China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress
Updated July 30, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL33153

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Summary
In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its
naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting.
China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for more than 25 years, since the early
to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is
conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters
of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as
posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of
blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced
since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-
standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition
programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs),
submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command
and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems.
China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics,
doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as
being aimed at developing capabilities for addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need
be; for achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region,
particularly the South China Sea; for enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate
foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ); for defending
China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the
Persian Gulf; for displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and for asserting China’s status
as the leading regional power and a major world power.
Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part
of a Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a
conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the
arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China’s
navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese
nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster
response (HA/DR) operations.
The U.S. Navy in recent years has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval
modernization effort. Among other things, the U.S. Navy has shifted a greater percentage of its
fleet to the Pacific; assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft and its best personnel to the
Pacific; maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental
exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific;
increased the planned future size of the Navy; initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous
programs for developing new military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned
vehicles, and weapons; begun development of new operational concepts (i.e., new ways to
employ Navy and Marine Corps forces) for countering Chinese maritime A2/AD forces; and
signaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more-distributed fleet architecture that will
feature a smaller portion of larger ships, a larger portion of smaller ships, and a substantially
greater use of unmanned vehicles. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. Navy is responding
appropriately to China’s naval modernization effort.
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities

Introduction
Issue for Congress
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on China’s naval
modernization effort and its implications for U.S. Navy capabilities. (For an overview of China’s
military as a whole, see CRS Report R44196, The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for
Congress, by Ian E. Rinehart.)
In an era of renewed great power competition,1 China’s military modernization effort, including
its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting.2
The issue for Congress for this CRS report is whether the U.S. Navy is responding appropriately
to China’s naval modernization effort. Decisions that Congress reaches on this issue could affect
U.S. and allied security, Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the defense industrial
base.
Sources and Terminology
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of
Defense (DOD) report to Congress on military and security developments involving China,3 a
2019 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on China’s military power,4 a 2015 Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) report on China’s navy,5 published reference sources such as IHS Jane’s
Fighting Ships,6 and press reports.
For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization effort to refer to the
modernization not only of China’s navy, but also of Chinese military forces outside China’s navy
that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based Air
Force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars
for detecting and tracking ships at sea.

1 For further discussion of the shift to an era of renewed great power competition, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed
Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 See, for example, Tom Rogan, “Defense Secretary Mark Esper: It's China, China, China,” Washington Examiner,
August 28, 2019; Melissa Leon and Jennifer Griffin, “Pentagon 'Very Carefully' Watching China, It’s ‘No. 1 Priority,’
Defense Secretary Mark Esper Tells Fox News,” Fox News, August 22, 2019; Missy Ryan and Dan Lamothe, “Defense
Secretary Wants to Deliver on the Goal of Outpacing China. Can He Do It?” Washington Post, August 6, 2019; Sandra
Erwin, “New Pentagon Chief Shanahan Urges Focus on China and ‘Great Power Competition,’ Space News, January 2,
2019; Ryan Browne, “New Acting Secretary of Defense Tells Pentagon ‘to Remember China, China, China,’” CNN,
January 2, 2019; Paul McCleary, “Acting SecDef Shanahan’s First Message: ‘China, China, China,’” Breaking
Defense, January 2, 2019.
3 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2019, May 12, 2019. Hereinafter 2019 DOD CMSD.
4 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, 125 pp.
Hereinafter 2019 DIA CMP.
5 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, undated but released
in April 2015, 47 pp.
6 Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this report is taken from IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships
2018-2019, and previous editions. Other sources of information on these shipbuilding programs may disagree regarding
projected ship commissioning dates or other details, but sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy
shipbuilding.
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China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its navy is called the
PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force,
or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or
PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).
This report uses the term China’s near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and
South China Sea—the waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second
island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between the
Philippines and Guam.7
Background
Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Key overview points concerning China’s naval modernization effort include the following:
 China’s naval modernization effort, which forms part of a broader Chinese
military modernization effort that includes several additional areas of emphasis,8
has been underway for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has
transformed China’s navy into a much more modern and capable force. China’s
navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is
conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the
broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around
Europe.
 China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and within the
past few years it has surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships,
meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy.
ONI states that at the end of 2020, China’s will have 360 battle force ships,
compared with a projected total of 297 for the U.S. Navy at the end of FY2020.
ONI projects that China will have 400 battle force ships by 2025, and 425 by
2030.9
 China’s naval ships, aircraft, and weapons are now much more modern and
capable than they were at the start of the 1990s, and are now comparable in many
respects to those of Western navies. ONI states that “Chinese naval ship design

7 For a map showing the first and second island chains, see 2019 DIA CMP, p. 32.
8 Other areas of emphasis in China’s military modernization effort include space capabilities, cyber and electronic
warfare capabilities, ballistic missile forces, and aviation forces, as well as the development of emerging military-
applicable technologies such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, robotics and unmanned vehicles, directed-energy
technologies, and quantum technologies. For an overview of China’s military as a whole, see CRS Report R44196, The
Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Ian E. Rinehart. For a discussion of advanced military
technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M. Sayler.
U.S.-China competition in military capabilities in turn forms one dimension of a broader U.S.-China strategic
competition that also includes political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions.
9 Source for China’s number of battle force ships: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed
Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans,
2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020,
and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission.
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and material quality is in many cases comparable to [that of] USN [U.S. Navy]
ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency.”10
 China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to
achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western
Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the
Cold War. China’s navy forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-
standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western
Pacific.
 China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and
weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned
vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval
modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics,
doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.11
 China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is
assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for addressing the situation
with Taiwan militarily, if need be; for achieving a greater degree of control or
domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; for
enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities
in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ);12 for defending China’s
commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking
China to the Persian Gulf; for displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific;
and for asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world
power.
 Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its navy to be capable
of acting as part of a Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that
can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan
or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of
intervening U.S. forces. Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting
maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating Chinese nationals
from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/
disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
 Until recently, China’s naval modernization effort appeared to be focused less on
increasing total platform (i.e., ship and aircraft) numbers than on increasing the
modernity and capability of Chinese platforms. Some categories of ships,
however, are now increasing in number. The planned ultimate size and
composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. In contrast to the U.S. Navy,
China does not release a navy force-level goal or detailed information about

10 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
11 See, for example, Roderick Lee, “The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the
High Seas,” China Brief, April 13, 2020.
12 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship procurement quantities,
planned ship retirements, and resulting projected force levels.
 Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s
naval capabilities in recent years, China’s navy currently is assessed as having
limitations or weaknesses in certain areas, including joint operations with other
parts of China’s military, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), long-range targeting, a
limited capacity for carrying out at-sea resupply of combatant ships operating far
from home waters,13 and a lack of recent combat experience.14 China is working
to reduce or overcome such limitations and weaknesses.15 Although China’s navy
has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be sufficient for performing
missions of interest to Chinese leaders. As China’s navy reduces its weaknesses
and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential
missions.
 In addition to modernizing its navy, China in recent years has substantially
increased the size of its coast guard.16 China’s coast guard is, by far, the largest of
any country in East Asia. China also operates a sizeable maritime militia that
includes a large number of fishing vessels. China relies primarily on its maritime
militia and coast guard to assert and defend its maritime claims in its near-seas
region, with the navy operating over the horizon as a potential backup force.17
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
This section provides a brief overview of elements of China’s naval modernization effort that
have attracted frequent attention from observers.
Anti-Ship Missiles
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)
China reportedly is fielding two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting
ships at sea—the DF-21D (Figure 1), a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a
range of more than 1,500 kilometers (i.e., more than 910 nautical miles), and the DF-26 (Figure
2), a road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a maximum range
of about 4,000 kilometers (i.e., about 2,160 nautical miles) that DOD says “is capable of

13 See, for example, Will Mackenzie, “Commentary: It’s the Logistics, China,” National Defense, June 10, 2020.
14 Some observers argue that corruption in China’s shipbuilding companies may be a source of additional weaknesses
in China’s naval modernization effort. See, for example, Zi Yang, “The Invisible Threat to China’s Navy: Corruption,”
Diplomat, May 19, 2020. See also Frank Chen, “Ex-PLA Navy chief in deep water amid war on graft,” Asia Times,
June 26, 2020.
15 For example, China’s naval shipbuilding programs were previously dependent on foreign suppliers for some ship
components. ONI, however, states that “almost all weapons and sensors on Chinese naval ships are produced in-
country, and China no longer relies on Russia or other countries for any significant naval ship systems.” (Source:
Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China:
Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, pp. 2-3. Provided by
Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.)
16 For additional details, see 2019 DOD CMSD, p. 53, and 2019 DIA CMP, p. 78.
17 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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conducting conventional and nuclear precision strikes against ground targets as well as
conventional strikes against naval targets....”18 China reportedly is also developing hypersonic
glide vehicles that, if incorporated into Chinese ASBMs, could make Chinese ASBMs more
difficult to intercept.19
Figure 1. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)

Source: Photograph accompanying Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)—
Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium,”
AndrewErickson.com, September 10, 2015, accessed August 28, 2019.
Observers have expressed strong concerns about China’s ASBMs, because such missiles, in
combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to
attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the
Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic
missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to
ASBMs as a “game-changing” weapon.

18 2019 DOD CMSD, p. 44.
19 See, for example, Christian Davenport, “Why the Pentagon Fears the U.S. Is Losing the Hypersonic Arms Race with
Russia and China,” Washington Post, June 8, 2018; Keith Button, “Hypersonic Weapons Race,” Aerospace America,
June 2018.
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Figure 2. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

Source: Photograph accompanying Missile Defense Project, "Dong Feng-26 (DF-26)," Missile Threat, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, January 8, 2018, last modified January 15, 2019, accessed August 28, 2019.
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
China’s extensive inventory of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (see Figure 3, Figure 4, and
Figure 5 for examples of reported images) includes both Russian- and Chinese-made designs,
including some advanced and highly capable ones, such as the Chinese-made YJ-18. Although
China’s ASCMs do not always receive as much press attention as China’s ASBMs (perhaps
because ASBMs are a more-recent development), observers are nevertheless concerned about
them. As discussed later in this report, the relatively long ranges of certain Chinese ASCMs have
led to concerns among some observers that the U.S. Navy is not moving quickly enough to arm
U.S. Navy surface ships with similarly ranged ASCMs.

