Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations
July 6, 2020
Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifth-most-populous
country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the
Peter J. Meyer
potential to become a world power and periodically has been the focal point of U.S. policy in
Specialist in Latin
Latin America. Brazil’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic
American Affairs
performance and political instability. After a period of strong economic growth and increased

international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has struggled with a
series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep

recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises
contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). They also
discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in
October 2018.
Since taking office in January 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro has begun to implement economic and regulatory reforms
favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed hard -line security policies intended to reduce
crime and violence. Rather than building a broad-based coalition to advance his agenda, however, Bolsonaro has sought to
keep the electorate polarized and his political base mobilized by taking socially conservative stands on cultural issues and
verbally attacking perceived enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of government.
This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential allies within the conservative-leaning congress and
hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious challenges, such as the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and
accelerating deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It also has placed additional stress on the country’s already strained
democratic institutions. With the novel coronavirus spreading rapidly throu ghout the country and the economy projected to
contract 9.1% in 2020, Brazilians have taken to the streets both in opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a
poll conducted in late June 2020, 32% of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23%
consider it “average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has moved away from Brazil’s traditional commitment to autonomy
and toward alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro has coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional
challenges such as the crisis in Venezuela. On other matters, such as commercial ties with China, Bolsonaro has adopted a
pragmatic approach intended to ensure continued access to Brazil’s major export markets. The Trump Administration has
welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-Brazilian relations. In 2019, the Trump Administration
took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil as a major
non-NATO ally. The United States and Brazil also agreed to several measures intended to facilitate trade and investment.
Nevertheless, some Brazilian analysts and former officials have questioned whether alignment with the United States is the
most effective way to advance Brazil’s national interests.
The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian relations. Environmental conservation has
been a major focus, with Congress appropriating $15 million for foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazon,
including $5 million to address fires in the region, in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94).
Likewise, Members introduced legislative proposals that would express support for Amazon conservation efforts (S.Res.
337) and restrict U.S. defense and trade relations with Brazil in response to deforestation (H.R. 4263). Congress also has
expressed concerns about the state of democracy and human rights in Brazil. A provision of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2020 (P.L. 116-92) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to
submit a report to Congress regarding Brazil’s human rights climate and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. Another
resolution (H.Res. 594) would express concerns about threats to human rights, the rule of law, democracy , and the
environment in Brazil.
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Introduction
As the fifth-largest country and the ninth-
Brazil at a Glance
largest economy in the world, Brazil plays
Population: 211.6 mil ion (2020 est.)
an important role in global governance (see
Race/Ethnicity: White—47.7%, Mixed Race—43.1%,
Figure 1 for a map of Brazil). Over the past
Black—7.6%, Asian—1.1%, Indigenous—0.4% (Self-
20 years, Brazil has forged coalitions with
identification, 2010)
other large, developing countries to push
Religion: Catholic—65%, Evangelical Christian—22%,
for changes to multilateral institutions and
None—8%, Other—4% (2010)
to ensure that global agreements on issues
Official Language: Portuguese
ranging from trade to climate change
Land Area: 3.3 mil ion square miles (slightly smal er than
adequately protect their interests. Brazil
the United States)
also has taken on a greater role in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/GDP per Capita:
promoting peace and stability, contributing
$1.85 tril ion/$8,797 (2019 est.)
to U.N. peacekeeping missions and
Top Exports: oil, soybeans, iron ore, meat, and
mediating conflicts in South America and
machinery (2019)
further afield. Although recent domestic
Life Expectancy at Birth: 76 years (2018)
chal enges have led Brazil to turn inward
Poverty Rate: 11.0% (2018 est.)
and weakened its appeal global y, the
Leadership: President Jair Bolsonaro, Vice President
country continues to exert considerable
Hamilton Mourão, Senate President Davi Alcolumbre,
influence on international policy issues that
Chamber of Deputies President Rodrigo Maia
affect the United States.
Sources: Population, race/ethnicity, religion, land
area, and life expectancy statistics from the Instituto
U.S. policymakers have often viewed
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística; GDP estimates
Brazil as a natural partner in regional and
from the International Monetary Fund; export data
from Global Trade Atlas; and poverty data from
global affairs, given its status as a fel ow
Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais.
multicultural democracy. Repeated efforts
to forge a close partnership have left both
countries frustrated, however, as their occasional y divergent interests and policy approaches have
inhibited cooperation. The Trump Administration has viewed the 2018 election of Brazilian
President Jair Bolsonaro as a fresh opportunity to deepen the bilateral relationship. Bolsonaro has
begun to shift Brazil’s foreign policy to bring the country into closer alignment with the United
States, and President Trump has designated Brazil a major non-NATO ally. Nevertheless, ongoing
differences over trade protections and relations with China threaten to leave both the United
States and Brazil with unmet expectations once again.
The 116th Congress has expressed renewed interest in Brazil, recognizing Brazil’s potential to
affect U.S. initiatives and interests. Some Members view Brazil as a strategic partner for
addressing regional and global chal enges. They have urged the Trump Administration to forge
stronger economic, security, and military ties with Brazil to bolster the bilateral relationship and
counter the influence of extra-hemispheric powers, such as China and Russia.1 Other Members
have expressed reservations about a close partnership with the Bolsonaro Administration. They
are concerned that Bolsonaro is presiding over an erosion of democracy and human rights in
Brazil and that his environmental policies threaten the Amazon and global efforts to mitigate

1 See, for example, Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. T rump, December 20, 2019, at
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e6199a08-c4d2-424b-9e48-676585575e34/
035E152B8835E8734AA978266554751D.20191220 -letter-to-potus-re-brazil-.pdf.
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Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations

climate change.2 Congress may continue to assess these differing approaches to U.S.-Brazilian
relations as it carries out its oversight responsibilities and considers FY2021 appropriations and
other legislative initiatives.
Figure 1. Map of Brazil

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS Graphics.

2 See, for example, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, “Climate Change,” Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record,
vol. 165, part 148 (September 16, 2019), p. S5496; and Letter f rom Honorable Richard E. Neal, Chairman, House
Committee on Ways and Means, et al. to Honorable Robert Lighthizer, U.S. T rade Representative, June 3, 2020, at
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/
20200603_WM%20Dem%20Ltr%20to%20Amb%20Lighthizer%20re%20Brazil.pdf.
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Brazil’s Political and Economic Environment
Background
Brazil declared independence from Portugal in 1822, initial y establishing a constitutional
monarchy and retaining a slave-based, plantation economy. Although the country abolished
slavery in 1888 and became a republic in 1889, economic and political power remained
concentrated in the hands of large rural landowners and the vast majority of Brazilians remained
outside the political system. The authoritarian government of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) began
the incorporation of the working classes but exerted strict control over labor as part of its broader
push to centralize power in the federal government. Vargas also began to implement a state-led
development model, which endured for much of the 20th century as successive governments
supported the expansion of Brazilian industry.
Brazil experienced two decades of multiparty democracy from 1945 to 1964 but struggled with
political and economic instability, which ultimately led the military to seize power. A 1964
military coup, encouraged and welcomed by the United States, ushered in two decades of
authoritarian rule.3 Although repressive, the military government was not as brutal as the
dictatorships established in several other South American nations. It nominal y al owed the
judiciary and congress to function during its tenure but stifled representative democracy and civic
action, carefully preserving its influence during one of the most protracted transitions to
democracy to occur in Latin America. Brazilian security forces kil ed at least 434 dissidents
during the dictatorship and they detained and tortured an estimated 30,000-50,000 others.4
Brazil restored civilian rule in 1985, and a national constituent assembly, elected in 1986,
promulgated a new constitution in 1988. The constitution established a liberal democracy with a
strong president, a bicameral congress consisting of the 513-member chamber of deputies and the
81-member senate, and an independent judiciary. Power is somewhat decentralized under the
country’s federal structure, which includes 26 states, a federal district, and some 5,570
municipalities.
Brazil experienced economic recession and political uncertainty during the first decade after its
political transition. Numerous efforts to control runaway inflation failed, and two elected
presidents did not complete their terms; one died before taking office, and the other was
impeached on corruption charges and resigned.
The situation began to stabilize under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) of the
center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, or
PSDB). Initial y elected on the success of the anti-inflation Real Plan that he implemented as
finance minister under President Itamar Franco (1992-1994), Cardoso ushered in a series of
market-oriented economic reforms. His administration privatized some state-owned enterprises,
gradual y opened the economy to foreign trade and investment, and adopted the three main pil ars
of Brazil’s macroeconomic policy: a floating exchange rate, a primary budget surplus, and an

3 For information on U.S. policy prior to and following the coup, see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–
1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, eds. David C. Geyer and David H. Herschler (Washington:
GPO, 2004), Documents 181-244, at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/ch5.
4 At least 8,350 indigenous Brazilians also were killed during the dictatorship, either directly by government agents or
indirectly as a result of government policies. Ministério Público Federal, Procuradoria Federal dos Direitos do Cidadão,
“PFDC Contesta Recomendação de Festejos ao Golpe de 64,” press release, March 26, 201 9; and Relatório da
Com issão Nacional da Verdade, December 10, 2014, at http://cnv.memoriasreveladas.gov.br/.
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inflation-targeting monetary policy. Nevertheless, the Brazilian state maintained an influential
role in the economy.
The Cardoso Administration’s economic reforms and a surge in international demand
(particularly from China) for Brazilian commodities—such as oil, iron, and soybeans—fostered a
period of strong economic growth in Brazil during the first decade of the 21st century. The center-
left Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) administration of President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva (Lula, 2003-2010) used increased export revenues to improve social inclusion and
reduce inequality. Among other measures, the PT-led government expanded social welfare
programs and raised the minimum wage by 64% above inflation.5 Between 2003 and 2010, the
Brazilian economy expanded by an average of 4.1% per year and the poverty rate fel from 28.2%
to 13.6%.6 The growth of the middle class fueled a domestic consumption boom that reinforced
Brazil’s economic expansion. Although the poverty rate initial y continued to decline under the
PT-led administration of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016)—reaching a low of 8.4% in
2014—socioeconomic conditions deteriorated during Rousseff’s final two years in office.7
Recession, Insecurity, and Corruption (2014-2018)
After nearly two decades of relative stability, Brazil has struggled with a series of crises since
2014. The country fel into a deep recession in late 2014, due to a decline in global commodity
prices and the Rousseff Administration’s economic mismanagement.8 Brazil’s real gross domestic
product (GDP) contracted by 8.2% over the course of 2015 and 2016.9 Although Brazil emerged
from recession in mid-2017, recovery has been slow. The economy expanded by just over 1% in
2017 and 2018, and unemployment, which peaked at 13.7% in the first quarter of 2017, has
remained above 11% for four years.10 Largely due to the weak labor market, the real incomes of
the bottom half of Brazilian workers declined by 17% between the onset of the recession and
mid-2019, pushing an estimated 6 mil ion people into poverty.11 The downturn disproportionately
affected Afro-Brazilians, who comprised an estimated 56% of the Brazilian population but 64%
of the unemployed in 2018.12 Large fiscal deficits at al levels of government exacerbated the
situation, limiting the resources available to provide social services.
The deep recession also hindered federal, state, and local government efforts to address serious
chal enges such as crime and violence. A record-high 64,000 Brazilians were kil ed in 2017, and

