link to page 1 
Updated August 13, 2020
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Overview
well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President
U.S. companies have provided proposals to Saudi
must make a written determination “that the performance of
authorities in relation to a planned tender for nuclear reactor
the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute
construction in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom’s nuclear
an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
energy program remains nascent, and, in recent years, the
The AEA requires Congress to review a 123 agreement for
Saudi government has entered into agreements concerning
two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. If
possible civil nuclear cooperation with several countries
the President has not exempted the agreement from any
(Table 1). In July 2017 the Saudi cabinet approved a
requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the
National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to
end of the second period, unless, during that time, Congress
build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity
adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and
production and desalination amid a larger effort to diversify
the resolution becomes law.
the Saudi economy and expand the use of renewable
Table 1. Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Developments
energy. Saudi authorities expressed hopes of signing
contracts for reactor construction in 2018, but did not do so.
March
Argentine-Saudi joint nuclear R&D venture agreed.
Depending on its nature and extent, future U.S.-Saudi
2015
Saudi-South Korean mutual nuclear cooperation
nuclear cooperation may require executive branch
agreements signed, including an MOU on building
authorizations and/or congressional approval of bilateral
two small reactors for Saudi water desalination.
agreements. Saudi plans also are fueling debate in Congress
June 2015
KA CARE signs a nuclear energy cooperation
over regional nuclear proliferation and security dynamics.
agreement with state-owned Rosatom of Russia.
Agreements signed with France on cooperation,
Saudi Arabia holds 16% of the world’s proven reserves
including EPR reactor feasibility studies.
of crude oil, has the world’s fourth-largest reserves of
natural gas, and is the largest oil consumer in the
January
Saudi Arabia and China memorandum of
Middle East, with oil consumption for electricity
2016
understanding signed regarding cooperation in the
generation projected to increase. Oil and natural gas
possible future construction of a high-temperature
generate 40% and nearly 60% of the kingdom’s
gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) in the kingdom.
electricity, respectively. The Saudi Ministry of Energy,
October
Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan sign a nuclear
Industry, and Mineral Resources and the King Abdullah
2016
cooperation agreement focused on nuclear fuel.
City for Atomic and Renewable Energy agency (KA
CARE) are considering proposals for the construction
March-
Agreement signed for Chinese-Saudi feasibility
of two reactors to generate 2.9 GWe of electricity.
August
study of HTGR construction in Saudi Arabia. China
2017
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the
Saudi Geological Survey sign agreements on
U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
cooperation on uranium exploration.
In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
December
Russia’s Rosatom and KA CARE sign implementing
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which stated the
2017
agreement related to small and medium reactors,
countries’ intentions to cooperate on nuclear activities in
personnel and fuel management.
the fields of medicine, industry, and electricity production.
November
KA CARE signs contract with WorleyParsons to
Previous Administrations had explored a civil nuclear
2018
provide project management consultancy services
energy agreement with Saudi Arabia. U.S.-Saudi
for the National Project for Atomic Energy.
negotiations remain open but reportedly have stalled.
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Requirements
January
KA CARE announces it has received reactor bid
2019
proposals from entities in the United States, Russia,
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
France, South Korea, and China.
(AEA, 22 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), requires nuclear cooperation
agreements for significant nuclear cooperation with foreign
April 2019
Argentina’s IAEA Envoy said “Saudi Arabia will have
governments. Such cooperation includes the transfer of
to move to a ful scope comprehensive safeguards
certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for
agreement with subsidiary arrangements” before an
commercial, medical, and industrial purposes; the export of
Argentinian-designed research reactor is fueled.
reactors and critical reactor components; and other
January
Saudi Arabia and South Korea amend pre-project
commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export
2020
engineering contract for planned small reactors.
licensing authority.
Source: Official statements and media reports.
So-called “123 agreements” must include the terms,
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, as
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
The Department of Energy (DOE) in 2017 expeditiously
safeguards. Other international mechanisms are designed to
granted a “Part 810 authorization” (per 10 C.F.R. 810) for
restrict the spread of sensitive nuclear technology including
U.S. companies to engage in discussions, including
enrichment technology. IAEA officials completed a nuclear
marketing, with the Saudi government regarding its civil
infrastructure review in Saudi Arabia in 2018 and issued a
nuclear program. Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows for
final report in January 2019. In March 2019, IAEA Director
limited cooperation related to the “development or
General Yukiya Amano said, “We’re encouraging all
production of any special nuclear material outside of the
countries to conclude and implement an additional protocol
United States” if that activity has been authorized by the
and that includes Saudi Arabia.” IAEA safeguards present a
Secretary of Energy following a determination that it “will
significant hurdle to the development of nuclear weapons.
