tariffs were to be imposed in addition to
any duties already in place, including antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD).
In the proclamations, the President established a bifurcated approach, instructing Commerce to
establish a process for domestic parties to request individual product exclusions and a U.S. Trade

25 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National
Security,” January 11, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/section-232-investigation-effect-imports-steel-us-national-
security.
26 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, “The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the
National Security,” January 17, 2018, https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
the_effect_of_imports_of_aluminum_on_the_national_security_-_with_redactions_-_20180117.pdf (hereinafter,
Aluminum Report).
27 Letter from James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of Commerce, 2018,
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/
department_of_defense_memo_response_to_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf.
28 Ibid.
29 Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83
Federal Register 11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel Into
the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11625, March 15, 2018.
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Representative (USTR)-led process to discuss “alternative ways” through diplomatic negotiations
to address the threat with countries having a “security relationship” with the United States.
The President officially notified Congress of his actions in a letter dated April 6, 2018. Several
Members have voiced their views since the investigations were launched, including through
hearings and letters to the President.30
On January 24, 2020, after the steel and aluminum tariffs had been in effect for over 22 months,
the President expanded the scope of products covered to include “derivative” products, effective
February 8, 2020.31 The President’s proclamation stated that the additional tariffs were needed
because the domestic steel and aluminum industries continued to be below the target capacity
utilization identified in the initial Commerce investigations, and imports of certain finished, or
derivative, products were undermining the purpose of the original proclamations.
With the increased costs of steel and aluminum inputs because of the Section 232 tariffs, some
U.S. manufacturers had trouble competing with importers of finished, or derivative, products
(e.g., steel wheels or metal filing cabinets). Thus, U.S. industries manufacturing similar products
have sought AD/CVD protection from import competition. Thus, there has been a noticeable
increase in AD/CVD investigations on finished products containing steel or aluminum. The
additional AD/CVD cases as a result of the Section 232 tariffs are in addition to any AD/CVD
duties already in place. Some economists have called this phenomenon “cascading protection.”32
According to the January 2020 proclamation, the countries that successfully negotiated
exemptions from each of the steel and aluminum tariffs (see below) are also exempt from the
additional tariffs on derivative products. The Commerce process for requesting product
exclusions applies to derivative products (see below).
Some analysts have raised questions about the President’s authority to impose the additional
tariffs and some U.S. manufacturers have challenged the action (see “Proclamation Imposing
Tariffs on Steel-Derivative Products”). The President’s actions under the 2020 proclamation relies
on the 2018 Section 232 investigations, although those investigations did not cover steel and
aluminum derivative products. House Ways and Means Committee Member Representative
Jackie Walorski sent a letter to Commerce questioning why a new investigation was not needed
for the change in product scope, and how the change would help increase domestic industry
capacity utilization, among other issues.33 The Section 232 statute does not specifically allow for
additional actions after the initial timeline or provide an expiration date of an investigation.
Similar questions as to whether the President’s authority to act is time-limited have been raised in
relation to the Section 232 auto investigation (see “Automobiles and Parts”).
Country Exemptions
Although tariffs were initially imposed on most trading partners, including many allies and FTA
partners, the President expressed a willingness to consider exceptions to individual countries,

30 U.S. President (Trump), “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Requests for Exclusions from United States Tariffs on
Aluminum and Steel Imports,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 6, 2018.
31 The White House, “Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel
Articles into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 5281, January 24, 2020. For a full list of derivative products
covered see https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/office-of-technology-evaluation-ote/section-232-
investigations. Steel and aluminum derivative products are defined according to certain criteria and the specific covered
products are specified in annexes of the presidential proclamation.
32 Chad P. Bown, “Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs are cascading out of control,” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, February 4, 2020.
33 Letter from Rep. Jackie Walorski to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of Commerce, March 3, 2020.
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specifically stating that countries with which the United States has a “security relationship” may
discuss “alternative ways” to address the national security threat and gain an exemption from the
tariffs. Initially, the President temporarily excluded imports of steel and aluminum products from
Mexico and Canada from the new tariffs, and the Administration implicitly and explicitly linked a
successful outcome of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) renegotiation to
maintaining the exemptions. With regard to other countries, the President charged the USTR with
negotiating bilaterally with trading partners on potential exemptions.
On March 22, 2018, after discussions with multiple countries, the President issued proclamations
temporarily excluding Australia, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, the European Union (EU),
Canada and Mexico, from the Section 232 tariffs.34 The President gave a deadline of May 1,
2018, by which time each trading partner had to negotiate “a satisfactory alternative means to
remove the threatened impairment to the national security by imports” for steel and aluminum in
order to maintain the exemption. On April 30, 2018, the White House extended negotiations and
tariff exemptions with Canada, Mexico, and the EU for an additional 30 days, until June 1, 2018,
and exempted Argentina, Australia, and Brazil from the tariffs indefinitely pending final
agreements.35 South Korea, which pursued a resolution over the tariffs in the context of
discussions to modify the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement, agreed to an
absolute annual quota for 54 separate subcategories of steel and was exempted from the steel
tariffs.36 South Korea did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum and its exports to the United
States have been subject to the aluminum tariffs since May 1, 2018.
On May 31, 2018, the President proclaimed Argentina and Brazil, in addition to South Korea,
permanently exempt from the steel tariffs, having reached final quota agreements with the United
States on steel imports.37 Brazil, like South Korea, did not negotiate an agreement on aluminum
and is subject to the aluminum tariffs. The Administration also proclaimed aluminum imports
from Argentina permanently exempt from the aluminum tariffs subject to an absolute quota.38 The
Administration proclaimed imports of steel and aluminum from Australia permanently exempt
from the tariffs as well, but did not set any quantitative restrictions on Australian imports.
As of June 1, 2018, imports of steel and aluminum from all other countries were subject to the
Section 232 tariffs. The imposition of tariffs on major trading partners such as Canada, Mexico,
and the EU increased the economic significance of the tariffs and prompted criticism from several
Members of Congress, including the chairs of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees.39

34 Proclamation 9710 of March 22, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register
13355, March 28, 2018; and Proclamation 9711 of March 22, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United
States,” 83 Federal Register 13361, March 28, 2018.
35 Executive Office of the President, “President Donald J. Trump Approves Section 232 Tariff Modifications,” press
release, April 30, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-approves-section-
232-tariff-modifications/.
36 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, QB 18-118 Steel Mill Articles (AMENDED), May 1, 2018,
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/bulletins/qb-18-118-steel-mill-articles.
37 Proclamation 9759 of May 31, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 25857,
June 5, 2018.
38 Proclamation 9758 of May 31, 2018 “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register
25849, June 5, 2018.
39 Chairman Kevin Brady, “Brady Statement on Administration’s Action on Steel and Aluminum Tariffs,” press
release, May 31, 2018; Chairman Orrin Hatch, “Hatch Statement on Administration Aluminum, Steel Tariff
Announcement,” press release, May 31, 2018, https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-
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The Trump Administration completed negotiations on the United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA) on September 30, 2018, to replace the NAFTA. The USMCA did not
resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and
Mexico, but includes a requirement that motor vehicles contain 70% or more of North American
steel and aluminum content to qualify for duty-free treatment.40 The parties also signed side
letters in case of Section 232 action on autos and auto parts, to exclude certain amounts of
Canadian and Mexican exports of these products and provide a 60-day period to reach a
negotiated outcome.41 Separately, on May 17, 2019, the three parties announced a new monitoring
mechanism to prevent surges in imports of steel and aluminum, and agreed to withdraw all
Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and related retaliatory tariffs.42
A year later, in May 2020, the American Primary Aluminum Association, which represents U.S.
primary aluminum producers, alleged a surge in aluminum imports from Canada and called for
the re-imposition of tariffs.43 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Foreign Trade
Council, and Aluminum Association opposed the proposal.44 After consultations with Canada, the
Trump Administration re-imposed tariffs on imports of non-alloyed unwrought aluminum from
Canada, effective August 16, 2020.45 Canada called the new tariffs “absurd” and issued a list of
products targeted for retaliatory tariffs.46
Regarding the EU, on October 16, 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress under TPA
of new broad-based U.S. trade agreement negotiations with the EU to address ongoing trade
frictions including Section 232 tariffs. The Administration seeks a “fairer, more balanced” U.S.-
EU relationship. The TPA notification followed the July 2018 Joint Statement (agreed between
President Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker) that aimed to de-
escalate trade tensions in which the two sides agreed to not impose further tariffs on each other’s
trade products while negotiations are active.47 The negotiations have not started formally, largely

administration-aluminum-steel-tariff-announcement.
40 USTR, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Text, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement. In a side letter on automobiles, the United States also agreed that,
in the event of Section 232 measure imposed on passenger vehicles and auto parts, that the United States would exclude
2.6 million passenger vehicles, all light trucks imported from Mexico, and up to $108 billion worth (in declared
customs value) of auto parts annually. For more information on USMCA, see CRS Report R44981, The United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.
41 Side letters are available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-
agreement/agreement-between.
42 USTR, “Joint Statement by the United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminum,” May 17,
2019, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/united-states-announces-deal-
canada and and “Modification of Regulations Regarding the Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis System,” 85
Federal Register 17515, March 30, 2020.
43 American Primary Aluminum Association letter to USTR, May 26, 2020, available at
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/apaa-calls-on-ambassador-lighthizer-to-restore-tariffs-on-surging-
canadian-aluminum-imports-301066198.html.
44 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “U.S. Chamber Opposes Aluminum Tariffs on Canada,” June 23, 2020; “Business
groups oppose Section 232 tariffs on Canadian aluminum,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 24, 2020.
45 White House, “Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” press release, August 6,
2020, and “Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States,” 85 Federal Register 49921, August 14, 2020.
46 Andy Blatchford, “Trump’s ‘absurd decision’ to slap aluminum tariffs on Canada draws threat of C$3.6B in
retaliatory duties,” PolticoPro, August 7, 2020, and Government of Canada, “Notice of intent to impose
countermeasures action against the United States in response to tariffs on Canadian aluminum products,” August 7,
2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/consultations/2020/notice-intent-impose-
countermeasures-action-against-united-states-response-tariffs-canadian-aluminum-products.html.
47 White House Factsheet, “President Donald J. Trump Launches a New Reciprocal Trade Relationship with the
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due to lack of U.S.-EU consensus on their scope. The EU asserts that it will stop negotiating if it
is subject to new Section 232 tariffs.48
Additional and Proposed Tariff Increases on Steel and Aluminum Imports
President Trump has proposed further tariff increases for steel and aluminum imports from Turkey, Argentina,
and Brazil. The President has cited trade-related concerns, plus other foreign and economic policy goals for these
proposals. The most recent proposals have not been implemented, and the tariff increases on Turkey have been
challenged in the Court of International Trade (CIT).

Turkey49
President Trump has adjusted tariffs on steel imports from Turkey twice (raising tariffs to 50% in August 2018, and
then reducing them to 25% in May 2019), and has proposed further increases. On October 14, 2019, after
Turkey’s military incursion into northeast Syria, President Trump announced plans to apply sanctions on Turkey,
as well as increase steel tariffs on imports from Turkey back to 50%.50 While sanctions were applied, and then
later lifted after an announced ceasefire, the tariff increase has not been imposed to date.51
U.S. importers contested the initial August 2018 increase in steel tariffs on Turkey in the Court of International
Trade (CIT), claiming that the action did not fol ow Section 232’s procedural mandates. In a July 2020 final opinion,
CIT judges agreed.52
The value of U.S. imports of steel from Turkey have decreased 83.3% between 2017 and 2019. In 2019, Turkey
was the 23rd largest supplier of steel to the United States, dropping from its position as the 9th largest supplier in
2017.
The President also proposed a tariff increase on aluminum imports from Turkey, but no increase has been
implemented. U.S. imports of aluminum from Turkey rose by more than 390% from 2017, making it the 14th
largest supplier of aluminum to the United States.

Argentina and Brazil
In June 2018, President Trump announced that some countries would be exempt from the tariffs, after agreeing to
adhere to quotas on imports into the United States. Among others, permanent exemptions were granted to Brazil
for steel tariffs and to Argentina for both steel and aluminum tariffs, in exchange for quotas.
In December 2019, citing concerns over the valuation of Argentina and Brazil’s currencies, President Trump
announced plans to reinstate steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Argentina and Brazil.53 The tariffs have
not been reinstated to date.
In 2019, Brazil was the second largest supplier of steel to the United States by value, accounting for 11.3% of
relevant U.S. imports. Argentina was the 21st largest supplier of steel by value (1.0% of relevant U.S. imports) and
the 10th largest supplier of aluminum (2.6% of relevant U.S. imports) to the United States.

European Union,” July 27, 2018.
48 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10931, U.S.-EU Trade and Economic Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
49 Also see CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.
50 The White House, “Statement from President Donald J. Trump Regarding Turkey’s Actions in Northeast Syria,”
October 14, 2019, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-regarding-
turkeys-actions-northeast-syria/.
51 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Situation in Northern Syria,” October 23, 2019, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-situation-northern-syria/.
52 “CIT quashes expansion of Section 232 tariffs on Turkish steel,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 14, 2020. See “Domestic
Court Challenges”.
53 @realDonaldTrump, December 2, 2019, at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1201455858636472320.
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Product Exclusions
To limit potential negative domestic impacts of the tariffs on U.S. consumers and consuming
industries, Commerce published an interim final rule for how parties located in the United States
may request exclusions for items that are not “produced in the United States in a sufficient and
reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality.”54 Requests for exclusions and objections
to requests were initially posted on regulations.gov.55 The rule went into effect the same day as
publication to allow for immediate submissions.
Commerce reviews exclusion requests and makes determinations based upon national security
considerations. To minimize the impact of any single exclusion on the Section 232 action, the rule
allows only “individuals or organizations using steel articles ... in business activities ... in the
United States to submit exclusion requests,” eliminating the ability of larger umbrella groups or
trade associations to submit petitions on behalf of member companies.56 Any approved product
exclusion is limited to the individual or organization that submitted the specific exclusion request.
Parties may also submit objections to any exclusion within 30 days after the exclusion request is
posted. The review of exclusion requests and objections will not exceed 90 days, creating a
period of uncertainty for petitioners. Exclusions will generally last for one year from the date of
signature.57
As of July 27, 2020, Commerce received 222,773 exclusion requests, 198,869 for steel and
23,904 for aluminum. Of those requests, the agency granted 107,886 steel exclusions and 13,289
aluminum exclusions; 30,189 steel and 3,189 aluminum requests were denied (see Figure 3).58
Some Members have advocated for or against specific exclusions in support of constituents that
represent different parts of the supply chain, in some cases putting Members on opposing sides of
an exclusion request.59

54 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Requirements for Submissions Requesting
Exclusions From the Remedies Instituted in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United
States and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 12106, March 19, 2018.
55 Docket Number BIS-2018-0006 (Steel); Docket Number BIS-2018-0002, (Aluminum).
56 A parallel requirement applies for aluminum requests.
57 Bureau of Industry and Security, Requirements for Submissions Requesting Exclusions from the Remedies Instituted
in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into
the United States; and the Filing of Objections to Submitted Exclusion Requests for Steel and Aluminum, Docket BIS-
2018-0006, https://www.regulations.gov/.
58 Data obtained by CRS from Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, August 18, 2020.
59 For example, see letters from Reps. H. Rogers, Kaptur, Guthrie, Comer, M. Rogers, Barr, Aderholt, Johnson,
Gonzalez and Gibbs to President Trump, February 7, 2020, and from Sen. Toomey to Secretary Ross, February 5,
2020, related to exclusion requests from Allegheny Technologies Incorporated (ATI).
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Figure 3. Section 232 Exclusion Requests as of July 27, 2020

Source: CRS based on data from Department of Commerce.
Companies have raised strong concerns about the intensive, time-consuming process to submit
exclusion requests; the lengthy waiting period to hear back from Commerce, which has exceeded
90 days in some cases; what some view as an arbitrary nature of acceptances and denials; and that
all exclusion requests to date have been rejected when a U.S. steel or aluminum producer has
objected.60 Some steel companies who expected to benefit from the tariffs and whose exclusion
requests have been denied are experiencing financial difficulty.61
Several Members of Congress have raised concerns about the exclusion process. A bipartisan
group of House Members, for example, raised concerns about the speed of the review process and
the significant burden it places on manufacturers, especially small businesses.62 The Members
included specific recommendations, such as allowing for broader product ranges to be included in
a single request, allowing trade associations to petition, grandfathering in existing contracts to
avoid disruptions, and regularly reviewing the tariffs’ effects and sunsetting them if they have a
“significant negative impact.”63
Commerce asserts it has taken several steps to improve the exclusion process, including
increasing and organizing its staff “to efficiently process exclusion requests,” and “expediting the
grant of properly filed exclusion requests that receive no objections.” Commerce’s Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) is the lead agency involved in making final decisions regarding
whether the requests are granted or denied. The agency’s International Trade Administration
(ITA) also became involved in the exclusion process by analyzing exclusion requests and

60 Ed Crooks and Fan Fei, “Trade war winners and losers grapple with Trump tariff chaos,” The Financial Times, July
23, 2018 and. Christine McDaniel and Joe Brunk, “Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariff Exclusion Requests
Continue Apace,” Mercatus The Bridge, January 21, 2020.
61 Bryan Gruley and Joe Deaux, “The Biggest Fan of Trump’s Steel Tariffs is Suing Over Them,” Bloomberg, February
13, 2020.
62 MIL OSI - ForeignAffairs.co.nz, “MIL-OSI USA: Walorski Calls for Changes to Tariff Product Exclusion Process
for Manufacturers,” ForeignAffairs.co.nz, May 8, 2018.
63 Ibid.
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objections to determine whether there is sufficient domestic production available to meet the
requestor’s product needs.64
On September 6, 2018, Commerce announced a new rule to allow companies to rebut objections
to petitions.65 The rule, published September 11, 2018, included new rebuttal and counter-rebuttal
procedures, more information about the exclusion submission requirements and process, the
criteria Commerce uses in deciding whether to grant an exclusion request, and revised estimates
of the total number of exclusion requests and objections that Commerce expects to receive.66 In
June 2019, Commerce launched an online 232 Exclusions Portal for submitting and processing of
steel and exclusion requests, objections, rebuttals, and sur-rebuttals.67 The portal is for all
submissions as of June 13, 2019, while all prior submissions reside on regulations.gov. The portal
may provide greater transparency of 232 submission documents, but does not necessarily impact
Commerce’s decision-making process.
Some Members have questioned the Administration’s processes and ability to pick winners and
losers through granting or denying exclusion requests. For example, Members have requested that
Commerce provide specific statistics and information on the exclusion requests and have sought
greater transparency on the exclusion process. Senator Elizabeth Warren requested that the
Commerce Inspector General investigate the implementation of the exclusion process, including a
review of the procedures Commerce has established; how they are being followed; and if
exclusion decisions are made on a transparent, individual basis, free from political interference.
Pending legislation in the 116th Congress to revise Section 232 also addresses the process for
excluding products such as having the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) administer
the process or establishing specific timelines (e.g., S. 287, H.R. 940, S. 2362).
On October 29, 2018, the Commerce Inspector General’s office (IG) initiated an audit of the
agency’s processes and procedures for reviewing and adjudicating product exclusion requests.68
In July 2019, the Commerce IG determined that BIS had a large backlog of exclusion requests
and that requests with objections had lower completion rates.69 In October 2019, the IG issued a
Management Alert regarding “a lack of transparency that contributes to the appearance of
improper influence in decision-making for tariff exclusion requests.”70 The IG recommended that
BIS take specific actions to ensure transparency. Commerce did not announce any new changes to