5 Cristiano Romero, “O Legado de Lula na Economia,” Valor Online, December 29, 2010.
6 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database October 2019, October 11, 2019. T he
poverty line is defined as the income necessary to cover basic expenses, such as food, clothing, housing, and transit.
Marcelo Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Políticas Sociais, August 2019, p. 15.
Hereinafter, Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade.
7 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade.
8 Alfredo Cuevas et al., “An Eventful T wo Decades of Reforms, Economic Boom, and a Historic Crisis,” in Brazil:
Boom , Bust, and the Road to Recovery, IMF, 2018; and Pedro Mendes Loureiro and Alfredo Saad-Filho, “ T he Limits
of Pragmatism: T he Rise and Fall of the Brazilian Workers’ Party (2002-2016),” Latin American Perspectives, vol. 46,
no. 1 (2019).
9 IMF, Staff Report for the 2018 Article IV Consultation, June 20, 2018.
10 IMF, “World Economic Outlook Database: October 2019,” October 11, 2019; and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatística (IBGE), “ PNAD Contínua: T axa de Desocupação é de 12,6% e T axa de Subutilização é de 25,6% no
T rimestre Encerrado em Abril de 2020,” press release, May 28, 2020.
11 Neri, A Escalada da Desigualdade, pp. 5, 15.
12 In 2018, 46.5% of Brazilians self-identified as mixed race and 9.3% self-identified as black. IBGE, Desigualdades
Sociais por Cor ou Raça no Brasil, 2019, p. 2.
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the country’s homicide rate of 30.9 per 100,000 residents was more than five times the global
average. Although homicides declined by nearly 11% in 2018, feminicide (gender-motivated
murders of women) and reports of sexual violence increased.13 The deterioration in the security
situation, like the economic crisis, disproportionately affected Afro-Brazilians, who were the
victims of more than 75% of homicides and 61% of feminicides in 2017 and 2018.14
A series of corruption scandals further discredited the country’s political establishment. The so-
cal ed Car Wash (Lava Jato) investigation, launched in 2014, implicated politicians from across
the political spectrum and many prominent business executives. The initial investigation revealed
that political appointees at the state-controlled oil company, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras),
colluded with construction firms to fix contract bidding processes. The firms then provided
kickbacks to Petrobras officials and politicians in the ruling coalition. Paral el investigations
discovered similar practices throughout the public sector, with businesses providing bribes and
il egal campaign donations in exchange for contracts or other favorable government treatment.
The scandals sapped President Rousseff’s political support, contributing to her controversial
impeachment and removal from office in August 2016.15 Michael Temer, who presided over a
center-right government for the remainder of Rousseff’s term (2016-2018), was entangled in
several corruption scandals but managed to hold on to power. Several other high-level politicians,
including former President Lula, have been convicted for corruption and face potential y lengthy
prison sentences (see the text box, below).
Lula’s Imprisonment and Release
Brazilian prosecutors have brought charges against former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula; 2003-2010) in
at least eight corruption cases, including two cases for which he has already been convicted. The first conviction
was upheld by a circuit court panel and Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice, which resulted in Lula being imprisoned
and barred from running for a third presidential term in 2018. Press reports have raised concerns, however, that
Judge Sérgio Moro and the prosecutors initial y involved in Lula’s case may have been political y biased and
engaged in improper coordination; Moro served as President Jair Bolsonaro’s minister of justice and public
security from January 2019-April 2020. Lula was released from prison in November 2019 after Brazil’s supreme
court ruled that most individuals convicted of nonviolent crimes should remain free until they have exhausted the
appeals process. Nevertheless, Lula remains ineligible for elective office unless the convictions are overturned and
ultimately may have to serve out the remainder of his sentences.
Sources: Letter from Adriano Augusto Silvestrin Guedes, Brazilian Circuit Court Federal Prosecutor, et al.
to a Group of International Jurists, published by the Global Anticorruption Blog, September 12, 2019; Glenn
Greenwald and Victor Pougy, “Hidden Plot: Brazil’s Top Prosecutors Who Indicted Lula Schemed in Secret
Messages to Prevent His Party from Winning 2018 Election,” Intercept, June 9, 2019; and Ernesto Londoño
and Letícia Casado, “Ex-President of Brazil Is Freed from Prison After Ruling by Supreme Court,” New York
Times, November 9, 2019.
The inability of Brazil’s political leadership to overcome these crises undermined Brazilians’
confidence in their democratic institutions. As of mid-2018, 33% of Brazilians expressed trust in
the judiciary, 26% expressed trust in the election system, 12% expressed trust in congress, 7%
expressed trust in the federal government, and 6% expressed trust in political parties. Moreover,

13 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2019; and United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Hom icide, 2019.
14 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, “Violence Against Black People in Brazil,” infographic, 2019, at
http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/infografico-consicencia-negra-2019-
FINAL_ingl%C3%AAs_site.pdf.
15 Felipe Nunes and Carlos Ranulfo Melo, “Impeachment, Political Crisis and Democracy in Brazil,” Revista de
Ciencia Política, vol. 37, no. 2 (2017).
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only 9% of Brazilians expressed satisfaction with the way democracy was working in their
country—the lowest percentage in al of Latin America.16
Bolsonaro Administration (2019-Present)
Brazilian voters registered their intense dissatisfaction with the situation in the country in the
2018 elections. In addition to ousting 75% of incumbents running for reelection to the senate and
43% of incumbents running for reelection to the chamber of deputies, they elected as president,
Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right congressman and retired army captain.17 Prior to the election, most
observers considered Bolsonaro to be a fringe figure in the Brazilian congress. He exercised little
influence over policy and was best known for his controversial remarks defending the country’s
military dictatorship (1964-1985) and expressing prejudice toward marginalized sectors of
Brazilian society.18 Backed by the smal Social Liberal Party (PSL), Bolsonaro also lacked the
finances and party machinery of his principal competitors. Nevertheless, his social media-driven
campaign and populist, tough-on-crime message attracted a strong base of support. He outflanked
his opponents by exploiting anti-PT and antiestablishment sentiment and aligning himself with
the few institutions that Brazilians stil general y trust: the military and the churches.19 Bolsonaro
largely remained off the campaign trail in the weeks leading up to the election after being stabbed
in an assassination attempt, but he easily defeated the PT’s Fernando Haddad 55%-45% in a
second-round runoff. Bolsonaro’s PSL also won the second-most seats in the lower house.
Since Bolsonaro began his four-year term on January 1, 2019, he has struggled to advance
portions of his agenda due to cabinet infighting and the lack of a working majority in Brazil’s
fragmented congress, which includes 24 political parties.20 Whereas previous Brazilian presidents
stitched governing coalitions together by distributing control of government jobs and resources to
parties in exchange for their support, Bolsonaro initial y was unwil ing to enter into such
arrangements. Moreover, he general y has avoided negotiating the details of his policy proposals
with legislators. Instead, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base mobilized by taking
social y conservative stands on cultural issues and verbal y attacking perceived enemies, such as
the press, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other branches of government.21
Bolsonaro’s attacks have grown more strident since March 2020, as he has faced widespread
scrutiny over his erratic response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and his
al eged attempts to interfere in law enforcement investigations to protect his family and al ies (see
“Pandemic Response” and “Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” below).
Bolsonaro’s confrontational approach to governance and recent scandals have alienated many of
his potential al ies within the conservative-leaning congress, as wel as some former supporters.
In November 2019, for example, Bolsonaro abandoned the PSL after a series of disagreements

