Presidential Succession: Perspectives and
July 14, 2020
Contemporary Issues for Congress
Thomas H. Neale
Succession to the office of President of the United States is provided for by the Twenty-Fifth
Specialist in American
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Title 3, Section 19 of the U.S. Code (3 U.S.C. §19).
National Government

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment states in Section 1 that when the office of President of the United
States becomes vacant due to “removal ... death or resignation” of the chief executive, “the Vice

President shall become President.” In Section 2, it further provides that, when the office of Vice
President becomes vacant for any reason, the President shall nominate a successor, who must be confirmed by a majority
vote of both houses of Congress. Sections 3 and 4 of the amendment provide for cases of presidential disab ility; for further
information on this issue, consult CRS Report R45394, Presidential Disability Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:
Constitutional Provisions and Perspectives for Congress, by Thomas H. Neale, Presidential Disability Under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment: Constitutional Provisions and Perspectives for Congress, by Thomas H. Neale.
Authority for succession beyond these two offices is provided in Article II, Section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, which
empowers Congress to “by Law provide for the case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President” The Succession Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 380), as amended, found at Title 3, Section 19 of the U.S. Code (3
U.S.C. §19), governs this eventuality. The 1947 act provides that if the offices of President and Vice President are vacant
simultaneously, the Speaker of the House of Representatives acts as President, after resigning from the House and from the
office of Speaker. If the speakership is also vacant, the President pro tempore of the Senate acts as President, after resigning
from the Senate and from the office of President pro tempore. If both offices are vacant, the Secretary of State, who heads the
most senior executive department, acts as President. If that office is vacant, then the Secretary of the next most senior
department succeeds, continuing through the executive departments, ranked in order of when they were established by law—
from the Secretary of State, through the Secretary of Homeland Security. If they do assume the acting presidency, the law
further states that taking the presidential oath of office constitutes an automatic resignation from their Cabinet position. All
potential successors must have been duly sworn in to their previous offices and meet the presidency’s constitutional
requirements of 35 years of age, “natural born” citizenship, and 14 years residence “within the United States,” as prescribed
in Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution. Anyone serving as acting President under the act can be supplanted or
“bumped” if a person holding an office higher in the order of succession takes the position. Since 1947, the Succession Act
has been has been updated regularly to include the heads of newly created executive departments.
Presidential succession was seemingly a settled issue prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). These events
demonstrated the potential for a mass “decapitation” of both legislative and executive leadership and raised the question of
whether current arrangements are adequate to guarantee continuity in government in such circumstances. Legislation was
proposed to revise or expand the line of succession in several Congresses in the years following 9/11. Nongovernmental
organizations also promoted similar plans during this period. The only legislative change enacted during that time, however,
was inclusion of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as 18th in order of succession, a provision
enacted in Title V, Section 503, of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (120 Stat. 192).
For some years prior to 9/11, and continuing since that event, observers and scholars of presidential succession have
questioned certain aspects of existing succession law. Some of these center on the following issues. Do the Speaker and
President pro tempore qualify as “officers” under the Constitution’s succession provisions? Are senior congressional leaders
best qualified to serve as acting chief executive? Would the succession of a congressional leader of a different party than the
departed incumbent overturn “the people’s choice” in the previous presidential election? Would the nation be well served by
the “bumping” procedure described above? Has the nation taken adequate precautions in the event a candidate or candidates
were to die or leave the ticket at any one of several stages between election day and the January 20 presidential inauguration?
These and other related issues are examined in this report.
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Presidential Succession: Perspectives and Contemporary Issues for Congress

Introduction
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, proposed by Congress in 1965 and ratified in
1967, provides that the Vice President “shal become President” on the death, resignation, or
removal from office of the President.1 In Article II, Section 1, clause 6, the Constitution delegates
authority for succession beyond the Vice President to Congress, authorizing it to “by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President.” The Twentieth Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1932 and ratified by the states
in 1933, revised and clarified earlier succession procedures. Its most notable provision established
January 20 as the date on which presidential terms of office begin. Since 1792, Congress has also
exercised its authority through three acts providing for presidential suc cession: in 1792, 1886, and
1947. Today, the Succession Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 380, 3 U.S.C. §19) and the two aforementioned
amendments govern succession to the presidency.
Although the issue was occasional y revisited by Congress with an eye to revision, presidential
succession was general y considered to be a settled issue prior to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 (9/11). These events, however, demonstrated the potential for a mass
“decapitation” of both the legislative and executive branches of government, and raised questions
among some observers as to whether current arrangements were adequate to guarantee continuity
in Congress and continuity in and succession to the presidency under such circumstances. Wide-
ranging discussions followed in both Congress and the public policy community on succession
issues in the years after 9/11. Bil s introduced addressed this question in the contemporary
context, while nongovernmental organizations explored alternatives and suggested changes in
presidential succession procedures. Of various bil s introduced in Congress in the decade
following 9/11, the only succession-related legislation to be enacted was Title V, Section 503, of
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192),
which incorporated the office of Secretary of Homeland Security into the line of succession.
Although no major succession-related legislation emerged from the activities following the
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the body of research and proposals explored and developed in Congress
and the public policy community during those years could serve as a resource for Congress
should it consider alternative approaches to presidential succession or revision of existing
succession procedures in the future.
Presidential Succession: Current Provisions in Brief
Succession to the office of President of the United States is provided for principal y by the
Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments to the Constitution and Title 3, Section 19 of the U.S.
Code (3 U.S.C. §19).
 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides in Section 1 that, when the office of
President of the United States becomes vacant due to “removal ... death or
resignation” of the chief executive, “the Vice President shal become President.”

1 T he amendment revised and clarified original constitutional language of Article II, Section 1, clause 6, which had
stated that, “In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge
the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President .” T he T wenty-Fifth
Amendment’s language, “the Vice President shall become President ,” was designed to resolve the long-debated
question as to whether a Vice President succeeding to the presidency was acting as President or whether they actually
were President if the incumbent had died, resigned, or left office for other reasons.
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 The amendment further provides in Section 2 that, when the office of Vice
President becomes vacant for any reason, the President shal nominate a
successor, who must be confirmed by a majority vote of both houses of Congress.
 Authority for determining succession beyond the President and Vice President is
found in Article II, Section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, which provides that,
“the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation,
or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shal
then act as President.”
 The Twentieth Amendment is perhaps best known for set ing the current dates for
the beginning of congressional and presidential terms of office.2 In Section 3, it
also clarifies a detail of presidential succession procedure. The section declares
that if a President-elect dies before being inaugurated, the Vice President-elect
becomes President-elect and is subsequently inaugurated. It also provides that if a
President has not qualified by January 20, then the Vice President-elect serves as
Acting President until a President qualifies. It further empowers Congress to
provide by law for situations in which neither a President-elect nor Vice
President-elect has qualified by inauguration day.
 The current legislation authorized by Article II, Section 1, clause 6 is the
Succession Act of 1947, incorporated as Title 3, Section 19 of the U.S. Code. It
provides that, if the offices of President and Vice President are vacant
simultaneously, the Speaker of the House of Representatives acts as President,
after resigning from the House and from the office of Speaker. If the speakership
is also vacant, the President pro tempore of the Senate acts as President, after
resigning from the Senate and from the office of President pro tempore. If both
offices are vacant, then the heads of designated executive departments, “Cabinet
officers,” are eligible to act as President, in the chronological order in which their
departments were established by law.
 Under the Succession Act of 1947, al potential presidential successors must be
duly sworn in their previous offices and meet the presidency’s constitutional
requirements of 35 years of age, “natural born” citizenship, and 14 years
residence “within the United States,” as prescribed in Article II, Section 1, clause
5 of the Constitution.
Perspectives: Constitutional Origins, Amendments,
and Legislation: 1787-1967
Article II of the Constitution, in its original form, provided the most basic building block of
succession procedures, stating that:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on
the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer

2 T he T wentieth Amendment set the congressional terms to end at noon on the third day of January in years following
federal elections—in practice, January 3 of all odd-numbered years. Presidential terms were set to end at noon of the
20th day of January of the year following elections for President and Vice President.
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shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected.3
This language evolved during the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The two most important
early drafts of the Constitution neither provided for a Vice President nor considered succession to
the presidency, and it was only late in the convention proceedings that the office of Vice President
emerged and the language quoted above was adopted.4 While the need for a Vice President was
debated during the ratification process, the question of succession received little attention,
meriting only one reference in the supporting Federalist Papers: “the Vice-President may
occasional y become a substitute for the President, in the supreme Executive magistracy.”5
The Succession Act of 1792
The Second Congress (1791-1793) exercised its constitutional authority to provide for
presidential vacancy or inability beyond the Vice President in the Succession Act of 1792 (1 Stat.
240). After examining several options, including designating the Secretary of State or Chief
Justice as successor, Congress settled on the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, in that order. These officials were to succeed if the presidency
and vice presidency were both vacant. During House debate on the bil , there was considerable
discussion of the question of whether the President pro tempore and the Speaker could be
considered “officers” in the sense intended by the Constitution. If so, it was argued, they were
eligible to succeed; if not, they could not be included in the line of succession. The House
expressed its institutional doubts when it voted to strike this provision, but the Senate insisted on
it, and it became part of the bil enacted and signed by the President.6 Although the Speaker and
President pro tempore were thus incorporated in the line of succession, they would serve only
temporarily, however, since the act also provided for a special election to fil the vacancy, unless
it occurred late in the last full year of the incumbent’s term of office.7 Final y, this and both later
succession acts required that designees meet the constitutional requirements of age, residence,
and natural born citizenship.
Presidential Succession in 1841: Setting a Precedent
The first succession of a Vice President occurred when President Wil iam Henry Harrison died on
April 4, 1841, one month after his inauguration. Vice President John Tyler’s succession set an
important precedent and suggested the settlement of a constitutional question. Debate at the
Constitutional Convention, and subsequent writing on succession, indicated that the founders
intended the Vice President to serve as acting President in the event of a presidential vacancy or
disability, assuming “the powers and duties” of the office, but not actual y becoming President.8

