Motor Vehicle Safety: Issues for Congress
July 31, 2020
Vehicle safety is a significant issue as Congress considers a replacement for the current
authorization of surface transportation programs, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation
Bill Canis
Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), which expires at the end of FY2020. On July 1, 2020, the House of
Specialist in Industrial
Representatives passed an infrastructure and surface transportation bill, the Moving Forward Act
Organization and Business
(H.R. 2), including provisions that seek to improve motor vehicle safety. A corresponding bill

has not advanced in the Senate.

Responsibility for motor vehicle safety lies with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) within the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). The agency’s performance has been
controversial, in part because of its handling of the largest-ever recall, involving more than 63 million Takata airbags; since
the recall was ordered in 2015, nearly 16 million potentially defective airbags have not been replaced. NHTSA has been
without a Senate-confirmed administrator since 2017.
Under federal law, NHTSA has the power to promulgate standards for cars and light trucks. The combination of new vehicle
designs, greater vehicle automation, and federal standards—including those for seat belts, airbags, hood and door latches, and
children’s car seats—has contributed to a reduction in the fatality rate by 80% over the past six decades. NHTSA does not
approve vehicles before they are manufactured, but may order or encourage a vehicle or parts manufacturer to recall products
that violate its standards.
Among the vehicle safety issues Congress may address in the reauthorization process are:
Recall compliance rates. According to NHTSA researchers, the combined annual completion rate for all automakers subject
to a recall between 2010 and 2014 was 67%, meaning that many vehicles with safety defects remain on the road. Congress
may want to consider additions or modifications to 2015 reforms that brought rental car fleets under federal recall
requirements and introduced new methods to contact consumers about pending recalls.
Defect investigations. The DOT Inspector General identified problems at NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation in 2015
and 2018. Although recommendations to improve its management of defects investigations appear to have been
implemented, the Trump Administration has sought to reduce spending on vehicle safety and investigations. Congress may
want to examine whether the defect investigation process is adequate.
Pedestrian and bicyclist fatalities. Vehicle crashes causing fatalities and injuries to pedestrians and bicyclists have reached
a 30-year high. H.R. 2 includes a provision requiring that new vehicles include pedestrian crash mitigation systems, a
technology already required in other countries.
Rear seat warnings. Although Congress has previously called for NHTSA to require seat belt warnings in rear seats, such a
regulation has not been issued. In addition, Congress has twice previously called for NHTSA to develop a system to warn
drivers about children inadvertently left unattended in the back seats of parked cars. H.R. 2 would require such warning
systems and would also require new labeling on children’s booster seats.
Driver privacy. The FAST Act’s driver privacy provisions apply only to data recorded just before a crash; similar
protections do not apply to the large volumes of data collected and stored by vehicle computers during normal operations. In
2018, the Secretary of Transportation reported to Congress that requiring storage of data for a longer period prior to a crash
would be appropriate. Congress has not addressed broader questions concerning the ownership and use of data collected
aboard vehicles.
Tires. Congress has previously required a NHTSA database for tire recalls, electronic identification on all new tires, and an
update to tire pressure monitoring standards, but regulations have not been issued.
Unique vehicles. Stretch limousines, amphibious passenger vehicles—called duck boats—and low-volume replica vehicles
have unique configurations and safety issues that Congress may want to address. H.R. 2 addresses stretch limousine safety.
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Appendix B. Recal Completion Rates.............................................................................. 29

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 29

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Motor Vehicle Safety: Issues for Congress

Introduction
Congress enacted the first vehicle safety legislation even before the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) and its vehicle-safety arm, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), were established more than 50 years ago. Since then, Congress has
delegated major regulatory responsibility to NHTSA while also directing it to give priority to
certain safety actions, such as mandating seat belt warning systems for the back seats of
passenger cars.1 In recent years, the periodic reauthorization of surface transportation programs
has included significant sections on motor vehicle safety. The Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation (FAST) Act,2 passed in 2015, included new initiatives to improve vehicle safety;
some congressional mandates made in that law have not been completed.
Legislation to reauthorize surface transportation programs beyond the end of FY2020 is currently
under discussion in Congress. On July 1, 2020, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2, the
Moving Forward Act, which includes provisions seeking to improve motor vehicle safety.3
Responsibility for highway safety is divided between state and federal governments. While the
states manage driver and vehicle licensing, establish and enforce traffic laws, and build and
maintain highways, the federal government regulates the design of motor vehicles. NHTSA, an
agency within DOT, issues Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and requires
manufacturers to recal and repair defects in vehicles that fail to meet those standards.
NHTSA’s enforcement of some of its vehicle safety standards is controversial, with its oversight
of recal s of passenger cars with defective airbags now in its fourth year. The airbag recal , the
largest on record, has come in for sharp criticism in Congress. In addition, NHTSA has taken on
responsibility for overseeing the development and testing of autonomous vehicles, even as
Congress has not agreed on legislation that would provide it new regulatory tools.4 The agency
has not had a permanent administrator confirmed by the Senate since January 2017. This report
examines NHTSA’s role overseeing vehicle design and regulation and highlights issues for
Congress in the context of reauthorization.
Origins of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Regulation
In the early decades of the automobile, U.S. vehicles were lightly regulated by a combination of
state and private-sector standards. National regulation was general y not seen as appropriate; in
the early 1900s, according to two historians of auto safety, it was widely believed that “the only
useful and political y acceptable action Congress might take was to help the states and localities
construct more and better roads.”5 The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), a professional
association founded in 1905, became the primary source of vehicle safety standards for many

1 Congress directed NHT SA to develop regulations that would require rear seat belt alerts in the Moving Ahead for
Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012 (MAP -21; P.L. 112-141).
2 P.L. 114-94.
3 T he Moving Forward Act, T itle II of Division G (Energy and Commerce Committee section).
4 For a discussion of the issues associated with highly automated vehicles, see CRS Report R45985, Issues in
Autonom ous Vehicle Testing and Deploym ent, by Bill Canis.
5 Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp.
30-31.
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decades. State governments often used SAE recommendations to set their own standards for
vehicle brakes, headlamps, and windshield wipers.
A rising number of highway deaths prompted a new interest in vehicle safety: between 1962 and
1964, Congress passed three safety bil s into law, including a seat belt regulation.6 The new laws
were only a precursor to broader federal regulation. Two publications also spurred interest in a
greater federal role. Ralph Nader’s 1965 book, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of
the American Automobile, argued that cars were unnecessarily unsafe and that the auto industry
should be regulated by a federal agency.7 Also influential was Accidental Death and Disability:
The Neglected Disease of Modern Society, a National Academy of Sciences report that
documented the impact of accidental injuries, including those by motor vehicles.8
Comprehensive vehicle safety legislation was passed in the form of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.9 As approved unanimously by both houses of Congress and
signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, the legislation had two parts:
1. The Highway Safety Act of 1966 mandated that each state put in place a highway
safety program in accordance with federal standards to improve driver
performance, accident records systems, and traffic control.
2. The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 directed the Secretary
of Commerce (later changed to the Secretary of Transportation when that agency
was established in 1967) to issue safety standards for al motor vehicles
beginning in January 1967. A National Traffic Safety Agency was established to
carry out the provisions of the new law; it was renamed the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1970.10
Since its establishment, NHTSA has issued dozens of safety standards,11 including regulations
affecting windshield wipers, hood latches, tires, brakes, seat belts, and airbags.12 Proposing,
finalizing, or revising a NHTSA safety regulation can take many years, pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA).
NHTSA does not verify in advance that motor vehicles and parts comply with its standards.
Instead, the law requires self-certification: “[a] manufacturer or distributor of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment shal certify to the distributor or dealer at delivery that the vehicle or
equipment complies with applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this
chapter.... Certification of a vehicle must be shown by a label or tag permanently fixed to the

6 P.L. 87-637 required hydraulic brake fluid used in motor vehicles to meet certain standards established by the
Secretary of Commerce; P.L. 88-201 required the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate safety standards for seat belts;
and P.L. 88-514 required vehicle manufacturers to meet certain minimum safety standards for vehicles sold to the
General Services Administration (GSA) for the federal fleet.
7 Ralph Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-in Dangers of the American Automobile (New York: Grossman,
1965).
8 National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council, Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected
Disease of Modern Society, 1966, at https://www.ems.gov/pdf/1997-Reproduction-AccidentalDeathDisability.pdf.
9 P.L. 89-563. When he signed the law, President Johnson cited the 50,000 people k illed on U.S. highways as the
biggest cause of death and injury among young Americans. T he White House, “Remarks of the President at Signing of
the Highway Safety Act and the T raffic Safety Act,” press release, September 9, 1966, cited in National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Legislative History, vol. 1, p. 31, published by NHT SA in 1985.
10 Highway Safety Act of 1970, P.L. 91-605.
11 T he authority for issuing standards is found in 49 U.S.C. §30111.
12 See https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/FMVSS-QuickRefGuide-HS811439.pdf.
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vehicle....”13 The self-certification label is affixed to the driver door jamb in al vehicles sold in
the United States.
Manufacturers are responsible for testing their vehicles and are liable for recal s and penalties if
they are later found not to meet FMVSS. After a new model goes on sale, NHTSA buys a
sampling from dealers and tests the vehicles at its own facilities to determine whether they
comply. It also receives consumer complaints about safety-related problems with vehicles. If
NHTSA determines there is noncompliance with its standards, it can encourage the manufacturer
to recal the model to correct the problem, or it can order a recal .14 NHTSA maintains a
comprehensive database about motor vehicle crashes to inform proposed standards and to identify
vehicles potential y requiring recal .15
Estimates of Effects of Federal Safety Standards
A NHTSA study estimated that passenger vehicle safety technologies associated with FMVSS
saved 613,501 lives between 1960 and 2012.16 The study evaluated the effects of 31 motor
vehicle technologies mandated by NHTSA, including front disc brakes, electronic stability
control, seat belts, airbags, and side door beams.17 It estimated that, taking account of rising
vehicle miles traveled (VMT), the risk of a fatality in 2012 was 56% lower than in 1960, based on
evaluation of the effectiveness of specific technologies in reducing occupant fatalities.18
The NHTSA report found seat belts, introduced in the late 1960s, to have been responsible for
more than half of al the lives saved, 329,715, and that their effectiveness rose sharply after
NHTSA required instal ation of combined lap and shoulder belts in place of simple lap belts in
1974.19 However, the study also highlighted the importance of other measures in addition to
federal vehicle safety regulation: it estimated that the number of lives saved annual y by seat belts
rose from 800 to 6,000 after many states al owed police to issue tickets if a driver or passengers
were not wearing seat belts. Every state but New Hampshire has enacted laws requiring seat belt
use.20
The full benefits of new federal safety standards may take many years to be felt. The passenger
vehicle fleet turns over slowly: the average age of light vehicles on the road in 2019 was 11.8