16 Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2018, November 2018.
17 Sylvio Costa and Edson Sardinha, “O que Você Precisa Saber para Entender o Novo Congresso Brasileiro,”
Congresso em Foco, October 9, 2018.
18 See, for example, Brian Winter, “System Failure: Behind the Rise of Jair Bolsonaro,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 11,
no. 1, (January 2018).
19 Matias Spektor, “It’s Not Just the Right T hat’s Voting for Bolsonaro. It ’s Everyone.” Foreign Policy, October 26,
2018. As of mid-2018, 58% of Brazilians expressed trust in the military and 73% expressed trust in the churches,
according to Corporación Latinobarómetro.
20 Câmara dos Deputados, “Bancada Atual,” accessed in June 2020.
21 See, for example, Andres Schipani, “Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro Pushes Cult ure War over Economic Reform,” Financial
Tim es, August 24, 2019; and Paulo T revisani, “ Brazil’s President Hits the Street, Railing Against the Media,” Wall
Street Journal, February 11, 2020.
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with the party’s leadership; he intends to create a new Al iance for Brazil party to contest future
elections. In May 2020, Bolsonaro reportedly began distributing government positions to several
large patronage-based parties in an attempt to ward off impeachment.22 Although Bolsonaro
appears to have sufficient congressional support to hold onto the presidency for the time being, he
stil lacks a working majority to advance his policy agenda (see “Economic Policy” and “Security
Policy,” below). Public opinion remains polarized, with Brazilians taking to the streets both in
opposition to, and in support of, Bolsonaro. According to a poll conducted in late June 2020, 32%
of Brazilians consider Bolsonaro’s performance in office “good” or “great,” 23% consider it
“average,” and 44% consider it “bad” or “terrible.”23
Pandemic Response
Brazil’s federal health ministry recognized the COVID-19 pandemic as a public health
emergency of national importance on February 3, 2020—nearly a month before Brazil confirmed
its first coronavirus infection. By mid-March, the Bolsonaro Administration had begun to close
Brazil’s international borders and had cal ed on the Brazilian Congress to declare a state of public
calamity in order to free up resources to address the pandemic’s health and economic effects.
Since then, however, President Bolsonaro has consistently downplayed the threat posed by
COVID-19. He has criticized Brazilian states and municipalities for imposing containment
measures and has argued that restrictions on economic activity are more damaging than the virus
itself. He has issued several decrees to overturn local restrictions, but these decrees have been
blocked in court. Bolsonaro has repeatedly flouted public health guidelines, wading into crowds
of supporters without a mask, even as nearly two dozen top officials in his government have
tested positive for the virus.24 Bolsonaro also has clashed with members of his own
administration, dismissing one health minister and provoking the resignation of another, due to
his opposition to social distancing measures and his promotion of chloroquine and
hydroxychloroquine—two antimalarial drugs that have yet to be proven effective for treating
COVID-19.25
To date, Brazil’s efforts to contain the virus have been unsuccessful. As of July 5, 2020, Brazil
had recorded more than 1.6 mil ion cases and nearly 65,000 deaths from COVID-19 (see Figure
2).26 An epidemiological study based on antibody tests suggests the total number of Brazilians
who have been infected by the virus may be six times higher than the number of official y
confirmed cases. The study also found significant regional, socioeconomic, and ethnic/racial
disparities in infection rates. For example, 1.1% of self-identified white Brazilians tested positive
for antibodies, compared to 2.1% of Brazilians of Asian descent, 2.5% of black Brazilians, 3.1%
of mixed-race Brazilians, and 5.4% of indigenous Brazilians.27 Although Brazil has one of the
strongest public health systems in Latin America, hospitals have been overwhelmed in some

22 André Shalders, “Bolsonaro terá ‘Centrão’, mas Impeachment pode Avançar se houver Apoio Popular, Dizem
Autores de Pedido,” BBC News Brasil, May 7, 2020.
23 Datafolha, “Bolsonaro é Reprovado por 44%,” June 26, 2020.
24 “Unsealed Exams Confirm Bolsonaro Did Not Catch COVID-19,” Valor International, May 13, 2020; and
“Bolsonaro Rallies with Supporters Amid Virus Surge,” Agence France Presse, May 24, 2020.
25 Mauricio Savarese, “Brazil’s Health Minister Resigns After One Month on the Job,” Associated Press, May 15,
2020; and Ernesto Londoño and Mariana Simões, “Defying Science, Brazil’s Leader T rumpets Unproven ‘Cure’,” New
York Tim es, June 14, 2020.
26 Ministério da Saúde do Brasil, “Painel Coronavirus,” July 6, 2020, at https://covid.saude.gov.br/.
27 Universidade Federal de Pelotas, Centro de Pesquisas Epidemiológicas, “EPICOVID19-BR Divulga Novas
Resultados Sobre o Coronavírus no Brasil,” July 2, 2020.
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cities, and the virus is now spreading rapidly throughout the interior of the country.28 The
politicization of the pandemic and the lack of coordination among different levels of government
may have contributed to the country’s ineffective response.
Figure 2. Confirmed Cases of COVID-19
(new cases by date reported [February 26, 2020 – July 5, 2020])

Source: CRS presentation of data from the Brazilian government’s Ministério da Saúde, “Painel Coronavirus,”
July 6, 2020, at https://covid.saude.gov.br/.
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law
Many analysts argue there has been an erosion of democracy in Brazil under Bolsonaro.29 Since
taking office, the president has continued to celebrate Brazil’s military dictatorship, and his
sons—who play an influential role in his government—have questioned democracy and
suggested authoritarian measures may be necessary in certain circumstances.30 Bolsonaro also has
attended ral ies in which some of his supporters have cal ed on the military to close congress and
the supreme court.31

28 Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, Nuclear T hreat Initiative, and Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Health
Security Index, 2019; and “ Cidades do Interior já Respondem por quase 60% dos Casos de Covid no País,” Folha de
São Paulo, June 22, 2020.
29 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute, Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows: Democracy Report 2020,
March 20, 2020; and “ Brasil está em Processo de Erosão, Dizem Brasilianistas,” Valor, June 12, 2020.
30 Rodrigo Borges Delfim and T hais Arbex, “Carlos Bolsonaro Diz que País Não T erá T ransformação Rápida por Vias
Democráticas,” Folha de São Paulo, September 9, 2019; and “ Eduardo Bolsonaro Fala em Novo AI-5 ‘se Esquerda
Radicalizar’,” UOL, October 31, 2019
31 T errence McCoy and Heloísa T raiano, “As Brazil’s Challenges Multiply, Bolsonaro’s Fans Call for a Military
T akeover,” Washington Post, May 11, 2020.
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Civil-military relations have shifted as Bolsonaro has appointed retired and active-duty military
officers to lead more than a third of his cabinet ministries and to approximately 3,000 other
positions throughout the government.32 The Brazilian armed forces are now more involved in
governance than they have been at any time since the end of the dictatorship. Although some
analysts maintain that the officers have had a moderating influence on Bolsonaro, others are
concerned about politicization of the armed forces. On several occasions, Bolsonaro and members
of his administration have appeared to suggest that the armed forces would back the president if
the Brazilian congress or judiciary sought to remove him from office.33
Bolsonaro also has exerted political influence over law enforcement agencies, potential y
hindering investigations and cal ing into question the independence of Brazilian institutions.
Minister of Justice and Public Security Sérgio Moro resigned in April 2020 after Bolsonaro
dismissed the director-general of the Brazilian federal police, al egedly to push for certain
appointments within the force and gain access to confidential information regarding ongoing
investigations. Bolsonaro denied the al egations, but his newly appointed director-general
immediately replaced the head of the federal police office in Rio de Janeiro, which reportedly is
investigating potential corruption and money laundering by two of Bolsonaro’s sons. The federal
police also are investigating dozens of Bolsonaro’s political al ies—and reportedly at least one of
his sons—for their al eged involvement in an il egal digital disinformation campaign.34 In
addition to his federal police appointments, observers have questioned changes Bolsonaro has
made to Brazil’s tax collection agency, financial intel igence unit, and antitrust regulator, as wel
as his decision to disregard a norm in place since 2003 of selecting an attorney general from a
shortlist approved by the public prosecutors’ association.35
Observers have raised serious concerns about human rights in Brazil as Bolsonaro has taken steps
to weaken the press, exert control over NGOs, and roll back rights previously granted to
marginalized groups.36 Brazil’s civil society has pushed back against such measures, many of
which have been blocked by the Brazilian congress and judiciary. Nevertheless, human rights
advocates argue the president’s statements and actions have fueled attacks against journalists,
activists, and indigenous and quilombola communities.37

32 Anthony Boadle, “ Analysis – T hreat of Brazil Military Coup Unfounded, Retired Generals Say,” Reuters, June 22,
2020.
33 “Bolsonaro: Forças Armadas Defendem a Pátria e ‘Não Cumprem Ordens Absurdas’,” UOL, June 12, 2020; and
Ricardo Brito, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Says Military Will Not Remove Elected President,” Reuters, June 15, 2020.
34 “Moro Plunges Knife into Bolsonaro as COVID-19 Swamps Brazil,” Latin American Weekly Report, April 30, 2020;
“Brazil: Police Investigate Bolsonaro’s Allies, T ensions Rise,” Latin News Daily, May 28, 2020; and “De ‘Rachadinha’
a Fantasmas, Conheça Investigações que Envolvem o Entorno de Jair Bolsonaro,” Folha de São Paulo, June 18, 2020.
35 Ryan C. Berg, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Continues to Be His Own Worst Enemy,” American Enterprise Institute,
September 24, 2019; and Guilherme France, Brazil: Setbacks in the Legal and Institutional Anti-Corruption
Fram eworks, T ransparency International, 2019.
36 “Brazil: Print Media T hreatened by Presidential Decree,” Latin News Daily, August 8, 2019; Mauricio Savarese,
“Brazil’s Bolsonaro T argets Minorities on 1st Day in Office,” Associated Press, January 3, 2019; and Gabriel
Stargardter, “Bolsonaro Presidential Decree Grants Sweeping Powers over NGOs in Brazil,” Reuters, January 2, 2019.
37 Quilombolas are a self-declared ethno-racial group, some of whom are the descendants of freed or escaped slaves.
For more information, see Mariana Nozela Prado, “Quilombola Communities of Brazil,” Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Brazil Institute, infographic, August 13, 2018, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
article/quilombola-communities-brazil. “ Brazil: Journalists Denounce Increased Attacks,” Latin News Daily, January
17, 2020; Maria Elena Bucheli, “ Bolsonaro ‘T urned Me into a Pariah,’ Says Gay Lawmaker Who Fled Brazil,” Agence
France Presse, March 20, 2019; and “Brazil: Indigenous Violence on the Rise,” Latin American Security & Strategic
Review, January 2020.
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Economic Policy
During its first year in office, the Bolsonaro Administration began implementing key aspects of
its market-oriented economic agenda. As part of a far-reaching privatization program, the
Brazilian government began sel ing off assets, including subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises,
stakes in private companies, and infrastructure and energy concessions, yielding revenues of
approximately $66 bil ion in 2019.38 The Brazilian congress also enacted a major pension reform
expected to reduce government expenditures by at least $194 bil ion over the next decade.39
Those policies built on a 2016 constitutional amendment that froze inflation-adjusted government
spending for 20 years. Other Bolsonaro Administration proposals to simplify the tax system, cut
and decentralize government expenditures, and decrease compensation and job security for
government employees had yet to move forward in congress when legislators shifted their focus
to addressing the COVID-19 pandemic.
Although the International Monetary Fund had expected Brazil’s economic growth to accelerate
from 1.1% in 2019 to 2.2% in 2020, it now forecasts a 9.1% contraction.40 According to one
projection, the unemployment rate, which was already above 12% before the onset of the
pandemic, wil average nearly 19% over the course of the year.41 The Brazilian congress has
enacted a series of emergency measures to mitigate the economic and social impacts of the
recession, including an expansion of a conditional cash transfer program for low-income
Brazilians, new monthly cash transfers for informal and unemployed workers, credit and payroll
assistance for smal - and medium-sized businesses, and aid for state and municipal governments.
Altogether, the government’s fiscal response is equivalent to more than 6% of GDP.42 The
Brazilian Central Bank has provided additional support for the economy by cutting the
benchmark interest rate to a historic low and implementing measures to increase the liquidity of
the financial system.
Bolsonaro Administration officials and some economists assert that Brazil should quickly
withdraw the emergency measures and enact pending structural reforms once the economy begins
to recover.43 They argue that reducing Brazil’s fiscal deficit and stabilizing public debt are
necessary to attract private investment and foster economic growth. Other economists argue that
the pandemic and recession demonstrate the need for a stronger public health system, more
comprehensive social safety net, and increased public investment in education, infrastructure, and
research and development.44
Security Policy
Bolsonaro has had difficulty advancing the hard-line security platform that was the centerpiece of
his campaign. The Brazilian congress blocked Bolsonaro’s proposal to shield from prosecution

