Women in the Middle East and North Africa:
June 19, 2020
Issues for Congress
Zoe Danon
The status of women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has garnered widespread
Section Research Manager
interest among many Members of Congress. Many experts have found that women in this region

fare worse than those in other parts of the world on a range of social, economic, legal and
Sarah R. Collins
political measures. Some attribute this underperformance to gender roles and perspectives
Research Assistant
(including discriminatory laws and beliefs), and challenges facing the region overall (such as a

preponderance of undemocratic governments, poor economic growth, civil wars, and mass
displacement, which often disproportionately affect women).

Some key issues facing many women in the region include:
 Unequal Legal Rights. Women in the MENA region face greater legal discrimination than women in any
other region, with differential laws on issues such as marriage and divorce, freedom of movement, and
inheritance, as well as limited to no legal protection from domestic violence.
 Constraints on Economic Participation and Opportunity. Regional conditions, in addition to gender-
based discrimination, contribute to a significant difference between men and women’s participation in
MENA economies. For example, women do not participate in the labor force to the same degree as women
in other regions, and those who do participate face on average nearly twice the levels of unemployment
than men.
 Underrepresentation in Political Processes. Women—particularly in countries like Yemen, Kuwait and
Lebanon—are poorly represented in legislative bodies compared to the global average.
 Conflict and Displacement. Women and girls constitute the majority of displaced civilian populations and
are at a higher risk of exploitation and abuse in conflict and displacement settings. Experts are particularly
concerned about displaced populations in Syria and Yemen.
 Lack of Representation in Conflict Resolution and Peace Negotiations. Despite international efforts to
improve women’s participation in peace negotiations, women have not played significant roles in efforts to
resolve the region’s three largest ongoing wars in Libya, Syria, or Yemen.
 Susceptibility to Radicalization, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism. Women are susceptible to
radicalization by extremist groups like the Islamic State, which have targeted them for support and
recruitment, though experts have noted that women may also be uniquely positioned to counter violent
extremist ideology. In Egypt and Algeria, for example, the governments have trained women clerics to
counter radicalization.
 Disproportionate Vulnerability to Possible Impacts of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The
impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on women have yet to be fully realized. However, previous pandemics
and infectious disease outbreaks suggest that women will be differentially affected by the COVID-19
outbreak relative to men, particularly in the areas of employment, access to education, and sexual and
gender-based violence.
Over the years, many Members of Congress have supported U.S. efforts to bolster gender equality in the MENA region in the
context of advocating for women’s rights and well-being globally. Some have also emphasized that supporting women’s
rights may advance broader U.S. national security interests in the region. To support these positions, proponents sometimes
cite research suggesting that the relative status of women in society appears to be linked to greater political stability, security,
and prosperity, as well as to better governance.
Congress has addressed issues related to women through foreign assistance appropriations and authorizations, resolutions,
statements and letters, and oversight activities. Some of these measures have been global in scope, while others have been
region-specific. In the 116th Congress and beyond, Members may consider whether improvements in the status of women
may contribute to other U.S. policy goals, and debate the appropriate level and types of U.S. engagement on the particular
challenges facing women in different MENA countries.
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Introduction
Congressional efforts to improve conditions for women in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) have garnered widespread support since at least the early 2000s. The broad appeal may
reflect a convergence of goals for those advocating positive changes for women as an end-goal in
itself, and those supporting such changes primarily as a potential means to advance broader U.S.
interests in the region, such as peace and stability, countering terrorism, increasing prosperity, and
fostering good governance and human rights. Such support reflects a growing body of research
suggesting that improving opportunities and conditions for women in a society may support such
outcomes both global y and in the region.
This report provides background and data on key issues regarding women in the MENA region
and describes selected ways in which Congress has engaged on issues such as women’s legal
rights, economic participation, and political representation; the humanitarian impact of conflict
and displacement on women; women’s inclusion in conflict resolution and peace processes;
violence against women; and women’s roles in perpetuating and combatting violent extremism.
Many Members of Congress have demonstrated an interest in women’s issues, both within
MENA and global y, through legislation (see Appendix), statements and letters, direct
engagement with regional leaders, and oversight.
For the purposes of this report, the MENA region comprises the areas defined as “Near East” by
the State Department: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen.1
Current Status of Women in the MENA Region
The World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) 2020 Global Gender Gap Report ranked the Arab states
of the MENA region the lowest in the world for achieving gender equality, with MENA states
comprising 13 of the 25 worst-performing countries global y.2 The region also performed poorly
in the 2019 Women Peace and Security (WPS) Index, in which MENA states comprise 7 of the 25
worst-performing countries.3 Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen—al countries sustaining significant
levels of violent conflict—were among the 10 worst performers on the WPS Index. The gender
gap in the region (as measured by WEF) narrowed by 0.5 percentage points since 2018 and 3.6
points since 2006: assuming the same rate of progress into the future, it would take approximately

1 T his report does not include data on the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. CRS does not take a position on the political
status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some of the key sources on which this report relies do not provide data for the
West Bank and Gaza. For information on the status of women in the West Bank and Gaza, see for example: U.N.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, “ Social and Economic Situation of Palestinian Women and Girls
(July 2016 – June 2018),” E/ESCWA/ECW/2019/T echnical Paper 2, January 9, 2019.
2 T he WEF index “benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, education, health and political criteria, and provides
country rankings that allow for effective comparisons across regions and income groups.” T he 13 countries are:
Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Oman, Morocco, Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Bahrain, and Algeria. WEF,
Global Gender Gap Report 2020, December 2019.
3 T he WPS Index measures performance across three dimensions of a woman’s wellbeing: inclusion (economic, social,
and political), justice (formal laws and informal discrimination), and security (at the family, community, and societal
levels). Countries in the bottom 25 are: Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, and Algeria. Georgetown Institute
for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Wom en, Peace and Security Index
2019/20: Tracking sustainable peace through inclusion, justice, and security for wom en , October 2019.
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Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress

150 years to close the gender gap.4 Not al MENA countries perform equal y poorly, as Figure 1
below il ustrates. For example, Israel scores higher than other MENA states in both rankings.
Figure 1. MENA Performance on Global Measures of Women’s Equality

Sources: Created by CRS with data from World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report 2020, December
2019; Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, Women, Peace
and Security Index 2019/20, October 2019.
Key Trends and Challenges
Explanations for the region’s underperformance on most measures of gender equality are subject
to debate, but general y fal into two overlapping categories: gender roles and perspectives, and
challenges facing the MENA region overall. The 2019 WPS Index posits that the region’s poor
performance is “traceable largely to high levels of organized violence and discriminatory laws
that disempower women, often coupled with low rates of inclusion, especial y in paid
employment.”5 Since the early 2000s, some experts and policymakers have increasingly related
these issues to research examining possible links between the wel -being of women and the

4 WEF, Global Gender Gap Report 2020. T his is the same amount of time as WEF predicts will take North America to
close its gap, given a slower projected rate of change.
5 GIWPS and PRIO, Women, Peace and Security Index 2019/20, p. 1.
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Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress

overal stability of societies (see “Research on Women, Prosperity, Good Governance, and
Security”).
Discriminatory Laws and Beliefs
Many experts postulate that some combination of institutionalized legal discrimination, cultural
practices, and religious beliefs about women contribute to gender inequality in the MENA region.
Legal discrimination (discussed in “Legal Rights”) and cultural views relegating women to a
lower standing in many regional countries appear to be pervasive, despite some signs of change.
Public opinion surveys in predominantly Arab countries, which make up most but not al of the
MENA region, suggest that certain cultural beliefs against women’s equality are prevalent. For
example, Arab Barometer’s 2019 survey on women’s rights in 15 Arab countries found that the
majority of survey respondents believed that men are better leaders and should have greater say in
family decision making, and that women should not be al owed to travel independently or have an
equal share in inheritance (see Figure 2).6
Figure 2. Public Opinion on Women’s Rights in Select MENA Countries

Source: Created by CRS with data from Kathrin Thomas, “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North
Africa,” Arab Barometer, August 2019. The Arab Barometer survey included 14 countries within the scope of
this report: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia,
Qatar, and Yemen.
Regional Dynamics
Experts also point to chal enges facing the region as a whole to explain why women in the MENA
region fare worse than women in most other regions in terms of a broad range of political, legal,
and socioeconomic indicators. Most MENA states have shown improvement on these indicators
over the last few generations.7 However, decades of civil and inter-state wars, a lack of effective
governing institutions, and a lag in developing robust, diversified economies arguably have
inhibited this progress. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the wave of unrest known as the

6 One 2019 study found that people who agree that men are better political leaders than women, regardless of their
gender, are more likely to state that corruption is justifiable. See Ortrun Merkle and Pui-Hang Wong, “ It Is All about
Power: Corruption, Patriarchy and the Political Participation of Women,” in Women and Sustainable Development:
Em powering Wom en in Africa, ed. Maty Konte and Nyasha T irivayi (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 353-368.
7 For a historical look at the status of women in the MENA region, see Nikki R. Keddie, Women in the Middle East:
Past and Present (Princeton University Press, 2007); Freedom House, Wom en’s Rights in the Middle East and North
Africa, 2010.
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“Arab Spring” that started in 2011 led to the fal of longstanding leaders in some countries, and
political conflict and sectarian violence in others. Those changes and the rise of the Islamic State
(IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) in 2014 produced a general deterioration in human development indicators
across the region.8
A majority of countries in the region are currently experiencing some combination of war,
political instability, terrorism, economic chal enges, and/or poor governance. These phenomena
have had negative impacts on the whole society, including some effects that are unique to, or
worse for, women (see below). Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen face wars and/or terrorist/insurgent
violence that are eroding central governance in each country and producing large-scale
humanitarian crises. Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon experienced significant popular
protests in 2019. Freedom House noted in 2020 that region-wide, “credible elections remain
exceedingly rare.”9 Tunisia remains the sole MENA country to have made a seemingly durable
transition to democracy as a result of the 2011 uprisings, but it continues to struggle to build
strong government institutions and overcome political polarization.
Research on Women, Prosperity, Good Governance, and Security
During the past two decades, research linking the wel -being of women and the economic, social,
and political stability and security of societies has gained prominence.10 Some U.S. policymakers
have sought to examine these links in the context of the MENA region, suggesting that
improvements to women’s status have the potential to achieve other U.S. regional policy
objectives by improving outcomes for the region as a whole. Below is a summary of some of the
research as it pertains to U.S. policy objectives in the region, such as peace and stability,
countering terrorism, increasing prosperity, and fostering good governance.
 Women’s equality appears to foster increased socioeconomic development
and political stability.11 Studies have demonstrated a correlation between the
extent to which women are involved and empowered in a country’s economy and
politics and better outcomes for the overal society in terms of economic growth
and stability.12 The World Bank has argued that “gender equality is smart

