World Trade Organization:
August 21, 2020
Overview and Future Direction
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs,
Historically, the United States’ leadership of the global trading system has ensured the United
Coordinator
States a seat at the table to shape the international trade agenda in ways that both advance and
Analyst in International
defend U.S. interests. The evolution of U.S. leadership and the global trading system remain of
Trade and Finance
interest to Congress, which holds constitutional authority over foreig n commerce and establishes

general and principal U.S. trade negotiating objectives through legislation. Congress has
Rachel F. Fefer
recognized the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the “foundation of the global
Analyst in International
trading system” within trade promotion authority (TPA) and plays a direct legislative and
Trade and Finance
oversight role over WTO agreements. The statutory basis for U.S. WTO membership is the

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465), and U.S. priorities and objectives for the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO have been reflected in various TPA
Ian F. Fergusson
legislation since 1974. Congress also has oversight of the U.S. Trade Representative and other
Specialist in International
agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments.
Trade and Finance

The WTO is a 164-member international organization that was created to oversee and administer

multilateral trade rules, serve as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations, and resolve trade
disputes. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and the rules and agreements
resulting from multilateral trade negotiations since 1947. The WTO encompassed and succeeded the GATT, established in
1947 among the United States and 22 other countries. Through the GATT and WTO, the United States, with other countries,
sought to establish a more open, rules -based trading system in the postwar era, with the goal of fostering international
economic cooperation and raising economic prosperity worldwide. Today, 98% of global trade is among WTO members.
The WTO is a consensus and member-driven organization. Its core principles include nondiscrimination (most-favored
nation treatment and national treatment), freer trade, fair competition, transparency, and encouraging development. These are
enshrined in WTO agreements covering goods, agriculture, services, intellectual property rights, and trade facilitation, among
other issues. Many countries have been motivated to join the WTO not just to expand access to foreign markets but also to
spur domestic economic reforms, transition to market economies, and promote the rule of law.
The WTO dispute settlement (DS) mechanism provides an enforceable means for members to resolve disputes over WTO
commitments and obligations. The WTO has processed nearly 600 disputes, and the United States has been an active user of
the system. Supporters of the multilateral trading system consider the DS mechanism an important success, and an
enforceable DS process was a priority negotiating objective for the United States in the Uruguay Round negotiations during
1986-1994. More recently, some members, most notably the United States, contend it has procedural shortcomings and has
exceeded its mandate in deciding certain cases. Because of this, the United States has vetoed the appointment of panelists to
the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB; the seven-member body that reviews appeals by WTO members of a panel’s findings in a
dispute case). In December 2019, the terms of two of the remaining jurists expired, leaving the AB unable to function and
hear new cases. This action could potentially render the DS system ineffective, as members struggle to agree to solutions that
sufficiently address U.S. concerns.
More broadly, many observers are concerned that the WTO’s effectiveness has diminished since the collapse of the Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 2001, and believe the WTO needs to negotiate new rules and adopt
reforms to continue its role as the foundation of the trading system. To date, members have been unable to reach consensus
for a new comprehensive agreement on trade liberalization and rules. While global supply chains and technology have
transformed global trade and investment, WTO rules have not kept up with the pace of change. Many countries have turned
to negotiating free trade agreements outside the WTO and plurilateral agreements involving subsets of WTO members.
In early 2020, the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) was rescheduled to 2021 due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic. The biennial meeting, which usually involves active U.S. participation, was widely anticipated as an
action-forcing event for the WTO. At the previous ministerial in December 2017, no major deliverables were announced,
leaving the stakes high for MC12. Several members committed to make progress on issues related to ongoing talks, such as
fisheries subsidies and e-commerce, while other areas remain stalled amid disagreements.
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World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction

In its June 2020 forecast, the WTO estimated a plunge in global trade growth for 2020, with recovery depending on the
duration of the pandemic and countries’ policy choices. The WTO has committed to work with other international
organizations to minimize disruptions to trade and global supply chains, and encouraged WTO members to notify trade
measures taken in response to COVID-19, which have surged since the beginning of 2020, causing concern for many. Some
members have called on the WTO to address the trade policy challenges emerging from COVID-19 through new rules.
Meanwhile, WTO members continue to explore aspects of reform and future negotiations. Potential reforms concern the
administration of the organization, its procedures and practices, and attempts to address the inability of WTO members to
conclude new agreements. Proposed reforms to dispute settlement also attempt to improve the working of the DS system,
particularly the AB, which U.S. trade officials to date have not supported.
Some U.S. government frustrations with the WTO are not new and many are shared by other trading partners. At the same
time, the Trump Administration’s overall approach has spurred questions among stakeholders and some Members of
Congress regarding future U.S. leadership and priorities for improving the trading system. Some concerns have emphasized
that the Administration’s actions to unilaterally raise tariffs under U.S. trade laws and to impede the functioning of the DS
system might undermine the WTO’s credibility.
The growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO are of interest to Congress. Some Members have expressed
support for WTO reform efforts and U.S. leadership; while others introduced joint resolutions in May 2020 to withdraw
congressional approval of WTO agreements. Issues Congress may address include the effects of current and future WTO
agreements on the U.S. economy, the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO, the possibility of establishing
new U.S. negotiating objectives or oversight hearings on the prospects for future WTO reforms and rulemaking, and the
relevant U.S. trade authorities and impact of potential U.S. withdrawal from the WTO on U.S. economic and foreign policy
interests. The pending WTO Ministerial Conference in 2021 presents the United States and WTO members with an
opportunity to address pressing concerns over reform efforts, ongoing and new negotiations, a nonfunctioning DS system,
and the future of the multilateral trading system more broadly, as members grapple with economic recovery from COVID-19
and other challenges.

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Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization that administers the trade
rules and agreements negotiated by its 164 members to eliminate trade barriers and create
transparent and nondiscriminatory rules to govern trade. It also serves as an important forum for
resolving trade disputes. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the
WTO in 1995 and the rules and agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations (1986-1994). The WTO encompassed and expanded on the commitments and
institutional functions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), established in
1947 by the United States and 22 other countries. Through the GATT and the WTO, the United
States and others sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era,
with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
Today, the vast majority of world trade, 98%, takes place among WTO members.
The evolution of U.S. leadership in the WTO and the institution’s future agenda have been of
interest to Congress. The terms set by the WTO agreements govern the majority of U.S. trading
relationships. Some 65% of U.S. global trade is with countries that do not have free trade
agreements (FTAs) with the United States, including China, the European Union (EU), India, and
Japan, and thus, the majority of U.S. trade relies primarily on the terms of WTO agreements.
Congress has recognized the WTO as the “foundation of the global trading system” within U.S.
trade legislation and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements.1 U.S.
FTAs also build on core WTO agreements. While the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
represents the United States at the WTO, Congress holds constitutional authority over foreign
commerce and establishes U.S. trade negotiating objectives and priorities and implements major
U.S. trade liberalization agreements through legislation. U.S. priorities and objectives for the
GATT/WTO are reflected in trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation since 1974. Congress
also has oversight of the USTR and other executive branch agencies that participate in WTO
meetings and enforce WTO commitments.
The WTO’s effectiveness as a negotiating body for broad-based trade liberalization has come
under intensified scrutiny, as has its role in resolving trade disputes. WTO members have
struggled to reach consensus over issues that can place developed country members against
developing country members (such as agricultural subsidies, industrial goods tariffs, and
intel ectual property rights protection). The institution has also struggled to address newer trade
barriers, such as digital trade restrictions and the role of state-owned enterprises in international
commerce, which have become more prominent in the years since the WTO was established.
Global supply chains and advances in technology have transformed global commerce, but trade
rules have failed to keep up with the pace of change; since 1995, WTO members have been
unable to reach consensus for a new comprehensive multilateral agreement. As a result, many
have turned to negotiating FTAs with one another outside the WTO to build on core WTO
agreements and advance trade liberalization and rules; in some of these bilateral and regional
agreements, including those pursued by the United States and EU, certain newer rules may vary
significantly. Plurilateral negotiations, involving subsets of WTO members rather than al
members, are also becoming a popular forum for tackling newer issues on the trade agenda.
The most recent round of WTO negotiations, the Doha Round, began in November 2001, but
concluded with no clear path forward, leaving several unresolved issues after the 10th Ministerial
Conference in 2015. Efforts to build on current WTO agreements outside of the Doha agenda

1 Section 102(b)(13) of the Bipartisan Congressional T rade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (T itle I, P.L. 114-
26), which reauthorized trade promotion authority (TPA).
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continue. While WTO members have made some progress, no major deliverables were announced
at the last Ministerial in 2017. The stakes appear high for the next meeting, which members were
forced to reschedule from 2020 to 2021 due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. COVID-19 has tested cooperation and coordination in global trade policies, disrupted
global supply chains, and resulted in widespread trade protectionism. At the same time, several
countries have reaffirmed the trading system, lifted restrictions, and view the WTO as playing an
important role in tackling trade policy chal enges that have emerged from the pandemic.
Concerns about growing protectionist trade policies predate COVID-19. Observers remain
concerned that recent U.S. tariff actions and counterretaliation, and escalating trade disputes
between major economies, most notably the United States and China, may further strain the
trading system. The WTO is faced with resolving significant pending disputes, which involve the
United States, as wel as debate about the role of its Appel ate Body.
In a break from the approaches of past Administrations, the Trump Administration has expressed
doubt over the value of the WTO institution to the U.S. economy and questioned whether
leadership in the organization benefits the United States. While USTR Robert Lighthizer
maintains that the WTO is an “important institution” that does an “enormous amount of good,”
U.S. officials have expressed skepticism toward multilateral trade deals, including those
negotiated within the WTO.2 President Trump has at times threatened to withdraw the United
States from the WTO.3 He claims that the WTO “needs drastic change,” and criticizes China as
declining to adopt promised reforms following WTO accession.4 In addition, amid concerns about
“judicial overreach” in WTO dispute findings, the Administration has withheld approval for judge
appointments to the WTO Appel ate Body—a practice that occurred under the Obama
Administration and concerns some Members of Congress.
At the same time, reform of the multilateral trading system is a stated trade policy objective of the
Trump Administration, and the United States remains engaged in certain WTO initiatives and
plurilateral efforts.5 In testimony before Congress in June 2020, USTR Lighthizer emphasized
primary U.S. concerns include that other WTO members resort more often to litigation, rather
than negotiations to craft new rules, maintain “outdated” high tariffs, and skirt WTO obligations
through flexibilities.6 The United States seeks a “broad reset” at the WTO, with across-the-board
reforms.7 While many of U.S. fundamental concerns predate the Trump Administration and are
shared by other trading partners, questions remain about U.S. priorities for improving the system.
With growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO, Congress may maintain
interest in several issues, including: the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO, the
possibility of establishing new U.S. negotiating objectives or holding oversight hearings to
address prospects of new WTO reforms and rulemaking, and the relevant U.S. trade authorities
and impact of potential WTO withdrawal on U.S. economic and foreign policy interests.

2 UST R, “ Opening Plenary Statement of UST R Robert Lighthizer at the WT O Ministerial Conference,” Press Release,
December 11, 2017.
3 John Micklethwait, Margaret T alev, and Jennifer Jacobs, “T rump T hreatens to Pull U.S. Out of WT O If It Doesn’t
‘Shape Up’,” Bloomberg News, August 30, 2018.
4 White House, “Remarks by President T rump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September
25, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president -trump-74th-session-united-nations-
general-assembly/.
5 UST R, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, March 2018.
6 House Ways and Means Committee, Hearing on the President’s 2020 Trade Policy Agenda, written testimony by
Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, June 17, 2020.
7 Also, see Robert E. Lighthizer, “ How to Set World T rade Straight ,” Wall Street Journal op-ed, August 20, 2020.
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This report provides background history of the WTO, its organization, and current status of
negotiations and reform efforts. The report also explores concerns some have regarding the
WTO’s future direction and key policy issues for Congress.
Background
Following World War II, countries throughout the world, led by the United States and several
other developed countries, sought to establish a more transparent and nondiscriminatory trading
system with the goal of raising the economic wel -being of al countries. Aware of the role of tit-
for-tat trade barriers resulting from the U.S. Smoot-Hawley tariffs in exacerbating the economic
depression in the 1930s, including severe drops in world trade, global production, and
employment, the countries that met to discuss the new trading system considered more open trade
as essential for peace and economic stability.8
The intent of these negotiators was to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) to
address not only trade barriers but other issues indirectly related to trade, including employment,
investment, restrictive business practices, and commodity agreements. Unable to secure approval
for such a comprehensive agreement, however, they reached a provisional agreement on tariffs
and trade rules, known as the GATT, which went into effect in 1948.9 This provisional agreement,
subject to several rounds of trade liberalization negotiations, became the principal set of rules
governing international trade for the next 47 years, until the establishment of the WTO.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
The GATT was neither a formal treaty nor an international organization, but an agreement
between governments, to which they were contracting parties. The GATT parties established a
secretariat based in Geneva, but it remained relatively smal , especial y compared to the staffs of
international economic institutions created by the postwar Bretton Woods conference—the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Based on a mission to promote trade liberalization,
the GATT became the principal set of rules and disciplines governing international trade.
The core principles and articles of the GATT
GATT/WTO Principles
(which were carried over to the WTO)
of Nondiscrimination
committed the original 23 members, including
Most-favored nation (MFN) treatment (also
the United States, to lower tariffs on a range of
cal ed normal trade relations by the United States).
Requires each member country to grant each other
industrial goods and to apply tariffs in a
member country treatment at least as favorable as it
nondiscriminatory manner—the so-cal ed
grants to its most-favored trade partner.
most-favored nation or MFN principle (see text
National treatment. Obligates each country not to
box). By having to extend the same benefits
discriminate between domestic and foreign products;
and concessions to members, the economic
once an imported product has entered a country, the
gains from trade liberalization were magnified.
product must be treated no less favorably than a
“like” product produced domestical y.
Exceptions to the MFN principle were al owed,
however, including for preferential trade
agreements outside the GATT/WTO covering “substantial y” al trade among members and for

8 Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin, “T he Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and
Why?” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 70, no. 4 (December 2010), pp. 871-897.
9 One major reason the IT O lost momentum was the U.S. government’s announcement in 1950 that it would no longer
seek congressional ratification of the IT O Charter, due to opposition in the U.S. Congress. WT O, “T he GAT T years:
from Havana to Marrakesh,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.
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nonreciprocal preferences for developing countries.10 GATT members also agreed to provide
“national treatment” for imports from other members. For example, countries could not establish
one set of health and safety regulations on domestic products while imposing more stringent
regulations on imports.
Although the GATT mechanism for the enforcement of these rules or principles was general y
viewed as largely ineffective, the agreement nonetheless brought about a substantial reduction of
tariffs and other trade barriers.11 The eight “negotiating rounds” of the GATT succeeded in
reducing average tariffs on industrial products from between 20%-30% to just below 4%, and
later establishing agreements to address certain non-tariff barriers, facilitating a 14-fold increase
in world trade over its 47-year history (see Table 1).12 When the first round concluded in 1947, 23
countries had participated, which accounted for a majority of global trade at the time. When the
Uruguay Round establishing the WTO concluded in 1994, 123 countries had participated and the
amount of trade affected was nearly $3.7 tril ion. As of the end of 2018, there are 164 WTO
members, and trade flows totaled $22.6 tril ion in 2017.13
Table 1. Summary of GATT Negotiating Rounds
Round
Negotiating
Major
(Year: Location)
Countries (#)
Accomplishments
1947: Geneva, Switzerland
23
 GATT established
 Tariff reduction of about 20% negotiated
1949: Annecy, France
13
 Accession of 11 new contracting parties
 Tariff reduction of about 2%
1950-51: Torquay, UK
38
 Accession of 7 new contracting parties
 Tariff reduction of about 3%
1955-56: Geneva
26
 Tariff reduction of about 2.5%
1960-61: Geneva (Dillon)
26
 Tariff reduction of about 4% and negotiations
involving the external tariff of the European
Community
1964-67: Geneva (Kennedy)
62
 Tariff reduction of about 35%
 Negotiation of antidumping measures
1973-79: Geneva (Tokyo)
102
 Tariff reduction of about 33%
 Several nontariff barrier codes negotiated,
including subsidies, customs valuation, standards,
and government procurement
1986-1994: Geneva (Uruguay)
123
 WTO created a new dispute settlement system
 Liberalization of agriculture, textiles, and apparel
 Rules adopted in new areas such as services, trade-
related investment, and intel ectual property
Sources: Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire, p. 225, and Stephen D. Cohen et al., Fundamentals of U.S.
Foreign Trade Policy, p. 185.

10 GAT T Article XXIV. For more information see CRS Report R45198, U.S. and Global Trade Agreements: Issues for
Congress, by Brock R. Williams.
11 For more detail on perceived shortcomings of GAT T dispute settlement, see “Historic development of the WT O
dispute settlement system,” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm.
12 WT O, World Trade Report 2007, pp. 201-209.
13 WT O, World Trade Statistical Review 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2018_e/wts2018_e.pdf.
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During the first trade round held in Geneva in 1947, members negotiated a 20% reciprocal tariff
reduction on industrial products, and made further cuts in subsequent rounds. The Tokyo Round
represented the first attempt to reform the trade rules that had existed unchanged since 1947, by
including issues and policies that could distort international trade. As a result, Tokyo Round
negotiators established several plurilateral codes dealing with nontariff issues such as
antidumping, subsidies, standards or technical barriers to trade, import licensing, customs
valuation, and government procurement.14 Countries could choose which, if any, of these codes
they wished to adopt. While the United States agreed to al of the codes, the majority of GATT
signatories, including most developing countries, chose not to sign the codes.15
The Uruguay Round, which took eight years to negotiate (1986-1994), proved to be the most
comprehensive GATT round. This round further lowered tariffs and liberalized trade in areas that
had eluded previous negotiators, notably agriculture and textiles and apparel. Several codes were
amended and turned into multilateral commitments accepted by al members.16 It also extended
rules to new areas such as services, trade-related investment measures, and intel ectual property
rights. It created a trade policy review mechanism, which periodical y examines each member’s
trade policies and practices. Significantly, the Uruguay Round created the WTO as a legal
international organization charged with administering a revised and stronger dispute settlement
mechanism—a principal U.S. negotiating objective (see text box)—as wel as many new trade
agreements adopted during the long negotiation. For the most part, the Uruguay Round
agreements were accepted as a single package or single undertaking, meaning that al participants
and future WTO members were required to subscribe to al the multilateral agreements.
U.S. Trade Negotiating Objectives for Uruguay Round
U.S. trade negotiating objectives for the Uruguay Round were set by Congress in the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418), including the fol owing:

Market access. Obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access in other countries;
reduced tariffs and nontariff barriers; and more effective system of international trade disciplines.

Dispute settlement. Adopt more effective and expeditious DS mechanisms and procedures, and
enable better enforcement of U.S. rights.

Transparency. Ensure broader application of the principle of transparency and clarification of the
costs and benefits of other countries’ trade policy actions.

Development. Ensure developing countries promote the “ful est possible measure of responsibility”
for maintaining an open trading system by providing reciprocal benefits and assuming equal obligations.

Agriculture. Obtain more open and fair conditions of trade in agriculture, and increase U.S. exports
by reducing barriers to trade and production subsidies.

Unfair trade practices. Discourage use of trade-distorting practices, nontariff measures, and other
unfair trading practices, such as subsidies in several sectors.

Services. Develop international rules in trade in services and reduce or eliminate barriers.

Intellectual property. Establish GATT obligations on adequate protection and effective
enforcement for IP, including copyrights, patents, and trade secrets.

Foreign direct investment. Reduce trade-distorting barriers to FDI, expand principle of national
treatment, and develop international y agreed rules.

Worker rights. Promote respect for worker rights.

