Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight
and Legislation 2015-2020
Updated June 19, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R45046

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019

Summary
This CRS report provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy
toward the conflict in Yemen, with summary tables providing information on various legislative
proposals considered in the 114th, 115th, and 116th Congresses. These proposals have reflected a
range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including
 the authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict;
 the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the
coalition led by Saudi Arabia;
 the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia;
 the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led
coalition;
 the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition’s air campaign and its adherence to
international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict;
 the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen;
 the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and
U.S. support to parties to the conflict;
 the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security
cooperation; and
 the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces
of the Houthi movement.
The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi
Arabia’s conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war
has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food
Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance.
The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid
agencies to count the war’s casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed
Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) estimates that targeted airstrikes reportedly
killed 8,120 Yemeni civilians from March 2015 to March 2020, out of 12,690 civilians reported
killed overall, and among more than 100,000 Yemenis that have died in the conflict.
The Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to
reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to
Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen.
This report does not include Yemen-related Iran sanctions legislation, which is covered in CRS
Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi
Arabia, please see the following CRS products:
CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.
CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations.
CRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.

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Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020

Overview
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of nations (hereinafter referred to as the
Saudi-led coalition or the coalition) to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Ansar
Allah/Houthi movement and loyalists of the previous president of Yemen, the late Ali Abdullah
Saleh.1 During 2014, the United States joined Saudi Arabia in demanding that Houthi forces
reverse their unilateral military campaign to occupy the Yemeni capital of Sanaa, but the rapid
onset of hostilities in March 2015 forced the Obama Administration to react quickly.2 At the start
of the Saudi-led intervention on March 25, 2015, the Administration announced that the United
States would provide “logistical and intelligence support” to the coalition’s operations without
taking “direct military action in Yemen in support of this effort.”3 Soon thereafter, a joint U.S.-
Saudi planning cell was established to coordinate military and intelligence support for the
campaign. At the United Nations Security Council, the United States supported the passage of
Resolution 2216 (April 2015), which, among other things, required member states to impose an
arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the Houthis withdraw from all
areas seized during the current conflict.
On June 9, 2020, President Trump reported to Congress “consistent with” the War Powers
Resolution that,4
A small number of United States military personnel are deployed to Yemen to conduct
operations against al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS. The United States
military continues to work closely with the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and
regional partner forces to degrade the terrorist threat posed by those groups.
United States Armed Forces, in a non-combat role, have also continued to provide military
advice and limited information, logistics, and other support to regional forces combatting
the Houthis in Yemen. Such support does not involve United States Armed Forces in
hostilities with the Houthis for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution.
United States Armed Forces are deployed to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to protect United
States forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran or supporting groups.
These forces, operating in coordination with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, provide air and missile defense capabilities and support the operation of United
States fighter aircraft. The total number of United States forces in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia is approximately 3,600.
Since the March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen, Congress has taken an active
role in debating and overseeing U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula.5 Members have considered

1 In early December 2017, the Houthi-Saleh alliance unraveled, culminating in the killing of former President Saleh on
December 4, 2017.
2 According to one account, “The Obama administration agreed to support what the Saudis called Operation Decisive
Storm with considerable reluctance, seeing it as an unwinnable proxy war against Iran.” See, “How the War in Yemen
Became a Bloody Stalemate and the Worst Humanitarian Crisis in the World,” New York Times Magazine, October 31,
2018.
3 Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, March 25, 2015.
4 Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate, June 9, 2020.
5 Over the last decade, Congress has periodically addressed Yemen-related issues in annual authorization and
appropriations legislation. Before the 2015 Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, Members were mostly focused on
providing security assistance to Yemeni government forces to counter terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian
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legislative proposals seeking to reduce Yemeni civilian casualties resulting from the coalition’s
operations; improve deteriorating humanitarian conditions; end restrictions on the flow of goods
and humanitarian aid; combat Iranian support for the Houthis; preserve maritime security in the
Bab al Mandab Strait; improve U.S. efforts to counter Al Qaeda and Islamic State forces in
Yemen; and/or support, condition, or end U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition.
Beyond Yemen, many Members have referred to the conflict as an element of a broader regional
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and discussed the conflict’s implications for the U.S.
effort to limit Iran’s malign regional influence. Others lawmakers have described the Yemen
conflict as indicative of what they perceive as problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship, a concern
that deepened after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government
personnel in October 2018. Congress has considered and passed proposals to reject certain U.S.
defense sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and to direct an end to U.S.
military involvement in military operations related to the anti-Houthi campaign, but has not voted
to override presidential vetoes of related legislation.
Responding to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen also appears to be reinvigorating some
Members’ interest in strengthening the role of Congress in foreign policy vis-à-vis the executive
branch. Debate in Congress over Yemen has featured bipartisan statements of interest in asserting
the prerogatives of the legislative branch to limit executive branch power, specifically using war
powers legislation and the appropriations and authorization processes to curb U.S. military
involvement in support of coalition operations.
Congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in Yemen has also led to actual and proposed legislative
changes to global authorities, such as the Department of Defense’s authority to enter into and use
acquisition and cross servicing agreements with partner militaries.6 The Trump Administration’s
invocation of emergency requirements to proceed with proposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, including sales of air-to-ground munitions scrutinized in the context of the Yemen war,
has similarly led some in Congress to propose changes to underlying arms sales authorities
granted to the executive branch.7
Congress, the Obama Administration, and Yemen
(2015-2016)
2015
Congressional interest in the Yemen conflict has evolved and grown gradually and was not
widespread at the outset of the coalition’s March 2015 intervention in Yemen.8 In early to mid-

Peninsula (AQAP); addressing Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; overseeing the issuance of visas for
Yemeni nationals traveling to the United States; countering human trafficking in Yemen; and prohibiting U.S.
assistance from being provided to Yemeni security forces which use child soldiers.
6 Section 1271 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232) modifies 10 USC 2342 to
prohibit the use of such agreements to transfer support or services to third parties and to require annual reporting.
7 Section 1270 of the House-passed version of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2500, would have
altered the authority granted to the President to determine that an emergency exists which requires waiving
congressional review requirements under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776). Conferees did not include this
provision in the final enacted version of the bill, S. 1790/P.L. 116-92.
8 Though Yemen was not the key focus of congressional interest in the Middle East at the time, congressional
committees did hold oversight hearings. For example, see “Yemen under Attack by Iranian-backed Houthis,”
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2015, congressional interest in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East centered on the Iran nuclear
deal and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.9
Several months after the March 2015 intervention, the Saudi-led coalition had not achieved a
conclusive victory and what modest gains had been made on the ground were offset by mounting
international criticism of growing civilian casualties from coalition air strikes. In Congress,
several lawmakers began to express concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Yemen.
 In late September 2015, Representative Ted W. Lieu wrote a letter to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff advocating for a halt to U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition
until it instituted safeguards to prevent civilian casualties.10
 In October 2015, 10 Members of Congress wrote a letter to President Obama
urging him to “work with our Saudi partners to limit civilian casualties to the
fullest extent possible.”11
 In October 2015, Senator Markey stated that “I fear that our failure to strongly
advocate diplomacy in Yemen over the past two years, coupled with our failure to
urge restraint in the face of the crisis last spring, may put the viability of this
critical [U.S.-Saudi] partnership at risk.”12
By the fall of 2015, as the Obama Administration tried to balance its concern for adhering to the
laws of armed conflict with its support for Gulf partners,13 lawmakers began to express concern
over U.S. involvement in the coalition’s intervention by scrutinizing U.S. arms sales to Saudi
Arabia.14 When the Administration informally notified Congress of a proposed sale of precision
guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia, some Senators sought to delay its formal notification.
After the formal notification in November 2015,15 Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC)
leaders jointly requested that the Administration notify Congress 30 days prior to associated
shipments, marking the first use of this prior-notification request authority.16 No related joint