3 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, clause 6. T his text was later changed and clarified by Section 1 of the T wenty-
Fifth Amendment.
4 John D. Feerick, From Failing Hands: The Story of Presidential Succession (New York: Fordham University Press,
1965), pp. 42-43. (Hereinafter “Feerick, From Failing Hands.”)
5 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 68,” in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Joh n Jay, The Federalist,
Benjamin F. Wright, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 433.
6 Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 58-60.
7 It should be recalled that during this period presidential terms ended on March 4 of the year after the presidential
election. Also, the act provided only for election of the President, since electors cast two votes for President during this
period (prior to ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, which specified separate electoral votes for President and Vice
President), with the electoral vote runner-up elected Vice President.
8 Ruth Silva, Presidential Succession (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968 (c. 1951)), p. 10; Feerick, From Failing
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Tyler’s status was widely debated at the time, but the Vice President decided to take the
presidential oath, and considered himself to have succeeded to Harrison’s office, as wel as to his
powers and duties. After some discussion of the question, Congress implicitly ratified Tyler’s
decision by referring to him in documents as “the President of the United States.”9 This action set
a precedent for succession that subsequently prevailed, and was later formal y incorporated into
the Constitution by Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
The Succession Act of 1886 and the Twentieth Amendment (1933)
President James A. Garfield’s death led to a major change in succession law. Shot by an assassin
July 2, 1881, the President struggled to survive for 79 days before succumbing to his wound on
September 19. Vice President Chester A. Arthur took office without incident, but the offices of
Speaker and President pro tempore were vacant throughout the President’s il ness, due to the fact
that the House elected in 1880 had yet to convene, and the Senate had been unable to elect a
President pro tempore because of partisan strife.10 Congress subsequently passed the Succession
Act of 188611 in order to ensure the line of succession and guarantee that potential successors
would be of the same party as the deceased incumbent. This legislation transferred succession
after the Vice President from the President pro tempore and the Speaker to Cabinet officers in the
chronological order in which their departments were created, provided they had been duly
confirmed by the Senate and were not under impeachment by the House. Further, it eliminated the
requirement for a special election, thus ensuring that any future successor would serve the full
balance of the presidential term. This act governed succession until 1947.
Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment
The Twentieth Amendment, ratified in 1933, modernized various provisions governing
congressional and presidential terms of office, among other things, setting January 20 of the years
following presidential elections as the date on which presidential terms end and January 3 of the
years following congressional elections as the date on which congressional terms end. Section 3
clarified one detail of presidential succession procedure by declaring that, if a President-elect dies
before being inaugurated, the Vice President-elect becomes President-elect and is subsequently
inaugurated. It also provided that if a President has not qualified by January 20, then the Vice
President-elect serves as Acting President until a President qualifies. It further empowers
Congress to provide by law for situations in which neither a President-elect nor Vice President-
elect has qualified by inauguration day.
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947
On April 12, 1945, Vice President Harry S. Truman succeeded as President at the death of
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Later that year, he proposed that Congress revise the order of succession,
placing the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate in line behind the
Vice President and ahead of the Cabinet. In his original proposal, the incumbent would serve until
a special election, which would be held at the next intervening congressional election. The winner

Hands, p. 56.
9 Congressional Globe, vol. 10, May 31, June 1, 1841, pp. 3-5.
10 In accord with contemporary practice, the House of Representatives elected in November 1880 did not convene in
the 47th Congress until December 5, 1881. As was also customary, the Senate had convened on March 10, following
Garfield’s inauguration, but traditionally confined its action at these sessions to consideration of the President’s Cabinet
and other nominations.
11 24 Stat.1, 49th Congress, ch. 4.
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would serve for the balance of the term. Truman argued that it was more appropriate to have
popularly elected officials first in line to succeed, rather than appointed Cabinet officers. A bil
incorporating the President’s proposal, minus the special election provision, passed the House in
1945, but no action was taken in the Senate during the balance of the 79th Congress.
The President renewed his cal for legislation when the 80th Congress convened in 1947, and
legislation was introduced in the Senate the same year. Debate on the Senate bil centered on
familiar questions: whether the Speaker and President pro tempore were “officers” in the sense
intended by the Constitution; whether legislators were wel qualified for the chief executive’s
position; whether requiring these two to resign their congressional membership and offices before
assuming the acting presidency was fair.12 The Senate and House passed, and the President
signed, legislation that embodied Truman’s request, but again deleted the special election
provisions.
Under the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 380, 3 U.S.C. §19), if both the presidency
and vice presidency are vacant, the Speaker succeeds, acting as President (after resigning the
speakership and House seat).13 If there is no Speaker, or if the Speaker does not qualify, the
President pro tempore succeeds, acting as President under the same requirements. If there is
neither a Speaker nor a President pro tempore, or if neither qualifies, then Cabinet officers
succeed, under the same conditions as applied in the 1886 act (see Table 3 for departmental order
in the line of succession). Any Cabinet officer acting as President under the act may, however, be
supplanted by a “qualified and prior-entitled individual” at any time.14 This means that if a
Cabinet officer is serving due to lack of qualification, disability, or vacancy in the office of
Speaker or President pro tempore, and a properly qualified Speaker or President pro tempore is
subsequently elected, then they may assume the acting presidency, supplanting the Cabinet
officer, provided the Speaker or President pro tempore resigns from both the offices. The
Presidential Succession Act of 1947 has been regularly amended to incorporate new Cabinet-level
departments into the line of succession, and remains in force.15
One succession-related anomaly remedied in the 109th Congress was the fact that the position of
Secretary of Homeland Security was not included in the line of presidential succession when the

12 Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 207-208.
13 T his requirement was included because the Constitution (Article I, Section 6, clause 2) expressly states that “no
person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office.”
14 3 U.S.C. 19(d)(2).
15 T he order of succession continued to change as the Cabinet evolved. Eight days after he signed the Succession Act,
President T ruman signed the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495) into law. T his legislation established the
Department of Defense, headed by the Secretary of Defense, who was designated to replace the Secretary of War in the
line of succession. T he act also removed the office of Secretary of the Navy from the line of succession. At that time,
the order of succession included the Secretaries of State, the T reasury, and Defense; the Attorney General; the
Postmaster General; and the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. In the years that followed,
the Secretaries of Health Education, and Welfare (HEW, established in 1953) and Housing and Urban Developmen t
(HUD, established in 1965) were added, both in 1965. T he HEW Secretary was added to the order of succession 12
years after the department had been established in 1953. T he next change was the Secretary of T ransportation, added in
1966. T he Postmaster General was removed by the Postal Reorganization Act (84 Stat. 719) in 1970, when that
department was reorganized. T he Secretary of Energy was added in 1977. In 1979, some HEW functions and
organizational units were reassigned to the newly created Department of Education (DOE),while others were retained
in the successor department, renamed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). T he Secretary of HHS
retained the position formerly occupied by HEW in the line of succession, while the Secretary of Educ ation was added
following the Secretary of Energy. T he Secretary of Veterans Affairs (VA) was added in 1988 (102 Stat. 2643) and,
most recently, the Secretary of Homeland Security was included in 2006 (116 Stat. 2135).
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Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135) established the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in November 2002. Free-standing legislation to remedy this omission
was introduced in the 108th (2003-2004) and 109th (2005-2006) Congresses, but no action was
taken on these bil s. Instead, the 109th Congress updated the order of succession when it
incorporated the office of Secretary of Homeland Security into the line of succession as a
provision of Title V of the USA PATRIOT Authorization and Improvement Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-
177, 120 Stat. 192).
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Current Procedures
The 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy helped set in motion events that culminated
in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, a key element in current succession
procedures. Although Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded without incident after
Kennedy’s death, the vice presidency remained unfil ed for almost 14 months, through January
20, 1965. This was due to the fact that the Constitution did not provide for fil ing vacancies in the
“second office.” The situation caused widespread concern, as observers asserted that, in an era of
domestic and international turmoil and the threat of nuclear conflict, a vice presidential vacancy
for any length of time constituted a dangerous gap in the nation’s leadership.16 It was also noted
that, with the death of President Kennedy, President Johnson’s potential immediate successor,
House Speaker John W. McCormack, was 71 years old, and Senate President pro tempore Carl T.
Hayden, next in line under the Succession Act of 1947, was 86 years old.17 The 88th Congress
(1963-1964) began hearings on reform within two months of President Kennedy’s death, and the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, providing for the fil ing of vice presidential vacancies and addressing
presidential disability, was proposed by the 89th Congress (1965-1966) in 1965 and approved by
the requisite number of states in 1967.18
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is the cornerstone of contemporary succession procedures. Section
1 of the amendment formalized traditional practice, and set aside recurrent doubts expressed since
the accession of John Tyler, by declaring that, “the Vice President shall become President
[emphasis added]” if the President is removed from office, dies, or resigns. Section 2 empowered
the President to nominate a Vice President whenever that office is vacant. This nomination must
be approved by a simple majority of Members present and voting in both houses of Congress.
Sections 3 and 4 established procedures for instances of presidential disability.19
Any Vice President who succeeds to the presidency serves the remainder of the previous
incumbent’s term. Constitutional eligibility to serve additional terms is governed by the Twenty-
Second Amendment, which provides term limits for the presidency. Under that amendment, if the
Vice President succeeds after more than two full years of the term have expired, that is, if he or
she serves less than two years of a predecessor’s term, the Vice President is eligible to be elected
to two additional terms as President. If, however, the Vice President succeeds and serves more