14 WT O, “Pre-WTO legal texts,” https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm.
15 Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 226.
16 Four agreements remained “plurilateral,” including on government procurement, bovine meat, civil aircraft and dairy
products. See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.
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World Trade Organization
The WTO succeeded the GATT in 1995. In contrast to the GATT, the WTO was created as a
permanent organization. But as with the GATT, the WTO Secretariat and support staff is smal by
international standards and lacks independent power. The power to write rules and negotiate
future trade liberalization resides specifical y with the member countries, and not the WTO
director-general (DG) or staff. Thus, the WTO is referred to as a member-driven organization.17
The Secretariat’s primary role is to provide technical and professional support to members on
WTO activities and negotiations, monitor and analyze global trade developments, and organize
Ministerial Conferences.
Decisions within the WTO are made by consensus, although majority voting can be used in
limited circumstances. The highest-level body in the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, which is
the body of political representatives (trade ministers) from each member country (Figure 1). The
body that oversees the day-to-day operations of the WTO is the General Council, which consists
of a representative from each member country. Many other councils and committees deal with
particular issues, and members of these bodies are also national representatives.
In general, the WTO has three broad functions: administering the rules and disciplines of the
trading system; establishing new rules through negotiations; and resolving disputes between
member states.
Administering Trade Rules
The WTO administers the global rules and principles negotiated and signed by its members. The
main purpose of the rules is “to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as
possible.”18 WTO rules and agreements are essential y contracts that bind governments to keep
their trade policies within agreed limits. A number of fundamental principles guide WTO rules.
In general, as with the GATT, these key principles are nondiscrimination and the notion that freer
trade through the gradual reduction of trade barriers strengthens the world economy and increases
prosperity for each member. The WTO agreements apply the GATT principles of
nondiscrimination as discussed above: MFN treatment and national treatment. The trade barriers
concerned include tariffs, quotas, and a growing range of nontariff measures, such as product
standards, food safety measures, subsidies, and discriminatory domestic regulations. The
fundamental principle of reciprocity is also behind members’ aim of “entering into reciprocal and
mutual y advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations.”19
Transparency is another key principle of the WTO, which aims to reduce information asymmetry
in markets, ensure trust, and, therefore, foster greater stability in the global trading system.
Transparency commitments are incorporated into individual WTO agreements. Active
participation in various WTO committees also aims to ensure that agreements are monitored and
that members are held accountable for their actions. For example, members are required to
publish their trade practices and policies and notify new or amended regulations to WTO

17 Ibid, p. 239.
18 “T he WT O,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm.
19 Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World T rade Organization, https://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm.
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committees. Regular trade policy reviews of each member’s trade policies and practices provide a
deeper dive into an economy’s implementation of its commitments—see “Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (Annex 3).”20 In addition, the WTO’s annual trade monitoring report takes stock of
trade-restrictive and trade-facilitating measures of the collective body of WTO members.
While opening markets can encourage competition, innovation, and growth, it can also entail
adjustments for workers and firms. Trade liberalization can also be more difficult for the least-
developed countries (LDCs) and countries transitioning to market economies. WTO agreements
thus al ow countries to lower trade barriers gradual y. Developing countries and sensitive sectors
in particular are usual y given longer transition periods to fulfil their obligations; developing
countries make up about two-thirds of the WTO membership—WTO members self-designate
developing country status.21 The WTO also supplements this so-cal ed “special and differential”
treatment (SDT) for developing countries with trade capacity-building measures to provide
technical assistance and help implement WTO obligations, and with permissions for countries to
extend nonreciprocal, trade preference programs.
In WTO parlance, when countries agree to open their markets further to foreign goods and
services, they “bind” their commitments or agree not to raise them. For goods, these bindings
amount to ceilings on tariff rates. A country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating
with its trading partners, which could entail compensating them for loss of trade. As shown in
Figure 2, one of the achievements of the Uruguay Round was to increase the amount of trade
under binding commitments. Bound tariff rates are not necessarily the rates WTO members apply
in practice to imports from trading partners; so-cal ed applied MFN rates can be lower than bound
rates, as reflected in tariff reductions under the GATT. Figure 3 shows average applied MFN
tariffs worldwide. In 2019, the United States simple average MFN tariff was 3.3%.
A key issue in the Doha Round for the United States was lowering major developing countries’
relatively high bound tariffs to below their applied rates in practice to achieve commercial y
meaningful new market access.
Promising not to raise a trade barrier can have a significant economic effect because the promise
provides traders and investors certainty and predictability in the commercial environment. A
growing body of economic literature suggests certainty in the stability of tariff rates may be just
as important for increasing global trade as reduction in trade barriers.22 This proved particularly
important during the 2009 global economic downturn. Unlike in the 1930s, when countries
reacted to slumping world demand by raising tariffs and other trade barriers, the WTO reported
that its 153 members (at the time), accounting for 90% of world trade, by and large did not resort
to protectionist measures in response to the crisis.23

20 For more information, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm.
21 T he WT O does not specify criteria for “developing” country status, though a sub-group, least-developed countries,
are defined under United Nations criteria. See, “Who are the developing countries in the WT O?” https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm.
22 See for example, Kyle Handley and Nuno Limao, “Policy Uncertainty, T rade, and Welfare: T heory and Evidence for
China and the United States,” American Economic Review, vol. 107, no. 9 (2017).
23 WT O, “ Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment,” WT/TPR/OV/12, November 18,
2009, p. 4.
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Figure 1. WTO Structure

Source: WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/organigram_e.pdf.
Figure 2. Uruguay Round Impact on Tariff Bindings

Source: Data from WTO, Understanding the WTO: Basics, http://www.wto.org. Created by CRS.
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Notes: Percentages reflect shares of total tariff lines; not trade-weighted. The Uruguay Round was 1986-1994.
Figure 3. Average Applied Most-Favored Nation (MFN) Tariffs

Source: WTO, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/tariff_profiles_e.htm. Created by CRS.
The promotion of fair and undistorted competition is another important principle of the WTO.
While the WTO is often described as a “free trade” organization, numerous rules are concerned
with ensuring transparent and non-discriminatory competition. In addition to nondiscrimination,
MFN treatment and national treatment concepts aim to promote “fair” conditions of trade. WTO
rules on subsidies and antidumping in particular aim to promote fair competition in trade through
recourse to trade remedies, or temporary restriction of imports, in response to al eged unfair trade
practices—see “Trade Remedies.”24 For example, when a foreign company receives a prohibited
subsidy for exporting as defined in WTO agreements, WTO rules al ow governments to impose
duties to offset any unfair advantage found to cause injury to their domestic industries.25
The scope of the WTO is broader than the GATT because, in addition to goods, it administers
multilateral agreements on agriculture, services, intel ectual property, and certain trade-related
investment measures. These newer rules in particular are forcing the WTO and its DS system to
deal with complex issues that go beyond tariff border measures.
Establishing New Rules and Trade Liberalization through Negotiations
As the GATT did for 47 years, the WTO provides a negotiating forum where members reduce
barriers and try to sort out their trade problems. Negotiations can involve a few countries, many
countries, or al members. As part of the post-Uruguay Round agenda, negotiations covering basic
telecommunications and financial services were completed in 1997 under the auspices of the
WTO. Groups of WTO members also negotiated deals to eliminate tariffs on certain information
technology products and improve rules and procedures for government procurement. A more

24 WT O, “Anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards: contingencies, etc.” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/agrm8_e.htm.
25 See CRS Report R46296, Trade Remedies: Antidumping, by Christopher A. Casey, and CRS In Focus IF10018,
Trade Rem edies: Antidum ping and Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C. Jones and Christopher A. Casey .
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recent significant accomplishment was the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement in 2017,
addressing customs and logistics barriers.
The latest round of multilateral negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), or Doha
Round, launched in 2001, has achieved limited progress to date, as the agenda proved difficult
and contentious. Despite a lack of consensus on its future, many view the round as effectively
over.26 The negotiations stal ed over issues such as reducing domestic subsidies and opening
markets further in agriculture, industrial tariffs, nontariff barriers, services, intel ectual property
rights, and SDT for developing countries. The negotiations exposed fissures between developed
countries, led by the United States and EU, and developing countries, led by China, Brazil, and
India, who have come to play a more prominent role in global trade.
The inability of countries to achieve the objectives of the Doha Round prompted many to
question the utility of the WTO as a negotiating forum, as wel as the practicality of conducting a
large-scale negotiation involving 164 participants with consensus and the single undertaking as
guiding principles. At the same time, members have advanced several proposals for moving
forward from Doha and making the WTO a stronger forum for negotiations in the future.27 (See
“Policy Issues and Future Direction.”)
With some exceptions, such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the WTO arguably has been
more successful in the negotiation of discrete items to which not al parties must agree or be
bound (see “Plurilateral Agreements (Annex 4)”). Some view these plurilaterals as a more
promising negotiating approach for the WTO moving forward given their flexibility, as they can
involve subsets of more “like-minded” partners and advance parts of the global trade agenda.
Some experts have raised concerns, however, that this approach could lead to “free riders”—those
who benefit from the agreement but do not make commitments—as agreements on an MFN basis,
or otherwise, could isolate some countries who do not participate and may face trade restrictions
or disadvantages as a result. Others argue that only through the single undertaking approach with
multiple issues under negotiation can there be trade-offs sufficient to bring al members on board.
Resolving Disputes
The third overal function of the WTO is to provide a mechanism to enforce its rules and settle
trade disputes. A central goal of the United States during the Uruguay Round negotiations was to
strengthen the DS mechanism that existed under the GATT. While the GATT’s process for
settling disputes between member countries was informal, ad hoc, and voluntary, the WTO DS
process is more formalized and enforceable.28 Under the GATT, panel proceedings could take
years to complete; any defending party could block an unfavorable ruling; failure to implement a
ruling carried no consequence; and the process did not cover al the agreements. Under the WTO,
there are strict timetables—though not always followed—for panel proceedings; the defending
party cannot block rulings; there is one comprehensive DS process covering al the agreements;
and the rulings are enforceable. WTO adjudicative bodies can authorize retaliation if a member
fails to implement a ruling or provide compensation. Yet, under both systems, considerable
emphasis is placed on having the member countries attempt to resolve disputes through

26 For example, see “T he Doha round finally dies a merciful death,” Financial Times, December 21, 2015.
27 See CRS Report RL32060, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda , by Ian F.
Fergusson; and CRS Report RS22927, WTO Doha Round: Im plications for U.S. Agriculture, by Randy Schnepf.
28 T his stronger DS system was created, in part due to demands from Congress based on concerns that the GAT T
approach was ineffective in eliminating barriers to U.S. exports. In fact, it was first princ ipal trade negotiating objective
set out in the Omnibus T rade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, §1101(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. 2901(b)(1).
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consultations and negotiations, rather than relying on formal panel rulings. See “Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU)” for more detail on WTO procedures and dispute trends.
The United States and the WTO
The statutory basis for U.S. membership in the WTO is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
(URAA, P.L. 103-465), which approved the trade agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round.
The legislation contained general provisions on:
 approval and entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and the
relationship of the agreements to U.S. laws (Section 101 of the act);
 authorities to implement the results of current and future tariff negotiations
(Section 111 of the act);
 oversight of activities of the WTO (Sections 121-130 of the act);
 procedures regarding implementation of DS proceedings affecting the United
States (Section 123 of the act);
 objectives regarding extended Uruguay Round negotiations;
 statutory modifications to implement specific agreements, including:
 Antidumping Agreement;
 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM);
 Safeguards Agreement;
 Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA);
 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (product standards);
 Agreement on Agriculture; and
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel ectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
U.S. priorities and objectives for the GATT/WTO have been reflected in various trade promotion
authority (TPA) legislation since 1974. For example, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 specifical y contained provisions directing U.S. negotiators to negotiate disciplines on
agriculture, DS, intel ectual property, trade in services, and safeguards, among others, that
resulted in WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round. The Trade Act of 2002 provided U.S.
objectives for the Doha Round, including seeking to expand commitments on e-commerce and
clarifications to the WTO DS system. The 2015 TPA, perhaps reflecting the impasse of the Doha
Round, was more muted, seeking full implementation of existing agreements, enhanced
compliance by members with their WTO obligations, and new negotiations to extend
commitments to new areas.29
Section 125(b) of the URAA sets procedures for congressional disapproval of WTO participation.
It specifies that Congress’s approval of the WTO agreement shal cease to be effective “if and
only if” Congress enacts a privileged joint resolution cal ing for withdrawal. Congress may vote
every five years on withdrawal; resolutions were introduced in 2000 and 2005, however neither
passed.30 The debates in 2000 and 2005 were characterized by concerns about certain dispute
settlement cases, especial y adverse decisions on trade remedies, and beliefs that WTO

29 See CRS Report R43491, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Ian F. Fergusson and
Christopher M. Davis.
30 For the 2000 and 2005 resolutions, see https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-joint-resolution/90/
actions and https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-joint -resolution/27/actions.
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membership impinges U.S. sovereignty. WTO supporters emphasized the economic benefits and
value of an open and rules-based trading system. Several factors shaped past debates. In 2000,
China had yet to join the WTO. In 2005, China had acceded but was not yet playing a pivotal
role, and the Doha Round, launched in 2001, was actively being negotiated. More recently, U.S.
concerns with the WTO have grown in some quarters and perception of WTO’s benefits have
dimmed among some Members.31 In May 2020, withdrawal resolutions were introduced during
the 116th Congress by Representatives DeFazio and Pal one (H.J.Res. 89) and by Senator Hawley
(S.J.Res. 71).32 A rule change proposed by the House Rules Committee and adopted by the
House, as wel as by an interpretation of the statute reportedly made by the Senate
Parliamentarian, are likely to prevent votes from occurring on the measures.33
WTO Agreements
The WTO member-led body negotiates, administers, and settles disputes for agreements that
cover goods, agriculture, services, certain trade-related investment measures, and intel ectual
property rights, among other issues. The WTO core principles are enshrined in a series of trade
agreements that include rules and commitments specific to each agreement, subject to various
exceptions. The GATT/WTO system of agreements has expanded rulemaking to several areas of
international trade, but does not extensively cover some key areas, including multilateral
investment rules, trade-related labor or environment issues, and emerging issues like digital trade
or the commercial role of state-owned enterprises.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
The Marrakesh Agreement is the umbrel a agreement under which the various agreements,
annexes, commitment schedules, and understandings reside. The Marrakesh Agreement itself
created the WTO as a legal international organization and sets forth its functions, structure,
secretariat, budget procedures, decisionmaking, accession, entry-into-force, withdrawal, and other
provisions. The Agreement contains four annexes. The three major substantive areas of
commitments undertaken by the members are contained in Annex 1.
Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods (Annex 1A)
The Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods establishes the rules for trade in goods through
sectoral or issue-specific agreements (see Table 2). Its core is the GATT 1994, which includes
GATT 1947, the amendments, understanding, protocols, and decisions of the GATT from 1947 to
1994, cumulatively known as the GATT-acquis, as wel as six Understandings on Articles of the
GATT 1947 negotiated in the Uruguay Round. In addition to clarifying the core WTO principles,
each agreement contains sector- or issue-specific rules and principles. The schedule of
commitments identifies each member’s specific binding commitments on tariffs for goods in
general, and combinations of tariffs and quotas for some agricultural goods. Through a series of
negotiating rounds, members agreed to the current level of trade liberalization (Figure 2 above).

31 For example, see Senator Josh Hawley’s op-ed, “T he WT O Should be Abolished,” New York Times, May 5, 2020.
32 CRS Insight IN11399, The WTO Withdrawal Resolutions, by Ian F. Fergusson and Christopher M. Davis.
33 Doug Palmer, “New ruling quashes Hawley’s hope for Senate WT O withdrawal vote,” Politico, July 1, 2020.
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Table 2. Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994

Agreement on
Agreement on
Agreement on Import
Agreement on Trade-
Agriculture
Implementation of
Licensing Procedures
Related Aspects of
Article VI (Anti-
Intel ectual Property
dumping)
Rights (TRIPS)

Agreement on the
Agreement on
Agreement on Subsidies
Understanding on Rules
Application of Sanitary and
Implementation of
and Countervailing
and Procedures Governing
Phytosanitary Measures
Article VII (Customs
Measures
the Settlement of Disputes
(SPS)
Valuation)

Agreement on Technical
Agreement on
Agreement on
Agreement on Trade
Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Preshipment Inspection
Safeguards
in Civil Aircraft

Agreement on Trade-
Agreement on Rules of
General Agreement
Agreement on
Related Investment
Origin (ROO)
on Trade in Services
Government
Measures (TRIMS)
(GATS)
Procurement
Source: CRS based on WTO.
In the last four rounds of negotiations, WTO members aimed to expand international trade rules
beyond tariff reductions to tackle barriers in other areas. For example, agreements on technical
barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures aim to protect a country’s
rights to implement domestic regulations and standards, while ensuring they do not discriminate
against trading partners or unnecessarily restrict trade.34
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) includes rules and commitments on market access and
disciplines on certain domestic agricultural support programs and export subsidies. Its objective
was to provide a framework for WTO members to reform certain aspects of agricultural trade and
domestic farm policies to facilitate more market-oriented and open trade.35 Regarding market
access, members agreed not to restrict agricultural imports by quotas or other nontariff measures,
converting them to tariff-equivalent levels of protection, such as tariff-rate quotas—a process
cal ed “tariffication.” Developed countries committed to cut tariffs (or out-of-quota tariffs, those
tariffs applied to any imports above the agreed quota threshold) by an average of 36% in equal
increments over six years; developing countries committed to 24% tariff cuts over 10 years.

34 T BT refers to technical regulations, standards and certification and conformity assessment pro cedures; while SPS
refers to food safety and animal and plant health measures.
35 WT O, “Agriculture: fairer markets for farmers,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm.
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Special safeguards to temporarily restrict imports were permitted for products considered
sensitive by a member in certain events, such as fal ing prices or surges of imports.
The AoA also categorizes and restricts agricultural domestic support programs, according to their
potential to distort trade. Members agreed to limit and reduce the most distortive forms of
domestic subsidies over 6 to 10 years, referred to as “amber box” subsidies and measured by the
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) index.36 Subsidies considered to cause minimal distortion
on production and trade are not subject to spending limits and are exempted from obligations as
“green box” and “blue box” subsidies or under de minimis (below a certain threshold) or SDT
provisions. A so-cal ed “peace” clause protected members using domestic subsidies that comply
with the agreement from being chal enged under other WTO agreements, such as through use of
countervailing duties; the clause expired after nine years in 2003. In addition, AoA commitments
required that export subsidies were to be capped and subject to incremental reductions.
Members are required to submit notifications regularly on the implementation of AoA
commitments on market access, domestic subsidies, and export competition—though some
countries, including the United States, have raised concerns that these requirements are not
abided by in a consistent fashion.
Further agricultural trade reform was a major priority under the Doha Round, but to date,
negotiations have seen limited progress on resolving major issues. Members have advanced some
areas for reform, however, for example, in 2015 members reached an agreement to fully eliminate
export subsidies for agriculture.
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
The framework of the GATT did not address the growing linkages between trade and investment.
During the Uruguay Round, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) was
drafted to address certain investment measures that may restrict and distort trade. The agreement
did not address the regulation or protection of foreign investment, but focused on investment
measures that may violate basic GATT disciplines on trade in goods, such as nondiscrimination.
Specifical y, members committed not to apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with provisions on
national treatment or a prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports or exports. TRIMS
includes an annex with an il ustrative list of prohibited measures, such as local content
requirements—requirements to purchase or use products of domestic origin. The agreement also
includes a safeguard measure for balance of payment difficulties, which permits developing
countries to temporarily suspend TRIMS obligations.
While TRIMS and other WTO agreements, such as the GATS (see below), include some
provisions pertaining to investment, the lack of comprehensive multilateral rules on investment
led to several efforts under the Doha Round to consider proposals, which to date have been
unfruitful (see “Future Negotiations on Selected Issues”). In December 2017, 70 WTO members
announced new discussions on developing a multilateral framework on investment facilitation, in
part to complement the successful negotiation of rules on trade facilitation.

36 T he United States committed to spend no more than $19.1 billion annually on amber box programs. For more detail,
see CRS Report R45305, Agriculture in the WTO: Rules and Lim its on U.S. Dom estic Support, by Randy Schnepf.
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (Annex 1B)
The GATT agreements focused solely on trade in goods. Services were eventual y covered in the
GATS as a result of the Uruguay Round.37 The GATS provides the first and only multilateral
framework of principles and rules for government policies and regulations affecting services
trade. It has served as a foundation for bilateral and regional trade agreements covering services.
The services trade agenda is complex due to the characteristics of the sector. “Services” refers to
a growing range of economic activities, such as audiovisual, construction, computer and related
services, express delivery, e-commerce, financial, professional (e.g., accounting and legal
services), retail and wholesaling, transportation, tourism, and telecommunications. Advances in
information technology and the growth of global supply chains have reduced barriers to trade in
services, expanding the services tradable across national borders. But liberalizing trade in services
can be more complex than for goods, since the impediments faced by service providers occur
largely within the importing country, as so-cal ed “behind the border” barriers, some in the form
of government regulations. While the right of governments to regulate service industries is widely
recognized as prudent and necessary to protect consumers from harmful or unqualified providers,
a main focus of WTO members is whether these regulations are applied to foreign service
providers in a discriminatory and unnecessarily trade restrictive manner that limits market access.
The GATS contains multiple parts, including definition of scope (excluding government-provided
services); principles and obligations, including MFN treatment and transparency; market access
and national treatment obligations; annexes listing exceptions that members take to MFN
treatment; as wel as various technical elements. Members negotiated GATS on a positive list
basis, which means that the commitments only apply to those services and modes of delivery
listed in each member’s schedule of commitments.38 WTO members adopted a system of
classifying four modes of delivery for services to measure trade in services and classify
government measures that affect trade in services, including cross-border supply, consumption
abroad, commercial presence, and temporary presence of natural persons (Figure 4). Under
GATS, unless a member country has specifical y committed to open its market to suppliers in a
particular service, the national treatment and market access obligations do not apply.
In addition to the GATS, some members made specific sectoral commitments in financial services
and telecommunications. Negotiations to expand these commitments were later folded into the
broader services negotiations.
WTO members aimed to update GATS provisions and market access commitments as part of the
Doha Round. Several WTO members have since submitted revised offers of services
liberalization, but in the view of the United States and others the talks have not yielded adequate
offers of improved market access (see “Future Negotiations”). Given the lack of progress, in
2013, 23 WTO members, including the United States, representing approximately 70% of global
services trade, launched negotiations of a services-specific plurilateral agreement.39 Although
outside of the WTO structure, participants designed the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)
negotiations in a way that would not preclude a concluded agreement from someday being
brought into the WTO. TiSA talks were initial y led by Australia and the United States, but have
since stal ed; the Trump Administration has not stated a formal position on TiSA.