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives,
April 14, 2015; “The U.S. Role and Strategy in the Middle East: Yemen and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 6, 2015; and “Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,” Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission, November 17, 2016.
9 Congress did address Yemen during consideration of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92).
H.R. 1735, the House version of that bill, included Section 1273, a “Sense of Congress on Evacuation of United States
Citizens and Nationals from Yemen.” That provision was excluded from the final version of the Act, which did contain
a provision that prohibited Defense Department funds from being provided to “an entity in Yemen that is controlled by
members of the Houthi movement.”
10 “Saudis Face Mounting Pressure over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict,” New York Times, September 29, 2015.
11 Letter from Representative Debbie Dingell et al to President Barack Obama, October 14, 2015. Available from CRS.
12 “Senate Democrats hold up Arms Sales for Saudi war in Yemen,” Al Monitor, October 7, 2015.
13 “As Saudis bombed Yemen, U.S. worried about Legal Blowback,” Reuters, October 10, 2016.
14 See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Call by Ben Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor
for Strategic Communications, and Jeff Prescott, Senior Director for the Middle East, NSC, on the Upcoming Visit of
King Salman of Saudi Arabia, September 2, 2015.
15 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittal No. 15-57, November 16, 2015.
16 The request marked the first time that Congress has invoked an authority it added to the Arms Export Control Act in
December 2014 through an amendment included in the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276). Section 201
of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-276) added Section 36(i) to the AECA. Potentially applicable to
any foreign military sale requiring notification pursuant to Section 36(b) of the AECA, the 36(i) mechanism requires
both the chair and ranking member of either of the two committees of jurisdiction (SFRC/HFAC) to jointly request that
the President provide such a “pre-shipment notification” 30 days prior to a shipment. The pre-shipment notification
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resolutions of disapproval on proposed sales of PGMs to the kingdom were introduced, but the
delay and the request for additional notification arguably demonstrated congressional concern.17
2016
By the one-year anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, a more defined opposition18
to U.S. support for the coalition had begun to coalesce amid repeated international documentation
of human rights abuses19 and errant coalition air strikes.20 In April 2016, legislation was
introduced that sought to place conditions on future proposed sale notifications, previously
approved sales, or transfers of PGMs to Saudi Arabia (Table 3).21 Proposed amendments to
FY2017 defense legislation22 would have added some similar conditions on the use of funds to
implement sales of PGMs or prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia.23 The
PGM amendment was not considered, but the cluster munitions amendment was narrowly
defeated in a June 2016 House floor vote.24
In the spring and summer of 2016, the United Nations held multiple rounds of peace talks in
Kuwait aimed at brokering an end to the conflict. From April 2016 to August 2016, the Saudi-led
coalition had largely spared Yemen’s capital Sanaa from aerial strikes as part of its commitment

would inform Congress that a shipment was about to occur, but would not require or preclude Congress from taking
further action to modify or block the shipment.
17 Although Congress has more than one legislative option it can use to block or modify an arms sale, one option
explicitly set out in law for blocking a proposed arms sale is the use of a joint resolution of disapproval as provided for
in Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). See, CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional
Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
18 In January 2016, Senator Chris Murphy called on the Administration to “suspend supporting Saudi Arabia’s military
campaign in Yemen, at the very least, until we get assurances that this campaign does not distract from the fight against
ISIS and Al Qaeda, and until we make some progress on the Saudi export of Wahhabism. And Congress should not
sign off on any more military sales to Saudi Arabia until similar assures are granted.” See, “Chris Murphy on the Roots
of Radical Extremism,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 29, 2016.
19 In April 2016, the “Saudi Arabia-led coalition” was listed alongside other parties to the conflict in Yemen in the
annex of the annual report of United Nations Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict for attacks that
resulted in the killing and maiming attacks of children in Yemen. In July 2016, then-U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon alleged that Saudi Arabia had threatened to reduce its funding for U.N. programs if the coalition was not
removed from the report annex, an allegation that Saudi leaders denied. In August 2016, the Secretary General said,
“After very careful consideration, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition was removed from the annexes, pending the
conclusions of a review. ...I have since received information on measures taken by the coalition to prevent and end
grave violations against children. We will continue our engagement to ensure that concrete measures to protect children
are implemented. But I want to repeat: the content of the report stands.” See, U.N. Blacklists Saudi-led Coalition for
Killing Children in Yemen, Reuters, October 5, 2017.
20 For example, see, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen
O’Brien Statement to the Security Council on Yemen, New York, February 16, 2016, and Press briefing note on
Yemen and Honduras, Spokesperson for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights: Rupert Colville, Geneva,
Switzerland, March 4, 2016.
21 In the 114th Congress, see, S.J.Res. 32—A joint resolution to provide limitations on the transfer
of certain United States munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia and H.J.Res. 90, To
provide limitations on the transfer of certain United States munitions from the United States to
Saudi Arabia.
22 In the 114th Congress, see, S. 2943—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 which became P.L.
114-328.
23 In the 114th Congress, see H.R. 5293—Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2017.
24 See, H.R. 5293, Recorded Vote, June 16, 2016, available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll327.xml.
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to the cessation of hostilities. When U.N.-mediated peace talks collapsed in August 2016, the
Saudi-led coalition resumed bombing and the war intensified.
During the summer of 2016, the Obama Administration reduced some of the U.S. support for
Saudi Arabia’s air campaign in Yemen by withdrawing U.S. personnel assigned to a joint U.S.-
Saudi planning cell.25 Nevertheless, overall U.S.-Saudi cooperation continued and, in August
2016, the Obama Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of M1A2S tanks to Saudi
Arabia. In response, some lawmakers wrote to request that President Obama withdraw the
proposal, citing concerns about Yemen.26 In September 2016, joint resolutions of disapproval of
the proposed tank sale were introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 39) and House (H.J.Res. 98). On
September 21, 2016, the Senate voted to table a motion to discharge the SFRC from further
consideration of S.J.Res. 39 (71-27, Record Vote 145).27 During debate over the motion, many
Senators argued in favor of continued U.S. support for Saudi Arabia, with Senator Lindsey
Graham remarking “To those who want to vote today to suspend this aid to Saudi Arabia, people
in Iran will cheer you on.”28
In the wake of an October 2016 Saudi air strike on a funeral hall in Sanaa that killed 140 people,
the Obama Administration initiated a review of U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia.29 Based
on that review, it put a hold on a planned sale of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi
Arabia and limited intelligence sharing, but maintained counterterrorism cooperation and
refueling for coalition aircraft.30
In the final months of the Obama Administration, U.S. Armed Forces briefly exchanged fire with
forces party to the conflict. In October 2016, Houthi-Saleh forces launched anti-ship missiles at
U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. The attacks against the U.S. ships marked the
first time U.S. Armed Forces had come under direct fire in the war. The Obama Administration
responded to the attacks against U.S. naval vessels by directing the Armed Forces to fire cruise
missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations. The Obama Administration described the U.S.
strikes as self-defense and indicated that it did not want to deepen its direct involvement in the
conflict.31 In August and November 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry made several
attempts to broker a peace initiative in Oman, but the parties rejected his efforts.
Leahy Law and Saudi-led Coalition Strikes in Yemen
Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, prohibits the furnishing of assistance
authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security force unit where there is
credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The State Department and U.S.
embassies overseas implement Leahy vetting to determine which foreign security individuals and units are eligible
to receive U.S. assistance or training. In October 2016, Senator Patrick Leahy remarked that “The humanitarian
crisis in Yemen has received too little attention, and it directly, or indirectly, implicates us. . The reports of civilian

25 “U.S. withdraws staff from Saudi Arabia dedicated to Yemen Planning,” Reuters, August 19, 2016.
26 See Hon. Lieu et al., Letter to President Barack Obama, August 29, 2016.
27 Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, pp. S5921-S5935.
28 op.cit., Congressional Record.
29 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on Yemen, October 8,
2016.
30 “U.S. Blocks Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia amid Concerns over Yemen War,” New York Times, December 13, 2016.
31 Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 14,
2016.
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casualties from Saudi air attacks in densely populated areas compel us to ask if these operations, supported by the
United States, violate [that law].”32
Analysis
By the end of the 114th Congress, the war in Yemen was becoming a more significant foreign
policy issue for lawmakers. While a growing number of Members were becoming critical of the
U.S. role in supporting the Saudi-led coalition amid a deteriorating humanitarian situation in
Yemen, more lawmakers still seemed to view the conflict through a regional lens rather than as a
localized affair.33 Amid significant congressional opposition to the 2015 nuclear agreement with
Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), some Members described Iran’s support
for the Houthi movement and the broader conflict in Yemen as an example of Iran’s malign
regional activities not directly addressed by the JCPOA. When Houthis targeted Gulf state
infrastructure on land and vessels at sea, U.S. officials and nongovernment observers cited their
behavior as evidence of Iran’s growing capabilities to threaten U.S. and Gulf security.34
While some Members described the Yemen conflict primarily a proxy war between the Iran-
backed Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, others portrayed it as a test of long-standing U.S.
commitments to supporting Saudi Arabian security.35 Supporters of the relationship, while
acknowledging that Saudi Arabia’s conduct of the war was at times problematic, argued that to
curtail U.S. arms sales or other defense support to the kingdom would weaken a vital partner that
was under threat from a hostile nonstate actor on its southern border.36
Others lawmakers charged that continued U.S. support for the coalition was not improving
coalition behavior but was damaging the U.S. reputation for upholding commitments to
international law and human rights.37 The 114th Congress did not enact legislation to limit U.S.
arms sales to Saudi Arabia, but these years marked the beginning of the broader congressional
debate that has continued.38
As the Trump Administration prepared to assume office, human rights organizations and aid
groups were pressing Congress to give more attention to the growing humanitarian crisis in
Yemen. Though the Obama Administration had taken some steps, particularly in late 2016, to
limit U.S.-coalition cooperation and restrict deliveries of PGMs to Saudi Arabia,
nongovernmental groups deemed this insufficient. According to Human Rights Watch, “Whatever
conditionality the Obama administration thought it had created—in holding up the transfer of
precision munitions near the tail end of Obama’s term and suspending cluster munition transfers