16 Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 258-259.
17 Joel K. Goldstein, The Modern American Vice Presidency: The Transformation of a Political Institution (Princeton,
NJ, Princeton U. Press: 1982), pp. 228 -230.
18 Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath
and Co.: 1978), pp. 136-141.
19 For additional information on these sections, see CRS Report R45394, Presidential Disability Under the Twenty-
Fifth Am endm ent: Constitutional Provisions and Perspectives for Congress, by T homas H. Neale, Presidential
Disability Under the T wenty-Fifth Amendment: Constitutional Provisions and Perspectives for Congress, by T homas
H. Neale.
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than two full years of a predecessor’s term, the constitutional eligibility is limited to election to
one additional term.20
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has been invoked twice since its ratification. First, in
1973, Representative Gerald R. Ford was nominated and approved by Congress to succeed Vice
President Spiro T. Agnew, who had resigned. Second, in 1974, the former governor of New York,
Nelson A. Rockefel er, was nominated and approved by Congress to succeed Ford, who had
become President when President Richard M. Nixon resigned (see Table 2). Although the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment did not supplant the order of succession established by the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947, its provision for fil ing vice presidential vacancies renders recourse to
the Speaker, the President pro tempore, and the Cabinet less likely, except in the event of an
unprecedented national catastrophe.
Perspectives: Recurrent Succession-Related Issues
Certain questions concerning both the Constitution’s provisions governing presidential succession
and the various succession acts passed by Congress since 1792 remain “hardy perennials,”
questions discussed and disputed by constitutional scholars of succeeding generations.
Constitutional Issues: Who Is an Officer for the Purposes of
Succession?
The authority of Congress to provide for presidential succession beyond the Vice President is
explicitly stated in Article II, Section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, subsequently modified by
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, as noted earlier in this report.21 What the Constitution means by
the word “Officer,” however, has been a recurrent element in the succession debate over time.
The succession acts of both 1792 and 1947 assumed that the language was sufficiently broad as to
include officers of Congress—the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.22 Some observers assert, however, that these two congressional
officials are not officers in the sense intended by the Constitution, and that the 1792 act was, and
the 1947 act is, constitutional y questionable. Attorney Mil er Baker explained this hypothesis in
his testimony before hearings held jointly by the Senate Committees on the Judiciary and on
Rules and Administration in 2003:
The Constitution is emphatic that members of Congress are not “Officers of the United
States.” The Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6, clause 2 provides that “no
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House

20 For instance, Lyndon B. Johnson became President on the death of President John F. Kennedy, on November 22,
1963. He served the remaining 13 months and 28 days of Kennedy’s term after he became President, less than half the
term. He would, therefore, have been eligible under the amendment to be elected to two terms as President. Conversely,
Gerald R. Ford became President on the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon on August 9, 1974. He served two
years, five months, and 11 days of Nixon’s term, more than half the term. Ford, therefore, would h ave been eligible
under the amendment to be elected to only one term.
21 “T he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President
and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President. ”
22 T he 1792 act specified this order of succession; the 1947 act reversed the order, placing the Speaker of the House
first in line, followed by the President pro tempore.
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during his Continuance in Office.” In other words, members of Congress by constitutional
definition cannot be “Officers” of the United States.23
This point was raised in congressional debate about the Succession Acts of both 1792 and 1947.
In 1792, opinion appears to have been divided: James Madison (arguably the single most
formative influence on the Constitution, and a serving Representative when the 1792 act was
debated) held that officers of Congress were not eligible to succeed. Conversely, other
Representatives who had also served as delegates to the Constitutional Convention maintained
that officers of Congress were eligible to succeed.24 In addition, political issues also contributed
to the debate in 1792. Succession scholar John D. Feerick, writing in From Failing Hands: The
Story of Presidential Succession, noted that the Federalist-dominated Senate insisted on inclusion
of the President pro tempore and the Speaker in the line of succession, and excluded the Secretary
of State. This, Feerick suggests, was a political maneuver intended to forestal the possibility that
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, leader of the Anti-Federalist opposition faction, might
succeed to the presidency.25
Questions as to the constitutional legitimacy of the Speaker and the President pro tempore as
potential successors to the President and Vice President recurred during debate on the 1947
succession act. At that time, Feerick notes, the longtime acceptance of the 1792 act, which had
been passed by the Second Congress, some of whose Members had first-hand knowledge of the
original debate on this question, was buttressed as an argument by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Lamar v. United States.26
Professor Howard Wasserman, of the Florida International University School of Law, introduced
another argument in support of the Speaker’s and President pro tempore’s inclusion in the order
of succession in his testimony before the 2003 joint hearing held by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the Committee on Rules and Administration:
The Succession Clause [of the Constitution] provides that “Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and the
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President and such Officer shal act
accordingly.”... This provision refers to “officers,” unmodified by reference to any
department or branch. Elsewhere, the Constitution refers to “Officers of the United States”
or “Officers under the United States” or “civil officers” in contexts that limit the meaning
of those terms only to executive branch officers, such as cabinet secretaries.
The issue is whether the unmodified “officer” of the Succession Clause has a broader
meaning. On one hand, it may be synonymous with the modified uses of the word
elsewhere, all referring solely to executive branch officials, in which case the Speaker and
the President Pro Tem cannot constitutionally remain in the line of succession. On the other
hand, the absence of a modifier in the Succession Clause may not have been inadvertent.
The unmodified term may be broader and more comprehensive, covering not only
executive-branch officers, but everyone holding a position under the Constitution who

23 T estimony of W. Miller Baker, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and Administration,
Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p.8; at
https://www.judiciary.senat e.gov/imo/media/doc/baker_testimony_09_16_03.pdf. Baker’s testimony cites additional
supporting arguments for his assertion at considerable length.
24 Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 59.
25 Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 60-61.
26 241 U.S. 103 (1916). According to Feerick, “the Supreme Court held that a member of the House of Representatives
was an officer of the government within the meaning of a penal statute making it a crime for one to impersonate an
officer of the government.” Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 206.
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might be labeled an officer. This includes the Speaker and President Pro Tem, which are
identified in Article I as officers of the House and Senate, respectively.27
Given the diversity of opinion on this question, and the continuing relevance of historical practice
and debate, the issue of constitutional legitimacy would arguably remain an issue for
consideration in any congressional effort to amend or replace the Succession Act of 1947.
Political and Administrative Issues
A second category of succession issues includes political questions and administrative concerns.
The latter have become increasingly urgent following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Democratic Principle and Party Continuity
These interrelated issues collectively comprise what could be described as the political aspect of
presidential succession. The first, democratic principle, was a major factor contributing to the
passage of the 1947 succession act. Simply stated, it is the assertion that popularly elected
officials should be first in the line of succession, rather than appointed Cabinet members, as was
the case under the 1886 act. According to Feerick, the 1886 act’s provisions had been questioned
for decades; they aroused criticism not long after Vice President Harry Truman became President
on the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt and may have influenced Truman’s thinking on
succession.28 Truman responded less than two months after he took office on April 12, 1945,
when he proposed to Congress revisions to succession procedures that, when amended, eventualy
were enacted as the Succession Act of 1947. The President explained his reasoning in his special
message to Congress on the subject of succession to the presidency:
by reason of the tragic death of the late President, it now lies within my power to nominate
the person who would be my immediate successor in the event of my own death or inability
to act. I do not believe that in a democracy this power should rest with the Chief Executive.
In so far as possible, the office of the President should be filled by an elective officer. There
is no officer in our system of government, besides the President and Vice President, who
has been elected by all the voters of the country. The Speaker of the House of
Representatives, who is elected in his own district, is also elected to be the presiding officer
of the House by a vote of all the Representatives of all the people of the country. As a
result, I believe that the Speaker is the official in the Federal Government, whose selection
next to that of the President and Vice President, can be most accurately said to stem from
the people themselves.29
Conversely, critics of this reasoning have asserted that the Speaker, while chosen for that office
by a majority of the House of Representatives, was elected as a Representative only by the voters
in the Speaker’s congressional district. With respect to the President pro tempore, the argument
suggests that, while elected by home-state voters, the President pro tempore customarily serves in
that office by virtue of being the Senator of the majority party with the longest tenure.30