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Figure 3. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Detail of photograph accompanying Pierre Delrieu, “China Promotes Export of CM-302 Supersonic
ASCM,” Asian Military Review, July 3, 2017. (The article states “This is an article published in our December 2016
Issue.”) The article states: “According to Chinese news media reports, the China Aerospace Science and
Industry Corporation(CASIC) CM-302 missile is being marketed for export as “the world’s best anti-ship
missile.” The missile was showcased at the Zhuhai air show in the southern People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
early November [2016], and is advertised as [a] supersonic Anti-Ship Missile (AShM) [ASCM] which can also be
used in the land attack role. The report, published by the national newspaper China Daily, suggest[s] that the CM-
302 is the export version of CASIC’s YJ-12 supersonic AShM, which is in service with the PRC’s armed forces.”)
Figure 4. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Photograph accompanying “YJ-18 Eagle Strike CH-SS-NX-13,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 1,
2019. The article states “A grand military parade was held in Beijing on 01 October 2019 to mark the People's
Republic of China's 70th founding anniversary.… One weapon featured was a new generation of anti-ship
missiles called YJ-18. China unveiled YJ-18/18A anti-ship cruise missiles in the National Day military parade in
central Beijing.”)
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Figure 5. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, Assessing
China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., 2014. The image appears on
an unnumbered page fol owing page 14. The caption to the photograph states: “YJ-83A/C-802A ASCM on display
at 2008 Zhuhai Airshow.” The photograph is credited to Associated Press/Wide World Photos.
Submarines
Overview
China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now
built to relatively modern Chinese and Russian designs. Qualitatively, China’s newest submarines
might not be as capable as Russia’s newest submarines,20 but compared to China’s earlier
submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more capable.
Types and Numbers
Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs). China also
operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may
grow in coming years, but the force will likely continue to consist mostly of SSs. DOD states that
“The speed of growth of the submarine force has slowed and [the force] will likely grow to
between 65 and 70 submarines by 2020.”21 DIA states that “By 2020 the submarine force

20 Observers have sometimes characterized Russia’s submarines rather than China’s as being the most capable faced by
the U.S. Navy. See, for example, Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, “US Could Lose a Key Weapon for Tracking Chinese
and Russian Subs,” Defense News, May 1, 2019; Dave Majumdar, “Why the U.S. Navy Fears Russia's Submarines,”
National Interest, October 12, 2018; John Schaus, Lauren Dickey, and Andrew Metrick, “Asia’s Looming Subsurface
Challenge,” War on the Rocks, August 11, 2016; Paul McLeary, “Chinese, Russian Subs Increasingly Worrying the
Pentagon,” Foreign Policy, February 24, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack
Boat,” USNI News, October 28, 2014.
21 2019 DOD CMSD, pp. 35-36.
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probably will increase to about 70 submarines.”22 ONI states that “China’s submarine force
continues to grow at a low rate, though with substantially more-capable submarines replacing
older units. Current expansion at submarine production yards could allow higher future
production numbers.” ONI projects that China’s submarine force will grow from a total of 66
boats (4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2020 to 76 boats (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in
2030.23
China’s newest series-built SS design is the Yuan-class (Type 039) SS (Figure 6), its newest SSN
class is the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN (Figure 7), and its newest SSBN class is the Jin (Type
094) class SSBN (Figure 8). In May 2020, it was reported that two additional Type 094 SSBNs
had entered service, increasing the total number in service to six.24
Figure 6. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS)

Source: Photograph accompanying “Type 039A Yuan class,” SinoDefence.com, July 10, 2018, accessed August
28, 2019.
ONI states that “nuclear submarines are solely produced at Huludao Shipyard and typically
undergo two to four years of outfitting and sea-trials before becoming operational. Since 2006,
eight nuclear submarines have reached IOC initial operational capability], for an average of one

22 2019 DIA CMP, p. 72.
23 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 1. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
24 See, for example, Peter Suciu, “China Now Has Six Type 094A Jin-Class Nuclear Powered Missile Submarines,”
National Interest, May 6, 2020.
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every 15 months…. Diesel-Electric submarines are produced at two shipyards and typically
undergo approximately one year of outfitting and sea-trials before becoming operational.”25
Figure 7. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN)

Source: Photograph accompanying SinoDefence.com, “Type 093 Shang Class,” July 1, 2018, accessed August 27,
2019, at http://sinodefence.com/type093_shang-class/.
Submarine Weapons
China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and
wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. Wake-homing torpedoes can be very difficult for surface
ships to decoy. Each Jin-class SSBN is expected to be armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).26 China reportedly is developing a new SLBM,
called the JL-3, as a successor to the JL-2.27

25 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission. See also H. I. Sutton, “Chinese Navy Steps Closer To New Generation Of Nuclear
Submarines,” Forbes, June 19, 2020.
26 DOD estimates the range of the JL-2 at 7,400 km. Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack targets in
Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions close to China, targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in
Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle) from locations south of Japan, targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous
states (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii, or targets in all 50 states from mid-
ocean locations east of Hawaii.
27 2019 DOD CMSD, p. 36.
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Figure 8. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)

Source: Photograph accompanying Minnie Chan, “China Puts a Damper on Navy’s 70th Anniversary
Celebrations As It Tries to Al ay Fears Over Rising Strength,” South China Morning Post, April 23, 2019. The
article credits the photograph to Xinhua.
Aircraft Carriers
Overview
China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (Type 001) (Figure 9), entered service in 2012. China’s
second aircraft carrier (and its first fully indigenously built carrier), Shandong (Type 001A)
(Figure 10), entered service on December 17, 2019. China’s third carrier, the Type 002 (Figure
11), is under construction; ONI expects it to enter service by 2024.28 China’s fourth carrier,
reportedly also to be built to the Type 002 design, reportedly may begin construction as early as
2021.29 The Type 002 carriers, like Liaoning and Shandong, are to be conventionally powered.
ONI states that “China has two shipyards expected to be used for aircraft carrier production,
though several other large commercial yards could, in theory, also build carriers.”30 Observers
have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly more than six)

28 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
29 Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy Set to Build Fourth Aircraft Carrier, but Plans for a More Advanced Ship Are Put on
Hold,” South China Morning Post, November 28, 2019.
30 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
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aircraft carriers. In late November 2019, it was reported that the Chinese government, while
deciding to proceed with the construction of the fourth carrier, had put on hold plans to build a
fifth carrier, known as the Type 003, which was to be nuclear-powered, due to budgetary and
technical considerations.31 Observers expect that it will be some time before China masters
carrier-based aircraft operations on a substantial scale.
Liaoning (Type 001)
Liaoning is a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier that China purchased from Ukraine in 1998
as an unfinished ship.32 It is conventionally powered, has an estimated full load displacement of
60,000 to 66,000 tons, and reportedly can accommodate an air wing of 30 or more fixed-wing
airplanes and helicopters, including 24 fighters. The Liaoning lacks aircraft catapults and instead
launches fixed-wing airplanes off the ship’s bow using an inclined “ski ramp.”
Figure 9. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Photograph accompanying China Power Team, “How Does China’s First Aircraft Carrier Stack Up?”
China Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies), December 9, 2015, updated December 14, 2018,
accessed August 28, 2019.
By comparison, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers are nuclear powered (giving them greater cruising
endurance than a conventionally powered ship), have a full load displacement of about 100,000

31 Minnie Chan, “Chinese Navy Set to Build Fourth Aircraft Carrier, but Plans for a More Advanced Ship Are Put on
Hold,” South China Morning Post, November 28, 2019. See also Steven Stashwick, “Technical Problems, Slowing
Economy Cut China’s Carrier Ambitions,” Diplomat, December 4, 2019; Sebastien Roblin, “China Cancels Plans for
Two Nuclear-Powered Super Aircraft Carriers,” National Interest, December 7, 2019; Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy is
Being Forced to Rethink Its Spending Plans as Cost of Trade War Rises,” South China Morning Post, May 26, 2019.
32 Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union and the place
where the Soviet Union built its aircraft carriers.
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tons, can accommodate air wings of 60 or more aircraft, including fixed-wing aircraft and some
helicopters, and launch their fixed-wing aircraft over both their bows and their angled decks using
catapults, which can give those aircraft a range/payload capability greater than that of aircraft
launched with a ski ramp. The Liaoning, like U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, lands fixed-wing aircraft
using arresting wires on its angled deck.
Some observers have referred to the Liaoning as China’s “starter” carrier. China has been using
Liaoning in part for pilot training. In May 2018, China reportedly announced that the aircraft
carrier group formed around Liaoning had reached initial operational capability (IOC),33 although
that term might not mean the same as it does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon
systems.
Shandong (Type 001A)
Shandong is a modified version of the Liaoning design that incorporates some design
improvements, including features that reportedly will permit it to embark and operate a larger air
wing of 40 aircraft that includes 36 fighters.34 Its displacement is estimated at 66,000 to 70,000
tons.
Figure 10. Shandong (Type 001A) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Photograph accompanying Daniel Brown, “China's Newest Aircraft Carrier Is Actually Very Outdated
— But Its Next One Should Worry the US Navy A Lot,” Business Insider, July 18, 2018. The article credits the
photograph to Reuters.