13 P.L. 89-563, 49 U.S.C. §30115.
14 NHT SA, Motor Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls: What Every Vehicle Owner Should Know, at https://www-
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/documents/MVDefectsandRecalls.pdf.
15 NHT SA’s data analysis and research are managed by its National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA) and
Office of Vehicle Safety Research, https://www.nhtsa.gov/research-data; NHT SA maintains the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS), which records factors of fatal crashes such as location, time and circumstances of the crash,
type of vehicle, passengers involved, and vehicles’ movements leading to the crash.
16 T he study evaluated technologies in cars, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), pickup trucks, minivans, and full-size vans.
C. J. Kahane, Lives Saved by Vehicle Safety Technologies and Associated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards,
1960 to 2012, NHT SA, DOT HS 812 069, January 2015.
17 Side door beams are anti-intrusion bars that protect passengers from side impacts.
18 C. J. Kahane, Lives Saved by Vehicle Safety Technologies and Associated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards,
1960 to 2012, NHT SA, DOT HS 812 069, January 2015, p. xii.
19 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Injury Prevention & Control: Motor Vehicle Safety, viewed
March 9, 2017, at https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calculator/factsheet/seatbelt.html.
20 Other major technologies and the cumulative lives saved as identified in the NHT SA study were steering wheel
assemblies (79,989), frontal airbags (42,856), door locks (42,135) , and side impact protection (32,288). C. J. Kahane,
Lives Saved by Vehicle Safety Technologies and Associated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 1960 to 2012 ,
NHT SA, DOT HS 812 069, January 2015.
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years, compared with 8.9 years in 2000.21 Although electronic stability control was introduced as
standard equipment on one make of vehicle in 1998 and was subsequently adopted on some other
makes, only 22% of light vehicles on the road were equipped with the technology in calendar
year 2012. FMVSS required electronic stability control to be included in al new vehicles starting
in model year 2012. The NHTSA study estimated that more than 1,362 lives may be saved
annual y when al vehicles on the road utilize the technology, but this wil not occur for a couple
of decades.
Several elements of traditional motor vehicle safety are being cal ed into question by recent data,
perspectives on earlier studies, and new technologies.
Safety goals have focused on making drivers and passengers safer inside vehicles, but recent
increases in traffic deaths outside the vehicle—of pedestrians and bicyclists—have raised
questions about the effectiveness of current highway safety policies and programs: in 2018, 34%
of highway fatalities were of those outside of vehicles, an increase from 20% in 2000.22
An often-cited statistic that “the major factor in 94% of al fatal crashes is human error”23 is
sometimes interpreted incorrectly to mean that nearly al crashes are due to driver error. The
extensive NHTSA survey from which these data are drawn—the National Motor Vehicle Crash
Causation Survey (NMVCCS)—does not draw that conclusion. That study, authorized by
Congress24 to better understand events leading up to motor vehicle crashes and assist in
developing and evaluating crash avoidance technologies, was conducted from 2005 to 2007,
collecting and analyzing data and events from nearly 7,000 light vehicle crashes.25 The
researchers evaluated data elements related to drivers, vehicles, highways, and the surrounding
environment of the crash sites, determining that of the crashes evaluated,
 36% involved vehicles that were turning or crossing intersections;
 22% involved a vehicle that ran off the edge of the road;
 11% involved a vehicle that did not stay in the proper lane;
 12% involved a stopped vehicle; and
 9% resulted when a driver lost control of a vehicle.
In an important finding that qualifies the causes of vehicle crashes, the NHTSA researchers
reported that the investigated accidents typical y involve a causal chain of events that may be
attributed to the driver (distraction or speeding), the vehicle (tires, brakes or other malfunctions),
the roadway (poor design or wet road surfaces), or atmospheric conditions (rain, snow, sun
glare).26 In a 2015 NHTSA report further analyzing the NMVCCS data, researchers noted that a
“critical reason” for the crashes in the survey “was assigned to the driver in an estimated 94% of

21 Bureau of T ransportation Statistics, Average Age of Automobiles and Trucks in Operation in the United States, at
https://www.bts.gov/content/average-age-automobiles-and-trucks-operation-united-states.
22 NHT SA, Traffic Safety Facts 2000, p. 18.
23 Department of T ransportation, Automated Driving Systems 2.0: A vision for Safety, Introductory Message by DOT
Secretary Elaine Chao, September 2017, p. i, at https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-
ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf.
24 Section 2003(c), Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient. T ransportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFET EA -
LU; P.L. 109-59).
25 Light vehicles include passenger cars, crossover vehicles, SUVs, and pickup trucks. NHT SA, National Motor
Vehicle Crash Causation Survey, DOT HS 811 059, July 2008, at https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/
ViewPublication/811059.
26 Ibid., p. 10.
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the crashes,”27 but that “the critical reason … is not intended to be interpreted as the cause of the
crash... ”28 The 2015 NHTSA report went further and stated that “in none of these cases was the
assignment intended to blame the driver for causing the crash.”29
This reading of the NMVCCS findings may cal into question forecasts that fully autonomous
vehicles could nearly eliminate fatalities, as NMVCCS findings would indicate that adverse
weather conditions, malfunctioning vehicle parts, and poor highway design wil remain factors in
motor vehicle fatalities even when fully autonomous vehicles are in use in the future.30
Increase in Pedestrian and Bicyclist Deaths Linked to More SUVs
Despite safety improvements over past decades, many drivers, passengers, and pedestrians are
kil ed annual y in motor vehicle accidents: in 2018, 36,560 fatalities occurred on U.S. roads. The
number of annual fatalities from motor vehicle accidents has declined by 28% since the first
federal vehicle safety law was enacted in 1966. However, the downward trend was interrupted
with fatality increases from 2015 and 2016, then declined slightly in 2017 and 2018. It is thought
that possible explanations for the increase in fatalities included more driving because of lower
gasoline prices, speeding, alcohol and drug-impaired driving, and driver distractions.31
When fatalities are viewed in the context of the expanded amount of driving that has taken place
in the past 50 years, however, the fatality rate has dropped by nearly 80%, from 5.50 deaths per
100 mil ion vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in 1966 to 1.13 deaths per 100 mil ion VMT in 2018
(Figure 1).32

27 NHT SA, Critical Reasons for Crashes Investigated in the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey , DOT HS
812 115, February 2015, https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812115.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 NHT SA is planning to develop a new crash causation survey to further examine the issues behin d such accidents.
U.S. Department of T ransportation, Fiscal Year 2021: National Highway Traffic Safety Adm inistration , p. 69, at
https://www.transportation.gov/mission/budget/nhtsa-cj-fy-2021-estimates.
31 Beckie Strum, “U.S. T raffic Fatalities Continued to Surge in First Half of 2016,” Wall Street Journal, August 23,
2016, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-traffic-fatalities-continued-to-surge-in-first-half-of-2016-1471967127.
32 Vehicles Miles T raveled is a transportation term that estimates the number of miles traveled by all vehicles nationally
in a one-year period. In 1966, when the fatality rate was at 5.50 per 100 million VMT , the nation’s total vehicle miles
traveled were 925 billion. In 2018, when the fatality rate had dropped to 1.13 per million VMT , total miles traveled had
risen to 3.2 t rillion. NHT SA, 2018 Traffic Safety Facts, DOT HS 812 826, October 2019, p. 2, at
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812826.
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Figure 1. Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities and Fatality Rates

Source: (NHTSA, Trends, Table 2, Persons Kil ed and Fatality Rates, 1966-2017, https://cdan.nhtsa.gov/tsftables/
tsfar.htm#. Data for 2018 from NHTSA, Traffic Safety Facts, DOT HS 812 826, October 2019, p. 2.
Note: VMT refers to Vehicle Miles Traveled.
Among other major countries, U.S. traffic fatalities are higher than most other developed
countries, but below the global average (see an excerpt from the 2018 World Health Organization
(WHO) report in Appendix A). The WHO asserts that the development and enforcement of
vehicle safety standards are important components of any country’s strategy for reducing motor
vehicle-related fatalities, yet only 40 countries—the United States is not among that group—have
implemented most of the United Nations priority vehicle safety standards.33 WHO data suggest
that the developed countries with the lowest fatality rates are those that have adopted more of the
UN vehicle standards.34 According to the WHO, “Vehicle safety is increasingly critical to the
prevention of crashes and has been shown to contribute to substantial reductions in the number of
deaths and serious injuries on the roads. Features such as electronic stability control and advanced
braking are examples of vehicle safety standards that can prevent a crash from occurring.…”35
Nearly two-thirds of U.S. vehicle fatalities in 2018 were occupants of passenger cars and light
trucks, with the remainder being occupants of large trucks, buses, or motorcycles; pedestrians; or
bicyclists (Figure 2). Pedestrian and bicyclist fatalities rose 3.4% and 6.3%, respectively, in 2018