27 T estimony of Howard M. Wasserman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p. 7, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wasserman_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
28 Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 204-205.
29 U.S. President, T ruman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States [:] Harry S Truman, 1945 (Washington:
GPO, 1961), p. 129.
30 T he President pro tempore is elected by the whole Senate, but this office is customarily filled only by the Senator of
the majority party who has served longest; thus, the act of election is arguably a formality.
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In addition to the case for succession by elected officials urged by President Truman, some
observers assign an equal importance to political party continuity, as expressed by the voters in
the previous election. The argument here is that a person acting as President under the provisions
of the Succession Act should be of the same political party as the previous incumbent. The
assertion is that an acting President of the same party as the prior incumbent would be necessary
to assure continuity of the political affiliation, and, presumably, the policies, of the candidate
chosen by the voters in the last election. According to this reasoning, succession by a Speaker or
President pro tempore of a different party could lead to a reversal of the people’s mandate that
they assert would be inherently undemocratic. Moreover, they note, this possibility is not remote:
the nation has experienced “divided government,” that is, control of the presidency by one party
and either or both houses of Congress by another, for 42 of the 73 intervening years between the
passage of the Succession Act of 1947 and the opening of the 116th Congress in 2019. As Yale
University Professor Akhil Amar noted in his testimony at the 2003 joint Senate committee
hearing, “[the current succession provisions] can upend the results of a Presidential election. If
Americans elect party A to the White House, why should we end up with party B?”31 At the same
hearing, another witness argued that, “[t]his connection to the President ... provides a national
base of legitimacy to a cabinet officer pressed to act as President. The link between cabinet
officers and the President preserves some measure of the last presidential election, the most
recent popular democratic statement on the direction of the executive branch.”32
The President’s Duties as Chief Executive
Some observers also question the potential effect on the conduct of the presidency if the Speaker
or President pro tempore were to succeed. Would these persons, whose duties and experience are
essential y legislative, be sufficiently prepared to assume and successfully discharge the duties of
chief executive? Moreover, it has been noted that these offices have often been held by persons in
late middle age, or even old age, whose health and energy levels might arguably be limited.33 As
Mil er Baker noted in his testimony before the 2003 joint committee hearings,
history shows that senior cabinet officers such as the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense are generally more likely to be better suited to the exercise of presidential duties
than legislative officers. The President pro tempore, traditionally the senior member of the
party in control of the Senate, may be particularly ill-suited to the exercise of presidential
duties due to reasons of health and age.34
To the contrary, it could be argued that the Speaker has extensive executive duties, both as
presiding officer in the House of Representatives and leader of its majority party, and as de facto
head of the committees, staff, and physical instal ations that comprise the “corporate” structure of
the House. It could also be noted that the speakership has often been held by men of widely

31 T estimony of Akhil Amar, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and Administration,
Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p. 2, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/amar_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
32 T estimony of Howard M. Wasserman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p. 4, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wasserman_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
33 Most often cited is the example of Speaker John McCormick and President pro tempore Carl Hayden, who were first
and second in line of presidential succession for 14 months following the assassination of President John Kennedy in
1963. Rep. McCormick was 71 at the time of the assassination, and Sen. Hayden was 86, and visibly frail.
34 T estimony of W. Miller Baker, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and Administration,
Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p.11, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/baker_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
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recognized judgment and ability, for example, Speakers Sam Rayburn, Nicholas Longworth,
Joseph Cannon, and Thomas Reed.
“Bumping” or Supplantation
This question centers on the 1947 Succession Act provision that officers who serve as President
under the act do so only until the disability or failure to qualify of any officer higher in the order
of succession is removed. If the disability is removed, the higher-ranking officer replaces
(supplants or bumps) the person acting as President who was lower in the order of succession. For
instance, supplantation could take place under any one of several scenarios.
Death of the President, Vice President, Speaker, and President pro tempore
In this scenario, the senior Cabinet Secretary is acting as President. The House elects a new
Speaker, who, upon meeting the requirements (i.e., resigning as a House Member and as
Speaker), then “bumps” the Cabinet Secretary, and assumes the office of Acting President. If the
President pro tempore were serving as Acting President, he or she could be similarly bumped by a
newly elected Speaker. Al the persons involved would lose their previous positions under this
scenario: the Speaker, by having resigned as Speaker and Representative in Congress; the
President pro tempore, by virtue of having resigned as Senator and officer of Congress in order to
become Acting President;35 or the senior Cabinet Secretary, by virtue of the fact that, under the
act, “[t]he taking of the oath of office ... [by a cabinet secretary] shal be held to constitute his
resignation from the office by virtue of the holding of which he qualifies to act as President.”36
Disability and Recovery of the President and Vice President
Another case might be an occasion in which the President and Vice President were disabled, and
either the Speaker, the President pro tempore, or a Cabinet officer was acting as President. If
either the President or Vice President recovered from the disability, they would supplant
whichever of these officers was acting as President. The officer previously acting as President
would not, however, recover their prior position, having been required to resign from Congress to
serve as Acting President, in the case of the Speaker and President pro tempore, or because, in the
case of a Cabinet officer, their assumption of the duties of acting President, as noted above,
constitutes resignation of their Cabinet position.37
The Speaker or President pro tempore Fail to Qualify Due to Declination
If the President and Vice President were disabled, or the offices were vacant, but the Speaker and
the President pro tempore declined to resign as Members or from their leadership positions, the
acting presidency would pass to the senior Cabinet officer. If, at some point, however, either the
Speaker or the President pro tempore were to reconsider, he or she could resign and supplant the
serving Cabinet Secretary. The same scenario could occur if the President pro tempore were to
resign to serve as acting President and were later supplanted by the Speaker who reconsidered his
or her original declination.

35 3 U.S.C. §19(b).
36 3 U.S.C. §19(d)(3).
37 3 U.S.C. §19(d)(3).
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Critics assert that such scenarios, which are possible due to the current succession act’s
supplantation provisions, could lead to instability in the presidency during a time of national
crisis. As one observer noted:
Imagine a catastrophic attack kills the president, vice-president and congressional
leadership. The secretary of state assumes the duties of the presidency. But whenever
Congress elects a new Speaker or president pro tem[pore], that new leader may “bump”
the secretary of state. The result would be three presidents within a short span of time.38
Moreover, as noted previously, any person who becomes acting President must resign their
previous position. In the case of the Speaker and President pro tempore, or in the case of a
Cabinet officer, his or her appointment would be vacated by the act of oath taking. It is arguable
that public officials might hesitate to serve as Acting President under these circumstances, if
doing so requires them to forfeit the office they hold and potential y ends their public service
career, particularly if there is the prospect of their own supplantation by a higher-ranking officer.
Critics of succession by the Speaker and President pro tempore could offer the issue of bumping
or supplantation as an additional argument for removing those officials from the line of
succession.39
Another suggested remedy to bumping might be to amend the Succession Act of 1947 to
eliminate the right of “prior entitled” individuals to supplant an acting President who is acting due
to a vacancy, rather than disabilities in the offices of President and Vice President. For instance,
under these circumstances, if a Cabinet officer was acting as President because of vacancy,
disability, or declination (refusal to serve) of the Speaker or President pro tempore, the Cabinet
officer would not be supplanted should the disability be removed or should either the speakership
or presidency pro tempore be fil ed. The intent here would arguably be to prevent a succession of
multiple acting Presidents under these circumstances.
Related proposals have suggested amending the succession law to permit Cabinet officers to take
a leave of absence from their departments while serving as acting President in cases of
presidential and vice presidential disability. They could thus return to their prior duties on
recovery of either the President and/or the Vice President, while at the same time, there would be
no need to nominate and confirm a replacement.
The Continuity of Government Commission also questioned bumping on constitutional grounds
in its 2009 report on presidential succession. Referring to the original language, found in Article
II, Section 1, clause 4 of the Constitution, the report stated that
the Constitution allows Congress to write a succession act “declaring what Officer shal
then act as president, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disabilit y be
removed, or a President shall be elected.” Under the key constitutional provision, once
selected to act as president, the officer will continue to act until the President’s disability
is removed, or, in the case of death or continuing disability, until a presidential election
(either the next general election or a special election for president). The Constitution on its

38 T estimony of Howard M. Wasserman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p. 8, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wasserman_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
39 For instance, the Continuity of Government Commission’s 2009 report on continuity in the presidency questioned
whether bumping might lead to instability and confusion “t hat would arise if the presidency were transferred to several
different individuals in a short period of time.” Continuity of Government Commission, Preserving Our Institutions,
Presidential Succession (Washington: Continuity of Government Commission, 2009 ), pp. 33-34.
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face seems to stipulate that once a person is deemed to be acting president by the
Presidential Succession Act, he or she cannot be replaced by a different person.40
Succession During Presidential Campaigns and Transitions
The related issue of succession during presidential campaigns and during the transition period
between elections and the inauguration was the subject of renewed interest following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.
Between Nomination and Election Day
The Democratic and Republican parties have traditional y authorized their national committees to
fil vacancies in the presidential and vice presidential tickets after their national conventions.41
If an incumbent President or Vice President who has been nominated for a second term leaves
office any time between the party national conventions and inauguration day, then the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment would apply with respect to their office. With respect to their candidacy, the
party rules would apply, at least in principle. No President or Vice President nominated for
reelection has ever left their party’s ticket since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment took effect in
1967.42
With respect to candidates who are not incumbent in the presidency or vice presidency, here
again, the party national committees are authorized to nominate a replacement, but this event has
occurred only once in modern times for a vice presidential candidate, and never for a presidential
candidate. In 1972, the Democratic Party vice presidential nominee, Senator Thomas Eagleton,
resigned from the ticket in July, after the national convention. The Democratic National
Committee was authorized by the party’s charter to nominate a successor, and Senator George
McGovern, the presidential nominee, proposed Ambassador R. Sargent Shriver as his
replacement, exercising the nominee’s traditional prerogative of choosing a running mate. The
committee met on August 8 of that year to approve Shriver as the new vice presidential candidate.
A key question is whether a vice presidential nominee would be chosen by their party’s national
committee to replace the head of the ticket if such a vacancy occurred. Although the vice
presidential nominee could arguably make a strong case to the national committee that he or she
should be elevated to the first position, neither party provides for mandated succession by the vice
presidential candidate.43