33 Andrew Tate, “Liaoning Carrier Group Reaches Initial Operational Capability, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 4,
2018. See also Travis Fedschun, “China Says Carrier Group Reaches ‘Initial’ Combat Capability,” Fox News, May 31,
2018; “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Formation Capable of Systemic Combat Operation,” CGTV.com, May 31, 2018;
Global Times, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Forming All-Weather Combat Capability with Successful Night Takeoff and
Landing,” People’s Daily Online, May 29, 2018.
34 See, for example, Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Can Carry 50% More Fighter Jets Than Its First,”
Global Times, August 13, 2019; Liu Zhen, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Pack More Jet Power Than the Liaoning,”
South China Morning Post, August 15, 2019.
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Type 002 Carriers
Press reports state that China’s Type 002 carriers may have a displacement of 80,000 tons to
85,000 tons and will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults rather than a ski ramp, which
will improve the range/payload capability of the fixed-wing aircraft that they operate.
Figure 11. Type 002 Aircraft Carrier Under Construction

Source: Photograph accompanying China Power Team, “Tracking China’s Third Aircraft Carrier,” China Power.
May 6, 2019, updated October 17, 2019, accessed November 18, 2019, at https://chinapower.csis.org/china-
carrier-type-002/.
The start of construction of the first Type 002 carrier was announced in the Chinese press in
November 2018.35 A July 18, 2020, press report states:
China is expected to launch36 its next-generation aircraft carrier within a year and
construction on a sister ship for the new giant vessel has been hastened, two sources close
to the projects said.
The Type 002 aircraft carrier—the country’s third carrier and the second to be domestically
developed—has started the final assembly process, two independent sources told the South
China Morning Post.
“Assembly of the new aircraft carrier has begun and is expected to be completed in the first
half of next year, because the Covid-19 pandemic slowed down progress,” said the first
source, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

35 See, for example, Zhao Lei, “China Launches Work on Third Aircraft Carrier, Xinhia Says,” China Daily, November
26, 2018; Liu Xuanzun (Global Times), “China’s 3rd Aircraft Carrier Under Construction, to Be Equipped with New
Technologies, People’s Daily Online, November 27, 2018.
36 The term launch means that the ship is put into the water for the final stages of its construction.
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“Workers are also starting the keel-laying for the new carrier’s sister ship. Both ships have
been built by the Jiangnan Shipyard outside Shanghai.”37
Type 003 Carrier
A March 15, 2018, press report stated that following the Type 002 carrier design, China was to
begin building a Type 003 carrier design that would displace 90,000 to 100,000 tons and, in
addition to being equipped with electromagnetic catapults, be nuclear powered.38 As mentioned
above, in late November 2019, it was reported that the Chinese government had put on hold plans
to build this Type 003 design.
Possible Type 076 Catapult-Equipped Amphibious Assault Ship
See also the discussion of the possible catapult-equipped Type 076 amphibious assault ship
(Figure 22 and Figure 23) in the section on China’s amphibious ships.
Carrier-Based Aircraft
China’s primary carrier-based fighter aircraft is the J-15 or Flying Shark (Figure 12), an aircraft
derived from the Russian Su-33 Flanker aircraft design that can operate from carriers equipped
with a ski ramp rather than catapults. China reportedly plans to develop a carrier-capable variant
of its J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter and/or a carrier-capable variant of its FC-31 fifth-
generation stealth fighter to complement or succeed the J-15 on catapult-equipped Chinese
carriers.39 China reportedly is also developing a carrier-based stealth drone aircraft.40
Roles and Missions
Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios,
they are not considered critical for Chinese operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within
range of land-based Chinese aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is
acquiring carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to demonstrate
China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power. Chinese aircraft carriers could
be used for power-projection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing
U.S. forces, and to impress or intimidate foreign observers.41
Chinese aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), and

37 Minnie Chan, “China Steps Up Shipbuilding with Two More Aircraft Carriers Under Construction Towards 2035
Navy Goal,” South China Morning Post, July 18, 2020.
38 Jeffrey Lin and P.W. Singer, “A Chinese Shipbuilder Accidentally Revealed Its Major Navy Plans,” Popular
Science, March 15, 2018.
39 See Kris Osborn, “Is China Building Its Own F-35 Fighter Jets for its Aircraft Carriers?” National Interest, July 3,
2020; Caleb Larson, “FC-31: China’s Next Carrier Jet is Stolen and Stealthy,” National Interest, April 18, 2020;
Sebastien Roblin, “China’s New Aircraft Carriers Are Getting Stealth Fighters,” National Interest, October 26, 2019;
Rick Joe, “Beyond China’s J-20 Stealth Fighter,” Diplomat, September 20, 2019; Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy ‘Set to
Pick J-20 Stealth Jets for Its Next Generation Carriers,’” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2019.
40 Minnie Chan, “China to Deploy Sharp Sword Stealth Drone for New Type 001A Aircraft Carrier,” South China
Morning Post, September 17, 2019.
41 For a discussion, see, for example, Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey, “The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft
Carriers, China’s Carrier Plans Target U.S. Alliances, Not Its Navy,” Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com),
April 10, 2014; Sebastien Roblin, “All of the Reasons Why the World Should Fear China’s Aircraft Carriers,” National
Interest, October 24, 2017.
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noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, aircraft carriers could be particularly
valuable to China for projecting an image of China as a major world power, because aircraft
carriers are viewed by many as symbols of major world power status. In a combat situation
involving opposing U.S. naval and air forces, Chinese aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable
to attack by U.S. ships and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and
aircraft from performing other missions in a conflict situation with China.
Figure 12. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Photograph accompanying “China Developing Elite New Variants of the J-15 Flying Shark to Deploy
from EMALS Equipped Future Carriers; Implications for the Balance of Power at Sea,” Military Watch Magazine,
August 17, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019.
Surface Combatants
Overview
China since the early 1990s has put into service numerous new classes of indigenously built
surface combatants, including a new cruiser (or large destroyer), several classes of destroyers and
frigates, a new class of corvettes (i.e., light frigates), and a new class of missile-armed patrol
craft.
These new classes of surface combatants demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy
surface combatant technology. DOD states that China’s navy “remains engaged in a robust
surface combatant construction program, producing new guided-missile cruisers (CG), guided-
missile destroyers (DDG), and guided-missile frigates (FFG) which will significantly upgrade the
PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities.”42 DIA states that “the era of past
designs has given way to production of modern multimission destroyer, frigate, and corvette
classes as China’s technological advancement in naval design has begun to approach a level

42 2019 DOD CMSD, p. 36.
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commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, that of other modern navies.”43 China is also
upgrading its older surface combatants with new weapons and other equipment.44
Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer
China is building a new class of cruiser (or large destroyer), called the Renhai-class or Type 055
(Figure 13), that reportedly displaces between 10,000 and 13,000 tons. By way of comparison,
the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class
destroyers (aka the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers) displace about 10,100 tons and
9,300 tons, respectively, while the U.S. Navy’s three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers
displace about 15,600 tons.
Figure 13. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)

Source: Photograph accompanying Kyle Mizokami, “Can the U.S. Navy Beat China’s New Type 055 Destroyer
In a Fight?” National Interest, September 29, 2019.
ONI states that Type 055 ships are being built by two shipyards, and that multiple ships in the
class are currently under construction.45 The first Type 055 ship was reportedly commissioned

43 2019 DIA CMP, p. 70.
44 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Potency Of Anti-Carrier Capabilities,” Forbes, May 1, 2020; Peter
Suciu, “Chinese Warships Are Now Armed with Supersonic Anti-Ship Missiles,” National Interest, May 10, 2020.
45 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
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into service on January 12, 2020, and the sixth was reportedly launched (i.e., put into the water
for the final stages of construction) in December 2019.46
Type 052 Destroyer
China since the early 1990s has put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
destroyers, the most recent of which is the Luyang III (Type 052D) class (Figure 14), which
displaces about 7,500 tons and is equipped with phased-array radars and vertical launch missile
systems that outwardly are broadly similar to those on U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. Type
052D ships have been in serial production for some time, and the 23rd such ship was reportedly
launched in December 2019.47 One observer states that “at present the PLAN fields 20 aegis-type
[i.e., Type 052] destroyers in service; however in four to five years it is likely that the PLAN will
field 39 aegis-type destroyers in service (or 40, depending on whether a 26th 052D is built or
not).”48
Figure 14. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer

Source: Photograph accompanying “Type 052D Luyang-III Class,” SinoDefence.com, September 3, 2017,
accessed August 28, 2019.

46 Kristin Huang, “China Steps Up Warship Building Programme as Navy Looks to Extend Its Global Reach,” South
China Morning Post, December 31, 2019. See also Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese Navy Commissions First Type 055
Destroyer,” Global Times, January 12, 2020. Another press report states that eight Type 055 ships are expected to enter
service over the next four years, and that more than two dozen such ships might be in service by the late 2020s. (Franz-
Stefan Gady, “China’s Navy Commissions First-of-Class Type 055 Guided Missile Destroyer,” Diplomat, January 13,
2020.)
47 Kristin Huang, “China steps up warship building programme as navy looks to extend its global reach,” South China
Morning Post, December 31, 2019.
48 Rick Joe, “The Chinese Navy’s Destroyer Fleet Will Double by 2025. Then What?” Diplomat, July 12, 2020. See
also Kris Osborn, “Double the Destroyers: China Will Soon Have Almost 40 of These Modern Warships,” National
Interest, July 17, 2020.
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Type 054 Frigate
China since the early 1990s has also put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
frigates, the most recent of which is the Jiangkai II (Type 054A) class (Figure 15), which
displaces about 4,000 tons. ONI states that 30 Type 054As entered service between 2008 and
2019, and that no additional Type 054As are currently under construction.49
Figure 15. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate

Source: Chinese Military Review, “Type 054A (Jiangkai II class) FFG-546 Yancheng Guided Missile Frigate in
Mediterranean,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in February of 2014), accessed August 29,
2018.
Type 056 Corvette
China is also building a new type of corvette (i.e., a light frigate, or FFL) called the Jiangdao
class or Type 056 (Figure 16), which displaces about 1,500 tons. Type 056 ships are being built at
a high annual rate in four shipsyards. The first was commissioned in 2013. DOD states that “more
than 40 of these corvettes entered service by the end of 2018, and more than a dozen more are
currently under construction or outfitting.”50 The 42nd and 43rd were reportedly commissioned into
service in December 2019.51 ONI states that as of February 2020, more than 50 had entered

49 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission. For a press article discussing the potential features of China’s next frigate design beyond the
Type 054A, see Rick Joe, “What Will the Chinese Navy’s Next Frigate Look Like?” Diplomat, May 15, 2020.
50 2019 DOD CMSD, p. 36.
51 Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s People Liberation Army Navy Commissions 42nd and 43rd Type 056/056A Corvettes,”
Diplomat, December 19, 2019.
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service and another 15 were under construction.52 In June 2020, it was reported that China that
month had commissioned its ninth Type 056 of 2020.53
Figure 16. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette

Source: Chinese Military Review, “Random Images of Chinese Type 056 Jiangdao Class Light Corvette,”
undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in October 2013), accessed August 29, 2018.
Amphibious Ships
Type 071 Amphibious Ship
China’s new Yuzhao or Type 071 amphibious ships (Figure 17) have an estimated displacement
of more than 19,855 tons,54 compared to about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy’s new San Antonio
(LPD-17) class amphibious ships. The fifth Type 071 ship was reportedly commissioned into
service in September 2018, and at least two more reportedly are under construction.