37 For more analysis, see CRS Report R43291, U.S. Trade in Services: Trends and Policy Issues, by Rachel F. Fefer.
38 Within U.S. FT As, the United States has sought a more comprehensive negative list approach, in which obligations
are to apply to all types of services, unless explicitly excluded by a country in its list of nonconforming measures.
39 See CRS In Focus IF10311, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations, by Rachel F. Fefer.
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Figure 4. Four Modes of Service Delivery and Hypothetical Examples

Source: CRS based on WTO.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) (Annex 1C)
The TRIPS Agreement marked the first time multilateral trade rules incorporated intel ectual
property rights (IPR)—legal, private, enforceable rights that governments grant to inventors and
artists to encourage innovation and creative output.40 Like the GATS, TRIPS was negotiated as
part of the Uruguay Round and was a major U.S. objective for the round. TRIPS sets minimum
standards of protection and enforcement for IPR. Much of the agreement sets out the extent of
coverage of the various types of intel ectual property, including patents, copyrights, trademarks,
trade secrets, and geographical indications. TRIPS includes provisions on nondiscrimination and
on enforcement measures, such as civil and administrative procedures and remedies.
The TRIPS Agreement’s newly placed requirements on many developing countries elevated the
debate over the relationship between IPR and development. At issue is the balance of rights and
obligations between protecting private right holders and securing broader public benefits, such as
access to medicines and the free flow of data, especial y in developing countries. TRIPS includes
flexibilities for developing countries al owing longer phase-in periods for implementing
obligations and, separately, for pharmaceutical patent obligations—these were subsequently
extended for LDCs until January 2033 or until they no longer qualify as LDCs, whichever is

40 For more detail, see CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson.
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earlier.41 The 2001 WTO “Doha Declaration” committed members to interpret and implement
TRIPS obligations in a way that supports public health and access to medicines.42 In 2005,
members agreed to amend TRIPS to al ow developing and LDC members that lack production
capacity to import generic medicines from third country producers under “compulsory licensing”
arrangements.43 The amendment entered into force in January 2017.44
Trade Remedies
While WTO agreements uphold MFN principles, they also al ow exceptions to binding tariffs in
certain circumstances. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM),
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, and articles in the GATT, commonly known as the
Antidumping Agreement, al ow for trade remedies in the form of temporary measures (e.g.,
primarily duties or quotas) to mitigate the adverse impact of various trade practices on domestic
industries and workers. These include actions taken against dumping (sel ing at an unfairly low
price) or to counter certain government subsidies, and emergency measures to limit “fairly”-
traded imports temporarily, designed to “safeguard” domestic industries.
Supporters of trade remedies view them as necessary to shield domestic industries and workers
from unfair competition and to level the playing field. Other domestic constituents, including
some importers and downstream consuming industries, voice concern that antidumping (AD) and
countervailing duty (CVD) actions can serve as disguised protectionism and create inefficiencies
in the world trading system by raising prices on imported goods. How trade remedies are applied
to imports has become a major source of disputes under the WTO (see below).
The United States has enacted trade remedy laws that conform to the WTO rules:45
 U.S. antidumping laws (19 U.S.C. §1673 et seq.) provide relief to domestic
industries that have been, or are threatened with, the adverse impact of imports
sold in the U.S. market at prices that are shown to be less than fair market value.
The relief provided is an additional import duty placed on the dumped imports.
 U.S. countervailing duty laws (19 U.S.C. §1671 et seq.) give similar relief to
domestic industries that have been, or are threatened with, the adverse impact of
imported goods that have been subsidized by a foreign government or public
entity, and can therefore be sold at lower prices than U.S.-produced goods. The
relief provided is a duty placed on the subsidized imports.
 U.S. safeguard laws give domestic industries relief from import surges of goods;
no al egation of “unfair” practices is needed to launch a safeguard investigation.
Although used less frequently than AD/CVD laws, Section 201 of the Trade Act
of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2251 et seq.), is designed to give domestic industry the

41 WT O, “Intellectual property: protection and enforcement,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
agrm7_e.htm.
42 Declaration on the T RIPS Agreement and Public Health, (WT /MIN(01)/DEC/2), November 14, 2001,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. For more on T RIPS, see CRS Report
RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson .
43 WT O, “ WT O IP rules amended to ease poor countries’ access to affordable medicines,” January 23, 2017,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm.
44 Notably, this marked the first time that a WT O agreement was amended since the WT O’s inception (WTO 2017).
45 For more detail, see CRS Report R46296, Trade Remedies: Antidumping, by Christopher A. Casey, CRS In Focus
IF10018, Trade Rem edies: Antidum ping and Countervailing Duties, by Vivian C. Jones and Christopher A. Casey , and
CRS In Focus IF10786, Safeguards: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, by Vivian C. Jones.
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opportunity to adjust to import competition and remain competitive. The relief
provided is general y a temporary import duty and/or quota. Unlike AD/CVD,
safeguard laws require presidential action for relief to be put into effect.
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (Annex 2)
The DS system, often cal ed the “crown jewel” of the WTO, has been considered by some
observers to be one of the most important successes of the multilateral trading system.46 WTO
agreements contain provisions that are either binding or nonbinding. The WTO Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes—Dispute Settlement Understanding
or DSU—provides an enforceable means for WTO members to resolve disputes arising under the
binding provisions.47 The DSU commits members not to determine violations of WTO obligations
or impose penalties unilateral y, but to settle complaints about al eged violations under DSU rules
and procedures. In recent years, there have been some cal s by members for reform of the DS
system to deal with procedural delays and new strains on the system, including the growing
volume and complexity of cases and disagreement over the role of the Appel ate Body (AB).
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is a plenary committee of the WTO, which oversees the
panels and adopts the recommendation of a DS panel or AB panel (see below). Panels are
composed of three (or five in complex cases) panelists—not citizens of the members involved—
chosen through a roster of “wel qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals”
maintained by the Secretariat. WTO members must first attempt to settle a dispute through
consultations, but if these fail, a member seeking to initiate a dispute may request that a panel
examine and report on its complaint. A respondent party is able to block the establishment of a
panel at the DSB once, but if the complainant requests its establishment again at a subsequent
meeting of the DSB, a panel is established. At its conclusion, the panel recommends a decision to
the DSB that it wil adopt unless al parties agree to block the recommendation. The DSU sets out
a timeline of approximately one year for the initial resolution of disputes (see Figure 5); however,
cases are rarely resolved in this timeframe.
The DSU also provides for AB review of panel reports in the event a decision is appealed. The
AB is composed of seven rotating panelists, appointed by the DSB, that serve four-year terms,
with the possibility of a one-term reappointment. According to the DSU, appeals are to be limited
to questions of law or legal interpretation developed by the panel in the case (Article 17.6). The
AB is to make a recommendation, and the DSB is to ratify that recommendation within 120 days
of the ratification of the initial panel report, but again, such timely resolution rarely occurs. The
United States has raised several issues regarding the practices of the AB and has blocked the
appointments of several judges—for more on the debate, see “Proposed Institutional Reforms.”

46 WT O, “T he Place of the WT O in the International Legal Order,” Speeches—DG Pascal Lamy, June 15, 2008,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl94_e.htm.
47 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10436, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Key Legal
Concepts, by Brandon J. Murrill.
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Figure 5. WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure
Stages and Time Periods

Source: Created by CRS. Based on information from Madhur Jha, Samantha Amerasinghe, and Philippe Dauba -
Pantanacce, Global trade: Trade first! (Avoiding an own goal), Standard Chartered, 2017, p. 17.
Notes: Alternating colors indicate a different stage of the procedure. Time periods displayed are approximate.
The WTO establishes timelines for each stage with one year total for the initial resolution of disputes; however,
in practice, cases are rarely resolved within this timeframe.
Following the adoption of a panel or appel ate report, the DSB oversees the implementation of the
findings. The losing party is then to propose how it is to bring itself into compliance “within a
reasonable period of time” with the DSB-adopted findings. A reasonable period of time is
determined by mutual agreement with the DSB, among the parties, or through arbitration. If a
dispute arises over the manner of implementation, the DSB may form a panel to judge
compliance. If a party declines to comply, the parties negotiate over compensation pending full
implementation. If there is stil no agreement, the DSB may authorize retaliation in the amount of
the determined cost of the offending party’s measure to the aggrieved party’s economy.
Filing a DS case provides a way for countries to resolve disputes through a legal process and to
do so publicly, signaling to domestic and international constituents the need to address
outstanding issues. DS procedures can serve as a deterrent for countries considering not abiding
by WTO agreements, and rulings can help build a body of case law to inform countries when they
implement new regulatory regimes or interpret WTO agreements.
That said, WTO agreements and decisions of panels are not self-executing and cannot directly
modify U.S. law. If a case is brought against the United States and the panel renders an adverse
decision, the United States would be expected to remove the offending measure within a
reasonable period of time or face the possibility of either paying compensation to the complainant
or be subject to sanctions, often in the form of higher tariffs on imports of certain U.S. products.
As of mid-2020, the WTO has initiated nearly 600 disputes on behalf of its members and issued
more than 350 rulings, with DS activity peaking in 2018.48 Nearly two-thirds of WTO members
have participated in the DS system. Not al complaints result in formal panel proceedings; about

48 WT O, “Dispute settlement activity—some figures,” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispustats_e.htm.
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half were resolved during consultations. Complainants have usual y won their cases, in large part
because they tend to only initiate disputes that they have a higher chance of winning. In the words
of WTO DG Roberto Azevêdo, the widespread use of the DS system is evidence it “enjoys
tremendous confidence among the membership, who value it as a fair, effective, efficient
mechanism to solve trade problems.”49
The United States is an active user of the DS system. Among WTO members, the United States
has been a complainant in the most dispute cases since the system was established in 1995,
initiating 124 disputes.50 The two largest targets of complaints initiated by the United States are
China and the EU, which, combined, account for more than one-third (Figure 6).
Figure 6. WTO Disputes Involving the United States

Source: WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm. Created by CRS.
Notes: Does not include cases with U.S. participation as a third party. Dispute count as of August 1, 2020.
As a respondent in 155 dispute cases since 1995, the United States has also had the most disputes
filed against it by other WTO members, followed by the EU (87 disputes) and China (44
disputes). The EU has filed the most cases against the United States, followed by Canada, China,
South Korea, Brazil, and India. A large number of complaints concern trade remedies, in
particular methodologies used for calculating and imposing antidumping duties on U.S. imports.
Several pending WTO disputes are of significance to the United States. These include chal enges
to the tariff measures imposed by the Trump Administration under U.S. trade laws, including
Section 201 (safeguards), Section 232 (national security), and Section 301 (“unfair” trading
practices) (Table 3). Nine WTO members, including China, the EU, Canada, and Mexico,
initiated separate complaints at the WTO, based on al egations that U.S. Section 232 tariffs on
steel and aluminum imports are inconsistent with WTO rules. In May 2019, the cases involving
Canada and Mexico were withdrawn, due to a negotiated settlement with the United States.51
Consultations were unsuccessful in resolving the remaining disputes and panel decisions are
expected in late 2020. Most countries notified their complaints pursuant to the Agreement on
Safeguards, though some also al ege that U.S. tariff measures and related exemptions are contrary

49 WT O, “WT O disputes reach 500 mark,” November 10, 2015, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/
ds500rfc_10nov15_e.htm.
50 Dispute count as of early August 2020. WT O, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
find_dispu_cases_e.htm.
51 T he three countries announced a joint monitoring and consultation system to replace the tariffs. See https://ustr.gov/
about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/united-states-announces-deal-canada-and.
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to U.S. obligations under several provisions of the GATT. Several other WTO members have
requested to join the disputes as third parties.
In 2018, the United States filed its own WTO complaints over retaliatory tariffs imposed by six
countries (Canada, China, EU, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey) in response to U.S. actions.52 Most
recently, in July 2019 the United States filed a similar case against India. The cases are in the
panel stage (except for resolved cases with Canada and Mexico). The United States has invoked
the national security exception (GATT Article XXI) in defense of its tariffs (see “Key Exceptions
under GATT/WTO”), and states that the tariffs are not safeguards as claimed by other countries.
Table 3. WTO Challenges to Tariff Measures Imposed by Trump Administration
Under U.S. Trade Laws
Complainant
Dispute
Issue
country
number
Date Filed / Latest Status
SECTION 201

U.S. safeguard measure on
South Korea
DS545 5/14/18 consultations requested;
crystalline silicon photovoltaic

9/26/18 panel established but not yet composed
products

China
DS562 8/14/18 consultations requested
10/24/19 panel composed
U.S. safeguard measure on
South Korea
DS546 5/14/18 consultations requested;
large residential washers
7/01/19 panel composed
imports
SECTION 232
U.S. tariffs on steel and
China
DS544 4/05/18 consultations requested;
aluminum imports
01/25/19 panel composed
India
DS547 5/18/18 consultations requested;
01/25/19 panel composed
EU
DS548 6/01/18 consultations requested;
01/25/19 panel composed
Canada
DS550 6/01/18 consultations requested;
05/23/19 settled or terminated
(withdrawn, mutual y agreed solution)
Mexico
DS551 6/05/18 consultations requested;
05/28/19 settled or terminated
(withdrawn, mutual y agreed solution)
Norway
DS552 6/12/18 consultations requested;
01/25/19 panel composed
Russia
DS554 6/29/18 consultations requested;
01/25/19 panel composed
Switzerland
DS556 7/09/18 consultations requested;
01/25/19 panel composed

Turkey
DS564 8/15/18 consultations requested;
01/25/19 panel composed

SECTION 301

52 UST R, “United States Challenges Five WT O Members Imposing Illegal T ariffs Against U.S. Products,” press
release, July 2018, https://go.usa.gov/xPftA.
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Complainant
Dispute
Issue
country
number
Date Filed / Latest Status
U.S. tariffs on certain Chinese
China
DS543 4/04/18 consultations requested;
imports
06/03/19 panel composed

China
DS565 8/23/18 consultations requested

China
DS587 09/02/19 consultations requested
Source: WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.
Note: Status as of August 1, 2020. Panel established is when the DSB has agreed to create a panel but the
panelists have not yet been chosen (i.e., panel composed).
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3)
Annex 3 sets the procedures for regular trade policy reviews that are conducted by the Secretariat
to report on the trade policies of members. These reviews are carried out by the Trade Policy
Review Body (TPRB) and are conducted periodical y with the largest economies (United States,
EU, Japan, and China) evaluated every three years, the next 16 largest economies every five
years, and remaining economies every seven years. These reviews are meant to increase
transparency of a country’s trade policy and enable a multilateral assessment of the effect of
policies on the trading system. The reviews also al ow each member country to question specific
practices of other members, and may serve as a forum to flag, and possibly avoid, future disputes.
The most recent trade policy review of China occurred in July 2018.53 During the review
members noted and commended some recent initiatives of China to open market access and
liberalize its foreign investment regime. Several concerns were also raised, including “the
preponderant role of the State in general, and of state-owned enterprises in particular,” and
“China’s support and subsidy policies and local content requirements, including those that may be
part of the 2025 [Made in China] plan.”54
2018 Trade Policy Review of the United States
The most recent trade policy review of the United States culminated in December 2018.55 The Secretariat’s
report issued in November is a factual description of a country’s policy and of significant developments since the
last review. It does not pass judgement on the consistency of a country’s policies with WTO agreements.
Subsequently, the TPRB met on December 17-19 to assess the report, pose questions, and al ow other members
to opine on specific aspects of U.S. policy. In his statement, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO Dennis Shea contended
that U.S. trade policy is “steadfastly focused on the national interest including retaining and using US sovereign
power to act in defense of that interest.” He described U.S. trade policy as resting on five major pil ars:
“supporting U.S. national security, strengthening the U.S. economy, negotiating better trade deals, aggressive
enforcement of U.S. trade laws, and reforming the multilateral trading system.”56
While WTO members general y lauded the United States on a free and open trade policy, and recognized its
traditional role as a pil ar of the multilateral trading system, some countries voiced their displeasure at recent U.S.
trade actions. Members took issue with the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum as a result of the Section
232 national security determinations; the imposition of Section 301 tariffs on China; increased use of trade
remedies; and rising levels of trade-distorting farm subsidies, including the aid package for agricultural producers

53 For the text of the report, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp475_e.htm.
54 WT O, “T rade Policy Review: China: Concluding remarks by the Chairperson,” July 11 and 13, 2018,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp475_crc_e.htm.
55 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp482_e.htm.
56 “U.S. Statement by Ambassador Shea at the 14th T rade Policy Review of the United States,” December 17, 2018,
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2018/12/17/u-s-statement-by-ambassador-shea-at-the-14th-wto-tpr-of-the-united-states-
of-america/.
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hit by retaliatory tariffs; as wel as perennial irritants, such as Buy American policies and Jones Act maritime and
cabotage restrictions.57 According to the EU Ambassador to the WTO Marc Vanheukelen, “the multilateral
trading system is in a deep crisis and the United States is in the epicenter for a number of reasons.”58
Plurilateral Agreements (Annex 4)
Most WTO agreements in force have been negotiated on a multilateral basis, meaning the entire
body of WTO members subscribes to them. By contrast, plurilateral agreements are negotiated by
a subset of WTO members and often focus on a specific sector. A handful of such agreements
supplement the main WTO agreements discussed previously.59
Within the WTO, members have two ways to negotiate on a plurilateral basis, also known as
“variable geometry.”60 A group of countries can negotiate with one another provided that the
group extends the benefits to al other WTO members on an MFN basis—the foundational
nondiscrimination principle of the GATT/WTO. Because the benefits of the agreement are to be
shared among al WTO members and not just the participants, the negotiating group likely would
include those members forming a critical mass of world trade in the product or sector covered by
the negotiation in order to avoid the problem of free riders—those countries that receive trade
benefits without committing to liberalization. An example of this type of plurilateral agreement
granting unconditional MFN is the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), in which tariffs on
selected information technology goods were lowered to zero, as negotiated by WTO members
comprising more than 90% of world trade in these goods (see below).
A second type of plurilateral is the non-MFN agreement, often referred to as “conditional-MFN.”
In this type, participants undertake obligations among themselves, but do not extend the benefits
to other WTO members, unless they directly participate in the agreement. Also known as the
“club” approach, non-MFN plurilaterals al ow for wil ing members to address policy issues not
covered by WTO disciplines. However, these agreements require a waiver from the entire WTO
membership to commence negotiations. Some countries are reluctant to al ow other countries to
negotiate for fear of being left out, even while not being ready to commit themselves to new
disciplines. Yet, according to one commentator, these members are “simply outsmarting
themselves” by encouraging more ambitious members to take negotiations out of the WTO.
Government Procurement Agreement
The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is an early example of a plurilateral agreement
with limited WTO membership—first developed as a code in the 1979 Tokyo Round. As of the
end of 2019, 48 WTO members (including the 28 EU member countries and United States)
participate in the GPA; non-GPA signatories do not enjoy rights under the GPA.61 The GPA

57 “Concluding Remarks of the Chairperson, Ambassador Sunanta Kangvalkulkij” T rade Policy Review Body,
December 19, 2018. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp482_crc_e.htm.
58 “U.S. Criticized at WT O,” Washington Trade Daily, December 18, 2018.
59 One example is the Agreement on T rade in Civil Aircraft , which entered into force in 1980 between 32 WT O
members, including the United States. T he agreement eliminates import duties on all aircraft, other than military
aircraft, and other specified products. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/civair_e/civair_e.htm.
60 Peter Sutherland et al., “T he Future of the WT O: Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium,” World
T rade Organization, 2004, p. 64.
61 In November 2018, WT O members approved in principle the UK’s market access offer to continue GPA
membership as a separate member, following its pending withdrawal from the EU. See WT O, https://www.wto.org/
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provides market access for various nondefense government projects to contractors of its
signatories.62 Each member specifies government entities and goods and services (with thresholds
and limitations) that are open to procurement bids by foreign firms of the other GPA members.
For example, the U.S. GPA market access schedules of commitments cover 85 federal-level
entities and voluntary commitments by 37 states.63
Negotiations to expand the GPA were concluded in March 2012, and a revised GPA entered into
force on April 6, 2014. Several countries, including China—which committed to pursuing GPA
participation in its 2001 WTO accession process—are in long-pending negotiations to accede to
the GPA. Australia was the latest WTO member to join the revised GPA in May 2019. According
to estimates by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), from 2008 to 2012, 8% of
total global government expenditures, and approximately one-third of U.S. federal government
procurement, was covered by the GPA or similar commitments in U.S. FTAs.64
Information Technology Agreement
Unlike the GPA, the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is a plurilateral agreement that is
applied on an unconditional MFN basis. In other words, al WTO members benefit from the tariff
reductions enacted by parties to the ITA regardless of their own participation.65 Original y
concluded in 1996 by a subset of WTO members, the ITA provides tariff-free treatment for
covered IT products; however, the agreement does not cover services or digital products like
software. In December 2015, a group of 51 WTO members, including the United States,
negotiated an expanded agreement to cover an additional 201 products and technologies, valued
at over $1 tril ion in annual global exports.66 Members committed to reduce the majority of tariffs
by 2019. In June 2016, the United States initiated the ITA tariff cuts. China began its cuts in mid-
September 2016, with plans to reduce tariffs over five to seven years.
Trade Facilitation Agreement
The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) is the newest WTO multilateral trade agreement,
entering into force on February 22, 2017, and perhaps the lasting legacy of the Doha Round, since
it is the only major concluded component of the negotiations.67 The TFA aims to address multiple
trade barriers confronted by exporters and importers and reduce trade costs by streamlining,
modernizing, and speeding up the customs processes for cross-border trade, as wel as making it
more transparent. Some analysts view the TFA as evidence that achieving new multilateral
agreements is possible and that the design, including special and differential treatment provisions,
could serve as a template for future agreements.

english/news_e/news18_e/gpro_28nov18_e.htm.
62 For more information on the GPA, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm.
63 For the U.S. GPA schedule, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_app_agree_e.htm.
64 U.S. GAO, United States Reported Opening More Opportunities to Foreign Firms T han Other Countries, but Bett er
Data Are Needed, GAO-17-168, February 9, 2017, p. 10. Also, see CRS In Focus IF11580, U.S. Governm ent
Procurem ent and International Trade, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
65 For more information on the ITA, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm and
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itaintro_e.htm.
66 UST R, “U.S. and WT O Partners Announce Final Agreement on Landmark Expansion of Information T echnology
Agreement,” December 2015, https://go.usa.gov/xPftt.
67 See CRS Report R44777, WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones.
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The TFA has three sections. The first is the
heart of the agreement, containing the main
Impact of the WTO Trade Facilitation
provisions, of which many, but not al , are
Agreement
binding and enforceable. Mandatory articles
According to WTO estimates, global export gains from
include requiring members to publish
ful implementation of the TFA could range from $750
information, including publishing certain
bil ion to more than $3.6 tril ion dol ars per year and,
for the 2015-2030 time period, could increase world
items online; issue advance rulings in a
export growth by 2.7% a year and world GDP growth
reasonable amount of time; and provide for
by over 0.5% a year.
appeals or reviews, if requested. The second
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
section provides for SDT for developing
Development (OECD) estimates that TFA
country and LDC members, al owing them
implementation could lower the costs of doing trade as
more time and assistance to implement the
much as 12.5%-17.5% global y.
agreement. The TFA is the first WTO
agreement in which members determine their own implementation schedules and in which
progress in implementation is explicitly linked to technical and financial c apacity. The TFA
requires that “donor members,” including the United States, provide the needed capacity building
and support. Final y, the third section sets institutional arrangements for administering the TFA.
As of the TFA’s third anniversary in February 2020, 91% of the membership have ratified the
agreement. Members have been actively notifying their commitments and progress, and capacity-
building activities are ongoing to support full implementation
Key Exceptions under GATT/WTO
Under WTO agreements, members general y cannot discriminate among trading partners, though
specific market access commitments can vary significantly by agreement and by member. WTO
rules permit some broad exceptions, which al ow members to adopt trade policies and practices
that may be inconsistent with WTO disciplines and principles such as MFN treatment, granting
special preferences to certain countries, and restricting trade in certain sectors, provided certain
conditions are met. Some of the key exceptions follow.
General exceptions. GATT Article XX grants WTO members the right to take certain measures
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, or to conserve exhaustible natural
resources, among other aims. The measures, however, must not entail “arbitrary” or
“unjustifiable” discrimination between countries, or serve as “disguised restriction on
international trade.” GATS Article XIV provides for similar exceptions for trade in services.
National security exception. GATT Article XXI protects the right of members to take any action
considered “necessary for the protection of essential national security interests,” as related to (i)
fissionable materials; (i ) traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, and such traffic in
other goods and materials carried out to supply a military establishment; and (i i) taken in time of
war or other emergency in international relations. Similar exceptions relate to trade in services
(GATS Article XIV bis) and intel ectual property rights (TRIPS Article 73).
More favorable treatment to developing countries. The so-cal ed “enabling clause” of the
GATT—cal ed the “Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries” of 1979—enables developed country members to
grant differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries that is not extended to
other members. For example, this permits granting unilateral and nonreciprocal trade preferences
to developing countries under special programs, such as the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), and also relates to regional trade agreements outside the WTO (see below).
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Exceptions for regional trade agreements (RTAs). WTO countries are permitted to depart from
the MFN principle and grant each other more favorable treatment in trade agreements outside the
WTO, provided certain conditions are met. Three sets of rules general y apply. GATT Article
XXIV applies to goods trade, and al ows the formation of free trade areas and customs unions
(areas with common external tariffs). These provisions require that RTAs be notified to the other
WTO members, cover “substantial y al trade,” and do not effectively raise barriers on imports
from third parties. GATS Article V al ows for economic integration agreements related to services
trade, provided they entail “substantial sectoral coverage,” eliminate “substantial y al
discrimination,” and do not “raise the overal level of barriers to trade in services” on members
outside the agreement. Paragraph 2(c) of the “enabling clause,” which deals with special and
differential treatment, al ows for RTAs among developing countries in goods trade, based on the
“mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs.” RTA provisions in the GATS also al ow greater
flexibility in sectoral coverage within services agreements that include developing countries.
Joining the WTO: The Accession Process
There are currently 164 members of the WTO. Another 22 countries are seeking to become
members.68 Joining the WTO means taking on the commitments and obligations of al the
multilateral agreements. Governments are motivated to join not just to expand access to foreign
markets but also to spur domestic economic reforms, help transition to market economies, and
promote the rule of law.69 While any state or customs territory fully in control of its trade policy
may become a WTO member, a lengthy process of accession involves a series of documentation
of a country’s trade regime and market access negotiation requirements (see Figure 7).70
For example, Kazakhstan joined the WTO on November 30, 2015, after a 20-year process.
Afghanistan became the 164th WTO member on July 29, 2016, after nearly 12 years of
negotiating its accession terms. Other countries have initiated the process but face delays. Iran
first applied for membership in 1996 and, while it submitted its Memorandum on the Foreign
Trade Regime in 2009 (a prerequisite for negotiating an accession package), Iran has not begun
the bilateral negotiation process, and the United States is unlikely to support its accession.71
As the WTO general y operates by member consensus, any single member could block the
accession of a prospective new member. As part of the process, a prospective member must
satisfy specific market access conditions of other WTO members by negotiating on a bilateral
basis. The United States has been a central arbiter of the accession process for countries like
China (joined in 2001, see below), Vietnam (2007), and Russia (2012), with which permanent
normal trade relations had to be established concurrently under U.S. law for the United States to
receive the full benefits of their membership.