38 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Brazil-U.S. Business Council, “What Can Brazil Expect from Concessions and
Privatizations in 2020?,” Brazil Investment Monitor, February 14, 2020.
39 Andres Schipani and Bryan Harris, “Can Brazil’s Pension Reform Kick -Start the Economy?,” Financial Times,
October 22, 2019.
40 IMF, Tentative Stabilization, Sluggish Recovery?, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2020; and IMF, A
Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery, World Economic Outlook, June 2020.
41 Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Insitituto Brasileiro de Economia, Boletim Macro, June 2020.
42 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Economic Outlook, June 2020.
43 “A Window of Opportunity for the Reforms,” Valor International, June 17, 2020; and OECD, OECD Economic
Outlook, June 2020.
44 Laura Carvalho, “As Funçöes do Estado Reveladas pela Pandemia,” Nexo Jornal, April 30, 2020.
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police who kil suspected criminals and pushed back against Bolsonaro’s decrees loosening gun
controls. Other Bolsonaro Administration proposals, including measures to modernize police
investigations and impose stricter criminal sentences, were enacted in December 2019.
Preliminary data suggest that security conditions in Brazil improved in 2019, as the country
registered a 19% decline in homicides. The number of individuals kil ed by police increased,
however, including an 18% spike in the state of Rio de Janeiro.45 In recent years, more than 75%
of those kil ed by police have been Afro-Brazilian.46 The Bolsonaro Administration has claimed
credit for fal ing crime rates, but some security analysts argue the situation has been improving
since late 2017 due to state and municipal initiatives and reduced conflict between the country’s
largest criminal groups.47 (See the “Counternarcotics” section for more information.)
Amazon Conservation and Climate Change
A 30% increase in fires in the Brazilian Amazon in 2019 compared to the previous year led many
Brazilians and international observers to express concern about the rainforest and the extent to
which its destruction is contributing to regional and global climate change.48 Covering nearly 2.7
mil ion square miles across seven countries, the Amazon Basin is home to the largest and most
biodiverse tropical forest in the world.49 Scientific studies have found that the Amazon plays an
important role in the global carbon cycle by absorbing and sequestering carbon. Although
findings vary, one recent study estimated the forest absorbs 560 mil ion tons of carbon dioxide
per year and its biomass holds 76 bil ion tons of carbon—an amount equivalent to seven years of
global carbon emissions.50 The Amazon also pumps water into the atmosphere, affecting regional
rainfal patterns throughout South America.51 An estimated 17% of the Amazon basin has been
deforested, however, and some scientists have warned that the forest may be nearing a tipping
point at which it is no longer able to sustain itself and transitions to a drier, savanna-like
ecosystem.52

45 “Número de Pessoas Mortas pela Polícia Cresce no Brasil em 2019; Assassinatos de Policiais Caem pela Met ade,”
G1, Monitor da Violência, April 16, 2020; and Karina Nascimento, “ Principais Crimes Registraram Queda no Estado
em 2019,” Governo do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Segurança Pública, January 21, 2020.
46 Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, “Violence Against Black People in Brazil,” infographic, 2019.
47 André Cabette Fábio, “A Queda da Criminalidade no Brasil. e o Discurso de Moro,” Nexo Jornal, January 6, 2020.
48 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE), “Monitoramento dos Focos Ativos por Bioma,” at
http://queimadas.dgi.inpe.br/queimadas/portal-static/estatisticas_estados/. For more information on the fires, see CRS
In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Am azon , by Pervaze A. Sheikh et al.
49 Portions of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Venezuela are located in the Amazon Basin. T he
rainforest extends beyond the Amazon Basin into Suriname and French Guiana. United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), Global International Waters Assessm ent: Am azon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b,
Kalmar, Sweden, 2004, p. 15.
50 Edna Rödig et al., “T he Importance of Forest Structure for Carbon Fluxes of the Amazon Rainforest,” Environmental
Research Letters, vol. 13, no. 5 (2018), p. 9; Hemholtz Centre for Environmental Research, “ The Forests of the
Amazon Are an Important Carbon Sink,” press release, November 8, 2019; and Pierre Friedlingstein et al., “Global
Carbon Budget 2019,” Earth System Science Data, vol. 11, no. 4 (2019), p. 1803.
51 D. C. Zemp et al., “Deforestation Effects on Amazon Forest Resilience,” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 44, no.
12 (2017).
52 T homas Lovejoy and Carlos Nobre, “Amazon T ipping Point: Last Chance for Action,” Science Advances, vol. 5, no.
12 (2019).
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Efforts to conserve the forest often focus on Brazil, since the country encompasses about 69% of
the Amazon Basin.53 Within Brazil, the government has established an administrative zone known
as the Legal Amazon, which includes nine states: Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará,
Rondônia, Roraima, Tocantins, and most of Maranhão (see Figure 1). Although rainforest covers
most of the Legal Amazon, savanna (Cerrado) and wetlands (Pantanal) are present in portions of
the region. The Legal Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military-led
government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of
national security. Partial y due to those incentives, the human population in the Legal Amazon
grew from 6 mil ion in 1960 to 25 mil ion in 2010. Forest cover in the Legal Amazon has
declined by approximately 20% as settlements, roads, logging, ranching, farming, and other
activities have proliferated in the region.54
Brazilian Policies and Deforestation Trends
In 2004, the Brazilian government adopted an action plan to prevent and control deforestation in
the Legal Amazon.55 It increased surveil ance in the Amazon region, began to enforce
environmental laws and regulations more rigorously, and took steps to consolidate and expand
protected lands. Nearly 20% of the Brazilian Amazon now has some sort of federal or state
protected status, and the Brazilian government has recognized an additional 22% of the Brazilian
Amazon as indigenous territories.56 Brazil’s forest code also requires private landowners in the
Legal Amazon to maintain native vegetation on 80% of their properties.
Other Brazilian initiatives have sought to support sustainable development in the Amazon while
limiting the extent to which the country’s agricultural sector drives deforestation. In 2008, the
Brazilian government began conditioning credit on farmers’ compliance with environmental
laws; in 2009, the government banned new sugarcane plantations in the Legal Amazon. The
Brazilian government also supported private sector conservation initiatives. Those included a
2006 voluntary agreement among most major soybean traders not to purchase soybeans grown on
lands deforested after 2006 (later revised to 2008) and a 2009 voluntary agreement among
meatpackers not to purchase cattle raised on lands deforested in the Amazon after 2008.
Brazil’s public and private conservation efforts, combined with economic factors that made
agricultural commodity exports less profitable,57 led to an 83% decline in deforestation in the
Legal Amazon between 2004 and 2012. Deforestation has been trending upward in recent years,
however, rising from a low of 1,765 square miles in 2012 to 3,911 square miles in the 12-month
monitoring period that ended in July 2019 (see Figure 3). Analysts have linked the increase in
deforestation to a series of policy reversals that have cut funding for environmental enforcement,
reduced the size of protected areas, and relaxed conservation requirements.58 Market incentives,

53 UNEP, Global International Waters Assessment: Amazon Basin, GIWA Regional Assessment 40b, Kalmar, Sweden,
2004, p. 16.
54 Eric A. Davidson et al., “ T he Amazon Basin in T ransition,” Nature, vol. 481 (2012), p. 321.
55 Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Plano de Ação para a Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia
Legal, March 2004.
56 Amazon Network of Georeferenced Socio-Environmental Information, “Amazonia 2019 – Protected Areas and
Indigenous T erritories,” map, 2019.
57 Philip Fearnside, “Business as Usual: A Resurgence of Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,” Yale Environment
360, April 18, 2017. Hereinafter, Fearnside, “ Business as Usual.”
58 Fearnside, “Business as Usual”; and William D. Carvalho et al., “Deforestation Control in the Brazilian Amazon: A
Conservation Struggle Being Lost as Agreements and Regulations Are Subverted and Bypassed,” Perspectives in
Ecology and Conservation, vol. 17, no. 3 (2019).
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such as the growth in Chinese imports of Brazilian beef and soybeans, also have contributed to
recent deforestation trends.59 For example, China purchased nearly 76% of its soybean imports
from Brazil in 2018, up from roughly 50% in prior years, after imposing a retaliatory tariff on
U.S. soybeans.60
Figure 3. Deforestation in Brazil’s Legal Amazon: 2004-2019