64 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Interim Final Rule. Submissions of Exclusion
Requests and Objections to Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum,” 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11,
2018.
65 Testimony by Department of Commerce Assistant Secretary For Export Administration Bureau of Industry and
Security Richard Ashooh at Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies hearing on
Conduct Oversight of Bureau of Industry & Security, International Trade Administration, & US International Trade
Commission, September 6, 2018, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/conduct-oversight-of-bureau-of-
industry-and-security-international-trade-administration_us-international-trade-commission.
66 Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to
Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum," 83 Federal Register 46026, September 11, 2018.
67 Portal is available at https://www.commerce.gov/page/section-232-investigations.
68 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Daniel O. Hill, Acting Under
Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, Bureau of Industry and Security, October 29, 2018.
69 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Nazak Nikakhtar, Assistant
Secretary for Industry and Analysis, Performing the Non-Exclusive Duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for
Industry and Security, Bureau of Industry and Security, July 1, 2019.
70 Letter from Carol Rice, Assistant Inspector General for Audit and Evaluation, to Secretary Ross, Management Alert:
Certain Communications by Department Officials Suggest Improper Influence in the Section 232 Exclusion Request
Review Process Final Memorandum No. OIG-20-003-M, October 28, 2019.
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the exemption process or policy to further address the concerns noted in the IG report and by
some Members.71
In May 2020, Commerce issued a Federal Register notice requesting feedback on the exclusion
process and “the appropriateness of the factors considered, and the efficiency and transparency of
the process employed, in rendering decisions on requests for exclusions from the tariffs and
quotas imposed on imports of steel and aluminum articles.”72 The notice also solicited comments
on potential revisions to the process. Comments included recommendations to ensure more
consistent application of Commerce regulations, rigorous claim verification, and adding
derivative products to the exclusion process.73 Other recommendations included reversing the
burden of proof for objections and requiring domestic steel manufacturers to show they can meet
the needs of the downstream manufacturer who is requesting the exclusion.74
To ensure that Commerce follows through with improving the exclusion process, in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), signed on February 15, 2019, Congress
provided funding for “contractor support to implement the product exclusion process for articles
covered by actions taken under section 232.”75 To ensure improvements to the exclusion process,
Congress indicated that the additional money is to be “devoted to an effective Section 232
exclusion process” and required that Commerce submit quarterly reports to Congress.76 Congress
mandated that the reports identify:
 the number of exclusion requests received;
 the number of exclusion requests approved and denied;
 the status of efforts to assist small- and medium-sized businesses in navigating
the exclusion process;
 Commerce-wide staffing levels for the exclusion process, including information
on any staff detailed to complete this task; and
 Commerce-wide funding by source appropriation and object class for costs
undertaken to process the exclusions.
The Commerce Federal Register notice requesting feedback on the process and potential revisions
may be part of the agency’s implementation of the appropriation requirements.
Tariffs Collected to Date
As of August 12, 2020, two full years since the Section 232 tariffs took effect, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) assessed $7.3 billion in steel tariffs and $2.2 billion in aluminum tariffs
About 63% of steel tariffs ($4.5 billion) and 68% of aluminum tariffs ($1.5 billion) were collected
the first year the tariffs were in effect, highlighting the fact that revenue from these two Section
232 actions has been declining. This could reflect (1) the exemptions to Canada and Mexico in

71 For example, see Rep. Walorski Statement on Commerce OIG Finding “Improper Influence” in Section 232
Exclusion Process, October 30, 2019.
72 Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce, "Notice of Inquiry Regarding the Exclusion Process for Section 232
Steel and Aluminum Import Tariffs and Quotas," 85 Federal Register 31441, May 26, 2020.
73 Letter from Representative Jackie Walorski to Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, July 10, 2020.
74 Christine McDaniel, “Commerce Should Improve the Objection Process for the Section 232 Tariff Exclusion
Requests,” Mercatus Center, George Mason University, July 13, 2020.
75 P.L. 116-6 Division C, Title I.
76 H.J.Res. 31, p. 609.
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May 2019 (top suppliers of both metals), (2) the effect of exemptions granted to U.S. importers,
and (3) declining imports in response to the relatively higher import prices, an objective of the
Administration’s actions.77 Re-imposed tariffs on Canadian aluminum could impact the trend in
the future. In addition, CBP has assessed $18.8 million and $1 million from the tariffs on steel
and aluminum derivative products. The tariffs collected are put in the general fund of the U.S.
Treasury and are not allocated to a specific fund.
Additional Trump Administration Investigations
Automobiles and Parts78
Subsequent to the steel and aluminum investigations, the Trump Administration in May 2018
initiated a third Section 232 investigation into the import of passenger cars, SUVs, vans, light
trucks, and automotive parts.79 Commerce held a public hearing to hear from stakeholders on the
potential impact of these imports on national security, identifying a broad set of factors related to
national defense and the national economy for consideration.80 As many foreign auto
manufacturers have established facilities in the United States—accounting for 45% of
employment in U.S. auto assembly and parts plants81—Commerce specifically requested
information on how the impact of auto imports on U.S. national security may differ when “U.S.
production by majority U.S.-owned firms is considered separately from U.S. production by
majority foreign-owned firms.”82
The value of U.S. imports potentially covered under the new investigation is significantly greater
than that of steel and aluminum imports. In 2019, the United States imported more than eight
million vehicles, with a value of $197 billion, and more than $155 billion in auto parts.83 With
complex global supply chains, industry dynamics such as the large number of foreign-owned auto

77 According to the President’s proclamations implementing the Section 232 tariffs, one of the objectives of the tariffs
is to “reduce imports to a level that the Secretary assessed would enable domestic steel (and aluminum) producers to
use approximately 80 percent of existing domestic production capacity and thereby achieve long-term economic
viability through increased production.” Presidential Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018, “Adjusting Imports of
Aluminum into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11619, March 15, 2018, and Proclamation 9705 of March 8,
2018, “Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States,” 83 Federal Register 11625, March 15, 2018.
78 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section.
79 For a further discussion of the Section 232 auto industry investigation, see CRS In Focus IF10971, Section 232 Auto
Investigation, coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer.
80 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and
Automotive Parts,” 83 Federal Register 24735, May 30, 2018.
81 In 2017, employment in manufacture of motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and vehicle parts was 972,000; of those,
431,000 worked in foreign-owned plants in the United States, according to the latest data from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Activities of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Multinational Enterprises,
viewed on July 31, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/activities-us-affiliates-foreign-mnes, and
BEA, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 6.4D. Full-time and Part-Time Employees by Industry, viewed
February 20, 2020, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&nipa_table_list=193&
categories=survey.
82 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice on Section 232 National Investigation of Imports of Automobiles and
Automotive Parts,” 83 Federal Register 24735, May 30, 2018.
83 Mexico, Japan, Canada, Germany, and South Korea accounted for 85% of vehicles imported by the United States in
2018; nearly 40% of automotive parts were imported from Mexico, with China, Canada, Japan, Germany, and South
Korea accounting for an additional 43% of imports. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, Automotive Team: Industry Trade Data, https://legacy.trade.gov/td/otm/autostats.asp.
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manufacturing facilities in the United States, and the potential for further retaliation by trading
partners if tariffs are imposed as a result of the investigation, the economic consequences could
be substantial.84 For example, the 1.9 million vehicles exported from the United States in 2019—
with a value of $59 billion—and $85 billion in parts exports could be targeted for retaliation by
some trading partners, as could the vehicle assembly plants of U.S. controlled companies in
overseas markets such as China and Europe.85 The Center for Automotive Research (CAR), a
research and analysis group that studies issues affecting the automotive industry, estimated that a
25% tariff added to all imported vehicles and parts (including from Canada and Mexico) could
raise the cost of U.S. vehicle assembly by 6%; if levied only against the post-Brexit EU, those
costs would increase by less than 1%.86
In its 2019 annual report, Ford Motor Company asserts that “steps taken by the U.S. government
to apply or consider applying tariffs on automobiles, parts, and other products and materials have
the potential to disrupt existing supply chains, impose additional costs on our business, affect the
demand for our products, and make us less competitive. Further, other countries attempting to
retaliate by imposing tariffs would increase the cost for us to import our vehicles into such
countries.”87
The automotive supply chain has already been affected by steel and aluminum tariffs. According
to CAR, U.S. vehicles and parts manufacturers account for 26% of U.S. steel consumption and
31% of aluminum consumption.88 The American Automotive Policy Council, an industry trade
group that represents the policy interests of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA US), Ford, and
General Motors, has estimated that the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs have added $400 to
the price of a new vehicle.89 Three groups voiced support for at least limited measures to
specifically address auto imports: the United Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers, and
the Forging Industry Association.90
Some Members and auto industry representatives spoke out in opposition to any tariffs during the
auto industry Section 232 investigation. The Driving American Jobs Coalition, created to oppose
the potential tariffs, is comprised of industry groups representing auto manufacturers, parts
suppliers, auto dealers, parts distributors, retailers, and vehicle service providers.91 Others view
the use of this investigation and potential tariffs as a tactical move by the Administration to

84 To illustrate the complexity of auto negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10835, NAFTA Motor Vehicle Talks Reopen
Old Trade Debate, by Bill Canis.
85 EU members alone in 2019 purchased 350,201 U.S-made vehicles, worth $13.7 billion. Nearly three-quarters of U.S.
automotive parts exports were to Mexico and Canada. U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, Automotive Team: Industry Trade Data, https://legacy.trade.gov/td/otm/autostats.asp
86 Michael Schultz, et al., U.S. Consumer & Economic Impacts of U.S. Automotive trade Policies, Center for
Automotive Research, February 2019, p. 26, https://www.cargroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/US-Consumer-
Economic-Impacts-of-US-Automotive-Trade-Policies-.pdf
87 Ford Motor Company, 2019 Annual Report, Form 10-K, For the Year Ended December 31, 2019, p. 15,
https://shareholder.ford.com/investors/financials/annual-reports/default.aspx.
88 Michael Schultz, et al., U.S. Consumer & Economic Impacts of U.S. Automotive trade Policies, Center for
Automotive Research, February 2019, pp. 24-25.
89 Ryan Beene, “Auto industry unites to oppose Trump import tariffs,” Automotive News, March 29, 2019,
https://www.autonews.com/automakers-suppliers/auto-industry-unites-oppose-trump-import-tariffs.
90 Doug Palmer and Megan Cassella, “U.S. allies warn of retaliation if Trump imposes auto tariffs,” PoliticoPro, July
19, 2018.
91 GT Staff, “Coalition Launches Campaign to Oppose Section 232 Auto Tariffs,” GlobalTrade Magazine, September
4, 2018, http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-trade-daily/coalition-launches-campaign-to-oppose-section-232-auto-
tariffs.
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pressure trade negotiating partners as the President continues to threaten auto tariffs.92 For
example, since the initiation of trade negotiations with the EU, the President has repeatedly
threatened to impose tariffs on U.S. auto imports in the absence of progress on the negotiations.93
The EU has reportedly drafted a list of targets for retaliatory tariffs if the Administration moves
forward with auto tariffs under Section 232.94 However, the president’s continued ability to
impose tariffs under the 2018 investigation is unclear after recent court rulings stating that
“temporal restrictions on the President’s power to take action pursuant to a [Commerce] report
and recommendation by the Secretary is not a mere directory guideline, but a restriction that
requires strict adherence.”95
Commerce submitted the final Section 232 report to the President on February 17, 2019, but the
report has not been publicly released.96 Some trade policy experts and Members have suggested
that the deadline by which President Trump may act under the current Section 232 report expired
in November 2019;97 the Administration disagrees.98 Some Members have asked for the report to
be made public, and the Cause of Action Institute sued Commerce to release the report after an
unsuccessful Freedom of Information Act request.99 On March 6, 2020, Senator Toomey and
other Members of Congress filed an amicus brief with the district court arguing, among other
things, that (1) Congress needed the report in order to exercise oversight over the authority it had
granted to the executive branch in Section 232; and (2) the President could not invoke executive
privilege to withhold disclosure of the document.100 The court has not issued a decision in the
case.
To compel the Administration to release the report, Congress included an amendment in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (H.R. 1158; P.L. 116-93) mandating that Commerce
publish the report in the Federal Register and that it submit to Congress any portion of the report
that contains classified information.101 The Administration has yet to release the report. A legal
opinion by the Department of Justice cited executive privilege, noting that disclosure of the report
“would risk impairing ongoing diplomatic efforts to address a national-security threat and would
risk interfering with executive branch deliberations,” in apparent reference to ongoing

92 Jakob Hanke, et al., “Juncker and Trump’s transatlantic trade truce falters,” Politico, October 17, 2018.
93 “Trump threatens big tariffs on car imports from EU,” Reuters, January 22, 2020.
94 Jonathan Stearns and Irina Vilcu, “EU Ready to Target Caterpillar, Xerox If Trump Hits Cars, Official Says,”
Bloomberg, February 22, 2019.
95 See “Domestic Court Challenges” discussion of Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States.
96 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Statement from the Department of Commerce on Submission of Automobiles and
Automobile Parts Section 232 Report to the President,” Press Releases, February 17, 2019.
97 David Lawder, “Trump can no longer impose ‘Section 232’ auto tariffs after missing deadline: experts,” Reuters,
November 19, 2020, and https://twitter.com/SenToomey.
98 “Wilbur Ross Says U.S. Has Had Constructive Talks With German Automotive,” Bloomberg Markets, January 23rd,
2020.
99 Eliana Johnson and Andrew Restuccia, “Trump administration withholds report justifying ‘shock’ auto tariffs,”
PoliticoPro, March 20, 2019; Doug Palmer, “Watchdog group sues for release of Commerce auto tariff report,”
PoliticoPro, March 21, 2019.
100 Senator Toomey, “Toomey Leading Bipartisan Amicus Brief Supporting Lawsuit Seeking Release of Commerce
Department’s 232 Auto Report,” March 7, 2020, https://www.toomey.senate.gov/?p=op_ed&id=2591.
101 P.L. 116-93, Sec. 112.
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negotiations with the EU and others.102 Several Members, including Senate Finance Chair Senator
Grassley have pushed back against the Administration’s refusal to release the report.103
Bills introduced in the House and Senate would require a report by the USITC on the economic
importance of domestic automotive manufacturing before the President could impose import
restrictions on the sector (S. 121, H.R. 1710).
Uranium104
Unlike the self-initiated investigations into steel, aluminum, and auto imports, the Trump
Administration opened two additional Section 232 investigations in response to industry
petitions. In July 2018, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into uranium imports in
response to a petition from two uranium producers (uranium mining and milling companies), and
after consulting with industry, government officials, and a public comment period.105 The
petitioners, the uranium producers Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy, requested limiting imports to
guarantee 25% of the U.S. nuclear fuel market for U.S. uranium producers, and “Buy American”
provisions for government purchases of uranium to bolster the industry.106
Compared to historical production, current uranium mining has become a relatively small-scale
industry in the United States. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports U.S.
production of uranium shrank to 1.6 million pounds in 2018, 33% less than 2017, and declined to
173,875 pounds in 2019.107 Kazakhstan accounted for 41% of the world’s production of uranium;
Canada and Australia supplied roughly a quarter of the world’s production in 2017.108 China
made up 3.5% of worldwide uranium production in 2018.109
In April, 2019, Commerce submitted its report to the President, determining affirmatively that
uranium imports threaten to impair U.S. national security.110 In July, the President expressed
concerns regarding national security, calling for a “fuller analysis of national security

102 Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General Office Legal Counsel, “Publication of a Report to the President on the
Effect of Automobile and Automobile-Part Imports on the National Security,” January 17, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1236426/download.
103 “Grassley says he intends to ‘pursue’ release of Section 232 autos report,” Inside U.S. Trade, February 11, 2020;
Doug Palmer, “Toomey blasts Commerce decision not to release auto report,” PoliticoPro, January 21, 2020; letter
from New Democrat Coalition to Pres. Trump dated February 13, 2020.
104 CRS Analyst Lance Larson contributed to this section.
105 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of
Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Uranium,” 83 Federal
Register 35204, July 25, 2018.
106 Energy Fuels, “Energy Fuels and Ur-Energy Jointly File Section 232 Petition with U.S. Commerce Department to
Investigate Effects of Uranium Imports on U.S. National Security,” press release, January 16, 2018,
http://www.energyfuels.com/news-pr/energy-fuels-ur-energy-jointly-file-section-232-petition-u-s-commerce-
department-investigate-effects-uranium-imports-u-s-national-security/.
107 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Domestic Uranium Production Report - Quarterly, February 13, 2020.
[not finding content on EIA site, suggest we omit URL. Or could it now be in annual report??]
108 World Nuclear Association, World Uranium Mining Production, August 2019, http://www.world-nuclear.org/
information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx.
109 Ad Hoc Utilities Group, “Domestic Uranium Quotas Threaten America’s Economy, Energy, and Security,”
https://www.ahuguranium.com/.
110 The White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of
the United States Nuclear Fuel Working Group, Presidential Memorandum, July 12, 2019,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect-uranium-imports-national-security-
establishment-united-states-nuclear-fuel-working-group/.
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considerations with respect to the entire nuclear fuel supply chain.” The White House
memorandum established a Nuclear Fuel Working Group, co-chaired by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy,
with representatives from other executive branch agencies. The working group was directed to
“examine the current state of domestic nuclear fuel production to reinvigorate the entire nuclear
fuel supply chain.”111 In April 2020, the working group released its “Strategy to Restore
American Nuclear Energy Leadership” containing ideas to revive the uranium industry and drive
U.S. exports, among other recommendations.112
Titanium Sponge
In March 2019, Commerce launched another Section 232 investigation in response to a petition
from a U.S. titanium firm.113 In explaining the investigation, the Commerce Secretary stated,
“Titanium sponge has uses in a wide range of defense applications, from helicopter blades and
tank armor to fighter jet airframes and engines.”114
Titanium Metals Corporation (known as Timet) is currently the only producer of titanium sponge
in the United States; U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that titanium sponge
manufacturing employed 150 workers in 2019.115 In 2016, there were three such producers.116 For
2019, and the United States was 86% import reliant for titanium sponge, up from 73% the
previous year.117 In 2019, Japan was the biggest supplier of titanium sponge to the United States,
accounting for more than 90% of sponge imports; Kazakhstan was the second-leading supplier,
making up 8% of imported titanium sponge.118 Although China was the world’s largest producer
of titanium sponge, producing 84 thousand tons in 2019, it is not an important source of sponge
imports for the United States.119 In its 232 petition, Timet voiced concern that without protection,
the U.S. defense and aerospace industries could become dependent on titanium sponge imports
from “risky” sources such as China or Russia. Furthermore, the company noted that China is not
certified as a producer of premium grade titanium sponge used in rotating parts of jet engines.120