68 For the current status of accessions, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/status_e.htm.
69 Uri Dadush and Chiedu Osakwe, ed., WTO Accessions and Trade Multilateralism: Case Studies and Lessons from
the WTO at Twenty, Cambridge University Press and the World T rade Organization, 2015.
70 For more information on WT O accessions, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm and
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm.
71 Iran’s prospective membership is complicated by U.S. economic sanctions, which restrict trade and investment.
Iran’s accession to the WT O would require the United States and other members to extend MFN treatment to Iran.
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Figure 7. WTO Accession Process

Source: WTO. Created by CRS.
Note: The Working Party is a group of members negotiating multilateral y with a country applying to join.
China’s Accession and Membership
China formal y joined the WTO in December 2001.72 China has emerged as a major player in the
global economy, as the fastest-growing economy, largest merchandise exporter, and second-
largest merchandise importer worldwide. China’s accession into the WTO on commercial y
meaningful terms was a major U.S. trade objective during the late 1990s.Entry into the WTO was
viewed by many as an important catalyst for spurring additional economic and trade reforms and
the opening of China’s economy in a market, rules-based direction.73 These reforms have made
China an increasingly significant market for U.S. exporters, a central factor in global supply
chains, and a major source of low-cost goods for U.S. consumers. At the same time, China has yet
to fully transition to a market economy and the government continues to intervene in many parts
of the economy, which has created a growing debate over the role of the WTO in both respects.
Negotiations for China’s accession to the GATT and then the WTO began in 1986 and took more
than 15 years to complete. China sought to enter the WTO as a developing country, while U.S.
trade officials insisted that China’s entry had to be based on “commercial y meaningful terms”
that would require China to significantly reduce trade and investment barriers within a relatively
short time. In the end, a compromise was reached that required China to make immediate and
extensive reductions in various trade and investment barriers, while al owing it to maintain some
protection (or a transitional period of protection) for certain sensitive sectors (see text box).74

72 For more information, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
73 Written testimony by Nicholas R. Lardy, “Issues in China’s WT O Accession,” May 9, 2001, Brookings Institution,
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/issues-in-chinas-wto-accession/.
74 For more detail on the terms, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by Wayne M. Morrison.
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Selected Terms of China’s 2001 WTO Accession

Reduce the average tariff for industrial goods from 17% to 8.9%, and average tariffs on U.S.
priority agricultural products from 31% to 14%.

Limit subsidies for agricultural production to 8.5% of the value of farm output, eliminate
export subsidies on agricultural exports, and regularly notify WTO of al state subsidies.

Grant full trade and distribution rights to foreign enterprises within three years (with some
exceptions, such as for certain agricultural products, minerals, and fuels).

Provide nondiscriminatory treatment to all WTO members, such as treating foreign firms
no less favorably than Chinese firms for trade purposes.

End discriminatory trade policies against foreign invested firms, such as domestic content
rules and technology transfer requirements.

Implement the TRIPS Agreement (which sets basic standards on IPR protection and rules for
enforcement) upon accession.

Fully open the banking system to foreign financial institutions within five years.

Allow joint ventures in insurance and telecommunications sectors (with various degrees of
foreign ownership al owed).
After joining the WTO, China began to implement economic reforms that facilitated its transition
toward a market economy and increased its openness to trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI). China also general y implemented its tariff cuts on schedule. However, by 2006, U.S.
officials and companies noted evidence of some trends toward a more restrictive trade regime and
more state intervention in the economy.75 In particular, observers have voiced concern about
various Chinese industrial policies, such as those that foster indigenous innovation based on
forced technology transfer, domestic subsidies, and IP theft. Some stakeholders have expressed
concerns over China’s mixed record of implementing certain WTO obligations and asserted that,
in some cases, China appeared to be abiding by the letter but not the “spirit” of the WTO.76
The United States and other WTO members have used dispute set lement (DS) procedures on a
number of occasions to address China’s al eged noncompliance with certain WTO commitments.
As a respondent, China accounts for about 12% of total WTO disputes since 2001. The United
States has brought 23 dispute cases against China at the WTO on issues, including IPR protection,
subsidies, and discriminatory industrial policies, and has largely prevailed in most cases. Though
some issues remain contested, China has largely complied with most WTO rulings.77 China has
also increasingly used DS to confront what it views as discriminatory measures; to date, it has
brought 16 cases against the United States (as of August 2020).
More broadly, the Trump Administration has questioned whether WTO rules are sufficient to
address the chal enges that China’s economy presents. USTR Lighthizer expressed this view in
remarks in September 2017: “The sheer scale of their coordinated efforts to develop their
economy, to subsidize, to create national champions, to force technology transfer, and to distort

75 See UST R, 2016 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, January 2017, and the annual UST R National
Trade Estim ate Reports for specific examples.
76 For example, see Written testimony by the U.S.-China Business Council, “China’s Implementation of its World
T rade Organization Commitments,” Submitted in response to the Office of the U.S. T rade Representative’s Request for
Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning China’s Compliance with WT O Commitments, September 21,
2016; and Atkinson et al., Stopping China’s Mercantilism : A Doctrine of Constructive, Alliance-Backed Confrontation,
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, March 16, 2017.
77 James Bacchus, Simon Lester, and Huan Zhu, “Disciplining China at the WT O,” CAT O Institute, Policy Analysis
No. 856, November 15, 2018.
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markets in China and throughout the world is a threat to the world trading system that is
unprecedented. Unfortunately, the World Trade Organization is not equipped to deal with this
problem.”78 USTR views efforts to resolve concerns over Chinese trade practices to date as
limited in effectiveness, including through WTO DS, as wel as recent proposals by WTO
members to craft new rules and WTO reforms.79 In its latest annual report to Congress on China’s
WTO compliance for 2019, USTR stated:
[The WTO DS] mechanism is not designed to address a trade regime that broadly conflicts
with the fundamental underpinnings of the WTO system. No amount of WTO DS by other
WTO members would be sufficient to remedy this systemic problem. Indeed, many of the
most harmful policies and practices being pursued by China are not even directly
disciplined by WTO rules.80
Another related U.S. concern is China’s claim that it is a “developing country” under the WTO,
and, in particular, implications for concessions under ongoing and future WTO negotiations.81
Through developing country status, which countries self-designate, countries are entitled to
certain rights under special and differential treatment (SDT), among other provisions in WTO
agreements (for more discussion, see “Treatment of Developing Countries” and text box). While
it is unclear the extent of SDT provisions China has sought in current ongoing negotiations, China
is a part of the coalition group of Asian developing members at the WTO and has claimed to be a
developing country in various fora.82 In the view of the Trump Administration, “the United States
has never accepted China’s claim to developing-country status,” and the WTO should change its
approach to affording flexibilities based on developing country status.83 (See “Treatment of
Developing Countries”.) Some Members of Congress also view this issue as a priority for WTO
reform in order to address what they perceive as China’s “predatory trade practices and abuse.”84
Chinese officials assert that despite being the world’s second-largest economy, China remains a
developing country, due to its relatively low GDP per capita and other economic chal enges.85
Concerns over China’s trade actions despite its WTO commitments have led the Trump
Administration to increase the use of unilateral mechanisms outside the WTO that in its view
more effectively address Chinese “unfair trade practices;” the recent Section 301 investigation of
Chinese IPR and technology transfer practices and resulting imposition of tariffs is evidence of

78 “U.S. T rade Policy Priorities: Robert Lighthizer, United States T rade Representative,” September 18, 2017, CSIS,
https://www.csis.org/events/us-trade-policy-priorities-robert -lighthizer-united-states-trade-representative.
79 See UST R, 2019 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, March 2020.
80 Ibid, pp. 14-15.
81 See “U.S. Statement at the T rade Policy Review of the People’s Republic of China,” Statement as delivered by
Ambassador Dennis C. Shea on Behalf of the United States of America, July 11, 2018, Geneva.
82 In its June 2018 white paper “China and the World T rade Organization,” which reflects on its compliance with WT O
obligations and support for the multilateral trading system, China called itself the “largest developing country in the
world.” See http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/28/c_137286993.htm.
83 T he White House, “Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World T rade Organization,” July
26, 2019.
84 Rep. Darin LaHood and Rep. Anthony Gonzalez, “Reforming China’s unfair practices at the WT O will level the
global playing field,” Op-ed, Washington Examiner, August 4, 2020.
85 “China remains largest developing country: economist,” Xinhua, April 15, 2018. As per the World Bank, China is
considered a developed country, though it is often distinguished as an “ emerging market.” However, based on World
Bank classifications of countries by income groupings, using gross national income (GNI) per capita, China is
considered an upper-middle income economy. See World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview
and https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
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this strategy.86 Prior to the establishment of the WTO, the United States resorted to Section 301
relatively frequently, in particular due to concerns that the GATT lacked an effective DS system.87
When the United States joined the WTO in 1995, it agreed to use the DS mechanism rather than
act unilateral y; many analysts contend that the United States has violated its WTO obligations by
imposing tariffs against China under Section 301. Following its investigation, the United States
also initiated a WTO DS case against China’s “discriminatory technology licensing” in 2018.
Subsequently, China filed its own complaints at the WTO over U.S. tariff actions (see above).
The United States has pursued cooperation to some extent with other countries with similar
concerns over Chinese non-market policies and practices, and the need to clarify and improve
WTO rules on industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in particular.88 In
December 2017, the United States, EU, and Japan announced new trilateral efforts to cooperate
on issues related to government-supported excess capacity, unfair competition caused by market-
distorting subsidies and SOEs, forced technology transfer, and local content requirements.89 The
three officials have made advances toward a draft text on stronger rules on industrial subsidies;
however, talks appear to have make limited progress since mid-2019.90 (See “Competition with
SOEs and Non-Market Practices”.)
“Non-market oriented” policies and practices of China are a central driver of recent efforts. A
related WTO dispute involving China was poised to have significant implications for the
treatment of China’s economy under WTO rules, in particular the terms of China’s “nonmarket
economy” (NME) status under its WTO accession protocol.91 USTR Lighthizer described the
case as “the most serious litigation matter we have at the WTO” and that a decision in favor of
China would be “cataclysmic” for the WTO.92 Both the United States and EU continue to treat
China as a nonmarket economy in antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings, a point of
contention for China. Under its accession, China agreed to al ow WTO members to use
alternative methodologies, such as surrogate countries, for assessing prices and costs on products
subject to AD measures, amid their concerns that distortions in the Chinese economy caused by
government intervention result in Chinese prices that do not reflect market forces. China contends
that its WTO accession protocol requires al members to terminate use of the alternative
methodology by December 11, 2016. The NME distinction is important to China as it has often
resulted in higher AD margins on Chinese exports; moreover, a significant share of Chinese

86 CRS In Focus IF11346, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg.
87 Chad P. Bown, “Rogue 301: T rump to Dust Off Another Outdated US T rade Laws,” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, August 3, 2017, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/rogue-301-trump-dust-
another-outdated-us-trade-law.
88 Some experts suggest that the United States should pursue a comprehensive, multilateral case at the WT O with a
broad coalition of countries sharing concerns about certain Chinese practices that either violate one or more specific
WT O commitments or that “nullify or impair” a benefit provided to WT O members (known as a non -violation claim
under Article XXIII of the GAT T ). See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on U.S.
Tools to Address Chinese Market Distortions, written testimony of Jennifer Hillman, June 8, 2018.
89 UST R, “Joint Statement by the United States, European Unio n and Japan at MC11,” December 11, 2017.
90 UST R, “Joint Statement on T rilateral Meeting of the T rade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the European
Union,” press release, May 31, 2018; and “Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the T rade Ministers,” press
release, January 9, 2019 and May 23, 2019.
91 Section 301 through 310 of the T rade Act of 1974, commonly called “Section 301,” is one of the principal statutory
means by which the United States addresses “unfair” foreign trade barriers to U.S. exports and enforces U.S. rights
under trade agreements. Section 301 applies to foreign acts, policies, and practices that UST R determines either
violates, or is inconsistent with, a trade agreement; or is “unjustifiable” and burdens or restricts U.S. trade.
92 David Lawder, “U.S. formally opposes China market economy status at the WT O,” Reuters, November 30, 2017.
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exports is subject to trade remedies.93 The United States and the EU have argued that the WTO
language is vague and did not automatical y obligate them to extend market economy status
(MES) to China because it is stil not a market economy.94
In December 2016, China requested consultations under WTO DS with the United States and EU
over the failure to grant China MES. In April 2017, a panel was established in the EU case. In
November 2017, the United States formal y submitted arguments as a third party in support of the
EU; China’s case involving the United States did not progress. The EU-China panel said it
expected to issue its final report during the second quarter of 2019.95 In May 2019, however,
China requested to suspend its dispute with the EU before the findings were issued.96
Current Status and Ongoing Negotiations
Buenos Aires Ministerial MC11, 2017
The last WTO Ministerial Conference (MC11) took place in December 2017, in Buenos Aires,
Argentina. After countries were unable to complete the Doha Round (see text box below), many
questioned what could effectively be achieved at MC11. WTO Director-General Azevêdo had
tempered expectations for major negotiated outcomes, acknowledging that “members’ positions
continue to diverge significantly on the substantial issues.”97 These differences were perhaps most
apparent by the inability of WTO members to reach consensus over a Ministerial Declaration,
largely due to staunch disagreements over including references to the mandate of the Doha Round
(see text box).98 Instead the Ministerial became primarily an opportunity for members to take
stock of ongoing talks and further define priority work areas.
Although WTO members worked intensively to build consensus over proposals in several areas,
MC11 did not result in major breakthroughs. WTO members committed to intensify negotiations
to reduce fisheries subsidies, “with a view to adopting” an agreement by the next Ministerial; the
United States has supported these efforts. A joint statement was issued by 60 members in support
of advancing multilateral negotiations on domestic regulations in services. Subsets of WTO
members also issued statements committing to new work programs or open-ended talks for
interested parties to potential y conclude plurilateral agreements in areas, including:99
 E-commerce: among 84 WTO members, including the United States;
 Investment facilitation: among 98 WTO members; and

93 Chad P. Bown, “ Should the United States Recognize China as a Market Economy?” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, December 2016.
94 T he expectation back in 2001 was that China would transition to a market economy within 15 years.
95 WT O, “DS516: European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies,” https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm.
96 Some speculate that this action was in anticipation of some findings that were not favorable to China. T om Miles,
“China pulls WT O suit over claim to be a market economy,” Reuters, June 17, 2019.
97 WT O, “DG Azevêdo details process for MC11 as preparations enter final stages,” November 28, 2017,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra201_e.htm.
98 “MC11 expected to end without Ministerial declaration as U.S., India clash over language on development,” Inside
U.S. Trade, December 13, 2017.
99 Number of countries in the talks reflects current participants, which expanded since the original announcemen ts.
WT O, “New initiatives on electronic commerce, investment facilitation and MSMEs,” December 13, 2017,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/minis_13dec17_e.htm.
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 Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises: among 90 WTO members.
The lack of concrete multilateral outcomes at MC11 was a reminder of the continued resistance of
some countries to a new agenda outside of the original 2001 Doha mandate. In the view of EU
Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, the Ministerial “laid bare the deficiencies of the
negotiating function at the WTO” and that “members are systematical y being blocked from
addressing the pressing realities of global trade.” Malmström blamed the lack of progress on
“procedural excuses and vetoes” and “cynical hostage taking.”100 Some developing country
members, including India, attempted to block multilateral progress in a range of areas absent
more progress on Doha issues, such as agricultural stockholding for food security. Such “hostage-
taking” tactics, widely acknowledged to have hindered progress in the Doha Round, further
highlight the difficulty of achieving future consensus among al 164 members.
In contrast, the United States general y viewed the Ministerial outcome positively—that it
signaled “the impasse at the WTO was broken,” paving the way for like-minded countries to
pursue new work in other areas.101 USTR expressed U.S. support in particular for forthcoming
work on e-commerce, scientific standards for agriculture, and disciplines on fisheries subsidies.

What Happened to the Doha Round
The Doha Round launched in November 2001, but after nearly two decades of negotiations, members did not
achieve its agenda. In the 2015 Ministerial Declaration, WTO members acknowledged their divisions over the
future of Doha and over reaffirming its continuation:
We recognize that many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and the Declarations and
Decisions adopted at Doha and at the Ministerial Conferences held since then, and reaffirm their ful
commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they
believe new approaches are necessary to achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members
have different views on how to address the negotiations.
Put simply, the large and diverse membership of the WTO made consensus on the broad Doha mandate
difficult. At the root of the stalemate were persistent differences among the United States, EU, and developing
countries on major issues including agricultural market access, subsidies, industrial tariffs and nontariff barriers,
services, and trade remedies. Developing countries, including large emerging markets like China, Brazil, and
India, sought reduction of agricultural tariffs and subsidies by developed countries, nonreciprocal market access
for manufacturing sectors, and continued protection for services sectors. In contrast, developed country
members sought reciprocal trade liberalization, especial y commercial y meaningful market access in advanced
developing countries, while retaining protection for agriculture.
Procedural rigidities inherent in the WTO negotiating approach also complicated negotiations. In particular, the
“single undertaking” approach, which means “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” prevented progress
in select areas where consensus might be easier to achieve. However, some experts view a big package as the
best approach to securing major new trade liberalization where every member has to give and take.
Countries have disagreed about how to learn best from the perceived failure of Doha, leaving the path forward
unclear. In the view of former USTR Michael Froman, the “route forward is a new form of pragmatic
multilateralism. Moving beyond Doha does not mean leaving its unfinished business behind. Rather, it means
bringing new approaches to the table. Doha issues are too important to leave to the Doha architecture that has
failed for so long.” Recently, the EU, Canada, and others have put forward proposals to “modernize” the WT O.

100 European Commission, “EU Statement at the Heads of Delegations meeting,” Buenos Aires, Argentina, December
13, 2017, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156464.pdf.
101 UST R, “UST R Robert Lighthizer Statement on the Conclusion of the WT O Ministerial Conference,” press release,
December 2017.
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Outlook for MC12, 2021
The Ministerial general y convenes every two years to make decisions and announce progress on
multilateral trade agreements. With Kazakhstan as the host for MC12, members scheduled the
Ministerial for June 2020 in the expectation of more accommodating weather. Following the
mixed results of MC11, the United States and other WTO members had hoped MC12 would be
an action-forcing event to conclude key negotiations and make progress on multiple initiatives,
demonstrating the value of the WTO. MC12 was also to serve as a critical forum for taking stock
of various WTO reform proposals and the crisis in the DS system.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, MC12 was postponed to 2021.102 During COVID-19, some
WTO activities have continued virtual y, including General Council meetings, and some in person
as wel , as limited staff returned to offices in May. But several negotiations stal ed as members
reevaluate whether it is viable and appropriate for talks to be conducted virtual y. The strategic
direction for MC12 wil be shaped by new leadership of the WTO Secretariat, following DG
Azevêdo’s announcement that he wil resign at the end of August 2020, a year before his term’s
end. Azevêdo resigned early to prevent the DG selection from coinciding with MC12, potential y
diverting political attention from achieving critical outcomes (see text box under “Policy Issues
and Future Direction”).
Selected Ongoing WTO Negotiations
Despite the postponement of the 2020 Ministerial, several countries continue to make progress on
some ongoing talks, including fisheries subsidies and e-commerce. In other areas, such as
agriculture and environmental goods, talks remain largely stal ed with no clear path forward. The
various states of talks raise the stakes for making progress at the rescheduled Ministerial in 2021.
Agriculture
For some issues, multilateral solutions arguably remain ideal, for example, disciplines on
agricultural subsidies, which are widely used by developed and advanced developing countries
alike. While the Doha Round largely did not achieve its comprehensive negotiating mandate to
lower agricultural tariffs and subsidies, negotiations more limited in scope have continued.103 The
2015 Nairobi Ministerial agreed to eliminate export subsidies for agriculture, but the issue of
public stockholding remains seemingly intractable. Public stockholding—otherwise known as
price support or supply control programs—is used by governments, especial y in developing
countries to purchase and stockpile food to bolster domestic farm prices by removing surplus
stocks from the market. Some governments may release portions of these government-owned
stocks to the public during periods of market volatility or shortage, but a major concern is that
some of these stocks may be exported at below their purchase price, thus acting as indirect export
subsidies. These programs can also become problematic when governments purchase food at a
price and quantity that effectively become trade-distorting domestic support.
Since the last Ministerial, working groups have met to seek convergence in the areas of domestic
support, market access, export competition, export prohibition/restrictions, public stockholding,
and cotton trade issues. With the postponement of MC12, members have exchanged views in