Source: CRS presentation of data from the Brazilian government’s Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “A
Taxa Consolidada de Desmatamento por Corte Raso para os Nove Estados da Amazônia Legal (AC, AM, AP,
MA, MT, PA, RO, RR e TO) em 2019 é de 10.129 km2,” press release, June 9, 2020.
Notes: Annual monitoring periods run from August to July (e.g., 2019 data include deforestation from August
2018 to July 2019).
Although changes that weakened Brazil’s environmental policies began under President Rousseff
and continued under President Temer, some analysts argue that the Bolsonaro Administration’s
approach to the Amazon has led to further increases in deforestation.61 Bolsonaro has fiercely
defended Brazil’s sovereignty over the Legal Amazon and its right to develop the region. Since
taking office, his administration has lifted the ban on new sugarcane plantations in the Legal
Amazon and cal ed for an end to the soy moratorium. It also has proposed measures to provide
property titles to individuals il egal y occupying public lands and to al ow commercial
agriculture, mining, and hydroelectric projects in indigenous territories. The Bolsonaro

59 Gustavo Faleiros, “China’s Brazilian Beef Demand Linked to Amazon Deforestation Risk,” Diálogo Chino, October
23, 2019; and Richard Fuchs et al., “U.S.-China T rade War Imperils Amazon Rainforest,” Nature, vol. 567 (March 28,
2019).
60 Marcos Caramuru de Paiva, “Brazil and China: A Brief Analysis of the State of Bilateral Relations,” in Brazil-China:
The State of the Relationship, Belt and Road, and Lessons for the Future (Rio de Janeiro: Centro Brasileiro de Relações
Internacionais, 2019), p. 122. Also see Fred Gale, Constanza Valdes, and Mark Ash, Interdependence of China, United
States, and Brazil in Soybean Trade, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, June 2019.
61 Kathryn Hochstetler, “This Isn’t the First T ime Fires Have Ravaged the Amazon,” Foreign Policy, August 29, 2019;
and Rubens Ricupero et al., Com unicado dos Ex-Ministros de Estado do Meio Am biente, May 8, 2019.
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Administration argues that such economic activities wil benefit those living in the region and
reduce incentives for il egal deforestation.
At the same time, Bolsonaro has questioned the Brazilian government’s deforestation data and
scaled back environmental enforcement. He has removed several high-level officials from
Brazil’s environmental monitoring and enforcement agencies, replacing them with appointees
who al egedly have hampered enforcement efforts.62 In 2019, Brazil’s primary environmental
enforcement agency reportedly issued 34% fewer environmental fines, reported 51% fewer
environmental crimes, and seized 61% less il egal y logged timber than it had in 2018.63
Those actions reportedly have emboldened some loggers, miners, and ranchers, contributing to
the surge in fires in 2019 and a 34% increase in deforestation in the annual monitoring period that
included the first seven months of Bolsonaro’s term.64 Bolsonaro initial y dismissed
environmental concerns about the Amazon, asserting that deforestation and burning are cultural
practices that wil never end.65 In January 2020, however, he announced the creation of a new
security force to protect the environment and a new Amazon Council, headed by Vice President
Hamilton Mourão, to coordinate conservation and sustainable development efforts. About 4,000
troops, police officers, and environmental agents have been deployed in the Amazon region as
part of an inter-agency enforcement operation since May 2020.66 The Bolsonaro Administration is
also reportedly drafting a new plan for combatting il egal deforestation.
Paris Agreement
The rising levels of Amazon deforestation cal into question whether Brazil wil meet its Paris
Agreement commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 37% below 2005 levels (to 1.3
gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO₂e) by 2025.67 According to a 2018 assessment by
the U.N. Environment Program, Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions declined by 12% per year
from 2006 to 2016, as significant declines in deforestation offset slight increases in emissions
from other sources.68 Those reductions had put Brazil on track to meet its Paris Agreement
commitment, but emissions have begun to rise again due to increased deforestation. In 2018,

62 Jack Spring and Stephen Eisenhammer, “Exclusive: As Fires Race through Amazon, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Weakens
Environment Agency,” Reuters, August 28, 2019.
63 Danielle Brant and Phillippe Watanabe, “Sob Bolsonaro, Multas Ambientais Caem 34% para Menor Nível em 24
Anos,” Folha de São Paulo, March 9, 2020; and Ernesto Londoño, Manuela Andreoni, and Letícia Casado, “Amazon
Deforestation Soars as Pandemic Hobbles Enforcement,” International New York Times, June 12, 2020.
64 Fabiano Maisonnave, “Declarações Antiambientalistas de Políticos Aceleram Desmatamento, Diz Estudo,” Folha de
São Paulo, December 16, 2019; Stephen Eisenhammer, “ ‘Day of Fire’: Blazes Ignite Suspicion in Amazon T own,”
Reuters, September 11, 2019; Marina Lopes, “ Illegal Miners, Feeling Betrayed, Call on Bolsonaro to End
Environmental Crackdown in Amazon,” Washington Post, September 10, 2019; and INPE, “A T axa Consolidada de
Desmatamento por Corte Raso para os Nove Estados da Amazônia Legal (AC, AM , AP, MA, MT , PA, RO, RR e T O)
em 2019 é de 10.129 km2,” press release, June 9, 2020.
65 “Bolsonaro Diz que Desmatamento é Cultural no Brasil e Não Acabará,” Folha de São Paulo, November 20, 2019.
66 Claudia Safatle, Fernando Exman, and Malu Delgado, “Society Reacts to Crisis and Mourão Rules Out Coup,” Valor
International, May 31, 2020.
67 Federative Republic of Brazil, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, September 21, 2016. “CO₂e” is a
metric used to express the impact of emissions from differing greenhouse gasses in a common unit by converting each
gas to the equivalent amount of CO₂ that would have the same effect on increasing global average temperature.
68 UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2018, November 2018, p. 9.
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Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions increased by an estimated 0.3% (to 1.9 GtCO₂e), even as
emissions from the energy sector declined by nearly 5%.69
President Bolsonaro had pledged to withdraw from the Paris Agreement during his 2018 election
campaign, but he reversed course following his inauguration, stating that Brazil would remain in
the agreement “for now.”70 At the 25th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change (COP 25), Brazil pushed developed countries to meet their 2009 goal to
mobilize $100 bil ion from public and private sources, annual y, by 2020, to help developing
countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. Brazil’s environmental minister has asserted that
Brazil should receive at least 10% of those funds.71 Brazil also insisted that carbon credits
developed under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol should carry over into the Paris Agreement’s new
international carbon markets and that countries that host emissions-cutting projects should not
have to report the transfers of those credits to other countries. Many other negotiators expressed
concern that Brazil’s proposals could al ow poorly validated credits from the Kyoto mechanisms
to undermine the new Paris Agreement markets, as wel as risk double-counting the credits both
international y and toward the host countries’ domestic mitigation goals. Those disagreements
reportedly impeded efforts to finalize rules for new carbon markets under the Paris Agreement.72
Even as the Brazilian government has cal ed for greater international financial support, it has
deprioritized domestic efforts to combat climate change. In 2019, the Bolsonaro Administration
closed the climate change departments within the environment and foreign ministries and reduced
spending on climate change initiatives by about 10% compared to 2018. Brazil’s 2020 federal
budget authorizes 37% less funding for climate change initiatives than was expended in 2019.73
Moreover, the Bolsonaro Administration lost one of Brazil’s primary sources of international
assistance when it unilateral y restructured the governance of the Amazon Fund—a mechanism
launched in 2008 to attract funding for conservation and sustainable development efforts. In
response, the governments of Norway and Germany, which have donated nearly $1.3 bil ion to
the fund since 2009, suspended their contributions in August 2019.74 Vice President Hamilton
Mourão and state governments in the Legal Amazon are negotiating with Norway and Germany
to restore the funding.
U.S.-Brazilian Relations
The United States and Brazil historical y have enjoyed robust political and economic relations,
but the countries’ divergent perceptions of their national interests have inhibited the development
of a close partnership. Those perceptions have changed somewhat over the past year and a half.
Whereas the past several Brazilian administrations sought to maintain autonomy in foreign
affairs, Bolsonaro has cal ed for close alignment with the United States. Within Latin America,
for example, the Bolsonaro Administration has adopted a more confrontational approach toward

69 Observatório do Clima, “Estimativas de Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa do Brasil 1970-2018,” November 5,
2019.
70 “Brazil to Remain in Paris Agreement ‘for Now,’ Bolsonaro Says,” Valor International, January 22, 2019.
71 Luciana Amaral and Gustavo Uribe, “Ricardo Salles: Brasil Cobrará no Mínimo US$10 bi ao Ano dos Países Ricos,”
UOL, November 29, 2019.
72 Simon Evans and Josh Gabbatiss, “COP25: Key Outcomes Agreed at the U.N. Climate T alks in Madrid,” Carbon
Brief, December 15, 2019; and Jean Chemnick, “ U.N. T alks Limp to a Close with No D eal on Carbon T rading,” E&E
News, December 16, 2019.
73 Senado Federal, “SIGA Brasil,” accessed in June 2020.
74 Amazon Fund, “Donations,” at http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/en/donations/.
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Cuba and has closely coordinated with the Trump Administration on measures to address the
crisis in Venezuela. The Trump Administration has welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement,
designating Brazil as a major non-NATO al y and concluding several smal -scale bilateral
commercial agreements in 2019. The Trump Administration also has sought to support Brazil’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, providing the country with more than $12.5 mil ion of
health and humanitarian assistance and—more controversial y—2 mil ion doses of
hydroxychloroquine.75
Bolsonaro’s realignment of Brazilian foreign policy has been contentious domestical y. Some
analysts argue that it has not resulted in many concrete benefits for Brazil.76 They note, for
example, that the Trump Administration has maintained, and threatened to impose, trade barriers
on key Brazilian exports despite recent bilateral agreements (see “Recent Trade Negotiations”).
Likewise, U.S. officials reportedly have warned Brazil that closer bilateral defense ties could be
in jeopardy if Brazil al ows Chinese telecommunications company Huawei to participate in
Brazil’s 5G cel ular network (see the “Defense Cooperation” section). Some Brazilian analysts
also argue that abandoning the country’s commitment to autonomy in foreign affairs has
weakened Brazil’s international standing and caused tensions in its relations with other important
partners, such as fel ow members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
group.77 There does not appear to be public support for the Trump Administration’s foreign policy
within Brazil; in 2019, 60% of Brazilians expressed no confidence in President Trump to “do the
right thing regarding world affairs.”78
In some cases, domestic opposition has prevented Bolsonaro from aligning Brazilian foreign
policy more closely with the United States. For example, during his 2018 presidential campaign,
Bolsonaro indicated he would follow President Trump’s lead in withdrawing from the Paris
Agreement on climate change and taking a more confrontational approach toward Chinese trade
and investment. He has backed away from those positions since taking office, reportedly due to
concerns about losing access to foreign markets, particularly within the powerful agribusiness
sector, which accounts for 21% of Brazil’s GDP and is a major component of Bolsonaro’s
political base.79
Although some Members of the 116th Congress have urged the Trump Administration to seize on
Bolsonaro’s goodwil to develop a strategic partnership with Brazil, others have expressed
reservations about the current Brazilian administration. They are concerned about Bolsonaro’s
commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, as wel as about changes to Brazil’s
environmental policies that appear to have contributed to fires and deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon (see “U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation”).