40 Continuity of Government Commission, Preserving Our Institutions, Presidential Succession (Washington:
Continuity of Government Commission, 2009), p. 33.
41 For the Republican Party, see Rules of the Republican Party, amended July 20, 2018, “Rule No. 9 Filling Vacancies
in Nominations,” at https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/2016-Republican-Rules-
Reformatted2018_1533138132.pdf. For the Democratic Party, see Charter and the Bylaws of the Dem ocratic Party of
the United States, 2018, “ Article 3, Democratic National Committee, Section 1(c),” at https://democrats.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/DNC-Charter-Bylaws-8.25.18-with-Amendments.pdf.
42 Vice President James S. Sherman, running mate of President William Howard T aft, died on October 30, 1912, less
than a week before the election. T he Republican National Committee appointed a replacement candidate who received
his electoral votes. Since T aft was defeated for reelection, Sherman’s replacement proved to be uncontroversial.
43 For further information, see CRS Report R44648, Presidential Elections: Vacancies in Major-Party Candidacies and
the Position of President-Elect, by T homas H. Neale, Presidential Elections: Vacancies in Major Party Candidacies and
the Position of President -Elect, by T homas H. Neale.
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Between the Election and the Meetings of Electors
The second contingency would occur in the event of a vacancy after the election, but before the
electors meet to cast their votes in December. This possibility has been the subject of speculation
and debate. Some commentators suggest that the political parties, applying their internal
procedures for fil ing presidential and vice presidential vacancies, would designate a substitute
nominee to receive the votes of the departed candidate’s electors. Here again, the vice presidential
candidate would be an obvious potential choice, but the national committee might select a
different candidate. If the vice presidential nominee were to leave the ticket for any reason, the
committee could rely on precedent and defer to the presidential nominee, as occurred in 1972.
Alternatively, the committee might propose its own choice as successor nominee. The electors,
selected for their loyalty to the party, would be expected to vote for the substitute nominee. Given
the unprecedented nature of such a situation, however, party discipline among the members of the
electoral college might also break down, particularly in the event of intraparty differences over
the choice of a successor candidate. This might lead to further disarray in an already fraught
situation.44 Another factor to be considered here is the amount of time between election day and
the electors’ meetings in the states: election day fal s 41 days before the day on which the electors
meet.45 If the vacancy occurs shortly after election day, the intervening period could provide time
to negotiate the succession; it might also provide the opportunity for the “cabal” and political
mischief that concerned the founders. Conversely, a vacancy on the ticket close to the electoral
college vote sessions could introduce an element of uncertainty to the process.
Between the Electoral College Vote and the Electoral Vote Count by Congress
A third contingency would occur if there were a vacancy in a presidential ticket during the period
between the time when the electoral votes are cast, Monday after the second Wednesday in
December,46 and when Congress counts and certifies the votes on January 6. The succession
process for this contingency focuses on when candidates who have received a majority of the
electoral votes actual y become President-elect and Vice President-elect. Some commentators
maintain that there is no President- or Vice President-elect until the electoral votes are counted
and the results declared by Congress on January 6. They maintain that this is a contingency
lacking clear constitutional or statutory direction.47 Others, however, assert that once a majority of
electoral votes has been cast for one ticket, then the recipients of these votes become the
President- and Vice President-elect, notwithstanding the fact that the votes are not counted and
certified by Congress until the following January 6.48 If so, then the succession procedures of the
Twentieth Amendment, noted earlier in this report, would apply as soon as the electoral votes

44 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Presidential Succession
Between the Popular Election and the Inauguration , hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 2, 1994 (Washington: GPO,
1995), pp. 12-13. Democratic presidential nominee Horace Greeley died on November 29, 1872, three weeks after the
election, and a week before the electors met. T he party issued no guidance, and most electors cast thei r votes for the
deceased nominee, but those votes were rejected by Congress at the electoral vote count session. (Hereinafter
“Presidential Succession Between the Popular Election and the Inauguration , hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 2,
1994.”)
45 Election day falls on T uesday after the first Monday in November; the electors meet on Monday following the
second Wednesday in December, 41 days later.
46 T he date on which electoral votes are cast can be as early as December 13, or as late as December 19.
47 Presidential Succession Between the Popular Election and the Inauguration , hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 2,
1994, pp. 39-40.
48 Presidential Succession Between the Popular Election and the Inauguration , hearing, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 2,
1994, p. 12.
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were cast. That is, if the President-elect dies, then the Vice President-elect becomes the President-
elect. This point of view receives strong support from the language of the House committee report
accompanying the Twentieth Amendment. Addressing the question of when there is a President-
elect, the report states:
It will be noted that the committee uses the term “President elect” in its generally accepted
sense, as meaning the person who has received the majority of electoral votes, or the person
who has been chosen by the House of Representatives in the event that the election is
thrown into the House. It is immaterial whether or not the votes have been counted, for the
person becomes the President elect as soon as the votes are cast.49
Between Electoral Vote Count and Inauguration
As noted previously, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment covers succession if the President-
elect dies, providing that the Vice President-elect “shal become President” under these
circumstances.50 Further, a Vice President-elect succeeding under these circumstances and
subsequently inaugurated President would nominate a Vice President under provisions in Section
2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
A concern expressed about this period since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, centers
on the order of succession under the Succession Act of 1947. What might happen in the event of a
mass terrorist attack during or shortly after the presidential inaugural ceremony at which a newly
elected President and Vice President are instal ed? While there would be a President, Vice
President, Speaker, and President pro tempore during this period, who would step forward in the
event an attack removed these officials? This question takes on additional importance because the
Cabinet, an important element in the order of succession, is general y in a state of transition at
this time. The previous Administration’s officers have general y resigned, while the incoming
Administration’s designees are usual y stil in the process of being confirmed. In 2017, for
instance, no Cabinet member in the line of succession was in office from the time President
Donald Trump was inaugurated at approximately noon, January 20, until Defense Secretary
James Mattis was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in late in the day. A worst-case scenario
might envision a situation in which not a single Cabinet officer wil have been confirmed by the
Senate and duly instal ed in office, thus raising the prospect of a de facto decapitation of the
executive branch. This concern and others were addressed by various legislative proposals
introduced in the 108th through 111th Congresses.51
Succession Issues Since 9/11
The events of September 11, 2001, and the prospect of a “decapitation” of the U.S. government
by an act of mass terrorism led to a reexamination of many previously long-settled elements of
presidential succession and continuity of government on the federal level. A number of proposals
to revise the Succession Act of 1947 were introduced in the 108th through 111th Congresses.
Perhaps the most basic (and urgent) response was inclusion of the Secretary of the Department of

49 U.S. Congress, House, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, report to accompany
S.J.Res. 14, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., Rept. 345 (Washington, GPO: 1932), p. 6.
50 Whether this provision would also cover disability or resignation of a President-elect is a question that arguably
merits further study.
51 For additional information on succession provisions governing the period during presidential elections through
inauguration of a new President, please consult CRS Report R44648, Presidential Elections: Vacancies in Major-Party
Candidacies and the Position of President-Elect, by T homas H. Neale, Presidential Elections: Vacancies in Major
Party Candidacies and the Position of President-elect, by T homas H. Neale.
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Homeland Security in the line of succession, whereas other proposals extended wel beyond this
action, offering both a range of comprehensive revisions of succession procedures and an
expanded line of succession.
Growing concern over succession issues in the wake of 9/11 was further reflected by
congressional hearings: a joint informational hearing held by the Senate Committees on Rules
and Administration and on the Judiciary on September 16, 2003, and the House Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution’s hearing on the succession issue held on October
6, 2004.52 On both occasions, witnesses offered a wide range of viewpoints and various
legislative and other options.
The question of continuity of government in the executive branch was also addressed by a
nongovernmental organization, the Continuity of Government Commission, sponsored by the
American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, nongovernmental public policy
research organizations based in Washington, DC. Between 2003 and 2011, the commission
conducted studies and published reports on continuity in the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the United States government in the contemporary context.53
Homeland Security Act of 2002: Establishing the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) by Law
Arguably the most pressing chal enge facing Congress following the attacks of September 11,
2001, was the realignment of federal agencies and functions to enhance prevention of, and better
coordinate the U.S. response to, terrorist attacks on the United States, and on U.S. interests
abroad. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the office of
Secretary of Homeland Security in 2002 marked a major legislative response to the terrorist
attacks.54 The Secretaries of newly established executive departments are customarily
incorporated in the line of presidential succession, an action that is sometimes accomplished by
an appropriate provision in the legislation authorizing the new department,55 but in other
instances, a Secretary’s inclusion has been omitted from the authorizing act, and was
accomplished at a later time by “perfecting” legislation. This was the situation with the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, which established the DHS and the office of Secretary of Homeland
Security (DHS Secretary) in the 107th Congress.56 The act did not, however, contain language
including the Secretary of the new department in the line of presidential succession.
Following enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, a range of related bil s were
introduced in succeeding Congresses that proposed incorporation of the DHS Secretary in the line
of succession. Some sought only to revise presidential succession to include the Secretary, while
others included proposals to effect additional changes in succession policy. Both are examined
later in this report. Examples include S. 442, offered by Senator Mike DeWine and H.R. 1455,