32 “U.S. Support for Saudi Strikes in Yemen Raises War Crime Concerns,” Foreign Policy.com, October 15, 2016.
33 “Senate tacitly endorses US role in Yemen War,” Al Monitor, September 21, 2016.
34 Congressional Record, November 15, 2016, Pages H6202-H6208.
35 Congressional Record, September 21, 2016, Pages S5921-S5935.
36 See colloquy between Senators Bob Corker and John McCain on Senate floor, September 21, 2016. Congressional
Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.
37 See remarks by Senator Christopher Murphy and Senator Rand Paul on Senate floor, September 21, 2016.
Congressional Record, 114th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 162, No. 143.
38 As one analyst described this trend in 2016, “We haven’t seen this much anti-Saudi activity on the Hill in a quarter of
a century.... Criticism of Saudi Arabia has come out of the closet, and I don’t think it’s going to go back in.” “Saudi
Arabia is Facing Unprecedented Scrutiny from Congress,” Washington Post, September 21, 2016.
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earlier—ultimately did not have meaningful impact in reining in the continued Saudi-led coalition
attacks on civilians.”39
Congress, the Trump Administration, and Yemen
(2017-2020)
2017
From the beginning of his Administration, President Donald Trump signaled strong support for
the Saudi-led coalition’s operations in Yemen as a bulwark against Iranian regional interference.
He initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Yemen, including President Obama’s October 2016
restrictions on U.S. arms sales and intelligence sharing to the coalition.40 On March 19, 2017, just
before his visit to Saudi Arabia, President Trump notified Congress that he was proceeding with
three proposed direct commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology deferred by the
Obama Administration, subject to congressional review.41
In May 2017, the Administration officially notified Congress of its intention to proceed with sales
of precision-guided munitions technologies that the Obama Administration had deferred, while
announcing plans to increase training for Saudi Arabia’s air force on both targeting and the Law
of Armed Conflict.42 Congress debated another resolution of disapproval (S.J.Res. 42) of these
proposed PGM sales in June 2017 (see below). After completing the policy review in July 2017,
President Trump directed his Administration “to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional
conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and
commerce in the Red Sea.”43
As President Trump entered office, the dynamics of the conflict in Yemen were changing, and the
coalition launched a new offensive along Yemen’s 280-mile western coastal plain ultimately
aimed at taking the strategic Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah (Yemen’s highest capacity port).
In early 2017, some Members of Congress responded to the coalition’s gradual advance toward
Hudaydah, coupled with an ongoing deterioration in humanitarian conditions, by imploring the
Administration to improve aid access and negotiate a cease-fire. In March 2017, several House
Members wrote a letter to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson urging him to “use all U.S.
diplomatic tools to help open the Yemeni port of Hodeida [Hudaydah] to international
humanitarian aid organizations.”44 A month later, another group of House Members wrote to

39 “Obama Officials’ Incomplete Reckoning with Failure on Yemen,” Just Security, November 19, 2018.
40 “Trump Administration Looks to Resume Saudi Arms Sale Criticized as Endangering Civilians in Yemen,”
Washington Post, March 8, 2017; and, “Trump Administration Weighs Deeper Involvement in Yemen War,”
Washington Post, March 26, 2017.
41 DDTC Transmittals No. DDTC 15-132 (JDAM), No. DDTC 16-011 (FMU-152A/B bomb fuzes), No. DDTC 16-043
(Paveway II & III, Enhanced Paveway II & III, Paveway IV), May 19, 2017.
42 A November 2017 report suggests that Saudi Arabia has agreed to purchase $7 billion in precision munitions from
U.S. companies in agreements that would span a decade. See, “Saudi Arabia Agrees to buy $7 billion in Precision
Munitions from U.S. firms: Sources,” Reuters, November 22, 2017. To date, no new precision-guided munitions
foreign military sales have been formally notified to Congress since the May 2017 notification of three direct
commercial sales of precision guided munitions technology that had been deferred by the Obama Administration.
43 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck
Schumer, February 27, 2018.
44 “Reps Lieu & Conyers lead 52 Member Letter urging Tillerson to use Diplomacy to reopen Yemen Port,” March 13,
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President Trump stating that Congress should approve any new U.S. support to the coalition amid
its offensive against Hudaydah.45
U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in Yemen 2015-2019
During both the Obama and Trump Administrations, the United States has sustained counterterrorism operations
against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and various affiliates of the Islamic State in Yemen. Throughout
the conflict in Yemen, the United States has been able to successful y target high-value targets within terrorist
organizations. In 2015, a U.S. strike kil ed then-AQAP leader Nasser al Wuhayshi.
At the start of the Trump presidency, the United States markedly increased the tempo of strikes.46 According to
one report, in early 2017, the President declared parts of three Yemeni provinces to be an “area of active
hostilities” where looser battlefield rules apply.47 In January 2017, Ryan Owens, a Navy SEAL, died during a
counterterrorism raid in which between 4 and 12 Yemeni civilians also were kil ed, including several children. One
of the children was a U.S. citizen. The raid was the Trump Administration's first acknowledged counterterror
operation.
In 2018, U.S. officials claimed that one of the most high-value targets in the AQAP organization, bombmaker
Ibrahim al Asiri, had been kil ed in a U.S. air strike. Asiri was a Saudi national who was believed to have created the
explosive devices used in the 2009 Christmas Day attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, in a 2009
attack against former Saudi Arabian intelligence chief Mohammed bin Nayef, and in the October 2010 air cargo
packages destined for Jewish sites in Chicago. On January 4, 2019, the Department of Defense announced that a
U.S. precision strike had kil ed Jamal al Badawi, one of the primary Yemeni terrorists involved in the 2000 USS Cole
bombing.
On June 13, 2017, the Senate debated another resolution (S.J.Res. 42) to disapprove of three
direct commercial sales of PGMs to Saudi Arabia. During Senate floor consideration over the
motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of
S.J.Res. 42, Members once again weighed various issues, such as the U.S.-Saudi bilateral
relationship, countering Iran, and limiting U.S. involvement in the war in Yemen. Some
lawmakers suggested that U.S. arms sales and military support to the coalition had enabled
alleged violations of international humanitarian law, while others argued that continuing U.S.
support to the coalition improves its effectiveness and helps minimize civilian casualties.
For example, during floor debate, Senator Graham argued that “If we are worried about collateral
damage in Yemen, I understand the concern. Precision weapons would help that cause, not hurt
it.”48 Senator Murphy responded, saying “What we are asking for is to hold off on selling these
precision-guided munitions until we get some clear promise—some clear assurance—from the
Saudis that they are going to use these munitions only for military purposes and that they are
going to start taking steps—real steps, tangible steps—to address the humanitarian crisis.”49 On
June 13, 2017, the Senate voted to reject the motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 42 (47-53, Record Vote 143), and a companion
resolution was not taken up in the House (H.J.Res. 102).