75 U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Brazil to Combat COVID-19,” May 31, 2020;
and White House, “Joint Statement from the United States of America and the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding
Health Cooperation,” May 31, 2020.
76 T errence McCoy, “In Brazil, T rump T ariffs Show Bolsonaro’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Has Backfired,”
Washington Post, December 2, 2019; and Oliver Stuenkel, “ Bolsonaro Placed a Losing Bet on T rump,” Foreign Policy,
December 6, 2019.
77 Maria Herminia T avares, “Rumo a Lugar a Nenhum,” Folha de São Paulo, January 23, 2020; and “Alinhamento
Automático do Brasil com EUA Causa Atritos na Cúpula dos BRICS,” Folha de São Paulo, November 13, 2019.
78 Richard Wike, “T rump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” Pew
Research Center, January 8, 2020.
79 Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada, PIB do Agronegócio Brasil, 2020; Oliver Stuenkel,
“Bolsonaro Fans the Flames,” Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2019; and “No 1º Ano de Bolsonaro, China Vai de Ameaça
Comunista a Aliada Estratégica,” Folha de São Paulo, January 1, 2020.
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Commercial Relations
Trade policy often has been a contentious issue in U.S.-Brazilian relations. Since the early 1990s,
Brazil’s trade policy has prioritized integration with its South American neighbors through the
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and multilateral negotiations at the World Trade
Organization (WTO).80 Brazil is the industrial hub of Mercosur, which it established in 1991 with
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Although the bloc was intended to advance incremental y
toward full economic integration, only a limited customs union has been achieved thus far.
Mercosur also has evolved into a somewhat protectionist arrangement, shielding its members
from external competition rather than serving as a platform for insertion into the global economy,
as original y envisioned. Within the WTO, Brazil traditional y has joined with other developing
nations to push the United States and other developed countries to reduce their agricultural tariffs
and subsidies while resisting developed countries’ cal s for increased access to developing
countries’ industrial and services sectors. Those differences blocked conclusion of the most recent
round of multilateral trade negotiations (the WTO’s Doha Round), as wel as U.S. efforts in the
1990s and 2000s to establish a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas.81
Recent Trade Negotiations
The Bolsonaro and Trump Administrations have negotiated several agreements intended to
strengthen the bilateral commercial relationship. During Bolsonaro’s March 2019 official visit to
Washington, the United States and Brazil agreed to take steps toward lowering trade barriers for
certain agricultural products. Brazil agreed to adopt a tariff rate quota—implemented in
November 2019—to al ow the importation of 750,000 tons of U.S. wheat annual y without tariffs.
Brazil also agreed to adopt “science-based conditions” that could enable imports of U.S. pork. In
exchange, the United States agreed to send a U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) team to Brazil to audit the country’s raw beef inspection system.82
The United States had suspended imports of raw beef from Brazil in June 2017, after Brazilian
investigators discovered that some of the country’s top meat processing companies, including
JBS and BRF, had bribed food inspectors to approve the sale of tainted products. FSIS began
inspecting al meat products arriving from Brazil and refused entry to 11% of Brazilian fresh beef
products in the months leading up to the suspension.83 The Bolsonaro Administration had hoped
an FSIS audit would quickly reopen the U.S. market to Brazilian beef and expressed frustration
that U.S. import restrictions remained in place through the end of 2019. On February 21, 2020,
however, the Trump Administration lifted the suspension after determining that “Brazil’s food
safety inspection system governing raw intact beef is equivalent to that of the [United States].”84
Nevertheless, some consumer advocates, industry groups, and Members of Congress remain
concerned about Brazilian meat. A bil introduced in April 2019 (S. 1124, Tester) would suspend

80 João Augusto de Castro Neves, Brazil’s Slow and Uncertain Shift from Protectionism to Free Trade, Inter-American
Dialogue, working paper, January 2014.
81 For background on the stalled negotiations, see CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Cathleen
D. Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F. Fefer, and Ian F. Fergusson; and CRS Report RL33162, Trade Integration in the
Am ericas, by M. Angeles Villarreal.
82 White House, “Joint Statement from President Donald J. T rump and President Jair Bolsonaro,” March 19, 2019.
83 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), “Perdue: USDA Halting Import of Fresh Brazilian Beef,” press release,
June 22, 2017; and “Scandal Could Spoil Brazil’s Meat Industry,” Latin News Daily, March 20, 2017.
84 David Pitt, “US Lifts Brazilian Beef Import Ban Amid Quality Concerns,” Associated Press, February 21, 2020; and
USDA, Food Safety and Inspection Service, “Eligibility of Brazil to Export Raw Intact Beef to the United States,”
FSIS Notice 09-20, February 24, 2020.
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al beef and poultry imports from Brazil while a working group evaluates the extent to which
those imports pose a threat to food safety.
The United States and Brazil announced several other agreements during Bolsonaro’s March
2019 official visit. A technology safeguards agreement, which the Brazilian congress ratified in
November 2019, wil enable the launch of U.S.-licensed satel ites from Alcântara space center in
Brazil’s northeastern state of Maranhão. The United States also endorsed Brazil’s accession to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in exchange for Brazil agreeing to
gradual y give up its “special and differential treatment” status, which grants special rights to
developing nations at the WTO.
In 2020, U.S. and Brazilian officials reportedly hope to conclude agreements on customs
administration, e-commerce rules, regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures while
consulting with domestic stakeholders regarding “how best to expand trade and develop the
bilateral economic relationship.”85 U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer asserts that the
Trump Administration does not have any plans to pursue a comprehensive free-trade agreement
with Brazil at this time but is negotiating smal -scale accords to address chal enges faced by U.S.
businesses.86 A majority of Members on the House Committee on Ways and Means signed a letter
in June 2020 expressing strong opposition to “pursuing any type of trade agreement with the
Bolsonaro government” due to human rights, labor, and environmental concerns.87
Potential U.S. Tariffs on Brazilian Steel
In December 2019, President Trump announced his intention to impose tariffs on steel imports from Brazil. The
Trump Administration had imposed a 25% tariff on selected steel imports from most countries in March 2018,
using the authority granted in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to take action to adjust imports
that threaten to impair U.S. national security (19 U.S.C. §1862). The Administration ended up excluding Brazil
from those additional duties after the Brazilian government agreed to a quota al otment that restricts the total
amount of steel Brazil can export to the United States. In his December 2019 tweet announcing the tariffs,
President Trump asserted that Brazil had presided over “a massive devaluation” of its currency, “which is not
good for [U.S.] farmers.” Economists maintain that the Brazilian real has lost value compared to the U.S. dol ar due
to the comparative weakness of the Brazilian economy, not manipulation by Brazil’s central bank. The Trump
Administration’s trade dispute with China also has led to increased Chinese purchases of Brazilian soy and other
agricultural commodities. The Trump Administration has yet to impose tariffs on Brazilian steel, but President
Trump has refused to rule out doing so in the future.
For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer
and Vivian C. Jones.
Sources: White House, “Presidential Proclamation in Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States,”
March 8, 2018; White House, “Presidential Proclamation in Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United
States,” May 31, 2018; Ana Swanson, “Trump Says U.S. Wil Impose Metal Tariffs on Brazil and Argentina,”
New York Times, December 2, 2019; and “Trump: No Promises Regarding Steel and Aluminum Tariffs on
Brazil,” Reuters, March 7, 2020.
In addition to congressional opposition, a potential free-trade agreement would need to overcome
a series of other chal enges. Barring changes to Mercosur’s rules, any agreement to reduce tariffs
would need to be negotiated with the broader bloc. In 2019, Mercosur signed free-trade