52 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
53 Naval News, “China Commissioned Its Ninth Type 056 Corvette So Far In 2020,” NOSI (Naval Open Source
Intelligence), June 20, 2020.
54 Unless otherwise indicated, displacement figures cited in this report are full load displacements. IHS Jane’s Fighting
Ships 2017-2018, p. 156, does not provide a full load displacement for the Type 071 class design. Instead, it provides a
standard displacement of 19,855 tons. Full load displacement is larger than standard displacement, so the full load
displacement of the Type 071 design is more than 19,855 tons.
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Figure 17. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship

Source: Chinese Military Review, “Jinggang Shan (999) Type 071 YUZHAO Class Amphibious Transport Dock,”
undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in February 2012), accessed August 29, 2018.
Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship
On September 25, 2019, China launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its
construction) the first of a new type of amphibious assault ship55 called the Type 075 (Figure 18,
Figure 19, and Figure 20) that has an estimated displacement of 30,000 to 40,000 tons, compared
to 41,000 to 45,000 tons for U.S. Navy LHA/LHD-type amphibious assault ships.56 On April 11,
2020, it was reported that a fire had occurred on the ship;57 published photographs showed smoke
rising from the ship and subsequent smoke stains at the ship’s stern (Figure 21). On July 29,
2020, it was reported that the ship was preparing for sea trials,58 suggesting that damage caused
by the fire has been (or soon will be) repaired.

55 Amphibious assault ships, also referred to as helicopter carriers or (in British parlance) commando carriers, look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers. U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships are designated LHA or LHD.
56 See, for example, Rick Joe, “The Future of China’s Amphibious Assault Fleet,” Diplomat, July 17, 2019; Sebastien
Roblin, “Bad News: China is Building Three Huge Helicopter ‘Aircraft Carriers,’” National Interest, July 27, 2019;
Tyler Rogoway, “China’s New Amphibious Assault Ship Is A Monster,” The Drive, August 22, 2019; Mike Yeo,
“Photos Reveal Progress on China’s Largest Amphibious Assault Ship,” Defense News, August 23, 2019.
57 See, for example, “China Confirms Fire on Board Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship,” DefenseWorld.net, April 11,
2020; Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 1st Type 075 LHD Caught On Fire During Fitting Out,” Naval News, April 12,
2020; “Fire Breaks Out on China’s New Amphibious Assault Helicopter Carrier,” War Is Boring, April 13, 2020.
58 H. I. Sutton, “Chinese Type 075 Big Deck Amphib Preparing for Sea Trials,” USNI News, July 29, 2020.
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On April 22, 2020, China launched the second Type 075 ship.59 ONI states that as of February
2020, three Type 075s, including the first one, were under construction.60
Figure 18. Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying David Axe, “China Is Finishing Its First Large Helicopter Assault Ship,”
National Interest, October 29, 2019.

59 Liu Zhen, “China Launches Second Type 075 Amphibious Helicopter Assault Ship,” South China Morning Post,
April 23, 2020; Elizabeth Shim, “China Launches Second Type 075 Assault Ship,” UPI, April 22, 2020; Caleb Larson,
“China Just Launched Their Second Type 075 Assault Carrier—Here’s Why Everyone Is Worried,” National Interest,
April 22, 2020; Andrew Tate, “China’s Second Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Launched in Shanghai,” Jane’s,
April 22, 2020.
60 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
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Figure 19. Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying David Axe, “Meet the Type 075 LHD: China's New Assault Ship,” National
Interest, December 11, 2019.

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Figure 20. Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “China Just Launched Its Huge And
Incredibly Quickly Built Amphibious Assault Ship,” The Drive, September 25, 2019. The caption to the photograph
credits the photograph to “Chinese internet.”
Figure 21. Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship During and After Reported Fire

Source: Photographs accompanying “Fire Breaks Out on China’s New Amphibious Assault Helicopter Carrier,”
War Is Boring, April 13, 2020.
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Possible Type 076 Catapult-Equipped Amphibious Assault Ship
In July 2020, it was reported that China might be planning to build the first of a new class of
amphibious assault ships, called the Type 076 by observers (Figure 22 and Figure 23), that
would be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would enhance its ability to support
operations by fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft carrier.61
Figure 22. Notional Rendering of Possible Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Il ustration accompanying H. I. Sutton, “Stealth UAVs Could Give China’s Type-076 Assault Carrier
More Firepower,” Forbes, July 23, 2020.
Figure 23. Notional Rendering of Possible Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Il ustration accompanying Minnie Chan, “Chinese Shipbuilder Planning Advanced Amphibious Assault
Ship,” South China Morning Post, July 27 (updated July 28), 2020.

61 H. I. Sutton, “Stealth UAVs Could Give China’s Type-076 Assault Carrier More Firepower,” Forbes, July 23, 2020;
Kathrin Hille, “China Plans Hybrid Assault Vessel to Strengthen Overseas Power,” Financial Times, July 24, 2020;
Minnie Chan, “Chinese Shipbuilder Planning Advanced Amphibious Assault Ship,” South China Morning Post, July
27 (updated July 28), 2020.
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Amphibious Ship Roles and Missions
Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071 and Type 075 would be of value for
conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers believe that
China is building such ships as much for their value in conducting other operations, such as
operations for asserting and defending China’s claims in the South and East China Seas,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as
antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, amphibious
ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and engagement activities) and for
impressing or intimidating foreign observers.62
Operations Away from Home Waters
Although China’s navy operates primarily in China’s home waters, Chinese navy ships are
conducting increasing numbers of operations away from China’s home waters, including the
broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters surrounding Europe,
including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. A November 23, 2019, DOD news report
quoted Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, as stating
that China’s navy had conducted more global naval deployments in the past 30 months than it had
in the previous 30 years.63
While many of China’s long-distance naval deployments have been for making diplomatic port
calls, some of them have been for other purposes, including conducting training exercises and
carrying out antipiracy operations in waters off Somalia. China has been conducting antipiracy
operations in waters off Somalia since December 2008 via a succession of more than 30
rotationally deployed naval escort task forces. China’s distant naval operations are supported in
part by China’s military base in Djibouti, which China officially opened in August 2017 as its
first overseas military base.64
Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy
The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. The U.S. Navy
makes public its force-level goal and regularly releases a 30-year shipbuilding plan that shows
planned procurements of new ships, planned retirements of existing ships, and resulting projected
force levels, as well as a five-year shipbuilding plan that shows, in greater detail, the first five
years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.65 In contrast, China does not release a navy force-level
goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship

62 See, for example, Grant Newsham, “China’s Amphibious Force Emerges,” Asia Times, November 5, 2019.
63 David Vergun, “Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea Critical to Prosperity, Says Indo-Pacific Commander,”
DOD News, November 23, 2019.
64 For a brief discussion of Djibouti and other potential Chinese military bases outside China, see 2019 DOD CMSD, p.
16. For a recent press report about China’s military base in Djibouti, see H. I. Sutton, “Satellite Images Show That
Chinese Navy Is Expanding Overseas Base,” Forbes, May 10, 2020; Peter Suciu, “China's Naval Base in Africa Is
Getting Bigger. Is a Network of Bases Next?” National Interest, May 11, 2020; Staff writer, “Chinese Navy Expanding
Base in Africa, Satellite Images Confirm,” War Is Boring, May 11, 2020; Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Djibouti
Naval Base Increasing Its Power,” East Asia Forum, May 16, 2020; Dave Makichuk, “China Builds a Mega-Fortress
on the Horn of Africa,” Asia Times, May 18, 2020; Michael Evans, “Beijing’s African Port Ready for Aircraft
Carriers,” Times (UK), May 19, 2020.
65 For more information on the U.S. Navy’s force-level goal, 30-year shipbuilding plan, and five-year shipbuilding
plan, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
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procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected force levels. It is
possible that the ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is an unsettled and evolving issue
even among Chinese military and political leaders.
Table 1 shows numbers of certain types of Chinese navy ships from 2005 to the present (and the
number of China coast guard ships from 2017 to the present) as presented in DOD’s annual
reports on military and security developments involving China. DOD states that China’s navy “is
the region’s largest navy, with more than 300 surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships,
patrol craft, and specialized types.”66 DIA states that “although the overall inventory has remained
relatively constant, the PLAN is rapidly retiring older, single-mission warships in favor of larger,
multimission ships equipped with advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and
sensors and C2 [command and control] facilities.”67
As can be seen in Table 1, about 65% of the increase since 2005 in the number of Chinese navy
ships shown in the table (a net increase of 77 ships out of a total net increase of 119 ships)
resulted from increases in missile-armed fast patrol craft starting in 2009 (a net increase of 35
ships) and corvettes starting in 2014 (42 ships). These are the smallest surface combatants shown
in the table. The net 35-ship increase in missile-armed fast patrol craft was due to the construction
between 2004 and 2009 of 60 new Houbei (Type 022) fast attack craft68 and the retirement of 25
older fast attack craft that were replaced by Type 022 craft. The 42-ship increase in corvettes is
due to the Jingdao (Type 056) corvette program discussed earlier. ONI states that “a significant
portion of China’s Battle Force consists of the large number of new corvettes and guided-missile
frigates recently built for the PLAN.”69
As can also be seen in the table, most of the remaining increase since 2005 in the number of
Chinese navy ships shown in the table is accounted for by increases in destroyers (12 ships),
frigates (11 ships), and amphibious ships (17 ships). Most of the increase in frigates occurred in
the earlier years of the table; the number of frigates has changed little in the later years of the
table.
Table 1 lumps together less-capable older Chinese ships with more-capable modern Chinese
ships. Thus, in examining the numbers in the table, it can be helpful to keep in mind that for many
of the types of Chinese ships shown in the table, the percentage of the ships accounted for by
more-capable modern designs was growing over time, even if the total number of ships for those
types was changing little.
For reference, Table 1 also shows the total number of ships in the U.S. Navy (known technically
as the total number of battle force ships), and compares it to the total number of Chinese ships
shown in the table. The result is an apples-vs.-oranges comparison, because the Chinese figure
excludes certain ship types, such as auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy figure
includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft.