2017.
45 U.S. Representative Mark Pocan, “Bipartisan Effort: 55 U.S. Representatives Call on Trump to Come to Congress
Before Taking Military Action in Yemen,” April 11, 2017.
46 “2017: A Record Year for US Counterterrorism Strikes,” Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of
Democracies, January 3, 2018. See also, U.S. Department of Defense, CENTCOM Officials Provide Update on Recent
Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen, Dec. 20, 2017.
47 “Trump Administration Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” New York Times, March 12,
2017.
48 Congressional Record, June 13, 2017, Issue: Vol. 163, No. 100—Daily Edition.
49 op.cit., Congressional Record.
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Representative Ro Khanna introduced a concurrent resolution (H.Con.Res. 81) pursuant to the
War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) in a bid to end U.S. support for the coalition’s military
intervention. After consultation between House leaders and supporters of the resolution on a
compromise approach, the House agreed to delay expedited consideration of the resolution until
after the November 2018 election and then adopted a nonbinding alternative (H.Res. 599, 366-30,
1 Present, Roll no. 623).50
In his first year in office, President Trump sought to improve relations with Saudi Arabia, counter
Iran, and increase U.S. counterterrorism activity in Yemen, while at the same time his
Administration also took strong positions at times on the need for the coalition to improve
humanitarian access, pursue a settlement to the conflict, and take measures to prevent civilian
casualties.
After a Houthi-fired missile with alleged Iranian origins landed deep inside Saudi Arabia in
November 2017, the coalition instituted a full blockade of all of Yemen’s ports, including the
main port of Hudaydah, exacerbating the country's humanitarian crisis.51 The White House issued
four press statements on the conflict between November 8 and December 8, including a statement
on December 6 in which President Trump called on Saudi Arabia to “completely allow food, fuel,
water, and medicine to reach the Yemeni people who desperately need it. This must be done for
humanitarian reasons immediately.”52
On December 20, 2017, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would end its blockade of
Hudaydah port for a 30-day period and permit the delivery of four U.S.-funded cranes to Yemen
to increase the port's capability to off-load commercial and humanitarian goods.53 The next day,

50 Congressional Record, November 13, 2017, Vol. 163, No. 185, Pages H9148-H9155.
51 On November 4, 2017, a Houthi ballistic missile (with alleged Iranian markings) landed on Saudi soil near King
Khalid international airport in Riyadh. Two days later, the Saudi-led coalition closed all Yemeni ports, including
Hudaydah, which is the primary point of entry for most imported food and humanitarian supplies entering Yemen.
Yemen imports over 90% of its food supply. After the coalition’s imposition of the port’s total closure, food and fuel
prices skyrocketed, leading international aid agencies to warn of impending famine. The total closure of all Yemeni
ports lasted until November 24, 2017, when the Saudi-led coalition announced that it would begin allowing
humanitarian aid to resume entering Hudaydah port—but not commercial shipments of food and fuel. The Saudi-led
coalition argued that the Houthis earn hard currency by taxing fuel imports. Yemen imports 80% of its food from
commercial suppliers rather than from humanitarian sources.
52 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Yemen, December 6,
2017. Other statements include the following: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, White House Statement
on Iranian-Supported Missile Attacks Against Saudi Arabia, November 8, 2017; The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement from the Press Secretary on the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, November 24, 2017; The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary Regarding the Violence and Humanitarian
Conditions in Yemen, December 8, 2017.
53 In late 2017, Senators Todd Young and Christopher Murphy placed a hold on the confirmation of the State
Department’s nominee for legal advisor, Jennifer Newstead, until the Administration took certain steps to address the
coalition’s blockade of Yemen. Dan De Luce and Robbie Gramer, “GOP Senator Presses Trump Administration Over
Deadly Saudi Blockade in Yemen,” Foreign Policy, December 4, 2017; and, Dan De Luce, “Trump Nominee Concedes
Saudi Siege of Yemen Could Be Violating U.S. Law,” Foreign Policy, December 19, 2017. On December 14, Senator
Young sent a letter to President Trump thanking the President for his December 6 statement, while asserting that, per
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended (22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a)), the coalition's blockade triggers a
prohibition on U.S. foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia. Newstead was confirmed by the Senate on December 19 after
promising the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider evidence of any possible foreign government restriction
of the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Yemen in determining whether to apply statutory prohibitions found
in 22 U.S. Code §2378-1(a). See, Senator Todd Young, Young: Law Triggered by Saudi Arabia's Actions in Yemen,
December 14, 2017, and Newstead response online at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4333104-20171114-
Young-Newstead-QFRs-Round-3-1.html.
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the White House issued a statement welcoming “Saudi Arabia's announcement of these
humanitarian actions in the face of this major conflict.”
2018
As the Saudi-led coalition intervention entered its fourth year, some in the Senate proposed use of
the War Powers Resolution as a tool for ending U.S. support for the coalition’s military
intervention. On February 28, 2018, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.J.Res. 54, a joint
resolution to “direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic
of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress (except for those U.S. forces engaged in
counterterrorism operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces).”54 Efforts in the Senate
followed a late 2017 attempt in the House (see Table 2 below), in which a concurrent resolution
directing the President to remove U.S. forces from Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed
nonbinding resolution.
Throughout 2018, there was disagreement between Congress and the Trump Administration and
within Congress itself, as to whether U.S. forces assisting the Saudi-led coalition have been
introduced into active or imminent hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. Some
Members claimed that by providing support to the Saudi-led coalition, U.S. forces have been
introduced into a “situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated” based
on the criteria of the War Powers Resolution.55 The Trump Administration disagreed. In February
2018, the Acting Department of Defense General Counsel wrote to Senate leaders describing the
extent of current U.S. support, and reported that “the United States provides the KSA [Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia]-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling;56
certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the
law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties.”57
On March 20, 2018, the Senate considered S.J.Res. 54. During floor debate, arguments centered
on a number of issues, ranging from concern over exacerbating Yemen’s humanitarian crisis to
reasserting the role of Congress in authorizing the use of armed force abroad. After then-Foreign
Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker promised to propose new legislation and
hold hearings scrutinizing U.S. policy in Yemen, a majority of Senators voted to table a motion to
discharge the Foreign Relations committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 54. Senator

54 This followed the late 2017 action in the House (see discussion of (H.Con.Res. 81 and H.Res.
599, above), in which a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove U.S. forces from
Yemen was tabled in favor of a House-passed nonbinding resolution.
55 For example, see remarks of Senator Mike Lee on the Senate floor, November 28, 2018. Congressional Record,
115th Congress, 2nd Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 187.
56 In-flight refueling to the militaries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was conducted pursuant to
the terms of bilateral Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) between the Department of Defense and
the respective ministries of each country. ACSA agreements are governed by 10 USC 2341-2350. The agreements
provide for reciprocal logistical support under a variety of circumstances, and their underlying statutory authority does
not prohibit U.S. support to partner forces engaged in armed conflict. U.S. ACSA agreements with Saudi Arabia and
the UAE provide for the transfer of support to third parties with the prior written consent of both the original provider
and original recipient. The U.S. agreement with Saudi Arabia was signed in May 2016. The executive branch has not
publicly specified what legal authority or agreement provided for refueling support to Saudi aircraft from March 2015
through May 2016.
57 Letter from Department of Defense Acting General Counsel William Castle to Senators Mitch McConnell and Chuck
Schumer, February 27, 2018.
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Robert Menendez made remarks expressing conditional support for Senator Corker’s approach, a
view shared by some other Senators who voted to table the motion.58
The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Yemen a month later. In parallel testimony
before Congress, U.S. defense officials stated that while the United States refueled Saudi aircraft
and provided advice on targeting techniques, CENTCOM did not track coalition aircraft after
they were refueled and did not provide advice on specific targets.59 Then-Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Robert S. Karem testified that “It’s correct that we do
not monitor and track all of the Saudi aircraft aloft over Yemen.”60 During the same hearing, U.S.
officials acknowledged that pressure from Congress has altered how the Administration deals
with the coalition over the Yemen conflict. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs David Satterfield told Senator Todd Young and the SFRC the following:
Senator, your efforts, the efforts of your colleagues in this body and on this Committee
have been exceedingly helpful in allowing the Administration to send a message from
whole of government regarding the very specific concerns we have over any limitations,
restrictions, constraints on the ability of both humanitarian and commercial goods
specifically to include fuel to have unrestricted and expeditious entry into Yemen. And that
messaging which comes from us, the Executive Branch, also comes from this body is
extremely important.61
After the promised hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also proposed new
legislation to place conditions on U.S. assistance to the coalition. In May, the committee reported
S.J.Res. 58 to the Senate; it would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for
in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not conducting
select types of operations if certain certifications cannot be made and maintained.62
The Senate Armed Services Committee incorporated the provisions of the SFRC-reported text of
S.J.Res. 58 as Section 1266 of the version of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) that it reported to the Senate on June 5, 2018 (S. 2987). The provision was modified
further and passed by both the House and Senate as Section 1290 of the conference version of the
FY2019 NDAA (H.R. 5515, see textbox below). It was signed into law as P.L. 115-232 in mid-
August, giving the Administration until mid-September 2018 to make certain certifications. In a
statement accompanying the President’s signing of P.L. 115-232 into law, President Trump
objected to provisions such as Section 1290, stating the Administration’s view that such
provisions “encompass only actions for which such advance certification or notification is