8 Since the Arab Spring, all but two MENA countries have witnessed a decline in Human Development Indicators: in
2009, only Yemen was categorized as low human development, but by 2018 Egypt, Morocco, and Syria had joined
Yemen in that category. Only Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia saw improvements in their global rankings. While the
number of flawed democracies in the region doubled from one in 2009 (Israel) to two in 2019 (Israel and T unisia), five
countries experienced decreases in democracy scores over the last decade (Bah rain, Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, and
Yemen). Sarah Repucci, Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Dem ocracy, Freedom House, February
2020.
9 Sarah Repucci, Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy, Freedom House, February 2020.
10 Increased international awareness of this issue led to the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on
women, peace, and security in October 2000 and eight subsequent resolutions. Resolution 1325 called on U.N. member
states to increase women’s participation at all decision-making levels, ensure the protection of and respect for human
rights of women, support local women’s peace initiatives, provide suitable women candidates as U.N. special
representatives and envoys, and create special measures to protect women and girls from violence in situations of
armed conflict.
11 T his report generally accepts these prevailing conclusions that improvements in social conditions for women and
increased participation by women are responsible for improvements in other areas, but acknowledges that other
interpretations of these positive correlations are possible. For a discussion on causation see for example Arjan de Haan,
“T he Win-Win Case for Women’s Economic Empowerment and Growth: Review of the Literatur e,” International
Development Research Centre, GrOW Working Paper Series, March 2017.
12 See, for example, Esther Duflo, “Women Empowerment and Economic Development,” Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 50, no. 4 (2012), pp. 1051 -79.
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economics,” asserting that gender equality enhances productivity and improves
other development outcomes, including prospects for the next generation and for
the quality of societal policies and institutions.13
 Women’s political participation may be critical to developing good
governance and sustaining lasting democratic transitions. Various studies
have found that women’s empowerment as political leaders is correlated with
greater responsiveness to citizen needs, increased cooperation across party and
ethnic lines, decreased levels of corruption, lower levels of civil conflict, and a
reduced risk of civil war relapse.14
 Women’s and girls’ experiences in conflict and displacement settings may
have long-term impacts on a country’s economic and social development.
Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against women and girls tends to
increase during conflict and humanitarian crises due to the sudden breakdown of
family and social structures after forced displacement.15 Gaps in education,
combined with war-related trauma and SGBV, may have long-term implications
for the region’s economic growth, rates of child, early, and forced marriage and
fertility, and maternal and child health.16 A World Bank study estimates that
ending childhood marriage global y would have significant socioeconomic
benefits.17
 Women’s participation in peace processes may enhance post-conflict
stability. Studies have shown that the inclusion of women in peace processes can
help to reduce conflict and improve long-term prospects for peace.18 A recent
study estimated that the participation of women and civil society groups in a
peace negotiation makes a peace agreement 64% less likely to fail and 35% more
likely to last at least 15 years.19

13 T he World Bank, World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development, 2012; T he World Bank,
Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Developm ent in the Middle East and North Africa , 2013.
14 See, for example, David Dollar et al., “Are Women Really the ‘Fairer’ Sex? Co rruption and Women in
Government,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 49 (2001), pp. 423-9; Georgina Waylen, “Gender
and T ransitions: What do We Know?” Democratization, vol. 10, no. 1 (2003), pp. 157-78; Erik Melander, “Gender
Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict,” International Studies International Studies Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 4 (2005),
pp. 695–714; Jacqueline Demeritt et al., “ Female Participation and Civil War Relapse,” Civil Wars, vol. 16, no. 3
(2014).
15 See, for example, U.N. Population Fund, Humanitarian Action: 2019 Overview, December 2018; and U.N. Security
Council, Conflict-related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, S/2019/280, March 29,
2019. T he WPS Index 2019 also posits that intimate partner violence is correlated with security in a country at large,
finding that “a 1 percentage point increase in the share of women experiencing current intimate partner violence is
associated with a 1.4 percent increase in organized violence.” GIWPS and PRIO, Women, Peace and Security Index
2019/20, p. 5.
16 See, for example, Oxfam, “Factsheet: Women, Peace and Security in the Middle East and North Africa Region,”
February 2016; UNHCR, “ T urn the T ide: Refugee Education in Crisis,” August 2018.
17 T he study estimated the welfare benefits from lower population growth due to ending child marriage globally would
be $22 billion in 2015 and $566 billion in 2030 (for 106 countries). Quentin Wodon et al., “Economic Impacts of Child
Marriage: Global Synthesis Report,” T he World Bank, June 2017.
18 For a review of the literature on women’s involvement in peace processes and the positive correlation with success
and durability, see Maxwell Adjei, “Women’s participation in peace processes: a review of literature,” Journal of
Peace Education, vol. 16, no. 2 (2019), pp. 133-154.
19 Marie O’Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, and T hania Paffenholz, Re-Imagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in
Peace Processes, International Peace Institute, June 2015.
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 Women’s status in the household may be linked to levels of extremism in a
community. Some studies have linked the status of women at the household
level to the resilience of a state and community to violence and violent
extremism.20 Terrorist groups have tasked female members with concealing
explosive devices, relaying communications, ferrying funds, and the like,
leveraging that women are less likely to be searched or otherwise draw attention
from security forces.21 At the same time, some research found that women may
be uniquely positioned as “mitigators” of terrorism, both as “predictors” and
“preventers.”22
Overview of U.S. Policy
Successive U.S. administrations at least since the George W. Bush presidency have expressed an
interest in improving women’s conditions in the MENA region, and have established or supported
programs aimed at pursuing that goal. At the same time, because of the complex nature of broader
U.S. policy, activities that specifical y address the wel -being of women often compete with other
regional policy priorities.
The primary U.S. government agencies that address women in the region are the State
Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Bilateral aid funded
by the State Department and USAID-funded democracy and governance activities routinely
incorporate the promotion of women’s equality.23 The Trump Administration requested
approximately $75 mil ion and $83 mil ion in FY2019 and FY2020 respectively for State
Department and USAID gender programs in the region.24 Broader U.S. foreign affairs and
security assistance programs addressing cross-cutting issues such as global health, humanitarian
activities, defense, and legal and political rights may also address issues related to women.
The U.S. government does not consistently or comprehensively track the number or cost of
programs that address the status of women in the MENA region. Therefore, it is unclear how
much money the United States spends annual y on such programs. Capturing this information is
complicated by the varying degree to which programs focus on women, and the extent to which
they focus on the region or are part of broader global initiatives. Despite a lack of government-

20 Krista Couture, “A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Women in
Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco,” Brookings Institution,
Policy Paper, July 2014; T estimony of Dr. Valerie Hudson, in House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on T errorism,
Nonproliferation and T rade, Wom en’s Role in Countering Terrorism , hearing 115th Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, 2018
(Washington DC: GPO, 2018). Dr. Hudson’s study, drawing data on foreign fighters from the Soufan Center, found
that the status of women at the household level is correlated with a reduction in the incidence of a country producing
foreign fighters.
21 Jamille Bigio and Rebecca T urkington, “U.S. Counterterrorism’s Big Blindspot: Women,” The New Republic, March
27, 2019. For an in-depth look at one terrorist organization that has utilized this tactic to unprecedented levels, see
Hilary Matfess, Wom en and the War on Boko Haram : Wives, Weapons, Witnesses (Zed Books, 2017).
22 For a discussion of the range of roles women play in perpetrating and mitigating terrorism, see Jamille Bigio and
Rachel Vogelstein, “Women and T errorism: Hidden T hreats, Forgotten Partners,” Council on Foreign Relations,
Discussion Paper, May 2019.
23 USAID’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Policy seeks to “advance gender equality through integrated
approaches as well as specific programming that dives deeper into the gender disparities across the region.” See
USAID, “Middle East Regional: Democracy and Governance,” last updated May 4, 2018.
24 FY2019 and FY2020 Congressional Budget Justification supplementary tables for the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs. T he MENA region accounted for 8% and 11% of the FY2019 and FY2020 regional
funding request s for gender programs.
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wide information, some U.S. agencies have provided potential y useful snapshots of their
activities. For example, USAID estimates that in FY2018 (the most recent year for which
comprehensive data are available), it spent over $30 mil ion on projects or activities in the region
in which gender equality or women’s and girls’ empowerment was the primary or secondary goal;
an additional $3.4 mil ion was spent on projects targeting gender-based violence and trafficking
in persons.25
Selected MENA-Specific Congressional Actions
In recent Congresses, legislation introduced and/or enacted aims to address issues of women’s
rights and wel being in the MENA region. Some examples are described below. (See Appendix A
for additional legislation.)
 FY2020 Appropriations. Section 7041(a) of P.L. 116-94 includes a provision
that withholds $300 mil ion of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds to Egypt
until the Secretary of State certifies that the Government of Egypt is taking
effective steps to advance democracy and human rights, among other things, to
include protecting religious minorities and the rights of women.26 Section 7041
(l) provides $40 mil ion under for stabilization assistance for Yemen, including a
contribution for United Nations (U.N.) stabilization and governance facilities,
and to meet the needs of vulnerable populations, including women and girls.27
 Saudi Arabia. In the 116th Congress, two resolutions have been introduced to
condemn the Government of Saudi Arabia’s detention and al eged abuse of
women’s rights activists (H.Res. 129, passed in the House on July 15, 2019, and
S.Res. 73). The Saudi Arabia Human Rights and Accountability Act of 2019
(H.R. 2037), which passed in the House on July 25, 2019, would impose
sanctions related to the kil ing of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi,
which could be suspended if, among other criteria, “the Government of Saudi
Arabia has taken verifiable steps to repeal any law or regulation that requires
Saudi women to obtain approval from a male guardian in order to leave the
country.”28
 Sexual and Gender-based Violence. The Accountability for Sexual and Gender-
based Violence as a Tool in Conflict Act of 2019 (S. 1777 and H.R. 3212) would
provide for sanctions against foreign persons responsible for conflict-related acts

25 CRS communication with USAID officials on October 28, 2019.
26 T he FMF certification requirement for Egypt in P.L. 116-94 does not apply to funds appropriated for
counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation programs for Egypt. T his provision has been in annual
appropriations bills since FY2012.
27 Joint Explanatory Statement for Division G – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94).
28 T he Act was incorporated as amendment 475 to the House-passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
(H.R. 2500), but only parts of the Act (reporting requirements on Saudi Arabia’s human rights record and on the killing
of Jamal Khashoggi) were incorporated into the final version (Sect. 1276 and 1277, P.L. 116-92). Shortly after the
NDAA passed the House, the Saudi government eased restrictions on women’s movement, however several prominent
women activists remain in jail. See Anya van Wagtendonk “ Saudi Arabia changed its guardianship laws, but activists
who fought them remain imprisoned,” Vox.com, August 3, 2019 and Human Rights Watch, “ Saudi Arabia: Unrelenting
Repression: Positive Reforms for Women T ainted by Ongoing Arrests of Activists, Dissidents,” News Release, January
14, 2020.
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of sexual and gender-based violence, and finds that “rape and sexual assault have
been used as tactics of war and terror in conflict zones including Iraq and Syria.”
Congress has also conducted some oversight on the status of women in the region. In 2019,
Congress held at least four hearings in which Members asked about the status of women in the
region.29 Members have also publicized meetings with senior women serving in the region’s
governments, and have expressed concerns related to the status of women during official travel
for oversight purposes.30 Senators have raised questions regarding U.S. efforts to advance the
status of women and sought related commitments from executive branch nominees for
ambassadorships to the region and Assistant Secretary positions within the State Department.31
Selected Global Congressional Actions
In recent years, legislation has been enacted or introduced to address women’s issues worldwide,
including on women, peace, and security; economic empowerment; and gender-based violence.
Although these pieces of legislation are global in scope, they have the potential to apply to the
MENA region given prevailing political, economic and security conditions. Three examples are
described below.
 The Women Peace and Security Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-68) states it is policy of
the United States “to promote the meaningful participation of women in overseas
conflict prevention, management and resolution, and post-conflict relief and
recovery efforts” and cal s for the creation of a new Women, Peace and Security
strategy to detail the operationalization of the WPS Act.32 It also requires training
for selected U.S. government employees, consultation and collaboration between
State Department and USAID to increase the meaningful participation of women
in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as wel as a reporting requirement on
the WPS strategy two years after enactment.
 The Women's Entrepreneurship and Economic Empowerment Act of 2018
(P.L. 115-428) modifies USAID programs to provide targeted assistance for
women and authorizes the President to provide programs in developing countries
for micro, smal , and medium-sized businesses, particularly those owned,
managed, and controlled by women.