102 WT O, “ DG Azevêdo provides urgent information to WTO members on MC12 date and venue,” Press release,
March 12, 2020.
103 For more detailed analysis, see CRS Report R46456, Reforming the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, by Anita
Regmi, Nina M. Hart, and Randy Schnepf.
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writing on issues, including public stockholding and special safeguard mechanisms for
developing countries. Recognizing the potential social and economic impact of the COVID-19
pandemic, the chair of the Agriculture Committee plans to seek member feedback on the ongoing
negotiations in an effort to revitalize reform efforts in September 2020.104
As part of WTO reform efforts, the United States has also flagged the broader issue of
notifications and transparency, which has implications for agricultural trade reform. WTO
agreements require members to notify subsidies and trade-distorting support to ensure
transparency and consistency with a member’s obligation. Compliance with notifications has
been notoriously lax, with some countries years behind on their reporting. According to U.S.
Department of Agriculture trade counsel, Jason Hafemeister, these practices have consequences:
In the absence of transparency, how are we to determine whether Members are complying
with existing obligations? Moreover, only with comprehensive and current information can
negotiators understand, discuss, and address the problems that face farmers today: high
tariffs, trade distorting support, and non-tariff barriers.105
Some experts see a transparency agreement as a feasible outcome for an eventual MC12. The
United States and other countries are also raising issues of special and differential treatment in the
agriculture negotiations (see below).
Fisheries Subsidies
As noted above, WTO members committed to negotiate disciplines related to fisheries subsidies
that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing with a view toward reaching an agreement by
2020. The proposals aim to meet the goals outlined in the UN Sustainable Development Goal 14
targeting il egal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. Members have tabled proposals to:
 combat IUU fishing, overfishing, and overcapacity by prohibiting harmful
fishery subsidies,
 cap the total amount of fisheries subsidies,
 identify al eged maintenance of a prohibited subsidy by another member through
a consultation mechanism, and
 require greater transparency over fishing subsidies.106
Members had committed to finish negotiations on fisheries subsidies at MC12, an achievement
many view as critical to upholding the WTO’s legitimacy. With the cancel ation of in-person
meetings during the pandemic, the chair initial y attempted to continue talks, but halted them after
some parties voiced concerns about the virtual participation. The chair released a consolidated
text in June, which forms the basis for negotiations with four rounds planned for September
through the end of 2020, with the goal to conclude the agreement by year-end or by MC12.
The United States has emphasized notification requirements and the need for subsidy caps that
“can combine transparent and accountable policy space with serious constraints on major

104 WT O, “ WT O members appoint new chair for agriculture talks,” July 21, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news20_e/agng_21jul20_e.htm.
105 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service, “What’s Next for Agriculture in the WT O?” January
5, 2018, https://www.fas.usda.gov/newsroom/what -s-next-agriculture-wto.
106 “New fisheries subsidies proposals considered ahead of December target for agreement,” WT O Press Release,
September 13, 2019, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/fish_13sep19_e.htm.
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subsidizers.”107 The United States has sought application of the commitments to al countries,
while some developing country members have sought flexibilities in implementing
commitments.108 A recent U.S. executive order aims to increase enforcement and resources to
combat IUU fishing and promote domestic seafood production.109
Electronic Commerce/Digital Trade
Digital trade has emerged as a major force in world trade since the Uruguay Round, creating end
products (e.g., email or social media), enabling trade in services (e.g., consulting), and facilitating
goods trade through services, such as logistics and supply chain management that depend on
digital data flows. While the GATS contains explicit commitments for telecommunications and
financial services that underlie e-commerce, trade barriers related to digital trade, information
flows, and other related issues are not specifical y included. The WTO Work Program on
Electronic Commerce was established in 1998 to examine trade-related issues for e-commerce
under existing agreements.110 Under the work program, members agreed to continue a temporary
moratorium on e-commerce customs duties, and have renewed the moratorium at each ministerial
meeting. Members had extended the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions
until MC12, but it is unclear if the extension wil be sustained after the delayed Ministerial, given
the opposition of some developing countries and lack of agreement on what would constitute the
scope of electronic transmissions.
Separate from the work program, at the 11th Ministerial, over 75 countries agreed to “initiate
exploratory work on negotiations on electronic commerce issues in the WTO.”111 After initial
talks, information exchanges and education, especial y targeting developing country members,
the United States and other parties formal y launched the e-commerce initiative in January
2019,112 and negotiations commenced in March 2019. Known as the Joint Statement Initiative on
E-commerce (JSI) and coordinated by Australia, Japan, and Singapore, the now 84 participants
are a mix of developed and developing countries and include the United States, EU, and China,
among others. As with the work program, some developing countries have opted not to participate
in the negotiations. For example, India and South Africa stated they do not want to accept
international constraints on efforts to protect their domestic industry or raise potential tariff
revenue on digital products, actions could be prohibited or curtailed under a new agreement.
Multiple negotiating parties submitted proposals outlining their positions and desired scope for
the negotiations.113 The United States was one of the first parties to submit a discussion paper.
The U.S. proposal includes “trade provisions that represent the highest standard in safeguarding
and promoting digital trade” and reflects the U.S. support for a market-driven, open, interoperable
internet under a multi-stakeholder system.114 The paper echoes many of the commitments

107 Hannah Monicken, “WTO to start fisheries text negotiations in fall; U.S. sees ‘missing pieces’,” Inside U.S. Trade,
July 21, 2020.
108 “WT O Polarized over Fisheries Subsidies,” Washington Trade Daily, July 2020.
109 White House, “ Executive Order on Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth ,” May 7,
2020.
110 WT O, “Electronic Commerce,” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/ecom_e.htm.
111 Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, WT O WT/MIN(17).60, December 13, 2017.
112 Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, WT O WT/L/1056, January 25, 2019.
113 All proposals can be found on the WT O online documents portal: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/
FE_S_S001.aspx.
114 United States, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, WT O INF/ECOM/23, April 26, 2019.
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contained in the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force in July
2020. On the other hand, a proposal by China focuses on facilitating narrowly on e-commerce
and global value chains as a means to assist WTO members, especial y developing countries, in
benefiting from digital trade.115 Some proposals included digital trade facilitation measures (e.g.,
electronic single windows and interoperability, technology for customs risk management), but it
is unclear if these issues should be considered under the WTO Committee on Trade Facilitation
and implementation of the TFA.116
The plurilateral negotiations are happening within the WTO context as the parties aim to set a
new international standard that could eventual y become a multilateral agreement. With MC12’s
postponement, the parties are negotiating virtual y, as wel as through hybrid in-person/virtual
formats, al owing trade negotiators and subject matter experts to participate.
The parties recognize that there are some significant hurdles, including issues related to data
flows and privacy, but aim to have a consolidated text this year. A June 2020 statement by the
members of the so-cal ed Ottawa Group117 cal ed for “officials to prioritize and accelerate work
on the Joint Statement Initiative on E-commerce, including through informal and virtual
discussions, ahead of the rescheduled Twelfth Ministerial Conference (MC12) in 2021, including
by the development of a consolidated negotiating text by the end of 2020 at the latest.”118 While
not a member of the group, the United States is reportedly in agreement with the goal of
completion of a streamlined text by the end of the year.119
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA)
The EGA negotiations were initiated in mid-2014 to liberalize trade in environmental goods
through tariff liberalization. The original 14 participants, including the United States, the EU, and
China, represented nearly 90% of global trade in covered environmental goods;120 talks have
since expanded to include 18 WTO members. Like the ITA, the EGA would be an open
plurilateral agreement so that the benefits achieved through negotiations would be extended on an
MFN basis to al WTO members. Despite 18 rounds of negotiations, members were unable to
conclude the agreement by the meeting of the General Council in December 2016, and no
negotiations have taken place since. Several stakeholders blamed China for the lack of progress,
as it rejected the list of products to be included and requested lengthy tariff phaseout periods
which other countries refused to accept.121 The EGA’s future remains uncertain; while several
countries have expressed support for resuming talks, the Trump Administration has not put
forward a public position on the agreement.122

115 China, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, WT O INF/ECOM/19, April 23, 2019.
116 T he T rade Facilitation Committee was created on 22 February 2017 when the T rade Facilitation Agreement (T FA)
entered into force. For more information, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/comm_tradfa_e.htm.
117 Ottawa Group members include Canada, Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Union, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, N ew
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland.
118 Government of Canada, “ June 2020 Statement of the Ottawa Group: Focusing Action on Covid-19,” June 15, 2020,
https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/wto-omc/2019-06-
covid-19.aspx?lang=eng.
119 “U.S. Urges Speed in E-Commerce T alks,” Washington Trade Daily, June 15, 2020.
120 WT O, “ Azevêdo welcomes launch of plurilateral environmental goods negotiations,” July 8, 2014.
121 “EU blames China for WT O environmental trade talks collapse,” Reuters, December 4, 2016; “Key Lawmaker, EU
and industry all blame China for torpedoing EGA deal,” Inside U.S. Trade, December 7, 2016.
122 “U.S. remains silent as WT O members look for ways to resume EGA talks,” Inside U.S. Trade, June 22, 2017.
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Policy Issues and Future Direction
The inability of WTO members to conclude a comprehensive agreement during the Doha Round
raised new questions about the WTO’s future direction. Many intractable issues from Doha
remain unresolved, and members have yet to reach consensus on a way forward. Persistent
differences about the extent and balance of trade liberalization continue to limit progress, as
indicated by the outcomes of recent ministerial meetings. Further, members remain divided over
adopting new issues on the agenda, amid concerns that the WTO could lose relevance if its rules
are not updated to reflect the modern global economy. Some WTO members seek to incorporate
new issues that pose chal enges to the trading system, such as digital trade, competition with
SOEs, global supply chains, and the relationship between trade and environment issues.
These divisions have cal ed into question the viability of the “single undertaking,” or one-package
approach in future multilateral negotiations and suggest broader need for institutional reform if
the WTO is to remain a relevant negotiating body. Moreover, the consistent practice of some
countries like India to block discussion of new issues serves as a reminder of the power of a
single member to halt progress in the WTO’s consensus-based system.
As a result of slow progress at the WTO, countries have increasingly turned to other venues to
advance trade liberalization and rules, namely plurilateral agreements and preferential FTAs
outside the WTO. Plurilaterals have been seen as having the potential to resurrect the WTO’s
relevance as a negotiating body, but have also been seen as possibly undermining multilateralism,
if the agreements are not extended to al WTO members on an MFN basis. Regional trade
agreements have also been seen as potential laboratories for new rules. How these negotiations
and agreements wil ultimately affect the WTO’s status as the preeminent global trade institution
is widely debated.
The fundamental longstanding chal enges facing the WTO are compounded by recent
developments that have further strained the trading system. In the near-term, COVID-19 has
highlighted serious economic and trade policy chal enges, in addition to the health crisis, and has
spurred protectionist trade and investment policies and disruptions to supply chains that may have
lasting effects.123 Many observers have cal ed for better global coordination in policy responses,
with some advocating for a new WTO plurilateral agreement on medical goods. Whether the
WTO is equipped to play a meaningful role in the crisis is also tied to broader questions about the
need for systemic reform of the institution. As Deputy DG Alan Wolff posited in May 2020:124
In the current upsurge in criticism of the inadequacies of the collective res ponses to the
pandemic, the WTO is receiving heightened scrutiny. Were the WTO Members to join
together to meet the trade challenges of the coronavirus and the desperately needed
economic recovery, most public criticisms of the WTO would likely disappear. But the
problems preceded the pandemic and will, absent reforms, persist after the pandemic is
over and its after-effects have been addressed. It is necessary to understand what values the
multilateral trading system is designed to promote before it can be reformed.
Prior to the crisis, concerns were already mounting about the growing use of trade protectionist
policies by both developed and developing countries, recent U.S. unilateral tariff actions and

123 See for example, OECD, COVID-19 and International Trade: Issues and Actions, June 12, 2020,
http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-and-international-trade-issues-and-actions-494da2fa/;
Chad P. Bown, “COVID-19 Could Bring Down the T rading System: How to Stop Protectionism From Running
Amok,” Foreign Affairs, April 28, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-28/covid-19-
could-bring-down-trading-system.
124 WT O, “ DDG Wolff: T his is the time to consider the future of the multilateral trading system ,” May 27, 2020.
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counterretaliation by other countries, and escalating trade disputes between major economies.
Many countries are questioning whether the WTO is equipped to effectively handle the
chal enges of emerging markets like China, where the state may play a central role in
international trade, as wel as the deepening trade tensions between major economic players.
Some experts view the multilateral trading system as facing a potential crisis, while others remain
optimistic that the current state of affairs could spur renewed focus on reforms of the system.
WTO members, including the EU, Canada, Japan, and the United States, are exploring areas for
reform and have submitted various proposals.
New WTO leadership wil face ushering the trading system through these chal enges. WTO
members are currently in the process of selecting a new DG among eight candidates (see text
box). The process requires al 164 members to agree by consensus on the appointment. WTO
members and observers view the outcome of the DG race and fresh leadership as important to
inject new momentum into the institution, amid efforts to increase its relevance and chart a path
forward. The WTO has expedited the intensive selection process, usual y lasting nine months, to
conclude possibly by early November, after Azevêdo steps down and following the U.S.
presidential election.125
Selection of WTO Director-General
Notwithstanding the lack of formal power of the WTO Secretariat, the DG is an advocate for the global trading
system and often wields “soft power,” relying on diplomatic and political heft in helping members build consensus
or break stalemates—an increasingly difficult task in recent years.126 As a result, some have argued that the
Secretariat should be granted more authority to table proposals and advance new rules.127
In the current DG race, analysts have variously cal ed for an “honest broker” and dealmaker, politician over
technocrat, or a “peacekeeper.” DG qualifications broadly include “extensive experience in international relations,
encompassing economic, trade and/or political experience; a firm commitment to the work and objectives of the
WTO; proven leadership and managerial ability; and demonstrated communication skil s.”128 The eight candidates
in 2020 have a breadth of experience (Table 4). A recent survey suggests management and political experience,
economics training, and WTO negotiating experience are preferred characteristics.129 Experts speculated at the
onset that Nigeria’s Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Kenya’s Amina Mohamed lead the field.130
WTO DG appointments general y have alternated between developing and developed countries, and have hailed
from al regions except Africa, the Middle East, and North America—regions home to five current candidates.
With Azevêdo from Brazil, some developed countries view it as their moment, while African countries strongly
argue it is their turn. No female has ever served as DG, and some are cal ing for a change to the status quo.
Candidates have emphasized that regardless of these factors, the person most qualified for the position should be
chosen. Some have highlighted their political neutrality for managing differences between the United States and
China as advantages to their candidacy.

125 Members were unable to agree on which deputy DG would serve as acting DG at the end of August until the
selection process concludes, attributed to disagreements between the U.S. and China. “U.S. official: China blocked
acting DG compromise at WT O,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 30, 2020.
126 David T inline and T atiana Lacerda Prazeres, “5 reasons why the role of WT O Director -General matters,” World
Economic Forum, June 5, 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/5-reasons-why-the-world-trade-
organization-wto-director-general-position-matters-roberto-azevedo-step-down/.
127 Doug Palmer, “U.S. dismisses ‘invalid’ WT O Appellate Body ruling,” Politico Pro Trade, April 23, 2020.
128 WT O, Procedures for the Appointment of Director-Generals, WT /L/509, January 20, 2003.
129 Fiorinia et al., “Selecting the next WT O Director-General: What the trade community thinks,” VoxEU, July 8, 2020,
https://voxeu.org/article/selecting-next-wto-director-general-what -trade-community-thinks.
130 Jim Brunsden and Alan Bettie, “Kenyan and Nigerian candidates lead field for WT O chief,” Financial Times, July
8, 2020.
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Table 4. WTO DG Candidates
Candidate (by order of
announcement)
Country
Background and Key Positions
Jesús Seade Kuri
Mexico

Foreign Affairs Under Secretary for North
America

Former Deputy DG of the WTO

Former Deputy DG of the GATT
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
Nigeria

Former Finance Minister

Former Managing Director World Bank
Abdel-Hamid Mamdouh
Egypt

Senior Counsel, King & Spalding LLP

Former WTO official
Tudor Ulianovschi
Moldova

Former Foreign Minister

Former Ambassador to WTO
Yoo Myung-hee
South Korea

Trade Minister
Amina C. Mohamed
Kenya

Secretary for Sports, Culture and Heritage

Former Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister;
Chair of 2015 WTO Ministerial Conference

Former Deputy Secretary-General United
Nations
Mohammad Maziad Al-Tuwaijri
Saudi Arabia

Royal Court Adviser

Former Economy and Planning Minister

Former Banking Executive
Liam Fox
United Kingdom

Former Trade Secretary
Source: WTO, “Candidates for DG selection process 2020,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/
dgsel20_e/dgsel20_e.htm
DG candidates met (primarily virtual y) with WTO members from July 15-17 to present views and answer
questions.131 This campaign phase, expected to last through September 7, is fol owed by consultations among
members over two months to narrow the field and build consensus around a candidate (two candidates are to be
eliminated in the first round and three candidates in the second round, leaving two for the final selection). A
selection committee, headed by the GC Chair, leads this process. The committee then issues its recommendation
on the candidate most likely to gain consensus, and members make their final decision.132
Regarding ideal qualities for a DG, in testimony to Congress USTR Lighthizer cal ed for leadership that supports
fundamental, across the-board reform and understands the nature of problems facing market economies in dealing
with China and current rules that fail to discipline large state-run economies.133 He noted that any “whiff of anti-
Americanism” would be grounds for a U.S. veto.
COVID-19 and WTO Reactions
As countries across the world grapple with COVID-19, many WTO activities have been disrupted
and trade policy chal enges have emerged. Experts have emphasized trade policies as playing a
major role in two respects. First in helping respond to COVID-19 and second, in assisting in the
recovery. The WTO committed to work with other international organizations to minimize
disruptions to cross-border trade and global supply chains—in particular those central to
combatting the virus. The WTO has also sought to inform members of the impact of the
pandemic, and cal ed on members to abide by notification obligations on trade-related measures

131 For candidates statements, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dgsel20_e/dgsel20_e.htm.
132 In the (rare) absence of consensus, procedures specify that as a last resort there can be recourse to other voting
procedures.
133 House Ways and Means Committee, Hearing on the President’s 2020 Trade Policy Agenda, written testimony by
Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, June 17, 2020.
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taken in response. Many countries, including the United States, have imposed temporary
restrictions on exports of certain medical goods and some foodstuffs to mitigate potential
shortages.134 At the same time, some countries have since lifted restrictions or implemented
measures to liberalize trade.135 A WTO report in April 2020 warned of the policies’ long-term
costs, in terms of lower supply and higher prices.136 WTO leadership urged careful consideration
of ripple effects of export curbs, as most major countries are both exporters and importers of
medical supplies, and emphasized use of WTO-consistent tools to address critical shortages, such
as unilateral y eliminating tariffs or other taxes, expediting customs procedures, and using
subsidies to generate production. In April, the WTO estimated a plunge in global trade in 2020,
with a potential recovery in 2021 dependent on the duration of the pandemic and countries’ policy
choices.137 For the latter, transparency is viewed as critical y important; however, members have
been slow to formal y notify new measures.138
WTO agreements are flexible in permitting emergency measures related to national security or
health that may contravene WTO obligations. They broadly require, however, that such
restrictions be targeted, temporary, and transparent, and do not unnecessarily restrict trade. GATT
Article XI prohibits export bans and restrictions, other than duties, taxes or other charges, but
al ows members to apply restrictions temporarily “to prevent or relieve critical shortages of
foodstuffs or other products essential” to the exporting country, among other circumstances. In
the case of foodstuffs, members must give “due consideration to the effects on food security” of
importers. As previously discussed, general exceptions providing policy flexibility require that
restrictions are not “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” or “disguised restriction
on international trade,” among other conditions.
Several WTO agreements have relevance to health-related policy, such as TBT, SPS, GATS and
TRIPS. Others guide implementation of policies, including the WTO’s core principle of
nondiscrimination and rules on subsidies. Specific commitments have contributed to liberalized
trade in medical products: (1) tariff negotiations during the Uruguay Round; (2) a plurilateral
Agreement on Pharmaceutical Products, updated in 2011; and (3) the expanded ITA in 2015.
These have improved market access for medical products, but barriers remain. An April 2020
WTO report estimates nearly $600 bil ion in annual trade in critical medical products with limited
availability during COVID-19.139 For these products, the average applied MFN tariff is 4.8%, but
certain products, such as hand soap and face masks, have relatively high tariffs in some countries.
As measures to restrict trade spread in early 2020, some countries including the G-20
recommitted to WTO guidance that measures be targeted, temporary, and transparent. A group of
seven countries led by New Zealand and Singapore issued stronger statements to maintain open
and connected supply chains.140 Forty-two WTO members pledged to lift emergency measures as
soon as possible; the United States, EU, and China did not join the pledge. Experts have

134 CRS In Focus IF11551, Export Restrictions in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, by Christopher A. Casey and
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
135 WT O, “ WT O report on G20 shows moves to facilitate imports even as trade restrictions remain widespread,” June
29, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/trdev_29jun20_e.htm.
136 WT O, Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, Information Note, April 23, 2020.
137 WT O, “T rade falls steeply in first half of 2020,” Press Release, June 22, 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
pres20_e/pr858_e.htm.
138 WT O, “COVID-19 and world trade,” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm.
139 WT O, Trade in Medical Goods in the Context of Tackling COVID-19, Information Note, April 3, 2020.
140 See https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/news-nouvelles/2020-03-25-joint-ministerial-statement-declaration-
ministerielle-commune.aspx?lang=eng.
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advocated for more coordinated trade policies worldwide or concrete action in the WTO.141 In
June, the Ottawa Group recommended a range of actions, with a central role for the WTO:142
In response to these challenges, thinking has begun on trade policy actions that would
support an inclusive, sustainable, and resilient recovery as well as what trade rules should
be adapted or developed to guide collaborative policy responses to future global crises. In
this context, the WTO must play an important role in helping ensure coordination and
coherence between actions its members take. This will require initiative and engagement
by WTO members in order to be successful.
Some WTO members advocate for a plurilateral agreement on medical goods, modeled after the
ITA. Other members acknowledge that there is neither time nor political wil to conclude a round
of tariff negotiations in the near term, but advocate for unilateral reductions. New Zealand and
Singapore recently agreed to an “open plurilateral” agreement to remove tariffs, not to impose
export restrictions, and to remove nontariff barriers on COVID-19 related products.143 The two
countries have encouraged others to join. U.S. trade officials have said they prioritize dealing
with the crisis before discussing the WTO role.144 Per USTR Lighthizer remarks in May to G20
trade ministers: “while we are in the midst of the crisis, we caution against embarking upon new
plurilateral tariff cutting negotiations, or trying to dictate what the future role of the WTO may be
in terms of addressing longer-term actions. Indeed, we find it inappropriate to use this crisis,
which has been tragic for the global community, to push other agendas.”
Negotiating Approaches
Plurilateral Agreements
In contrast to the consensus-based agreements of the WTO, some members, including the United
States, point to the progress made in sectoral or plurilateral settings as the way forward for the
institution. By assembling coalitions of interested parties, negotiators may more easily and
quickly achieve trade liberalizing objectives, as shown by the ITA. Sectoral agreements are
viewed as one way to pursue new agreements and extend WTO disciplines and commitments in
new areas, including, for example, U.S. trade priorities in digital trade and SOEs. The
commitments by some WTO members to pursue talks in e-commerce, investment facilitation,
SMEs and other areas, could plant the seeds for future plurilaterals.
Plurilateral negotiations, however, stil involve resolving divisions among developed and
advanced developing countries. Members were able ultimately to overcome their differences in
the ITA negotiation, but thus far have been unable to reach consensus in the EGA. At the same
time, the participation of developing and emerging market economies, such as China and India, is