111 Ibid.
112 U.S. Department of Energy, “Strategy to Restore American Nuclear Energy Leadership,” April 23, 2020,
https://www.energy.gov/strategy-restore-american-nuclear-energy-leadership. For more information on uranium
enrichment, see CRS Report R45753, The Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Current Issues, by Lance N. Larson.
113 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security
Investigation of Imports of Titanium Sponge,” 84 Federal Register 8503, March 8, 2019.
114 U.S. Department of Commerce press release, March 2019, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2019/
03/us-department-commerce-initiates-section-232-investigation-titanium.
115 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020, https://minerals.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/.
116 USGS, Titanium Minerals Yearbook, January 2020, Table 2, p. 79.7., https://prd-wret.s3-us-west-
2.amazonaws.com/assets/palladium/production/atoms/files/myb1-2016-titan.pdf
117 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020,
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2020/mcs2020-titanium.pdf.
118 Global Trade Atlas, based on U.S. import statistics for 8108.20.0010, Titanium Sponge.
119 USGS, Titanium and Titanium Dioxide Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020, https://minerals.usgs.gov/
minerals/pubs/commodity/titanium/.
120 Petition of the Titanium metals Corporation Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for relief from
Imports of Titanium Sponge that Threaten National Security, September 27, 2018, p.19, https://www.timet.com/assets/
local/documents/petition/Titanium-Sponge-232-Petition-Executive-Summary.pdf.
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Commerce submitted its report to the President in November 2019, but has not released it to
Congress or to the public.121 On February 27, 2020, the President announced that he agreed with
the Commerce finding that titanium sponge imports threaten to impair national security and also
with the Commerce recommendation not to adjust imports.122 Similar to the uranium case, the
White House memorandum established a working group, in this case co-chaired by the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce with heads from other executive branch agencies. The
working group is to meet with counterpart agencies in Japan to “agree upon measures to ensure
access to titanium sponge in the United States for use for national defense and critical industries
in an emergency.”123 Furthermore, the President instructed the Secretary of Defense “to take all
appropriate action… to increase access to titanium sponge for use for national defense and critical
industries and to support domestic production capacity for the production of titanium sponge to
meet national defense requirements.”124 Timet is reportedly satisfied with the result of the
investigation.125
Transformers and Components126
On May 4, 2020, Commerce self-initiated a Section 232 investigation into whether imports of
certain electrical transformers or their parts, including laminations and cores made of grain-
oriented electrical steel (GOES), threaten to impair national security. The existing Section 232
steel tariffs included the expanded derivative products and do not cover GOES derivative
products, which had raised concerns among some Members of Congress who called the tariffs
insufficient. They also argue that some firms had avoided tariffs by increasing imports of such
derivative products from Mexico and Canada, which do not presently face tariff restrictions.127
Canada contested the circumvention allegation in its submission to Commerce. Canadian officials
claimed that the North American supply chain was highly integrated, and that Canadian
component manufacturers source some GOES inputs from U.S. suppliers. Furthermore, they
wrote, restriction of Canadian imports might “adversely affect” the integrated North American
electrical grid shared by the United States and Canada.128 AK Steel, with manufacturing
operations in Pennsylvania and Ohio, is currently the sole domestic GOES producer.129

121 BIS, Section 232 Investigations: The Effects on Imports on National Security, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/
other-areas/office-of-technology-evaluation-ote/section-232-investigations.
122 The White House, Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security, February 27,
2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-effect-titanium-sponge-imports-national-
security/.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Doug Palmer, “Trump won't restrict titanium sponge imports in name of national security,” PoliticoPro, February
28, 2020.
126 CRS Analyst Brian E. Humphreys contributed to this section.
127 Senator Portman, “Portman, Brown, Casey Ask President Trump to Prioritize Electrical Steel in Trade Remedy,”
press release, March 8, 2018.
128 Government of Canada, Comments By the Government of Canada to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Request for
Comment: The Effect of Imports of Laminations for Staked Cores for Incorporation Into Transformers, Stacked Cores
for Incorporation Into Transformers, Wound Cores for Incorporation Into Transformers, and Transformer Regulators,
An Investigation Under Section 232(B) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended U.S. Federal Register,
Washington, DC, July 2, 2020, p. 15.
129 Representative Mike Kelly, “Reps. Kelly and Balderson Urge President Trump to Protect AK Steel, the Last
Remaining U.S. Electrical Steel Producer,” press release, March 6, 2020.
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GOES products are incorporated into transformers used in critical energy infrastructure. Risk
assessments for the U.S. energy infrastructure have generally focused on threats and hazards that
may disable or permanently damage large numbers of high-voltage electric-power transformers
(LPTs) that are critical to the movement of electricity. Because LPTs require long lead times for
their manufacture, transport, and installation, the loss of these systems for any reason may have
severe long-term consequences for electric reliability. Experts have expressed increasing concern
about the threat of coordinated cyberattacks through the nation's networked control systems that
might significantly impair the nation's electric grid by damaging LPTs and other bulk-power
equipment.130 Widely recognized cyber supply chain vulnerabilities may increase cybersecurity
risks to the electricity subsector.131
In 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directed the North American
Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop a new reliability standard to address supply
chain risk management issues affecting cybersecurity of bulk-power systems.132 The rule would
require industry stakeholders to formalize cybersecurity risk management and implement more
rigorous vetting of vendors and software, among other measures.133 In April 2020, FERC delayed
implementation of the rule to October 1, 2020, due to COVID-19 contingencies.134
An affirmative Section 232 investigation might block procurement of bulk-power systems from
certain foreign-owned vendors and subcontractors on national security grounds, rather than
allowing industry stakeholders to purchase these systems and then assume corporate
responsibility for carrying out risk mitigation measures mandated by applicable FERC reliability
standards. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Foreign Trade Council oppose potential
action to limit imports under Section 232 and instead advocate for use of AD/CVD to limit
targeted imports. There are currently duties assessed on transformer components imported from
South Korea. The Commerce investigation is ongoing.
Mobile Cranes135
On May 19, 2020, Commerce initiated an investigation on imports of mobile cranes136 on the
basis of a petition filed by the Manitowoc Company, Inc.137 In its December 2019 petition, the

130 For more information, see CRS Report R45312, Electric Grid Cybersecurity, by Richard J. Campbell.
131 For more information see, NIST Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management, https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cyber-supply-
chain-risk-management.
132 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Implementation Plan, Project 2016-03 Cyber Security
Supply Chain Risk Management Reliability Standard, July 2017, p. 2. NERC “is a not-for-profit international
regulatory authority whose mission is to assure the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and
security of the grid.... NERC is the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) for North America, subject to oversight by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and governmental authorities in Canada.” See NERC, “About
NERC”, https://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Pages/default.aspx.
133 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric Systems of North
America,” June 23, 2020.
134 U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order Granting Deferred Implementation of Certain NERC
Reliability Standards, April 17, 2020, 171 FERC ¶ 61,052.
135 CRS Specialist Bill Canis contributed to this section.
136 Cranes are large machines that move heavy objects using a projecting beam. They are used to unload freight and
place bridge sections over highways, and in construction and manufacturing applications. Cranes can be either
stationary or mobile, with the latter mounted on wheels, crawler tracks, or trucks.
137 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of
Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Mobile Cranes,” 83
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Wisconsin-based company asserted that lower-priced imports—particularly from Germany,
Austria, and Japan—and intellectual property infringement138—by a Chinese competitor—have
resulted in a 72% increase in imported cranes since 2014 and the closure of one of its two U.S.
production facilities.139
According to its petition, Manitowoc is the “dominant supplier of mobile cranes to the U.S.
military and has a long history of Department of Defense contract awards, having supplied a wide
number of rough-terrain and self-propelled cranes through the Defense Logistics Agency and
through direct sales to all military branches of service.”140 The company asserts that in 2019, it
was the U.S. military’s exclusive supplier of all-terrain and boom truck cranes, and supplied half
of the rough terrain cranes used by the services.141 Manitowoc also said that its cranes are
essential to “strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure”
within the United States.142 Manitowoc is seeking the imposition of duties on some imported
mobile cranes, though notably requests exclusions for imports of its own mobile cranes
manufactured in Germany.
The crane industry is split in its views on the Manitowoc petition: other mobile crane
manufacturers and some crane users support the petition, while others have argued against it.143
Opponents to the Section 232 investigation, mostly those involved in crane rental, sales, and
service, say that Kobelco and Tadano, two Japanese crane manufacturers that have invested in
U.S. factories, make more reliable equipment with regards to safety, quality, service, and
reliability, and are more competitively priced than their Manitowoc counterparts.144 One Texas
crane importer asserted that, Manitowoc has not invested in its plants or in innovation through
research and development (R&D) since the early 1990s, so that demand for its product has
diminished.145 The investigation is ongoing.

Federal Register 31439, May 26, 2020.
138 The International Trade Commission found in May 2015 that a Chinese crane manufacturer had violated Manitowoc
patents and trade secrets with regard to certain crawler cranes and excluded them from entry into the United States. In
the Matter of Certain Crawler Cranes and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-887 1-4 (U.S. International
Trade Commission).
139 While the company headquarters and engineering remain in Wisconsin, its sole crawler crane manufacturing facility
was moved in 2016 to Shady Grove, Penn. Manitowoc Company, Inc., Petition of the Manitowoc Company, Inc. under
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 for the Relief from Imports of Mobile Cranes that Threaten National
Security, December 19, 2019.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 D. Ann Shiffler, “Global crane community responds to Manitowoc petition for tariffs,” International Cranes and
Specialized Transport, July 18, 2020, at https://www.khl.com/international-cranes-and-specialized-transport/global-
crane-community-responds-to-manitowocs-petition-for-tariffs/145129.article.
144 Public comments of Scott Cummins, CEO of Scott Equipment Company, LLC, July 17, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0008.
145 Public comments of Don Udelson, President of G.P., Lift Source Machinery, LTD.,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0009-0025.
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Vanadium146
On May 28, 2020, Commerce, in response to a petition, initiated an investigation to determine the
effects on U.S. national security from imports of vanadium.147 Vanadium is a metal used in the
production of metal alloys, and is designated a critical mineral by the Department of the
Interior.148 Vanadium is most often used as a strengthening agent for steel and is especially valued
for its strength-to-weight ratio.149 Uses potentially important for national security include the
manufacture of components of aircraft, jet engines, ballistic missiles, and batteries for energy
storage.150 Vanadium is also used in the manufacture of steel alloys, which are commonly sold as
steel plate, sheet, beams, bars, pipes, and tubes, among others, and can be used as a catalyst for
the production of some acids. Other minerals can often serve as substitutes for vanadium.
AMG Vanadium (Cambridge, OH)151 and U.S. Vanadium, LLC (Hot Springs, AR)152 filed the 232
petition. The petitioners assert that the U.S. vanadium industry is “adversely impacted by unfairly
priced imports, limited exported markets due to value-added-tax regimes, and the distortionary
effects of Chinese and Russian industrial policies.”153 AMG Vanadium and other U.S. producers
of ferrovanadium are protected by antidumping orders on imports of ferrovanadium from China
and South Africa that have been in place since 2003.154
Opponents of the Section 232 investigation point out that there is no primary production of
vanadium in the United States, and that both of the U.S. petitioners rely on secondary sources of
vanadium, including imports of spent catalysts from oil refiners, fly ash from industrial boilers
and power plants, and vanadium-bearing steelmaking slag.155 Another U.S. manufacturer that uses
vanadium pentoxide to produce ferrovanadium, objected to any Section 232 action because the
limited production of vanadium pentoxide in the United States makes it necessary to rely on

146 CRS Analyst Brandon S. Tracy contributed to this section.
147 Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, U.S. Department of Commerce, “Notice of
Request for Public Comments on Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium,” 85 Federal
Register 34179, June 3, 2020.
148 Office of the Secretary, Interior, “Final List of Critical Minerals 2018,” 83 Federal Register 23295, May 18, 2018.
149 U.S. Vanadium, LLC, https://usvanadium.com.
150 “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation into Imports of Vanadium,” Press
Release, June 2, 2020.
151 AMG Vanadium reclaims spent steel refinery and other vanadium-bearing residues, which it converts to
ferrovanadium as well as a ferronickel-molybdenum alloy that are marketed and sold to the carbon and stainless steel
industries; AMG Vanadium, https://amg-v.com/.
152 U.S. Vanadium LLC is a processor of vanadium that makes high-purity vanadium oxides and downstream vanadium
chemicals that it markets to the catalyst, chemical, titanium, and energy storage industries. U.S. Vanadium LLC,
https://usvanadium.com/news/f/us-vanadium-llc-announces-agreement-to-acquire-evraz-stratcor.
153 Department of Commerce, “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Initiates Section 232 Investigation on Imports
of Vanadium,” Press Release, June 2, 2020.
154 International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, “Notice of Antidumping Order: Ferrovanadium from
the Republic of South Africa,” 68 Federal Register 4169, January 28, 2003, and “Notice of Amended Final
Antidumping Duty Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Ferrovanadium from
the People’s Republic of China,” 68 Federal Register 4168, January 28, 2003. In these antidumping orders, the scope
included all ferrovanadium, but specifically excluded all vanadium additives, such as nitride vanadium, vanadium-
aluminum master alloys, vanadium chemicals, vanadium oxides, vanadium waste and scrap, and vanadium-bearing raw
materials (slag, boiler residues, and fly ash).
155 Julie C. Mendoza et al., Comments of Bushveld Minerals, Limited, Morris, Manning & Martin LLP, Section 232
National Security Investigation of Imports of Vanadium, July 20, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0013.
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vanadium imports for its feedstock. The company suggested that if the investigation resulted in
tariffs on all vanadium imports, it could critically reduce the amount of vanadium available for
steelmaking.156 Other downstream producers, including manufacturers of vanadium flow batteries
and of titanium mill products for the aerospace industry, also opposed the Section 232 measure.157
The investigation is ongoing.
Section 232 Tariffs and International Trade158
The Trump Administration’s increased tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%) under Section
232 currently affect $23.3 billion of U.S. annual imports (Figure 4), excluding countries currently
exempted from the additional tariffs. The scale of imports affected by the actions declined in
2019, as the Administration exempted Canada and Mexico from increased tariffs on both
metals—Canada and Mexico accounted for one-third of relevant U.S. steel and aluminum imports
in 2019. However, in February 2020, President Trump expanded the steel and aluminum tariffs to
cover additional derivative products, and more significantly, on August 16, 2020, reinstated tariffs
on selected aluminum imports from Canada, accounting for $2.5 billion of annual U.S. imports.
The Trump Administration has also proposed or is investigating potential increased tariffs on
several additional products under Section 232 authority. Among these products, the most
economically significant are U.S. auto imports from the European Union ($62 billion in 2019).159
U.S. trading partners have responded to the U.S. tariff actions with retaliatory tariffs on
approximately $6.5 billion in U.S. annual exports (see “Retaliatory Tariffs”).

156 Comments of David F. Carey, General Manager, Bear Metallurgical Company, July 20, 2020,
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIS-2020-0002-0015.
157 See comments in https://regulations.gov, BIS-2020-0002.
158 U.S. trade data cited throughout this section is from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via Trade Data Monitor.
Calculations based on products included in the Administration’s various tariff proclamations, and adjusted for
exempted countries as noted.
159 President Trump’s proclamation under Section 232 declaring auto and parts imports a national security threat,
focused on U.S. imports from the European Union and Japan. However, following the January 2020 entry into force of
the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreements, the Trump Administration has stated it has no intent to pursue auto tariffs with Japan
at this time. For more information, see CRS Report R46140, “Stage One” U.S.-Japan Trade Agreements, coordinated
by Brock R. Williams.
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Figure 4. U.S. Trade Affected by Section 232 Tariffs
(U.S. dollars)

Source: CRS calculations with data from the U.S. Census Bureau sourced through Trade Data Monitor.
Notes: Based on annual 2019 trade values. Excludes exempted countries (aluminum imports from Canada under
HTS 760110 included). Motor vehicles and parts import figure includes only U.S. imports from the European
Union (EU). Proposed retaliatory tariffs consist of Canada’s proposed retaliation to the Trump Administration’s
reinstated tariffs on certain aluminum imports from Canada.
(*) Derivative data excludes two products covered by the expanded tariffs, notably 8HTS codes 87081030 and
87082921, because only a portion of 2019 trade under these product categories is subject to the tariff actions.
The USITC created new 10HTS codes for the covered products and data are available from February 2020.
Steel and Aluminum Trade160
In 2019, U.S. imports of steel and aluminum products covered by the Section 232 tariffs totaled
$23.8 billion and $15.8 billion, respectively, including all U.S. trading partners.161 Over the past
decade, steel imports have fluctuated significantly, by value and quantity. Imports of aluminum
generally increased through 2018, but saw a slight decline in 2019. Compared to 2017, imports of
both metals have decreased, by value and quantity. Steel imports have decreased 17.8% by value
(-$5.2 billion) and 24.0% by quantity (-8.3 million metric tons). Aluminum imports have
decreased 9.2% by value (-$1.6 billion), and 12.7% by quantity (-0.9 million metric tons).
U.S. imports from individual countries fluctuated since the tariffs went into effect (see Appendix
D). When comparing 2019 trade data to 2017, before the tariffs took effect, the largest declines in
U.S. steel imports were from Turkey (-$995.1 million, -83.3%), the European Union (-$891.8
million, -14.9%), Russia (-$815.3 million, -57.6%), and South Korea (-$554.7 million, -19.9%),
with notable increases in trade from Brazil (+$248.9, +10.2%) and Mexico (+$173.4, +7.0%).
The largest declines in aluminum imports were from Canada (-$1,410.9 million, -20.0%), China
(-$1,099.4 million, -59.4%), Russia (-$1,024.8 million, -62.8%), and Argentina (-$134.7 million,
-24.6%). Aluminum imports increased by value from Australia (+$361.1 million, +169.1%), the
European Union (+$581.6 million, +46.6%), and Turkey (+$195.6 million, +389.1%).

160 Data in this section from the U.S. Census Bureau accessed via Trade Data Monitor.
161 Figures include countries currently exempted from the Section 232 tariffs.
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The countries with permanent exclusions from the tariffs accounted for 52.5% of U.S. steel
imports in 2019 and 27.1% of U.S. aluminum imports.162
Figure 5. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports

Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on the HTS codes listed in the 2018 Section 232
proclamations.
Notes: Data includes U.S. imports from all trading partners, but does not include derivative products.
As mentioned, in February 2020, the Administration declared that while steel and aluminum
imports decreased, a perceived increase in imports of certain derivatives of steel and aluminum
undermined the purpose of the Section 232 steel and aluminum actions.163 In response, the
President proclaimed tariffs on selected derivatives products, namely steel nails and aluminum
wire, as well as certain automobile bumpers and body stampings for tractors made of steel and
aluminum. An examination of U.S. trade data shows that U.S. imports of both steel nails and
aluminum wire increased from 2017 to 2019 (Figure 6).164 In 2019, the United States imported a
total of $347.6 million of steel nails, and $46.1 million of aluminum wire. In comparison to 2017,
imports of steel nails have increased by 37% ($94.1 million), while imports of aluminum wire
have increased by 104.6% ($23.5 million).