29 Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, T ransnational Crime, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues, Women in Conflict: Advancing Women’s Role in Peace and
Security, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., June 13, 2019; Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South
Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism, Iraq: A Crossroads of U.S. Policy, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 16,
2020; House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and International Terrorism, The FY20
Budget: State Departm ent Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extrem ism Bureau , hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
July 24, 2019; Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism
The Path Forward: Key Findings from the Syria Study Group Report, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 24,
2019.
30 For example, Senators Young and King met with female activists during a congressional delegation to Saudi Arabia
in Sept ember 2019 to discuss women’s rights in the Middle East . Sen. T odd Young and Sen. Angus King, “ Public
actions, not private assurances, will help repair US-Saudi relations,” Defense News, September 20, 2019.
31 See for example questions raised about Saudi Arabia’s detention of women’s rights activists during the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Ambassadorial Nominations for Saudi Arabia and Iraq, March 6, 2019 and
on Pending Nomination for Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, March 27, 2019.
32 T he T rump Administration delivered its strategy on Women Peace and Security on June 11, 2019 available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/WPS_Strategy_10_October2019.pdf .
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 The Women and Countering Violent Extremism Act of 2019 (H.R. 1653),
would find that the Islamic State benefited strategical y and financial y from the
subjugation of women, and would authorize assistance to women-led and
women’s empowerment organizations in foreign countries working on countering
violent extremism and terrorism. Section 1047 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2020 (P.L. 116-92) incorporates a similar provision
contained in H.R. 1653 that requires an independent assessment of the
relationship between gender and violent extremism (for more detail see
Appendix).
Over the years, several Members have also introduced various versions of the International
Violence Against Women Act, and Congress has enacted legislation on a range of women’s issues
in annual appropriations acts (see text box). Some Members have also sought to codify the
executive branch positions and offices related to global women’s issues.33

FY2020 Foreign Aid Appropriations for Global Women’s Issues
Section 7059 of the final FY2020 SFOPS appropriations (Division G, P.L. 116-94) provides up to $330
mil ion to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment global y. It is unclear to what extent, if
any, such funding might impact women in the MENA region.
 Women’s Economic Empowerment—Up to $100 mil ion in bilateral economic assistance
(Title III) funds for the Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Fund.
 Women’s Leadership—Not less than $50 mil ion in Title III funds for programs “specifical y
designed to increase leadership opportunities for women in countries where women and girls
suffer discrimination due to law, policy, or practice, by strengthening protections for women’s
political status, expanding women’s participation in political parties and elections, and increasing
women’s opportunities for leadership positions in the public and private sectors at the local,
provincial, and national levels.”
 Gender-based Violence—Not less than $165 mil ion in Title III and IV (international security
assistance) funds to implement a multi-year strategy to prevent and respond to a variety of
forms of gender-based violence including child, early, and forced marriage, rape, female genital
cutting and mutilation, and domestic violence, in conflict and non-conflict settings.
 Women, Peace and Security—Unspecified level of funds from various accounts to support a
multi-year strategy to expand, and improve coordination of U.S. government efforts to empower
women as equal partners in conflict prevention, peace building, transitional processes, and
reconstruction efforts in countries affected by conflict or in political transition, and to ensure the
equitable provision of relief and recovery assistance to women and girls.
 Women and Girls at Risk from Extremism and Conflict—Not less than $15 mil ion in
Economic Support Fund monies “to support women and girls who are at risk from extremism
and conflict.”
Policy Issues
The following sections describe several issues policymakers and lawmakers may take into
account when considering how to improve the status of women in the MENA region, including
legal rights and protections for women, women’s economic participation, women’s political

33 For example, selected legislative vehicles that have sought to codify the State Department’s Office of Global
Women’s Issues and the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s issues over the years included versions of the
International Violence Against Women Act; some proposed Senate State/Foreign Operations appropriations bills; and
proposed State Department authorization bills.
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representation, and the impact of conflict and displacement on women and girls. Each section
examines both the gender perspectives and regional dynamics that affect women in the region.
Legal Rights
A chal enge facing many women in the MENA region is a lack of legal rights. The region exhibits
high levels of gender-based legal discrimination (see Figure 3): according to the aforementioned
2019 WPS Index, al 18 MENA countries except Israel are below the global average and 10
countries are among the world’s bottom 12 performers.34 Saudi Arabia ranked the lowest global y
for legal discrimination against women, followed closely by Yemen, the UAE, and Syria. (These
findings pre-date legal and administrative changes undertaken by Saudi Arabia in 2019 regarding
guardianship laws.)
Figure 3. Legal Discrimination Score by World Region
2019 WPS Index

Sources: Created by CRS with data from GIWPS and PRIO, Women, Peace and Security Index 2019/20. The
Index calculates the legal discrimination score by aggregating and weighting scores of 78 laws and regulations that
limit women’s ability to participate in society or the economy or that differentiate between men and women, as
measured by The World Bank, Women, Business, and the Law 2019: A Decade of Reform, February 2019.
Note: The WPS index “Fragile States” classification is based on The World Bank “Harmonized List of Fragile
Situations,” 2019.
The constitutions of some MENA countries nominal y guarantee equality between men and
women (see Figure 4).35 However, in practice, rules governing matters of family law apply
differently to women in nearly al MENA countries, as they are often based on religious
jurisprudence. On issues related to family matters, al of the Arab countries and Iran apply Islamic
law, which is not gender-neutral on marriage, divorce, child custody and guardianship, and
inheritance. Israel’s legal system places status issues of marriage and divorce under the
jurisdiction of religious courts, which include Jewish Rabbinical Religious Courts, as wel as
Muslim, Druze, and Christian courts.36 In general, constitutional provisions and laws mandating

34 T his measure captures both legal discrimination and discriminatory norms. GIWPS and PRIO, Women, Peace and
Security Index 2019/20.
35 Additionally, every MENA country, with the exception of Iran, has ratified the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), though almost every country ratified with conditions. (T he United States
has not ratified CEDAW.)
36 In Israel, laws regulating inheritance, transmission of citizenship, and age of marriage in Israel do not differentiate
between persons based on their gender. T he Law Library of Congress, “ Legal Provisions on Gender Equality: Arab
Countries, Israel, Iran,” LL File No. 2020-018615, February 2020. See also Ruth Levush, “Israel: Spousal Agreements
for Couples Not Belonging to Any Religion—A Civil Marriage Option?” Law Library of Congress, September 2015.
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gender equality cannot be effective if judicial institutions are not independent and if executive
institutions are unwil ing or unable to implement the laws, or hold perpetrators accountable. 37
As il ustrated in Figure 4, no MENA countries treat women fully equal y under the law.
Specifical y, women are treated differently under:
 Gender equality and discrimination laws. Half of MENA countries (9 of 18)
include a constitutional provision enshrining the principle of gender equality. The
other half either have an equality provision that does not specifical y mention the
term “gender,” or they provide for equality based on Islamic legal criteria, which
treat women and men differently.
 Domestic violence laws. Half of MENA countries have laws addressing
domestic violence. In three of these countries, legal provisions address some acts
of domestic violence but do not address marital rape.
 Age of marriage laws. More than half of MENA countries (11 of 18) have set a
minimum age for marriage of 18 or older for both girls and boys. Nevertheless,
13 countries (including Israel) have a provision in their family law al owing a
religious court to marry women younger than the legal age of marriage. Iran has
the lowest legal age of marriage for girls at 13 years old, and Yemen has no
minimum age for marriage.
Case Study: USAID Efforts to Address the Justice System
and Gender-based Violence (GBV) in Jordan38
In FY2018, USAID aimed to improve the ability of the judicial system in Jordan to respond to cases of violence
against women by developing and securing approval from the Ministry of Justice to promulgate and enforce
guidelines for judicial handling procedures for victims of domestic violence. USAID trained 210 justice sector
personnel across Jordan on how to use the guidelines. As part of its efforts to strengthen advocacy for female
empowerment, USAID also worked with the Jordanian National Commission for Women to advocate for legal
safeguards to prevent or respond to GBV by helping to draft recommendations for amendments to the Personal
Status Law and lobby members of Parliament. The law offers the legal framework that governs marriage, divorce,
paternity, and inheritance, and provides guardianship provisions that shape gender relationships within families.
The proposed amendments safeguard non-discrimination based on social status, sex, and religion, and promote
gender equality and the rights of children in line with international treaties. USAID partnered with national
stakeholders and convened a two-day workshop bringing advocates and experts to further examine the Personal
Status Law. An assessment published by USAID in January 2020 notes that the law has stil not incorporated these
amendments, despite increased debate on the issues.39

37 For example, the State Department noted that in Morocco, “the judiciary lacked willingness to enforce [family law
reforms enacted in 2004], as many judges did not agree with their provisio ns” and where “ corruption among working-
level court clerks and lack of knowledge about its provisions among lawyers were also obstacles to enforcing the law. ”
U.S. Department of State, “ Morocco 2019 Human Rights Report,” March 2020.
38 CRS communication with USAID officials on October 28, 2019.
39 USAID, “Final Report: USAID/Jordan Gender Analysis and Assessment,” January 10, 2020.
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Figure 4. Selected Measures of Legal Discrimination Against MENA Women