52 See joint Senate committees hearing record at https://fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/cog.pdf; and House committee
hearing at https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=
twentyfifth_amendment_congressional_materials.
53 For additional information on the AEI/Brookings Continuity of Government Commission publications, see
https://www.aei.org/profile/continuity-of-government-commission/.
54 T he department was established by law in 2002 and began operations in 2003; the first Secretary of Homeland
Security, Governor T om Ridge of Pennsylvania, was confirmed by the Senate and took office in 2003.
55 See 3 U.S.C. §19 “Amendments” for examples.
56 Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Congress, P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
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offered by Representative Tom Davis. These bil s, both introduced in the 109th Congress, would
have incorporated the Secretary of Homeland Security in the line of succession directly following
the Attorney General.
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act: Secretary of
Homeland Security Incorporated in the Line of Succession
At the same time proposals like those cited above were introduced, the House and Senate in the
109th Congress were also moving toward enactment of comprehensive legislation to revise and
reauthorize the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.57 The vehicle for legislation was H.R. 3199
(Representative James Sensenbrenner), which the House passed on July 21, 2005, and the Senate
on July 29. The two chambers voted on different versions of the bil , so a conference committee
was convened to arrive at a final version. Neither the House nor the Senate version passed in July
included any provisions relating to presidential succession, but language inserting the DHS
Secretary was included as Title V, Section 503, in the report filed by the conferees on December
8. The House agreed to the report on December 14, while the Senate took longer to concur,
agreeing to the report on March 2, 2006. President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act into law on March 9.58
Section 503 reads as follows, “Section 19(d)(1) of Title 3, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ‘Secretary of Homeland Security’ after ‘Secretary of Veterans Affairs.’”59 The record
does not include information about the decision to include the DHS Secretary, but it should be
noted that the conference report honored tradition by including the Secretary at the end of the line
of succession, rather than after the Attorney General, as was proposed in both S. 442 and H.R.
1455. The report’s joint explanatory text is similarly economical: “section 503 of the Conference
Report is a new section and fil s a gap in the Presidential line of succession by including the
Secretary of Homeland Security.”60
Revising Succession Procedures: Legislative Proposals
To date, action by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act to include the DHS
Secretary in the line of succession after the Secretary of Veterans Affairs is the only succession-
related legislation enacted since 9/11. For nearly a decade, however, bil s that embodied revisions
to existing succession law were introduced in the 107th through 111th Congresses (2001-2010). In
scope, they ranged from adding the Secretary of Homeland Security to the order of succession, as
was done by the act noted above, to changing the order in which Cabinet Secretaries would
succeed to the presidency, and to comprehensive revisions of the Succession Act of 1947 that
sought to anticipate some of the chal enges to presidential succession and continuity in the
executive branch that emerged following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The various revision
proposals that appeared in succession-related bil s introduced during that period are identified and
analyzed in this section.

57 USA PAT RIOT Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Congress, P.L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
58 USA PAT RIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 109 th Congress, P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192.
59 USA PAT RIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Sec. 503, 109th Congress, P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat.
247.
60 U.S. Congress, Conference Committees, 2005, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
conference report to accompany H.R. 3199, H.Rept. 109-333, 109th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 2006), p. 109.
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Include the DHS Secretary in the Line of Succession Following the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs
As noted previously, Congress incorporated the DHS Secretary in the line of succession in the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. The Secretary was placed as 18th
in line, directly following the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the next most junior department by
date of creation.61 With this action, Congress followed established precedent dating to the
Succession Act of 1886,62 in which the positions of the various Cabinet Secretaries were ranked
for purposes of inclusion in the line of presidential succession according to the seniority of their
departments. The executive departments were included in the order of succession as they existed
when the Succession Act of 1947 became law.63As codified, the act lists as amendments the
various departments added to or removed from the order since 1947.64
Include the DHS Secretary in the Line of Succession Following the Attorney
General
Bil s were introduced to incorporate the Secretary of DHS in the line of succession beginning in
the 107th Congress. Several of these bil s proposed adding the DHS Secretary to the existing order
of succession, but would not otherwise have provided major changes in the Succession Act of
1947. In the 108th Congress, H.R. 1354 and S. 148, and in the 109th Congress, S. 442 and H.R.
1455, contained no provision other than incorporating the DHS Secretary in the line of
succession.
These bil s departed from tradition, however, by proposing to place the in the line of succession
directly following the Attorney General. In this position, the Secretary would have been 8th in line
to succeed the President, rather than 18th, last in line, following the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
Had it passed, this realignment would have had historical significance, as the four offices that
would immediately precede the Secretary of Homeland Security constitute the original Cabinet,
as established between 1789 and 1792 during the presidency of George Washington—the
Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, and the Attorney General. They are sometimes
referred to as the “big four.”65

61 102 Stat. 2643. T he Secretary of Veterans Affairs was included in the line of presidential succession under Section
13a, “Conforming Amendments,” of T he Department of Veterans Affairs Act, 102 Stat. 2635, P.L. 100-527. It should
be noted that all Cabinet officers must meet constitutional and statutory requirements in order to act as President.
62 24 Stat.1. T he 1886 act listed the Secretaries of State, the T reasury, and War; the Attorney General; the Postmaster
General; and the Secretaries of the Navy and the Interior.
63 61 Stat. 380, 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(1). Shortly after the Succession Act was signed, President T ruman signed the National
Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, into law. T he National Security Act established the Department of Defense, headed
by the Secretary of Defense, who was designated to replace the Secretary of War in the line of succession. T he office of
Secretary of the Navy was removed from the line of succession by the same act.
64 As noted above, the Secretaries of seven departments have been added to the line of succession since 1947: Health,
Education, and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; T ransportation; Energy; Education; Veterans Affairs; and
Homeland Security. One position, that of the Postmaster General, was removed by the Postal Reorganization Act (84
Stat. 719). With the establishment of the Department of Education in 1979, the name of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) was changed to Health and Human Services (HHS). T he Secretary of HHS retained the
predecessor agency’s place in the order of succession, while the Secretary of Education was added at the end of the
order (93 Stat. 692).
65 T he Secretary of Defense supplanted the Secretary of War when the Department of Defense was established in 1947.
Attorneys General served in the Cabinet beginning in 1792, although the Department of Justice was not established
until 1870.
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This departure from tradition derived from heightened concern over the question of continuity of
government.66 It was argued that the proposed placement of the DHS Secretary would have at
least two advantages: first, the Department of Homeland Security, from the time of its
establishment, immediately became one of the largest of the executive departments, with many
responsibilities directly affecting the security and preparedness of the nation. Both its size and its
crucial role were cited as arguments for placing the head of DHS high in the order of succession.
It was argued that the Secretary would be expected to possess the relevant knowledge and
expertise that arguably justified placing this official ahead of 10 heads of more senior
departments, particularly in the event an unprecedented disaster were to befal the leadership of
the executive branch.67
In the 108th Congress, S. 148 was passed by the Senate without amendment by unanimous
consent on June 27, 2003, but was not considered in the House.68 No action was taken on H.R.
1354 beyond committee referral. In the 109th Congress, S. 442 was passed by the Senate by
unanimous consent without amendment on July 26, 2005; it was not considered in the House.69
H.R. 1455 was ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee; no further action was
taken.
Authorize the President to Designate Congressional Successors to Ensure Party
Continuity
Several bil s introduced following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 addressed the long-standing
question of party continuity in the presidency. As noted earlier, concern was occasional y
expressed that the Succession Act of 1947, under conditions of divided government, contemplated
succession of a President and Vice President of one party by a House Speaker or President pro
tempore who was a member of the opposite party. In an era when “divided government” has more
often been the norm than unified party control of the presidency and both houses of Congress,
this possibility might be considered a reversal of the mandate bestowed by the previous
presidential election.70 Legislation to remedy that eventuality proposed to authorize a newly
inaugurated President to designate either the holder of the office of Speaker of the House of
Representatives or the House Minority Leader and the holder of the office of Majority Leader or
Minority Leader of the Senate for the purpose of succession under Section 19, title 3 of the act.
Under this procedure, the President would have the option of designating officials of the same
political party as successors, notwithstanding differences in partisan control of the presidency and
Congress.71