33 T he priority UN vehicle safety standards call for countries to establish rules on frontal and side impact protection;
electronic stability control; pedestrian front protection; seat belts and anchorages; child restraints; and motorcycle
antilock braking systems. T he priorities are developed by the United Nations World Forum for Harmonization of
Vehicle Regulations, part of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE); see https://www.unece.org/trans/
main/wp29/meeting_docs_wp29.html.
34 Among the countries with lower fatality rates that were shown to have adopted at least four of the UN vehicle
standards were Australia, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
35 World Health Organization, Global Status Report on Road Safety, 2018, p. 58, at https://www.who.int/publications-
detail/global-status-report -on-road-safety-2018.
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(when compared to 2017), reaching the highest levels since 1990.36 The composition of vehicles
on the road may be a factor in the increasing numbers of pedestrian and bicyclist deaths. U.S.
vehicle buyers are increasingly opting for light trucks, a category that includes crossovers, sport-
utility vehicles (SUVs), and pickup trucks; such vehicles accounted for 72% of light-vehicle sales
in 2019, up from 50% in 2010.37 The Governors Highway Safety Association has noted that the
number of pedestrian fatalities involving SUVs increased 50% from 2013 to 2017, while the
number involving passenger cars increased 30%.38
Figure 2. Fatality Composition

Source: NHTSA, 2018 Traffic Safety Facts, DOT HS 812 826, October 2019, p. 2.
Notes: Light trucks include most crossovers, SUVs, and al pickup trucks.
An April 2020 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sheds additional light on
the role larger vehicles—in particular SUVs—may play in rising pedestrian fatalities.39 GAO
analyzed a decade of data (from 2008 through 2018) in three NHTSA crash and accident
databases, finding that number of fatalities in accidents involving SUVs increased by 68% during
the decade studied, the number involving light trucks by 25%, and the number involving
passenger cars by 47%.40 GAO found that there were more pedestrian fatalities involving SUVs
because (1) more SUVs are on the road than in the past and (2) pedestrians struck by bigger
vehicles with greater mass are more likely to experience serious injuries or fatalities.41

36 In 2018, 6,283 pedestrians and 857 bicyclists were killed in motor vehicle-related accidents. Ibid., p. 3.
37 Ward’s Intelligence Data Center, North America Vehicle Sales by Vehicle Type, 2000-2019, viewed May 1, 2020.
38 Governors Highway Safety Association, Pedestrian Traffic Fatalities by State: 2018 Preliminary Data, February
2019, p. 4.
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Pedestrian Safety, GAO-20-419, April 23, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-20-419.
40 Other factors contributing to the higher fatalities included older vehicles and higher vehicle speeds. Ibid., p. 13.
41 Ibid., p. 16.
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Technologies exist that could mitigate pedestrian fatalities. In evaluating data provided from 13
automakers, GAO found that 62% of new model year 2019 vehicles had some type of pedestrian
crash mitigation system. GAO recommended that NHTSA (a) expand a current pilot program that
collects data on the type and severity of pedestrian injuries; (b) include pedestrian safety tests in
its five-star New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) safety rating program,42 a step that could
increase automaker use of those technologies on more vehicles; and (c) clarify its process for
updating its safety ratings.43
A 2018 study by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) also associated the greater
number of SUVs on the road with increased pedestrian deaths and injuries. IIHS found that
improving vehicle headlights and equipping more vehicles with pedestrian detection systems
could reduce the number of pedestrian fatalities. It also recommended changing the front-end
design of SUVs so they are less likely to strike pedestrians in the head or chest.44 In a separate
study, IIHS found that smal er vehicles have higher driver death rates, while drivers of some
SUVs have the lowest death rates.45
Many Advanced Technologies Improve Vehicle Safety
In the past decade, the use of advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) has improved vehicle
safety and passenger mobility by warning drivers of potential y dangerous situations, such as
another vehicle braking ahead of them, and in some instances, by taking control of the vehicle to
prevent an accident. A Consumer Reports survey among drivers—with data on 72,000 vehicles—
found that 57% reported that “at least one advanced driver assist feature in their vehicle had kept
them from getting into a crash.”46
IIHS and its affiliated Highway Loss Data Institute documented the effects of some crash
avoidance technologies by comparing actual crashes of vehicles with and without ADAS. In the
2019 IIHS/HDLI study, the authors found that vehicles with forward collision warning
experienced 27% fewer front-to-rear crashes, and when that technology was combined with
automatic braking, 50% fewer crashes were experienced. Lane departure warning, blind spot
detection, and rearview cameras each contributed to lower crash rates.47
Figure 3 shows many of the technologies currently used on passenger motor vehicles; some are
based on NHTSA standards, such as airbags, tire pressure monitors, and rearview cameras, while
others are not at this time. The technologies include the following:
 Electronic stability control limits wheel spinning during acceleration and keeps
the vehicle on the driver’s intended path.

42 T he 5-star safety rating program, formally known as the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP), has since 1978
provided consumers with information on each vehicle’s safety performance based on a series of crash scenario tests
conducted by NHT SA. NCAP was authorized by Congress in the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of
1973 (P.L. 92-513).
43 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Pedestrian Safety, GAO-20-419, April 23, 2020, pp. 39-40.
44 “On foot, at risk,” IIHS Status Report, Vol. 53, No. 3, May 8, 2018, at https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/
status-report/pdf/53/3.
45 IIHS, Driver death rates remain high among small cars, May 28, 2020, at https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/driver-
death-rates-remain-high-among-small-cars.
46 Mike Monticello, Car Safety Systems That Could Save Your Life, Consumer Reports, June 25, 2019, at
https://www.consumerreports.org/automotive-technology/car-safety-systems-that-could-save-your-life/.
47 Institute for Highway Safety and Highway Loss Data Institute, Real-world benefits of crash avoidance technologies,
June 2019, at https://www.iihs.org/media/259e5bbd-f859-42a7-bd54-3888f7a2d3ef/e9boUQ/T opics/
ADVANCED%20DRIVER%20ASSI ST ANCE/IIHS-real- world-CA- benefits.pdf.
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 Automatic emergency braking detects a sudden effort to stop the vehicle,
automatical y applying the brakes to prevent an imminent crash.
 Seat belt pretensioners employ a sensor to detect abrupt deceleration of an
impending accident, forcing a concealed piston to quickly remove any slack in
front-seat seat belts to hold drivers and passengers firmly in their seats, thereby
providing maximum airbag protection.
 Forward collision warning uses cameras, radar, and lasers to search for cars
ahead of a vehicle and alerts drivers if a crash may be imminent, using audible
signals or a vibrating driver’s seat to alert the driver. A similar system is available
to detect pedestrians in a vehicle’s path.
 Blind spot warning devices are built into external side vehicle mirrors; using
radar or cameras, they light up when a motorist seeks to change lanes and another
vehicle is in the driver’s blind spot.
 Lane departure warning systems monitor roadway lane markings and send
audible or vibrating signals to the driver if the vehicle leaves the lane, unless a
turn signal is activated. Research has indicated that drivers who fal asleep, suffer
a medical emergency or black out from drug or alcohol use are most likely to
leave intended lanes.48
 Adaptive lighting is a safety system designed for the driver to see better at night
without affecting other drivers, using a camera under the rearview mirror to
detect oncoming traffic and curves in the road, automatical y adjusting
headlights. FMVSS do not al ow adaptive headlights.
Since there are no universal standards for some of these technologies, they may have different
names among manufacturers and different capabilities. Consumer Reports has suggested that
automakers, regulators, and safety groups develop an “accurate naming convention” so that
consumers wil better understand what these relatively new systems do.49
Many of these newer ADAS technologies are not mandated by Congress or NHTSA; they often
appear first on luxury vehicles because of their high initial costs.50 NHTSA’s position has been
that to develop standards for rapidly changing technologies could impede innovation and result
ultimately in outmoded standards, which could then take years to revise. Delays in issuing or
updating standards can be caused by opposition to some of the proposals by industry or
consumers or by inaction by regulators. In addition, the lengthy period for standard setting is
affected by the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, which ensures that a
proposed rulemaking is publicized in the Federal Register, that public comments are evaluated by
the regulatory agency, and then that decisions that are made are clearly explained in another
Federal Register notice.
To speed the application of one new technology, NHTSA developed a voluntary agreement with
20 automakers in 2016 to instal automatic emergency braking systems on nearly al new
passenger vehicles by 2022, a pace of application that NHTSA’s then-administrator said could

48 IIHS, Drivers who drift from lane and crash often dozing or ill, September 1, 2016, at https://www.iihs.org/news/
detail/drivers-who-drift-from-lane-and-crash-often-dozing-or-ill.
49 David Friedman, Jake Fisher, and Kelly Funkhouser, et al., “ A Consumer Reports Initiative to End Confusion About
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems,” Consum er Reports, October 25, 2018, at https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/
research/advanced-driver-assistance-systems-standard-nomenclature/.
50 H.R. 2, as passed by the House, would require NHT SA to establish federal standards for many of these crash
avoidance technologies.
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not have been met with a traditional standards-setting regulation. Under the agreement,
automakers report annual y on their progress: the latest reporting period (for 2019) showed that
12 manufacturers had equipped more than 75% of their vehicles with the systems.
Figure 3. Advanced Vehicle Technologies