not be inimical to the interest of the United States.” A 123
The U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Precedent
agreement is not necessary for such authorizations, which
mostly involve unclassified nuclear technology transfer and
A commitment to forgo enrichment or reprocessing is not
services, such as nuclear reactor designs, nuclear facility
required for 123 agreements. Still, some 123 agreements
operational information and training, and nuclear fuel
contain provisions designed to discourage national
fabrication. Part 810 authorizations are not subject to
enrichment and reprocessing programs in the Middle East.
congressional review. A March 2019 DOE press statement
The 123 agreement reached in 2009 with the United Arab
confirmed that the Administration has approved seven 810
Emirates (UAE) provides the United States the right to
authorizations related to Saudi Arabia.
terminate nuclear cooperation with that country if it
Proliferation, Fuel, and Policy Choices
“possesses sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or
otherwise engages in activities within its territory relating to
Analysts have examined Saudi nuclear plans and proposals
enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.” An
for decades in light of the kingdom’s economic profile,
Agreed Minute to that agreement states that its terms “shall
energy resources, and security dilemmas. Saudi state policy
be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which
underscores that the kingdom’s nuclear energy pursuits are
may be accorded” to other countries in the Middle East.
limited to peaceful purposes, but senior officials, including
The minute also explains that, if the U.S. government
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also have stated in
concludes a more-favorable agreement with another
2018 that if Iran pursues or obtains a nuclear weapon, then
regional government, the United States will, at the UAE’s
the kingdom also would work to do so.
request, consult with the UAE “regarding the possibility of
The most proliferation-sensitive nuclear technology is the
amending” the agreement with equally favorable terms.
capability to produce fuel for nuclear reactors, by either
Saudi officials have not forsworn uranium enrichment and
enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to
fuel reprocessing or publicly stated they are willing to
obtain plutonium. Both highly enriched uranium and
accept UAE-style restrictions as part of a 123 agreement.
plutonium can be used as fuel in some types of nuclear
In February 2018, then-Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir
reactors but also are used as fissile material in nuclear
said “we want to have the same rights as other countries,” a
weapons. Consequently, enrichment and reprocessing
presumed reference to Iran. In May 2018, Secretary of State
facilities frequently generate concern that ostensibly
Michael Pompeo said in Senate testimony, “we want a
peaceful facilities may aid nuclear weapons programs
gold-standard Section 123 Agreement from [the Saudis],
Conversely, a program without such facilities generally
which would not permit them to enrich.” The State
poses little proliferation risk, but may pose security and/or
Department said in an August 2020 press statement that the
environmental risks. KA CARE is considering low-
United States would “attach great importance” to continued
enriched uranium fuel for reactors in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi compliance with the NPT and seeks an agreement
The 2008 U.S.-Saudi MOU, which is a statement of intent
“with strong nonproliferation protections that will enable
and is not legally binding, described the Saudi
Saudi and U.S. nuclear industries to cooperate.” Congress
government’s intent “to rely on existing international
prohibited the use of FY2020 funds for Export-Import Bank
markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the
support for nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia until the
pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.” However, KA
kingdom has a 123 agreement in effect that commits to
CARE has said that it may use indigenous uranium
renouncing uranium enrichment and reprocessing and has
resources for fuel, and, in September 2019, Saudi Energy
signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA (Section
Minister Prince Abd al Aziz bin Salman Al Saud said,
7041[h] of Division G, P.L. 116-94).
“even if we scale up [nuclear power] ... we want to go to the
General Security Concerns
full cycle, to producing the uranium, enriching the uranium,
Threats to the security of critical Saudi infrastructure may
using the uranium.” In August 2020, Saudi authorities
raise concerns about the security of Saudi nuclear facilities.
denied press reports citing unnamed Western officials that
claimed Saudi Arabia with China’s help
The U.S. government cites threats from terrorist groups and
built a facility for
hostile regional actors, including missile and rocket attacks
milling uranium oxide ore. Such a facility would not violate
Saudi Arabia’s nonproliferation commitments but would
from Yemen. U.S. officials attributed a major 2019 missile
and drone attack on Saudi infrastructure to Iran. U.S.-Saudi
require declaration. Other press reporting described a
security cooperation mechanisms are robust and remain
separate possible undeclared site.
focused on mitigating these threats and others.
Saudi Arabia is a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), and its nuclear facilities, including any Saudi
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
enrichment or reprocessing facilities, would be required to
Affairs
be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
IF10799
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10799 · VERSION 12 · UPDATED