141 For example, see Richard E. Baldwin and Simon J. Evenett ed., COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward
Won’t Work, Centre for Economic Policy Research, April 2020; Wendy Cutler, “Coronavirus: T he Need to Adjust and
Reshape Our T rade Agenda,” March 17, 2020, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/coronavirus-need-adjust-and-
reshape-our-trade-agenda; Jennifer Hillman, “ Six Proactive Steps in a Smart T rade Approach to Fighting COVID-19,”
Think Global Health, March 20, 2020, https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/six-proactive-steps-smart-trade-
approach-fighting-covid-19; and Anabel Gonzalez, “ A memo to trade ministers on how trade policy can help fight
COVID-19,” T rade and Investment Policy Watch blog, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment -policy-
watch/memo-trade-ministers-how-trade-policy-can-help-fight-covid.
142 Government of Canada, “ June 2020 Statement of the Ottawa Group: Focusing Action on Covid-19,” June 15, 2020,
https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/wto-omc/2019-06-
covid-19.aspx?lang=eng.
143 See https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/covid-19-and-trade/.
144 “U.S.: Wait until crisis subsides to address WT O’s role,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 15, 2020.
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critical to achieving agreements that cover a meaningful share of global trade. There is also a
concern that plurilateral agreements not applied on an MFN basis could lead nonparticipating
countries to become marginalized from the trading system and face new trade restrictions. To
attract a critical mass of participants and lower barriers for developing countries and LDCs who
may be hesitant to agree to ambitious commitments, agreements could al ow flexibility in
implementation timeframes and provide additional assistance, as in the TFA.
Some experts question whether potential waning U.S. leadership in plurilateral and multilateral
trade negotiations might slow momentum toward concluding new agreements (see “Value of the
Multilateral System and U.S. Leadership and Membership”). The Trump Administration has yet
to clarify its position on plurilaterals pursued under the Obama Administration, such as EGA and
TiSA, which have stal ed, but is supporting new efforts on e-commerce/digital trade.
Preferential Free Trade Agreements
Given that the WTO al ows its members to establish preferential FTAs outside the WTO that are
consistent with WTO rules, many countries have formed bilateral or regional FTAs and customs
areas; since 1990, the number of RTAs in force has increased seven-fold, with around 300
agreements notified to the WTO and in force.145 FTAs have often provided more negotiating
flexibility for countries to advance new trade liberalization and rulemaking that builds on WTO
agreements; however, the agreements vary widely in terms of scope and depth. Like plurilaterals,
many view comprehensive FTAs as having potential for advancing the global trade agenda.
However, like plurilaterals, FTAs can also have downsides compared to multilateral deals.
The United States currently has 14 FTAs in force with 20 countries, with some new partial
agreements completed or in progress. The Trump Administration has stated a preference for
negotiating bilateral FTAs, rather than multiparty agreements. In October 2019, the United States
and Japan signed the “first stage” of trade agreements covering certain agricultural and industrial
goods market access, as wel as rules on digital trade—the agreements did not require
congressional approval.146 In January 2020, Congress approved the USMCA between the United
States, Mexico, and Canada, which replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).147 In addition, USTR notified Congress of trade negotiations with the EU, the UK, and
most recently, Kenya.
In general, U.S. FTAs are considered to be “WTO-plus” in that they reaffirm the WTO
agreements, but also eliminate most tariff and nontariff barriers and contain rules and obligations
in areas not covered by the WTO. For example, most U.S. FTAs include access to services
markets beyond what is contained in the GATS or, more recently, digital trade obligations and
disciplines to address distortions from state-led trade practices. The recent U.S. limited
agreements with Japan, however, represent a significant shift in approach from recent U.S. FTAs,
which typical y involve one comprehensive negotiation and agenda. Several analysts question the
extent to which the stage-one agreement adheres to GATT Article XXIV, requiring that FTAs

145 As of the end of 2019. WT O RT A database, https://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx.
146 White House, “Joint Statement of the United States and Japan,” September 25, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/joint -statement-united-states-japan-2/; UST R, “ FACT SHEET : U.S.-Japan T rade Agreement,”
September 2019, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2019/september/fact -sheet -us-japan-
trade-agreement .
147 CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F.
Fergusson.
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cover “substantial y al trade,” in particular given the exclusion of U.S.-Japan auto trade.148
Whether or not the agreement violates the letter or spirit of this provision likely depends on the
timeline and scope of the next stage of U.S.-Japan talks, which both sides indicated aim to be
comprehensive in scope, and whether another WTO member would chal enge it via WTO dispute
settlement.149 In practice, however, WTO members have rarely chal enged other trading partners’
agreements for consistency with these requirements at DS proceedings.150
While U.S. FTAs cover some major trading partners, the majority of U.S. trade, including with
significant trade partners such as China and the EU, continues to rely solely on the terms of
market access and rulemaking in WTO agreements. In 2019, the United States traded $3.6 tril ion
with non-FTA partners, compared to $2 tril ion with its FTA partners (Figure 8).
Figure 8. U.S. Trade in the WTO

Sources: Data from the Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Figure created by CRS.
Notes: Includes exports and imports of goods and services. U.S. trade with non-FTA partners is covered under
WTO rules. Since the U.S.-Japan trade agreement, which entered into effect in January 2020 covers a portion
(5%), but not al bilateral goods trade and second-stage talks remain incomplete, Japan is not included as a ful
FTA partner for il ustrative purposes.
More recently, groups of countries have also been pursuing so-cal ed “mega-regional” trade
agreements that have broad membership and cover significant shares of global trade. These
include the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
signed in March 2018 between 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific region to replace the proposed
TPP, near complete negotiations over the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP) between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and five of its FTA

148 “Analysts question WT O compliance of U.S.-Japan deal,” Inside U.S. Trade, September 17, 2019. In addition, the
GAT S includes a similar provision.
149 U.S. negotiating objectives, released at the outset of the talks in December 2018, suggested a broad range of issues
beyond tariffs and digital trade would be covered. See https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/japan/us-
japan-trade-agreement -negotiations.
150 Petros C. Mavroidis, “If I Don’t Do It, Somebody Else Will (or Won't),” Journal of World Trade, vol. 40, no. 1
(February 2006): 187-214.
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partners including China,151 and the Pacific Al iance signed in June 2012 among Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and Peru. Such agreements could potential y help to consolidate trade rules across
regions, and to a varying extent, address new issues not covered by the WTO. With U.S.
withdrawal from the TPP and Trump Administration’s preference for bilateral negotiations, the
United States is likely to play a more limited role in shaping rules in such fora under the current
Administration.
There has been wide debate regarding the relationship of preferential FTAs to the WTO and
multilateral trading system.152 Some argue that crafting new rules through mega-regionals could
undermine the trading system, create competing regional trade blocs and rules, lead to trade
diversion, and marginalize countries not participating in the initiatives.153 In remarks in July 2020,
USTR Lighhizer claimed “we should have a multilateral system or a bunch of bilateral systems,”
noting that otherwise the two systems fundamental y conflict with one another.154 On the other
hand, some view such agreements as potential y spurring new momentum at the global level.
WTO DG Azevêdo has supported the latter sentiment, expressing that “RTAs [regional trade
agreements] are blocks which can help build the edifice of global rules and liberalization.”155
Many analysts have viewed the CPTPP specifical y through this lens.156 Some experts view
plurilateral agreements in particular as potential vehicles for bringing new rulemaking from RTAs
into the multilateral trading system, as NAFTA did for the groundbreaking Uruguay Round in
1994.157 While RTAs may propagate precisely what the multilateral system—with MFN and
national treatment at its underpinnings—was designed to prevent, namely trade diversion and
fragmented trading blocs, some observers believe it may be the only way trade may be liberalized
in the future as additional interested parties could join the over time.
Future Negotiations on Selected Issues
Since the founding of the WTO, the landscape of global trade has changed dramatical y. The
commercial internet, the growth of supply chains, and increasing trade in services have al
contributed to the tremendous expansion of trade. However, WTO disciplines have not been
significantly modernized or expanded since 1995, aside from the TFA and renegotiation of the
ITA and GPA. In addition to ongoing WTO efforts to negotiate new trade liberalization and rules
in areas like e-commerce and digital trade, the following selected areas of trade policy could be
subjects for future negotiations multilateral y within the WTO, or as plurilaterals. Meaningful
progress in areas such as services, competition with SOEs, investment, and labor and
environment issues could help increase the relevance of the WTO as a negotiating body. More

151 India, an original member, dropped out of RCEP in December 2019, when RCEP members announced the
agreement’s preliminary conclusion. CRS Insight IN11200, The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership:
Status and Recent Developm ents, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs and Michael D. Sutherland.
152 For example, see World Economic Forum, Regional Trade Agreements: Game Changers or Costly Distractions for
the World Trading System , July 2014.
153 For more on the debate, see CRS Report R45198, U.S. and Global Trade Agreements: Issues for Congress, by
Brock R. Williams.
154 David Lawder and Andrea Shalal, “Lighthizer says bilateral trade pacts conflict with multilateral trading system ,”
Reuters, July 9, 2020.
155 WT O, “Regional trade agreements ‘cannot substitute’ the multilateral trading system,” September 25, 2014,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra33_e.htm.
156 See CRS Report R44489, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson and Brock R. Williams.
157 For example, see Chad P. Bown, Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of the WTO, Council on Foreign
Relations, Part of Discussion Paper Series on Global and Regional Governance, September 2016.
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recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, and subsequent disruption to supply chains and spread of new
trade restrictions have also led to some cal s for a dedicated plurilateral agreement on medical
goods trade.
Services
Since the GATS, the scope of global trade in services has increased tremendously, spurred by
advances in IT and the growth of global supply chains. Yet, these advances are largely not
reflected in the GATS. WTO members committed to further services negotiations, which began in
2000 and were incorporated into the Doha Round. Further talks were spurred by recognition
among many observers that GATS, while extending the principles of nondiscrimination and
transparency to services trade, did not provide much actual liberalization, as many countries
simply bound existing practices.158 However, services talks during Doha also succumbed to
developing countries’ resistance to open their markets in response to developed country demands,
as wel as dissatisfaction with other aspects of the single undertaking. Whether the stal ed
plurilateral TiSA talks wil ultimately lead to services reform in the WTO is an open question.
Aside from increased market access, several issues are ripe for future negotiations at the WTO,
such as transition from the current positive list schedule of commitments to a negative list.159
Instead of a member declaring which services are open for competition, it would need to declare
which sectors are exempted. This exercise in itself could force members to reexamine their
approximately 25-year-old commitments and decide whether current market access barriers wil
be maintained. Before the pandemic, WTO members had been discussing proposals on market
access for tourism and related services and environmental services. The issue of “servicification”
of traditional goods industries—for example, services that are sold with a good, such as insurance
or maintenance services, or enabling services, such as distribution, transportation, marketing, or
retail—has also attracted attention as the subject of possible WTO negotiations.160 Other issues of
interest to members include services facilitation (transparency, streamlining administrative
procedures, simplifying domestic regulations),161 and emergency safeguards, envisioned in GATS
(Article X) as an issue for future negotiation. Recently members have focused on the economic
impact of COVID-19 on sectors such as tourism, transport and distribution services as wel as the
chal enges and opportunities presented for digital services delivery and digital inclusion.
Competition with SOEs and Non-Market Practices
The United States and other members of the WTO see an increased need to discipline state-owned
or state-dominated enterprises engaged in international commerce, and designated monopolies,
whether through the WTO or through regional or bilateral FTAs. However, WTO rules on
competition with state-owned or state-dominated enterprises are limited to state trading
enterprises (STE)—enterprises, such as agricultural marketing boards, that influence the import

158 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “Liberalization of Services T rade,” in Trans-Pacific Partnership: An Assessment, ed.
Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs and Jeffrey J. Schott, (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics, 2016).
159 U.S. FT As use a negative list approach, and the proposed T iSA negotiations use a hybrid approach to apply a
negative list to national treatment commitments and a positive list for market access.
160 International Centre for T rade and Sustainable Development (ICT SD), “Negotiating Disciplines on Domestic
Regulations in Services,” June 2018, https://www.ictsd.org/themes/services-and-digital-economy/research/negotiating-
disciplines-on-domestic-regulations-in.
161 Marta Soprana, “ Services facilitation in regional trade agreements and opportunities for convergence,” The E15
Initiative, October 2018, http://e15init iative.org/blogs/services-facilitation-in-regional-trade-agreements-and-
opportunities-for-convergence/.
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or export of a good. GATT Article XVII requires them to act consistently with GATT
commitments on nondiscrimination, to operate in accordance with commercial considerations,
and to abide by other GATT disciplines, such as disciplines on import and export restrictions. The
transparency obligations consist of reporting requirements describing the reason and purpose of
the STE, products covered, a description of its functions, and pertinent statistical information. 162
Meanwhile, countries desiring disciplines on SOEs have turned to FTAs. The CPTPP and the
USMCA have dedicated chapters on SOEs. The USMCA includes commitments that SOEs of a
party act in accordance with commercial considerations; requires parties to provide
nondiscriminatory treatment to like goods or services to those provided by SOEs; and prohibits
most noncommercial assistance to SOEs, among other issues. The USMCA SOE chapter could
also be aimed at countries other than the three USMCA parties, such as China, to signal their
negotiating intentions going forward. While there could be a desire to multilateralize these
disciplines, they likely would face objections from those members engaged in such practices.
State support provided to SOEs, including subsidies, is a closely related issue, as it can play a
major role in market-distorting behavior under current rules. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) covers the provision of specified subsidies granted to
SOEs, including by the government or any “public body.” Some members, including the United
States and EU, have contested past interpretations by the Appel ate Body of what qualifies as a
public body as too narrow, and remain concerned that a large share of Chinese and other SOEs in
effect have avoided being subject to disciplines.163 As discussed, the United States, EU, and Japan
are engaged in ongoing discussions to strengthen WTO rules. A January 2020 joint statement by
the trilateral proposed areas for changes to the existing WTO ASCM rules on industrial
subsidies.164 Recommended changes include expanding the types of prohibited subsidies,
reversing the burden of proof to the subsidizing country, and incentives for subsidy notifications,
among others. China opposes the proposal and stated it wil not negotiate new rules on industrial
subsidies.165 It is unclear if the trilateral members or others wil pursue a plurilateral agreement on
subsidy disciplines; moreover, analysts emphasize that such efforts must ultimately achieve buy-
in from China and others to have a lasting impact.166 Regardless, members may seek to revisit
multilateral competition rules if market distortions emerge in the post-pandemic economic
recovery, given many governments have provided subsidies and other forms of support to
domestic industries during the economic downturn.
Investment
With limited provisions under TRIMS and GATS, rules and disciplines covering international
investment are not part of the WTO. More extensive protection for investors was one of the
“Singapore issues” proposed at the 1996 WTO Ministerial as a topic for future negotiations, but

162 WT O, “T echnical Information on State T rading Enterprises,” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/statra_e/
statra_info_e.htm.
163 European Commission, WTO Modernization, Concept Paper, September 2018, pp. 4-5; and UST R, Statement by the
U.S. to the Dispute Settlement Body, March 2011, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/
Mar25%20Stmt%20US%20AD-CVD%20fin.pdf.
164 “Joint Statement of the T rilateral Meeting of the T rade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the E uropean
Union,” January 14, 2020, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/january/joint-
statement -trilateral-meeting-trade-ministers-japan-united-states-and-european-union.
165 Doug Palmer, “ Envoy: China can't support WT O talks on industrial subsidies,” Politico Pro, May 12, 2020.
166 Wendy Cutler and Andrew Chatzky, Curbing State-Driven Trade Policies: How to Craft New & Effective
Approaches to Counter Distortive Practices, Asia Society Policy Institute, July 2020.
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then dropped under opposition from developing countries at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial. The
OECD also attempted to liberalize investment practices and provide investor protections through
a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, however, that effort was abandoned in 1998 in the face
of widespread campaigns by nongovernment organizations in developed countries.
While multilateral attempts to negotiate investment disciplines have not borne fruit, countries
have agreed to investment protections within bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and chapters in
bilateral and regional FTAs. The U.S. “model BIT” serves as the basis for most recent U.S.
FTAs.167 These provisions are often negotiated between developed countries and developing
countries—often viewed as having less robust legal systems—that want to provide assurance that
incoming FDI wil be protected in the country. Developed countries themselves have begun to
diverge on the use and inclusion of provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).168
Incorporating investment issues more fully in the WTO would recognize that trade and
investment issues are increasingly interlinked. Moreover, bringing coherence to the nearly 3,000
BITs or trade agreements with investment provisions could be a role for the WTO. In addition,
agreement on investment disciplines could help to resolve the thorny issue of investment
adjudication between the competing models of ISDS and an investment court, as proposed by the
EU in its recent FTAs, given that disputes likely would remit to WTO DS. While it remains
unclear whether developing countries would be more amenable to negotiating investment
disciplines multilateral y than they were in 2003, this area could be ripe for plurilateral activity.
In the meantime, since MC11 some WTO members have been pursuing the development of a
multilateral framework on investment facilitation. The group is comprised of a mix of developed
and developing economies, including the EU, Canada, China, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, and
Russia, but not the United States.169
Labor and Environment
Labor and environmental provisions were not included in the Uruguay Round agreements, largely
at the insistence of developing countries.170 Some observers maintain that this has created major
gaps in global trade rules and cal for the WTO to address these issues.171 Related provisions have
developed and evolved within U.S. FTAs outside the WTO. Recent U.S. FTAs require partner
countries to adhere to international y recognized labor principles of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and applicable multilateral environmental agreements, and to enforce their
labor or environmental laws and not to derogate from these laws to attract trade and investment.
Recent agreements like the CPTPP and USMCA also contain provisions, though not identical,

167 CRS In Focus IF10052, U.S. International Investment Agreements (IIAs), by Martin A. Weiss and Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar, and CRS Report R43052, U.S. International Investm ent Agreem ents: Issues for Congress, by Shayerah Ilias
Akhtar and Martin A. Weiss.
168 T he United States has pursued ISDS in most of its FT As. In the proposed USMCA, the T rump Administration
restricted recourse to ISDS in the case of Mexico and ended the application of ISDS with Canada. Recent EU
agreements contain an investment court model with a standing body replacing ad hoc tribunals common to ISDS.
169 “Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation for Development,” WT/MIN(17)/59, December 13, 2017.
170 One labor-related provision, GAT T Article XX(e) provides an exception to trade obligations for measures “relating
to products of prison labor.”
171 For example, in the view of T hea Lee of the Economic Policy Institute, WT O rules are currently “lopsided” and do
not adequately protect the interests of workers, consumers, and the environment; in particular, the WTO should
recognize that “violation of internationally recognized workers’ rights is as much an unfair trade policy as the violation
of patents or copyrights.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on Multilateral Economic Institutions and
U.S. Foreign Policy, written testimony by T hea M. Lee, November 27, 2018.
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prohibiting the most harmful fisheries subsidies, and relating to il egal trafficking, marine species,
air quality, marine litter, and sustainable forestry. More broadly, while inclusion of labor and
environmental provisions in FTAs has expanded in the past decade, in general the commitments
can vary widely in their scope and depth, with only some subject to DS mechanisms.172
While general provisions on labor and environment may be a heavy lift at this time given these
differences, the WTO has undertaken an effort to discipline fisheries subsidies, which could have
a beneficial environmental effect (see above). However, fisheries subsidies may be a special case,
as it directly pertains to an existing trade-related agreement, the ASCM.
Proposed Institutional Reforms
Many observers, including some Members of Congress, believe the WTO needs to adopt reforms
to continue its role as the foundation of the world trading system. In particular, its negotiating
function has atrophied following the collapse of the Doha Round. Its DS mechanism, while
functioning, is viewed by some WTO members as cumbersome and time consuming. And some
observers, including U.S. officials, contend it has exceeded its mandate when deciding cases.
Potential changes described below address institutional and negotiation reform, as wel as reforms
to the DS system. Reforms concern the administration of the organization, including its
procedures and practices, and attempts to address the inability of WTO members to conclude new
agreements. DS reforms attempt to improve the working of the DS system, particularly the
Appel ate Body (AB), which fel below its three-member quorum in December, chal enging the
WTO’s ability to effectively enforce DS decisions.
Certain WTO members have been exploring some aspects of reform.173 In September 2018, the
European Commission published a revised paper on its comprehensive approach “to modernise
the WTO and to make international trade rules fit for the chal enges of the global economy.”174 As
noted, the United States, EU, and Japan have issued scoping papers on strengthening WTO
disciplines on industrial subsidies and SOEs.
In addition, in late 2018 Canada organized a ministerial among a smal group of “like-minded”
countries interested in WTO reform, including Australia, Brazil, Chile, the EU, Japan, Kenya,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, and Switzerland. Canadian trade
officials said that “starting smal has al owed us to address problems head-on and quickly develop
proposals,” while acknowledging that a larger effort must include the United States and China.175
In a joint communiqué, the group of 13 countries emphasized that “the current situation at the
WTO is no longer sustainable,” and identified three areas in particular requiring “urgent
consideration”: safeguarding and strengthening the DS system; reinvigorating the WTO’s
negotiating function; including how the development dimension can be best pursued in
rulemaking; and strengthening the monitoring and transparency of WTO members’ trade

172 T he ILO reports that less than a third of trade agreements have labor-related provisions (as of 2016). Of those,
nearly half are U.S., EU or Canadian agreements, while about a quarter are between South -South trading partners. See
ILO, Labour-related provisions in trade agreem ents, GB.328/POL/3, September 2016.
173 For a database listing of some of the ongoing reform efforts by country, see CSIS, “WT O Reform T racker,”
https://tradeguys.csis.org/trade-explained/wto-tracker/.
174 European Commission, “EU proposals on WT O modernization,” WK8329/2018 INIT, July 5, 2018 ; and “European
Commission presents comprehensive approach for the modernization of the World T rade Organization,” press release,
September 18, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5786_en.htm.
175 Janyce McGregor, “Global trade reform must include China, U.S., Jim Carr says after hosting WT O meeting,” CBC
News, October 25, 2018.
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policies.176 The group held its third meeting in May 2019, and confirmed that “work continues
apace on developing concrete proposals to be brought forward for consideration by the wider
membership.”177 Some Members of Congress have expressed support for these new efforts to
address longstanding concerns of the United States.178
China held its own mini-ministerial among 34 WTO members in November 2019 to discuss
reform efforts, and cal ed on al parties “to firmly support the multilateral trading system,
resolutely oppose unilateralism and protectionism, actively participate in the necessary reform of
the WTO….and enhance the WTO’s confidence”179
Institutional Issues
Consensus in Decisionmaking
While consensus in decisionmaking is a long-standing core practice at the GATT/WTO, voting on
a nonconsensus basis is authorized for certain activities on a one member-one vote basis. For
example, interpretations of the WTO agreements and country waivers from certain provisions
require a three-fourths affirmative vote for some matters, while a two-thirds affirmative vote is
required for an amendment to an agreement. However, even when voting is possible, the practice
of consensus decisionmaking remains the norm.
As an organization of sovereign entities, some observers believe the practice of consensus
decisionmaking gives legitimacy to WTO actions. Consensus assures that actions taken are in the
self-interest of al its members. Consensus also reassures smal countries that their concerns must
be addressed. However, the practice of consensus has often led to deadlock, especial y in the
Doha Round negotiations. The ability to block consensus also has perpetuated so-cal ed “hostage
taking,” in which a country can block consensus over an unrelated matter.
In order to attempt to expedite institutional decisionmaking, some expert observers have proposed
alternatives to the current system, such as:
 Use the voting procedures currently prescribed in the WTO agreements.
 Adopt a weighted voting system based on a formula that includes criteria relating
to a member’s GDP, trade flows, population, or a combination thereof.
 Establish an executive committee composed of a combination of permanent and
rotating members, or composed based on a formula as above or representatives of
differing groups of countries.