Source: CRS.
With more than 260 mil ion vehicles on U.S. roads, the life-saving value of new technologies wil
be limited until most cars in use, not just new ones, are equipped with them. The Highway Loss
Data Institute reported in 2019 that “carmakers are making vehicles more crashworthy about 3
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times faster today than they did in the mid-1990s, but those improvements and new safety
features stil take decades to filter into most vehicles on the road.”51
Vehicle Recalls and Defects
In addition to promulgating and enforcing vehicle safety standards, NHTSA investigates vehicle
defects that affect safety. NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) initiates defect
investigations and reviews complaints of al eged defects from vehicle owners, automakers, and
other sources. There are several routes a potential recal complaint can take:
 Denial. When NHTSA’s analysis of petitions cal ing for defect investigations
leads the agency to decide not to proceed, it publicizes the reasons for the denial
in the Federal Register.
 Further review. If NHTSA opens an investigation of al eged safety-related
defects, the investigation concludes with either a recommendation that the
manufacturer recal the vehicle or a determination that there is no safety-related
defect.
If a safety defect is confirmed by NHTSA, the manufacturer may initiate a recal ; if it fails to do
so, NHTSA can initiate a recal itself. In addition to the NHTSA investigative process,
manufacturers conduct their own internal investigations; if a manufacturer finds that a vehicle or
component does not comply with a federal safety standard, it may issue its own recal to correct a
safety defect before accidents are reported. Of the 966 recal s issued in 2019, 57 were issued by
manufacturers influenced by a NHTSA finding, and 909 were issued based on a manufacturer’s
finding alone.52 The law establishing the motor vehicle safety program requires that a
manufacturer of a defective vehicle or component notify the vehicle owner and fix the defect
without charge.53

How Consumers Can Report Defects and Check on Recalls
Increasing the reporting of defects and enabling consumers to know about current recal s is an important part of
NHTSA’s public education program to ensure that more vehicles that need repairs are actual y fixed. Vehicle
owners and buyers often want to know how to check on recal s or how to report defects. NHTSA encourages
car owners to report vehicle defects, as knowledge of what consumers are experiencing is one way a recal may
be determined. Consumers can report defects by telephone tol -free (1-888-327-4236 or 1-800-424-9393; a
Spanish-speaking line is available at 1-800-424-9153); on the website http://www.safercar.gov, using the “select a
complaint” feature; or by U.S. mail:
U.S. Department of Transportation
NHTSA, Office of Defects Investigation (NVS-210)
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
Consumers can also check on whether their vehicles have been subject to a recal by visiting
http://www.nhtsa.gov/recal s and using the 17-character Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) that is unique to each
car. A VIN can be found in the lower left of the car’s windshield (on the driver’s side), and on the driver’s side
door jamb near the seat; it is also located on a state vehicle registration card.

51 “Automakers accelerate push to make vehicles safer,” Status Report, December 16, 2019, pp. 4-5, at
https://www.iihs.org/api/datastoredocument/status-report/pdf/54/7.
52 NHT SA, 2016 Annual Recall Report.
53 Remedies for Defects and Compliance, 49 U.S.C. §30120.
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The annual number of recal actions rose 81% between 2009 and 2016, but has fluctuated in a
narrow range since 2016. The number of vehicles and items of equipment recal ed rose steeply
between 2013 and 2015, but then fel through 2018 (see Figure 4). There are several reasons the
number of recal s is higher than in earlier years, including stricter laws, larger fines, delayed
detection by NHTSA of vehicle problems, and several recent high-visibility cases affecting
mil ions of vehicles.
Figure 4. Motor Vehicle and Equipment Recalls

Source: NHTSA, 2019 Annual Recal Report, covering years 2000-2019.
Notes: Data include recal s of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts, tires, and child safety seats. Nearly al of the
recal s in 2019 were of vehicles—39 mil ion—and parts—14 mil ion.
Takata Airbag Recall
The spike in the number of vehicles and equipment recal ed from 2013 to 2017 is due in large
part to the recal of more than 63 mil ion defective airbags manufactured by parts supplier Takata,
making it the largest-ever automotive recal .54 To date there have been 16 confirmed deaths and
more than 220 injuries attributable to Takata airbag defects.55 In 2014, NHTSA opened a formal
investigation into defective airbags that, when deployed in a crash, could shower metal fragments
into front-seat vehicle occupants, often with fatal consequences. In 2015, Takata and NHTSA
entered into a consent order requiring Takata to submit a plan to maximize recal completion
rates.56 During its investigation, NHTSA found that Takata had not notified it of defects in a
timely or accurate way. Takata agreed to retain, at its expense, an independent monitor to assess
compliance with the consent order. In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice took legal action

54 NHT SA, T akata Recall Spotlight, https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/takata-recall-spotlight, viewed on May 7, 2020.
55 Independent Monitor of T akata and the Coordinated Remedy Program, Update on the State of the Takata Airbag
Recalls, January 23, 2020, p. 31, at http://www.takatamonitor.org/.
56 NHT SA Consent Order In re: EA 15-001 Air Bag Inflator Rupture, November 2, 2015, https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/
nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/nhtsa-consentorder-takata.pdf.
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against Takata, leading to Takata pleading guilty in 2017 to criminal charges and agreeing to a $1
bil ion settlement.57
Although mil ions of airbags have been replaced since the defect was detected, an estimated 15.9
mil ion vehicles with the recal ed airbags remain on the road.58 A separate group of 10 mil ion
Takata airbags was recal ed in 2019,59 of which NHTSA estimates about 1% may have a defect.60
The airbags in this recal were used to replace those recal ed earlier, NHTSA having deemed the
replacements safer than the originals. Now, many motorists wil have to return to their dealers for
a second airbag replacement.61 The independent monitor reported in January 2020 that
the Takata recalls, now in their fourth year, continue to pose new and unprecedented
challenges.... Many of the remaining vehicles in the field are older and inherently more
difficult to reach. Affected vehicle manufacturers have learned that, at this stage in the
Takata recalls when repairs have exceeded 60%, over half of remaining vehicle owner
contact information based on registration data, can be incorrect.62
Other Major 2019 Recalls
Aside from the Takata recal s, the 10 largest in 2019, several of which involved defective
software or electronic components, were63
 3.5 mil ion Cadil ac, Chevrolet, and GMC SUVs and pickup trucks, model years
2014-2018, recal ed for a faulty vacuum pump that required reprograming of the
electronic brake control module;
 1.3 mil ion Subaru cars and SUVs, model years 2008-2017, requiring a new
brake light switch to replace one prone to malfunction;
 1.2 mil ion Nissan and Infiniti cars and trucks, model years 2018-2019, requiring
a software update to ensure that their backup cameras worked properly;
 1.2 mil ion Ford Explorers, model years 2011-2017, requiring replacement of
part of the rear suspension so that the rear wheels remain pointed in the right
direction;
 928,000 Toyota, Scion, and Lexus vehicles, model years 2003-2017, requiring
airbag assembly replacements;

57 U.S. Department of Justice, “T akata Corporation Pleads Guilty, Sentenced to Pay $1 Billion in Criminal Pen alties for
Air Bag Scheme,” press release, February 27, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/takata-corporation-pleads-guilty-
sentenced-pay-1-billion-criminal-penalties-airbag-scheme.
58 Independent Monitor of T akata and the Coordinated Remedy Program, Update on the State of the Takata Airbag
Recalls, January 23, 2020, p. 1.
59 NHT SA, “ More T akata Air Bags Recalled,” https://www.nhtsa.gov/recalls/takata-air-bags-nadi, viewed on June 5,
2020.
60 NHT SA, Defect Information Report for Driver and Passenger Side Airbag Inflators, January 2, 2020, at
https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2020/RMISC-20E001-4050.pdf.
61 Colin Beresford, “10 Million More T akata Airbags Recalled from 14 Automakers,” Car And Driver, January 8,
2020, https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a30446627/takata-airbags-recall-10-million/.
62 T he report of the Independent Monitor discusses novel ways in which manufact urers have attempted to increase the
rate of compliance. Independent Monitor of Takata and the Coordinated Remedy Program, Update on the State of the
Takata Airbag Recalls, January 23, 2020, p. 1.
63 Patrick Masterson, “The 10 Biggest Recalls in 2019,” cars.com, January 14, 2020, at https://www.cars.com/articles/
the-10-biggest-recalls-in-2019-416480.
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 863,000 Chrysler, Dodge, and Jeep vehicles, model years 2011-2016, with faulty
catalytic converters, affecting their emission controls;
 693,100 Ram pickup trucks, model years 2013-2014, requiring new tailgate
latches;
 679,000 Volkswagen vehicles, model years 2011-2019, needing new ignition
switches and circuit boards;
 662,100 Volkswagen Passat and Atlas vehicles, model years 2012-2020, missing
a headlight component; and
 638,000 Chevrolet and GMC SUVs and pickup trucks, model years 2014-2018,
recal ed because of a faulty electronic brake control module that affected the
driver’s ability to steer.
A recent private study concluded that a significant trend has been the increase in software defects,
noting that “with the emergence of advanced driver assistance systems, connected vehicles,
vehicle-to-vehicle, and vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, this wil be an important area for
manufacturers and suppliers to focus on.. .”64
Inspector General Report on Recall Process
The Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was required by the
FAST Act to audit NHTSA’s recal process based on its handling of the Takata airbag recal . Its
2018 report, which included six recommendations,65 found that NHTSA’s recal process had a
number of shortcomings. Specifical y, the OIG found that NHTSA’s monitoring process for light
vehicle recal s did not ensure that remedies were fully reported and that it did not verify recal
completion rates or notify manufacturers of missing information, making it difficult to assess the
adequacy of a manufacturer’s recal campaign. The OIG later said NHTSA had addressed its
recommendations.66
In a separate report, issued in 2015, the OIG criticized NHTSA’s methods of collecting vehicle
safety data and reviewing complaints, recommending 17 improvements.67 In the FAST Act,
Congress conditioned the agency’s funding authorization on the resolution of the 17 OIG
recommendations.68 The OIG notified Congress on September 30, 2016, that NHTSA had
addressed the 17 issues raised in its report.
Recall Completion Rates
Vehicle owners do not always bring their vehicles to a dealer when a recal is announced,
resulting in many unrepaired vehicles on the road with safety-related defects. Consumers may not