58 Senator Menendez said, “Based upon Chairman Corker's commitments to those hearings and future markups and
based upon the totality of the situation, I will vote to table the motion to discharge from the committee because I am not
ready to either abandon our partners that face an existential threat from Iran run amok in Yemen, but my support is not
unconditional, and I will demand responsive actions.” Congressional Record, March 20, 2018, 115th Congress, 2nd
Session, Issue: Vol. 164, No. 48 — Daily Edition.
59 Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
March 18, 2018.
60 Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Karem, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 17,
2018.
61 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield, Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, April 17, 2018.
62 The joint resolution identified several certification criteria, although, reported as amended by the committee, it would
have enabled the Secretary of State to waive the certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary
provides an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. The joint resolution also would have
required a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed strategy to accomplish those
objectives.
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feasible and consistent” with “[his] exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief
and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign affairs.”63
As Congress continued to question the role of the United States in supporting coalition operations
in Yemen, the pace and scale of fighting on the ground increased dramatically by the summer of
2018. On June 12, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition launched “Operation Golden Victory,” aimed at
retaking the Red Sea port city of Hudaydah. As coalition forces engaged Houthi militants in and
around Hudaydah, humanitarian organizations warned that if port operation ceased, famine could
become widespread throughout northern Yemen. On June 12, nine Senators wrote a letter to
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis saying, “We are
concerned that pending military operations by the UAE and its Yemeni partners will exacerbate
the humanitarian crisis by interrupting delivery of humanitarian aid and damaging critical
infrastructure. We are also deeply concerned that these operations jeopardize prospects for a near-
term political resolution to the conflict.”64
Section 1290 of H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232
Section 1290 of P.L. 115-232 states that potential restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for in-flight refueling of
coalition aircraft would not apply to certain types of operations, including missions related to Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State or “related to countering the transport, assembly, or employment of ballistic missiles or components
in Yemen.” Under the final version of the provision, the Administration must certify that the Saudi and Emirati
governments are undertaking

an urgent and good faith effort to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Yemen;

appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access for Yemenis to food,
fuel, medicine, and medical evacuation, including through the appropriate use of Yemen’s Red Sea ports,
including the port of Hudaydah, the airport in Sana’a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia; and,

demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military
operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen,
including by (1) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles purchased or
transferred from the United States, and (2) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to
civilians and civilian infrastructure.
With specific regard to Saudi Arabia, the Administration also must certify that “the Government of Saudi Arabia is
undertaking appropriate actions to reduce any unnecessary delays to shipments associated with secondary
inspection and clearance processes other than UNVIM.” The Administration may waive the certification
requirement if certain explanatory submissions are made. Reporting and strategy submission requirements also
were included in the final version.
Several weeks later, Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, placed a hold on a potential U.S. sale of precision guided munitions to
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In a June 28 letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of
Defense Mattis, Senator Menendez said,
I am not confident that these weapons sales will be utilized strategically as effective
leverage to push back on Iran’s actions in Yemen, assist our partners in their own self-
defense, or drive the parties toward a political settlement that saves lives and mitigates
humanitarian suffering.... Even worse, I am concerned that our policies are enabling
perpetuation of a conflict that has resulted in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.65

63 White House, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on H.R. 5515, August 13, 2018.
64 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez, Corker, Murphy, Young, Colleagues
raise Concerns about Imminent Military Operations at Hudaydah, Yemen, June 12, 2018.
65 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member's Press, Menendez Demands more Answers from Trump
Admin before letting Arms Sales to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia move forward, June 28, 2018.
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On August 9, the coalition conducted an air strike that hit a bus in a market near Dahyan, Yemen,
in the northern Sa’ada governorate adjacent to the Saudi border. The strike reportedly killed 51
people, 40 of whom were children. The coalition claimed that its air strike was a “legitimate
military operation” conducted in response to a Houthi missile attack on the Saudi city of Jizan a
day earlier that had killed a Yemeni national in the kingdom. The U.S. State Department called on
the Saudi-led coalition to conduct a “thorough and transparent investigation into the incident.”66
Several Members of Congress wrote to the Administration seeking additional information
regarding U.S. operations in the wake of the August 2018 coalition strike at Dahyan.67 Several
Senators also submitted an amendment to the FY2019 Defense Department appropriations act
(H.R. 6157) that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act to support the
Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to
Congress that the coalition air campaign “does not violate the principles of distinction and
proportionality within the rules for the protection of civilians.” The provision would not have
applied to support for ongoing counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda and the Islamic State
in Yemen.
On September 12, Secretary of State Pompeo issued a certification that would allow the use of
FY2019 defense funds to support in-flight refueling of coalition aircraft to continue, per the terms
of Section 1290 (see discussion above) of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA, P.L. 115-232). Some Members of Congress criticized the Administration’s actions,
asserting that the coalition had not met the act’s specified benchmarks for avoiding civilian
casualties in Yemen.68
On September 26, several House Members introduced H.Con.Res. 138, which sought to direct the
President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in Yemen, except for Armed Forces
engaged in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, within
30 days unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use has been
enacted into law. In response to a similar initiative in the Senate, the Administration submitted a
detailed argument expressing its view that U.S. forces supporting Saudi-led coalition operations
are not engaged in hostilities in Yemen.
By late 2018, the prospect of widespread famine in Yemen, coupled with international reprobation
over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials, had created pressure on the
Administration and the coalition to accelerate moves toward peace talks. On October 30, then-
Secretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Pompeo called for all parties to reach a cease-
fire and resume negotiations. On November 9, Secretary Mattis further announced that effective
immediately, the coalition would use its own military capabilities—rather than U.S. capabilities—
to conduct in-flight refueling in support of its operations in Yemen.69
Though fighting continued along several fronts, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-
General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire on December 13, 2018, centered on the
besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah.70 As part of the U.N.-brokered deal (known as the
Stockholm Agreement), the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside

66 State Department Spokesperson Heather Nauert, Press Briefing, August 9, 2018.
67 “Congress, White House Reaching Breaking Point on Yemen?” Lobe Log, August 16, 2018.
68 Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Statement Following Trump Administration's Certification in Support of Saudi-led
Coalition, September 12, 2018.
69 White House, Statement Of Administration Policy on S.J.Res. 54, November 28, 2018.
70 The full text of the cease-fire agreements are available at https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-
agreement.
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Hudaydah city and port.71 The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination
Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. The international community
praised the Stockholm Agreement as a first step toward broader de-escalation and a possible road
map to a comprehensive peace settlement.
Also on December 13, 2018, the Senate amended and passed S.J.Res. 54 (56-41), which, among
other things, directed the President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen, except U.S.
forces engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces. In the House, lawmakers
twice narrowly approved rules containing provisions that made similar resolutions directing the
President to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration
(H.Res. 1142 and H.Res. 1176).72 On December 13, the Senate also passed S.J.Res. 69, which,
among other things, expressed the sense of the Senate that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman is responsible for the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and that there is no
statutory authorization for United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war.
2019
For the first several months of 2019, implementation of the Stockholm Agreement stalled.
According to Special Envoy Griffiths, “the initial timelines were rather ambitious” and “a
complex situation on the ground” was stalling U.N.-backed efforts.73 The Stockholm Agreement
did not specify which local actors were to assume responsibility for security in Hudaydah after
both parties redeployed.74 According to reporting by the United Nations, initial implementation of
the Stockholm Agreement was hindered by an overall lack of trust and a reluctance to make
operational concessions outside of a comprehensive political agreement. On February 17, the
United Nations announced that “The parties reached an agreement on Phase 1H.R. 2 of the
mutual redeployment of forces” whereby the Houthis would withdraw from Hudaydah port and
the Saudi-led coalition would move out of the eastern outskirts of Hudaydah city.75
At the February 2019 Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East in
Warsaw, Poland, members of the self-described “quad” (United States, United Kingdom, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) met to coordinate their policy toward the Yemen conflict.
The quad emphasized the importance of implementing the Stockholm Agreement, the problematic
role Iran plays in arming and financing the Houthis, and the need for additional humanitarian
assistance. The foreign ministers comprising the quad also “expressed full support for Saudi
Arabia and its legitimate national security concerns and called for an immediate end to such
attacks by Houthi forces and their allies.”
In February 2019, CNN reported that Saudi Arabia and the UAE had provided U.S. military
equipment (armored vehicles) to local Yemeni units fighting the Houthis in possible violation of

