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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
Overview
in May 2016 that the sale “… is not formally a violation [of
A 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (Joint
2231]” because the S-300 is for defensive uses only.”
Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), provides for
limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions
Effects of the Ban
relief. The accord, endorsed by U.N. Security Council
The U.S. government has assessed the arms transfer ban as
Resolution 2231 (July 17, 2015), contains Annex B that
effective. According to Appendix J of the congressionally
provides for a ban on the transfer of arms to or from Iran
mandated Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) annual report
until October 18, 2020. The Trump Administration, with
on the military power of Iran for 2019, released in
the support of many in Congress, seeks to extend the ban in
November 2019, states that Iran wants to “purchase new
order to prevent Iran from acquiring new conventional
advanced weapon systems from foreign suppliers to
weaponry, particularly advanced combat aircraft. However,
modernize its armed forces, including equipment it has
on August 14, the U.N. Security Council, including two key
largely been unable to acquire for decades.”
potential arms suppliers of Iran—Russia and China—voted
down a U.S. draft to extend the arms transfer ban. Members
Figure 1. Iran’s Regional Allies
of the Council, including the European parties to the
JCPOA, also oppose a U.S. plan to implement its
longstanding threat to invoke the provision of Resolution
2231 that would snap back all U.N. sanctions on Iran—if
the Council does not extend the arms transfer ban.
Annex B contains a ban until October 18, 2023, on
supplying equipment with which Iran could develop
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and calls on Iran not to
develop ballistic missiles designed to carry nuclear
weapons. See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by
Kenneth Katzman.
Provisions of the Arms Transfer Ban
Annex B of Resolution 2231 restated and superseded the
Iran arms transfer restrictions of previous U.N. Security
Council resolutions. Resolution 1747 (March 24, 2007)
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019.
banned Iran’s transfer of arms from its territory and
required all U.N. member states to prohibit the transfer of
Iranian arms. Resolution 1929 (June 9, 2010) banned the
supply to Iran of “any battle tanks, armoured combat
By contrast, the ban on Iranian arms exports has arguably
not been effective. According to the DIA report, which
vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft,
represents a consensus U.S. judgment, “Since the Islamic
attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as
Revolution, Iran has transferred a wide range of weapons
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
and military equipment to state and non-state actors,
Arms [ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a
including designated terrorist organizations.… Although
warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 16
some Iranian shipments have been interdicted, Tehran is
miles] or related materiel, including spare parts….” The
often able to get high-priority arms transfers to its
Security Council can waive the restrictions on a “case-by-
customers. [See Figure 1.] Over the years, Iranian transfers
case basis,” but no Iran arms transfers have been approved
to state and non-state actors have included communications
to date. The arms transfer ban expires on the earlier of: (1)
equipment; small arms—such as assault rifles, sniper rifles,
five years after the JCPOA “Adoption Day” (Adoption Day
machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades
was October 18, 2015), or (2) upon the issuing by the
(RPGs)—and ammunition; … artillery systems, including
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a “Broader
Conclusion” that all nuclear
MRLs (multiple rocket launchers) and battlefield rockets
material in Iran remains in
and launchers; armored vehicles; FAC (fast attack craft);
peaceful activities.
equipment for unmanned explosives boats; … SAMs
(surface-to-air missiles); UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles)
U.S. and other Security Council member officials interpret
… ground-attack aircraft …” and other weaponry. A June
the restriction as inapplicable to the sale to Iran of purely
2020 report by the U.N. Secretary General on
defensive systems. In 2007, Russia agreed to the sale to Iran
implementation of Resolution 2231 assessed that Iran
of the S-300 air defense system, and it delivered the system
attempted to export weaponry and missile parts to Houthi
in November 2016. A State Department spokesperson said
forces in Yemen, and U.S. and allied forces intercepted
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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
some of that weaponry in November 2019 and February
On August 14, the Security Council completed the voting
2020. See CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense
process on the U.S. extension draft. The United States and
Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
the Dominican Republic voted in favor, Russia and China
Figure 2. Iran Military Structure and Size Estimates
voted against, and the remaining eleven Council members
abstained. Secretary of State Pompeo immediately
denounced the adverse U.N. vote, saying “The Security
Council’s failure to act decisively in defense of
international peace and security is inexcusable." President
Trump stated that the United States would proceed to
implement its threat to invoke a snap back of all U.N.
sanctions that were lifted upon implementation of the
JCPOA, if the arms embargo were not extended. He said
"We'll be doing a snapback. You'll be watching it next
week."