162 On August 16, 2020, the Trump Administration reinstated tariffs on aluminum imports from Canada under HTS
760110. The aluminum figure for exempted countries, reflects the fact that Canada is only partially exempted from the
Section 232 tariffs.
163 Presidential Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, “Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and
Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States.”
164 Historic data on U.S. imports of bumpers (HTS 87081030) and body stampings for tractors (HTS 87082921) subject
to the tariffs are not available, because only a portion of trade under these product categories is covered by the tariff
actions. The USITC created two new 10HTS codes for the covered products and data are available from February 2020.
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Figure 6. U.S. Imports of Select Derivative Products

Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data for HTS codes listed in Presidential Proclamation 9980
(January 24, 2020) on steel and aluminum derivative products.
Notes: U.S. imports of steel and aluminum derivative products identified in the Presidential Proclamation 9980.
Steel nails consist of HTS codes: 73170030, 7317005503, 7317005505, 7317005507, 7317005560, 7317005580,
and 7317006560, and aluminum wire consists of HTS 76141050, 76149020, 76149040, and 76149050. Bumpers
(HTS 87081030) and body stampings for tractors (HTS 87082921) were also included in the new derivatives
tariffs, but historical data for the portion of these product categories covered by the tariffs are not available.
Retaliatory Tariffs
As noted above, several major U.S. trading partners who are challenging the Section 232 actions
on steel and aluminum in the WTO are imposing retaliatory tariffs (see Figure 7).165 Retaliatory
tariffs are currently in effect on approximately $6.5 billion of U.S. annual exports (2019 value).166
The scale and scope of annual U.S. exports targeted for retaliation declined significantly during
the past year as Canada and Mexico withdrew their retaliatory tariffs (covering U.S. exports of

165 Products targeted by retaliatory tariffs were identified in countries’ World Trade Organization notifications (China
(G/L/1218, March 29, 2018); India (G/L/1237/Rev 1, June 13, 2018); EU (G/L/1237, May 18, 2018); Turkey
(G/L/1242/Supplement 2, May 22, 2019); Russia (G/L/1241, May 22, 2018), and in the notices published by Canada,
Mexico, Russia, and India on their own government websites. Canada: Department of Finance (Canada),
“Countermeasures in Response to Unjustified Tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum products,” June 29, 2018,
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/international-trade-finance-policy/measures-steel-aluminum-
businesses/countermeasures-response-unjustified-tariffs-canadian-steel-aluminum-products.html; Mexico: Ministry of
Finance (Mexico), Diario Oficial de la Federacion, June 5, 2018,
http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5525036&fecha=05/06/2018; Russia: Russian Federation, “Approval
of rates of import duties in respect to certain goods from the United States,” Decision no. 788, July 6, 2018,
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201807060023; India: Ministry of Finance (India), Notification
no. 17, June 15, 2019, https://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocs-cbec/customs/cs-act/notifications/notfns-2019/cs-
tarr2019/cs17-2019.pdf. Canada’s proposed retaliatory tariffs in response to the Trump Administration’s reinstatement
of Section 232 tariffs on certain aluminum products are available at https://www.canada.ca/en/department-
finance/programs/consultations/2020/notice-intent-impose-countermeasures-action-against-united-states-response-
tariffs-canadian-aluminum-products.html.
166 U.S. exports are estimated using partner country import data in order to match trade values with retaliatory tariff
lists.
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$14.1 billion in 2019) following the Trump Administration’s May 2019 decision to exempt both
countries from Section 232 steel and aluminum duties. The EU, however, slightly expanded its
retaliatory tariffs (covering additional U.S. exports of $42 million in 2019), effective May 8,
2020, in response to the Trump Administration’s decision to expand the U.S. steel and aluminum
tariffs to derivative products.167 Most recently, Canada has announced new proposed retaliatory
tariffs on approximately $2.5 billion of U.S. exports, effective September 16, 2020, in response to
the Trump Administration’s decision to reinstate Section 232 tariffs on certain aluminum imports
from Canada. U.S. exports subject to retaliatory tariffs have declined significantly compared to
their 2017 pre-tariff levels, suggesting the tariffs have had a negative impact on several U.S.
industries (see “Retaliation”).
Figure 7. Retaliatory Actions by U.S. Trading Partners

Source: CRS analysis of Trade Data Monitor trade data. Retaliatory tariff lists sourced from WTO notifications
and partner country notifications. See footnote 165 for complete sourcing.
Notes: U.S. exports approximated by using partner country import data. Steel and aluminum are among the top
exports facing retaliation by several U.S. trading partners as highlighted above. Canada’s proposed retaliatory
tariffs are in response to the Trump Administration’s reinstatement of tariffs on selected aluminum imports from
Canada, effective August 16, 2020. They are to take effect September 16, 2020 and cover a value of U.S. exports
commensurate with the U.S. action.
(1) The EU expanded its retaliatory tariffs to cover additional products in May 2020 in response to the Trump
Administration’s expansion of U.S. tariffs to include steel and aluminum derivative products.

167 European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/502, April 6, 2020, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32020R0502&from=EN.
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(2) Turkey temporarily increased its retaliatory tariffs up to 140% in August 2018 in response to the Trump
Administration’s tariff increase on Turkish steel to 50%, but in May 2019 both countries withdrew the additional
increases.
(3) India’s retaliatory tariffs were first announced in June 2018, but were repeatedly postponed until June 2019.
(4) Russia published its list of retaliatory tariffs rates and products on July 6, 2018. The tariffs appear to have
gone into effect within 30 days of the publication.
U.S. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing and
Employment
As discussed earlier (see “Commerce Findings and Recommendations”), a stated goal of the
metal tariffs is to spur U.S. producers of steel and aluminum to operate at an average of 80% or
more of their production capacity. Commerce’s Section 232 reports deemed this as necessary to
sustain adequate profitability, to reopen idled capacity, and to continue capital investment in both
manufacturing sectors.168 Currently, domestic steel producers operate at 80% or less of production
capacity (it was 64% over the first half of 2020, 77.1% in 2019, and about the same in 2018).169
Domestic producers of primary aluminum operated at an estimated 60% of production capacity in
2019, a rise from about 55% of capacity in 2018.170
Domestic Steel Manufacturing
U.S. raw steel production increased to 87 million metric tons in 2019, compared to 82 million
metric tons in 2017, the year before the Section 232 trade action took effect.171 According to the
USGS, nationwide in 2019 three companies in nine locations operated large integrated steel
mills—once the chief method of producing steel in the United States—and 50 companies
operated 98 minimills—with lower capital and energy costs and a largely nonunion workforce.172
One effect of the steel tariff is that U.S. hot-rolled band steel prices initially rose, registering a 10-
year high of more than $1,000 per metric ton at the beginning of July 2018. Since then, the
domestic price of steel has been dropping, reaching around $570 per metric ton in June 2020,
which was lower than before the United States applied the steel tariff.173 One reason is slowing
global demand for steel products from major steel-using sectors, such as automotive, in recent
months, thus lessening the effect of the steel tariff. U.S. downstream industries that use steel have
had to contend, at least for a time, with higher costs of inputs into production. Any price increases
may put U.S. exporters of products made of steel at a disadvantage as they compete against
foreign rivals who may pay a lower price for steel in the global market when buying materials for
production.
Figures from the U.S. government show a modest increase in steel manufacturing jobs, and it is
possible that the tariffs may have prevented some additional steel jobs from disappearing. U.S.
steelmakers directly employed 144,000 workers in 2019 (see Figure 8), accounting for 1.1% of
the nation’s 12.8 million factory jobs. Steel manufacturers added a total of 6,600 jobs in 2018 and

168 Steel Report, p. 4, and Aluminum Report, p. 107.
169 The U.S. Federal Reserve Board publishes industrial production and capacity utilization data by industry.
170 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, 2019 and 2020.
171 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Iron and Steel, 2020.
172 Ibid..
173 World Steel Dynamics, Steelbenchmarker: Price History, Tables and Charts, February 10, 2020.
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2019, a rise of 4.8% from 2017.174 Nevertheless, steelmakers employed 7,300 fewer people than
in 2014. Despite the recent uptick, the U.S. government expects steel industry employment to
shrink to 124,100 jobs by 2028.175 In the first five months of 2020, there were 7% fewer steel
industry jobs compared to the same period in the previous year. What is not yet known and
difficult to assess is the employment effect of increased input costs on other U.S. manufacturing
industries that use steel intensively, such as manufacturers of automobiles and parts, household
appliances, and farm machinery. The possible effects of the steel and aluminum tariffs on the
automotive supply chain are discussed in the section “Automobiles and Parts”. Beyond the
various U.S. tariff actions over the years meant to protect the industry from foreign competition,
employment in the steel industry has been affected by new technology, particularly the increased
use of electric arc furnaces to make steel, which has reduced the demand for workers.176
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, labor productivity in steelmaking nearly tripled since
1987 and rose 10% over the past decade.177 Hence, even a significant increase in domestic steel
production is likely to result in a relatively small number of additional jobs. In the past two years,
a few steel plant expansions have been realized or announced, and some blast furnaces have
reopened.178 Nevertheless, industry experts are skeptical domestic steelmakers will make long-
term capital expenditures solely on the basis of trade and tariff policy that could change or be
eliminated in the future at the President’s discretion. Some analysts argue the uncertainty
associated with the tariff actions could discourage steelmakers from adding new capacity.179 Over
the same period, other steelmakers have closed mills, idled employees, or cut back on work
hours.180

174 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Iron and Steel Mills (NAICS 3311) and
Steel Products (NAICS 3312), accessed July 15, 2020, https://www.bls.gov/ces/.
175 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, Table 2.7, September 4, 2019, https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/industry-
employment-and-output.htm.
176 See CRS In Focus IF10902, Trade Actions and U.S. Steel Manufacturing, by Michaela D. Platzer, for a related
discussion on the domestic steel industry.
177 BLS, Industry Productivity and Costs, https://www.bls.gov/lpc/.
178 Bob Tita, “U.S. Steel’s Turnaround Plan Runs Through Big River Mill,” Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2020.
179 Shawn Donnan and Joe Deaux, “Trump’s Tariffs Revived a Steel Town, but Industry is Unforgiving,” Bloomberg
News, December 18, 2019.
180 As one example, AK Steel’s plant in Ashland, KY, closed permanently at the end of 2019.
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Figure 8. Steel and Aluminum Manufacturing Employment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey for North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) 3311 (iron and steel mil s), 3312 (steel products), and NAICS 3313 (aluminum).
Domestic Aluminum Manufacturing
Figures from the USGS indicate that domestic production of raw aluminum has risen over the
past two years, reaching 1.1 million metric tons in 2019, up from 741,000 metric tons in 2017, the
lowest level since 1951. Three companies operated eight primary aluminum smelters in the
United States in 2019, compared with five companies that operated nine primary aluminum
smelters in 2010.181 In April 2020, Alcoa, the largest domestic producer, announced that it would
curtail its Intalco aluminum smelting facility in Washington State by August 2020, thereby
reducing its U.S. production of primary aluminum by 230,000 metric tons.182 The action suggests
that the 10% tariff has not been enough of a factor to allow Alcoa to maintain its current domestic
capacity or to reopen curtailed capacity. Century Aluminum, the main proponent of the tariff and
chiefly a domestic producer, has restarted some of its U.S. production capacity since the
imposition of the tariff, but it has not led to a substantial rebuild of its domestic production of
primary aluminum.183
U.S. production of aluminum accounted for a tiny fraction of the world’s primary aluminum
production at 1.7% in 2019, whereas China constituted more than half.184 A main source of
imported aluminum for the United States is Canada, which was exempted from the aluminum
tariff in mid-May 2019.185 However, as noted, on August 6, 2020 President Trump re-imposed the
tariff on some aluminum imports from Canada.186
One aim of the 10% tariff was to raise the price of imported aluminum as a way to encourage
domestic manufacturers to restart idled capacity. In March 2020, the average spot price of
primary aluminum ingot produced in the United States was $1,909 per metric ton, or 19% higher

181 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2011 and January 2020.
182 Alcoa, "Alcoa Corporation Reports First Quarter 2020 Results," press release, April 22, 2020,
https://investors.alcoa.com/news-releases/2020/04-22-2020-210941017.
183 Century Aluminum, 2020 Chairman’s Letter, April 28, 2020.
184 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summary, Aluminum, January 2019.
185 The Section 232 U.S. aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico applied from June 1, 2018 to May 19, 2019.
186 See “Country Exemptions”
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than the London price (the global price of aluminum). However, in the first three months of 2020,
the average price of primary aluminum in the United States fell by 8.4%, according to USGS.187
Aluminum manufacturers directly employed 59,800 workers in 2019, 2,200 more than in 2017,
and an increase of 1,100 jobs from 2014 (see Figure 8).188 According to federal employment
figures, aluminum industry employment shrank nearly 7% in the first five months of 2020,
compared to the same period in 2019.189 Similar to the trend in steelmaking, the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) expects employment in aluminum manufacturing to shrink, falling to
52,800 jobs by 2028.190 A reason for this is that domestic smelting of aluminum from bauxite ore,
which requires large amounts of electricity, has been in long-term decline, and secondary
aluminum produced from recycled scrap melted in a smelter now accounts for the majority of
domestic aluminum production.191 Secondary aluminum production, which has been fairly steady
over the past two decades, accounted for three-fourths of U.S. aluminum production in 2019, and
the United States was the world’s largest producer of secondary aluminum.192 China ranked
second. Imports of secondary unwrought aluminum are not covered by the Section 232 aluminum
trade action.193
Another development affecting aluminum is that the President’s Commerce budget request for
FY2021 published in February 2020 seeks funds to create a formal aluminum import monitoring
system “to track imports of aluminum products and provide an early warning system for import
surges.”194 The aluminum program would be similar to the import monitoring and analysis system
for steel administered by ITA’s Enforcement and Compliance unit.195 In April 2020, Commerce
requested comments on its proposed rule for a new Aluminum Import Monitoring and Analysis
(AIM) system.196
Global Production Trends
Tariffs to protect the domestic steel industry do not address the underlying issue of global
overcapacity. The steel committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) estimates global steel overcapacity was at 440 million metric tons in
2019.197 Although China is the world’s largest steel producer, accounting for roughly 45% of

187 USGS, Aluminum Mineral Industry Survey, Table 6, March 2020.
188 (BLS), Current Employment Statistics (CES), Alumina and aluminum production (NAICS 3313), accessed July 15,
2020, https://www.bls.gov/ces/.
189 CRS analysis of average employment data for 2020 are from BLS’s CES program.
190 BLS, Employment and Output by Industry, Table 2.7, September 4, 2019.
191 For more information on domestic aluminum manufacturing, see CRS In Focus IF10998, Effects of U.S. Tariff
Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing, by Michaela D. Platzer.
192 Secondary aluminum can be substituted for primary aluminum in most uses, although primary aluminum is favored
in some applications, such as electronics or aerospace manufacturing.
193 Section 232 trade action includes certain semi-finished wrought aluminum products, such as bars, rods, foil, and
wire, which can be manufactured using primary aluminum, secondary aluminum, or a combination of the two.
194 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration (ITA), Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2021,
February 24, 2020, p. 41.
195 See Steel Import Monitoring and Analysis (SIMA) system, https://enforcement.trade.gov/steel/license/index.html.
196 Department of Commerce, Enforcement and Compliance, International Trade Administration, “Aluminum Import
Monitoring and Analysis System,” 85 Federal Register 23748, April 29, 2020.
197 See Fabien Mercier, Valentina Burrai, and Daichi Mabashi, Steel Market Developments Q4 2019, OECD, 2019, p.
38, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/steel-market-developments.htm; and, G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,
Ministerial Report, September 20, 2018, p.6, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/pdf/0921_003a.pdf.
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global capacity in 2018, relatively little Chinese steel enters the U.S. market directly, due to
extensive U.S. AD/CVD duties, but the large amount of Chinese production depresses prices
globally. China has indicated that it plans to reduce its crude steelmaking capacity by 100-150
million metric tons over the five-year period from 2016 to 2020.198 According to the Chinese
government, the country’s crude steel capacity has fallen by more than 120 million metric tons
since it announced its steel reduction goal in 2016.199
No OECD or other multinational forum has been established to monitor global aluminum
overcapacity, though aluminum industry groups have called for such a forum.200 Although China
accounted for more than half of the world’s primary aluminum production in 2019, it does not
export aluminum in commodity form to the United States.201 China ships semi-finished aluminum
such as bars, rods, and wire to the United States. These are subject to the Section 232 tariffs.202
Metals imports should be put in the context of U.S. production. In 2019, the United States
produced more than three times the amount of steel it imported.203 According to Commerce,
import penetration—the share of U.S. demand met by steel imports—rose to 28.3% in 2018, from
23% in 2009.204 Some segments of the domestic steel industry, such as slab converters, import a
sizable share of their semi-finished feedstock from foreign suppliers, totaling nearly 6.1 million
tons in 2019.205 In the primary aluminum market, U.S. net import reliance fell to 22% in 2019
from 41% in 2015, according to USGS.206 Most U.S. foreign trade in steel and aluminum is with
Canada (see Appendix D).
International Efforts to Address Overcapacity
OECD analysis has found that ongoing global steel overcapacity and excess production are
largely caused by government intervention, subsidization, and other market-distorting practices,
although these are not the only factors.207 Other reasons for excess capacity include cyclical
market downturns. The situation is similar in the aluminum industry, where government financial
support for large aluminum stockpiles has delayed the response to lower demand.
Previous U.S. Administrations worked to address the issue of steel overcapacity. President George
W. Bush, for example, initiated international discussions on global capacity reduction and
improved trade disciplines in the steel industry as part of his general steel announcement of

198 OECD, Latest Developments in Steelmaking Capacity, July 2019, p. 11, https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/
steelcapacity.htm.
199 In October 2019, China blocked the continuation of the Global Forum on Excess Capacity in the G20; however,
more than 30 countries, including the United States, have pledged to continue the work of the Global Forum to reduce
the global overcapacity of this metal. G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, Ministerial Report, September 20,
2018, p. 10.
200 European Aluminum, G7 Makes Explicit Urgency to Avoid Aluminum Overcapacity, June 10, 2018.
201 USGS, Aluminum, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2020, p. 2.
202 CRS In Focus IF10998, Effects of U.S. Tariff Action on U.S. Aluminum Manufacturing, by Michaela D. Platzer.
203 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Iron and Steel, January 2020.
204 DOC, ITA, Steel Imports Report: United States, Global Steel Trade Monitor, September 2019, p. 6.
205 DOC, ITA, Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Steel Import Monitor, Import by Country and Product Category,
2019.
206 USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries, Iron and Steel, January 2020.
207 OECD, “Excess Capacity in the Global Steel Industry: The Current Situation and Ways Forward,” 2015, p. 4,
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/excess-capacity-in-the-global-steel-industry.pdf.
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2001.208 Other governments agreed to join the Bush Administration in discussing overcapacity
and trade issues at the OECD in a process that started in mid-2001. The industrial, steel-
producing members of the OECD were joined by major non-OECD steel producers, such as
India, Russia, and, during later stages of the talks, China. Negotiations were suspended
indefinitely in 2004, and by 2005, the OECD had abandoned this effort to negotiate an agreement
among all major steel-producing countries to ban domestic subsidies for steel mills.
The Obama Administration also participated in international efforts to curb steel imports,
including the launch of the G-20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity in 2016, another venue
that sought to address the challenges of excess capacity in steel worldwide.209 In December 2016,
the G-20 convened its first meeting of more than 30 economies—all G-20 members plus
interested OECD members—as a global platform to discuss steel issues among the world’s major
producers.210 The same year, as part of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SE&D)
established in 2009, the Obama Administration agreed to address excess steel production and also
to communicate and exchange information on surplus production in the aluminum sector.211
In September 2018, the OECD Forum agreed on a process to identify and remove subsidies and
take other measures to reduce the global steel overcapacity. The OECD issued a consensus report
outlining six principles and specific policy recommendations to address excess steel capacity.212
The USTR, while supportive of the recommendations, questioned the Forum’s ability to pursue
effective implementation and did not rule out unilateral action.213 Some Members have expressed
support of U.S. participation in the Forum and other global coalitions to address overcapacity.214
Despite calls from international steel industry associations and most Forum members, including
the United States, the G-20 was unable to overcome objections by China to extend the Forum’s
mandate past November 2019.215 However, the Chair noted that a large majority of members
agreed to continue and USTR stated that it “will continue to work with like-minded partners to
seek long-term solutions” to global overcapacity.216
The aluminum industry argues it is also suffering because of China’s excess production of
primary aluminum. According to the aluminum associations of Japan, Europe, Canada, and the
United States, global overcapacity amounted to 11 million metric tons in 2017. A June 2019
OECD report found that subsidies, especially in China and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, and other market-distorting practices impact global competition in the aluminum

208 President George W. Bush, Statement by the President Regarding a Multilateral Initiative on Steel, June 5, 2001,
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010605-4.html.
209 The White House, Fact Sheet: The 2016 G-20 Summit in Hangzhou, China, September 5, 2016,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/05/fact-sheet-2016-g-20-summit-hangzhou-china.
210 European Commission, Steel: Commission Welcomes New Global Forum to Tackle Root Causes of Overcapacity,
December 16, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4435_en.pdf.
211 U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S.-Fact Sheet, June 7, 2016,
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0485.aspx.
212 Global Forum on Excess Steel Capacity, Ministerial Report, September 20, 2018,.
213 The U.S. Trade Representative, “USTR Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,”
USTR Press Releases, September 2018.
214 Senators Portman, Brown, Braun, and Casey, “Portman, Brown, Braun, Casey Urge USTR to Prioritize Extension of
the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 24, 2019.
215 G-20 Chair, Japanese Ministry of Economy, “Trade and Industry, Ministerial Meeting on the Global Forum on Steel
Excess Capacity (GFSEC) Held,” October 26, 2019, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2019/1026_001.html.
216 USTR, “USTR Statement on Meeting of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity,” October 26, 2019.
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industry.217As noted, the U.S. Aluminum Association and some of its international counterparts
seek to establish a global forum to address aluminum excess capacity.
The Trump Administration’s Section 232 actions have led multiple U.S. trading partners, such as
the EU, the UK, and Canada, to initiate their own safeguard investigations and quota restrictions
to prevent dumping of steel and aluminum exports and protect domestic industries. Unlike the
OECD efforts, the individual country safeguard actions are uncoordinated.
In addition to the Section 232 action, the Trump Administration is pursuing joint action on
industrial overcapacity in other forums. The USTR began meeting with EU and Japanese
counterparts in May 2018, to address “nonmarket-oriented policies and practices that lead to
severe overcapacity, create unfair competitive conditions for our workers and businesses, hinder
the development and use of innovative technologies, and undermine the proper functioning of
international trade.”218 The parties also agreed to cooperate on their concerns with third parties’
technology transfer policies and practices219 and issued a joint statement containing a list of
factors that identify if market conditions for competition exist.220 In January 2020, the three
parties issued a statement with specific recommendations and proposed reforms to strengthen the
existing WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) rules.221 Some
analysts suggested that the UK might join the trilateral effort once it is no longer part of the EU
trade regime. China opposes several of the proposed ASCM reforms.222
In addition, in November 2018, the United States, the EU, Japan, Argentina, and Costa Rica put
forward a joint proposal in the WTO to increase transparency, proposing incentives for
compliance or penalties for noncompliance with WTO notification reporting requirements
regarding subsidies.223 U.S. unilateral tariff actions, however, may limit other countries’
willingness to participate or support U.S. reform proposals in multilateral forums.
Policy and Economic Issues
Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports into the United States raise a number of issues
for Congress. The economic repercussions of U.S. and foreign actions may be felt not only by
domestic steel and aluminum producers, but by downstream manufacturers or other industries
targeted for retaliation, and consumers. Some companies have challenged the president’s actions
through domestic litigation,224 and may also seek alternative markets for their own products to
avoid U.S. tariffs.

