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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
Overview
agreed to the sale to Iran of the S-300 air defense system,
A 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear agreement (Joint
with a reported estimated value of about $800 million.
Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), provides for
Russia delivered the system in November 2016. A State
limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions
Department spokesperson said in May 2016 that the sale
relief. The accord, endorsed by U.N. Security Council
“… is not formally a violation [of 2231]” because the S-300
Resolution 2231 (July 17, 2015), contains an annex (Annex
is for defensive uses only.”
B) that provides for a ban on the transfer of arms to or from
Iran until October 18, 2020. The Trump Administration,
Effects of the Ban
with the support of many in Congress, is seeking to
The U.S. government assesses that the ban on selling arms
persuade other Security Council members to extend the ban
to Iran has been effective. According to Appendix J of the
in order to prevent Iran from acquiring new conventional
congressionally mandated Defense Intelligence Agency
weaponry, particularly advanced combat aircraft. Two key
(DIA) annual report on the military power of Iran for 2019,
potential arms suppliers of Iran—Russia and China—are
released in November 2019, states that Iran wants to
veto-wielding members of the Security Council and oppose
“purchase new advanced weapon systems from foreign
an extension. Those two countries, as well as U.S. partners
suppliers to modernize its armed forces, including
in Europe, also oppose a U.S. plan to snap back all U.N.
equipment it has largely been unable to acquire for
sanctions if the Council refuses to agree to the arms ban
decades.”
extension.
Figure 1. Iran’s Regional Allies
Annex B also contains a ban until October 18, 2023, on
supplying equipment that Iran could use to develop nuclear-
capable ballistic missiles, and it calls for Iran not to develop
ballistic missiles designed to carry a nuclear weapon. These
provisions are addressed in CRS Report RS20871, Iran
Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Provisions of the Arms Transfer Ban
Annex B of Resolution 2231 restated and superseded the
arms transfer restrictions on Iran in previous U.N. Security
Council resolutions. Resolution 1747 (March 24, 2007)
contained a ban on Iran’s transfer of arms from its territory
and required all U.N. member states to prohibit the transfer
of Iranian arms, and Resolution 1929 (June 9, 2010) banned
the supply to Iran of “any battle tanks, armoured combat
vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft,
attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019.
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of
Arms [ballistic or cruise missiles capable of delivering a
warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 16
By contrast, the ban on Iranian arms exports has arguably
miles] or related materiel, including spare parts….” Annex
not been effective. According to the DIA report, which
B permits the importation and exportation of such arms by
represents a consensus U.S. judgment, “Since the Islamic
Iran if the U.N. Security Council provides advance approval
on a “case
Revolution, Iran has transferred a wide range of weapons
-by-case basis.” Such approval is unlikely;
and military equipment to state and non-state actors,
officials in both the Obama and Trump Administrations
including designated terrorist organizations.… Although
have consistently said they could not envision U.S.
some Iranian shipments have been interdicted, Tehran is
approval of arms transfers to or from Iran. The arms
often able to get high-priority arms transfers to its
transfer ban expires on the earlier of: (1) five years after the
JCPOA Adoption Day” (
customers. [See Figure 1]. Over the years, Iranian transfers
Adoption Day was October 18,
to state and non-state actors have included communications
2015, or (2) upon the issuing by the International Atomic
equipment; small arms—such as assault rifles, sniper rifles,
Energy Agency (IAEA) of a “Broader Conclusion” that all
machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades
nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.
(RPGs)—and ammunition; … artillery systems, including
MRLs (multiple rocket launchers) and battlefield rockets
U.S. and other Security Council member officials widely
and launchers; armored vehicles; FAC (fast attack craft);
interpret the restriction as inapplicable to the sale to Iran of
equipment for unmanned explosives boats; … SAMs
systems for purely defensive purposes. In 2007, Russia
(surface-to-air missiles); UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles)
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U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
… ground-attack aircraft …” and other weaponry. A June
and direct U.N. member states to interdict Iranian weapons
2020 report by the U.N. Secretary General on
shipments suspected of containing arms exports. At the
implementation of Resolution 2231 assessed that Iran
June 30 meeting of the Security Council mentioned above,
attempted to export weaponry and missile parts to Houthi
Council members, including those from allied countries,
forces in Yemen. U.S. and allied forces intercepted the
rejected the U.S.-proposed extension of the arms transfer
weaponry in November 2019 and February 2020. See CRS
ban and instead expressed regret at the U.S. exit from the
Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by
JCPOA. It is not clear if the U.S. draft resolution has
Kenneth Katzman
enough support to receive a Council vote. Addressing the
Figure 2. Iran Military Structure and Size Estimates
June 30 Council meeting, Iran’s Foreign Minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that: “Any attempt to change
or amend the agreed timetable [for the arms transfer ban
expiration] is thus tantamount to undermining Resolution
2231 in its entirety.” He added that “Iran’s options…will be
firm.”