71 On December 6, 2018, the warring parties to the conflict in Yemen convened in Sweden under the auspices of the
United Nations to discuss various de-escalation proposals and a possible road map to a comprehensive peace
settlement. The talks were the first formal negotiations since 2016. After a week of negotiations, all sides agreed to the
Stockholm Agreement, which consists of three components; a cease-fire around the port city of Hudaydah, a prisoner
swap, and a statement of understanding that all sides would form a committee to discuss the war-torn city Taiz.
72 See Section 2 of H.Res. 1176, Providing for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bill () to
provide for the reform and continuation of agricultural and other programs of the Department of Agriculture through
fiscal year 2023, and for other purposes.
73 “U.N. Envoy Urges Yemen Combatants to Withdraw from Lifeline Port,” Reuters, January 28, 2019.
74 “Explainer: What's So Hard About Implementing a Peace Deal in Yemen's Main Port,” Reuters, February 26, 2019.
75 “Yemen's Parties Agree to Start Stalled Troop Withdrawal from Main Port,” Reuters, February 17, 2019.
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end-user foreign military sale or direct commercial sale agreements.76 The coalition denied these
charges, while the U.S. State Department said that it was “seeking additional information” on the
issue. In Senate and House hearings in early February, some Members expressed concern about
end-use monitoring of equipment provided to the coalition.77
On February 7, 2019, Senator Robert Menendez, ranking member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, introduced S. 398, the Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act of 2019
(Table 1). This bill, which was originally introduced in the 115th Congress, would, among other
things, legislatively require an end to in-flight refueling for Saudi-led coalition operations in
Yemen, suspend certain arms sales to the kingdom, sanction persons blocking humanitarian
access in Yemen, and sanction persons supporting the Houthis in Yemen. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee reported the bill to the Senate in July 2019.
In response to reporting by the New York Times on the use of child soldiers by the Saudi-led
coalition, 13 Members of Congress wrote to Secretary Pompeo on February 15, 2019, seeking
information about the accuracy of the reports, and about whether these children had been
provided U.S.-made weapons and uniforms. Coalition officials denied the reports. Saudi Arabia
and the UAE were not included on the annual U.S. list of countries using child soldiers, although
the 2019 Trafficking in Persons report detailed continuing concerns about the government of
Yemen’s willingness and ability to end child soldier use by its forces and others.78
On February 13, 2019, the House passed (248-177) H.J.Res. 37, a joint resolution originally
introduced in the 115th Congress (S.J.Res. 54) “Directing the removal of United States Armed
Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.”
Prior to its passage by the House, the White House issued a State of Administration Policy in
which the Administration argued that “the premise of the joint resolution is flawed” because the
United States has provided only “limited support to member countries of the Saudi-led coalition”
and U.S. forces providing such intelligence and logistics support are not engaged in hostilities.
Section 4 of H.J.Res. 37 includes a rule of construction stating that “Nothing in this joint
resolution may be construed to influence or disrupt any intelligence, counterintelligence, or
investigative activities conducted by, or in conjunction with, the United States Government.”
The Senate companion resolution to H.J.Res. 37 (S.J.Res. 7) was introduced on January 30, 2019,
and passed in the Senate (54-46) on March 13, 2019, and in the House (247-175) on April 4.
President Trump vetoed the resolution on April 16, citing a concern that the resolution would
weaken his constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief, harm bilateral relationships, and
negatively affect efforts to prevent civilian casualties and prevent the spread of terrorist
organizations in the Arabian Peninsula.79 House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer responded to the
presidential veto message stating that “the fight is not yet over, and the House will explore further
legislation and conduct rigorous oversight.”80

76 Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Mohamed Abo El Gheit and Laura Smith-Spark, “Sold to an ally, lost to an enemy,”
CNN.com, February 2019. Available at: https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/yemen-lost-us-arms/.
77 “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States Central Command in Review of the Defense Authorization
Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 5,
2019; “Hearing on U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 6, 2019.
78 State Department, 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report, June 20, 2019. Yemen is listed as a “Special Case” for the
fourth consecutive year.
79 The White House, “Presidential Veto Message to the Senate to Accompany S.J. Res. 7,” April 16, 2019.
80 “Hoyer Statement on President Trump's Veto of the Bipartisan Yemen War Powers Resolution,” Press Release, April
17, 2019.
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On May 2, 2019, the resolution failed to garner the 67 votes needed to override the veto in the
Senate (53-45). Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell reiterated his opposition to what he
referred to as the false premises of the bill: “We’re not parties to the civil war in Yemen. We’re no
longer providing air-to-air refueling. More importantly, the measure would make it actually more
difficult to prevent the loss of innocent lives.”81 Text from the House-passed version of H.J.Res.
37 subsequently was added to the House version of the FY2020 Defense appropriations act (Title
X of H.R. 2968) and passed by the House, but not included in the final version of the act.
Houthi forces began handing over control of Hudaydah and two other ports on the Red Sea on
May 10, in accordance with the first phase of redeployment laid out in the Stockholm Agreement.
Hadi government officials subsequently questioned the legitimacy of the withdrawal, with the
Information Minister calling it a “theatrical play”; Special Envoy Griffiths stated in a briefing to
the U.N. Security Council on May 15 that the Houthis had complied with the withdrawal.82
Though mediators had expressed hope that the Stockholm Agreement would lead to broader
peace negotiations, the Houthis escalated their drone and ballistic missile attacks against Saudi
Arabia during the summer of 2019. The Houthis called these attacks their “airport for airport”
campaign, stating that they would target Saudi civilian airports for as long as the Saudi-led
coalition maintains its closure of Sana’a airport. The Houthis launched multiple unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) attacks against regional airports in Saudi Arabia (Jizan, Najran, and Abha), forcing
the suspension of flights, damaging runways, and killing several civilians. Iran is believed to be
the original source of UAV technology and knowledge transfer to the Houthis.83 However, the
Houthis may now be manufacturing their own UAVs. According to Jane’s Defence, “the available
evidence suggests that Ansar Allah is increasingly making use of parts that are commercially
available on the international market to develop new UAV designs.”84
On May 24, 2019, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of immediate foreign
military sales and direct commercial sales of training, equipment, and weapons with a possible
value of more than $8 billion, including sales of precision guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, and the gift transfer of PGMs by the UAE to Jordan. Other notified sales
include, among others, F-15 Engines and support for Saudi Arabia and AH-64 equipment, Javelin
Anti-Tank Missiles, and Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles for the UAE. In the
Administration’s justification for the emergency sales to Congress, it described a “rapidly-
evolving security situation in the region” and noted, among others, the threat posed by Iranian-
backed Houthis, who have “publicly threatened to increase operations targeting vital military
targets in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Saudi-Led Coalition positions in
Yemen.”85
On June 5, 2019, a bipartisan group of seven Senators introduced 22 separate joint resolutions of
disapproval against the sales. One cosponsor, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), expressed in a
statement his concern about “the precedent these arms sales would set by having the