64 Stout Risius Ross LLC, 2019 Automotive Defect & Recall Report, October 14, 2019, pp. 18-19, at
https://www.stout.com/en/insights/report/2019-automotive-defect-and-recall-report.
65 DOT Office of Inspector General, NHTSA’s Management of Light Passenger Vehicle Recalls Lacks Adequate
Processes and Oversight, ST 2018062, July 18, 2018, pp. 27 -28, at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
NHT SA%20Auto%20Recalls%20Final%20Report%5E07 -18-18.pdf.
66 CRS conversation and email with Office of Inspector General at DOT .
67 DOT Office of Inspector General, Inadequate Data and Analysis Undermine NHTSA’s Efforts to Identify and
Investigate Vehicle Safety Concerns, ST -2015-063, June 18, 2015, at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
NHT SA%20Safety-Related%20Vehicle%20Defects%20-%20Final%20Report%5E6-18-15.pdf.
68 P.L. 114-94, §§24101 and 24102.
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open a recal notice in the mail, find it difficult to schedule a free repair, think the recal is not
important enough for a response, or may have sold the vehicle. Sometimes, as with the Takata
airbag recal , the manufacturer does not have enough repair parts available at the time recal
notices are sent out, and vehicle owners may lose interest during an extended delay. A goal of the
FAST Act was to increase the number of vehicles repaired through the recal process.
The FAST Act required NHTSA to conduct an analysis of vehicle recal completion rates and
submit a report to Congress. NHTSA completed that review, based on recal s issued between
2010 and 2014, and submitted its report in May 2017.69 NHTSA evaluated annual completion
rates rather than average completion rates because the former reflects the number of vehicles
affected.70 NHTSA researchers found that the combined annual completion rate for al
automakers subject to a recal in those years was 67%, “meaning that 67% of al vehicles recal ed
were remedied.”71 Individual automakers’ results varied, with Tesla having the highest annual
completion rate, 100%, in 2010 and Mercedes-Benz having the lowest, 33%, in 2011. Results for
major automakers are shown in Table B-1.
The NHTSA report’s findings are relevant to congressional efforts to boost recal completion
rates:
 The older the vehicle on the date of a recall, the less likely the defect will be
repaired. Cars one to three years old at the time of recal had a repair average of
80%, while cars more than six years old had a 56% rate. NHTSA speculated that
owners of newer cars stil under warranty may be more inclined to return them to
the dealer for a recall.72 This observation appears in other recent recal studies.73
 Vehicle parts recall completions differ by type of components. It appears that
vehicle owners are more likely to respond to recal s for certain types of parts,
such as tires, powertrain, and seat belts (al above 70% completion) than to
lighting and suspension recal s (under 60%).
 Larger recalls underperform smaller recalls. NHTSA compared the average
completion rate—81% for the major automakers—with the annual completion
rate for the same group, which was 67%. The researchers concluded that “recal s
that cover more vehicles are underperforming compared to smal er recal s;
otherwise the unweighted average would more closely resemble the percentage
of vehicles actual y remedied.”74
To the extent that recal s deal with software issues in a vehicle, novel remedies available for that
category may facilitate higher recal completion rates. Software remedies could include over-the-
air solutions that are pushed out to all vehicle owners over wireless networks; alternatively,

69 NHT SA, Report to Congress: Vehicle Safety Recall Completion Rates Report, May 2017, https://www.nhtsa.gov/
sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13376-recall_completion_rates_rtc-tag_final.pdf.
70 As an example, the report notes that BMW’s 2014 annual completion rate was 42% because it fixed 42% of the
vehicles it recalled that year. Its average completion rate was 87% because of several smaller recalls that year that had
higher completion rates. One large BMW recall had a relatively low completion rate, bringing down the annual rate.
Ibid., p. 6.
71 Ibid., p. 11.
72 Ibid., p. 13.
73 Stout, Risius Ross LLC, 2019 Automotive Defect & Recall Report, October 14, 2019, pp. 10-11.
74 NHT SA, Report to Congress: Vehicle Safety Recall Completion Rates Report, May 2017, p. 12.
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vehicle owners could download a software correction from a manufacturer’s (or NHTSA’s)
website onto their vehicle’s USB port.75
The 2015 FAST Act and Unresolved Issues
Major Safety Provisions
Congress last enacted vehicle safety legislation as part of the last surface transportation
reauthorization, the FAST Act of 2015. Among the safety provisions it included were the
following:
 Recall compliance for rental cars and new notice requirement for auto
dealers. The FAST Act required rental car companies for the first time to repair
vehicles subject to recal s before renting, leasing, or sel ing them. Motor vehicle
dealers were also required to notify vehicle owners when there is an open recal
on a vehicle brought in for servicing.
 Types of consumer communications. The FAST Act requires NHTSA to issue a
rule requiring manufacturers to use email, social media, and targeted online
campaigns to notify vehicle owners of recal s, in addition to first-class mail.76
The law required DOT to initiate a two-year pilot grant program with six states to
evaluate the feasibility of using states’ motor vehicle registration process to
inform consumers of open recal s on their vehicles.
 Recall compliance period. Previous law required that a defect triggering a recal
be repaired free of charge for up to 10 years after a recal ; the FAST Act extended
this protection to 15 years.
 Driver privacy. The Driver Privacy Act of 2015, included in the FAST Act,
specifies that data retained by an event data recorder (EDR) is the property of the
vehicle owner. EDRs capture data about the driver and the vehicle, such as seat
belt use and speed, in the five seconds before a crash. The Driver Privacy Act
does not address the ownership of data collected in a vehicle at other times.
 Improved databases. NHTSA was directed to revise its existing crash
investigation database to include specific information about child restraint
systems utilized at the time of vehicle crashes. In addition, it was required to
establish a publicly searchable database of tire recal s.
 Civil penalties. With the goal of encouraging automakers to more readily
disclose potential defects that could lead to a recal , the statutory civil penalty cap
for each violation of the law was raised from a maximum of $35 mil ion to $105
mil ion.77
 Whistleblower incentives. The FAST Act included the Motor Vehicle Safety
Whistleblower Act, which provides financial rewards to employees of motor

75 Stout Risius Ross LLC, 2019 Automotive Defect & Recall Report, October 14, 2019, p. 65.
76 A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued in 2016; a comment period ended in October 2016. No final rule has
been issued. Department of T ransportation, Report on DOT Significant Rulem akings, February 2020, p. 68, at
https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/report-on-significant -rulemakings.
77 NHT SA, “Notice of Increase in Civil Penalty for Violations of National T raffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,” 81
Federal Register 15413, March 22, 2016.
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vehicle and parts manufacturers, contractors, and automobile dealers who report
vehicle defects to NHTSA. The law directed NHTSA to issue regulations
implementing the whistleblower process by 2017, but no Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking has been issued.78
Unresolved Safety Issues
Recent surface transportation laws—the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of
2012 (MAP-21)79 and the FAST Act—have directed NHTSA to study and report on safety-related
issues, while requiring the agency to begin rulemakings on others. Many of these issues remain
unresolved (unless otherwise noted).
 Recalls. DOT’s inspector general was required to conduct an audit of vehicle
recal management.80 NHTSA was required to assess the effectiveness of the
rental car recal process, report on the findings of the state motor vehicle pilot,
and evaluate the feasibility of requiring instal ation of a technical system in new
cars that would alert motorists to open recal s.
 Crash data recordings. A report was required assessing how long an event data
recorder (EDR) should capture data preceding a crash, with an ensuing regulation
to establish a revised data recording period.81 NHTSA began a rulemaking in
2018 to update the current pre-crash recording duration; a final rule is anticipated
in February 2021.82
 Child occupant crash data. A report analyzing these data was required. A
rulemaking was completed in 2014, but a new rule is planned to be issued in
December 2020.83
 NHTSA agenda. NHTSA is required to submit annual y a report that details its
projected priorities and initiatives for the year ahead.84
 Tire identification. A feasibility study was required about providing electronic
identification of vehicle tires. NHTSA submitted a report to Congress in March
2019, concluding that it is technological y feasible for manufacturers to include
an electronic-based identification in al new tires, subject to NHTSA possibly
developing a standard for use of that technology.85