217 OECD (2019), “Measuring Distortions in International Markets: the Aluminum Value Chain”, OECD Trade Policy
Papers, No. 218, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c82911ab-en.
218 U.S. Trade Representative, “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States,
Japan, and the European Union,” May 2018.
219 Ibid, Annex Statement 2, Joint Statement on Technology Transfer Policies and Practices.
220 Ibid, Annex Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions.
221 U.S. Trade Representative, “Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States
and the European Union,” January 14, 2020.
222 Statement by Zhang Xiangchen, China's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO, July 15, 2020.
223 “Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements Under WTO Agreements,”
JOB/GC/204, November 1, 2018.
224 See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l Trade filed June 27, 2018); Severstal
Exp. GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 3, 2018) (order granting joint stipulation of dismissal).
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The response by other countries can have implications for the U.S. economy and multilateral
world trading system. Also, other countries may be hesitant in the future to cooperate with the
United States to address broader global issues, including steel and aluminum overcapacity, if their
exports are subject to U.S. tariffs. U.S. trading partners’ responses to Section 232 actions have
varied based on the country’s relationship with the United States. Some countries are pursuing
direct negotiations, while keeping other countermeasures in reserve, and raising actions at the
WTO (see below). Others have proposed or pursued retaliation with their own tariffs.
Domestic Court Challenges
The President’s actions under Section 232 have resulted in legal challenges in the U.S. domestic
court system. Specifically, the Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum have been challenged
in cases before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT). In one case, Severstal Export GmbH,
a U.S. subsidiary of a Russian steel producer, sought a preliminary injunction from the CIT to
prevent the United States from collecting the import tariffs on certain steel products.225 The
company and its Swiss affiliate argued that the President acted outside of the authority delegated
by Congress because the tariffs were not truly imposed for national security purposes.226 The
court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on the merits of
their challenge.227 According to the case docket, the parties agreed to dismiss the case in May
2018.
In another case, which was heard by a three-judge panel of the CIT, the American Institute for
International Steel (AIIS), a trade association, challenged the constitutionality of Congress’s
delegation of authority to the President under Section 232.228 The plaintiffs argued that “Congress
created an unconstitutional regime in section 232, in which there are essentially no limits or
guidelines on the trigger or the remedies available to the President, and no alternative protections
to assure that the President stays within the law, instead of making the law himself.”229
On March 25, 2019, the CIT issued an opinion rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments that Congress
delegated too much of its legislative power to the President in Section 232 in violation of the
Constitution’s separation of powers established.230 In granting the United States’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the CIT held that it was bound by a 1976 Supreme Court precedent
determining that Section 232 did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation because it
established an “intelligible principle” to guide presidential action.231 One member of the three-
judge panel, Judge Katzmann, wrote separately to express his significant concerns about the
ruling without openly dissenting.232 Judge Katzmann wrote that he was bound to follow Supreme

225 See Severstal Export GmbH v. United States, No. 18-00057, 2018 WL 1705298, at *2 (Ct. of Int’l Trade April 5,
2018).
226 See ibid. at *9.
227 See ibid. at *10. Another case filed in December 2019 against the steel and aluminum tariffs challenges the
executive branch’s alleged failure to meet Section 232’s statutory requirements, and its purportedly overbroad
interpretation of “threat to national security” in Section 232. Complaint at 14-17, Universal Steel Prods., Inc. v. United
States, No. 19-00209 (Ct. Int’l Trade Dec. 3, 2019). The case remains pending before the court.
228 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1337 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019), aff’d, No. 2019-
1727, 2020 WL 967925 (Fed. Cir. February 28, 2020).
229 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, at 3–4, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v.
United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l Trade July 19, 2018).
230 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1344–45.
231 Ibid. at 1340–41 (citing Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559–60 (1976)).
232 Ibid. at 1345 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
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Court precedent and uphold the delegation, but questioned whether the nondelegation doctrine
retained any significant meaning if a delegation as broad as that in Section 232 was
permissible.233 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
affirmed the CIT’s decision, agreeing that the case was controlled by the Supreme Court
precedent that “declare[d] section 232 not to violate the nondelegation doctrine.”234 AIIS asked
the Supreme Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision, but in June 2020, the Court declined
to hear the case, denying AIIS’s petition for a writ of certiorari.235
More recently, the CIT issued a preliminary decision in a case in which U.S. importers of Turkish
steel alleged that the President’s increase of the Section 232 steel tariffs from 25% to 50% on
U.S. imports from Turkey did not have a sufficient national security rationale, did not follow
statutory procedural mandates, and violated the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights
because the action “creates an arbitrary distinction between importers of steel products from
Turkey and importers of steel products from all other sources.”236 In a decision denying the
United States’ motion to dismiss the company’s complaint in Transpacific Steel LLC v. United
States, the CIT indicated that the President’s power to impose tariffs under Section 232, while
broad, is not unlimited.237 Specifically, the court suggested that the President must closely adhere
to the procedural requirements of the statute when exercising such authority.238 The court also
determined that the company raised a plausible argument that the Executive violated
constitutional guarantees of equal protection protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause when imposing, without a rational basis, the additional steel tariffs only on imports from
Turkey.239 In a July 2020 opinion, the CIT ruled that the President violated Section 232’s
mandated procedures and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantees when issuing the
proclamation doubling the tariffs on steel imports from Turkey.240
The decision in Transpacific Steel indicates that courts might scrutinize whether the executive
branch has followed the proper procedures, including meeting statutory deadlines, when
exercising Section 232 authority.241 Presidential action that does not follow these statutory
procedures may be deemed in excess of the President’s authority.242

233 Ibid. at 1352.
234 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 967925, at *1 (Fed. Cir. February 28,
2020).
235 Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1177, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3353, at *1 (S. Ct. June 22, 2020).
See also Sarah Martinson, “Steel Importers Take National Security Tariff Fight To Justices,” Law360, March 25, 2020.
236 Complaint at 1-3, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, No.19-00009 (Ct. Int’l Trade January 17, 2019).
237 Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1276 (Ct. of Int’l Trade 2019).
238 Ibid. at 1275–76.
239 Ibid. at 1270.
240 Opinion at 22, Transpacific Steel LLC v. United States, No. 19-00009 (Ct. of Int’l Trade July 14, 2020).
241 See ibid. at 1276.
242 See ibid. At least one U.S. importer has challenged the Department of Commerce’s exclusion process for Section
232 tariffs. In JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, the plaintiff argues that Commerce’s failure to grant the company’s
products an exclusion from the steel tariffs violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the Agency improperly
determined that the U.S. market could furnish the products “in a sufficient quantity or quality on a timely basis to
replace the steel slab [the plaintiff] currently imports.” Complaint at 13-14, JSW Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-
00133 (July 30, 2019). On August 5, 2020, the CIT remanded the case to the Department of Commerce, instructing the
agency to (1) supplement the administrative record that it relied upon when denying the company’s exclusion requests,
and (2) to reconsider its decisions on those requests.
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Proclamation Imposing Tariffs on Steel-Derivative Products
As noted, in a January 2020 proclamation, President Trump expanded the steel and aluminum
tariffs to cover derivative products (e.g., steel nails, tacks, drawing pins, and stranded wire).243 On
February 4, 2020, a U.S. importer of steel-derivative products sued the United States in the CIT,
seeking a temporary restraining order preventing CBP from collecting the additional duties.244
The company argues that the President’s imposition of the tariffs failed to follow required
statutory procedures; occurred after the statutory deadline for action; and violated the company’s
constitutional rights, among other things.245 On February 13, with the consent of both parties, a
judge issued an order enjoining CBP from collecting the additional duties and requiring the
plaintiff-company to post a bond for the duties until the CIT reaches a final judgment on the
merits of the plaintiff’s complaint.246 The case remains pending before the CIT.247
WTO Cases
The President’s imposition of tariffs on certain imports of steel and aluminum products,248 as well
as Commerce’s exemption of certain WTO members’ products from such tariffs, may also have
implications for the United States under WTO agreements. As an example, on April 9, 2018,
China took the first step in challenging the executive branch’s actions as violating U.S.
obligations under the WTO agreements (particularly the Agreement on Safeguards) by requesting
consultations with the United States.249 Under WTO dispute settlement rules, members must first
attempt to settle their disputes through consultations. If consultations fail, the member initiating a
dispute may request the establishment of a dispute settlement panel composed of trade experts to
determine whether a country has violated WTO rules.250 In October 2018, China requested the
formation of such a panel.251 Other WTO members have requested consultations with the United

243 Presidential Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020, Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and
Derivative Steel Articles into the United States, 85 Federal Register 5281 (January 29, 2020).
244 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 1-6, PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032
(February 4, 2020).
245 Id.
246 Order at 1-3, PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United States, No. 20-00032 (February 13, 2020).
247 Several other companies have also filed cases at the CIT challenging the President’s January 2020 Proclamation
imposing tariffs on steel- and aluminum- derivative products. See, e.g., Complaint at 19-25, J. Conrad Ltd. V. United
States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l Trade Mar. 2, 2020); Complaint at 17-23, Aslanbas Nail & Wire Co. v. United States,
No. 20-00049 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 26, 2020). In June 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against implementation of the proclamation in the J. Conrad case, stating
that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable harm from the proclamation. Slip op. at 2, J.
Conrad Ltd. V. United States, No. 20-00052 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 1, 2020).
248 For legal background on the tariff measures, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10097, UPDATE: Threats to National
Security Foiled? A Wrap Up of New Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum, by Brandon J. Murrill.
249 Request for Consultations by China, U.S.—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WT/DS/544/1 (Apr.
9, 2018) [hereinafter Request for Consultations]. This report does not examine potential implications under other
international agreements to which the United States is a party, such as other U.S. free trade agreements.
250 WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) arts. 3-6. A WTO
Member may appeal a panel’s report to the WTO Appellate Body, id. art. 17(1), however that Body stopped
functioning as of December 11, 2019, when it lost its quorum, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10385, The WTO’s
Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum: Is This the Beginning of the End for the “Rules-Based Trading System”?, by
Brandon J. Murrill. The text of the DSU and other WTO agreements discussed in this report are available at
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/final_e.htm.
251 Items proposed for consideration at the next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, WTO/AIR/DSB/70, Oct. 19,
2018.
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States, or have joined existing requests, and panels have been composed to hear the cases (see
Figure 9).
In its request, China alleged that the U.S. tariff measures and exemptions are contrary to U.S.
obligations under several provisions of the GATT, the foundational WTO agreement that sets
forth binding rules on international trade in goods.252 In particular, China alleged that the
measures violate GATT Article II, which generally prohibits members from imposing duties on
imported goods in excess of upper limits to which they agreed in their Schedules of Concessions
and Commitments.253 It further alleged that Commerce’s granting of exemptions from the import
tariffs to some WTO member countries, but not to China, violates GATT Article I, which
obligates the United States to treat China’s goods no less favorably than the goods of other WTO
members (i.e., the so-called most-favored-nation treatment principle).254 China also maintained
that the Section 232 tariff measures are “in substance” a safeguard measure intended to alleviate
injury to a domestic industry from increased quantities of imported steel that compete with
domestic steel, but that the United States did not make the proper findings and follow the proper
procedures for imposing such a measure, as required by the GATT and WTO Safeguards
Agreement.255
The United States has invoked the so-called national security exception in GATT Article XXI in
defense of the steel and aluminum tariffs. GATT Article XXI states, in relevant part, that the
GATT256 will not
be construed ... (b) to prevent any [member country] from taking any action which it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment; [or]
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.

252 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) art. II.
253 GATT Article II limits the charges that WTO Members can impose in connection with the import of products. It
provides that a WTO Member shall not impose “ordinary customs duties” in excess of the bound tariff rates set forth in
that Member’s Schedule of Concessions. It also bars “other duties and charges of any kind imposed in connection with
the importation” of products in excess of charges levied on the date of the tariff concession. A member’s schedule is a
list of specific commitments as to tariffs and other trade barriers. Goods Schedules: Members’ Commitments, WORLD
TRADE ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm. The GATT provides limited
ways in which WTO members may modify the bound tariff rates. E.g., GATT art. XXVIII (establishing procedures for
negotiations among WTO members on changes to a member’s bound tariff rates in its schedules).
254 Request for Consultations at 2; GATT art. I:1 (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation ..., and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation ... any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.”). China also alleged that the measures violate GATT Article X:3(a), arguing that the United
States “failed to administer its laws, regulations, decisions, and rulings in relation to the measures at issue in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner.”
255 Request for Consultations at 2.
256 As noted, China has also alleged that the United States’ imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs violated the WTO
Safeguards Agreement, which lacks an exception for national security interests. This report does not analyze whether
the United States could invoke the GATT’s national security exception to justify a violation of the Safeguards
Agreement.
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While some analysts argue that a WTO panel may evaluate whether a WTO member’s use of the
national security exception falls within one of the three provisions listed above, historically, the
United States has taken the position that this exception is self-judging—or, in other words, once a
WTO member has invoked the exception to justify a measure potentially inconsistent with its
WTO obligations, a WTO panel may not proceed to the merits of the dispute to evaluate whether
the WTO member’s use of the exception is proper.257 In the past, however, WTO members have
expressed concern that overuse of the exception will undermine the world trading system because
countries might enact a multitude of protectionist measures under the guise of national security.258
In April 2019, a WTO panel interpreted the national security exception in Article XXI of the
GATT for the first time. In Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, the panel determined
that it had jurisdiction to review whether a member’s actions were justified under Article XXI’s
national security exception and whether the member satisfied the requirements for invoking the
exception.259 As of December 11, 2019, however, the WTO’s Appellate Body lost its quorum of
three members necessary for the Body to decide appeals of WTO dispute settlement panel
decisions and issue final reports.260 Because of this, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (i.e., the
committee composed of all WTO members that oversees the dispute settlement mechanism) can
no longer adopt panel reports in line with the WTO’s Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).261 Consequently, unless WTO members agree to
consider unadopted dispute reports as final, the DSB cannot oversee the losing member’s
implementation of a panel ruling or authorize the prevailing member to engage in trade retaliation
if the losing member ignores the dispute panel’s recommendations. Thus, even if the United
States or one of its trading partners prevails in a dispute over the Section 232 or retaliatory tariffs,
there are significant doubts as to whether the ruling would be enforceable under WTO
procedures.
Prior to December 2019, if one of the WTO panels had rendered an adverse decision against the
United States, the United States would be expected to remove the tariffs, generally within a
reasonable period of time, or face the possibility of paying compensation to the complaining
member or be subject to certain countermeasures allowed under the rules.262 Such

257 See, e.g., Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on October 23, 2017,
¶ 4.9, WT/DSB/M/403 (Feb. 20, 2018) (noting that a U.S. representative, in commenting on the United Arab Emirates’
invocation of national security exceptions in a dispute with Qatar, had maintained that national security issues “were
political and were not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement system”); GATT Panel
Report, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 1.2, L/6053 (October 13, 1986) (noting the United
States’ argument that the national security exception in the GATT “left it to each [GATT party] to judge what actions it
considered necessary for the protection of its essential security interests” and that “[a] panel could therefore not address
the validity of, nor the motivation for, the United States’ invocation of [the exception]”).
258 See, e.g., WTO Council for Trade in Goods, National Security Cited in Two Trade Concerns at Goods Council
Meeting, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/good_10jul17_e.htm (June 30, 2017)
(discussing potential systemic risks to the world trading system from overuse of the national security exception).
259 Report of the Panel at ¶¶ 8.1(d)(i)-(iv), Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R (Apr. 5,
2019).
260 Alan H. Price, Real WTO Reform Now Possible With Demise of Appellate Body, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 20,
2019). For more on this issue, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10385, The WTO’s Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum: Is
This the Beginning of the End for the “Rules-Based Trading System”?, by Brandon J. Murrill.
261 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 16, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm#16.
262 DSU arts. 21-22. Members whose measures are deemed inconsistent with its WTO obligations and unjustified under
one of the GATT exceptions are expected to implement the panel and/or Appellate Body’s report. Id. art. 21.3. That is,
the defending member must withdraw, modify, or replace its violative measures. See id. If a disagreement arises as to
whether the defending member has, in fact, implemented the report, a WTO panel may be convened to hear a dispute
over compliance issues. Id. art. 21.5. The WTO Appellate Body hears appeals of these compliance panel reports. Id. art.
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countermeasures might include the complaining member imposing higher duties on imports of
selected products from the United States.263 Nonetheless, several trading partners have already
imposed retaliatory duties on selected U.S. exports without awaiting the outcome of a dispute
settlement proceeding.264
In turn, the United States has argued that unilateral imposition of tariffs in response to the U.S.
Section 232 measures cannot be justified under WTO rules.265 On July 16, 2018, the United States
filed its own WTO complaints over the retaliatory tariffs imposed by five countries (Canada,
China, the EU, Mexico, and Turkey) in response to U.S. actions; in late August 2018, it filed a
similar case against Russia;266 and in July 2019, it filed a similar case against India.267 Canada,
Mexico, and the United States withdrew their cases regarding the Section 232 tariffs and
corresponding retaliatory measures in May 2019 when the parties agreed to settle the disputes.268
Dispute settlement panels have been composed to hear the other cases, but, as noted, there are
questions about the viability of the WTO’s dispute settlement system because the Appellate Body
has suspended its operations.