81 Marianne Levine, “Senate fails to override Trump's veto on Yemen,” Politico, May 5, 2019.
82 “Houthi withdrawal from Yemen ports going according to plan: UN,” Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019.
83 In January 2018, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen identified military unmanned aerial vehicles that are of Iranian
origin (Ababil-T/Qasef-1) and were brought into Yemen after the imposition of the targeted 2015 arms embargo. See,
Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated by Security Council resolution 2342
(2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/68) [EN/AR].
84 “Ansar Allah “Airport for Airport” Strategy underlines Potential for Re-Escalation of Yemen Conflict, Jane's
Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor, June 21, 2019.
85 Congressional Record, June 4, 2019, pp. S3203-S3209.
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Administration go around legitimate concerns of Congress.”86 The Senate adopted all 22 of the
measures. Three of the measures focused on proposed sales of air-to-ground munitions were
adopted by the House and Senate and vetoed by the President.
In summer 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) unilaterally withdrew most of its forces from
Yemen. The UAE had been Saudi Arabia’s primary partner in a coalition war against the Houthis.
The UAE’s local partners in southern Yemen, the Transitional Political Council for the South (aka
Southern Transitional Council, STC), attempted to seize more power in Aden from the Hadi
government following the UAE’s withdrawal. Violent confrontations ensued between STC and
pro-Hadi forces. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE brokered a power-sharing agreement
between Hadi’s supporters and the STC in November 2019, implementation of that deal stalled,
leaving the STC ensconced in the South, the Houthis controlling the north, and the Hadi
government isolated. The United Arab Emirates withdrawal of forces from Yemen may limit
further scrutiny of their operations against the Houthis, but Members of Congress may continue
to pursue questions about arms transfers to Yemeni partner forces and human rights.
Beyond the ground war in Yemen, the Houthis have continued to intermittently launch missile,
rocket, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)87 attacks against Saudi Arabian population centers
and energy infrastructure. After sophisticated air attacks against Saudi Arabian oil fields of
Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019, attacks widely attributed to Iran but claimed by the
Houthis, the Houthis announced that they would suspend missile and UAV attacks against Saudi
Arabia. Between September and December 2019, Saudi, Yemeni government, and Houthi
representatives engaged in talks aimed at de-escalating the fighting. The talks were accompanied
by several confidence-building measures, such as prisoner exchanges and medical evacuation
flights from Sana’a to Amman, Jordan. However, in January 2020, the Houthis resumed their
UAV and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia (see below).88
Section 1273 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) codified (for a
two-year period) an existing Department of Defense policy to end in-flight refueling of Saudi-led
coalition aircraft engaged in hostile operations in Yemen. After President Trump signed the Act,
he issued a signing statement arguing that
Several provisions of the Act, including sections 1254, 1273, 1698(a), and 2810, purport
to restrict the President’s authority to manage personnel, materiel, and logistical matters in
the manner the President believes to be necessary or advisable for the successful conduct
of military missions and foreign affairs….My Administration will implement these
provisions consistent with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief...
Other provisions proposed, considered, and adopted in the House during 2019 debate over the
National Defense Authorization Act were not included in the final enacted version, including
provisions that would have prohibited all U.S. support to and participation in the Saudi-led
coalition’s military operations against the Houthis in Yemen and provided for a one-year ban on

86 Joe Gould, “Graham, Menendez offer action to thwart Trump arms sales to Saudi, UAE and Jordan,” Defense News,
June 5, 2019.
87 According to one analysis, “The Houthis have demonstrated that their UAV technology has greatly improved since
the weapons were first introduced to their military arsenal. No other known non-state armed group (NSAG) across the
Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region and beyond has reached the same level of UAV technological
sophistication.” See, Ludovico Carlino, “Houthis Selecting More UAVs over Ballistic Missiles in Arabian Peninsula
Attacks,” Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, December 6, 2019.
88 See, Missy Ryan and Kareem Fahim, “Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s rebels were Making Rare Progress in Peace Talks.
Then New Violence Flared,” Washington Post, February 4, 2020.
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link to page 25 Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020

U.S. sales of precision guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with
some exceptions (see Table 1 below).
2020 (through June 15)
During winter 2020, amidst the backdrop of fracturing in the anti-Houthi opposition, the Houthis
launched a new offensive into Jawf governorate, where they succeeded in seizing the provincial
capital. By April 2020, the Houthis were in position to threaten Marib governorate, one of the last
Yemeni areas loyal to the Hadi government and where Yemen’s modest oil and gas reserves are
located. The capture of Marib would represent a major gain for the Houthis. Its seizure also could
trigger major internal displacement. According to the International Crisis Group, Marib’s
population has increased from 300,000 before the war to as many as 3 million as of March
2020.89
On March 28, 2020, the Houthis fired missiles at the Saudi capital Riyadh (and elsewhere in the
kingdom), and Saudi air defenses reportedly intercepted the projectiles. The remnants of previous
Houthi ballistic missile attacks against Saudi Arabia have proven to resemble Iran’s Qiam missile,
which itself is a modified short-range Scud missile.90 In February 2020, the USS Normandy
intercepted a small dhow (trading vessel) while on patrol in the Arabian Sea and discovered a
cache of Iranian weapons intended for delivery to Yemen; some of the items seized included
Iranian made copies of a Russian antitank guided missile, Iranian designed and manufactured
surface-to-air missiles, and components for unmanned maritime systems.91
As the COVID-19 pandemic escalated worldwide, United Nations officials called for worldwide
humanitarian cease-fires in various conflict zones in order to respond. On April 8, 2020, Saudi
Arabia unilaterally announced a two-week cease-fire in Yemen and a $500 million pledge of
humanitarian aid. Parties to the conflict subsequently reengaged in ceasefire negotiations under
United Nations auspices, but intense conflict has continued in some areas, including in and
around the northern port of Hudaydah—the country’s lifeline for food and fuel imports—and
along an arc from Ta’izz governorate in the southwest through Bayda, Marib, and Al Jawf
governorates.
According to the Yemen Data Project, a non-governmental organization that compiles public
reporting about the conflict in Yemen, Saudi and coalition airstrikes increased in frequency from
January 2020 to an 18-month high in March, before declining in April and increasing again in
May. Overall civilian casualties in the conflict were highest in 2015, and continue to occur in
connection with indiscriminate fire by Houthi forces, shelling by government of Yemen and allied
local forces, and, to a less frequent extent, Saudi and coalition airstrikes.92
As international frustration over Houthi obstruction of humanitarian assistance mounted, donors
and aid implementers warned that if the Houthis would not abide by the principles of
international humanitarian law and allow for unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance, they
would risk losing aid.93 The Trump Administration has supported international attempts to

89 “Preventing a Deadly Showdown in Northern Yemen,” International Crisis Group, Briefing 74, March 17, 2020.
90 Jeremy Binnie and Mohammed Najib, “‘New’ Houthi Missile Appears to be Another Iranian Scud Derivative,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 30, 2020.
91 U.S. Department of Defense, Central Command Holds Defense Department Media Availability, February. 19, 2020.
92 Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and Yemen Data Project, March 2020.
93 Lisa Barrington, “Aid to Houthi-controlled Yemen to be cut back over risk it can be diverted –sources,” Reuters,
February 6, 2020.
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pressure the Houthis to abide by international humanitarian law. On March 24, 2020, USAID
initiated a partial suspension of its funding to support humanitarian operations in northern Yemen.
Some Members of Congress have called on the Trump Administration to step up its role in
resolving the standoff between the Houthis and international aid agencies. In February 2020,
several Senators wrote a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo asking him to take a
more active role in "ensuring the unimpeded, accountable, and impartial flow of assistance and
commerce into Yemen."94 A month later, a bipartisan group of House Members demanded that,
concerns about the Houthis notwithstanding, Secretary Pompeo not suspend aid in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic and other humanitarian considerations.95
In May 2020, six Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo and Acting USAID Administrator
Barsa saying “We recognize the challenge that Houthi obstruction poses to relief efforts in
Yemen…We must ensure that development dollars provided to Yemen actually benefit the people
most in need of help, and do not enrich Houthi forces or their partners, who have regularly
imposed unacceptable constraints on common-sense measures to track and account for funds and
supplies.”96
In late April 2020, the STC declared self-administration in southern Yemen, upending a power-
sharing agreement between it and the central Yemeni government signed in November 2019 in
Riyadh. Violent clashes followed the STC’s announcement, and the separatist group seized
hundreds of millions in cash from the central bank in Aden.
While Saudi Arabia and the Houthis have been engaged for months in negotiations97 over how to
deescalate their conflict, there is some speculation that the COVID-19 outbreak in the Arabian
Peninsula may provide an opportunity for cooperation.98 International aid organizations have
warned that Yemen is ill-equipped to handle the pandemic. According to one report, 51% of
health facilities are fully functional, and there are limited supplies of personal protective
equipment and few testing sites nationwide.99 At a June 2020 pledging conference hosted by
Saudi Arabia, donors pledged an additional $1.35 billion to support assistance programs in
Yemen, short of the $2.4 billion sought by the United Nations.
In June 2020, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote a letter to Secretary Pompeo seeking his
leadership in resolving the conflict in Yemen, writing “Your interventions were important to
securing past interim agreements. We now believe that sustained, high-level U.S. engagement is
necessary to finally put an end to this devastating civil war.”100
As of June 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to spread throughout Yemen, and
humanitarian workers have accused the Houthis of covering up the extent of the outbreak.101 In