66 T estimony of Dr. John C. Fortier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Governm ent: The Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st
sess., September 16, 2003, at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fortier_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
67 Richard Albert, “T he Constitutional Politics of Presidential Succession,” Hofstra Law Review, vol. 39, no. 3, spring
2011, pp. 517-518.
68 Congressional Record, House, 108th Congress, 1st session, vol. 149, no 97, daily ed., June 27, 2003, p. S8846.
69 Congressional Record, House, 109th Congress, 1st session, vol. 151, no 103, daily ed., June 6, 2005, p. S9057.
70 For instance, between 1981 and 2021, barring unforeseen circumstances, the House, Senate, and presidency will have
been controlled by the same party for 10 years and 5 months (1993 -1995, January-May of 2001, 2003-2007, 2009-
2011, and 2017-2019), whereas divided government will have prevailed for 29 years and 7 months (1981 -1993, 1995-
2001, May 2001-2003, 2007-2009, 2011-2017, and 2019-2021).
71 See, for instance, H.R. 3816, 107th Congress, “Presidential Succession Act of 2002,” §2.
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Expand the Line of Succession
Several bil s introduced in the years following the attacks of 9/11 proposed that the order of
presidential succession be expanded by the addition of United States Ambassadors. In the 109th
Congress (2005-2006), H.R. 1943, introduced by Representative Brad Sherman, and S. 920,
introduced by Senator John Cornyn, would have incorporated the offices of the following U.S.
Ambassadors to the existing line of succession:72
 the United Nations;
 the United Kingdom (Great Britain);
 Russia;
 China; and
 France.
The intent of these bil s was to add high-ranking federal officers to the succession list who are
normal y not physical y present in Washington, DC, at any given time, thus assuring there would
be an experienced public official available to serve as President in the event of a worst-case
scenario, the mass “decapitation” of the U.S. government’s political leadership by a successful
attack on the capital.
Eliminate Bumping/Supplantation Provision in U.S. Code (3 U.S.C. 19)
Another proposal, included in 109th Congress bil s H.R. 1943 and S. 920, would have revised
procedures governing succession by Cabinet officers. These bil s proposed no change to existing
provisions of Section 19 governing succession by the Speaker of the House of Representatives or
the President pro tempore of the Senate. Both, however, provided that if a Cabinet officer became
“Acting President,” then he or she would continue to serve the balance of the presidential term of
office, unless their tenure in that position was due to temporary disability of the incumbent. In
that case, the President or Vice President would resume office once the disability was removed,
but otherwise, the Cabinet officer would continue as Acting President until the next President was
elected. This provision would have eliminated supplantation or “bumping” of Cabinet officers
serving as Acting President, thus reducing the potential for executive instability or “revolving
door” Presidents, as discussed earlier in this report.73
Eliminate Automatic Resignation by Cabinet Officers Serving as Acting
President Provision in U.S. Code (3 U.S.C. 19)
Another change to the Succession Act included in post-9/11 succession proposals was elimination
of the provision that service by a Cabinet officer as Acting President constitutes an automatic
resignation from his or her office.74 This change would have had the effect of al owing a Cabinet
officer to take a de facto leave of absence to serve as Acting President, particularly if the
succession were connected with a disability on the part of either the President or the Vice
President.
This provision addressed several issues cited earlier in this report that have been noted by critics
of the Succession Act of 1947. First, by eliminating the displacement of a Cabinet officer acting

72 See also H.R. 5390, 108th Congress, H.R. 540, 110th Congress, and H.R. 6557, 111th Congress.
73 See also H.R. 2319, 108th Congress, §2(d).
74 See, for instance, H.R. 1943, 109th Congress, “Presidential Succession Act of 2005,” Sec. 2, and H.R. 2319, 108th
Congress, §3.
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as President, except in cases of presidential or vice presidential disability, it would have removed
a potential source of instability: once instal ed as acting President, the Cabinet officer would
remain in this position for the balance of the presidential term, unless, as noted above, the officer
were acting due to the temporary disability of the President or Vice President. Further, under
these circumstances, this provision would likely have reduced the possibility of a President and
Vice President being succeeded by an Acting President of a different party, which has proved to
be an issue of continuing concern since passage of the Succession Act of 1947.75 Final y, Cabinet
officers acting as President under this provision would have the option of returning to their
original position in the event the President or Vice President recovered from a disability.
Replace Members of Congress in the Line of Succession by Cabinet Members
Another legislative approach involved a repeal of the central succession provision of the 1947 act
by removing the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate from the order of presidential succession. The bil , S. 2073, introduced by Senator John
Cornyn in the 108th Congress, would have amended the line of succession to include duly
confirmed and instal ed Cabinet members who were not under impeachment, and who met
constitutional requirements for the presidency, in the order in which their departments were
created.76 In so doing, this bil would have restored presidential succession to the status quo under
the 1886 act. Proponents could argue that it would general y remove two issues identified earlier
in this report from the debate on presidential succession. It would ensure that a presidential
successor would almost certainly be of the same political party as the prior incumbent, and it
would resolve the long-standing question of whether the Speaker and the President pro tempore
were “officers” eligible to succeed to the presidency under the Constitution.77
“Sense of Congress” Provisions Relating to Succession During Election
Campaigns
Several provisions included in proposed post-9/11 succession-related bills declared the sense of
Congress concerning electoral college procedures in the event a presidential or vice presidential
nominee should die or be permanently incapacitated.78
Among various elements, they included advice to the presidential and vice presidential nominees
of political parties to designate substitute candidates who would receive the electoral votes
otherwise cast for them if they were to die or be permanently incapacitated. They also advised
electors pledged to vote for a presidential nominee to cast their electoral votes for the vice
presidential nominee if the presidential nominee had died or was permanently incapacitated.
Further, they proposed to express the sense of Congress that if the vice presidential nominee
suffered the same circumstances, then the electors were advised to vote for the substitute vice
presidential nominee. If both candidates died or were permanently incapacitated, then the electors

75 T his assumption is grounded in the tradition that Presidents almost always choose members or supporters of their
own political party for Cabinet positions. T here have been exceptions to this practice; for instance, Secretary of
T ransportation Norman Mineta served as a Democratic Representative in the 94 th through 104th Congresses (1975-
1996), and as Secretary of T ransportation in the George W. Bush Administration (2001-2006).
76 S. 2073 would also have included the Secretary of DHS in the line of succession immediately following the Attorney
General. It also provided that the person acting as President would continue to do so for the balance of the term, unless
their tenure was based on the recovery from a disability of the President and/or Vice President.
77 A variation of this proposal was advanced by the American Enterprise Institute’s Continuity of Government
Commission, which proposed that state governors also be included in the line of succession. See later in this report
under “Non-Congressional Succession Initiatives Since 9/11.”
78 See, for instance, H.R. 6557, 111th Congress, “Presidential Succession Act of 2010,” §3.
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were advised to vote for substitute nominees for both President and Vice President. These
proposals general y included advice to the political parties to establish rules and procedures
consistent with these practices.
These proposals sought to eliminate uncertainties that might result from the death or permanent
incapacity of a presidential or vice presidential nominee at any time in the election process
between the nomination and the casting of electoral votes. These issues were discussed earlier in
this report under “Succession During Presidential Campaigns and Transitions.” Although the
political parties would not have been compel ed to accept such recommendations, the
recommendations might carry considerable weight as the expressed sense of Congress, and
therefore might have persuaded the national committees of the major parties to consider them
seriously or to adopt them. In this sense, these proposals arguably provided a template or “model
legislation” for the parties.
“Sense of Congress” Provisions Concerning Continuity in the Cabinet During
Presidential Transitions
Several provisions included in proposed post-9/11 succession-related bil s declared the sense of
Congress concerning Cabinet continuity during presidential transitions. Specifical y, it was
recommended that outgoing Presidents should submit nominations proposed by the President-
elect for Cabinet officers in the line of succession during the transition period. It was further
urged that the Senate conduct and finalize its confirmation proceedings for these nominations
between January 3, the date on which new Congresses convene, and January 20, when new
presidential terms begin. Final y, outgoing Presidents were urged to sign and deliver the
commissions for these officials before leaving office on January 20.79 The intention here was to
address the contingency identified earlier in this report: the period around the inauguration when
the outgoing Cabinet has resigned, but the newly nominated Cabinet officers have yet to be
approved, and are not yet eligible to succeed to the presidency.
Traditional y, Presidents-elect announce their Cabinet choices during the transition period that
normal y takes place between election day and January 20 of the following year, when the newly
elected President actual y assumes office. Also during this period, the outgoing President’s
Cabinet officers traditional y submit their resignations, general y effective on or before
inauguration day. Although investigations of and hearings on Cabinet nominees for an incoming
Administration are often under way before the changeover, official nominations by an incoming
President, and subsequent advice and consent by the Senate, cannot occur until after the new
President has assumed office, when the nominations are formal y submitted. Frequently, this
process continues for some weeks, or longer in the case of controversial or contested
nominations, so that the full Cabinet may not be sworn in until wel after the inauguration.
Proponents of “sense of Congress” provisions concerning Cabinet continuity viewed this gap,
particularly in the confirmation and swearing-in of Cabinet officers included in the line of
succession, as a threat to continuity in both the presidency and executive branch management.
One advantage conferred by this approach would have been that Cabinet Secretaries, unlike
elected officials, do not serve set terms of office which expire on a date certain. Further, the
process in some of the proposals offered in these measures could be implemented without
legislation or a constitutional amendment. If the level of interpersonal and bipartisan cooperation
envisaged in these bil s could be attained, an incoming President might assume office on January
20 with a full Cabinet, or at least key officers in the line of succession, already approved by the