17.1.
263 See id. art. 22.3. Ultimately, when a defending member fails to implement a panel or Appellate Body report within
the established compliance period, the prevailing member may request that the defending member negotiate a
compensation agreement. Id. art. 22.2. If such negotiations are not requested, or if an agreement is not reached, the
prevailing member may also request authorization to impose certain trade sanctions against the noncomplying member.
Id. art. 22.2-22.3. Specifically, the WTO may authorize the prevailing member to suspend tariff concessions or other
trade obligations that it otherwise owes the noncomplying member under a WTO agreement. Id.
264 Charles Hutzler, China Retaliates Against Trump Tariffs with Duties on American Meat and Fruit, WALL STREET J.
(April 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-retaliates-with-new-tariffs-on-u-s-meat-and-other-products-
1522618533.
265 See, e.g., Committee on Safeguards, Imposition of a Safeguard Measure by the United States on Imports of
Aluminum and Steel: Communication from the United States in Response to China’s Requests Circulated on 26 March
2018, 1-2, G/SG/161/Suppl.1 (Apr. 4, 2018) (“Because the actions under the Steel and Aluminum Proclamations are
not safeguard measures, the United States considers that Article 8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards does not justify
China’s suspension of concessions or other obligations. China has asserted no other justification for its measures, and
the United States is aware of none. Therefore, it appears that China’s actions have no basis under WTO rules.”).
266 USTR, “United States Challenges Five WTO Members Imposing Illegal Tariffs Against U.S. Products,” press
release, July 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/july/united-states-
challenges-five-wto.
267 Request for Consultations at 1-2, India—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States,
WT/DS585/1 (July 4, 2019).
268 Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Mexico—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States,
WT/DS560/4 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, United States—Certain Measures on Steel
and Aluminum Products, WT/DS551/13 (June 3, 2019); Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Canada—
Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WT/DS557/4 (May 27, 2019); Notification of a
Mutually Agreed Solution, United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WT/DS550/13 (May
27, 2019).
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Figure 9. WTO Cases Challenging the United States’ Section 232 Actions

Source: CRS based on WTO filings.
Notes: The UK is included as a member of the EU for cases filed prior to January 31, 2020. Independent of the
EU, the UK has not been a complainant or third party in the WTO Section 232 disputes.
Retaliation
The process of retaliation is complex given multiple layers of relevant international rules and the
potential for unilateral action, which may or may not adhere to those existing rules. Both through
agreements at the WTO and in bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the United
States and its trading partners have agreed to maintain certain tariff levels. Those same
agreements include rules on potential responses, including formal dispute settlement procedures
and in some cases commensurate tariffs, when one party increases its tariffs above agreed-upon
limits.269 In addition to the national security considerations, the Trump Administration has cited as
justification for its Section 232 actions, increased tariffs are permitted under these agreements,
under specific circumstances, including for example, antidumping tariffs, countervailing duties,
and safeguard tariffs.270

269 Chad P. Bown, Trump’s Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: How WTO Retaliation Typically Works, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, March 5, 2018, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trumps-steel-and-
aluminum-tariffs-how-wto-retaliation-typically.
270 Antidumping duties are imposed when a domestic industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury,
by sales found to be at less than fair value in the U.S. market; countervailing duties are imposed when a domestic
industry is materially injured, or threatened with material injury, as a result of sales in the U.S. market of products
found to be subsidized by a foreign government or other public entities; and safeguards are provided in response to
injury to a domestic industry from a sharp increase in imports. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10786,
Safeguards: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, by Vivian C. Jones, and CRS In Focus IF10018, Trade Remedies:
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C. Jones.
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Retaliatory actions have magnified the effects of U.S. Section 232 tariffs. From an economic
perspective, retaliation increases the scope of industries affected by the tariffs. U.S. agricultural
exports, for example, are among the largest categories of U.S. exports targeted for retaliation,
which may have contributed to reduced sales of certain U.S. farm products.271 Given the scale of
U.S. motor vehicle and parts imports, if the Trump Administration moves forward with Section
232 tariffs on that sector, and U.S. trading partners respond with retaliation of a similar
magnitude, it could have significant negative effects on U.S. exporters. For example, the United
States imported roughly $62 billion of motor vehicles and parts from the EU in 2019,272 and the
EU has announced potential retaliatory tariffs on nearly $40 billion of U.S. exports should the
United States decide to impose Section 232 auto tariffs.273
Retaliatory actions may also heighten concerns over the potential strain the U.S. Section 232
tariffs place on the international trading system. Many U.S. trading partners view the Section 232
actions as protectionist and in violation of U.S. commitments at the WTO and have initiated
WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the United States, while the Trump Administration
views the actions within its rights under those same commitments (see “WTO Cases”).274 The
retaliating countries notified their retaliation to the WTO pursuant to the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards, arguing that U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs are intended to protect U.S. industry and
therefore are effectively safeguard tariffs, the tariffs have not been authorized by a WTO dispute
settlement panel.275 The Trump Administration argues, in turn, that the retaliation violates WTO
rules and has responded by initiating additional WTO disputes. If the WTO dispute settlement
process cannot satisfactorily resolve this conflict, it could lead to further unilateral actions and
increasing retaliation.
Economic Impacts
The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and resulting retaliation affect various stakeholders in
the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support and
others voicing concern. Congress has also held a number of hearings to examine the issue.276
Press reports, company earnings statements, government data, and academic studies to date have
suggested the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs raised the tariff inclusive cost of imports leading to
declining demand for U.S. imports of the products subject to the tariffs, which allowed domestic
steel and aluminum producers to increase domestic prices and expand output for a time.277 In turn,

271 For more information, see CRS Report R45903, Retaliatory Tariffs and U.S. Agriculture, by Anita Regmi.
272 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. International Transactions,” Table 1.3, June 19, 2020 release,
https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=62&step=1.
273 “Threat of Auto Import Tariffs Remains Despite Lapsed Deadline,” Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2019.
274 For example, see China, “United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products Request for
Consultations by China,” WTO WT/DS544/1, April 9, 2018; and United States, “Certain Measures on Steel and
Aluminum Products,” WTO WT/DS544/2, April 17, 2018.
275 For example, see European Union, “United States – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products Request for
the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union,” WTO WT/DS548/14, October 19, 2018.
276 See, for example, 115th Congress, the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings examining the potential
economic implications of the tariffs and the product exclusion process, and its Trade Subcommittee held a hearing on
the effects on U.S. agricultural producers. The Senate Finance Committee also held a hearing during the 115th Congress
with Commerce Secretary Ross to discuss the Administration’s Section 232 investigations and the potential impacts of
Section 232 auto tariffs. In the 116th Congress, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing on the
impact of recent trade policies on the U.S. economy.
277 Sources cited throughout this section. For an overview of the estimated effects of the tariffs on the U.S. economy,
see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, January 28, 2020, p. 33,
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downstream domestic industries (e.g., manufacturers using steel and aluminum as inputs) and
consumers have faced higher costs. Trade data suggest other countries’ retaliatory tariffs have had
negative effects on U.S. industry by reducing demand for certain U.S. exports (see “Retaliation”).
Most studies attempting to measure the overall economic effects of the tariffs estimate a negative
impact on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) as a result of the tariffs. Some groups supporting
the tariff actions, however, argue that potential negative effects on the broader economy are
exaggerated and that such effects are outweighed by the benefits to the domestic steel and
aluminum industries in any case.278 President Trump’s May 2019 decision to exempt Canada and
Mexico, which accounted for more than 30% of affected steel and aluminum imports, have likely
lessened the effects of the Section 232 tariffs. However, on August 16, 2020, President Trump
reinstated tariffs on a significant share of aluminum imports from Canada (covering $2.5 billion
of U.S. imports in 2019). In addition, academic studies suggest that the Administration’s broader
tariff actions—including Section 301 tariffs on imports from China and China’s subsequent
retaliation—and increased uncertainty from the Administration’s various tariff actions may
further depress U.S. and global economic growth, which would have negative implications for
U.S. steel and aluminum producers as well as downstream industries (see “Aggregate Effects on
the U.S. Economy”). In the near term, however, the supply and demand shocks resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic and associated economic downturn may outweigh tariff-related economic
effects in steel, aluminum, and downstream industries.
Industry-Level Dynamics of the Tariff Increase
Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported goods
and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change
and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad
depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (foreign producers of the goods
subject to the tariffs, producers of domestic substitutes, producers in downstream industries, and
consumers) respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy.
Several industry-level dynamics that occurred after the increase in steel and aluminum tariffs are
described below. Tariffs, however, are only one of many variables influencing market conditions.
 Tariffs raise the costs of imports relative to domestic goods, which may have
given domestic steel and aluminum producers the ability to raise prices
relative to foreign competitors. Both foreign and domestic producers may
respond to increased tariffs. Domestic firms are likely to increase their prices in
response to the new tariff protection, while foreign producers may lower their
prices and absorb a portion of the tariff increase in order to remain competitive in
the U.S. market.279 Foreign producers’ response determines the tariff “pass-
through” rate, and most early economic studies of the tariff actions found that the

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf.
278 See for example: Jeff Ferry, Steel & Aluminum Tariffs Produce Minimal Impact on Jobs, GDP, Coalition for a
Prosperous America, March 2018, https://www.prosperousamerica.org/
steel_aluminum_tariffs_produce_minimal_impact_on_jobs_gdp; and Robert E. Scott, Aluminum Tariffs Have Led to a
Strong Recovery in Employment, Production, and Investment in Primary Aluminum and Downstream Industries,
Economic Policy Institute, December 11, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-tariffs-have-led-to-a-strong-
recovery-in-employment-production-and-investment-in-primary-aluminum-and-downstream-industries/.
279 Mary Amiti, Sebastian Heise, and Noah Kwicklis, “Will New Steel Tariffs Protect U.S. Jobs?,” Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics (blog), April 19, 2018, http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/
2018/04/will-new-steel-tariffs-protect-us-jobs.html.
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U.S. Section 232 tariffs had largely been passed through to downstream
industries and consumers with little effect on foreign export prices.280 A more
recent study, however, found that foreign steel producers absorbed some share of
the tariff increases, potentially lowering their export prices by as much as 50%.281

BLS data on domestic producer and import price indices for broad categories of
steel and aluminum suggest that price differences between domestic and
imported steel and aluminum increased after the Section 232 tariffs took effect in
March 2018. For steel, the domestic producer price index increased by 20.5%
from January to December 2018, while the price index for imports (excluding
tariffs) increased by 8.5% (see Figure 10). By the end of 2019, after Canada and
Mexico were exempted from the additional duties, domestic and imported steel
prices had become more closely aligned, but by June 2020 had widened again, at
5.7% and 9.3% below their January 2018 levels, respectively. For aluminum,
both domestic and import prices have drifted lower in 2019 and 2020 after
peaking in mid-2018. Import prices fell at a faster rate throughout the period, but
as of June 2020, domestic and imported aluminum prices had largely converged
at 14.1% and 13.3% below their January 2018 levels (see Figure 11).
Figure 10. Steel Price Indices
Figure 11. Aluminum Price Indices
(monthly % change from January 2018)
(monthly % change from January 2018)

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Notes: Based period set to January 2018.
Notes: Base period set to January 2018.
Production series ID = PCU3311 and import
Production series ID = PCU3313 and import
series ID = EIUIZ3311. Import price index
series ID = EIUIZ3313. Import price index
excludes tariffs.
excludes tariffs.
 U.S. steel and aluminum production initially expanded and U.S. imports
declined as demand for goods produced domestically increased relative to
demand for imported goods (see Figure 12 and Figure 13). Although U.S. steel
and aluminum producers increased prices relative to foreign producers in 2018
and 2019, the additional tariff costs on imports, which were largely passed
through to downstream firms (as discussed above), put downward pressure on

280 For example, see Alberto Cavallo, et al., Tariff Passthrough at the Border and at the Store: Evidence from U.S.
Trade Policy, Becker Friedman Institute, Working Paper No. 2019-124, October 2019, https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-
content/uploads/BFI_WP_2019124-1.pdf.
281 Mary Amiti, Stephen J. Redding, and David E. Weinstein, Who’s Paying for the U.S. Tariffs? A Longer-Term
Perspective, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 26610, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/
papers/w26610.
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demand for imports.282 By the first quarter of 2020, U.S. real imports of steel and
aluminum (adjusted for price fluctuations) had decreased by more than 30% and
16%, respectively, compared to their average quarterly values in 2017, the year
before the tariffs went into effect.283

By contrast, U.S. production increased over much of the period since the tariffs
took effect. Anticipating higher domestic demand and less foreign competition,
U.S. producers announced investment and production increases, including a new
electric arc furnace (which uses scrap metal to make steel), near Birmingham,
AL,284 and increased capacity at an aluminum facility in Hawesville, KY,
resulting from a multiyear project underway to restart previously curtained
capacity, among others.285 The increase in domestic steel and aluminum
production peaked in the fourth quarter of 2018 at 13.5% and 9.0%, respectively,
above average 2017 values.286

More recently, however, domestic production has fallen sharply in line with
broader declines in U.S. economic activity associated with the COVID-19
pandemic—from January to May 2020, U.S. steel and aluminum production
declined by 36% and 25%, respectively.287 In April 2020, citing declining market
conditions including the global oversupply of aluminum, falling prices, and the
economic fallout from the pandemic, Alcoa announced plans to cut production at
its aluminum smelter in Ferndale, WA, and began layoffs at the facility in June.288
Various U.S. steel facilities have announced similar plant closures, or reductions
in capacity, in recent months.289

282 Downstream firms’ demand sensitivity to higher import prices (their price elasticity of demand) depends on the
degree to which the steel and aluminum products produced domestically are sufficient substitutes for the products
facing the tariffs, and the availability of domestic supplies.
283 Import statistics sourced from U.S. Census Bureau.
284 Bob Tita, “U.S. Steel to Expand Under Tariffs,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2019.
285 Alan Rappeport, “Trump’s Tariffs are Paying Off for Century Aluminum,” New York Times, August 20, 2018.
286 Production data are from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
287 Monthly production data from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (series
IPN3311A2RS and IPG3313S).
288 Geoff Baker, "Alcoa Begins Laying Off Workers at its Ferndale Aluminum Plant Ahead of Schedule," Seattle
Times, June 4, 2020.
289 For example, see Letter from Michael P. Madar, Vice President and General Manager, ArcelorMittal Cleveland, to
Ohio Office of Workforce Development, Rapid Response Program Manager, July 24, 2020,
https://jfs.ohio.gov/warn/pdf/ArcelorMittalClevelandIncArcelorMittalUSALLC.stm.
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Figure 12. Domestic Production and
Figure 13. Domestic Production and
Imports: Steel
Imports: Aluminum
(quarterly % change from 2017, real values)
(quarterly % change from 2017, real values)

Source: Production data from Federal Reserve
Source: Production data from Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S.
Economic Data (FRED) and imports from U.S.
Census Bureau.
Census Bureau.
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average.
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average.
Production series seasonally adjusted, ID =
Production series seasonally adjusted, ID =
IPN3311A2RSQ. Import classification = NAICS
IPG3313S. Import classification = NAICS 3313.
3311. Data are in real terms (adjusted for price
Data are in real terms (adjusted for price
fluctuations).
fluctuations).
 The combination of higher domestic prices and the added duties on imports
led to higher input costs for some downstream industries. Domestic industries
that use steel and aluminum in their products (“downstream” industries,
including auto manufacturers and oil producers) faced higher input costs relative
to producers in other markets. Higher input costs led to some combination of
lower profits for producers and higher prices for importers and consumers, which
in turn may have dampened demand for downstream products, leading to some
contraction in these sectors. A study by researchers at the Federal Reserve Board,
which examined effects on the manufacturing sector from all U.S. tariff actions
in 2018, found that higher input costs from the tariffs were associated with higher
prices, employment declines, and reductions in output for affected firms.290
Another study found that the higher input costs associated with the tariffs may
have led to a decrease in U.S. exports for firms reliant on imported intermediate
inputs. This study suggests export growth was approximately 2% lower for
products made with steel and aluminum or other goods subject to higher U.S.
tariffs, relative to unaffected products.291

Some have also pointed to higher costs for several industries relying on both
domestic and imported steel and aluminum. For example, Ford CEO James

290 Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce, Disentangling the Effects of the 2018-2019 Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S.
Manufacturing Sector, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics
Discussion Series 2019-086, December 23, 2019, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019086pap.pdf.
291 The authors suggest that the U.S. import increases had the equivalent effect of U.S. trading partners applying a 2%
tariff on U.S. exports. Kyle Handley, Fariha Kamal, and Ryan Monarch, Rising Import Tariffs, Falling Export Growth:
When Modern Supply Chains Meet Old-Style Protectionism, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working
Paper No. 26611, January 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26611.
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Hackett suggested the metal tariffs cost the auto manufacturer roughly $1 billion
in profits in 2018.292 The higher input costs for U.S. downstream firms
potentially gives their foreign competitors an advantage in the U.S. market and
abroad. Allegheny Technologies, which uses imported steel slabs in its
production of stainless steel sheet, cited the Administration’s tariffs in its April
2020 decision to close a facility in western Pennsylvania.293 In January 2020, the
Trump Administration expanded the Section 232 tariff actions to certain steel and
aluminum derivative products (see “Presidential Actions”), arguing that higher
input costs had disadvantaged these downstream domestic manufacturers relative
to their foreign counterparts, in turn leading to more imports of the downstream
products.
 U.S. exports subject to retaliatory
tariffs declined. Five U.S. trading
Figure 14. U.S. Exports Subject to Section
partners (China, EU, India, Russia,
232 Retaliation
and Turkey) are currently imposing
(quarterly % change from 2017)
retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S.
Section 232 tariffs affecting
approximately $6.5 billion of U.S.
annual exports (2019 value).294
Products targeted include agricultural
goods, particularly pork and nuts, as
well as steel and aluminum.295 The
retaliatory tariffs have led to
decreased demand for these U.S.
exports as they lower the
competitiveness of U.S. firms relative

to other suppliers in foreign markets.
Source: CRS analysis with data from the U.S. Census
In each of the seven quarters since the
Bureau and partner country customs agencies via
retaliatory tariffs took effect, U.S.
Trade Data Monitor.
exports to China, the EU, Russia, and
Notes: Base period set to 2017 average. Includes
Turkey subject to the additional
U.S. exports to China, the EU, Russia, and Turkey
subject to retaliation since Q2 2018. Exports
duties were roughly 25% or more
estimated using partner country import data. India
below their average quarterly value in
began imposing retaliatory tariffs in Q2 2019 and is
2017 (Figure 14).296 During the same
not included. Total U.S. exports includes all products
period, overall U.S. exports were as
exported to all countries globally.
much as 10% higher in each quarter relative to 2017 levels, suggesting the tariffs
played a large role in the product-specific export declines.