66 2019 DOD CMSD, p. 35. A similar statement is in 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
67 2019 DIA CMP, p. 69.
68 The Type 022 program was discussed in the August 1, 2018, version of this CRS report, and earlier versions.
69 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
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Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of Ships Since 2005
(Figures include both less-capable older units and more-capable newer units)
Year of DOD report
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
2019 change
from 2005
Ballistic missile submarines
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
+3
Nuclear-powered attack submarines
6
5
5
5
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
0
Diesel attack submarines
51
50
53
54
54
54
49
48
49
51
53
57
54
47
50
-1
Aircraft carriers
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
+1
Destroyers
21
25
25
29
27
25
26
26
23
24
21
23
31
28
33
+12
Frigates
43
45
47
45
48
49
53
53
52
49
52
52
56
51
54
+11
Corvettes
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
15
23
23
28
42
+42
Missile-armed coastal patrol craft
51
45
41
45
70
85
86
86
85
85
86
86
88
86
86
+35
Amphibious ships: LSTs and LPDs
20
25
25
26
27
27
27
28
29
29
29
30
34
33
37
+17
Amphibious ships: LSMs
23
25
25
28
28
28
28
23
26
28
28
22
21
23
22
-1
Total of types above (does not
216
221
222
233
262
276
276
271
273
283
294
303
317
306
335
+119
include other types, such as
auxiliary and support ships)
China Coast Guard ships
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
185
240
248
n/a
Total U.S. Navy battle force ships
291
282
281
279
282
285
288
284
287
285
289
271
275
279
286
-5
(which includes auxiliary and support
ships but excludes patrol craft)
U.S. Navy figure compared to above
+75
+61
+59
+46
+20
+9
+12
+13
+14
+2
-5
-32
-42
-27
-49
-124
total for certain Chinese ship types
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on 2005-2019 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on military and security developments involving China (known for
2009 and prior editions as the report on China military power), and (for U.S. Navy ships) U.S. Navy data as presented in CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Notes: n/a means data not available in report. LST means tank landing ship; LPD means transport dock ship; LSM means medium landing ship. The DOD report
generally covers events of the prior calendar year. Thus, the 2019 edition covers events during 2018, and so on for earlier years. Similarly, for the U.S. Navy figures, the
2019 column shows the figure for the end of FY2018, and so on for earlier years.
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Table 2 shows comparative numbers of Chinese and U.S. battle force ships. Battle force ship are
the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy. For China, the battle force ships
total excludes the missile-armed coastal patrol craft shown in Table 1, but includes auxiliary and
support ships that are not shown in Table 1. Compared to the comparison shown in Table 1, the
comparison Table 2 is closer to being an apples-to-apples comparison of the two navies’ numbers
of ships. Even so, it is important to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two
navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy has many more diesel attack
submarines, frigates, and corvettes.
Table 2. Numbers of Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030
Figures include both less-capable older units and more-capable newer units

2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
Ballistic missile submarines
1
1
3
4
4
6
8
Nuclear-powered attack submarines
5
4
5
6
7
10
13
Diesel attack submarines
56
56
48
53
55
55
55
Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers
19
25
25
26
43
55
65
Frigates, corvettes
38
43
50
74
102
120
135
Total China navy battle force ships,
110
220
220
255
360
400
425
including types not shown above
Total U.S. Navy battle force ships
318
282
288
271
297
n/a
n/a
Source: Table prepared by CRS. Source for China’s navy: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for
Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy
Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, 4 pp. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and
CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Figures are for end of
calendar year. Source for figures for U.S. Navy: U.S. Navy data; figures are for end of fiscal year.
Note: n/a means not available.
Relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes assessed by showing comparative
numbers of U.S. and Chinese ships. Although the total number of ships in a navy (or its aggregate
tonnage) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous
other factors that bear on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned
missions. As a result, as discussed in further detail in Appendix A, comparisons of the total
numbers of ships in the PLAN and the U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing
relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions
assigned to those navies. At the same time however, an examination of the trends over time in the
relative numbers of ships can shed some light on how the relative balance of U.S. and Chinese
naval capabilities might be changing over time.
U.S. Navy Response
The U.S. Navy in recent years has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval
modernization effort. Among other things, the U.S. Navy has
 shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific;70

70 Efforts in this regard began at least as far back as 2006: The final report on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
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 assigned its most capable new ships and aircraft and its best personnel to the
Pacific;
 maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental
exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the
Indo-Pacific;
 increased the planned future size of the Navy;
 initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new
military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and
weapons;
 begun development of new operational concepts (i.e., new ways to employ Navy
and Marine Corps forces) for countering Chinese maritime A2/AD forces; and
 signaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more distributed fleet
architecture that will feature a smaller portion of larger ships, a larger portion of
smaller ships, and a substantially greater use of unmanned vehicles.
U.S. Navy efforts to increase cooperation with naval forces from allies and other countries such
as Japan, Australia, and India appear aimed in part at expanding existing bilateral forms of naval
cooperation (e.g., U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-India) into trilateral (e.g., U.S.-Japan-
Australia, U.S.-Australia-India) or quadrilateral (U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) forms that could
support the Trump Administration’s overarching security and foreign policy construct for the
Indo-Pacific region, called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).71
The increase in the planned size of the Navy is detailed in detail in another CRS report.72
Many of the Navy’s programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, and weapon systems
can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter
Chinese maritime A2/AD capabilities. Examples of new technologies being developed by the
Navy that might be of value in countering Chinese maritime A2/AD capabilities include large
unmanned vehicles,73 lasers, the electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided
projectile (aka hypervelocity projectile).74
Navy and Marine Corps efforts to develop new operational concepts such as Distributed Maritime
Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and to shift to a more
distributed fleet architecture, are discussed in detail in other CRS reports.75

(QDR) directed the Navy “to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and
sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.” (U.S.
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. February 6, 2006, p. 47.) Subsequent
to this directive, the Navy announced an intention to increase to 60% (from a starting point of about 55%) the
percentage of the fleet as a whole that is assigned to the Pacific.
71 For more on the FOIP, see CRS Report R45396, The Trump Administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”: Issues
for Congress, coordinated by Bruce Vaughn.
72 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
73 For more on these efforts, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
74 For more on these efforts, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
75 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Issues for Congress
Overview
The overall issue for Congress is whether the U.S. Navy is responding appropriately to China’s
naval modernization effort. Within this overall issue, specific issues include the following:
 the current and potential future U.S.-China balance of naval power in general,
and in specific geographic areas, particularly the South China Sea;
 whether the planned size of the Navy will be appropriate for countering China’s
naval modernization effort in coming years while also permitting the Navy to
perform other missions, including countering Russian military forces and
defending U.S. interests in the Middle East;
 whether the Navy should shift to a more-distributed fleet architecture so as to
improve the Navy’s ability to avoid and withstand attack from Chinese maritime
A2/AD forces—and if so, what that new architecture should look like, and how
quickly the Navy should shift to it;
 whether the Navy is doing enough to
 improve its ability to counter China’s ASBMs or some of China’s other
maritime A2/AD weapons, such as its wake-homing torpedoes;
 develop and procure new ASCMs with ranges that match or exceed those of
China’s longer-ranged ASCMs;
 increase the operating range of Navy carrier air wings, so as to improve the
ability of carriers and their air wings to achieve effects while operating at
longer distances from Chinese ASBMs and other A2/AD weapons; and
 whether Congress should modify acquisition policies or the metrics for judging
the success of acquisition programs so as to facilitate faster development of new
technologies and weapons for the Navy—and if so, how those policies or metrics
should be modified.
Discussion
Regarding the U.S.-China balance of naval power in general, U.S. and other observers generally
assess that while the United States today has more naval capability overall, China’s naval
modernization effort since the 1990s has substantially reduced the U.S. advantage, and that if
current U.S. and Chinese naval capability trend lines (such as those shown in Table 1 and Table
2) do not change, China might eventually draw even with or surpass the United States in overall
naval capability.
Regarding the current U.S.-China naval balance of power specifically in the South China Sea,
some observers are concerned that China has already drawn even with or even surpassed the
United States. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in responses to advance policy questions from
the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing before the committee to
consider nominations, including Davidson’s nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM),76 stated that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in