Source: Created by CRS with data from the GIWPS and PRIO, Women, Peace and Security Index 2019/20 (legal
discrimination score, reflecting country conditions as of 2019) and The Law Library of Congress, “Legal
Provisions on Gender Equality: Arab Countries, Israel, Iran,” LL File No. 2020-018615, February 2020.
Economic Participation and Opportunity
Regional conditions, in addition to gender-based discrimination, contribute to a significant
difference between men and women’s economic participation. With the partial exception of major
oil- and gas-producing countries, the MENA region has long lagged on economic development
indicators when compared with other regions. Development indicators have declined further in
some countries as a result of violent unrest since 2011. Al but one MENA country (Algeria) fel
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in the ranking of Human Development Indicators (HDI) between 2009 and 2019.40 Women
arguably have experienced these national and regional disadvantages more severely than men: the
average unemployment rate for women in the region (14.7%) is more than twice the regional
average for men (6.6%).41 Conversely, the limits in women’s economic participation may be
among many factors that have contributed to regional shortfal s: in 2016, the OECD estimated
that gender-based discrimination in laws and social norms costs the MENA region $575 bil ion a
year.42
Within the region, states have significant differences with regard to income level. To some extent,
women in states that have achieved more economic success overal have higher participation in
the labor force and lower unemployment rates than women in the lower-income, less developed
countries (see Figure 5). This is not uniformly true, however; in Saudi Arabia, where the legal
system and culture have traditional y discouraged women’s participation in the economy, few
women work despite relative national wealth. Saudi authorities have begun encouraging women’s
participation in the workforce in recent years as a component of broader national economic
development and transformation initiatives.43
The MENA region has the lowest rates of female labor force participation (i.e., the percentage of
women who work or are actively seeking employment) in the world.44 The regional average
female labor force participation rate (28.3%) is 19 percentage points below the global average for
women (47.7%), ranging from 5.8% in Yemen to 59.2% in Israel.45 On average, women
participate in the labor force at less than half the rate of men in the region (76.2%). The greatest
gaps between male and female participation in the labor force are found in Yemen, Iraq and
Syria—countries that face severe instability and conflict in addition to economic woes—and in
several Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Oman).
The “MENA Paradox”
In what has been referred to as the “MENA paradox,” female labor force participation remains low across the
region despite rapidly rising female education attainment (see Figure 5).46 The World Bank argues that the
region’s conservative gender norms, legal and institutional barriers, and incentives and opportunities generated by
local economic structures drive low rates of women’s participation in the public sphere.47 Some observers have
posited that the mismatch is demand-side driven, as young women have increasingly entered the workforce at a

40 With the exception of five countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen), all of the MENA countries
improved their HDI scores over the 10-year period. T he HDI is a statistic composite index of life expectancy,
education, and per capita income indicators compiled by the U.N. Development Program .
41 T he ILO defines unemployment as the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking
employment. T welve of the world’s 14 worst performing countries o n female employment are Yemen, Syria, Algeria,
Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, T unisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Lebanon. ILOST AT data, 2018, presented in
GIWPS and PRIO, Wom en, Peace and Security Index 2019/20 .
42 Gaëlle Ferrant and Alexandre Kolev, “T he economic cost of gender-based discrimination in social institutions,”
OECD Development Centre, Issues Paper, June 2016.
43 T he World Bank, “ Saudi women rising up in business in line with Vision 2030,” March 11, 2020.
44 International Labor Organization (ILO) modeled estimates retrieved December 2019. T he ILO statistics on labor
force participation and unemployment do not count unpaid domestic or agricultural work that many women do.
45 ILO modeled estimates retrieved December 2019. For a discussion of why women’s economic participation is so low
in Yemen specifically, see Fawziah Al-Ammar and Hannah Patchett, “The Repercussions of War on Women in the
Yemeni Workforce,” Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, July 23, 2019.
46 ILO, “High female education and low labour participation rates: IFAD and ILO tackle the ‘MENA gender paradox,’”
ILO News, July 19, 2017.
47 T he World Bank, Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa , 2013.
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time when job opportunities happen to have stagnated for both men and women .48 Others argue that the paradox
can be explained by a trifecta of constraints on supply-side factors, namely discriminatory gender norms, attitudes
and regulations; a lack of financial and business services for women; and limited access to skil s, knowledge,
markets and networks.49
The World Bank has noted that a failure to address the high unemployment rates among youth
and women could “deter economic recovery and hamper long-term growth prospects in the
region.”50 High rates of unemployment and under-employment (reflecting those who are actively
seeking work), particularly among young people, continue to chal enge MENA governments (see
Figure 5). Youth unemployment, while a chal enge for men as wel as women, is worse for young
women in al the MENA countries except Israel: on average, female youth unemployment is
nearly 14 percentage points higher than male youth unemployment (31.6% compared to 18%).51
Economic frustration was arguably one of the driving forces behind the Arab Spring uprisings in
2011, and renewed protests in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon in 2019 again brought the issue
to the fore.52
The picture is not uniformly negative: since 2000, over nine mil ion women have entered the
region’s labor force.53 Some observers also point to increased female entrepreneurship in
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar as positive economic developments for women. In
2019, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were found to have more women entrepreneurs than men, an
increase from 2017 when there were around eight women for every 10 male entrepreneurs.54
Case Study: USAID Efforts to Promote Women’s Entrepreneurship in Egypt55
Through its Strengthening Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development (SEED) activity, USAID launched a
women entrepreneurs' network (WEN) in 2018 with representatives from eight women-focused organizations.56
This network aims to secure financial and non-financial services for women entrepreneurs and business owners
and articulate policy needs to the Government of Egypt. In FY2018, USAID reached out to 5,720 women
beneficiaries, and 776 women entrepreneurs were trained to become leaders through USAID’s SEED capacity
building programs and events. SEED activities in FY2018 also supported female entrepreneurs in developing their
businesses and generating revenues of $64,211, with revenue growth of 366%.

48 Ragui Assaad et al., “Explaining the MENA Paradox: Rising Educational Attainment, Yet Stagnant Female Labor
Force Participation,” IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Discussion Paper No. 11385, March 2018.
49 Drew Gardiner, “Attitudes and Norms on Women’s Employment in the MENA region,” ILO, March 2018.
50 Rabah Arezki et al., “ A New Economy for the Middle East and North Africa,” T he World Bank, Middle East and
North Africa Econom ic Monitor, October 2018.
51 CRS calculations using ILO modeled estimates last updated April 9, 2020.
52 See for example Jeremy Bowen, “Is a new Arab Spring unfolding in the Middle East?” BBC News, October 29,
2019.
53 Saadia Zahidi, Fifty Million Rising: The New Generation of Working Women Transforming the Muslim World, (New
York, NY: Nation Books, 2018), p. 7.
54 Ayman Ismail, “Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Middle East and North Africa,” Global Entrepreneurship Research
Association, London Business School, November 2017; Niels Bosma et al., “ Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
2019/2020 Global Report ,” Global Entrepreneurship Research Association, London Business School, 2020. While
promising, these gains for women are not universal across the region: the 2019 study found there are more than two
male entrepreneurs for every female entrepreneur in Egypt .
55 CRS communication with USAID officials on October 28, 2019.
56 U.S. Embassy in Egypt, “ USAID Supports the Launch of Egypt’s First Women Entrepreneurs Network ,” Press
Release, November 18, 2018.
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Figure 5. Selected Economic Indicators for Women in the MENA region

Source: Labor force participation rate and unemployment rate are International Labor Organization (ILO)
modeled estimates for 2019, downloaded from the World Bank data portal on May 28, 2020. GDP data are also
available from the World Bank for 2018. Mean years of schooling data are from the UN Development Program
(UNDP), Human Development Report 2019, Gender Development Index, July 15, 2019.
Notes: UNDP defines mean years of schooling as “the average number of years of education received by people
ages 25 and older, converted from educational attainment levels using official durations of each level.” The most
recent GDP per capita data for Syria is from 2010 and from 2017 for Iran.
Political Representation
Women are underrepresented in political positions and institutions in the MENA region to a
greater extent than they are in most of the world.57 For example, MENA countries perform poorly
as compared to the world average when it comes to the percentage of seats held by women in
legislative bodies: 10.4% of seats are held by women compared to 24.3% global y and 23.6% in
the United States (see Figure 6). Moreover, no country in the region is classified by Freedom
House as a full democracy.58 Monarchies and authoritarian or hybrid political systems may create
some opportunities for women to participate in legislative bodies, but ultimately may not be
responsive to elected representatives. For example, the Saudi monarchy granted women the right

57 See CRS Report R45483, Women in National Governments Around the Globe: Fact Sheet, by Susan G. Chesser.
58 In order of descending democracy scores, Freedom House ranks Israel and T unisia as flawed democracies; Morocco,
Lebanon, and Algeria as hybrid regimes; and Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Egypt, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, Iran, Libya,
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria as authoritarian regimes. Sarah Repucci, Freedom in the World 2020: A Leaderless
Struggle for Dem ocracy.
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to vote in 2011 and has granted women some additional rights (such as the right to drive) since
2017, but the government continues to detain women activists and maintain some “guardianship”
limits on women’s behavior.59 Some observers argue that authoritarian leaders rhetorical y uphold
initiatives on women’s rights to appear more inclusive and divert attention away from repressive
behavior or to bolster their legitimacy abroad.60
Some governments and political parties have attempted to improve women’s representation in
legislative bodies by implementing gender quotas. Eight countries in the region have some form
of quota to ensure women’s representation, and those countries have more women seated in lower
houses of the legislature than the MENA average (see Figure 6). Arab Barometer findings
indicate that more than two thirds of those surveyed support women’s quotas.61 One recent
example of quota implementation is in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria,
also known as Rojava, where “each administrative institution is co-led by a woman and, in
addition to al -female councils, a 40 per cent quota reinforces female representation and
participation in economic initiatives and civil society organizations.”62
In 2019, women won fewer parliamentary seats than in the past in both Tunisia and Israel, the
region’s two most democratic countries. In Tunisia, where the electoral law requires that
parliamentary candidate lists alternate between men and women (meaning that any party that
wins more than one seat in a given district wil send at least one woman to parliament), women
lost 25 seats in the 2019 parliamentary elections compared to 2014.63 In Israel, where some
political parties have voluntarily instituted gender quotas, women held 35 seats in the 120-seat
20th Knesset (elected in 2015), compared to 29 elected in April 2019, 28 in the September 2019
re-run of elections, and 30 in the third electoral re-run, in March 2020.64
Where women are elected to political bodies, they may encounter additional barriers to political
participation. For example, a 2015 study found that even though women held 16% of seats in the
Libyan parliament (due in part to gender quotas), female members of parliament were chal enged
by practices such as holding meetings late at night when it is not social y acceptable for women to
be out or in places considered unsafe for women to attend. They have also been subject to verbal
intimidation by their male counterparts.65