Retaliatory tariffs also have given U.S. exporters an incentive to manufacture

292 “Trump Metal Tariffs will Cost Ford $1 Billion in Profits, CEO Says,” Reuters, September 26, 2018, Business
News.
293 "Allegheny Technologies to Shutter Steel Plant, Cites Tariffs," U.S. News, April 1, 2020.
294 Canada has announced plans to reinstate retaliatory tariffs on approximately $2.5 billion of U.S. annual exports on
September 16, 2020, in response to the Trump Administration’s recent decision to resume tariff increases on certain
aluminum imports from Canada.
295 Canada and Mexico removed retaliatory tariffs affecting approximately $14.1 billion of U.S. annual exports (2019
value) after the Trump Administration exempted both countries from Section 232 tariffs in May 2019.
296 India’s retaliatory tariffs were delayed until June 2019.
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abroad to avoid the retaliation. Facing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. motorcycle
exports to the European Union, Harley-Davidson announced its intent to shift
some of its production out of the United States to remain competitive in the EU
market.297 In July 2019, the company received approval from the European
Union to begin importing motorcycles from Thailand, facing a 6% tariff, as
compared to the 31% tariff applied to motorcycles exported to the European
Union from the United States.298
Aggregate Effects on the U.S. Economy
In addition to industry-level effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect the broader U.S.
economy. For example, several academic studies and preliminary accounts of other industry
observers appear to suggest the ad hoc nature of the tariffs has increased uncertainty in the
business environment placing a drag on investment activity. One study found that uncertainty
resulting from U.S. trade policy reduced investment by roughly 1.5% in 2018.299 U.S. tariffs may
also reduce national consumption patterns, as the higher costs of imported goods potentially
reduces consumers’ discretionary income and therefore aggregate demand. Similarly, retaliatory
tariffs may dent U.S. consumption to the extent they cause export declines and lower incomes in
affected industries. For example, some research suggests U.S. counties most exposed to China’s
retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports saw auto sales decline by 4%-5% relative to
unaffected counties after the retaliatory tariffs were imposed.300 Some groups that support the
tariffs, however, argue that estimates of their impact may exaggerate potential negative effects.301
Assessing the tariffs overall impact on the U.S. economy is in part a distributional question, given
the tariffs varied effects on producers in protected industries, downstream industries, consumers,
and exporters subject to retaliation. From a policy perspective some analysts see the
Administration’s trade actions as addressing long-standing issues of fairness that are intended to
provide U.S. steel and aluminum producers with a more level playing field. Research by
academic economists, however, generally argues the negative impact of higher prices on
consumers and industries using the imported goods outweighs the benefit of higher profits and
expanded production in the import-competing industries and the additional government revenue
generated by the tariffs, especially if the negative effects of retaliatory tariffs are taken into
consideration.302 Quantitative estimates of the effects vary based on modeling assumptions and
techniques, but most suggest a negative overall effect on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) as a
result of the tariffs.
The Congressional Budget Office, for example, estimates that the increased tariffs in effect as of
December 2019 would reduce U.S. GDP by 0.5% in 2020, below a baseline without the tariffs,

297 “U.S. Trade War with Europe Revs Up as Harley-Davidson Shifts Production,” Financial Times, June 25, 2018.
298 “Harley-Davidson Gets EU Approval for Plan to Dodge $100-million Tariff Hit,” Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2019.
299 Dario Caldara, et al., “The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
109 (January 2020), pp. 38-59.
300 Michael E. Waugh, The Consumption Response to Trade Shocks: Evidence from the U.S.-China Trade War,
National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 26353, December 2019, https://www.nber.org/papers/
w26353.
301 Robert E. Scott, Estimates of Jobs Lost and Economic Harm Done by Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Wildly
Exaggerated, Economic Policy Institute, March 21, 2018, https://www.epi.org/publication/estimates-of-jobs-lost-and-
economic-harm-done-by-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-wildly-exaggerated/.
302 For example, see Pablo D. Fajgelbaum, et al., “The Return to Protectionism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 135, no. 1 (January 2020), pp. 1-55.
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while raising consumer prices by 0.5%, thereby reducing average real household income by
$1,277.303 From a global perspective, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the
tariffs would reduce global GDP in 2020 by 0.8%.304 As these studies examine the effects of all
recent U.S. tariffs actions, the impact directly attributable to the Section 232 tariffs on steel and
aluminum is likely smaller, although this could grow if the Section 232 tariffs were expanded to
U.S. motor vehicle imports.305 U.S. steel and aluminum imports subject to Section 232 tariffs
accounted for less than 10% of imports affected by the Administration’s tariff actions—imports
from China subject to Section 301 tariffs accounted for more than 90%.306
In early 2020, the United States entered a recession as a result of the economic fallout from the
global COVID-19 pandemic with the scale of economic disruption far outweighing estimated
negative effects of the Administration’s tariff actions, cited above.307 In the second quarter of
2020, U.S. GDP declined at annualized rate of 32.9%, highlighting further deterioration in U.S.
economic conditions following a 5% decline (annualized rate) in the first quarter of 2020.308
Various stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, have called for suspending the tariff
increases, including actions under Section 232, in an effort to enhance U.S. economic growth
during the downturn.309 Some beneficiaries of the increased tariffs, however, argue they are
necessary to maintain domestic production and employment during the pandemic.310
Issues for Congress
As Congress debates the Administration’s Section 232 actions it may consider the following
issues, many of which include potential legislative responses.
Possible Long-Term Effects
Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports have now been in place for over two years and
have no statutory expiration. Congress may explore the long-term economic consequences of the
tariffs on U.S. domestic industry, including steel and aluminum producers, downstream
manufacturers, and those sectors targeted by retaliatory tariffs. Impacts may include increased
prices and costs for steel and aluminum producers and users, respectively; changes in workforce

303 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030, January 28, 2020, p. 33,
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-01/56020-CBO-Outlook.pdf.
304 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Trade Barriers,
October 2019, pp. 31-33, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook-
october-2019.
305 Motor vehicle and parts imports from Japan and the EU (the two trading partners targeted in the Administration’s
Section 232 proclamation on motor vehicles) totaled $119 billion in 2018 according to BEA data.
306 CRS Insight IN10971, Escalating U.S. Tariffs: Affected Trade, coordinated by Brock R. Williams.
307 For more, see CRS Report R46270, Global Economic Effects of COVID-19, coordinated by James K. Jackson.
308 Bureau of Economic Analysis, "Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2020 and Annual Update," press release, July
30, 2020, https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-2nd-quarter-2020-advance-estimate-and-annual-
update.
309 Ana Swanson, "U.S. Weighs Tariff Relief but Some Fear China Will Take Advantage," New York Times, March 15,
2020. Representative Stephany Murphy, "Murphy, Cunningham Urge Congressional Leadership to Suspend Tariffs in
Upcoming Coronavirus Response Bill," press release, March 18, 2020,
https://murphy.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1254.
310 United Steelworkers, "USW Calls on Congress to Continue Strict Enforcement of Trade Rules," press release,
March 26, 2020, https://m.usw.org/news/media-center/releases/2020/usw-calls-on-congress-to-continue-strict-
enforcement-of-trade-rules.
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levels; shifts in global supply chains as firms seek to avoid tariffs; and potential loss of foreign
markets for domestic producers facing retaliatory tariffs.
In a 2018 Ways and Means Committee hearing on the Section 232 tariff exclusion process,
Commerce stated the “Secretary has directed Commerce Department economists to conduct semi-
annual reviews of the impacts of the steel and aluminum tariffs, including on downstream
sectors.”311 As part of its own assessment, Congress may request the Administration’s analyses.
Some Members, including Senate Finance Chair Grassley, have suggested that the Administration
consider immediate tariff relief to help U.S. importers in the wake of the economic downturn of
the Covid-19 pandemic.312 Representative Ron Kind noted that the re-imposition of tariffs on
Canadian aluminum will “disproportionately harm Wisconsin’s storied beer industry, which is
already facing weakened demand due to a national shortage of aluminum cans and a stagnant
economy.”313
Appropriate Delegation of Constitutional Authority
In enacting Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Congress delegated aspects of its authority to
regulate international commerce to the executive branch. Use of the statute to restrict imports
does not require any formal approval by Congress or an affirmative finding by an independent
agency, such as the USITC, granting the President broad discretion in applying this authority.
Should Congress disapprove of the President’s use of the statute, its current recourse is limited to
passing new legislation or using informal tools to pressure the Administration (e.g., putting holds
on presidential nominee confirmations in the Senate). Some Members and observers have
suggested that Congress should require additional steps in the Section 232 process. In the 116th
Congress, a variety of proposals have been introduced to amend Section 232, in various ways,
such as by:
 requiring an economic impact study by the USITC, congressional consultation, or
approval of any new tariffs,
 allowing for a resolution of disapproval of trade actions, or
 mandating a transparent exclusion process to limit potential negative domestic
effects.
In addition, the 2020 expansion of the steel and aluminum tariffs, initially imposed in 2018, has
raised questions about Section 232 authority expiration. Some stakeholders have suggested that
Section 232 reform should include new or clarified timelines, deadlines, or expiration dates for
any tariffs or quotas imposed or on the authority to impose new or expanded trade actions.
Some Members, including Senate Finance Chair Senator Grassley, have sought to draft a
consensus bill to restore certain congressional authority that would gain sufficient bipartisan
support to withstand a possible presidential veto. Contentious issues have included whether any
changes would be retroactive, potentially affecting the steel and aluminum tariffs, or whether they
would only apply to future actions, and whether Congress’s role should be consultative or

311 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Hearing on Product Exclusion
Process for, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 2018, Serial No. 115-TR06, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/WM/WM04/
20180724/108591/HHRG-115-WM04-Transcript-20180724.pdf.
312 Adam Beshudi, “Grassley: White House, Congress should consider tariff easing measures,” PoliticoPro, March 16,
2020.
313 Representative Ron Kind, Twitter, August 6, 2020.
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decisive (e.g., requiring congressional approval). The Chairman noted that, “the president’s use of
tariffs has brought to our attention the shortcomings of the 1962 and 1974 legislation on trade that
delegated too much authority from Congress’ constitutional power [over trade] to the executive
branch.”314 After multiple meetings, the Chairman admitted that the efforts had stalled as it was
“difficult to get bipartisan agreement on what to do and, secondly, there’s some Republicans who
don’t want to advance [the bill] because they might be seen as doing it in an anti-Trump
fashion.”315
Others have proposed revisiting the delegation of congressional constitutional authority more
broadly, such as by requiring congressional approval of executive branch trade actions more
generally. The Tariff Reform Coalition, a cross-sectoral coalition of industry associations, have
advocated for “greater Congressional oversight with respect to Presidential use of tariff
authority.”316
For a list of proposals in the 116th Congress, see Appendix C.
Legislative Responses to Retaliatory Tariffs
Several major U.S. trading partners are currently imposing retaliatory tariffs in response to the
U.S. actions. In the 116th Congress, some Members of Congress proposed legislation to respond
to the potential economic impact of these foreign retaliatory tariffs. Some proposals expand
programs like trade adjustment assistance to include assistance for workers, firms, and farmers
harmed by foreign retaliation.317 The Administration announced an assistance program for
farmers harmed by foreign retaliation to Section 232 and other tariffs through the U.S.
Department of Agriculture.318 Others have suggested broader trade adjustment assistance reform
to help U.S. workers and firms harmed by globalization, supply chain shifts, global over-capacity
in certain sectors, and depressed demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For a list of proposals
from the 116th Congress, see Appendix C.
Establishing Threshold
It is relatively easy for a stakeholder to prompt the Section 232 investigation process. The statute
states that “Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an
interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce ... shall immediately initiate
an appropriate investigation.” To limit the volume of Section 232 petitions and ensure that any
requests are sufficiently justified, Congress may consider establishing criteria or a threshold that a
request must meet before Commerce and Defense agencies invest resources in conducting a
Section 232 investigation. Similarly, Congress may consider limiting the types of imported
articles that may be considered under Section 232 (e.g., S. 287, H.R. 940).

314 Megan Cassella, “Grassley Still Hopes to Craft 232 Reform Bill with Wyden,” PoliticoPro, March 4, 2020.
315 Hannah Monicken, “Grassley: Section 232 reform efforts have stalled, could be over,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 28,
2020.
316 Tariff Reform Coalition, letter to Chair and Ranking Members of Senate Finance and House Ways and Means
Committee, September 19, 2020, http://www.nftc.org/default/trade/Tariff%20Reform%20Coalition%20Letter.pdf.
317 For more information on trade adjustment assistance, see CRS In Focus IF10570, Trade Adjustment Assistance for
Workers (TAA), by Benjamin Collins, CRS Report RS20210, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms, by Rachel F.
Fefer, and CRS Report R40206, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers, by Mark A. McMinimy.
318 For more information see CRS Report R45310, Farm Policy: USDA’s 2018 Trade Aid Package, by Randy Schnepf
et al.
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Interpreting National Security
Congress created the Section 232 process to try to ensure that U.S. imports do not cause undue
harm to U.S. national security. Some observers have raised concerns that restrictions on U.S.
imports under Section 232, however, may harm U.S. allies, which could also have negative
implications for U.S. national security. For example, Canada is considered part of the U.S.
defense industrial base according to U.S. law and is also a top source of U.S. imports of steel and
aluminum.319
National security is not clearly defined in the statute, allowing for ambiguity and alternative
interpretations by an Administration. International trade commitments both at the multilateral and
FTA level generally include broad exceptions on the basis of national security. The Trump
Administration argues its Section 232 actions are permissible under these exceptions, while many
U.S. trading partners claim the actions are unrelated to national security. If the United States
invokes the national security exemption in what may be perceived to be an arbitrary way, it could
similarly encourage other countries to use national security as a rationale to enact protectionist
measures and limit the scope of potential U.S. responses to such actions.
Congress may consider amending Section 232 to address these concerns. For example, some
Members have proposed to narrowly define “national security” under Section 232 and the factors
to be considered in a Section 232 investigation. One bill limits it to protection against foreign
aggression (S. 287, H.R. 940). Congress could also consider changing the investigative authority
from Commerce to Defense to provide more weight to the military perspective or interpretation as
to what constitutes a national security threat.
Establishing New International Rules
Addressing the specific market-distorting practices that are the root causes of steel and aluminum
overcapacity (e.g., government intervention, subsidization) may require updating or amending
existing trade agreements. In addition to the international efforts discussed, recent U.S. FTA
negotiations, including the recently-implemented USMCA, include related disciplines (e.g., by
establishing rules on state-owned enterprises or anticorruption). To address these issues, Congress
could consider establishing specific or enhanced new negotiating objectives for trade agreement
negotiations, potentially through new or modified Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation.
Congress could also consider directing the executive branch to prioritize engagement in such
negotiations, by, for example, endorsing the continuation of the OECD discussions or the
trilateral proposals by USTR with the EU and Japan to address nonmarket practices, including
subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and technology transfer requirements, mostly aimed at China.
Congressional oversight on ongoing reform efforts at the WTO may examine efforts to establish
new international trade rules on these issues (see below).
Impact on the Multilateral Trading System
Some analysts argue that the United States risks undermining the international system it helped
create when it invokes unilateral trade actions that may violate core commitments and with regard
to broad uses of national security exemptions. These observers fear that disagreements at the
WTO on these issues may be difficult to resolve through the existing dispute settlement
procedures given the concerns over national sovereignty that would likely be raised if a WTO
dispute settlement panel issued a ruling relating to the U.S. use of national security. Furthermore,
actions by the United States that do not make use of the multilateral system’s dispute settlement

319 10 U.S.C. §148.
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process may open the United States to criticism and could impede U.S. efforts to use the
multilateral system for its own enforcement purposes. For example, China called on other parties
such as the EU to join it in opposition to the U.S. actions on Section 232, while simultaneously
promoting domestic policies often seen as undermining WTO rules.320 Congress could potentially
address these concerns by conducting increased oversight of the Administration’s actions by
inviting testimony from multiple parties, considering legislation to establish more stringent
criteria for Section 232 investigations, or requiring congressional approval of any use of Section
232, among other possible actions.
The WTO overall is at a critical point and many observers believe the WTO needs to adopt
reforms to retain its credibility and continue its role as the foundation of the world trading system.
Potential areas of reform could include addressing the issues underlying the Section 232 actions
including: the proposal on subsidies and nonmarket practices, reforming certain aspects of the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, or clarifying the national security exception and the WTO’s
role. The growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to
Congress as it conducts oversight over the U.S. position and role in reform efforts as some
Members have expressed support to address long-standing concerns of the United States. 321
Impact on Broader International Relationships
The U.S. unilateral actions under Section 232 have raised the level of tension with U.S. trading
partners and could pose risks to broader international economic cooperation. The strain on
international trading relationships also could have broader policy implications, including for
cooperation between the United States and allies on foreign policy issues and U.S. credibility in
future trade negotiations. After the United States re-imposed tariffs on Canada, the Ontario
premier commented, “I just have to say how disappointed I am with President Trump right
now.”322 The EU Trade Commissioner cited the U.S. Section 232 unilateral investigations and
actions as part of the justification for establishing expanded retaliatory powers, potentially for use
against the United States.323 On the other hand, WTO reform provides an opportunity for the
United States to address issues of joint concern, such as rules for subsidies, with U.S. allies and
trading partners, and strengthen those relationships.

320 Lyubov Pronina, “China Seeks EU’s Support in Standing Up to U.S. Trade Threat,” Bloomberg BNA, April 9, 2018.
For more information on U.S.-China trade, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M.
Morrison.
321 For more information, see CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction,
coordinated by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
322 “Canada to impose $3.6B in tariffs in response to Trump's move against Canadian aluminum,” CBC News, August
7, 2020.
323 “Hogan cites U.S. Section 232 probes in call for new retaliatory powers,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 7, 2020.
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Appendix A. Amendments to and Past Uses of
Section 232 (19 U.S.C. §1862)
Concern over national security, trade, and domestic industry was first raised by the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-464 §2). The 1954 act prohibited the President from
decreasing duties on any article if the President determined that such a reduction might threaten
domestic production needed for national defense.324 In 1955, the provision was amended to also
allow the President to increase trade restrictions, in cases where national security may be
threatened.325
The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-686 §8) expanded the 1955 provisions, by
outlining specific factors to be considered during an investigation, allowing the private sector to
petition for relief, and requiring the President to publish a report on each petition.326 The factors
to be considered during an investigation included (1) the domestic production capacity needed for
U.S. national security requirements, (2) the effect of imports on domestic production needed for
national security requirements, and (3) “the impact of foreign competition on the economic
welfare of individual domestic industries.”
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) continued the provisions of the
1958 Act. Section 232 has been amended multiple times over the years, including (1) to change
the time limits for investigations and actions; (2) to change the advisory responsibility from the
Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce; and (3) to limit presidential authority to
adjust petroleum imports.327
Section 232: Joint Disapproval Resolution Provision for Petroleum Products
In 1980, Congress amended Section 232 to create a joint disapproval resolution provision under
which Congress could override presidential actions to adjust petroleum or petroleum product
imports.328 Congress included the joint disapproval resolution provision in the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act of 1980. The bill was signed into law on April 2, 1980, the same day that President