85 Embassy of Brazil in Washington, D.C., “Brazil-U.S. Joint Statement on Enhancement of Bilateral Economic and
T rade Partnership,” April 20, 2020; and Daniel Rittner, “Brazil and US Close to Reaching Customs Deal,” Valor
International, June 9, 2020.
86 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 2020 Trade Policy Agenda, testimony of Ambassador Robert
E. Lighthizer, U.S. T rade Representative, 116 th Cong., 2nd sess., June 17, 2020.
87 Letter from Honorable Richard E. Neal, Chairman, House Committee on Ways and Means, et al. to Honorable
Robert Lighthizer, U.S. T rade Representative, June 3, 2020.
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agreements with the European Union and the European Free Trade Association. Those
agreements have yet to be ratified, however, and the recent political shift in Argentina could make
the negotiation of new agreements more difficult.88 A free-trade agreement also could provoke
opposition from domestic producers threatened by foreign competition. Industry associations in
Brazil reportedly have been lobbying the Bolsonaro Administration to focus on reducing costs for
domestic business before pursuing trade liberalization.89 U.S. businesses also have sought
protections, and President Trump has occasional y threatened to impose tariffs on Brazilian
products (see the text box, above).
Trade and Investment Flows
U.S.-Brazilian trade has increased significantly over the past two decades but has suffered from
economic volatility, such as the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and Brazil’s 2014-2017
recession (see Figure 4). In 2019, total bilateral merchandise trade amounted to $73.9 bil ion.
U.S. goods exports to Brazil totaled $43.1 bil ion, and U.S. goods imports from Brazil totaled
$30.9 bil ion, giving the United States a $12.2 bil ion trade surplus. The top U.S. exports to Brazil
were mineral fuels, aircraft, machinery, and organic chemicals. The top U.S. imports from Brazil
included mineral fuels, iron and steel, aircraft, machinery, and wood and wood pulp. In 2019,
Brazil was the 14th-largest trading partner of the United States.90 The United States was Brazil’s
second-largest trading partner, accounting for 14.8% of Brazil’s total merchandise trade,
compared to 24.4% for China.91
Brazil benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences program, which provides
nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing
countries. Brazil was the fourth-largest beneficiary of the program in 2019, with duty-free
imports to the United States valued at $2.3 bil ion—equivalent to 7.4% of al U.S. merchandise
imports from Brazil.92
U.S.-Brazilian services trade is also significant. In 2018 (the most recent year for which data are
available), total bilateral services trade amounted to $34.4 bil ion. U.S. services exports to Brazil
totaled $28.2 bil ion, and U.S. services imports from Brazil totaled $6.1 bil ion, giving the United
States a $22.1 bil ion surplus. Travel, transport, and telecommunications were the top categories
of U.S. services exports to Brazil, and business services was the top category of U.S. imports
from Brazil.93 Brazil began exempting U.S. citizens from the country’s tourist and business visa
requirements in June 2019, which could increase U.S. travel to Brazil in the coming years. In
2019, more than 2.1 mil ion Brazilians visited the United States, spending $11.3 bil ion on travel
and tourism.94 Due to widespread person-to-person transmission of the novel coronavirus in

88 For more information on Argentina, see CRS In Focus IF10932, Argentina: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan.
89 “Brazil Economy: T rade Liberalisation Advances, but Slower T han Guedes Wants,” Economist Intelligence Unit,
November 25, 2019.
90 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, February 2020.
91 Brazilian Foreign T rade Secretariat (SECEX) data, as made available by Global Trade Atlas, February 2020.
92 U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau data, as made available by the U.S. International T rade Commission,
“Interactive T ariff and T rade DataWeb,” accessed in February 2020.
93 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “U.S. T rade in Services, by Country or Affiliation
and by T ype of Service,” October 15, 2019.
94 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, National T ravel and T ourism Office, Market
Profile: Brazil, March 2020.
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Brazil, however, the United States has denied entry to most Brazilian citizens and other foreign
nationals who have been present in Brazil in the previous 14 days since May 28, 2020.95
Figure 4. U.S. Trade with Brazil: 2008-2019

Source: CRS presentation of U.S. Department of Commerce data, as made available through Global Trade Atlas
and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, accessed February 2020.
Note: Services data are not yet available for 2019.
U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil has increased by more than 60% since 2008. As of
2018 (the most recent year for which data are available), the accumulated stock of U.S. FDI in
Brazil was $70.9 bil ion, with significant investments in manufacturing, finance, and mining,
among other sectors.96
Security Cooperation
Although U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on security issues traditional y has been limited, law
enforcement and military ties have grown closer in recent years. In 2018, the countries launched a
new Permanent Forum on Security that aims to foster “strategic, intense, on-going bilateral
cooperation” on a range of security chal enges, including arms and drug trafficking, cybercrime,
financial crimes, and terrorism.97 The United States and Brazil also engage in high-level security
discussions under the long-standing Political-Military Dialogue and a new Strategic Partnership
Dialogue, which met for the first time in September 2019.

95 White House, “Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Certain Additional
Persons Who Pose a Risk of T ransmitting Novel Coronavirus,” May 24, 2020.
96 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Balance of Payments and Direct Investment Position
Data,” accessed in January 2020.
97 U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, “U.S.-Brazil Permanent Security Forum,” March 19, 2019.
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Counternarcotics
Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, but it is the world’s second-largest consumer of
cocaine hydrochloride and likely the world’s largest consumer of cocaine-derivative products. It
is also a major transit country for cocaine bound for Europe.98 Organized crime in Brazil has
increased in scope and scale over the past decade, as some of the country’s large, wel -organized,
and heavily armed criminal groups—such as the Red Command (Comando Vermelho, or CV) and
the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital, or PCC)—have increased their
transnational operations. Security analysts have attributed much of the recent violence in Brazil,
particularly in the northern portion of the country, to clashes among the CV, PCC, and their local
affiliates over control of strategic trafficking corridors.99
The Brazilian government has responded to the chal enges posed by organized crime by
bolstering security along the 9,767-mile border it shares with 10 nations, including the region’s
cocaine producers—Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Under its Strategic Border Plan, introduced in
2011, the Brazilian government has deployed interagency resources, including unmanned aerial
vehicles, to monitor il icit activity in high-risk locations along its borders and in the remote
Amazon region. It also has carried out joint operations with neighboring countries. More recently,
the Brazilian government has begun acquiring low-altitude mobile radars and other equipment to
support its Integrated Border Monitoring System. That system was initial y scheduled to be
operational along the entire Brazilian border in 2022, but the Brazilian government now estimates
that the system may not be completely in place until 2035 due to budget constraints.100
The United States supports counternarcotics capacity-building efforts in Brazil under a 2008
U.S.-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement. In
2019, the United States trained nearly 1,000 Brazilian police officers on combatting money
laundering and community policing, among other topics.101
Counterterrorism
Despite having little history of terrorism, Brazil began working closely with the United States and
other international partners to assess and mitigate potential terrorist threats in the lead-up to
hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Among other support, U.S.
authorities trained Brazilian law enforcement on topics such as countering international terrorism,
preventing attacks on soft targets, and identifying fraudulent documents. The Brazilian
government also enacted legislation that criminalized terrorism and terrorist financing in 2016,
closing a long-standing legal gap that reportedly had hindered counterterrorism investigations and
prosecutions.102 Brazil further strengthened its legal framework for identifying and freezing
terrorist assets in 2019 to address deficiencies identified by the intergovernmental Financial
Action Task Force.103

98 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, Volum e I: Drug and Chem ical Control, March 2, 2020, p. 109. Hereinafter: INCSR, 2020.
99 See, for example, Bruno Paes Manso, “A Cena Criminal Brasileira Mudou; Compreendê-la Ajuda Entender as Novas
Dinâmicas do Homicídio,” in Anuário Brazileiro de Segurança Pública 2019 (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública,
2019); and Carolina Sampó, De la Reclusión en las Prisiones al Control del Tráfico de Cocaína: la Evolución de las
Organizaciones Crim inales Brasileñas, Real Instituto Elcano, working paper, June 10, 2019.
100 Nelza Oliveira, “Brazil Invests in Border Surveillance Radars,” Diálogo, January 3, 2019.
101 INCSR, 2020, p. 111.
102 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017.
103 Financial Action T ask Force (FAT F), “Outcomes FAT F Plenary, 16 -18 October 2019,” press release, October 18,
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Brazilian officials have used the new legal framework several times in recent years. In the weeks
leading up to the 2016 Olympics, they dismantled a loose, online network of Islamic State
sympathizers; 12 individuals were detained, and 8 ultimately were convicted and sentenced to
between 5 and 15 years in prison for promoting the Islamic State and terrorist attacks through
social media.104 In 2018, Brazilian prosecutors charged 11 individuals with planning to establish
an Islamic State cel in Brazil and attempting to recruit fighters to send to Syria.105 Although some
observers have applauded such efforts, others argue that Brazilian authorities are improperly
surveil ing, and stoking prejudice toward, the country’s smal Muslim population.106
Brazil historical y had been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation due to concerns
about criminalizing the activities of social movements and other groups that engage in actions of
political dissent. President Bolsonaro has reinvigorated those concerns by labeling protestors and
Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra, or MST) as
terrorists.107 In December 2019, the Brazilian congress restricted the ability of the country’s
financial intel igence unit to report on terrorist financing, reportedly to prevent Bolsonaro from
targeting political and social activists. That restriction could jeopardize Brazil’s compliance with
global anti-money laundering and antiterrorism financing standards.108
In December 2019, the U.S. Department of State al ocated $700,000 of FY2019 Nonproliferation,
Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs aid to Brazil to improve Brazilian law
enforcement’s capability to deter, detect, and respond to terrorism-related activities.109 The
assistance wil fund border security training and other initiatives, with a particular focus on
preventing suspected terrorists and terrorist facilitators from transiting the so-cal ed Tri-Border
Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, which has long been a haven for il icit activities.110 U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officers also are working with Brazilian authorities at Guarulhos
International Airport in São Paulo to identify high-risk travelers and contraband moving through
Brazil.111
Defense Cooperation
U.S.-Brazilian military ties have grown considerably over the past decade but have faced
occasional setbacks. In the aftermath of a massive January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, U.S. and