59 See Eman Alhussein, “Saudi Changes to Guardianship System Ease Restrictions on Women,” Arab Gulf States
Institute in Washington, August 7, 2019, and Amnesty International, “ Saudi Arabia: Women’s rights campaigner
Loujain al-Hathloul due in court,” March 9, 2020.
60 See for example: Gabrielle Bardall, “Autocrats use feminism to undermine democracy,” Policy Options, October 30,
2019; Hind Ahmed Zaki, “ El-Sissi’s Women? Shifting gender discourses and the limits of state feminism ,”
Égypte/Monde Arabe, vol. 13 (2015), pp. 39-53.
61 Kathrin T homas, “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa,” Arab Barometer, August 2019. T homas
notes that “Many MENA publics express a preference for greater female political participation, including acceptance of
a female head of state and the implementation of women’s quotas for elected office. However, the belief that men are
better political leaders prevails.”
62 U.N. Human Rights Council, “ Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic,” A/HRC/43/57, January 28, 2020. See also, Gayle T zemach Lemmon, “ Inside the World’s Most Radical
Experiment in Women’s Rights,” DefenseOne, February 6, 2018.
63 T his may be attributed, in part, to the election of a more fractious parliament in 2019, in which relatively few parties
won more than one seat. Composition of the 2019 parliament available at https://majles.marsad.tn/2019/fr/assemblee/.
64 T he 22nd Knesset was dissolved in December 2019 after PM Netanyahu was unable to form a coalition. Allison
Kaplan Sommer, “Israel Election Results: Fewer Women and LGBT People – But Lots of Ex-Generals – in New
Knesset,” Haaretz, September 24, 2019; Greer Fay Cashman, “ T here are fewer Israeli women in politics than it may
seem,” The Jerusalem Post, February 25, 2020.
65 U.N. Development Program Libya, “Women, Peace and Security in Libya: Comparative Summary of the WPS
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Obstacles to women’s representation may also include cultural beliefs about a woman’s place in
politics, though there appears to be a range of views within the region. A 2016 public opinion poll
in Arab countries indicated that men, and to a lesser extent women, view men as superior political
leaders. At the same time, the poll also found that a majority of men and a larger majority of
women in each country except Algeria agreed that an Arab woman could become the head of state
of a Muslim-majority country.66
Furthermore, as women gain greater representation in political bodies, they may stil hold less
power than men, a distinction that is sometimes lost in quantitative measures of participation. An
index developed by the U.S. government’s Wilson Center to measure women’s leadership in the
MENA region found in 2020 that when women led top government departments there, they were
four times more likely to be found in what are considered traditional y “feminized” roles that
focused on various forms of caretaking, primarily in socio-cultural ministries.67
Selected Milestones for Women’s Political Representation
 In 1969, Golda Meir was elected Prime Minister of Israel. From 2006-2009, Dalia Itzik served as
the first female speaker of the Israeli Knesset.
 In 2011, Bothaina Kamel became the first woman to run for president in Egypt.
 In 2011, Saudi Arabia became the last country in the world (besides the Vatican) to give women
the right to vote fol owing Oman (2003), Qatar (2003), Kuwait (2005), and the UAE (2006).1
 In 2014, Iraq adopted the region’s first National Action Plan in support of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security, fol owed by Jordan (2017), Tunisia (2018),
Lebanon (2019), and Yemen (2019).
 In 2015, the UAE elected Dr. Amal Al Qubaisi Speaker of the Federal National Council, the first
woman to serve as speaker of a legislative body in the Arab world.
 In 2018, Sarwa Abdul Wahid became the first woman to run for president in Iraq.
 In January 2019, Lebanon’s Raya Al-Hassan was appointed the first female interior minister in
the Arab world.1
 In February 2019, Princess Reema bint Bandar Al-Saud became the first female ambassador to
represent Saudi Arabia.1
 In September 2019, two women, Selma El oumi Rekik and Abir Moussi, ran in Tunisia’s
presidential elections.1

Baseline Study, Phase I and Phase II,” 2015.
66 Arab Barometer, “Views of Arab Women as Political Leaders,” February 11, 2019.
67 Merissa Khurma et al., “ Ready to Lead: Understanding Women’s Public Leadership in the Middle East and North
Africa,” T he Wilson Center, March 2020, p. 20.
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Figure 6. Political Representation of Women
Percentage of seats held by women in parliament/consultative body and date of women’s suf rage

Sources: Compiled by the Congressional Research Service using data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the
Gender Quotas Database published by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, and
UN Women: Women in Politics 2019.
Conflict and Displacement
Compared with most of the rest of the world, the MENA region has experienced a
disproportionate share of conflict and population displacement in the last decade.68 Women and
children make up the majority of displaced civilian populations in the region.69 Prolonged
situations of conflict and displacement have specific implications for sexual and gender-based
violence (SGBV), girls’ access to education, and rates of child, early, and forced marriage
(CEFM).70 As Figure 7 il ustrates, the countries suffering from conflict and humanitarian crises

68 Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program suggests that 58% of the world’s battle deaths took place in the
MENA region from 2009-2019 (available through the World Bank data portal). United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 29% of the world’s refugees and internally displaced persons in 2019 originated in
the MENA region. T he region accounts for 6% of the total global population. UNHCR, “Mid-Year T rends 2019 -
Annex T ables,” February 2020; U.N. Population Division, “World Population Prospects 2019,” data as of July 1 2019.
69 After eight years of war in Syria, at least 5.6 million people have fled the country as refugees, 6.2 million are
internally displaced, and an estimated 12 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance. In March 20 20, the
U.N. Population Fund estimated that women and children make up 80% of those displaced in Syria since December
2019. T he International Rescue Committee estimates that women and girls account for 75% of those displaced in
Yemen since 2015. UNHCR, “Syria Emergency,” April 19, 2018; “ UN Population Fund sounds alarm over dire
situation facing women and girls in Syria, as 10th year of war begins,” UN News, March 16, 2020; Delphine Valette,
Protection, Participation and Potential: Women and Girls in Yemen’s War, International Rescue Committee, January
2019.
70 T he United Nations offers the following definition of CEFM: “ Child marriage, or early marriage, is any marriage
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also have some of the highest rates of intimate partner violence in the region.71 In some cases,
SGBV may even be used as a weapon of war. For example, conflict-related sexual violence has
been documented in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Some examples of instances of SGBV in
countries affected by conflict and humanitarian crises follow.
 At the height of its power, the Islamic State (which assumed power across Iraq
and Syria between 2014 and 2019) “discriminated against women, girls, and
sexual minorities as a matter of policy.”72 The group was notably implicated in
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against the Yazidis, an ethnic
group indigenous to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Yazidi women and girls as young as
nine were sold into sexual slavery by IS fighters.73 Abuses against women
attributed to IS combatants also included stonings, executions, forced marriages,
restrictions on movement, and strict dress codes enforced by lashings.
 Parties to the Syrian conflict have al egedly used sexual violence as a tool to
“instil fear, humiliate and punish or, in the case of terrorist groups, as part of
their enforced social order.”74 The United Nations has al eged that rapes and
other acts of sexual violence carried out by government forces have “formed part
of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, and
amount to crimes against humanity.”75 Syrian refugee women have also noted
that intimate partner violence has intensified as the lack of employment
opportunities for men have increased frustration, tension, and violence in the
home.“[R]ampant child marriage” was explained, particularly by widows, as a
way to al eviate financial burdens and protect the reputation of the family.76
 In Yemen, the United Nations recorded increased reporting of sexual violence in
2018, including cases of physical or sexual assault, rape, and sexual slavery,
noting that “while a few cases are directly attributable to parties to the conflict,
most are the result of increased risks that women and children face, against a

where at least one of the parties is under 18 years of age. Forced marriages are marriage s in which one and/or both
parties have not personally expressed their full and free consent to the union. A child marriage is considered to be a
form of forced marriage, given that one and/or both parties have not expressed full, free and informed consent .” T his
naming convention has not been universally adopted, so this report uses the term “child marriage” when reflecting the
conventions of the underlying sourcing. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “ Child, early and
forced marriage, including in humanitarian settings,” last updated 2020.
71 Overall rates of sexual and gender-based violence are not universally available: a USAID context analysis of six
MENA countries in 2016 remarked that “existing GBV studies focus on IPV [intimate partner violence] or early and
forced marriage—and, in the case of Egypt, on female genital mutilation (FGM); as a result, numerous other forms of
GBV are not well studied or understood.” Banyan Global, International Center for Research on Women, Center of Arab
Women for T raining and Research, Gender-Based Violence in the MENA Region: Context Analysis, USAID
Countering Gender-Based Violence Initiative – MENA T ask Order, May 2016.
72 U.N. Human Rights Council, “‘I lost my dignity’: Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic,”
A/HRC/37/CRP.3, March 2018.
73 U.N. Human Rights Council, “‘T hey Came to Destroy’: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis,” A/HRC/32/CRP.2, June
15, 2016.
74 U.N. Human Rights Council, “‘I lost my dignity.”
75 Ibid, p. 1.
76 UNHCR, “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Prevention and Response in Refugee Situations in the Middle East
and North Africa,” 2015; U.N. Human Rights Council, “ Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/42/51, August 15, 2019.
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backdrop of pre-existing gender inequality, exacerbated by the chronic incapacity
of Government institutions to protect civilians.”77
 In 2019, then-head of U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Ghassan
Salamé spoke of a “pattern of violence against women across the country,”
highlighting the abduction of Seham Serghewa, a member of the Libyan House
of Representatives, and other instances of kil ing and forced disappearances.
Salamé also noted that “women migrants and refugees in Libya are at risk of rape
and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and
forced prostitution in detention and at large.”78
Figure 7. Conflict, Displacement, and Gender-based Violence

Source: Created by CRS using battle death and intimate partner violence data from GIWPS and PRIO, WPS
Index 2019/20; displacement data from UNHCR, “Mid-Year Trends 2019 - Annex Tables,” February 2020; and
child marriage data from WEF, Global Gender Gap Report 2020. Literacy rates are from CIA World Factbook,
accessed June 2020.
Notes: The WPS Index measures intimate partner violence by the percentage of women who experienced
physical or sexual violence committed by their intimate partner in the previous 12 months. The Global gender
Gap Report measures child marriage by the percentage of girls aged 15–19 years who are or have ever been
married, divorced, widowed or in an informal union in 2017.
Years of conflict and prolonged displacement are expected to have a detrimental effect on an
entire generation of girls’ education, particularly in Syria and Yemen, where schools have closed