76 The name of the command has since been changed to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
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all scenarios short of war with the United States.”77 A January 18, 2020, press report quotes James
Kraska of the Naval War College as stating that “the US has lost advantage throughout the
spectrum of operations, from low-level interaction against China’s maritime militia to higher-end
conflict scenarios,” and that “in other words, China has escalation dominance, because it has the
power to deter any US turn towards escalation. The US is outmatched in all of the scenarios.”78
Skeptics of assessments like those above might argue that they do not give adequate weight to
relative U.S. strengths (and corresponding Chinese relative weaknesses and limitations) in areas
such as undersea warfare; personnel quality, training, and initiative; operational experience
(particularly in combat situations); joint operations with other U.S. military services; and
potential support from allies and partners, particularly Japan and Australia.
The above-listed issues of the planned size of the Navy and the shift to a more-distributed fleet
architecture are discussed in detail in other CRS reports.79 The issue of the Navy’s ability to
counter China’s ASBMs is discussed in detail in this report in Appendix B. The issue of the
Navy’s ability to counter wake-homing torpedoes may have been made more pressing by the
reportedly poor performance of an anti-torpedo torpedo that the Navy was developing as a means
for Navy surface ships to counter hard-to-decoy wake-homing torpedoes and other torpedoes. The
Navy now reportedly plans to remove the anti-torpedo torpedo system from the ships that were
equipped with it.80
The Navy in recent years has initiated efforts to develop and procure longer-ranged ASCMs, but
some observers have expressed frustration that these efforts are not moving quickly enough.81 In
support of its efforts, the Navy testified in March 2020 that
The Navy’s offensive strike systems consist of a broad family of current and future
weapons that together can and will strike from the sea, air, and land. These weapons
capitalize on key system attributes (e.g. speed, range, lethality, survivability, and
commonality) with a strong focus on delivering ‘multi-domain’ capabilities. The [Navy]
Department’s Offensive Missile Strategy (OMS) supports a wider, more systematic
approach towards delivering offensive weapons balance to increase overall force
effectiveness to address emerging threats.
Our current OMS construct has three pillars. First, the Department will sustain relevant
weapon systems. Our objective is to preserve the readiness and capacity of our key strike
weapons inventories. Second, the Department will pursue strike weapon capability
enhancements. Under this initiative, the Navy will develop near-term capability upgrades
to enhance existing weapons that provide critical improvements to our current long-range

77 Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, USN Expected Nominee for Commander, U.S. Pacific
Command, p. 18. See also pp. 8. 16. 17. 19, and 43.
78 John Power, “Has the US Already Lost the Battle for the South China Sea?” South China Morning Post, January 18,
2020. See also Gregory B. Poling, “The Conventional Wisdom on China’s Island Bases Is Dangerously Wrong,” War
on the Rocks, January 10, 2020; Kerry K. Gershaneck and James E. Fanell, “This Is How China's [Military] Will Fight
And Win A War In The South China Sea,” National Interest, January 18, 2020.
79 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
80 For additional discussion, see Alex Lockie, “US Navy Admits Failure on $760 Million Weapon to Protect Its Aircraft
Carriers from An Age-Old Threat,” Business Insider, February 5, 2019; Joseph Trevithick, “The Navy Is Ripping Out
Underperforming Anti-Torpedo Torpedoes From Its Supercarriers,” The Drive, February 5, 2019.
81 See, for example, James Turnwall, “The Navy Is Losing the Missile Arms Race,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
November 2019. For a similar discussion regarding U.S. and Chinese air-to-air missiles, see Douglas Barrie, “Will
America’s Next Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile Match Up to China’s?” Defense One, October 22, 2019.
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strike weapons capabilities (e.g. Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST), LRASM V1.1, SM-
6/Block 1B, and the Naval Strike Missile). Third, the Department will develop next-
generation strike missile capabilities to address emerging threats.
The OMS is reviewed annually based on current capabilities and emerging threats, and
updated to leverage analytical processes/study updates. The results are used to inform
annual RDT&E and procurement funding priorities to achieve an optimal mix of offensive
strike missile system capabilities. The 2020 OMS is currently being finalized and is a
classified document. Additional details about next generation weapons development can
be provided in a classified setting.82
The issue of the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is a key component of an ongoing
debate over the future survivability, utility, and cost-effectiveness of aircraft carriers and their air
wings, with critics arguing that the current operating range of Navy carrier air wings will force
Navy aircraft carriers to operate well within the ranges of Chinese ASBMs or other A2/AD
systems, which could put the carriers’ survivability at substantial risk, or alternatively require
carriers to operate beyond the range of those Chinese A2/AD systems, in locations that are safer
but so far away that the carriers and their air wings will contribute little combat capability.
A key U.S. Navy program for increasing the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is the MQ-
25 Stingray program, which is a program to acquire a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) for use as a tanker for in-flight refueling of manned carrier-based aircraft (with a
secondary mission of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Some observers, while not
necessarily objecting to the MQ-25 program, argue that the Navy should do more to increase the
operating range of Navy carrier air wings, such as developing a stealthy, carrier-based UAV
capable of penetrating enemy air defenses and striking land targets at very long ranges.
The issue of acquisition policies and the metrics for judging their success is discussed in more
detail in another CRS report.83
Legislative Activity for FY2021
The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget was submitted on February 10, 2020.
Coverage in Related CRS Reports
A variety of CRS reports cover U.S. Navy programs that in varying degrees can be viewed as
responses to, among other things, China’s naval modernization effort. These reports include but
are not limited to the following:
 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke

82 Statement of the Honorable James F. Geurts, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development and
Acquisition ASN(RD&A), and Vice Admiral James W. Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Warfighting
Requirements and Capabilities (OPNAV N9), and Lieutenant General Eric Smith, Deputy Commandant, Combat
Development and Integration, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on the Department of the
Navy Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Rrequest for Seapower and Projection Forces, March 4, 2020, p. 20. See also David
Lague, “Special Report: U.S. Rearms to Nullify China's Missile Supremacy,” Reuters, May 6, 2020.
83 See CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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 CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah
Gertler (the JSF program is a joint DOD program with Navy participation)
 CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R44972, Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R46374, Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided
Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
 CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/S. 4049)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-442 of July 9, 2020) on H.R.
6395, states: “The committee continues to support the 355-ship fleet codified in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91) as an essential part of the
National Defense Strategy and its emphasis on near-peer competitors such as Russia and China.”
(Page 17)
Section 1265 of H.R. 6395 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 1265. REPORT ON DIRECTED USE OF FISHING FLEETS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Commander of the
Office of Naval Intelligence shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate an unclassified report on the use of distant-water fishing
fleets by foreign governments as extensions of such countries’ official maritime security
forces, including the manner and extent to which such fishing fleets are leveraged in
support of naval operations and foreign policy more generally. The report shall also
consider the threats, on a country-by-country basis, posed by such use of distant-water
fishing fleets to—
(1) fishing or other vessels of the United States and partner countries;
(2) United States and partner naval and coast guard operations; and
(3) other interests of the United States and partner countries.
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 116-236 of June 24, 2020) on S.
4049, states: “The committee continues to support the national policy of achieving at least a 355-
ship fleet, as codified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law
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115–91), which is integral to the National Defense Strategy and its emphasis on near-peer
competition with Russia and China.” (Page 49)
S.Rept. 116-236 also states:
Anti-ship missile development
The committee is encouraged by increased attention across the Department of Defense to
the surface warfare mission area, including several new anti-ship missile (ASM) programs.
However, the committee desires greater clarity on Joint Force ASM requirements,
development efforts, and acquisition strategies. The committee is interested in ensuring
that rigorous ASM requirements exist tied to specific threats and operational concepts,
development efforts are rationalized where possible, and acquisition strategies are
streamlined.
Therefore, the committee directs the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Sustainment, in consultation with the Secretaries of the military
departments, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than
December 1, 2020, on Joint Force ASM requirements, development efforts, and acquisition
strategies.
This report shall include the following elements: (1) A description of Joint Requirements
Oversight Council-validated (JROC-validated) requirements for ASMs, including
inventory objectives and capabilities required for each ASM, such as range, speed, seeker
performance, and data link requirements; (2) A description of other Department of Defense
requirements for ASMs that have not been validated by the JROC, including inventory
objectives and capabilities required for each ASM, such as range, speed, seeker
performance, and data link requirements; (3) A description of the development efforts
supporting each ASM program listed under (1) and (2), such as prototyping subsystems,
investigating use of common components, conducting developmental testing, conducting
operational testing, and engaging in other forms of risk reduction; and (4) A description of
the acquisition strategies, if applicable, for each ASM program listed under (1) and (2)
above. (Pages 44-45)
S.Rept. 116-236 also states:
Increase in basic research, Navy
The budget request included $467.2 million in Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation (RDT&E), Navy, for PE 61153N Defense Research Sciences.
The committee recognizes the ‘‘increasingly complex security environment’’ detailed in
the National Defense Strategy and born from rapid technological change, challenges from
adversaries in every operating domain, and decreased readiness derivative of the longest
continuous stretch of armed conflict in U.S. history. Accordingly, it is crucial to adequately
fund, resource, and structure the Department of Defense to conduct RDT&E activities for
critical emerging technologies to stay ahead of our adversaries, most notably Russia and
China. Resources must be devoted and responsibly spent toward research and development
of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonics, directed energy, biotechnology,
autonomy, cyber, space, 5G, microelectronics, and fully networked command, control, and
communications technologies. As such, the committee encourages rapid development,
prototyping, testing, and acquisition of these emerging technologies in order to remain
ahead of our adversaries.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $10.0 million in RDT&E, Navy, for
PE 61153N Defense Research Sciences to support additional basic research. (Page 93)
Section 1251 of S. 4049 as reported by the committee states:
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SEC. 1251. PACIFIC DETERRENCE INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry out an initiative to ensure the
effective implementation of the National Defense Strategy with respect to the Indo-Pacific
region, to be known as the “Pacific Deterrence Initiative” (in this section referred to as the
“Initiative”).
(b) Purpose.—The purpose of the Initiative is to carry out only the following activities:
(1) Activities to increase the lethality of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific region, including,
but not limited to—
(A) by improving active and passive defenses against theater cruise, ballistic, and
hypersonic missiles for bases, operating locations, and other critical infrastructure at
locations west of the International Date Line; and
(B) procurement and fielding of—
(i) long-range precision strike systems to be stationed or pre-positioned west of the
International Date Line;
(ii) critical munitions to be pre-positioned at locations west of the International Date Line;
and
(iii) command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems intended for stationing or operational use in the Indo-Pacific
region.
(2) Activities to enhance the design and posture of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific region,
including, but not limited to, by—
(A) transitioning from large, centralized, and unhardened infrastructure to smaller,
dispersed, resilient, and adaptive basing at locations west of the International Date Line;
(B) increasing the number and capabilities of expeditionary airfields and ports in the Indo-
Pacific region available for operational use at locations west of the International Date Line;
(C) enhancing pre-positioned forward stocks of fuel, munitions, equipment, and materiel
at locations west of the International Date Line;
(D) increasing the availability of strategic mobility assets in the Indo-Pacific region;
(E) improving distributed logistics and maintenance capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region
to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multidomain attack; and
(F) increasing the presence of the Armed Forces at locations west of the International Date
Line.
(3) Activities to strengthen alliances and partnerships, including, but not limited to, by—
(A) building capacity of allies and partners; and
(B) improving—
(i) interoperability and information sharing with allies and partners; and
(ii) information operations capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, with a focus on
reinforcing United States commitment to allies and partners and countering malign
influence.
(4) Activities to carry out a program of exercises, experimentation, and innovation for the
joint force in the Indo-Pacific region.
(c) Plan Required.—Not later than February 15, 2021, the Secretary, in consultation with
the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall submit to the
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congressional defense committees a plan to expend not less than the amounts authorized to
be appropriated under subsection (e)(2).
(d) Budget Display Information.—The Secretary shall include in the materials of the
Department of Defense in support of the budget of the President (submitted to Congress
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code) for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal
year thereafter a detailed budget display for the Initiative that includes the following
information:
(1) A future-years plan with respect to activities and resources for the Initiative for the
applicable fiscal year and not fewer than the four following fiscal years.
(2) With respect to procurement accounts—
(A) amounts displayed by account, budget activity, line number, line item, and line item
title; and
(B) a description of the requirements for such amounts specific to the Initiative.
(3) With respect to research, development, test, and evaluation accounts—
(A) amounts displayed by account, budget activity, line number, program element, and
program element title; and
(B) a description of the requirements for such amounts specific to the Initiative.
(4) With respect to operation and maintenance accounts—
(A) amounts displayed by account title, budget activity title, line number, and subactivity
group title; and
(B) a description of the specific manner in which such amounts will be used.
(5) With respect to military personnel accounts—
(A) amounts displayed by account, budget activity, budget subactivity, and budget
subactivity title; and
(B) a description of the requirements for such amounts specific to the Initiative.
(6) With respect to each project under military construction accounts (including with
respect to unspecified minor military construction and amounts for planning and design),
the country, location, project title, and project amount by fiscal year.
(7) With respect to the activities described in subsection (b)—
(A) amounts displayed by account title, budget activity title, line number, and subactivity
group title; and
(B) a description of the specific manner in which such amounts will be used.
(8) With respect to each military service—
(A) amounts displayed by account title, budget activity title, line number, and subactivity
group title; and
(B) a description of the specific manner in which such amounts will be used.
(9) With respect to the amounts described in each of paragraphs (2)(A), (3)(A), (4)(A),
(5)(A), (6), (7)(A), and (8)(A), a comparison between—
(A) the amount in the budget of the President for the following fiscal year; and
(B) the amount projected in the previous budget of the President for the following fiscal
year.
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(e) Authorization Of Appropriations.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the
Secretary to carry out the activities of the Initiative described in subsection (b) the
following:
(1) For fiscal year 2021, $1,406,417,000, as specified in the funding table in section 4502.
(2) For fiscal year 2022, $5,500,000,000.
(f) Repeal.—Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
(Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat. 1676), as most recently amended by section 1253 of the
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law
115–232; 132 Stat. 2054), is repealed.
Regarding Section 1251, S.Rept. 116-236 states:
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (sec. 1251)
The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to
carry out the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) to ensure the effective implementation of
the National Defense Strategy with respect to the Indo-Pacific region. The provision would
describe the activities to be carried out under the PDI: (1) Activities to increase the lethality
of the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region; (2) Activities to enhance the design and
posture of the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region; (3) Activities to strengthen alliances
and partnerships; and (4) Activities to carry out a program of exercises, experimentation,
and innovation for the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region. The provision would
authorize $1.4 billion to be appropriated for the Secretary to carry out PDI in fiscal year
2021, as specified in the funding table in section 4502.
The provision would also authorize $5.5 billion to be appropriated for the Secretary to carry
out the PDI in fiscal year 2022. Not later than February 15, 2021, the provision would
require the Secretary, in consultation with the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,
to submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to expend not less than the
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Secretary to carry out the PDI in fiscal year
2022.
The provision would repeal section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91), as most recently amended by section 1253 of the
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law
115–232), which established an authority for an ‘‘Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative.’’
The committee notes that the provision would emphasize that specific activities to be
carried out under the PDI, particularly those related to the lethality of the Joint Force and
the design and posture of the Joint Force, should be focused in and with respect to locations
west of the International Date Line. In this way, the committee believes that the PDI will
bolster the ‘‘contact’’ and ‘‘blunt’’ layers described by the Global Operating Model of the
National Defense Strategy to maintain the credibility of American deterrence against
adversarial aggression in the Indo-Pacific region.
The committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to consider whether a named operation
in the Indo-Pacific would improve the execution of the PDI, including through more
predictable and sustainable funding, improved joint planning and coordination of training
and exercise activities, and increased support for deployments of rotational forces.
The committee notes that the PDI is designed to further the strategic and policy objectives
articulated by Congress in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115–409) and
by the executive branch in the National Security Strategy, the ‘‘Free and Open Indo-
Pacific’’ strategy of the Department of State, the National Defense Strategy, and the Indo-
Pacific strategy report of the Department of Defense.
The committee notes that the provision would require the Department of Defense to submit
detailed budgetary display information associated with the PDI in future budget requests.
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The committee believes that the availability of budgetary data organized according to
regional missions and the priorities of the combatant commands is critical for the ability of
the Department and the Congress to assess the implementation of the National Defense
Strategy. Furthermore, a budgetary display is included elsewhere in this Act that captures
spending related to the PDI. The committee encourages the Department of Defense to
continue working with the Congress to improve budgetary transparency in support of its
oversight responsibilities. (Pages 301-302)