176 “Joint Communiqué of the Ottawa Ministerial on WT O Reform,” October 15, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/
global-affairs/news/2018/10/joint -communique-of-the-ottawa-ministerial-on-wto-reform.html.
177 Government of Canada, “Summary of Ottawa Group Meeting in Paris, May 2019,” May 23, 2019,
https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/summary-of-ottawa-group-meeting-in-paris-may-2019.html.
178 House Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady noted, “I am pleased that some of the key trading partners appear to
be engaged in serious discussion of the concerns the United States has raised for many years about the need for reform
... the WT O urgently needs to reform to keep the organization well-functioning and viable, including with respect to
negotiations towards new agreements as well as improving dispute resolution.” See “Brady Calls for Serious WT O
Reform,” October 25, 2018, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/brady-calls-for-serious-wto-reform/.
179 “At mini-ministerial, WTO members call for resuming Appellate Body nominations,” Inside U.S. Trade, November
5, 2019.
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 Maintain current consensus voting but require a member stating an objection to
explain why it is doing so, or why it is a matter of vital national interest.180
The Single Undertaking Approach
The “single undertaking” method by which WTO members negotiate agreements means that
during a negotiating round, al issues are up for negotiation until everything is agreed. On one
hand, this method, in which nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, is suited for large,
complex rounds in which rules and disciplines in many areas of trade (goods, services,
agriculture, IPR, etc.) are discussed. It permits negotiation on a cross-sectoral basis, so countries
can make a concession in one area of negotiation and receive a concession elsewhere. The
method is intended to prevent smal er countries from being “steamrolled” by the demands of
larger economies, and helps ensure that each country sees a net benefit in the resulting agreement.
On the other hand, arguably, the single undertaking has contributed to the breakdown of the
negotiating function under the WTO, exemplified by the never-completed Doha Round, as issues
of importance to one country or another served to block consensus at numerous points during the
round. Some members, including the EU, have cal ed for “flexible multilateralism,” based on
continued support for full multilateral negotiations where possible, but pursuit of plurilateral
agreements on an MFN basis where multilateral consensus is not possible.181
Transparency/Notification
An important task of the WTO is to monitor each member’s compliance with various agreements.
A WTO member is required to notify the Secretariat of certain relevant domestic laws or practices
so that other members can assess the consistency of WTO members’ domestic laws, regulations,
and actions with WTO agreements. Required notifications include measures concerning
subsidies, agricultural support, quantitative restrictions, TBT, and SPS standards.
Compliance with the WTO agreement’s notification requirements, especial y regarding
government subsidy programs, has become a serious concern among certain members, including
the United States. Many WTO members are late in submitting their required notifications or do
not submit them at al . This effectively prevents other members from fully examining the policies
of their trading partners. In response, some members—notably the United States and the EU—
have proposed incentives for compliance or sanctions for noncompliance with notification
reporting requirements. These include:
 A U.S. proposal to impose a series of sanctions including steps to “name and
shame” an offending member, limiting the member from using certain WTO
resources, and designating a member “inactive.”182
 An EU proposal to create a rebuttable presumption that a non-notified subsidy
measure is an actionable subsidy or a subsidy causing serious prejudice, thereby
al owing a member to chal enge the subsidy under WTO DS.

180 Peter Sutherland et al., The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium , World
T rade Organization, 2004, p. 64.
181 European Commission, “WT O modernization,” Concept Paper, September 2018.
182 “Procedures to enhance transparency and strengthen notification requirements under WT O agreements,”
Communications from the United States, JOB/GC/148, October 30, 2017; under this proposal, inactive members would
have access to most training and technical assistance, and would be referred to as such in General Council meetings.
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 An EU proposal to encourage counternotifications—a chal enge to the accuracy
or existence of another member’s notification—against members that do not
voluntarily notify on their own.183 In May and November 2018, for example, the
United States launched counternotifications of India’s farm subsidy notifications
regarding wheat, rice, and cotton.
In November 2018, the United States, EU, Japan, Argentina, and Costa Rica put forward a joint
proposal that reflects several of these elements, including penalties for noncompliance.184 It also
specifies exemptions for developing countries that lack capacity and have requested assistance to
help fulfil notification obligations.
Treatment of Developing Countries
A country’s development status can affect the pace at which a country undertakes its WTO
obligations. Given that WTO members self-designate their status, some members hold on to
developing-country status even after their economies begin more to resemble their developed-
country peers.185 In addition, some of the world’s largest economies, including China, India, and
Brazil, may justify developing country status because their per capita incomes more closely
resemble those of a developing country than those of developed countries. Developing country
status enables a country to claim special and differential treatment (SDT) both in the context of
existing obligations and in negotiations for new disciplines (see text box).186 The WTO specifies,
however, that while the designated status is based on self-selection, it is “not necessarily
automatical y accepted in al WTO bodies.”187
Several developed countries, including the EU and United States, have expressed frustration at
this state of affairs. In January 2019, the United States circulated a paper warning that the WTO is
at risk of becoming irrelevant due to the practice of allowing members to self-designate their
development status to obtain special and differential treatment.188 On July 26, 2019, President
Trump issued a “Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World Trade
Organization.”189 The President stated that the WTO dichotomy between developed and
developing countries is outdated and “has al owed some WTO Members to gain unfair
advantages in the international trade arena.” He specifical y mentioned China, stating that “the
United States has never accepted China’s claim to developing-country status, and virtual y every
current economic indicator belies China’s claim.” The President instructed USTR to work to
reform the WTO self-declaration practice and, if no substantial progress is made within 90 days,
to take certain unilateral actions, such as no longer treating a country as developing if the USTR

183 European Commission, “EU proposals on WT O modernization,” WK8329/2018 INIT, July 5, 2018.
184 “Procedures to Enhance T ransparency and Strengthen Not ification Requirements Under WT O Agreements,”
JOB/GC/204, November 1, 2018.
185 T he WT O does not specify criteria for “developing” or “developed” country status, but least-developed countries
are defined under U.N. criteria.
186 For examples of types of the SDT provisions in WT O agreements, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
devel_e/teccop_e/s_and_d_eg_e.htm.
187 “Understanding the WT O: T he Organization,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm.
188 “An undifferentiated WT O: Self-declared development status risk institutional irrelevance,” Communications from
the United States, WT /GC/W/757, January 16, 2019.
189 T he White House, “Memorandum on Reforming Developing-Country Status in the World T rade Organization,” July
26, 2019.
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believes that designation to be improper, and to publish a list of al economies USTR believes to
be “inappropriately” claiming developing-economy status.
The U.S. memorandum received a mixed response from other WTO members. Defending its
developing country status and the availability of SDT, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
insisted that the principle of SDT “reflects the core values and basic principles of the WTO” and
“must be safeguarded no matter how the WTO is reformed.” At the same time, she stated that in
claiming the status, “China does not intend to shy away from its due international
responsibilities,” while the U.S. position shows the United States to be “capricious, arrogant and
selfish.”190 China, India, South Africa, and others defend the relevance of development status,
claiming that, “the persistence of the enormous development divide between the developing and
developed Members of the WTO is reflected on a wide range of indicators.”191 Developed
countries, such as Norway and others, also have emphasized the importance of SDT as a “tool for
enabling development and greater participation in the multilateral trading system.”192 Further, in
their view, “negotiating criteria for designating Members’ access to S&D is unlikely to be
productive. What matters is responding adequately to the specific development needs of
Members.” On the other hand, some countries, like South Korea, Brazil, and Singapore, recently
agreed not to seek SDT,193 and Taiwan previously changed its status to “developed” in 2018.194
Several other suggestions have been made to address the situation, including encouraging
countries to graduate from developing country status; setting quantifiable criteria for development
status; targeting SDT in future agreements on a needs-driven, differential basis; and requiring full
eventual implementation of al new agreements.195 Some of these steps were implemented in the
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.
The Meaning of “Developing Country” Status
The WTO does not apply established definitions of “developed” and “developing” countries to its
members; in practice, most WTO members select their designation as “developing.” In general,
this status means countries are entitled to certain rights under so-cal ed “special and differential
treatment” (SDT). Broadly, these provisions include the fol owing:196

Measures that aim to increase trading opportunities for developing countries.

Requirements that WTO members safeguard the interests of developing countries.

190 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press
Conference,” July 29, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/
t1684227.shtml.
191 “T he Continued Relevance of Special and Differential T reatment in Favour of Developing Members to Promote
Development and Ensure Inclusiveness,” Communication from China, India, South Africa and the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, WT /GC/W/765, February 18, 2019.
192 “Pursuing the Development Dimension in WT O Rule-making Efforts,” Communication from Norway, Iceland, New
Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland, WT /GC/W/7 70/Rev.2, May 6, 2019.
193 “S. Korea Has ‘Little to Gain’ in Maintaining Developing-Nation Status,” KBSWorld, September 5, 2019;
“Singapore does not take advantage of WT O special provisions for developing nations in negotiating agreements:
MT I,” can, July 27, 2019; and Iana Dreyer, “ Beyond Brussels: Brazil accepts to forego WT O developing country
status,” Borderlex, March 20, 2019.
194 Joseph Yeh, “T aiwan will benefit from ‘developed’ country status in WT O: Deng,” Focus Taiwan, October 14,
2018.
195 For example, see European Commission, “EU proposals on WT O modernization,” July 5, 2018.
196 See WT O, “Special and differential treatment provisions,” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/
dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm, and “ Examples of provisions for differential and more favourable treatment
of developing countries,” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/s_and_d_eg_e.htm.
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
Transitional time periods for implementing WTO agreements and commitments.

Flexibility of commitments, action, and use of certain policy instruments.

Technical assistance to build capacity to carry out WTO work, handle disputes, and
implement technical standards.

Specific provisions for least-developed countries.
These provisions are general y nonreciprocal, meaning that developed country members agree to
unilateral y grant additional preferences or flexibilities to developing countries. According to the
WTO, there are 145 SDT provisions across core WTO agreements including on goods,
agriculture, services, intel ectual property, government procurement, and DS.197 Most recently,
SDT provisions were also included in the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Certain ministerial
declarations and General Council decisions al ow for SDT as wel . The Bali Ministerial in
December 2013 established a monitoring mechanism to review implementation of SDT provisions.
Dispute Settlement
Supporters of the multilateral trading system consider the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM)
not only a success of the system, but essential to maintain the relevance of the institution,
especial y while the WTO has struggled as a negotiating body. However, the DSM is facing
increased pressure for reform, in part due to long-standing U.S. objections over certain rules and
procedures. USTR Lighthizer contends that the WTO has become a “litigation-centered
organization,” which has lost its focus on negotiations.198 While WTO members have actively
used the DSM since its creation, some have also voiced concerns about various aspects, including
procedural delays and compliance, and believe the current system could be reformed to be fairer
and more efficient.
The Doha Round included negotiations to reform the DS system through “improvements and
clarifications” to DSU rules.199 A framework of 50 proposals was circulated in 2003 but countries
were unable to reach consensus.200 Discussions have continued beyond Doha with a primary
focus on 12 issues, including third-party rights, panel composition, and remand authority of the
Appel ate Body. Under prior Administrations, the United States proposed greater control for
WTO members over the process, guidelines for the adjudicative bodies, and greater transparency,
such as public access to proceedings. However, these negotiations have yet to achieve results.
Some experts suggest that enhancing the capabilities and legitimacy of the DS system wil likely
require several changes, including improving mechanisms for oversight, narrowing the scope of
and diverting sensitive issues from adjudication, improving institutional support, and providing
WTO members more input over certain procedures.201 Other analysts point to major chal enges
facing the DS system that could have the potential to either dismantle the current system or
further catalyze change. These include most notably, the Appel ate Body ceasing to operate in

197 WT O Committee on T rade and Development, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements
and Decisions, Note by the Secretariat, WT /COMT D/W/219, September 22, 2016.
198 UST R Robert Lighthizer, “Opening Plenary Statement,” December 11, 2017.
199 “Doha WT O Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration,” WT /MIN(01)/DEC/1, November 20, 2001,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
200 T here have been some cases of past DSU procedural reforms, such as the decisions to accept outside counsel and
am icus curiae briefs in panel deliberations. See Craig VanGrasstek, The History and Future of the World Trade
Organization, World T rade Organization, 2013.
201 Robert McDougall, “ Crisis in the WT O: Restoring the WT O Dispute Settlement Function ,” Centre for International
Governance Innovation, CIGI Papers No. 194, October 2018.
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December 2019 and forthcoming rulings on WTO disputes over U.S. Section 232 tariffs, or
resolution of the long-standing, though currently dormant, dispute regarding China’s treatment as
a nonmarket economy.202 Many analysts point to the impasse over reform of the DS system as
also reflecting deeper systemic issues concerning the inability of the WTO to keep up with
structural changes in the global economy. One report concludes, the WTO’s “dispute settlement
function cannot be safeguarded unless, at the same time, the WTO’s rule-making function is also
strengthened and the substantive trade rules are modernized.”203
Appellate Body (AB) Vacancies
The immediate flashpoint to the system is the refusal of the United States to consent to the
appointment of new AB jurists. The United States has long-standing objections to decisions
involving the AB’s interpretation of certain U.S. trade remedy laws in particular—the subject of
the majority of complaints brought by other WTO members against the United States.204 The
AB’s seven jurists are appointed to four-year terms on a rolling basis, with the possibility of a
one-term reappointment. The Trump Administration, as wel as the Obama Administration in one
instance, blocked the process to appoint new jurists as their term’s expired, leaving the AB with
one member in December 2019.205 Deputy DG of the WTO Alan Wolff summarized the stakes of
the Appel ate Body ceasing to function: with member countries unable to appeal an adverse panel
decision against one of their policies, “there is a risk of every trade dispute devolving into smal
and not so smal trade wars, consisting of retaliation and counter-retaliation.”206
WTO members and other stakeholders are exploring a number of options, in the absence of a
functioning AB, that may support the current system (see below), to forestal collapse of dispute
settlement altogether. Interim or permanent solutions debated include the possible creation of a
paral el DS system that mirrors the WTO but does not include the United States; fal back to a
GATT-like system where a disputing party can block decisions; or tacit agreement by members to
accept panel decisions without appeal.207 Most notably, on April 30, 2020, a group of members
led by the EU put into effect an ad hoc Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement
(MPIA), pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU, as a temporary measure to arbitrate disputes, which
mirrors the main functions of the WTO appeals system.208 On July 31, the MPIA took a final step
toward becoming operational when members formal y decided on the pool of 10 standing
arbitrators to hear appeals. To date, 22 WTO members, including China, are part of the MPIA; it
does not apply to cases involving members who have not joined, including the United States.
The United States, has criticized these efforts as “endorsing and legitimizing” the Appel ate Body
practices that “breached the rules set by WTO members,” that have been central to U.S.
concerns.209 One study considers the merits of interim solutions, suggesting that “no-appeal and
appeal-arbitration agreements can preserve rights for some members, but solutions that attempt to

202 Jack Caporal et al., The WTO at a Crossroad, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2019.
203 CIGI Expert Consultation on WTO Reform , Special Report: Spring 2019, Centre for International Governance
Innovation (CIGI), September 12, 2019.
204 Adam Behsudi, “T he man getting ready to take on the WTO,” Politico, February 15, 2017.
205 T he Obama Administration blocked the reappointment of a Korean AB jurist in May 2016.
206 Megan Cassella, “WT O’s Wolff: More trade wars coming if Appellate Body dies,” Politico, October 16, 2018.
207 Jack Caporal et al., The WTO at a Crossroad, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2019.
208 See European Commission, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2143.
209 “U.S.: EU-Canada interim plan would ‘legitimize’ bad Appellate Body practices,” Inside U.S. Trade, September 30,
2019.
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exclude the United States are not in the interests of most members.”210 In the view of Japan, one
major economy that has not joined the MPIA, “attempts to adopt measures of provisional nature
must serve the ultimate purpose of achieving a long-lasting reform” of the DS system.211 Some
analysts argue that the experience of the MPIA wil likely lead to new approaches to handling
appeals, but without engagement the United States wil have no ability to shape its direction.212
More broadly, some are also concerned that the perceived U.S. disinterest or lack of leadership in
resolving the impasse over the AB may undermine other U.S. efforts to advance WTO reforms
and new rules beset by a lack of trust among members. Other experts have cautioned against a
quick agreement to restart the AB without deeper engagement from members on U.S. critiques,
arguing that the U.S. risks losing its leverage, and that DS and WTO reforms should be done
together.213
Proposed DS Reforms
The United States expounded on some of the perceived shortcomings of the DS system in its most
recent trade policy agenda and lengthy report on the AB issued in February 2020.214 Arguably, the
main U.S. complaint is that the system, particularly the AB has “overreached on substantive
issues, engaged in impermissible gap-fil ing, and read into the WTO agreements rules that are
simply not there… adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations of WTO Members.” 215
This is particularly so in the areas of subsidies, AD and CVDs, standards, and safeguards. At its
crux, the current controversy is over the autonomy of the AB, its deference to the DSB, and its
obligations to implement the provisions of the DSU. The United States has been the most vocal in
its criticisms, yet other WTO members have expressed similar concerns. While the United States
has not tabled specific reforms for these complaints to the WTO membership, it has criticized
aspects of the DS system in various General Council meetings and reports. Meanwhile, several
members, singly or in groups, have tabled proposals or suggestions on how to reform AB
procedures and practices. The General Council launched an informal process on the functioning
of the AB at its December 2018 meeting. This group’s facilitator, Ambassador David Walker of
New Zealand, proposed in October 2019 a list of items of convergence among its participants as a
draft decision of the General Council—the United States ultimately declined to back the draft
decision. Under each of the following issues, U.S. concerns are raised along with Ambassador
Walker’s proposals to address them.216
Disregard for the 90-day, DSU-mandated deadline for AB appeals. USTR claims that the AB
does not have the authority to fail to meet the deadline without consulting the DSB, maintaining

210 CIGI Expert Consultation on WTO Reform , Special Report: Spring 2019, Centre for International Governance
Innovation (CIGI), September 12, 2019, p. 18.
211 Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Geneva, “T rade Policy Review: Japan,”
Statement, July 8, 2020, https://www.geneve-mission.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/statement_trade_20200708.html.
212 Senate Finance Committee, Hearing on WTO Reform: Making Global Rules Work For Global Challenges, written
testimony by Jennifer Hillman, July 29, 2020.
213 Senate Finance Committee, Hearing on WTO Reform: Making Global Rules Work For Global Challenges, written
testimony by T homas R. Graham, July 29, 2020.
214 UST R called the report the “the first comprehensive study of the Appellate Body’s failure to comply with WT O
rules and interpret WTO agreements as written,” and published it “to examine and explain the problem, not dictate
solutions.” See Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, February 2020.
215 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
216 WT O General Council, “Informal Process Related to the Functioning of the Appellate Body – Report by the
Facilitator, H.E. David Walker (New Zealand), (Job /GC/222), T uesday October 15, 2019.
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that the deadline “helps ensure that the AB focuses its report on the issue on appeal.” The
facilitator found convergence on the following issues:
 The AB is obligated to issue its report no later than 90 days from the date a party
to the dispute notifies its intention to appeal.
 The parties may agree with the Appel ate Body to extend the timeframe for
issuance of the Appel ate Body report beyond 90 days in cases of unusual
complexity or periods of numerous appeals. The parties wil notify such
agreement to the DSB and the Chair of the AB.
 Extension of service by former AB jurists on cases continuing after their
four-year terms have expired. The United States maintains that the AB does
not have the authority unilateral y to extend the terms of jurists, rather that
authority lies with the DSB and that it is a matter of adherence to the DSU.217
In actual practice, however, it may be the case that having former jurists stay
on to finish an appeal may be more efficient than having a new jurist join the
case. The DSB has the authority and responsibility to determine the
membership of the AB and must fil vacancies as they arise.
 The DSB shal launch the selection process for a new member 180 days
before the expiration of the term of an outgoing AB member. If a vacancy
arises before the expiration of an AB jurist’s mandate, the DSB shal launch
an immediate selection process.
 AB members may be assigned a new appeal until 60 days prior to the
expiration of their term.
 An AB panel may complete an appeal after expiration of the member’s term
if the oral hearing is held prior to the expiration.
During the Obama Administration, the United States blocked the reappointment of a South
Korean jurist to the AB in May 2016. The United States cited what it considered “abstract
discussions” in prior decisions by the jurist that went beyond the legal scope of the WTO.218 This
action has led to the concern that the prospect of non-reappointment could affect the
independence of the AB system.219 However, one former AB jurist opines that, “reappointment is
an option, not a right,” and cal s for the WTO members to determine if a more formal process
similar to initial appointment of AB jurists is needed for reappointment.220

217 UST R indicates this plank requires immediate attention, noting “the United States is resolute in its view that
Members need to resolve this issue before moving on to the issue of replacing Appellate Body Members.” See UST R
2018 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 26.
218 Shawn Donnan, “US accused of undermining WT O,” Financial Times, May 30, 2016.
219 European Commission, “EU proposals on WT O modernization,” (WK8329/2018 INIT), July 5, 2018, p. 16.
220 WT O, “Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Ricardo Ramirez-Hernandez, May 28, 2018,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ricardoramirezfarwellspeech_e.htm.
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Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 3.2
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system. The members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations
of members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations a nd
rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
Other criticisms of the AB involve the extent to which it can interpret WTO agreements. The
United States, in arguing for a more restrictive view of the power of the DSB, points to Article
3.2 that “recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements” (see text box above). However, those supporting
a more expansive view of the DSU’s role can point to the same article, which highlights the role
“to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of
interpretation of public international law.” The scope and reach of the AB’s activities is an
enduring controversy for the organization, not limited to the Trump Administration. USTR has
flagged several specific practices relating to these issues, such as the following:
Issuing advisory opinions on issues not relevant to the issue on appeal. This point relates to the
U.S. concern that the AB is engaged in “judicial overreach” by going beyond deciding the case at
hand. USTR contends that the ability to issue advisory opinions or interpretations of text rests
with the Ministerial Conference or General Council. The facilitator found convergence on the
following issues:
 The AB should not rule on issues not raised by either party.
 The AB shal address issues raised by parties only to the extent necessary to
assist the DSB in making a decision.
The following two suggestions, while not part of the Walker recommendations, have also been
raised in this context:
 Rather than issue advisory opinions, the AB also could “remand” issues of
uncertainty to the standing committees of the WTO for further negotiation.
Canada has suggested this could al ow for more interaction between the
panel and appeal level.221
 Members could also use a provision of the WTO Agreement (Article IX.2) to
seek an “authoritative interpretation” of a WTO text at the General Council
or Ministerial Conference, which could be adopted by a three-fourths vote.
De novo review of facts or domestic law in cases on appeal. The United States al eges that the AB
is not giving the initial panel due deference on matters of fact, including regarding the panel’s
interpretation of domestic law. This point derives from USTR’s view that a country’s domestic or
municipal law should be considered as fact, and that the panel’s interpretation of the domestic law
is thus not reviewable by the AB. The facilitator found convergence on the following issues:
 The meaning of a party’s municipal (domestic) laws is a matter of fact, and
not reviewable by the AB.
 The DSU does not permit de novo review or ‘to complete the analysis’ of
facts in a dispute.