77 U.N. Security Council, “ Conflict Related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General,”
S/2019/280, March 29, 2019.
78 UNSMIL, “ SRSG Ghassan Salamé Briefing to the Security Council,” November 18, 2019.
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due to conflict. Two mil ion children are out of school in both Syria and Yemen.79 Yemeni women
historical y have the highest rate of il iteracy in the region,80 and the ongoing conflict is likely to
lead to a rise in that rate as girls drop out of school.81 Facing the economic and social burdens that
emerge during protracted conflict and humanitarian crises, families may resort to harmful
practices such as child, early, and forced marriage and child labor that may further impact girls’
access to education and increase the risk of gender-based violence (see text box).82 Gaps in
education, combined with war-related trauma, may have long-term implications for the region’s
economic growth, rates of child, early, and forced marriage and fertility, and maternal and child
health.83
Child, Early, and Forced Marriages in Conflict and Displacement Settings
UNICEF estimated in April 2019 that 17% of girls in the MENA region were married before their 18 th birthdays,
with 700,000 new child brides each year.84 Rates of child, early and forced marriages (CEFM) had decreased
between 1990 and 2010, but progress has reportedly stal ed since then. Studies suggest that CEFM general y rises
in conflict-affected countries and protracted displacement conditions. Civil society organization Girls Not Brides
explains the increase in child marriage in humanitarian crises by noting that parents may see child marriage as a
way to relieve economic difficulties by transferring the cost of supporting a girl to another family or th rough
dowry payments, and may believe that marriage wil protect girls from violence.85 Negative trends for girls in Iraq,
Libya, Syria, and Yemen, il ustrate this increased vulnerability.
 In Iraq, CEFM increased from 15% in 1997 to 24% by 2016, including 5% of marriages involving children
younger than 15;86
 In Syria, child marriage rates are reportedly four times higher among displaced Syrian refugees than
among Syrians before the crisis;87
 In Libya, previously ranked among the region’s lowest rates of child marriage (2%), the number of child
brides is rising, and rose particularly rapidly in areas that were control ed or influenced by the Islamic
State;88 and
 In Yemen, child marriage rates may be as high as two thirds of girls under the age of 18; in governorates
with high numbers of internal y displaced persons, 44% of marriages reportedly involved girls under the
age of 15.89

79 UNICEF, “If Not In School: T he Paths Children Cross in Yemen,” March 2 018.
80 UNICEF data last updated October 2015 https://data.unicef.org/topic/education/literacy/.
81 See, for example, Louise Wetheridge, “Girls’ and women’s literacy with a lifelong learning perspective: issues,
trends and implications for the Sustainable Development Goals,” U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, 2016.
82 See, for example, UNHCR, “ Woman Alone: T he Fight for Survival by Syria’s Refugee Women,” July 2014.
83 UNHCR, “T urn the T ide: Refugee Education in Crisis,” August 2018.
84 UNICEF, “A Profile of Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa,” April 2019.
85 Girls Not Brides, “ Why Does Child Marriage Happen?” last updated 2020.
86 Gilgamesh Nabeel and Jacob Wirtschafter, “Early marriage figures for Iraq are startling. Child advocates worry it
could rise even more,” Public Radio International, August 13, 2018.
87 U.N. Human Rights Council, “ Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic,” A/HRC/42/51, August 15, 2019.
88 Omer Karasapan and Sajjad Shah, “Forced Displacement and Child Marriage: A Growing Challenge in the MENA
region,” Brookings Institution, Future Development blog post, June 19, 2019; Umberto Bacchi, “ISIS in Libya: Child
Brides Boom in Derna as Record Number of Girls Married Off to Jihadi Fighters,” International Business Times, May
11, 2015.
89 UNICEF, “Falling T hrough the Cracks: T he Children of Yemen,” March 2017.
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Conflict Resolution and Peace Negotiations
Women have not largely not been involved in formal efforts to resolve the MENA region’s three
largest ongoing wars in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, despite attempts by some international players to
involve women in these processes. For example, in Libya, despite the active involvement of
nearly one in five women in the 2011 Libyan revolution, peace efforts to date have not been fully
inclusive of women.90 Since 2016, the U.N. Security Council Resolutions extending the mandate
of U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) have cal ed for the “the full, equal and effective
participation of women in al activities relating to the democratic transition, conflict resolution
and peacebuilding.”91 No women were invited to participate in the International Conference on
Libya that took place in Paris on May 29, 2018.92 The consultative phase of the Libyan National
Conference Process that ended in July 2018, coordinated by then-head of UNSMIL Ghassan
Salamé to organize elections and a peace process in Libya, solicited submissions from 7,000
Libyans, a quarter of whom were women.93
In Syria, throughout six rounds of peace talks between 2012 and 2017 to resolve the Syrian war,
women were sidelined from the process, despite repeated cal s by the international community for
women to be included in government and opposition delegations. Four years into the U.N.-
sponsored talks in 2016, the U.N. Special Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, created a Syrian Women’s
Advisory Board to support women’s participation in the peace process, which sent a delegation of
12 women as third party observers to negotiations in Geneva.94 In 2017, women comprised 15%
of negotiators of the U.N.-sponsored peace talks.95 That same year, Syrian women politicians and
activists formed the Syrian Women Political Movement to develop a shared vision for a peace
process inclusive of women and grassroots activists. The group has advocated that al decision-
making processes include at least 30% women, among other demands.96 Women hold about 30%
of seats in the 150-member Constitutional Committee, created in late 2019, and 13 of 45 seats in
the constitution drafting committee.97
Yemen was on track to increase political representation of women before the outbreak of conflict
in 2015. In 2009, Yemen ranked at the bottom for women’s political participation (135th of 136
countries assessed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union); there was one woman serving in the lower
house of parliament and two in the upper house.98 After protests broke out in 2011, however, a

90 Rola Abdul-Latif, “ Libya Status of Women Survey 2013,” IFES, September 2013.
91 U.N. Security Resolution 2273, March 12, 2016; U.N. Security Council Resolut ion 2376, September 14, 2017; U.N.
Security Resolution 2434, September 13, 2018; U.N. Security Resolution 2486, September 12, 2019.
92 Scheherazade Khan, “Libyan Women Break the Silence,” Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom,
October 10, 2018.
93 UNSMIL, “Remarks of SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United Nations Security Council,” July 16, 2018.
94 Council on Foreign Relations, “Women’s Participation in Peace Processes: Syria,” January 30, 2019.
95 Bela Kapur, “Syrian Women in Political Processes: Literature Review,” T he Kvinna T ill Kvinnna Foundation, May
2017; T estimony of Jamille Bigio in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, T ransnational
Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues, Wom en in Conflict: Advancing
Wom en's Role in Peace and Security, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., June 13, 2019.
96 Sheila Goishabib, “ Syrian Women’s Political Movement Releases T hree Policy Papers,” Women’s International
League for Peace & Freedom, July 1, 2019.
97 Remarks by Jomana Qaddour at Middle East Institute event, “The Role of Women in Syria’s Future,” November 21,
2019. T he U.N.-facilitated Constitutional Committee is comprised of 150 delegates equally split between the Syrian
government, opposition and civil society.
98 Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments,” September 30, 2009, available at
http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif300909.htm.
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National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was cal ed to broker a transition from the longtime rule of
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Women held 30% of seats
and chaired three of the nine committees at the NDC. A new draft constitution that built on
recommendations from the NDC would have secured the recognition of women as equal citizens
and independent individuals, a 30% quota in decision making positions, and a legal minimum age
of marriage. The constitution was never ratified, however, and rebel Houthi leaders’ rejection of
the draft constitution was one of the triggers of the current crisis. Women have been minimal y
involved in subsequent peace negotiations to resolve the conflict with the Houthis, which has
drawn in multiple neighboring states.99 Eight women were reportedly invited by U.N. Special
Envoy Martin Griffiths to join the peace talks in Sweden in 2018, though only one woman was
present at the negotiation table.100 There are three women currently serving as members of the 26-
member presidential body of the separatist Southern Transitional Council.101
Radicalization, Terrorism and Violent Extremism
The recruitment of women by the Islamic State and other armed Islamist groups, and the
uncertain status of many of those women after the Islamic State lost control of territory in Syria
and Iraq, brought increased attention to the roles women play within violent extremist
organizations. From its inception, the Islamic State used women as recruiters and fundraisers, and
to provide support and companionship to male fighters. As the group lost territory it reportedly
loosened gender role distinctions to use women in traditional military operational roles as wel .102
One estimate suggested that women accounted for up to 13% (4,761) of the total 41,490
foreigners who were recorded to have traveled to, or were born inside, territory under the control
of the Islamic State from 2014 to 2019.103 According to a journalist who covered the fighting in
Iraq, IS territorial losses elevated the role of women within the group, as some were driven by
“revenge, need, or both” to retaliate against coalition military operations.104
Experts and U.S. government officials have repeatedly expressed concern about the potential
radicalization of women residing in camps for people displaced from territory formerly held by
the Islamic State.105 In August 2019, the United Nations reported that vulnerable populations in
these camps were at risk of further radicalization:
As many of their countries of origin initially refused to repatriate them, most families of
foreign ISIL fighters, including children, are being held in limbo by SDF [Syrian
Democratic Forces]. Subsequently, women and children remain at higher risk of further

99 Neha Wadekar, “Women Want to Put Yemen Back T ogether Again,” Foreign Policy, November 27, 2018.
100 Valette, Protection, Participation and Potential, January 2019.
101 Afrah Nasser, “Southern Yemeni women enter storm of politics, war,” Al Monitor, August 23, 2019.
102 Vera Mironova, “Is the Future of ISIS Female?” New York Times, February 20, 2019.
103 Joana Cook and Gina Vale, “ From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’ II: T he Challenges Posed by Women and Minors after the
Fall of the Caliphate,” Combating T errorism Center, CTC Sentinel vol. 12, no. 6, July 2019.
104 For example, Iraqi security forces reportedly raped and harassed women and stole from them in rampages after
expelling IS fighters. T his reportedly left some women wanting to get revenge, and others seeing no other way to
survive after being left without incomes and in terrible living conditions. Mironova, “Is the Future of ISIS Female?”
105 See, for example, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and
Counterterrorism, Iraq: A Crossroads of U.S. Policy, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 2020; House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and International T errorism , The FY20 Budget: State Departm ent
Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extrem ism Bureau, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 24, 2019; House
Homeland Security Committee, Global Terrorism : Threats to the Hom eland, Part I and II , hearings, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., September 10, 2019 and October 30, 2019.
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radicalization, especially given the absence of age- and gender-sensitive rehabilitation
programmes.106
A U.N. assessment in early 2020 estimated that 96% of the 66,100 inhabitants of Al Hol
displacement camp in Syria were women and children.107 An unknown number of these women
are family members and/or former supporters of IS combatants, or are former IS combatants
themselves.
Experts have argued that in order to be effective, efforts to counter terrorism need to recognize
the role women can play (as the extremist groups do).108 Several MENA governments have taken
steps in this direction. For example, the State Department’s 2018 Country Reports on Terrorism
noted that the Algerian foreign minister had lauded the “crucial role” of women in Algeria’s
efforts to counter extremism, highlighting the female clerics who work with young girls, mothers,
and prisoners.109 The report also noted that in Egypt, the Ministry of Islamic Endowments
(Awqaf) had trained up to 250 female preachers as part of its outreach program to women who
might be susceptible to recruitment by extremist organizations.
Case Study: USAID Efforts to Counter Violent Extremism in Morocco110
USAID’s Favorable Opportunities to Reinforce the Self Advancement of Today’s Youth (FORSATY) program,
active from 2012 to 2019, worked with vulnerable youth in nine marginalized communities in northern Morocco
where extremist recruitment cel s have been active. FORSATY partnered with local community members to
encourage greater female participation in school, the workforce, and extracurricular activities. In FY2018,
FORSATY served 3,699 at-risk youth through community activities, including 817 young women (22 percent), an
increase from FY2015 when 15 women participated. FORSATY’s education component served almost equal
numbers of female and male at-risk students: of 2,011 at risk students who were served, 976 were men and 1,035
were women. USAID noted that “based on the success of the model, FORSATY has leveraged funds from other
donors and the private sector, which have contributed to expanding the program to other cities and its overal
sustainability.”111
Implications of COVID-19
The effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on the MENA region, or on
women in the region specifical y, have yet to be fully realized. Previous pandemics and infectious
disease outbreaks suggest that women may be uniquely affected by the COVID-19 outbreak.112
Women are likely to face greater exposure to the virus in many countries, as they constitute the
majority of healthcare workers and disproportionately care for sick family members at home.
Women’s preexisting vulnerabilities detailed in this report are likely to be exacerbated by the
virus and by government responses in the following areas.