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Appendix A. Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval
Capabilities
This appendix presents some additional discussion of factors involved in comparing U.S. and
Chinese naval capabilities.
U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of
U.S. and Chinese ships. Although the total number of ships in a navy (or its aggregate tonnage) is
relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous other
factors that bear on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned
missions. One-dimensional comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China’s navy and the
U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval
capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to those navies, for the
following reasons:
 A fleet’s total number of ships (or its aggregate tonnage) is only a partial
metric of its capability. Many factors other than ship numbers (or aggregate
tonnage) contribute to naval capability, including types of ships, types and
numbers of aircraft, the sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and
networking capabilities, supporting maintenance and logistics capabilities,
doctrine and tactics, the quality, education, and training of personnel, and the
realism and complexity of exercises. In light of this, navies with similar numbers
of ships or similar aggregate tonnages can have significantly different
capabilities, and navy-to-navy comparisons of numbers of ships or aggregate
tonnages can provide a highly inaccurate sense of their relative capabilities. In
recent years, the warfighting capabilities of navies have derived increasingly
from the sophistication of their internal electronics and software. This factor can
vary greatly from one navy to the next, and often cannot be easily assessed by
outside observation. As the importance of internal electronics and software has
grown, the idea of comparing the warfighting capabilities of navies principally on
the basis of easily observed factors such as ship numbers and tonnages has
become increasingly less reliable, and today is highly problematic.
 Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines or surface
combatants) can obscure potentially significant differences in the
capabilities of those ships, both between navies and within one country’s
navy. Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a number
of other factors, including sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, networking
capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum
speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time
the ship is available for operation).
 A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that changes in total
numbers necessarily translate into corresponding or proportional changes in
aggregate capability. For a Navy like China’s, which is modernizing by
replacing older, obsolescent ships with more modern and more capable ships, this
is not necessarily the case. As shown in Table 1 and Table 2, for example,
China’s attack submarine force today has only a slightly larger number of boats
than it had in 2000 or 2005, but it has considerably more aggregate capability
than it did in 2000 or 2005, because the force today includes a much larger
percentage of relatively modern designs.
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 Comparisons of total numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take
into account the differing global responsibilities and homeporting locations
of each fleet. The U.S. Navy has substantial worldwide responsibilities, and a
substantial fraction of the U.S. fleet is homeported in the Atlantic. As a
consequence, only a certain portion of the U.S. Navy might be available for a
crisis or conflict scenario in China’s near-seas region, or could reach that area
within a certain amount of time. In contrast, China’s navy has more-limited
responsibilities outside China’s near-seas region, and its ships are all homeported
along China’s coast at locations that face directly onto China’s near-seas region.
In a U.S.-China conflict inside the first island chain, U.S. naval and other forces
would be operating at the end of generally long supply lines, while Chinese naval
and other forces would be operating at the end of generally short supply lines.
 Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into
account maritime-relevant military capabilities that countries might have
outside their navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based Air Force aircraft
armed with ASCMs or other weapons. Given the significant maritime-relevant
non-navy forces present in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries, this is a
particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and Chinese military
capabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-China
incident at sea might involve only navy units on both sides, a broader U.S.-China
military conflict would more likely be a force-on-force engagement involving
multiple branches of each country’s military.
 The missions to be performed by one country’s navy can differ greatly from
the missions to be performed by another country’s navy. Consequently,
navies are better measured against their respective missions than against one
another. Although Navy A might have less capability than Navy B, Navy A might
nevertheless be better able to perform Navy A’s intended missions than Navy B
is to perform Navy B’s intended missions. This is another significant
consideration in assessing U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, because the
missions of the two navies are quite different.
A 2015 RAND report attempts to take factors like those discussed above more fully into account
with the aim of producing a more comprehensive assessment of relative U.S. and Chinese
military capabilities for potential conflict scenarios involving Taiwan and the Spratly Islands in
the South China Sea. The report states the following:
Over the past two decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has transformed itself
from a large but antiquated force into a capable, modern military. In most areas, its
technology and skill levels lag behind those of the United States, but it has narrowed the
gap. Moreover, it enjoys the advantage of proximity in most plausible scenarios and has
developed capabilities that capitalize on that advantage....
... four broad trends emerge:
• Since 1996, the PLA has made tremendous strides, and, despite improvements to the U.S.
military, the net change in capabilities is moving in favor of China. Some aspects of
Chinese military modernization, such as improvements to PLA ballistic missiles, fighter
aircraft, and attack submarines, have come extraordinarily quickly by any reasonable
historical standard.
• The trends vary by mission area, and relative Chinese gains have not been uniform across
all areas. In some areas, U.S. improvements have given the United States new options, or
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at least mitigated the speed at which Chinese military modernization has shifted the relative
balance.
• Distances, even relatively short distances, have a major impact on the two sides’ ability
to achieve critical objectives. Chinese power projection capabilities are improving, but
present limitations mean that the PLA’s ability to influence events and win battles
diminishes rapidly beyond the unrefueled range of jet fighters and diesel submarines. This
is likely to change in the years beyond those considered in this report, though operating at
greater distances from China will always work, on balance, against China.
• The PLA is not close to catching up to the U.S. military in terms of aggregate capabilities,
but it does not need to catch up to the United States to dominate its immediate periphery.
The advantages conferred by proximity severely complicate U.S. military tasks while
providing major advantages to the PLA. This is the central finding of this study and
highlights the value of campaign analysis, rather than more abstract assessments of
capabilities.
Over the next five to 15 years, if U.S. and PLA forces remain on roughly current
trajectories, Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of U.S. dominance. The
United States would probably still prevail in a protracted war centered in virtually any area,
and Beijing should not infer from the above generalization that it stands to gain from
conflict. U.S. and Chinese forces would likely face losses on a scale that neither has
suffered in recent decades. But PLA forces will become more capable of establishing
temporary local air and naval superiority at the outset of a conflict. In certain regional
contingencies, this temporal or local superiority might enable the PLA to achieve limited
objectives without “defeating” U.S. forces. Perhaps even more worrisome from a military-
political perspective, the ability to contest dominance might lead Chinese leaders to believe
that they could deter U.S. intervention in a conflict between it and one or more of its
neighbors. This, in turn, would undermine U.S. deterrence and could, in a crisis, tip the
balance of debate in Beijing as to the advisability of using force....
Although trends in the military balance are running against the United States, there are
many actions that the United States could take to reinforce deterrence and continue to serve
as the ultimate force for stability in the Western Pacific.84
As mentioned earlier, while comparisons of the total numbers of ships in the PLAN and the U.S.
Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities
and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to those navies, an examination of
the trends over time in the relative numbers of ships can shed some light on how the relative
balance of U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities might be changing over time.