The June 30 Security Council meeting did not directly
address earlier U.S. official statements that the United
States would trigger a provision of Security Council
Resolution 2231 to “snap back” all U.N. sanctions,
including the arms transfer ban, if the arms embargo is not
extended. Resolution 2231 stipulates that a JCPOA
participant could, after notifying the Security Council of an
issue that the government “believes constitutes significant
non-performance of [JCPOA] commitments,” trigger an
Source: Defense Intel igence Agency. Iran Military Power: 2019
automatic draft resolution keeping sanctions relief in effect.
Relevant Laws, Authorities, and Options
A U.S. veto of this resolution would reimpose the
for the Administration and Congress
suspended sanctions. At an April 30, 2020, briefing, the
Special Representative for Iran and Senior Advisor to the
The stated Iran policy of the Trump Administration is to
apply “maximum pressure” on Iran’s economy, through
Secretary, Ambassador Brian Hook, asserted that this
the
option is available because the U.S. right “as a participant
imposition of U.S. sanctions, to compel Iran to alter its
[in Resolution 2231] is something which exists
behavior. The Administration cited the expiration of the
independently of the JCPOA.”
arms transfer ban as one among several reasons that the
JCPOA was sufficiently flawed to justify a U.S. exit from
European, Iranian, Russian, and other officials have
the accord in May 2018. As part of the maximum pressure
opposed the U.S. assertion that it can trigger a snapback of
campaign, the Administration has insisted on keeping the
all sanctions through Resolution 2231. On June 19, 2020,
arms transfer ban in place. At a meeting of the U.N.
the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and
Security Council on June 30 that discussed the arms
Germany (all parties to the JCPOA) issued a joint
transfer ban, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated:
“Don’t just take it from the United States, listen to countries
statement: “We firmly believe that any unilateral attempt to
trigger U.N. sanctions snapback would have series adverse
in the region. From Israel to the Gulf, countries in the
consequences in the UNSC. We would not support such a
Middle East – who are most exposed to Iran’s predations –
decision which would be incompatible with our current
are speaking with one voice: Extend the arms embargo.” A
efforts to preserve the JCPOA.” The reaction to the U.S.
May 4, 2020, House letter, signed by 387 Members,
“urge[s] increased diplomatic action by the United States to
threat to snap back all sanctions raises questions whether
the reimposition of sanctions through that action would
renew the expiring United Nations arms embargo against
Iran….”
obtain broad international implementation of reimposed
sanctions. Iran’s possible responses to a snap back are
discussed in: CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear
The annual Iran military report, cited above, states: “Iran’s
Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by Paul K.
potential acquisitions after the lifting of UNSCR 2231
Kerr.
restrictions include Russian Su-30 fighters, Yak-130
trainers, and T-90 MBTs (main battle tanks). Iran has also
If the United States is not able to achieve a U.S. extension
shown interest in acquiring S-400 air defense systems and
of the ban, the Administration might use its sanctions laws
Bastian coastal defense systems from Russia.” On June 23,
and authorities to deter any arms sales to Iran. These
2020, Secretary Pompeo posted a Twitter message that: “If
include the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, the Iran,
the U.N. Arms Embargo on Iran expires in October, Iran
will be able to buy new fighter aircraft like Russia’s SU
North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA),
-30
and China’s J
Executive Order 13382, the Countering America’s
-10. With these highly lethal aircraft, Europe
and Asia could be in Iran’s crosshairs.”
Adversaries through Sanctions Act, and Iran’s designation
The composition of
Iran’s forces is depicted in
as a state sponsor of terrorism provides authorities for the
Figure 2
President to sanction arms suppliers to Iran. See: CRS
Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
In June 2020 Administration officials said they had begun
circulating a draft U.N. Security Council resolution that
would extend the arms transfer ban for at least one year,
Kenneth Katzman, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers
IF11429
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