106 U.N. Human Rights Council, “ Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic,” A/HRC/42/51, August 15, 2019.
107 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Syrian Arab Republic: North East Syria: Al Hol Camp,”
Humanitarian Snapshot, January 16, 2020.
108 See, for example, Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein, Women and Terrorism: Hidden Threats, Forgotten
Partners, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019.
109 U.S. Department of State, “ Country Reports on T errorism 2018.”
110 CRS communication with USAID officials on October 28, 2019.
111 USAID, “ Favorable Opportunities to Reinforce Self-Advancement for T oday’s Youth (FORSAT Y),” Factsheet, last
updated June 27, 2018.
112 Helen Lewis, “ T he Coronavirus Is a Disaster for Feminism: Pandemics affect men and women differently,” The
Atlantic, March 19, 2020.
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 Economic Opportunities. Economic opportunities are likely to decrease, especial y for
women who work as foreign domestic workers or in service industries impacted by travel
limitations. The United Nations estimates that 700,000 women in the MENA region wil
lose their jobs as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.113 Women, who make up 68% of
workers in the informal sector, wil be particularly impacted, as they often lack access to
protections such as unemployment insurance and health benefits.114 Unpaid domestic
work is likely to increase as health systems are weakened and women have to care for
children and sick relatives at home.115
 Education. With schools closed, girls and boys are missing educational opportunities and
women are taking on added responsibilities of homeschooling children. While some
schools and universities turn to virtual classes, access to high-speed internet and
computers or tablets varies across the region, and may be gendered within the
household.116
 Humanitarian Crises. The humanitarian crises and conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Yemen
have weakened health systems and destroyed medical facilities, and refugees and
displaced populations have higher rates of underlying health issues due to the impacts of
war, disease, and famine. Already vulnerable women and girls appear likely to have a
harder time accessing aid as the virus makes delivery of goods and services more difficult
for humanitarian organizations, and limits the activities of their personnel on the
ground.117
 Sexual and Gender-based Violence. Rates of domestic violence may rise as families are
asked to shelter in place and face heightened anxiety over physical and financial
insecurity.118 Furthermore, access to domestic violence assistance services, where
available, wil likely be reduced due to physical distancing measures, and as healthcare
systems become overloaded in the crisis.119
Considerations for Congress
Given the linkages between overal societal prosperity and the specific status of women, it is
likely that improvements in either of those would promote positive change in the other. Looking
ahead, Members of the 116th Congress and beyond may take into account the following issues

113 UN Women and U.N. ESCWA, “T he Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Equality in the Arab Region,”
E/ESCWA/2020/Policy Brief.4, April 2020.
114 Ibid.
115 David Evans, “How Will COVID-19 Affect Women and Girls in Low- and Middle-Income Countries?” Center for
Global Development, March 16, 2020.
116 Rasha Faek and T arek Abd El-Galil, “T he Shift to Online Education in the Arab World Is Intensifying Inequality ,”
El Fanar Media, April 30, 2020; U.N. Women and U.N. ESCWA, “ T he Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Equality in
the Arab Region.”
117 See for example, International Rescue Committee, “ How the IRC responds to COVID-19 in Syria and other conflict
zones,” March 25, 2020; U.N. Population Fund, “ Regional Situation Report for the Syria Crisis,” no. 91, March 1 -31,
2020.
118 For example, T unisian Minister of Women’s Affairs, Asma Shiri Laabidi, stated there had been a five-fold rise in
the number of domestic abuse cases reported between March 23 and 29 compared with the same period in 2019.
“T unisia Offers Free Helpline as Lockdown Sees Abuse Spike,” Asharq Al-Awsat, April 3, 2020.
119 Mélissa Godin, “As Cities Around the World Go on Lockdown, Victims of Domestic Violence Look for a Way
Out,” TIME, March 18, 2020.
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and questions as they conduct oversight of and consider U.S. policy addressing both the status of
women in MENA countries and broader security and policy priorities in the region.
 Resources and priorities. In a context of competing domestic and foreign policy
priorities and finite resources, where might U.S. foreign policy, foreign
assistance, and military cooperation be most usefully directed to address gender
imbalances in the MENA region? What is the history of performance of U.S.
efforts to date? Are there specific countries or lines of effort that should be
prioritized over others, and for what reasons?
 Level of aid. How might the level of U.S. political, military, and economic
engagement and assistance, given possible changes over time, affect how MENA
countries address women’s roles and wel -being?
 Effectiveness. Which types of policies, and particularly foreign assistance
programs, appear to have been the most effective in improving conditions for
women? What has been the impact of U.S. programs in specific MENA
countries, such as the aforementioned USAID programs described in Egypt,
Jordan, and Morocco? Could such programs be expanded to other MENA states?
 Whole of government approach. What are the pros and cons of using
legislation to mandate the incorporation of gender elements into broader foreign
policy initiatives, foreign assistance programs, and military cooperation
activities?
 Funding conditions. What are the pros and cons of conditioning U.S. financial
support to authoritarian states on respect for women’s rights and gender equality?
What metrics would be appropriate for gauging the latter?
 Best practices. To what extent, if any, is the United States sharing best practices
within the U.S. government and among other international actors? Would efforts
such as the congressional steps to encourage women’s participation in peace
negotiations in Afghanistan be applicable to MENA conflicts such as those in
Syria, Yemen, and Libya?
 Cultural sensitivities and resistance to change. How can U.S. and international
assistance and programs be structured to maximize local ownership of initiatives
for women and girls and minimize the perception of outside interference?
 Other international efforts. What programs and initiatives do other
governments and multilateral organizations have for addressing gender issues in
the MENA region? How wel coordinated are international efforts, and what
opportunities are there for greater coordination and/or burden-sharing?
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Appendix. Legislation in the 116th Congress
In recent Congresses, Members have introduced and passed a number of bil s and resolutions
related to the status of women’s rights global y, some of which may directly or indirectly address
gender inequality in the MENA region. Some Members have also raised the issue in oversight
hearings. Selected hearings and relevant legislation introduced during the 116th Congress related
to legal rights, economic empowerment, political representation, girls’ education, sexual and
gender-based violence, and conflict resolution are catalogued in further detail below.
Legal Rights
The 116th Congress has engaged on the topic of global legal protections for women, in particular
those related to preventing and addressing gender-based violence. Harmful practices that occur in
several MENA countries, such as female genital mutilation/cutting (e.g., H.Res. 106), and child,
early, and forced marriage (discussed below in “Sexual and Gender-based Violence”), have been
of particular interest. Some Members have also voiced concerns about the detention of women’s
rights advocates in Saudi Arabia (S.Res. 73 and H.Res. 129).120
H.Res. 106, passed in the House, denounces the practice of Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
(FGM/C) as a “violation of the human rights of women and girls” and urges the State Department
and USAID to incorporate coordinated efforts to eliminate FGM/C in their gender
programming.121 This mirrors language incorporated into appropriations bil s or accompanying
explanatory statements since FY2014, which states that State Department and USAID “gender
programs shal incorporate coordinated efforts to combat a variety of forms of gender-based
violence, including child marriage, rape, female genital cutting and mutilation, and domestic
violence, among other forms of gender-based violence in conflict and non-conflict settings.”122
The Trump Administration requested bilateral economic assistance in FY2019 and FY2020
specifical y to combat FGM/C in Egypt, where the practice is reported to be most prevalent in the
region; the FY2021 request did not make the same request.123
Economic Empowerment
Introduced in the 116th Congress, the Women’s Global Empowerment, Development and
Prosperity Act of 2020 (S. 3301and H.R. 6117) would require the Secretary of State to establish

120 Other legislation on Saudi Arabia includes the Saudi Arabia Human Rights and Accountability Act of 2019 (H.R.
2037), which would allow the President to suspend sanctions on Saudi Arabia if, among other criteria, “ the
Government of Saudi Arabia has taken verifiable steps t o repeal any law or regulation that requires Saudi women to
obtain approval from a male guardian in order to leave the country.” T his provision was included in the House version
of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 2500), but was not incorporated into the final law (P.L. 116-
92).
121 H.Res. 106 defines FGM/C as “all procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia,
or other injury to the female genital organs for nonmedical reason s.”
122 Final FY2020 SFOPS appropriations (Division G, P.L. 116-94) does not contain this language, however the
explanatory statement accompanying the act states that “gender programs should incorporate coordinated efforts to
combat a variety of forms of gender-based violence, including child, early, and forced marriage, rape, female genital
cutting and mutilation, and domestic violence, in conflict and non -conflict settings.” For prior year appropriations see:
FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), FY2018 (P.L. 115-141), FY2017 (P.L. 115-31), FY2016 (P.L. 114-113), FY2015 (P.L. 113-235),
FY2014 (P.L. 113-76).
123 UNICEF estimates that 87% of girls aged 15 to 49 have undergone FGM/C in Egypt, as compared to 7% in Iraq and
19% in Yemen. UNICEF, “ Female genital mutilation (FGM),” updated February 2020.
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within the Office of Women’s Empowerment an office for the Women’s Global Development and
Prosperity Initiative (W–GDP). Congress funded up to $100 mil ion for the Women’s Global
Development and Prosperity Fund in final FY2020 SFOPS appropriations (Section 7059,
Division G, P.L. 116-94). The W-GDP annual report 2019/2020 notes that USAID W-GDP
funding in FY2018 was used for programs in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.124
Political Representation
Congress in FY2020 appropriated not less than $50 mil ion for global programs designed to
strengthen protections for women’s political status, and to expand women’s participation in
political parties and elections in countries where women and girls suffer discrimination due to
law, policy or practice (Section 7059, Division G, P.L. 116-94). Congress also continues to fund
gender and women’s empowerment projects through the State Department’s Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI), created in 2002 to promote political, economic and educational
reform in the Middle East.125 MEPI works “in partnership with local leaders and indigenous
organizations to increase women’s political and economic participation, support women
visionaries, provide training to enhance women’s capabilities to contribute to their countries’
development, and build the capacity of civil society to secure equal rights and economic
prosperity for women and their families.”126 Funding for MEPI, Near East Regional Democracy,
and Multinational Force and Observers is included in the State Department’s Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs Regional FY2019 al ocation ($118 mil ion) and the FY2021 request ($121
mil ion). Congress funded MEPI at $51 mil ion in FY2017 and $31.6 mil ion in FY2018.127
Sexual and Gender-based Violence in Conflict and Displacement
The Preventing Child Marriage in Displaced Populations Act (H.R. 2140, passed in the House,
incorporated as Title IV, Section J in P.L. 116-94) finds that displaced populations are particularly
vulnerable to child marriage. The Act cal s for the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to cal for an agreed-upon definition of “child marriage” across U.N. agencies and for a
comprehensive strategy to address child marriage in refugee settlements administered by the
United Nations. The Act finds that rates of child marriage are particularly high in Syria and
Yemen.
The Accountability for Sexual and Gender-based Violence as a Tool in Conflict Act of 2019 (H.R.
3212 and S. 1777 ) would “amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to include in the Annual
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices a section on conflict-related sexual and gender-based
violence” and “amend the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act [22 U.S.C. §
2656] to authorize the President to impose economic sanctions and a visa ban on the leader of an
organization that commits sexual or gender-based violence.” The bil would find that rape and
sexual assault have been used as tactics of war and terror in conflict zones including Iraq and
Syria.