324 P.L. 83-464, §2.
325 The original inclusion of the 1955 provision appears to be due to considerations about specific minerals, namely
petroleum, fluorspar, lead, and zinc. However, according to the committee report, the committee chose not to focus on
specific commodities, but to create a more general provision requiring the President to adjust imports where national
security may be threatened. (See S.Rpt. 84-232, p. 4.)
326 P.L. 85-686, §8. For a review of the committee’s rationale for these changes see, H.Rpt. 85-2502, H.Rpt. 85-1761,
and S.Rpt. 85-1838.
327 Following the reorganization of trade functions in 1973, the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, §127(d)) changed the
responsibility to advise the President from the Director of Office of Emergency Preparedness to the Secretary of the
Treasury with requirements to consult with the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and other appropriate departments
and agencies. The 1974 Act also placed a one-year time limit on the investigation. Following the reorganization of
trade functions in the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L.
100-418, §402) changed the advisory responsibility from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce.
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 also reduced the investigation timeline from one year to 270
days and created the 15-day implementation period for the President to act. The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of
1980 (P.L. 96-223, §402) created an option for Congress to override presidential actions to adjust petroleum imports
through a joint disapproval resolution.
328 P.L. 96-223, §402, the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.
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Carter proclaimed a license fee on crude oil and gasoline pursuant to Section 232 in Proclamation
4744.329
On April 15, 1980, two weeks after the President’s proclamation on the crude oil and gasoline
license fee, Representative James Shannon introduced House Joint Resolution 531 to disapprove
and effectively nullify the presidential action. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Trade voted 14 to 4 to disapprove the presidential action; the resolution was favorably reported
out of the full committee on a 27 to 7 vote. Dissenting views were voiced by Members who
supported the fee program and were concerned about U.S. dependence on foreign oil. While the
measure passed the House, it was indefinitely postponed in the Senate.330 Multiple joint
resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress in 1980, but none passed both chambers.
In addition to the disapproval mechanism created in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of
1980, President Carter’s action in Proclamation 4744 was also challenged in court and through
separate legislation in Congress. On May 13, 1980, a federal district court struck down the
President’s action on petroleum imports as unlawful, thereby preventing the government from
implementing the program. The court’s decision, however, was appealable to the higher courts.331
Before a court could consider an appeal, Congress enacted an amendment to a bill to extend the
public debt limit (P.L. 96-264, Section 2) on June 6, 1980, which terminated Proclamation 4744’s
petroleum import program. Section 2 of P.L. 96-264 did not use the disapproval mechanism
established in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980; it was a separate piece of legislation
that was attached as an amendment to an unrelated bill.332
On June 19, 1980, the President formally rescinded Proclamation 4744 “in its entirety, effective
March 15, 1980.”333

329 Presidential Proclamation 4744, “Petroleum Import Adjustment Program,” Federal Register volume 45, No. 66,
April 3, 1980.
330 H.J.Res 531.
331 Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1980).
332 H.R. 7428 (P.L. 96-264).
333 “Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products,” Proclamation 4766, June 19, 1980, (45 Federal Register 41899).
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Appendix B. Section 232 Investigations
Table B-1. Section 232 Investigations and Presidential Actions, 1962-2019
Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
1
Manganese and chromium ferroalloys
1963
Manufacturing Chemists
Negative
-
Association, Inc.
2
Tungsten mil products
1964
General Electric Company
Negative
-
(Co.)
3
Antifriction bearings
1964
Anti-Friction Bearing
Terminated at request of
-
Manufacturers Association
petitioner
4
Watches, watch movements and parts
1965
Presidential Request
Negative
-
5
Manganese, silicon and chromium
1968
Committee of Producers of
Negative
-
ferroalloys and refined metals
Ferroalloys and Related
Products
6
Miniature and instrument precision ball
1969
Anti-Friction Bearing
Negative
-
bearings
Manufacturers Association
7
Extra high voltage power circuit
1972
General Electric Co.
Negative
-
breakers, transformers, and reactors
8
Petroleum
1973
Chairman of the Oil Policy
Positive
Transitioned away from existing quota
Committee
system to a license fee (Proclamation
4210, 38 FR 9645).
9
Petroleum
1975
Secretary of the Treasury
Positive
Added supplemental fee to the license
fee (Proclamation 4341); fee was later
reduced to zero (Proclamation 4655).
10
Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws
1978
Presidential Directive
Negative
-
11
Petroleum
1978
Secretary of the Treasury
Positive
Conservation fee added, but found to
be il egal and blocked by District
Court in 492 F. Supp. 614.
CRS-58

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Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
12
Petroleum from Iran
1979
Secretary of the Treasury
Positive
Embargo imposed on petroleum from
Iran on Nov. 12, 1979 (Proclamation
4702).
13
Glass-lined chemical processing
1981
Ceramic Coating Co.
Negative
-
equipment
14
Manganese, silicon and chromium
1981
Ferroalloys Association
Negative
ferroalloys and related metals
-a
15
Iron and steel nuts, bolts, large screws
1982
Secretary of Defense
Negative
-
16
Petroleum from Libya
1982
Presidential Request
Positive
Embargo imposed on petroleum from
Libya on Mar. 10, 1982 (Proclamation
4907).
17
Metal-cutting and Metal Forming
1983
National Machine Tool
Positive
Deferred a formal decision on the
Machine Tools
Builders’ Association
Section 232 case and instead sought
voluntary restraint agreements
starting in 1986 with leading foreign
suppliers and developed a domestic
plan of programs to help revitalize the
industry.b
18
Antifriction bearings
1987
Anti-Friction Bearing
Negative
-
Manufacturers Association
19
Petroleum
1987
National Energy Security
Positive
No action taken.c
Committee (an industry
group)
20
Plastic injection molding machinery
1988
Society of the Plastic
Negative
-
Industry, Inc.
21
Uranium
1989
Secretary of Energy
Negative
-
22
Gears and gearing products
1991
American Gear
Negative
-
Manufacturers Association
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Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
23
Ceramic Semiconductor Packaging
1992
Coors Electronic Package
Negative
-
Co. and Ceramic Process
Systems Corporation
24
Crude Oil and Petroleum Products
1994
Independent Petroleum
Positive
No action taken.c
Association of America
25
Crude Oil
1999
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
No action taken.c
26
Iron ore and finished steel
2001
Representatives James
Negative
-
Oberstar and Bart Stupak
27
Steel
2017
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
Imposed tariffs of 25% on steel
imports, from all countries, with an
initial exception for Canada and
Mexico, with other potential future
exceptions (Proclamation 9705).
28
Aluminum
2017
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
Imposed tariffs of 10% on aluminum
imports, from all countries, with an
initial exception for Canada and
Mexico, with other potential future
exceptions (Proclamation 9704).
29
Automobiles, including SUVs, vans and
2018
Secretary of Commerce
Positive
Directed USTR to negotiate with
light trucks, and automotive parts
European Union (EU), Japan, and
others to resolve national security
threat (Proclamation 9888).
30
Uranium ore and products
2018
U.S. uranium mining
Positive
President did not concur with
companies (UR-Energy and
Commerce findings. Established U.S.
Energy Fuels)
Nuclear Fuel Working Group to
develop recommendations to revive
domestic industry.d
31
Titanium Sponge
2019
Titanium Metals Corp.
Positive
President concurred with Commerce
findings but did not restrict imports.
Established working group with Japan
to ensure access to titanium sponge.e
CRS-60

Treasury or
Commerce

Subject of Investigation
Year Initiated
Initiator
Determination
Presidential Action
32
Transformers and certain grain-
2020
Secretary of Commerce
Ongoing
N/A
oriented electrical steel parts
33
Mobile Cranes
2020
Manitowoc Company, Inc.
Ongoing
N/A
34
Vanadium
2020
AMG Vanadium and U.S.
Ongoing
N/A
Vanadium
Source: CRS compiled from the Bureau of Industry and Security’s “Section 232 Investigations Program Guide,” June 2007, at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-
documents/section-232-investigations/86-section-232-booklet/file, and other Department of Commerce sources.
a. Although this investigation concluded with a negative threat determination, the President accepted Commerce’s recommendation to start a 10-year program to
upgrade the National Defense Stockpile ore into high-carbon ferrochromium and ferromanganese and to remove certain ferroalloy imports from eligibility for duty-
free entry under the Generalized System of Preferences (49 FR 21391).
b. For the announcement of the action, see, U.S. President (R. Reagan), “Statement on the Machine Tool Industry,” May 20, 1986. For an announcement of the
voluntary restraint agreements with Japan and Taiwan, see “Statement on the Revitalization of the Machine Tool Industry,” December 16, 1986. The agreement was
modified in 1991 and extended through December 1993, (see U.S. President (G. H.W. Bush), “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on Extension of Machine
Tool Voluntary Restraint Agreements With Japan and Taiwan,” December 27, 1991).
c. In the 1987, 1994, and 1999 investigations into petroleum and crude oil, the Commerce Department determined that certain oil imports threatened to impair
national security but did not recommend that the President use his authority to adjust imports. In not acting, the President fol owed the Commerce
recommendation in these three investigations. In the 1989 report, Commerce did not recommend that the President adjust imports using quotas, fees, or tariffs
under the authority of Section 232 because any such actions would not be “cost beneficial and, in the long run, impair rather than enhance national security.” In the
1994 and 1999 investigations into oil imports, Commerce found that existing government programs and activities related to energy security were more appropriate
and cost effective than import adjustments. (Also see Department of Commerce, “The Effect of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Product Imports on the National
Security,” January 1989, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/section-232-investigations/78-crude-oil-and-petroleum-products-1989/file.)
d. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Uranium Imports on the National Security and Establishment of the United States Nuclear Fuel Working
Group,” July 12, 2019.
e. President Donald Trump, “Memorandum on the Effect of Titanium Sponge Imports on the National Security,” February 27, 2020.

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Appendix C. Proposals Concerning Section 232
Table C-1. Select Proposals on Section 232: 116th Congress
(Through July 2020)
Legislation
Title
Brief Description
Select Proposals on Congressional-Executive Powers
H.R. 3673
Promoting Responsible and
To require congressional approval of certain trade
Free Trade Act of 2019
remedies, including a joint resolution for approval of
Sec. 232 investigation report; and to change
investigatory authority to the Secretary of Defense,
and recommendation authority to the Secretary of
Commerce.
S. 899 / H.R. 3477
Reclaiming Congressional
To require congressional approval of duty rate changes
Trade Authority Act of 2019
under Sec. 232 and IEEPA, and to allow for
congressional disapproval of actions under Section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974.
S. 365 / H.R. 1008
Trade Security Act of 2019
To amend Sec. 232 to allow for a congressional joint
disapproval resolution to override presidential actions;
to transfer investigatory authority to the Secretary of
Defense; and to outline the scope of a national
security assessment.
S. 287 / H.R. 940
Bicameral Congressional
To amend Sec. 232 to require congressional approval
Trade Authority Act of 2019
of presidential actions; to transfer investigatory
authority to the Secretary of Defense. The bil also
outlines specific national security-related items to be
covered under Sec. 232 investigations.
H.R. 723 / S. 1284
Global Trade Accountability
To amend Sec. 232 and other trade authorities to
Act of 2019
require congressional approval of unilateral trade
actions. Both measures would require the President to
report to Congress on the proposed trade action and
provide an analysis of its economic impact, and
Congress would need to pass a resolution before the
action would go into effect. H.R. 723 provides the
President 90-day temporary authority to act for
national security reasons, after which congressional
approve would be required.
Select Proposals on the Auto Investigation
H.R. 1158
Consolidated Appropriations
Requires the Administration to publish the Sec. 232
Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93)
report on automotive imports publically, and to
provide any classified information from the report to
Congress.
S. 121 / H.R. 1710
Automotive Jobs Act of 2019
To require a study of the U.S. auto industry by USITC
and to stall the Sec. 232 investigation into auto imports
until such a study is complete.
Select Proposals on Tariff Exclusions and Tariff Revenue
S. 2551
Tariff Rebate Act
To establish the Tariff Rebate Program to disburse
revenues from tariffs to certain eligible individuals.
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Legislation
Title
Brief Description
S. 2362
American Business Tariff Relief To establish a process for U.S. businesses to obtain
Act of 2019
exclusions from certain duties imposed under Sec. 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 and Sec. 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, and for other purposes.
Select Proposals to Mitigate the Impact of Retaliatory Tariffs
S. 1984
To amend the Magnuson-
To provide relief for fisheries targeted for retaliation,
Stevens Fishery Conservation
in response to Sec. 232 actions.
and Management Act to
provide fisheries disaster relief
for commercial fishery failures
that are due to certain duties,
and for other purposes.
H.R. 2690 / S. 1453
Assistance for Farmers
To provide trade adjustment assistance to farmers
Harmed by Tariffs on Exports
affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports in
Act
response to Sec. 232 actions.
H.R. 6124
Assistance for Firms Harmed
To provide trade adjustment assistance to firms
by Tariffs on Exports Act
affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports in
response to Sec. 232 actions.
H.R. 2362
American Agriculture First Act To prioritize the purchase of agricultural commodities
from domestically owned enterprises, and for other
purposes. The bil cites trade damage from retaliation
by foreign nations, as primary determining factor.
Source: CRS, compiled from Congress.gov
Notes: Sec. 232 = Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; USITC = U.S. International Trade
Commission; IEEPA = International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

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Appendix D. 2019 U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports
Table D-1. Top U.S. Import Suppliers of Aluminum and Steel Products
(2019, Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Aluminum
Steel
Change
Change
Trading
Import
Import
since
Trading
Import
Import
since
Partner
Value
Share
2017
Partner
Value
Share
2017
Exempted
Exempted
Canada-exempta
$3,126.7
19.8%
-17.9% Canada
$4,428.9
18.6%
-14.7%
Australia
$574.6
3.6%
169.1% *Brazil
$2,700.1
11.3%
10.2%
*Argentina
$412.0
2.6%
-24.6% Mexico
$2,666.9
11.2%
7.0%
Mexico
$176.0
1.1%
-31.1% *South Korea
$2,235.2
9.4%
-19.9%
Total
$4,289.4
27.1%
-11.1% Australia
$239.3
1.0%
20.5%
Exempted
Not-Exempted
*Argentina
$234.7
1.0%
5.9%
Canada-
$2,505.2
15.8%
-22.5% Total
$12,505.1
52.5%
-6.3%
nonexempta
Exempted
EU
$1,830.9
11.6%
46.6% Not-Exempted
U.A.E.
$1,256.6
7.9%
-9.7% EU
$5,096.1
21.4%
-14.9%
China
$750.3
4.7%
-59.4% Japan
$1,487.2
6.2%
-10.2%
Bahrain
$705.4
4.5%
20.6% Taiwan
$886.0
3.7%
-29.8%
Russia
$607.4
3.8%
-62.8% China
$735.4
3.1%
-26.0%
India
$550.8
3.5%
44.2% Russia
$598.9
2.5%
-57.6%
Qatar
$414.9
2.6%
35.1% Vietnam
$488.2
2.0%
-8.2%
South Africa
$387.2
2.4%
13.7% India
$323.9
1.4%
-57.3%
Saudi Arabia
$294.7
1.9%
99.2% Thailand
$250.3
1.1%
-29.2%
South Korea
$290.4
1.8%
160.4% Ukraine
$223.1
0.9%
30.3%
**Total
$11,519.
72.9%
-8.4% **Total
$11,319.3
47.5%
-27.7%
Nonexempted
8
Nonexempted
U.S. Total
$15,809.
100.0%
-9.2% U.S. Total
$23,824.3
100.0%
-17.8%
(All Countries)
2
(All Countries)
Source: CRS compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in the Section 232
proclamations. (These data do not include derivative products. For select derivative products see Table 2.
Notes: Percentage change comparisons are made to 2017 annual data, as a baseline before tariff actions took
effect. European Union (EU) includes 28 member states. U.A.E. refers to the United Arab Emirates. (*) Absolute
quota effective in place of additional tariffs.
(**) Total nonexempted includes additional countries not listed.
a. Most aluminum imports from Canada are exempted from the Section 232 tariffs, with the exception of non-
alloy unwrought aluminum products from Canada, which are subject to a 10% tariff as of Aug. 16, 2020. The
Canada-exempt figure is a sum of the aluminum imports exempted from the tariffs; the Canada-nonexempt
figure is a sum of imports of non-alloy unwrought aluminum products subject to tariffs.
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Table D-2. Top U.S. Import Suppliers of Steel and Aluminum Derivatives
(2019, Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Aluminum Wire
Steel Nails
Change
Change
Trading
Import
Import
since
Trading
Import
Import
since
Partner
Value
Share
2017
Partner
Value
Share
2017
Exempted
Exempted
Canada
$9.6
20.8%
182.6% South Korea
$33.1
9.5%
19.3%
Mexico
$7.6
16.6%
72.3% Mexico
$16.4
4.7%
80.4%
Australia
$0.0
0.0%
- Canada
$9.5
2.7%
-29.0%
Argentina
$0.0
0.0%
- Australia
$0.0
0.0%
-
Total
$17.2
37.4%
120.1% Brazil
$0.0
0.0%
-100.0%
Exempted
Not-Exempted
Total
$59.0
17.0%
17.6%
Exempted
Turkey
$9.2
20.0%
101.6% Not-Exempted
India
$7.6
16.5%
288.4% Oman
$61.8
17.8%
95.9%
China
$5.5
12.0%
88.9% Taiwan
$33.0
9.5%
-14.5%
EU
$3.8
8.4%
662.1% Turkey
$30.5
8.8%
43.4%
Colombia
$1.0
2.1%
- Thailand
$28.0
8.1%
178.2%
Indonesia
$0.5
1.0%
-32.3% India
$26.3
7.6%
18.1%
South Korea
$0.4
0.9%
-37.5% Sri Lanka
$24.1
6.9%
503.6%
Japan
$0.3
0.6%
-86.8% China
$17.3
5.0%
-31.9%
Vietnam
$0.2
0.4%
- Liechtenstein
$13.9
4.0%
96.1%
Thailand
$0.1
0.2%
226.5% Malaysia
$13.1
3.8%
59.4%
Ecuador
$0.1
0.2%
-86.6% Austria
$10.4
3.0%
19.2%
***Total
$28.8
62.6%
96.4% ***Total
$288.6
83.0%
41.9%
Nonexempted
Nonexempted
U.S. Total
$46.1
100.0%
104.6% U.S. Total
$347.6
100.0%
37.1%
(All Countries)
(All Countries)
Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data on HTS products included in Presidential Proclamation
9980 (January 24, 2020), concerning steel and aluminum derivative products.
Notes: Due to insufficient data, the table does not include information on steel and aluminum bumpers and
tractor stamping, which are also in the scope of Proclamation 9980. Percentage change comparisons are made to
2017 annual data, as a baseline before tariff actions took effect. European Union (EU) includes 28 member states,
including the United Kingdom.

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link to page 71 link to page 71 link to page 71 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Table D-3. Estimates of U.S. Imports Under Ongoing Section 232 Investigations
(2019, Millions of U.S. Dollars)
2019 Import
Import
Top Trading Partners
Value
Share
Transformers, GOES, NOESa
Total U.S. Imports
$2,435.0
100.0%
Mexico
$1,063.7
43.7%
European Union
$547.6
22.5%
Canada
$369.3
15.2%
South Korea
$174.9
7.2%
Taiwan
$63.9
2.6%
Mobile Cranesb

Total U.S. Imports
$923.5
100.0%
European Union
$552.2
59.8%
Japan
$353.5
38.3%
Thailand
$5.8
0.6%
Canada
$5.6
0.6%
China
$4.9
0.5%
Vanadiumc

Total U.S. Imports
$192.4
100.0%
European Union
$89.9
46.7%
Canada
$64.5
33.6%
Japan
$11.4
5.9%
Ukraine
$11.4
5.9%
South Africa
$8.2
4.3%
Source: CRS, compiled from U.S. Census Bureau data, based on HTS codes likely within the scope of
announced Section 232 investigations.
Notes: These are estimates based, narrowly, on the products described in publically available Section 232
petitions and a BIS survey; however, the investigations are on-going and the ful scope is not yet public. European
Union (EU) includes 28 member states, including the United Kingdom.
a. The transformer investigation estimates include grain-oriented electrical steel (GOES) and non-oriented
electrical steel (NOES), as well as transformer products. The estimates are based on the products
described in BIS’s survey and assessment of the U.S. electrical steel and transformer products industry,
available at https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/esproducts232.
b. The mobile crane estimate is based on the products outlined in the company’s Section 232 petition; HTS
842641, 842649, 84314910.
c. The vanadium estimate is based on the products narrowly described by the companies petitioning for a
Section 232 investigation; HTS 2825300050, 2850002000, 7202920000, 2841901000.

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Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Author Information

Rachel F. Fefer, Coordinator
Brandon J. Murrill
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Legislative Attorney

Keigh E. Hammond
Michaela D. Platzer
Senior Research Librarian
Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business

Vivian C. Jones
Brock R. Williams
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R45249 · VERSION 30 · UPDATED
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