78 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List,
Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?p ubI d=202004&
RIN=2127-AL85.
79 P.L. 112-141.
80 Completed in 2018.
81 Secretary of T ransportation Elaine Chao submitted a report to congressional committees on September 21, 2018,
showing that the current five-second minimum recording requirement does not capture all steps that a driver takes to
avoid a crash, and suggests that a 20-second recording prior to a crash would provide better data for analysis. T his
report is not available on the NHT SA website.
82 OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaVie wRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AM12.
83 OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaVie wRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AK95.
84 T he most recent report on NHT SA’s planned activities, for 2020, was issued on March 4, 2020; at
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/nhtsa_agenda_report_to_congress_03042020.pdf.
85. NHT SA, Electronic Tire Identification Study, March 2019, p. 28, at https://www.safetyresearch.net/Library/18-
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Among the new rulemakings required in the FAST Act:
 Motor vehicle tires. NHTSA was required to update the existing standard for tire
pressure monitoring; promulgate a new rule for tire fuel efficiency performance,
and initiate a rulemaking to require independent tire sel ers—not affiliated with a
manufacturer—to maintain records of tire purchasers. Of these three required
rulemakings, NHTSA has said only that it is considering issuing a rule for the
fuel efficiency performance standard.86
 Manufacturers’ safety records. Automakers had been required to retain
information on their vehicles’ safety records for five years; the FAST Act doubled
the holding period to 10 years to account for defects or safety issues that develop
as vehicles age. NHTSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in May
2019, but a final rule has not been issued.87
 Special rules for low-volume manufacturers. DOT and the Environmental
Protection Agency were required to establish, within a year of the enactment of
the FAST Act, a separate regulatory process for limited-production vehicles that
may not meet some federal safety and emission standards, such as replicas of
older-model vehicles.88 NHTSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
January 7, 2020. The comment period closed on February 6, 2020, and NHTSA is
reviewing the comments.89
 Submission of corporate vehicle safety reports. NHTSA was required to issue
a final rule governing how companies involved in safety defect or compliance
investigations wil certify their submissions; a final rule was due one year after
enactment. No rule has been issued.
Several rules mandated in MAP-21 also remain to be finalized:
 Side impact crash protection and anchorage standards for child restraint
systems. NHTSA was required to finalize rules that would improve the
protection of children using child restraint systems governed by FMVSS 213 and
225; statutory deadlines were 2014 and 2015, respectively. If NHTSA determined
that it would not issue a revised anchorage standard, MAP-21 required a report to
be submitted to Congress. Notices of Proposed Rulemakings were issued in 2014
for amending both standards, but final rules have not been issued. NHTSA has
not submitted the report to Congress.90

3053%20Elec%20tire%20id%20study-3.pdf.
86 OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaVie wRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AM08.
87 OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaVie wRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AL81.
88 In January 2020, NHT SA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking for low-volume vehicle manufacturers. See
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/07/2019-27211/replica-motor-vehicles-vehicle-identification-
number-vin-requirements-manufacturer-identification.
89 NHT SA, “Replica Motor Vehicles,” 85 Federal Register 792-823, January 7, 2020; and OMB, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020 , https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AL77.
90 Department of T ransportation, Report on DOT Significant Rulemakings, February 2020, pp. 58 and 62,
https://www.transportation.gov/regulations/report-on-significant -rulemakings; and OMB, Office of Inform ation and
Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020 , https://www.reginfo.gov/public/
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 Frontal impact tests. A final rule to amend FMVSS 213 to improve simulation
of children’s rear seats in frontal crashes was required by 2016. A Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking was issued in February 2020; a final rule has not been
issued.
 Rear seat belt warnings. NHTSA was required to initiate a rulemaking to amend
FMVSS 208 to require instal ation of a seat belt warning system for rear
passengers, similar to what is now required for passengers in front seats. A final
rule (or report if NHTSA chose not to pursue a rule) was required by 2015. An
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued in 2019, with a comment
period that ended in November 2019. No final rule has been issued.91
 Warning about unattended passengers. MAP-21 suggested—did not require—
that NHTSA evaluate ways in which drivers could be alerted to children or other
unattended passengers in the back seats. When such research was not completed,
the FAST Act mandated that such research be undertaken. No rule has been
issued.
 Vehicle defect reporting. A final rule was mandated by 2013 that would require
auto manufacturers to place a sticker in the glove compartment or in another part
of the vehicle that would instruct a vehicle owner on how to file a vehicle defect
complaint with NHTSA. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued in 2016,
but further action has not been taken.
In addition, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 200792 required the establishment of a
national tire fuel efficiency consumer information program for motor vehicle replacement tires. In
2010, NHTSA published a final rule specifying the test procedures that would be used to rate tire
performance,93 but the consumer information part of the statutory requirement has not been
fulfil ed.
Unaddressed NTSB Recommendations
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency that
investigates al major transportation crashes.94 After each investigation, it releases a detailed
report, including probable cause of a crash and recommendations for federal policy changes, if
appropriate. The NTSB has no authority to implement its recommendations.
Following are recent vehicle safety recommendations that have not been acted on by NHTSA or
Congress.

do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AL34.
91 Department of T ransportation, Report on DOT Significant Rulemakings, February 2020, p. 64, and OMB, Office of
Inform ation and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020 ,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaVie wRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AL37.
92 P.L. 110-140, §111.
93 NHT SA, “T ire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program,” 75 Federal Register 15893-15947, March 30,
2010. NHT SA forecasts that a new notice of proposed rulemaking will be issued in January 2021; and OMB, Office of
Inform ation and Regulatory Affairs, Agency Rule List, Department of T ransportation, June 30, 2020,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaVie wRule?pubId=202004&RIN=2127-AK76.
94 National T ransportation Safety Board home page, https://www.ntsb.gov.
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Stretch Limousines
Stretch limousines are conventional vehicles purchased from motor vehicle manufacturers, and
lengthened and repurposed by independent car body shops. Several have been involved in fatal
crashes; the most recent stretch limousine crash investigated by NTSB occurred near Albany, NY,
in October 2018, kil ing 20 people, including the 17 passengers, the driver, and 2 pedestrians.
In 2019, the NTSB recommended that NHTSA establish standards for seat belt use in stretch
limousines, with requirements that passengers in such vehicles use lap/shoulder belts and that
seating systems instal ed in such modified vehicles meet minimum performance standards “to
ensure their integrity during a crash.”95 In 2014, after investigating a fatal accident involving a
limousine van, NTSB recommended that NHTSA require such vehicles to provide a full-sized
exit on one side of the passenger compartment and another emergency exit elsewhere should the
full-sized exit be blocked in a crash.96
Motorcycles
Among al motor vehicle users, motorcyclists have the highest risk of fatal injuries, which occur
per mile traveled nearly 28 times more frequently than other vehicle fatalities.97 While NTSB
reported in 2018 that more than 90% of crashes it analyzed were due primarily to human error,98
it has urged NHTSA to address the design of motorcycles, including99
 requiring motorcycles to meet performance standards for passenger vehicle crash
warning systems;
 mandating that new motorcycles manufactured for on-road use come equipped
with antilock braking systems; and
 developing standards for stability control systems for on-road motorcycles.
Amphibious Passenger Vehicles
Amphibious passenger vehicles (APVs), more widely known as duck boats, were original y built
during World War II to deliver cargo from ships at sea directly to the shore, and often to evacuate
injured military personnel. Today, they serve as tourist vehicles designed both to drive on roads
and operate as boats in the water. They have multiple regulators because they
 serve as on-road passenger vehicles that must comply with certain federal motor
vehicle standards established by NHTSA;
 are considered smal passenger vessels, so the U.S. Coast Guard inspects them
for seaworthiness and certifies their drivers as vessel captains;

95 NT SB also recommended that the New York State Department of T ransportation ensure that seat belts are functional
and accessible during regular state inspections. National T ransportation Safety Board, Safety Recom m endation Report,
October 2, 2019, at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/HWY19MH001.aspx.
96 Letter from Christopher Hart, Chairman, National T ransportation Safety Board, to Marc Rosekind, Administrator,
NHT SA, September 8, 2015, at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/H-15-017.pdf.
97 NT SB, Select Risk Factors Associated with Causes of Motorcycle Crashes, NT SB/SR-18/01, September 11, 2018, p.
ix, https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SR1801.pdf.
98 Ibid., p. 16.
99 Ibid., p. 39; for a summary of the recommendations, see https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/H-18-
029-038.pdf.
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 are commercial vehicles, so are subject to federal commercial vehicle regulations
enforced by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. In addition, duck
boat safety inspections are typical y conducted by state agencies, and drivers
must be certified by state officials as commercial vehicle drivers.
APVs have been involved in a number of accidents in recent years. Seventeen of 31 passengers
died on a duck boat that sank in a storm on a lake near Branson, MO, in July 2018. In September
2015, a duck boat was involved in a crash with a commercial bus on a bridge in Seattle, kil ing
five passengers. APV accidents occurred in Boston in 2016 and Philadelphia in 2010, and earlier
incidents include a sinking with 13 fatalities in Arkansas in 1999. Among NTSB’s
recommendations were the following:100
 NHTSA should classify al APVs as non-over-the-road buses and make newly
manufactured APVs subject to applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards
in effect at the time of manufacture;
 NHTSA should separately adopt Coast Guard rules about cargo loads and
passenger seating limits; and
 the Coast Guard should revise buoyancy standards for APVs so they remain
afloat in the event of damage; address the safety implications of boat canopies
and supports; and ensure that APV operators instruct passengers not to wear seat
belts when the vehicle is operated in the water.
Tires
According to NTSB research, tire-related vehicle crashes were responsible for more than 700
fatalities in 2017.101 NTSB has recommended that NHTSA be given statutory authority to require
tire dealers to register al tires with NHTSA when they are purchased so buyers can be contacted
more readily in the event of recal s, and that it post recal information such as tire identification
numbers, brand, and models on its website.102
Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety Systems
NTSB has examined 15 crashes involving motor vehicles and pedestrians and issued a special
report on its findings in 2018, its first major pedestrian investigation since the 1970s.103 It issued a
report on bicycle crashes involving motor vehicles in 2019.104 NTSB found that improvements in
vehicle systems could mitigate future collisions and their consequences; it recommended