124 T he White House, “Women’s Global Development and Prosperity In itiative Annual Report 2019-2020,” February
2020, p. 22-23.
125 See out of print CRS Report RS21457, The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview, by Jeremy M. Sharp,
available to congressional clients on request
126 U.S. Department of State, “Gender and Women’s Empowerment,” T he U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI), available at https://mepi.state.gov/about -mepi/gender-womens-empowerment/.
127 T he T rump Administration has requested $14.5 million for MEPI in FY2021, consistent with the FY2020 request.
Funding for MEPI is included in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Regional FY2019 allocation
($118 million) and the FY2021 request ($121 million).
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The Safe from the Start Act of 2019 (H.R. 4092) seeks to “improve United States consideration of,
and strategic support for, programs to prevent and respond to gender-based violence from the
onset of humanitarian emergencies and build the capacity of humanitarian assistance to address
the immediate and long-term chal enges resulting from such violence, and for other purposes.”
The International Violence Against Women Act of 2019 (H.R. 5267 and S. 3037), which would
find that rape and sexual assault are used as tools of war in conflict zones such as Iraq and Syria,
would authorize existing appropriations to be used to develop a U.S. strategy to prevent and
respond to gender-based violence global y.
Girls’ Education
The Keeping Girls in School Act (S. 1071, H.R. 2153, passed in the House) aims to support
empowerment, economic security, and educational opportunities for adolescent girls around the
world. It expresses the sense of Congress that “achieving gender parity in both access to and
quality of educational opportunity contributes significantly to economic growth and development,
thereby lowering the risk for violence and instability” and that achieving gender equality “should
be a priority goal of United States foreign policy.” The Act would authorize USAID activities that
address barriers facing adolescent girls in accessing secondary education, including but not
limited to, child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation. The Act would build on
the Protecting Girls’ Access to Education in Vulnerable Settings Act (P.L. 115-442) enacted in
December 2018, which authorizes the State Department and USAID to prioritize programs that
protect displaced children, particularly displaced girls.
Conflict Resolution
Some Members of the 116th Congress have cited the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017
(WPS Act or P.L. 115-68) to cal for greater participation of Afghan women in the negotiations
between the U.S. and the Taliban, but have been less vocal about pushing for women’s
participation in recent peace negotiations to resolve the ongoing wars in Libya, Syria, and
Yemen.128 Senator Jeanne Shaheen raised the issue with regard to Syria in a June 2019 Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearing, asserting that, “as we look at stability in Syria, women
need to be significant part of any resolution to the conflict there.”129 To date, none of the
legislation introduced in the 116th Congress regarding the conflict in Yemen has discussed the
meaningful participation of women in managing or resolving the crisis.130 Legislation supporting
a diplomatic solution to the conflict in Libya (H.R. 4644 and S. 2934) introduced in November
2019 does not mention women’s participation.
Congress previously funded efforts in line with the WPS Act in Syria. Appropriations measures
for FY2016-FY2018 explicitly made funds available for programs in Syria that sought to
“empower women through political and economic programs, and address the psychosocial needs
of women and their families in Syria and neighboring countries” and “expand the role of women

128 Congressional support for women’s inclusion in Afghan peace negotiations was codified in FY2020 appropriations
and authorization bills. See Sect. 7044 (a) of Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-94) and Sect.
1216 of the National Defense Authorization Act, 2020 ( P.L. 116-92).
129 Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, T ransnational Crime, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues, Wom en in Conflict: Advancing Wom en's Role in Peace and
Security, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., June 13, 2019.
130 See CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015 -2019, by Jeremy M.
Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Sarah R. Collins.
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in negotiations to end the violence and in any political transition in Syria.”131 The Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (Section 7059, Division G, P.L. 116-94) does not specify
funds for WPS implementation in Syria, although it does provide that funds should be made
available to support a multi-year strategy to expand and improve coordination of U.S.
government efforts to “empower women as equal partners in conflict prevention, peace building,
transitional processes, and reconstruction efforts in countries affected by conflict or in political
transition, and to provide the equitable provision of relief and recovery assistance to women and
girls.”
Congress has also used appropriations legislation to improve the participation and effectiveness
of women in foreign partner security forces. The Enhancing Military and Police Operations
through Women’s Engagement and Recruitment Act of 2016 (S. 3377), which was introduced
during the 114th Congress, cited that approximately 7% of foreign participants in the U.S.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program were women. Recent
appropriations measures have directed international security assistance and cooperation funds to
be used to support the integration of women into foreign security forces.132 For example, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92) mandated that, of funds
made available for training and equipping Afghan security forces, $10 mil ion be used to support
recruitment, training, and treatment of women.
Countering Violent Extremism
Members have sought to highlight the nexus of gender and countering violent extremism as it
relates to the MENA region through various hearings. In a House Foreign Affairs Committee
hearing on the State Department counterterrorism budget in July 2019, two Members asked what
efforts the Trump Administration was making to engage women in the prevention of terrorism
and raised specific concerns about the potential radicalization of women and children held in
displacement camps in Syria.133 At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Syria in
September 2019, Senator Jeanne Shaheen asserted that Iraqi partners were concerned “not just
with any fighters who may be in the [displacement] camp but with al of the women and children
who are being radicalized.”134 In response, one of the witnesses, Syria Study Group Co-Chair
Michael Singh, stated that the U.S. government had not yet come up with durable solutions: “You
have the 70,000 mostly women and children, mostly children frankly, in the [al Hol] camp who
have grown up in the worst possible conditions and the fact is that we don’t real y know how to
conduct this process of de-radicalization and that’s, again, I think something that is—that
behooves us, to get on top of.”135

131 See P.L. 115-141, P.L. 115-31, P.L. 114-113. Appropriations acts for FY2016 (P.L. 114-113) and FY2015 (P.L.
113-235) included the same clause on expanding the ro le of women in negotiations.
132 H.Rept. 116-78, accompanying the House-reported FY2020 SFOPS bill states: “T he Committee directs that funds
made available to train foreign police, judicial, and military personnel, including for international peacekeeping,
address prevention and response to gender-based violence and trafficking in persons, and support integration of women
into security forces. T he Committee encourages the Secretary of State to ensure women’s participation is increased in
peacekeeping operations and other security assistance programs, as appropriate.”
133 House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, The FY20
Budget: State Departm ent Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extrem ism Bureau , hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess.,
July 24, 2019.
134 Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, The Path
Forward: Key Findings from the Syria Study Group Report, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., September 24, 2019.
135 T estimony of Michael Singh, in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia,
and Counterterrorism, The Path Forward: Key Findings from the Syria Study Group Report, hearing, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., September 24, 2019.
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Two pieces of legislation (one introduced, one passed) in the 116th Congress have cal ed for
greater research on the nexus of gender and countering violent extremism and terrorism. The
Women and Countering Violent Extremism Act of 2019 (H.R. 1653) which would find that the
Islamic State benefited strategical y and financial y from the subjugation of women, would
“ensure that the United States recognizes women’s varied roles in al aspects of violent extremism
and promote their meaningful participation as full partners in al efforts to prevent and counter
violent extremism and terrorism.” The bil would, among other things, require the Secretaries of
Defense and State, in conjunction with the Administrator of USAID, to conduct research on
gender and countering violent extremism and report their findings back to Congress. The Act
would also authorize assistance to women-led and women’s empowerment organizations in
foreign countries working on countering violent extremism, and would increase training for U.S.
government officials and for those receiving training under the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism
Assistance programs.
In addition, Section 1047 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L.
116-92) requires an independent assessment on gender and countering violent extremism, with a
report due to Congress not later than September 15, 2020. Specifical y, the assessment “shal
consider”:
 the probable causes and historical trends of women’s participation in violent
extremist organizations, and ways in which that participation is likely to change;
 the relationship between violent extremism and each of the following: gender-
based violence, the perceived role or value of women at the community level,
community opinions of kil ing or harming women, and violations of girls’ rights
(such as child, early and forced marriage and access to education); and
 ways the Department of Defense may engage and support women and girls who
are vulnerable to extremist behavior.
COVID-19
Section 233 of the COVID–19 International Response and Recovery Act of 2020 (S. 3669)
introduced on May 7, 2020 would express the sense of Congress that “credible research indicates
that the COVID–19 pandemic has increased exposure to domestic violence, child marriage,
trafficking and other forms of gender-based violence and abuse, and has increased and
compounded the risks displaced women and girls face in emergencies;” and that the pandemic is
disrupting access to sexual and reproductive health care. It also would authorize the State
Department and USAID to “carry out activities to prevent, mitigate, and respond to gender-based
violence during and following the COVID–19 pandemic,” and would authorize assistance to the
U.N. Population Fund for activities such as the “coordination and delivery of information and
services to prevent child marriage and female genital mutilation, the incidence of which has
increased during the COVID–19 pandemic.”

Author Information

Zoe Danon
Sarah R. Collins
Section Research Manager
Research Assistant

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Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Issues for Congress

Acknowledgments
The authors would like to extend their gratitude to Amber Wilhelm for her help in producing all of the
graphics found in this report, as well as to the many people who read and commented on versions of this
report, including Luisa Blanchfield, Mallary Stouffer, Alexis Arieff, Chris Blanchard, Jeremy Sharp,
Kenneth Katzman, and Clayton Thomas.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

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