2019. For more on the FAT F, see CRS Report RS21904, The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview, by James K.
Jackson.
104 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, September 2018.
105 “Brazil Charges 11 People with T rying to Set Up Islamic State Cell,” Reuters, May 17, 2018.
106 T ulio Kruse, “Brazilian Muslims Face a Wave of Persecution and Prejudice Stoked by New Government,”
Intercept, October 4, 2016.
107 “A Empresários, Bolsonaro Defende Ação Armada contra Movimentos Sociais,” Agência Estado, May 22, 2018;
“Bolsonaro Says Brazil Is Prepared in Case of Protests, But Not Worried,” Reuters, November 23, 2019; and “Brazil:
Gov’t Dismisses Critics as ‘T errorists’,” Latin News Daily, June 4, 2020.
108 Isabela Cruz, “Como o Novo COAF vai Impactar o Combate ao T errorismo,” Nexo Jornal, December 18, 2019; and
Bryan Harris, “Brazil Criticised for Backtracking on T error Funding Fight,” Financial Times, February 3, 2020.
109 U.S. Department of State, “Congressional Notification 19-324,” December 5, 2019.
110 In September 2018, for example, Brazilian police arrested an alleged Hezbollah financier in the T ri-Border Area
who the U.S. Department of the T reasury had previously sanctioned as a Specially Designated Globa l T errorist
pursuant to Executive Order 13224. Brazil does not consider Hezbollah a terrorist organization, but the Bolsonaro
Administration reportedly is considering measures to designate it as such.
111 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 2020, at
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/brazil/.
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Brazilian military forces providing humanitarian assistance engaged in their largest combined
operations since World War II.112 Later in 2010, the countries signed a Defense Cooperation
Agreement and a General Security of Military Information Agreement intended to facilitate the
sharing of classified information. The Brazilian congress did not approve those agreements until
2015, however, due to a cooling of relations after press reports revealed that the U.S. National
Security Agency had engaged in extensive espionage in Brazil. A Master Information Exchange
Agreement, signed in 2017, implemented the two previous agreements and enabled the countries
to pursue bilateral defense-related technology projects.
In July 2019, President Trump designated Brazil as a major non-NATO al y for the purposes of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).113 Among other benefits, that designation
offers Brazil privileged access to the U.S. defense industry and increased joint military
exchanges, exercises, and training.114 In FY2019, the U.S. government provided $666,000 in
International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to Brazil to strengthen military-
to-military relationships, increase the professionalization of Brazilian forces, and enhance the
Brazilian military’s capabilities. The U.S. government also delivered to Brazil $11.2 mil ion of
equipment under the Excess Defense Articles program and $96.7 mil ion of equipment and
services under the Foreign Military Sales program.115 The U.S. government is providing an
estimated $800,000 of IMET to Brazil in FY2020, and the Trump Administration has requested
$625,000 of IMET for Brazil in FY2021.116
Although recent bilateral agreements and the U.S. designation of Brazil as a major non-NATO
ally have laid a foundation for closer military ties, the long-term trajectory of the defense
relationship may depend on broader geopolitical considerations. For example, U.S. officials
reportedly have warned that bilateral military and intel igence cooperation could be in jeopardy if
Brazil al ows the Chinese company Huawei to participate in Brazil’s 5G cel ular network.117 The
U.S. government reportedly is offering financing through the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation for Brazilian telecommunications companies to purchase 5G equipment
from other providers, such as Sweden’s Ericsson or Finland’s Nokia. Some Brazilian officials are
concerned, however, that excluding Huawei could delay the technology’s rollout and make it
more expensive for consumers.118 More broadly, the Bolsonaro Administration general y has
sought to avoid confrontations with China—Brazil’s top trade partner and an important source of
foreign investment—and influential sectors of Brazil’s military and foreign policy establishments
are wary of becoming embroiled in global power rivalries.119

112 Brazil was the only Latin American nation to deploy forces to Europe during World War II. T he 25,000 -strong
Brazilian Expeditionary Force fought as a division within the United States Fifth Army in Italy.
113 White House, “Designation of the Federative Republic of Brazil as a Major Non -NAT O Ally,” Presidential
Determination No. 2019-21 of July 31, 2019, 84 Federal Register 43035, August 19, 2019.
114 U.S. Embassy Brazil, “Major Non-NAT O Ally,” press release, March 19, 2019.
115 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Fiscal Year 2019 Military Assistance Report,
February 10, 2020.
116 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimate data provided to CRS, June 15, 2020; and Congressional Budget
Justification for the Departm ent of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program s, Fiscal Year 2021, February 10,
2020, p. 132.
117 “EUA Pressionam Brasil Contra Entrada da Chinesa Huawei no Mercado de 5G,” Folha de São Paulo, November
19, 2019.
118 “U.S. Offers Brazil Funding to Buy 5G Gear from Huawei Rivals – Diplomat,” Reuters, June 23, 2020; and “Maia
in Favor of Chinese Suitors for 5G T echnology,” Valor International, June 16, 2020.
119 Benoni Belli and Filipe Nasser, “Brazil: Coupling Multipolarity with Multilateralism,” in The Road Ahead: The 21st-
Century World Order in the Eyes of Policy Plann ers (Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2018), p. 108; and
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Congress has expressed interest in ensuring that U.S. military engagement with Brazil does not
contribute to human rights abuses. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
(P.L. 116-92) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to
submit a report to Congress regarding U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. The report is to assess
the capabilities of Brazil’s military forces and describe the U.S. security cooperation relationship
with Brazil, including U.S. objectives, ongoing or planned activities, and the Brazilian military
capabilities that U.S. cooperation could enhance. The report is also to assess the human rights
climate in Brazil, including the Brazilian military’s adherence to human rights and an
identification of any Brazilian military or security forces credibly al eged to have engaged in
human rights violations that have received or purchased U.S. equipment or training. Moreover,
the report is to describe ongoing or planned U.S. cooperation activities with Brazil focused on
human rights and the extent to which U.S. security cooperation with Brazil could encourage
accountability and promote reform through training on human rights, rule of law, and rules of
engagement.
Some Members of Congress also have cal ed for changes to U.S. security cooperation with
Brazil. A resolution introduced in September 2019 expressing concerns about threats to human
rights, the rule of law, democracy, and the environment in Brazil (H.Res. 594, Grijalva) would
cal for the United States to rescind Brazil’s designation as a major non-NATO al y and suspend
assistance to Brazilian security forces, among other actions. In contrast, other Members have
cal ed for closer U.S. security ties with Brazil, including its inclusion in NATO partnership
programs.120
U.S. Support for Amazon Conservation
The U.S. government has supported conservation efforts in Brazil since the 1980s. Current U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) activities are coordinated through the U.S.-
Brazil Partnership for the Conservation of Amazon Biodiversity (PCAB). Launched in 2014, the
PCAB brings together the U.S. and Brazilian governments, private sector companies, and NGOs
to strengthen protected area management and promote sustainable development in the Amazon. In
addition to providing assistance for federal y and state-managed protected areas, USAID works
with indigenous and quilombola communities to strengthen their capacities to manage their
resources and improve their livelihoods. USAID also supports the private sector-led Partnership
Platform for the Amazon, which facilitates private investment in innovative conservation and
sustainable development activities.121 In November 2019, USAID helped establish the Athelia
Biodiversity Fund, a Brazilian equity fund that aims to raise $100 mil ion of mostly private
capital to invest in similar efforts. In addition to those long-term development programs,
USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance deployed a team of wildfire experts to assist
Brazilian fire investigators in 2019.
Several other U.S. agencies are engaged in Brazil, often in collaboration with or with funding
transferred from USAID. The U.S. Forest Service, for example, provides technical assistance to
the Brazilian government, NGOs, and cooperatives intended to improve protected area
management, reduce the threat of fire, conserve migratory bird habitat, and facilitate the

“Bolsonaro Wants Closer Security T ies with Washington. Does Brazil’s Military?” World Politics Review, April 5,
2019.
120 Letter from Senator Marco Rubio to President Donald J. T rump, December 2 0, 2019.
121 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Brazil: Bilateral Biodiversity Conservation,” September 6, 2019, at
https://www.usaid.gov/brazil/our-work/environment al-partnerships.
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establishment of sustainable value chains for forest products. NASA also has provided data and
technical support to Brazil to help the country better monitor Amazon deforestation.
President Trump has not requested funding for environmental programs in Brazil in any of his
budget proposals. Nevertheless, Congress has continued to fund conservation activities in the
country. In the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), Congress
appropriated $15 mil ion for the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 mil ion to address fires in the
region.
Some Members of Congress have cal ed on the Brazilian and U.S. governments to do more to
conserve the Amazon. For example, a resolution introduced in the Senate in September 2019
(S.Res. 337, Schatz) would express bipartisan concern about fires and il egal deforestation in the
Amazon, cal on the Brazilian government to strengthen environmental enforcement and reinstate
protections for indigenous communities, and back continued U.S. assistance to the Brazilian
government and NGOs. The Act for the Amazon Act (H.R. 4263, DeFazio), introduced in
September 2019, would take a more punitive approach. It would ban the importation of certain
fossil fuels and agricultural products from Brazil, prohibit certain types of military-to-military
engagement and security assistance to Brazil, and forbid U.S. agencies from entering into free
trade negotiations with Brazil.
Outlook
More than five years after the country fel into recession and more than three years after the
controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Rousseff, Brazil remains mired
in difficult domestic circumstances. The COVID-19 pandemic abruptly halted the country’s slow
economic recovery and now threatens to wipe out the modest employment gains achieved since
the last downturn. Repeated budget cuts have reduced social services for the most vulnerable and
have weakened the Brazilian government’s capacity to respond to the pandemic and other
chal enges, such as high levels of crime and increasing deforestation. President Bolsonaro was
elected, in part, on his pledge to clean up the political system, but his interference in justice sector
agencies and frequent attacks on the press, civil society groups, and other branches of government
have placed additional stress on the country’s already-strained democratic institutions. Brazilian
policymakers are likely to remain focused on these internal chal enges for the next several years,
limiting Brazil’s ability to take on regional responsibilities or exert its influence international y.
U.S.-Brazilian relations have grown closer since 2019, as President Bolsonaro’s foreign policy
has prioritized alignment with the Trump Administration. In addition to coordinating on
international affairs, the U.S. and Brazilian governments have taken steps to bolster commercial
ties and enhance security cooperation. Nonetheless, policy differences have emerged over
sensitive issues, such as bilateral trade barriers and relations with China, which affect the
economic and geopolitical interests of both countries. Those disagreements suggest the Trump
and Bolsonaro Administrations may need to engage in more extensive consultations and
confidence-building measures if they intend to avoid the historic pattern of U.S.-Brazilian
relations, in which heightened expectations give way to mutual disappointment and mistrust.
The 116th Congress may continue to shape U.S.-Brazilian relations using its legislative and
oversight powers. Although there appears to be considerable support in Congress for forging a
long-term strategic partnership with Brazil, many Members may be reluctant to advance major
bilateral commercial or security cooperation initiatives in the near term, given their concerns
about the erosion of democracy, human rights, and environmental protections under Bolsonaro.
For the time being, Congress may continue appropriating funding for programs with broad
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support, such as Amazon conservation efforts, while Members continue to advocate for divergent
policy approaches toward the Bolsonaro Administration.

Author Information

Peter J. Meyer

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
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