221 See, for example, Joost Pauwelyn, Appeal without Remand: A Design Flaw in WTO Dispute Settlement and How to
Fix It, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, June 2007; Canada submission, JOB/GC/201, p. 3.
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Treatment of AB decisions as precedent. Like the previous two concerns, this complaint speaks to
the al eged overreach of the AB. USTR asserts that while AB reports can provide “valuable
clarification” of covered agreements, they cannot be considered or substituted for the WTO
agreements and obligations negotiated by members. However, according to one former DG of the
WTO, “the precedent concept used in the WTO jurisprudence is ... central y important to the
effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement procedure goals of security and predictability.”222 A
related concern some WTO members have is “gap-fil ing” by the DS system, where the legal
precedent is unclear or ambiguous or there are no or incomplete WTO rules regarding a contested
issue. Here there are diametrical y opposite beliefs: a U.S. trade practitioner asks, “Is fil ing gaps
and construing silences real y not the creation of rights and obligations through disputes vs.
leaving such function to negotiations by the members?”223 The former DG, however, contends
that “every juridical institution has at least some measure of gap-fil ing responsibility as part of
its efforts to resolve ambiguity.”224 The issue of the legitimacy of precedence or gap-fil ing may
be one of the thorniest issues of al with few solutions proposed that would potential y satisfy
differences among members. The facilitator found convergence on the following issues:
 DS proceedings do not create precedent.
 Members find value in the consistency and predictability of the interpretation
of rights and obligations under the covered agreements.
 Panels and the AB should take previous panel/Appel ate Body reports into
account to the extent they find them relevant to a dispute they are
considering.
 Reaffirms that findings and recommendations of panels and the AB and
recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights
and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
 Reaffirms Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement, which states that
“where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of
more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shal find the [domestic
administrative] authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the Agreement
if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.”
The Walker process also found consensus to establish a mechanism for regular dialogue between
WTO members and the AB in an informal setting to discuss issues related to the functioning of
the AB, but unrelated to particular cases.
It is likely that many of the issues that could arise from proposed reforms to the WTO system
would require clarification of or amendment to the language of the Marrakesh Agreement or the
DSU. Clarification could take the form of interpretation of the agreements. As noted above,
interpretation can be undertaken by the Ministerial Conference (held every two years), General
Council, or DSB, with a three-fourths vote of the WTO membership. Amending the
decisionmaking provisions of the Marrakesh Agreement (Article IX) or the DSU would require
consensus of the membership at the Ministerial Conference (Marrakesh Agreement, Article X.8).
Amendments to the Marrakesh Agreement would require a two-thirds vote of the membership. As
noted above, negotiations related to reforms of the DSM occurred during the Doha Round, and

222 Peter Sutherland et al., The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional challenges in th e new millennium , World
T rade Organization, 2004, p. 55.
223 T erence Stewart, “T he Broken Multilateral T rade Dispute System,” Asia Society Policy Institute, February 7, 2018.
224 Sutherland, 2004, p. 52.
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despite the criticism of the DSM by the United States and others, the General Council or the DSB
has not undertaken serious consideration of these reforms.
The United States criticized some of the Walker proposals as seeking to change WTO DS rules to
fit the practices objectionable to the United States, rather than adhering to the rules as original y
negotiated. Instead of seeking to accommodate current practices, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO
Dennis Shea proposed that WTO members “engage in a deeper discussion” of why the Appel ate
Body has “felt free to depart from what WTO Members agreed to,” and that “without this
understanding, there is no reason to believe that simply adopting new or additional language, in
whatever form, wil be effective in addressing the concerns shared by several Members.”225 In
testimony before Congress in June 2020, USTR Lighthizer commented that it would be a
welcome outcome if the AB were never to go back into effect.226
Selected Challenges and Issues for Congress
Value of the Multilateral System and U.S. Leadership and Membership
The United States has served as a leader in the WTO and the GATT since their creation. The
United States played a major role in shaping GATT/WTO negotiations and rulemaking, many of
which reflect U.S. laws and norms. It was a leading advocate in the Uruguay Round for
expanding negotiations to include services and IPR, key sources of U.S. competitiveness, as wel
as binding DS to ensure new rules were enforceable. Today, many stakeholders across the United
States rely on WTO rules to open markets for importing and exporting goods and services, and to
defend and advance U.S. economic interests.
As discussed, the Trump Administration has variously expressed doubt over the value of the
WTO and multilateral trade negotiations to the U.S. economy. While President Trump’s initial
talk of WTO withdrawal has abated, the Administration continues to express skepticism toward
the value of multilateralism, often preferring bilateral negotiations to address “unfair trading
practices.” While many view U.S. concerns as justified, the U.S. practice of blocking of the AB
and reticence to debate specific reforms could cede U.S. leadership to others. At the same time,
reform of the multilateral trading system is a stated U.S. trade policy objective, and the United
States has remained engaged in certain initiatives and plurilateral efforts at the WTO, and has put
forward several reform proposals in other areas. While some U.S. frustrations with the WTO are
not new and are shared by other trading partners, the Administration’s overal approach has
spurred questions regarding the future of U.S. leadership of and participation in the WTO.
Most observers maintain that the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the WTO remains unlikely
for procedural and substantive reasons. Procedural y, a withdrawal resolution would have to pass
the House and Senate; it has also been debated what legal effect the resolution would have if
adopted.227 While resolutions were introduced in May 2020 during the 116th Congress, a rule
change proposed by the House Rules Committee and adopted by the House, as wel as by an
interpretation of the statute reportedly made by the Senate Parliamentarian, are likely to prevent
votes from occurring on the measures.228 Moreover, if the United States were to consider such a

225 Ambassador Dennis Shea, “Statements delivered by Ambassador Shea at the Meeting of the WT O General Council,
July 23, 2019, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/07/23/statements-delivered-by-ambassador-dennis-shea-wto-general-
council-meeting-july-23-2019/.
226 “UST R: If WT O Appellate Body never comes back, ‘that would be fine,’” Inside U.S. Trade, June 17, 2020.
227 For a discussion of the debate, see Jack Caporal et al., The WTO at a Crossroad, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, September 2019.
228 Doug Palmer, “New ruling quashes Hawley’s hope for Senate WT O withdrawal vote,” Politico, July 1, 2020.
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step, withdrawal would have a number of practical consequences. The United States would face
economic costs, since absent WTO membership, remaining members would no longer be
obligated to grant the United States MFN status under WTO agreements, or uphold WTO rules on
IPR and restrictions on the use of regulations, trade-related investment measures, or subsidies.
Consequently, U.S. goods and services could face significant disadvantages in other markets, as
members without FTAs with the United States could raise tariffs or other trade barriers on U.S.
exports at wil . More broadly, the United States would stand to lose influence over the writing of
future global trade rules.
A broader question is whether the WTO would flounder without U.S. leadership, or whether other
members like the EU and China would expand their roles. As some in the United States question
the value of WTO participation and leadership, other countries have asserted themselves as
advocates for the global trading system. As noted, cooperation on WTO reform has been elevated
as a major topic at recent high-level meetings including among the EU, China, and Canada.229
Ongoing congressional oversight could examine the value, both economic and political, of U.S.
WTO membership and leadership. Congress could consider, or could ask the U.S. International
Trade Commission to investigate the value of the WTO or potential impact of WTO withdrawal
on U.S. businesses, consumers, federal agencies, laws and regulations, and foreign policy.
Through resolutions some Members have expressed support for ongoing WTO reform efforts
(H.Res. 746, introduced December 2019) and advocated for specific reforms and U.S. leadership
(S.Res. 651, introduced July 2020). S.Res. 651, for example, cautioned that the United States
“achieved its trade policy objectives through active leadership at the WTO, and that an absence of
that leadership would be fil ed by nonmarket economies that are hostile to a host of United States
interests.” Congress could also hold broader debate over WTO participation in considering a
disapproval resolution of U.S. membership under the URAA.
H.Res. 746
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States should reaffirm its commitment as a
member of the WTO and work with other WTO members to achieve reforms at the WTO that improve the
speed and predictability of dispute settlement, address longstanding concerns with the WTO’s Appel ate Body,
increase transparency at the WTO, ensure that WTO members invoke special and differential treatment reserved
for developing countries only in fair and appropriate circumstances, and update the WTO rules to address the
needs of the United States and other free and open economies in the 21st century.
S.Res. 651
Expressing the sense of the Senate that, while the United States finds value and usefulness in the WTO in fulfil ing
the needs of the United States and other free and open economies in the 21st century, significant reforms at the
WTO are needed and the United States must therefore continue to demonstrate leadership to achieve those
reforms.
Respect for the Rules and Credibility of the WTO
The founding of the GATT and WTO were premised on the notion that an open, transparent and
rules-based multilateral trading system was necessary to avoid a return to the nationalistic
interwar trade policies of the 1930s. There arguably are substantial reasons for the United States
and other countries to uphold the rules and enforce their commitments. A liberalized, rules-based
global trading system increases competition for companies domestical y, but also helps to ensure

229 For example, see Delegation of the European Union to China, “Joint statement of the 21 st EU-China summit,” April
10, 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china_en/60836/Joint%20statement%20of%20the%2021st%20EU-
China%20summit ; and Government of Canada, “ Ottawa Group and WT O reform,” https://www.canada.ca/en/global-
affairs/news/2019/05/ottawa-group-and-wto-reform.html.
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that companies and their workers have access and opportunity to compete in foreign markets with
the certainty of a stable, rules-based system. A system for enforcing the rules and resolving
disputes that inevitably arise from repeated commercial interactions also helps ensure such trade
frictions do not spil over into broader international relations.
However, certain actions by the Trump Administration and other countries have raised questions
about respect for the trading system, and could weaken the credibility of the WTO. In particular,
recent U.S. actions to raise tariffs against major trading partners and obstruct the functioning of
the DS system have prompted concerns from some that the United States may undermine the
effectiveness and credibility of the institution that it helped to create.230 Moreover, the outcomes
of controversial dispute cases over U.S. tariffs could set important related precedents (see below).
Some are concerned that U.S. actions may embolden other countries to protect their own
industries under claims of protecting national security interests. At the same time, other countries’
retaliatory tariff actions may violate WTO commitments and are pending DS resolution. If the DS
process cannot satisfactorily resolve the conflicts, further unilateral actions and tit-for-tat
retaliation could escalate. More broadly, many observers view the future of the trading system as
deeply intertwined with how the United States and China manage their ongoing trade frictions.
In recent years, countries have also been accused of imposing new trade restrictions and taking
actions that are not in line with either the spirit or letter of WTO agreements—in particular,
China’s state-led industrial policies, including subsidies, IPR violations, and forced technology
transfer practices.231 In part, the WTO’s perceived inability to address Chinese policies and gaps
in rules led to the United States resorting to Section 301 actions. Many increasingly view WTO
relevance as waning, absent more concerted efforts to tackle systemic non-market practices,
which have driven recent U.S. and other’s efforts to explore new rules in and outside the WTO—
efforts largely resisted by China. More broadly, countries’ pursuit of such measures in the name
of national or economic security appears to further cal into question the viability of the rules-
based system. While WTO agreements offer ample flexibility for temporary measures justified by
national security or health crises, the spread of export restrictions following COVID-19 have
further amplified such concerns.
U.S. Sovereignty and the WTO
Under the Trump Administration, USTR has put new emphasis on “preserving national
sovereignty” within the U.S. trade policy agenda, emphasizing that any multinational system to
resolve trade disputes “must not force Americans to live under new obligations to which the
United States and its elected officials never agreed.”232 The question of sovereignty is not a new
one. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act provided that U.S. law would prevail against an
inconsistent provision or an application of a provision in a WTO agreement. Further, it specified
that no U.S. law could be modified or amended by the agreements, including in areas of public
health, environment, worker safety, or U.S. trade laws, unless specified in the implementing
legislation.233 In other words, an adverse DS decision against the United States would not change

230 CRS Report R45529, Trump Administration Tariff Actions (Sections 201, 232, and 301): Frequently Asked
Questions, coordinated by Brock R. Williams.
231 In 2018, trade-restrictive measures imposed by G20 economies “hit a new high” between mid- and late 2018,
compared to the previous reporting period, and was the largest recorded since 2012. “WT O report shows sharp rise in
trade-restrictive measures from G20 economies,” November 27, 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/
trdev_22nov18_e.htm.
232 UST R, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, March 2018, p. 3.
233 P.L. 103-465, Sec. 102.
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U.S. law; Congress would need to make the change to come into compliance with a DS decision
or decline to do so, as Congress has done in the past. In that case, however, the other disputing
party may impose retaliatory tariffs on the United States in compensation. In addition, the
withdrawal procedures in the URAA responded to the same sovereignty concerns expressed in the
language above.234
While U.S. concerns regarding al eged “judicial overreach” in WTO dispute findings are long-
standing, the Trump Administration has also emphasized unilateral action outside the WTO as a
means of defending U.S. interests, including national security. Some observers fear that
disagreements at the WTO on issues related to national security (e.g., Section 232 tariffs) may be
difficult to resolve through the existing DS procedures, given current disagreements related to the
WTO AB and concerns over national sovereignty.235 WTO members and parties to the GATT
have invoked Article XXI al owing measures to protect “essential security interests,” in a handful
of other trade disputes. These parties, including the United States, have often argued that each
country is the sole judge of questions relating to its own security interests.
The outcome of a recent case could have implications for the adjudication of disputes involving
U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs. In April 2019, a panel ruling in a Russia-Ukraine dispute
clarified the WTO’s role in evaluating the use of the national security exception, finding that DS
panels are competent to review member actions justified under Article XXI.236 The panel
determined that it had jurisdiction to review whether a WTO member’s actions were justified
under Article XXI’s national security exception and that Russia satisfied the requirements for
invoking the exception.237 The United States voiced concerns with the panel report, finding it
“insufficient,” and maintaining that Article XXI is “self-judging” and not subject to panel review.
Role of Emerging Markets
The broadened membership of the WTO over the past two decades has promoted greater
integration of emerging markets such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia in the global economy,
and helped ensure that developing country interests are represented on the global trade agenda. At
the same time, many observers have attributed the inability of WTO members to collectively
reach compromise over new rules and trade liberalization to differing priorities for reforms and
market opening among developed countries and emerging markets.
One question is to what extent economies like China, with significant economic clout, wil take
on greater leadership to play a more constructive role, advance the global trade agenda, and
facilitate compromise among competing interests. China has voiced support for globalization and

234 During congressional debate over URAA, some Members proposed to create extra review mechanisms of WT O DS,
and many Members stressed that only Congress can change U.S. laws as a result of dispute findings.
235 For more information, see CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Rachel F. Fefer.
236 WT O, “ Members adopt national security ruling on Russian Federation’s transit restrictions,” April 26, 2019.
Ukraine argued that Russia’s restrictions and bans on the traffic of certain goods crossing its territory from Ukraine
violated the GAT T and Russia’s Accession Protocol. Russia invoked the national security exception in GAT T Article
XXI(b)(iii) in its defense, arguing that the panel lacked jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of Ukraine’s claims, and that
deterioration in relations and conflict between Russia and Ukraine was a threat to its security interests.
237 T he panel determined requirements were met because: (1) Russia’s relations with Ukraine had deteriorated to the
point that they constituted an “emergency in international relations”; (2) Russia’s trade restrictions qualified as
measures “taken in time of this emergency”; and (3) Russia met all other requirements for invoking the exception. Ibid,
Para. 8.1(d)(i)-(iv).
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the multilateral trading system under which it has thrived.238 The Chinese government’s 2018
white paper on the WTO stated that: “The multilateral trading system, with the WTO at its core,
is the cornerstone of international trade and underpins the sound and orderly development of
global trade. China firmly observes and upholds the WTO rules, and supports the multilateral
trading system that is open, transparent, inclusive and nondiscriminatory.”239 At the same time,
China has blocked progress in certain initiatives, including the WTO’s stal ed plurilateral on
environmental goods, is seeking to limit the scope of ongoing e-commerce negotiations, and has
not put forward a sufficiently robust offer on procurement to join the GPA, a longstanding
promise. More broadly, growing scrutiny of Chinese industrial policies and non-market practices
are chal enging China’s role in the system, raising questions about the country’s wil ingness in
practice to take on meaningful leadership responsibility in the WTO context.
Another related concern voiced by the United States, including some Members of Congress, and
other WTO members is the role of large emerging markets and use of developing country status
by those and other countries to ensure flexibility in implementing commitments. The United
States is seeking to work with other members to set qualifications for such status, but the issue
remains controversial. Members could be given incentives to graduate from developing country
status; moreover, different WTO agreements could offer different incentives or other flexibilities.
Priorities for WTO Reforms and Future Negotiations
Reform of the multilateral trading system remains among the Administration’s trade policy
objectives.240 Congress can take a number of steps to direct, influence, and signal support for U.S.
priorities for ongoing and future WTO negotiations and reform. The primary legislative vehicle
for establishing negotiating objectives is TPA. Congress could consider establishing specific or
enhanced negotiating objectives for multilateral or plurilateral trade negotiations, possibly
through legislation to amend TPA during its potential reauthorization after July 2021. Congress
could also consider specific reporting requirements in TPA, related to providing updates to
Congress on progress toward meeting WTO objectives or on WTO reform efforts.
As discussed, some Members have expressed congressional views on reforms through “sense of
Congress” resolutions and directed the executive branch to increase U.S. engagement in specific
areas. Congress could hold oversight hearings or submit letters to ask USTR about specific
actions, plans, or objectives regarding WTO reforms for the institution, dispute settlement
procedures, or in regards to updating existing agreements to address trade barriers and economic
practices not sufficiently covered by current rules. In July 2020, the Senate Finance Committee
held a hearing on WTO reform, expressing bipartisan agreement on the importance of improving
the institution.241 Congress could request that USTR provide an update of ongoing plurilateral
talks at the WTO, such as on e-commerce and digital trade—specified by Congress as a principal
trade negotiating objective in TPA. Congress could also consider appropriating additional funds
dedicated to WTO reform efforts. More broadly, Congress may consider the long-term
implications of recent U.S. and other countries’ restrictive and/or unilateral trade actions on
current and future trade negotiations. Some experts argue that U.S. unilateral tariffs and blocking
of AB appointments may limit other countries’ interest in engaging in negotiations to reduce trade

238 See, for example, President Xi Jinping’s remarks at the World Economic Forum in 2017, http://www.china.org.cn/
node_7247529/content_40569136.htm.
239 China’s State Council Information Office, “China and the World T rade Organization,” white paper, June 2018,
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/06/28/content_281476201898696.htm.
240 UST R, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, March 2018; and 2020 Trade Policy Agenda, February 2020.
241 Senate Finance Committee, Hearing on WTO Reform: Making Global Rules Work For Global Challenges, July 29,
2020.
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barriers and craft new rules. Such concerns are amplified with the proliferation of preferential
FTAs outside the WTO, which may have potential discriminatory effects on non-participating
countries, including the United States.
Outlook
The future outlook of the multilateral trading system is the subject of growing debate, as it faces
serious chal enges, some longstanding and some emerging more recently. Some experts view the
system as long stagnant and facing a crisis; others remain optimistic that the current state of
affairs could spur new momentum toward reforms and alternative negotiating approaches moving
forward. Despite differing views, there is a growing consensus that the status quo is no longer
sustainable, and that there is urgent need to improve the system and find ground for new
compromises if the WTO is to remain the cornerstone of the trading system.
Debate about the path forward continues. Recent proposals for WTO reforms and for new rules
are under development and have provided the seeds for new ideas, though concrete solutions and
next steps have yet to be agreed among countries involved in discussions and broader WTO
membership. In the near term, several events on the horizon could provide added impetus for
resolving differences and assessing progress. The chal enges of COVID-19 have tested the
resilience of global cooperation, disrupted global supply chains, and resulted in widespread trade
protectionism. At the same time, several countries have reaffirmed the trading system, lifted
restrictions and liberalized trade in response to the crisis, and view the WTO as playing an
important role in tackling the trade policy chal enges. While some reform efforts are stal ed and
the WTO DS system ceased to fully function in December 2019, the alternate arbitration
mechanism among the EU, China and some other WTO members began operations in 2020 and
wil test a key function of the WTO. In addition, several U.S. WTO disputes, including ones
involving China, are awaiting consequential decisions in 2020. More broadly, many observers
view the future of the global trading system as deeply intertwined with how the United States and
China manage their trade relationship and ongoing frictions.
WTO members also are to face their rescheduled Ministerial in 2021, which many view as a
critical action-forcing event. MC12 could provide an opportunity for countries to announce
completion of negotiations and concrete progress in other priority areas, including plurilateral
efforts. MC12 and more broadly, the WTO as an institution wil be shaped by the vision of a new
Director-General seeking to inject new momentum into ongoing efforts.

Author Information

Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Coordinator
Ian F. Fergusson
Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Rachel F. Fefer

Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Acknowledgments
The authors thank Amber Hope Wilhelm, CRS Visual Information Specialist, who developed the graphics
for this report.
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Disclaimer
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