100 NT SB, Safety Recommendation Report, Improving Vessel Survivability, MSR1901, November 6, 2019, at
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/MSR1901.aspx and NT SB, Am phibious Passenger Vehicle
DUCK 6 Lane Crossover with Motorcoach, HAR1602, November 15, 2016, at https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/
Documents/Seattle-WA-DUKW-Abstract.pdf.
101 Latest data, https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/tires.
102 NT SB, Safety Recommendation, H-15-27 through -35, November 12, 2015, https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/
RecLetters/H-15-027-035.pdf. Establishing a tire recall database was required by Section 24335 of the FAST Act, but
has not been implemented.
103 NT SB, Pedestrian Safety, SIR-18/03, September 25, 2018, https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/
SIR1803.pdf.
104 NT SB, Bicyclist Safety on US Roadways: Crash Risks and Countermeasures, SS-19/01, November 5, 2019,
https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SS1901.pdf.
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 that NHTSA revise federal motor vehicle safety standards to al ow adaptive
headlight systems,105 along with performance standards to ensure that headlights
are correctly aimed and tested;
 that NHTSA develop performance tests and criteria for vehicle designs that could
reduce vehicle-pedestrian injuries;106 and
 expanding NHTSA’s New Car Assessment Program to incorporate tests to
evaluate a vehicle’s ability to avoid crashes and reduce injuries with pedestrians
and bicyclists,107 a step some other countries have already taken.
Autonomous and Connected Driving Systems
While advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) are available on many vehicles today, the
motor vehicle industry and technology companies have been seeking to develop vehicles that may
someday be fully automated, requiring little or no driver involvement. Such vehicles do not exist
commercial y now, and NHTSA’s acting administrator has cautioned that
all vehicles sold to the public today require a driver to be fully attentive and cognitively
engaged in the driving at all times. This is true even if the car is equipped with any of the
ADAS technologies currently on the market. While ADAS technologies are improving and
enhancing safety, they are not self-driving. Misusing driver assistance systems by failing
to maintain control of the operation of the vehicle at all times can result in serious and even
deadly crashes.108
Increasing the autonomy of cars and trucks is general y seen as an effective way to reduce
vehicle-related accidents that are caused by human error. Autonomous vehicles may someday
have most of the technologies on board to operate independently without human engagement.
Connected vehicles, which are on some roads today, instead use technologies to communicate
with other vehicles and infrastructure around them, and with cloud-based servers. The connected
vehicle safety technologies under development would require cars and trucks to communicate
with each other (vehicle-to-vehicle, or V2V) and with their surroundings (vehicle-to-
infrastructure, or V2I). V2V communication is expected to reduce the number of accidents by
improving detection of oncoming vehicles and providing driver warnings. V2I communication is
expected to help highway operators monitor and manage traffic and provide drivers with
information such as weather and traffic conditions. Autonomous and connected vehicle
technologies may merge in the future.
In the 115th Congress, the House of Representatives passed legislation109 that would have
provided new regulatory tools to NHTSA for the regulation of automated vehicles. That
legislation was not brought up for a vote in the Senate due to controversies over possible

105 Adaptive lighting provides better illumination for drivers as they turn corners; the headlights may be self -leveling;
and they may also automatically switch between high - and low-beam headlights based on the detection of other
vehicles ahead. NT SB, Pedestrian Safety, SIR-18/03, September 25, 2018, p. 18.
106 Ibid., p. 42.
107 NT SB, Bicyclist Safety on US Roadways: Crash Risks and Countermeasures, SS-19/01, November 5, 2019, p. x.
108 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and T ransportation, Testimony of James C, Owens,
Acting Adm inistrator, NHTSA, Highly Automated Vehicles: Federal Perspectives on the Deployment of Safety
T echnology, 116th Cong., 1st sess., November 20, 2019, p. 5.
109 H.R. 3388, the SELF DRIVE Act.
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preemption of state and local safety laws and the types of federal standards for driverless vehicles
that would be permitted by the legislation.110
Separately, the development of autonomous vehicles may be affected by a pending Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) rulemaking concerning use of radio frequencies that have
been al ocated exclusively for vehicle communications since 1999.111 In December 2019, the
FCC proposed to open this band of spectrum to certain other uses; it has been al ocated
exclusively for development of vehicle communications in 1999 and is known as the “safety
band.” DOT112 and the auto industry113 have continued to raise concerns with the FCC proposal.
In addition, the NTSB has recommended that NHTSA develop standards that could ensure safer
operation of autonomous and connected vehicles, including (1) performance standards for
forward collision avoidance systems,114 (2) a standard to limit the use of Level 2 automated
vehicle control systems115 to conditions for which they were designed, and (3) a requirement that
manufacturers report crashes involving misuse of Level 2 control systems.116 It has also cal ed for
NHTSA to expand research and data collection to ensure that experience with pedestrians and
bicyclists is incorporated into the deployment of connected vehicles.
Congress Addresses Motor Vehicle Safety
Motor vehicle safety issues are typical y addressed through multi-year surface transportation
reauthorization legislation, as wel as through the annual appropriations process.
The Moving Forward Act
Title II of Division G of H.R. 2, as passed by the House, would require NHTSA to issue a variety
of new or revised standards, general y within two years of enactment:
Safety warning about unattended passengers. In surface transportation laws in 2012 and 2015,
Congress cal ed on NHTSA to take action on the issue of fatalities occurring when children are
left in vehicles, often on hot summer days. NHTSA has not issued a final rule. H.R. 2 would
require NHTSA to issue a final rule requiring new passenger vehicles to be equipped with a
system that wil provide auditory and visual warnings that an occupant is stil in the car when the

110 For a discussion of the issues associated with highly automated vehicles, see CRS Report R45985, Issues in
Autonom ous Vehicle Testing and Deploym ent, by Bill Canis.
111 For a discussion of spectrum issues related to vehicle safety, see CRS In Focus IF11260, Smart Cars and Trucks:
Spectrum Use for Vehicle Safety, by Bill Canis and Jill C. Gallagher.
112 T he National T elecommunications and Information Administration outlined DOT ’s concerns with regard to
changing the safet y band in a letter to the FCC. Letter from Charles Cooper, Associate Administrator for Spectrum
Management, NT IA, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, March 13, 2020,
https://www.transportation.gov/content/safety-band.
113 Alliance for Automotive Innovation, “Auto Industry Forms Consensus to Move Forward on Safety Spectrum Band
Plan that Advances Lifesaving T echnologies,” press release, April 28, 2020, at https://www.autosinnovate.org/press-
release/auto-industry-forms-consensus-to-move-forward-on-safety-spectrum-band-plan-that-advances-lifesaving-
technologies.
114 NT SB, Safety Recommendation, H-15-004-007, June 8, 2015, https://ntsb.gov/pages/Results.aspx?k=H-15-004.
NHT SA has not issued a rule.
115 NHT SA categorizes automated vehicles as Levels 0-5, a scale that reflects increasing levels of autonomy; currently,
most automated vehicles are Level 2 or 3. NHT SA has not issued a rule.
116 NT SB, New Safety Recommendation, H-17-037-043, September 12, 2017, http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/
RecLetters/H-17-037-043.pdf. NHT SA has not issued a rule.
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engine or motor is deactivated. It would also require a study of the feasibility of retrofitting
existing motor vehicles with a similar technology.
Keyless ignition technology.117 NHTSA would be required to issue a final rule to ensure that new
motor vehicles include technology to (1) automatical y shut off the engine after a vehicle is
parked to prevent carbon monoxide poisoning and (2) prevent a vehicle from moving if parked
but not in the park setting.
Crash avoidance and headlamp technologies. NHTSA would be required to issue final rules
requiring al new vehicles to have (1) a range of crash avoidance technologies (such as automatic
emergency braking, forward collision warning, and blind spot warning) and (2) revised headlamp
standards to improve road il umination (including adaptive headlamps).
NCAP safety rating system. Within one year, NHTSA would be required to issue a public report
on its five-year plan to improve consumer information on motor vehicle crashworthiness, as wel
as update NCAP’s safety criteria and crash test procedures, including the impact of crash
avoidance technologies such as AEB and blind spot warning. H.R. 2 would also require NHTSA
to establish crash avoidance tests to evaluate and prevent injuries and fatalities to pedestrians and
bicyclists.
Limousine safety. NHTSA would be required to issue final rules mandating seat belts and event
data recorders in stretch limousines (passenger vehicles with seating capacity of nine or more).
NHTSA would be given three years to issue a new final standard for passenger evacuations and
six years to conduct research and adopt new standards for stretch limousine crashworthiness, such
as side impact and roof protection. As a new federal oversight requirement, safety elements of
new stretch limousines would have to be approved by NHTSA before they can be put in service.
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission would be given authority to enforce new limousine
safety inspection requirements.
Revised hood and bumper standards. NHTSA would be directed to establish standards for vehicle
hoods and bumpers so that front-end vehicle collisions with pedestrians and bicyclists would
result in reduced injuries and fatalities.
Children’s booster seats. The booster seat standard would have to be revised to require visible
labeling about the permissible height and weight of occupants.
NHTSA Appropriations
NHTSA’s budget in recent years has had modest growth, as Trump Administration proposals to
reduce some levels of spending have not been accepted by Congress. The largest parts of
NHTSA’s budget fund highway traffic safety grants and highway safety research and
development. Most of the reductions recommended in FY2018-FY2021 have been in the third
and smal est part of the NHTSA budget, the vehicle safety area, affecting al three components of