The U.S. plan to trigger a sanctions snap back is based on a
State Department legal interpretation of Resolution 21231.
According to U.S. officials, Resolution 2231 stipulates that
a JCPOA participant could, after notifying the Security
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019.
Council of an issue that the government “believes
Relevant Laws, Authorities, and Options
constitutes significant non-performance of [JCPOA]
for the Administration and Congress
commitments,” trigger an automatic draft resolution
keeping sanctions relief in effect. A U.S. veto of this
The stated Iran policy of the Trump Administration is to
apply “maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy, through
resolution would reimpose the suspended sanctions. On
the
April 30, 2020, the then-State Department Special
imposition of U.S. sanctions, to compel Iran to alter its
Representative for Iran, Ambassador Brian Hook, asserted
behavior. The Administration cited the expiration of the
that this option is available because the U.S. right “as a
arms transfer ban as one among several reasons that the
participant [in Resolution 2231] is something which exists
JCPOA was sufficiently flawed to justify a U.S. exit from
independently of the JCPOA.”
the accord in May 2018. As part of the maximum pressure
campaign, the Administration insisted on keeping the arms
However, European, Iranian, Russian, and other officials
transfer ban in place. At a meeting of the U.N. Security
have opposed the U.S. assertion that it can trigger a
Council on June 30, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
snapback. On August 16, EU foreign policy chief Josep
stated: “Don’t just take it from the United States, listen to
Borrell said: "Given that the US unilaterally withdrew from
countries in the region. From Israel to the Gulf, countries in
the JCPOA in May 2018 and has not participated in any
the Middle East – who are most exposed to Iran’s
JCPOA structures or activities subsequently, the US cannot
predations – are speaking with one voice: Extend the arms
embargo.”
be considered as a JCPOA participant. We therefore
A May 4, 2020, House letter, signed by 387
Members, “urge[s] increased diplomatic action by the
consider that the US is not in a position to resort to
mechanisms reserved for JCPOA participants [such as the
United States to renew the expiring United Nations arms
embargo against Iran….”
so-called snapback]." Despite the dispute over the U.S.
standing to trigger a snap back, Secretary of State Pompeo
reportedly planned to meet on August 20 with the
The annual Iran military report, cited above, states: “Iran’s
representative of the current Security Council president –
potential acquisitions after the lifting of UNSCR 2231
Indonesia – to proceed with the process of snapping back
restrictions include Russian Su-30 fighters, Yak-130
JCPOA sanctions. It is not clear what entity or person might
trainers, and T-90 MBTs (main battle tanks). Iran has also
adjudicate the dispute over the U.S standing to do so, and it
shown interest in acquiring S-400 air defense systems and
Bastian coastal defense systems from Russia.”
is not clear that a reimposition of sanctions would obtain
On June 23,
broad international implementation
2020, Secretary Pompeo posted a Twitter message that: “If
the U.N. Arms Embargo on Iran expires in October, Iran
If the United States is not able to snap back sanctions,
will be able to buy new fighter aircraft like Russia’s SU-30
and China’s J
including the ban, the Administration might use its
-10. With these highly lethal aircraft, Europe
and Asia could be in Iran’s crosshairs.”
sanctions authorities to deter any arms sales to Iran. These
The composition of
Iran’s forces is depicted in
include the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, the Iran,
Figure 2.
North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),
Executive Order 13382, the Countering America’s
In August 2020, the United States circulated a draft U.N.
Adversaries through Sanctions Act, and Iran’s designation
Security Council resolution that would extend the arms
as a state sponsor of terrorism provides authorities for the
transfer ban “until the Security Council decides otherwise.”
President to sanction arms suppliers to Iran. Alternatively,
Several Council members, including those in Europe, stated
the United States might try to work with potential arms
opposition to extending, arguing that doing so might cause
sellers to Iran to dissuade them from completing any sales.
Iran to leave the JCPOA entirely. Regional U.S. allies,
including Israel and the Arab monarchy states of the
Persian Gulf, publicly supported the proposed extension.
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
IF11429
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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
Disclaimer
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