84 Eric Heginbotham, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard, Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power,
1996-2017, Santa Monica (CA), RAND Corporation, 2015 (RAND report RR-392), pp. xix, xxx-xxxii.
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Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter Chinese
ASBMs
This appendix provides additional discussion of the issue of the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter
China’s ASBMs.
Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a “game
changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered. There are several potential approaches for
countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination.
The ASBM is not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has
developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring
various approaches for countering ASBMs.
Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e.,
“hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e.,
“soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing
ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack
various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to
carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and
localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM,
and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.
Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an
opponent’s military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes
Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans,
and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill
chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.”85
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as
controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for
China to detect, identify, and track those ships.86 The Navy could acquire weapons and systems
for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for
attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying
and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in
flight include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block IIA

85 David A. Fulghum, “USAF: Slash And Burn Defense Cuts Will Cost Missions, Capabilities,” Aerospace Daily &
Defense Report, September 30, 2011: 6.
86 For a journal article discussing actions by the Navy during the period 1956-1972 to conceal the exact locations of
Navy ships, see Robert G. Angevine, “Hiding in Plain Sight, The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations Under EMCON,
1956-1972,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2011: 79-95. See also Jonathan F. Sullivan, Defending the Fleet From
China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based Missile Defense, A Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, April 15, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011, at
http://gradworks.umi.com/1491548.pdf; Jon Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber: Reexamining the Late
Cold War Struggle Between Soviet Maritime Reconnaissance and U.S. Navy Countertargeting,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 27, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire
Bomber, Part II,” Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), October 28, 2014; John Solomon,
“Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III,” Information Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net),
October 29, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part IV,” Information Dissemination
(www.informationdissemination.net), October 30, 2014.
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version), the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile,87 and accelerating development
and deployment of the hypervelocity projectile (HVP), electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and
solid state lasers (SSLs).88 Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their
intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or
systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that
could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.89
An October 4, 2016, press report states the following:
Several times in the past, [Chief of Naval Operations John] Richardson has stressed that
long range weapons developments from adversarial nations like Russia and China aren't
the end-all, be-all of naval conflicts.
Just because China's “carrier-killer” missile has a greater range than the planes aboard a
US aircraft carrier doesn't mean the US would shy away from deploying a carrier within
that range, Richardson has stated on different occasions.
Again, Richardson challenged the notion that a so-called A2/AD zone was “an
impenetrable keep out zone that forces can only enter at extreme peril to their existence,
let alone their mission.”
Richardson took particular issue with the “denial” aspect of A2/AD, repeating his assertion
that this denial is an “aspiration” not a “fait accompli.” The maps so common in
representing these threats often mark off the limits of different system's ranges with “red
arcs that extend off coastlines,” with the implication that military forces crossing these
lines face “certain destruction.”
But this is all speculation according to Richardson: “The reality is far more complex, it's
actually really hard to achieve a hit. It requires the completion of a really complex chain of
events.... these arcs represent danger for sure... but the threats they are based on are not
insurmountable, and can be managed, will be managed.”
“We can fight from within these defended areas, and we will... this is nothing new and has
been done before,” said Richardson.
So while Russia and China can develop missiles and radars and declare their ranges on
paper, things get a lot trickier in the real world, where the US has the most and best
experience in operating.
“Potential adversaries actually have different geographic features like choke points,
islands, ocean currents, mountains,” said Richardson, who urged against oversimplifying
complicated, and always unique circumstances in so-called A2/AD zones.
“Have no doubt, the US navy is prepared to go wherever it needs to go, at any time, and
stay there for as long as necessary in response to our leadership’s call to project our
strategic influence,” Richardson concluded.

87 For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the SM-6, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
88 For more on HVP, EMRG, and SSLs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided
Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
89 Regarding the option of systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds, Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic
Implications of Obscurants,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2010: 73-84; Scott Tait, “Make Smoke!” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 58-63. Regarding radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, see “7th Fleet Tests Innovative
Missile Defense System,” Navy News Services, June 26, 2014; Kevin McCaney, “Navy’s Carbon-Fiber Clouds Could
Make Incoming Missiles Miss Their Targets,” Defense Systems (http://defensesystems.com), June 27, 2014. See also
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Cyber, EW Are Secret Missile Defense Weapons Too Secret To Use,” Breaking Defense,
December 4, 2015.
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Similarly, an August 29, 2016, press report states the following:
The United States Navy is absolutely confident in the ability of its aircraft carriers and
carrier air wings to fly and fight within zones defended by so-called anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) weapons....
In the view of the U.S. Navy leadership, A2/AD—as it is now called—has existed since
the dawn of warfare when primitive man was fighting with rocks and spears. Overtime,
A2/AD techniques have evolved as technology has improved with ever-greater range and
lethality. Rocks and spears eventually gave way to bows and arrows, muskets and cannons.
Thus, the advent of long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles is simply another
technological evolution of A2/AD.
“This is the next play in that,” Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval operations, told The
National Interest on Aug. 25 during an interview in his office in the Pentagon. “This
A2/AD, well, it’s certainly a goal for some of our competitors, but achieving that goal is
much different and much more complicated.”
Indeed, as many U.S. Navy commanders including Richardson and Rear Adm. (Upper
Half) DeWolfe Miller, the service’s director of air warfare, have pointed out, anti-access
bubbles defended by Chinese DF-21D or DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile systems or
Russian Bastion-P supersonic anti-ship missile systems are not impenetrable ‘Iron Domes.’
Nor do formidable Russian and Chinese air defense systems such as the S-400 or HQ-9
necessarily render the airspace they protect into no-go zones for the carrier air wing.
Asked directly if he was confident in the ability of the aircraft carrier and its air wing to
fight inside an A2/AD zone protected by anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles as well as
advanced air defenses, Richardson was unequivocal in his answer. “Yes,” Richardson
said—but he would not say how exactly how due to the need for operational security. “It’s
really a suite of capabilities, but I actually think we’re talking too much in the open about
some of the things we’re doing, so I want to be thoughtful about how we talk about things
so we don’t give any of our competitors an advantage.”...
Miller said that there have been threats to the carrier since the dawn of naval aviation. In
many ways, the threat to the carrier was arguably much greater during the Cold War when
the Soviet Union massed entire regiments of Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfires and deployed
massive cruise missile-armed Oscar-class SSGN submarines to hunt down and destroy the
Navy’s flattops. The service developed ways to defeat the Soviet threat—and the carrier
will adapt to fight in the current environment.
“We could have had this interview twenty-years-ago and there would have been a threat,”
Miller said. “The nature of war and A2/AD is not new—that’s my point. I don’t want to
downplay it, but our improvements in information warfare, electronic warfare, payloads,
the weapons systems that we’ve previously talked about—plus our ability to train to those
capabilities that we have—we will create sanctuaries, we’ll fight in those sanctuaries and
we’re a maneuver force.”90
An October 18, 2017, blog post states the following:
Assuming the DF-21D is ready for battle, can America defend against China’s mighty
missile?

90 Dave Majumdar, “Chief of Naval Operations Richardson: US Aircraft Carriers Can Fight Inside A2/AD Zones,”
National Interest, August 29, 2016. See also Ryan Pickrell, “Navy Admirals Brush Aside Biggest Worry Of Modern
Naval Combat,” Daily Caller, August 31, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “Here Is Why the US Military Is Not In Panic Mode
Over China’s Carrier-Killer Missiles,” National Interest, June 20, 2016.
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While opinions are clearly mixed—in speaking to many sources over the last several years
on this topic—it seems clear there is great nervousness in U.S. defense circles. However,
as time has passed, initial fears have turned towards a more optimistic assessment....
In the end, the weapon might not be the great “game-changer” that many point it out to be,
but a great complicator.91

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

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91 Harry J. Kazianis, “Could China's Aircraft Carrier Killer Missiles 'Sink' the U.S. Navy?” National Interest, October
18, 2017. See also Dick Mosier, “Breaking the Anti-Ship Missile Kill Chain,” Center for International Maritime
Security, February 26, 2018; Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Myth of the ‘Game-Changer’ Weapon,” Asia Times, April 26,
2018.
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