117 Keyless ignition technology is increasingly a standard feature on many passenger motor vehicles, developed as a
security measure to deter break-ins. It replaces the key with an electronic fob that drivers keep in their pockets, purses
or briefcases, enabling the driver to push a button on the dashboard to start the engine. A safety issue has emerged with
this technology and quieter engines: Drivers have sometimes forgotten to turn off the engine when parked in their
garage, resulting in carbon monoxide poisoning and some deaths. With no key to disengage, oth er drivers have
forgotten to put the car in park and stepped out while it was still in the drive setting, causing serious injuries.
Automakers have addressed these safety issues with a variety of solutions, including audible warnings and automatic
shutdown of the engine. For more information on keyless ignitions, see NHT SA, Keyless Ignition System s, at
https://www.nhtsa.gov/driver-assistance-technologies/keyless-ignition-systems.
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NHTSA’s Vehicle Safety operations: rulemaking, enforcement, and research and analysis (Table
1).
 The Vehicle Safety & Research budget develops test procedures and assesses the
safety impact and risks of new technologies (such as ADAS), investigates crash
survivability, and operates NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and Test Center in Ohio.
 The rulemaking functions include informing consumers about vehicle safety and
crashworthiness, managing NCAP testing, overseeing fuel economy standards,
and updating current vehicle standards.
 Enforcement officials investigate safety-related defects, ensure that
manufacturers complete recal s, and seek to expand recal notifications via text
messaging and other new outreach methods. The Office of Defects Investigations
(ODI) fal s within the enforcement budget; for FY2021, the Trump
Administration has proposed a budget of $12 mil ion for defects investigations,
compared to a $28 mil ion appropriation in FY2020;118 the House-passed
appropriation (H.R. 7616) recommends $30 mil ion in its FY2021 bil .119
Table 1. NHTSA Vehicle Safety Budget
(dol ars in mil ions)

FY2018
FY2019
FY2019
FY2020
FY2020
FY2021
FY2021
Actual
Request
Enacted
Request
Enacted
Request
House Billa
Vehicle
$179
$152
$190
$151
$194
$156
$214
Safety Total
Vehicle Safety
40
38
49
33
48
33
48
Research &
Analysis
Rulemaking
23
22
25
23
28
23
42
Enforcement
37
17
33
20
37
20
42
Administrative
79
76
83
76
81
81
82
expenses
Source: Sources: CRS, based on DOT Budget Estimates for FY2018-FY2021: https://www.transportation.gov/
budget.
Notes: Appropriations derived from the general fund. Totals may not add due to rounding. “Enacted” refers to
the amount of spending authorized in an appropriations act; “actual” refers to the amount available after
adjustments such as rescissions and reprogramming, and is reported a year or two after the enactment of the
appropriations.
a. Spending recommended in H.R. 7616, the Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Bil , 2021, as passed by the House on July 31, 2020.
The Administration’s budget recommendations have been opposed by numerous vehicle safety
organizations, such as Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety and the Center for Auto Safety.
Congress has not accepted the recommended reductions. For example, the Trump Administration

118 U.S. Department of T ransportation, Fiscal Year 2021: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration , p. 62, at
https://www.transportation.gov/mission/budget/nhtsa-cj-fy-2021-estimates.
119 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban
Developm ent, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2021 , report to accompany H.R. 7616, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
July 16, 2020, H.Rept. 116-452, pp. 51-55.
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requested $151 mil ion for NHTSA’s FY2020 vehicle safety programs; the House-passed
FY2020 appropriation120 for them was $214 mil ion; the Senate-passed appropriation121 was $194
mil ion; and the final enacted appropriation was $194 mil ion.122 In their reports on NHTSA’s
FY2020 funding, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees noted several areas of
disagreement with the Administration over NHTSA’s program execution, including the
following:
 Office of Defects Investigation. The House committee cal ed on ODI to
“strengthen its collection and analysis of early warning data and vehicle defects
and enhance defects investigations,”123 as recommended by the OIG, and report
to Congress in six months on implementation. The Senate committee expressed
similar concerns and also required NHTSA to report to Congress within a year
about additional analytical and modeling tools that could boost recal compliance
rates.
 Autonomous vehicles (AV) research. The House committee said it is
“concerned that the development of AVs is not receiving sufficient oversight
from NHTSA.”124 The Senate committee directed NHTSA to develop goals for
future federal standards that would ensure access to autonomous vehicles for
persons with disabilities and report to Congress on its efforts.
 Overdue rulemaking. The House committee report stated that the “committee is
extremely concerned by NHTSA’s lack of progress on critical rulemakings that
the agency has been directed to complete in both the FAST Act and MAP-21.”125
The committee required NHTSA to submit a report to within six months of
enactment with a timeline for completion of rules required by the FAST Act and
MAP-21.
 New Car Assessment Program (NCAP). The House committee stated that it is
“concerned that crashworthiness standards have not kept pace with technological
advances” and that NHTSA should report to Congress on plans for updated
standards that would also include ratings on pedestrian and bicyclist safety and
ADAS.126 The Senate committee also expressed concern over the nearly four-
year delay in adding crash avoidance technologies to the NCAP ratings and
directed NHTSA to report on its timeline for completing the rulemaking; it also
encouraged NHTSA to include pedestrian and bicyclist safety ratings.

120 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban
Developm ent, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2020 , report to accompany H.R. 3163, 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 6, 2019, H.Rept. 116-106, pp. 40-44 at https://appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/
files/FY2020%20T HUD%20Filed%20Report%20 116-106.pdf.
121 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2020 , report to accompany S. 2520, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 19, 2019,
S.Rept. 116-109, pp. 62-69, at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
FY2020%20T HUD%20Appropriations%20Act,%20Report%20116 -109.pdf.
122 T ransportation, Housing and Urban Development, and related Agencies (T HUD) Appropriations, FY 2020, P.L.
116-94.
123 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban
Developm ent, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2020, report to accompany H.R. 3163, 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
June 6, 2019, H.Rept. 116-106, p. 40.
124 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
125 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
126 Ibid., p. 42.
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 Tire efficiency. The Senate committee noted that the FAST Act cal ed for three
new tire efficiency regulations and directed NHTSA to report within four months
on its schedule to issue them.
On July 31, 2020, the House passed the FY2021 appropriations bil for DOT programs (see Table
1). Its recommended spending level for NHTSA’s vehicle safety programs—$214 mil ion—is the
same as it recommended for FY2020. The bil proposes major spending increases for rulemaking
and enforcement; the House Appropriations Committee report that accompanies H.R. 7616
recommends specific requirements for NHTSA action, including the following:
 Vehicle defects. The committee expressed concern about the status of a report
detailing NHTSA’s plans to enhance its defect investigations, which was due in
June 2020, and asked for an immediate briefing.
 Older drivers. $8 mil ion would be set aside for new research and a pilot
program to explore how software could be used to facilitate mobility for elderly
drivers.
 Autonomous vehicles. Concerns were raised about safety of passengerless
delivery vehicles and about NHTSA’s monitoring of pilot programs. In addition,
the committee directed NHTSA to conduct research on the need for (1) possible
new crashworthiness standards associated with “alternatively positioned vehicle
occupants,”127 (2) advanced computing methods and machine learning that could
assist state governments in preparing for autonomous vehicles, and (3)
establishment of minimum performance standards for associated vehicle
technologies.

127 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban
Developm ent, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2021 , report to accompany H.R. 7616, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
July 16, 2020, H.Rept. 116-452, p. 54.
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Appendix A. Road Traffic Fatalities Abroad
The World Health Organization (WHO) tracks road traffic accidents and progress among 175
countries in improving enactment and enforcement of vehicle and pedestrian safety laws. The
WHO report does not measure the fatality rate per 100 mil ion vehicle miles traveled (VMT), as
does the United States. Instead, WHO developed data from a variety of sources and used a
measurement based on fatalities per 100,000 population. The following data show 2016 road
traffic fatalities in selected countries.
Table A-1. Global Comparison of Road Traffic Fatalities
Selected Countries, for 2016
Country
Road Traffic Fatalities per 100,000 Population
Argentina
14.0
Australia
5.6
Brazil
19.7
Canada
5.8
China
18.2
France
5.5
Germany
4.1
India
22.6
Japan
4.1
Mexico
13.1
Russian Federation
18.0
South Korea
9.8
Saudi Arabia
28.8
South Africa
25.9
United Kingdom
3.1
United States
12.4
Global Average
18
Source: World Health Organization, Global Status Report on Road Safety, 2018, pp. 94-266, at
https://www.who.int/publications-detail/global-status-report-on-road-safety-2018.
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Appendix B. Recall Completion Rates
Table B-1. Annual Recall Completion Rates by Major Vehicle Manufacturer
Company
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

In Percent of Vehicles Recalled
BMW of North America
82
54
77
79
42
Chrysler (FCA US)
76
77
51
54
69
Ford Motor Company
45
45
56
73
70
General Motors
73
93
78
82
66
Honda (American Honda Motor Co.)
69
78
59
73
72
Hyundai Motor America
95
60
70
63
70
Kia Motors America
88
61
59
67
75
Mercedes-Benz USA
92
33
90
59
69
Nissan North America
53
55
84
85
84
Subaru of America
91
76
72
58
55
Tesla Motors
100
-
-
89
99
Toyota Motor Engineering &
78
74
68
56
67
Manufacturing
Volkswagen Group of America
79
95
93
89
80
Source: NHTSA, Report to Congress: Vehicle Safety Recal Completion Rates Report, May 2017, pp. 32-34, at
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13376-recal _completion_rates_rtc-tag_final.pdf.

Author Information

Bill Canis

Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service
R46398 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED
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