79 See, for instance, H.R. 6557, 111th Congress, “Presidential Succession Act of 2010,” §4.
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Senate and sworn in to their positions, thus reducing the potential for disruption of the executive
branch by a terrorist attack.
In addition to the national security-related advantage this would confer, it arguably would provide
an impetus to streamlining the sometimes lengthy and contentious transition and appointments
process faced by al incoming Administrations. It would also, however, have faced substantial
obstacles, because its success would be dependent on high levels of good wil and cooperation
between incumbent Presidents and their successors, and between the political parties in the
Senate. Moreover, it would impose a sizeable volume of confirmation-related business on both
the lame duck and newly sworn Congresses during the 10 weeks following a presidential election.
During this period, the expiring Congress traditional y adjourns sine die, while the new Congress
general y performs only internal business and counts the electoral votes between its own
instal ation on January 3 and the presidential inauguration.
Cabinet continuity “sense of Congress” proposals were included in H.R. 1943 and S. 920 in the
109th Congress. Notably, Section 4 of H.R. 1943 included a preamble that cited the Presidential
Transition Act of 1963 (3 U.S.C. 102), the provisions of which were designed to prevent
disruption in the U.S. government’s functions during these periods; it also noted that the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) made specific
recommendations concerning continuity of government during the transition from an outgoing
presidential administration to an incoming one, particularly with respect to national security
officials.
H.R. 1943 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on April 27, 2005, while S. 920
was referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on the same day. No further
action was taken on either bil for the balance of the 109th Congress.
Noncongressional Succession Initiatives Since 9/11
Additional succession-related proposals were conceived and put forward by nongovernmental
entities in the decade following the terrorist attacks of 2001, but were not introduced as
legislation. They sought particularly to address post-9/11 concerns over the prospect of a
“decapitation” of the U.S. government by a terrorist attack or attacks, possibly involving the use
of weapons of mass destruction.
One proposal, suggested by John C. Fortier at joint Senate committee hearings held in September
2003, proposed that Congress establish a number of additional federal officers whose specific
duties and function would be to be ready to assume the acting presidency if necessary. 80 Fortier
envisioned that the President would appoint them, subject to Senate confirmation, and that
obvious candidates would be governors and former Presidents, Vice Presidents, Cabinet officers,
and Members of Congress—in other words, private citizens who had broad experience in
government. They were to receive regular briefings, and would also serve as advisors to the
President. A further crucial element was that they would be located outside the Washington, DC,
area, in order to be available in the event of a governmental “decapitation.” Fortier further
suggested that these officers should be included ahead of Cabinet officers “lower in the line of
succession.”81 Although he was not more specific in his testimony, it could be argued that these
officers might be inserted after the “big four”, that is, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and

80 Dr. Fortier was executive director of the Continuity of Government Commission at the American Enterprise Institute,
a nongovernmental study commission identified earlier in this report . Fortier suggest ed four or five officers.
81 T estimony of Dr. John C. Fortier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Governm ent: The Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st
sess., September 16, 2003, p. 7, at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fortier_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
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Defense, the Attorney General, and, possibly the Secretary of Homeland Security, should that
officer be included at that place, as was proposed in some then-pending legislation.
Mil er Baker offered other proposals during his testimony at the September 2003 hearings, al of
which would have required amending the Succession Act of 1947. Under one, the President
would be empowered to name an unspecified number of state governors as potential successors.
The constitutional mechanism here would be the President’s ability to cal state militias (the
National Guard) into federal service.82 Baker argued that, by virtue of their positions as
commanders-in-chief of their state contingents of the National Guard, governors could, in effect
be transformed into federal “officers” by the federalization of the Guard.83
Another proposal by Fortier proposed amendment of the Succession Act to establish a series of
assistant vice presidents, nominated by the President, and subject to approval by advice and
consent of the Senate. These officers would be included in the order of succession at an
appropriate place. They would be classic “stand-by” equipment: their primary function would be
to be informed, prepared, physical y safe, and ready to serve as Acting President should that be
required.84
Professor Akhil Amar proposed a similar measure that the Cabinet position of assistant vice
president be established by law, again, nominated by the President and subject to confirmation by
the Senate. In his testimony before the September 2003 joint Senate committee hearings, he
suggested that presidential candidates should announce their choices for this office during the
presidential campaign. This would presumably enhance the electoral legitimacy of the assistant
vice president, as voters would be fully aware of the candidates’ choices for this potential y
important office, and include this in their voting decisions.85
A further variant was offered by Howard Wasserman during his joint Senate committee hearing
testimony. He suggested establishment of the Cabinet office of “First Secretary,” nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate. The First Secretary’s duties would be the same as
those of the offices proposed above, with special emphasis on full inclusion and participation in
Administration policies. As Wasserman noted in his testimony, “[t]his officer must be in contact
with the President and the administration, as an active member of the cabinet, aware of and
involved in the creation and execution of public policy.”86
Final y, Fortier proposed a constitutional amendment that would eliminate the requirement that
successors be officers of the United States, empowering the President to nominate potential
successors beyond the Cabinet, subject to advice and consent by the Senate. Such an amendment,
he argued, would “eliminate any doubts about placing state governors in the line of succession,

82 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, clause 1.
83 T estimony of W. Miller Baker, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and Administration,
Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p.10, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/baker_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
84 T estimony of Dr. John C. Fortier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Governm ent: The Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st
sess., September 16, 2003, p. 13, at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fortier_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
85 T estimony of Akhil Amar, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and Administration,
Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, pp. 2-3, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/amar_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
86 T estimony of Howard M. Wasserman, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., September 16, 2003, p. 6, at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/wasserman_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
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and could provide for succession to the Presidency itself (as opposed to the acting Presidency).”87
Fortier envisioned that these persons would be “eminently qualified” to serve. In the
contemporary context, he suggested, as examples that President George W. Bush might nominate,
“former President George H.W. Bush and former Vice President Dan Quayle, both of whom no
longer live in Washington, to serve in the line of succession. Similarly, a future Democratic
President might nominate former Vice Presidents Al Gore and Walter Mondale to serve in the
statutory line of succession.”88
Concluding Observations
Seemingly a long-settled legislative and constitutional question, the issue of presidential and vice
presidential succession in the United States gained a degree of urgency following the events of
September 11, 2001. Old issues were revisited, and new questions were asked in light of concerns
over a potential y disastrous “decapitation” of the U.S. government as the result of a terrorist
attack, possibly by use of weapons of mass destruction.
The 109th Congress acted to insert the office of Secretary of Homeland Security into the current
line of succession—remedying an oversight in the legislation that created the department in
2002—in Title V of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-
177, 120 Stat. 192).
Since that time, interest in succession-related legislation has declined: no bil proposing a revision
to the existing arrangements has been introduced since the 111th Congress. The work of Congress
and nongovernmental organizations in the first decade of the 21st century did, however, produce a
body of research and analysis that would be available to scholars and lawmakers in the future.
The American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institution’s Continuity of Government
Commission issued reports and recommendations on continuity in Congress, the presidency, and
the Supreme Court between 2003 and 2011. In addition, the hearings conducted in September
2003 by the Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and Administration and in October
2004 by the House Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on the Constitution provided
forums for public discussions of current succession provisions, their al eged shortcomings, and a
wide range of proposals for change. The record of these studies and deliberations provides a
heritage of information and analysis that would be readily available to Congress should it revisit
this question in the future.
Table 1. Presidential Successions by Vice Presidents

Cause of

Year
President
Partya
Vacancyb
Successor
1841
Wil iam Henry Harrison
W
1
John Tyler
1850
Zachary Taylor
W
1
Mil ard Fil more
1865
Abraham Lincoln
R
2
Andrew Johnson
1881
James A. Garfield
R
2
Chester A. Arthur

87 T estimony of Dr. John C. Fortier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Govern m ent: The Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st
sess., September 16, 2003, p. 14, at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fortier_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
88 T estimony of Dr. John C. Fortier, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committees on the Judiciary and Rules and
Administration, Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Governm ent: The Presidency, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st
sess., September 16, 2003, p. 14, at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fortier_testimony_09_16_03.pdf.
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Cause of

Year
President
Partya
Vacancyb
Successor
1901
Wil iam McKinley
R
2
Theodore Roosevelt
1923
Warren G. Harding
R
1
Calvin Coolidge
1945
Franklin D. Roosevelt
D
1
Harry S. Truman
1963
John F. Kennedy
D
2
Lyndon B. Johnson
1974
Richard M. Nixon
R
3
Gerald R. Ford
a. Party Affiliation: D = Democratic, R = Republican, and W = Whig
b. Cause of Vacancy: 1 = death by natural causes, 2 = assassination, and 3 = resignation
Table 2. Vice Presidential Successions Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
Year
Vice President
Partya
Causeb
Successor
1973
Spiro T. Agnew
R
1
Gerald R. Ford
1974
Gerald R. Ford
R
2
Nelson A. Rockefel er
Note: Prior to ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the vice presidency was vacant on 16 occasions.
Eight resulted when the Vice President succeeded to the presidency (see Table 1). Seven resulted from the Vice
President’s death: George Clinton (Democratic Republican—DR), 1812; Elbridge Gerry (DR), 1814; Wil iam R.
King (D), 1853; Henry Wilson (R), 1875; Thomas A. Hendricks (D), 1885; Garret A. Hobart (R), 1899; and James
S. Sherman (R), 1912. One Vice President resigned: John C. Calhoun (D), in 1832.
a. Party Affiliation: R = Republican
b. Cause of Vacancy: 1 = resignation; 2 = succession to the presidency
Table 3. The Order of Presidential Succession
(under the Succession Act of 1947)
President
Vice President
Speaker of the House of Representatives
President pro tempore of the Senate
Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of Energy
Secretary of Education
Congressional Research Service

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Presidential Succession: Perspectives and Contemporary Issues for Congress

Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Secretary of Homeland Security

Author Information

Thomas H. Neale

Specialist in American National Government

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