94 Senators Schumer, Menendez, and Reed Letter to U.S. Secretary Mike Pompeo, February 4, 2020.
95 Bryant Harris, "Intel: Democrats Warn Trump Administration against Cutting Yemen Aid, Al Monitor, March 26,
2020.
96 Cardin, Young Lead Effort to Continue Humanitarian Lifeline for Yemeni Civilians, May 12, 2020.
97 “Saudi, Yemen's Houthis hold 'Indirect Talks' in Oman to End War,” Al Jazeera, November 13, 2019. See also,
Colum Lynch, Lara Seligman, Robbie Gramer, “Can a Young Saudi Prince End the War in Yemen?”
ForeignPolicy.com, November 20, 2019.
98 “Saudi Arabia Looks for an Exit to the War in Yemen,” The Economist, Apr 18th 2020 edition.
99 “COVID-19 Impact on Yemen – Update,” ACAPS, Risk Report, April 8, 2020.
100 Murphy, Young Lead Bipartisan Call for Pompeo to Facilitate Diplomatic Solution to End Yemen War, June 16,
2020.
101 “Rebel threats, secret burials and shuttered hospitals mask spread of Yemen’s epidemic,” Washington Post, June 3,
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early June, United Nations Secretary General António Guterres noted that mortality rates from
COVID-19 in Aden are among the highest in the world. Lise Grande, the head of the U.N.’s head
of humanitarian operations in Yemen, said that in the worst case scenario, the death toll from the
COVID-19 pandemic could “exceed the combined toll of war, disease, and hunger over the last
five years (in Yemen).”102
Analysis
The 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi
Arabia’s conduct of the war in Yemen. Lawmakers potentially could broaden the scope of their
oversight activities beyond the current conflict to more fully address the root causes of Yemen’s
chronic instability. They also could focus on challenges to the delivery of humanitarian assistance
in light of ongoing conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic. Even if the United States is no longer
as active a supporter of coalition military efforts, Yemen has been devastated by years of war and
remains the world’s “worst humanitarian crisis.”103 Experts expect Yemen to require sustained
international attention and financial assistance in order to help local actors reach and sustain a
political settlement. Thus, Congress may grapple with Yemen-related questions about the conduct
of U.S. diplomacy, the provision of U.S. security support, and the investment of U.S. assistance
and defense funds for years to come.
The 115th Congress frequently debated the extent and terms of the United States' involvement in
the ongoing conflict in Yemen. Lawmakers questioned the extent to which successive
Administrations have adhered to existing law related to providing security assistance, including
sales or transfers of defense goods and defense services, while upholding international human
rights standards (e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2754 or 22 U.S.C. §2304). They also enacted new legislation
that would condition or prohibit the use of U.S. funds for some activities related to Yemen and
would extend legislative oversight over the executive branch's policy toward the war in Yemen.
While the House and its Rules Committee voted to make resolutions with respect to war powers
and Yemen ineligible for expedited consideration,104 the Senate passage of S.J.Res. 54 at the
conclusion of the 115th Congress demonstrated stronger congressional opposition to U.S.
involvement in the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen relative to previous years. Over
time, the balance of votes shifted in favor of measures that could be described as critical or
restrictive of U.S. support for Saudi-led coalition operations with regard to arms sales, oversight
measures, and war powers measures.
The 116th Congress has continued to express dismay at the humanitarian situation in Yemen and
some Members have called on relevant parties to implement the Stockholm Agreement and to
establish and maintain a ceasefire. In hearings in both chambers, some Members have raised
concerns about the actions of the Saudi-led coalition, highlighting potential end-use monitoring
violations of U.S. weapons provided to the coalition, civilian casualties from coalition air strikes,
and reports of coalition use of child soldiers. President Trump has vetoed renewed bipartisan
efforts to remove U.S. forces from hostilities in Yemen (S.J.Res. 7) and to disapprove of sales of
air-to-ground munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 37,

2020.
102 Omer Karasapan, “Yemen and COVID-19: The Pandemic Exacts its Devastating Toll,” June 15, 2020.
103 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen “Humanitarian
programmes in Yemen forced to shut due to lack of funding,” August 21, 2019.
104 “House Republicans move to block Yemen War-Powers votes for rest of Congress,” The Hill, December 11, 2018.
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and S.J.Res. 38). Both chambers’ passage of the underlying measures demonstrated continued
congressional opposition to aspects of U.S. policy.
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to identify the locus of congressional consensus about Yemen.
Many in the House and Senate state that they seek to preserve cooperative U.S.-Saudi relations in
broad terms and express concern about Iranian activities in Yemen, while also expressing support
for expanded humanitarian access and efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Some lawmakers
express opposition to the intervention and U.S. involvement on moral grounds, citing errant
coalition air strikes and the prospect of famine and mass displacement. Others argue that the
conflict creates opportunities for Iran and Sunni Islamist extremist groups to expand their
influence and operations in Yemen. Still others also refer to factors not directly related to
conditions in Yemen, such as the mechanisms and authorities used by the executive branch to
support the coalition and/or anger with the Saudi government over the killing of Jamal Khashoggi
and other human rights issues, when discussing continued U.S. support for the intervention.
Recent congressional consideration of Yemen legislation also may be an indication of broader
efforts by Members of Congress to reassert congressional prerogatives toward U.S. foreign policy
and to leverage legislative processes to enhance their effectiveness. Measures to expand oversight
of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition and U.S. strategy toward Yemen have received broad
bipartisan support, while proponents of other recently considered arms sales and war powers
measures have used legislative mechanisms to ensure prompt and/or privileged consideration of
their proposals.
Although the 116th Congress has not overridden the President on vetoes of consequential Yemen-
related measures, the volume and frequency of expressions of congressional opposition and the
passage of measures rejecting aspects of the Administration’s policy by majorities in both
chambers may constrain the choices available to the White House and governments in Riyadh and
Abu Dhabi. Unilateral escalation of the conflict by the coalition or operations resulting in
increased civilian casualties or harm could generate additional opposition among Members and
might allow Congress to override presidential preferences.
Debate to date suggests that, similarly, escalation attributable to the Houthis, closer overt
coordination between the Houthis and Iran, and/or Houthi rejection of United Nations resolution
efforts could lead some Members to support continued or more expansive U.S. cooperation with
the coalition. The inclusion of Yemen-related provisions directing the end of U.S. support for
coalition operations and constraining related arms sales could become an issue of renewed
executive-legislative dispute during consideration of annual defense authorization and
appropriations measures for FY2021.
The Yemen conflict began as a localized affair, but has become part of a larger narrative of
regional confrontation between Iran and its proxies on one side and the United States and Gulf
monarchies on the other. This dynamic may remain a central impediments to reaching a political
solution to the Yemen conflict.

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Table 1. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 116th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 116th Congress through June 15, 2020
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments
S.Res. 243
Senator Christopher Murphy
Resolution requesting information on Saudi Arabia's human rights practices in
Introduced and referred to
(D)—Connecticut
Yemen pursuant to section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/10/2019
S.J. Res. 27-48
Senator Robert Menendez
22 separate resolutions providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed
Introduced and referred to
(D)—New Jersey
transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan,
the Committee on Foreign
certain defense articles and services described in the certification DDTC
Relations on 06/05/2019
Transmittals No. 17-079, 17-094, 17-112, 17-126, 17-128, 18-029, 18-030, 18-
S.J.Res. 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
050, 18-080, 18-103, 18-109, 18-110, 19-001 and DSCA Transmittals No. 17-0B,
33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42,
17-39, 17-70, 17-73, 18-21, 18-31, 19-01, 19-18.
43, 44, 45, 46, 47, and 48
agreed to en bloc in the
Senate on 06/20/2019 (Yeas
and Nays 51-45, Record
Vote Number 179)
See below for further
consideration of S.J.Res. 37
CRS-22

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.J.Res. 36
Senator Robert Menendez
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed
Introduced and referred to
(D)—New Jersey
transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
the Committee on Foreign
and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain, and the Italian Republic of certain
Relations on 06/05/2019
defense articles and services.
Agreed to in the Senate on
Would disapprove of the
06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays

53-45, Record Vote Number

coproduction and manufacture in Saudi Arabia of Paveway Pre-Amp Circuit
Card Assemblies (CCA), Guidance Electronics Assembly (GEA) CCAs, and
177)
Control Actuator System (CAS) CCAs for all Paveway variants;
Passed in the House on

07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays

coproduction and manufacture in Saudi Arabia of Paveway II Guidance
Electronics Detector Assemblies (GEDA) and Computer Control Groups
238-190, Rol no. 486)
(CCG); and
Vetoed by President on

07/24/2019

transfer of up to 64,603 additional kits, partial kits, and ful -up-rounds.
Passage over veto failed in
Senate on 07/29/2019 (Yeas
and Nays 45-40, Record
Vote Number 231)
S.J.Res. 37
Senator Robert Menendez
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export Introduced and referred to
(D)—New Jersey
to the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
the Committee on Foreign
Ireland, and the Republic of France of certain defense articles and services.
Relations on 06/05/2019
Would disapprove of the proposed transfer of 44,000 GBU-12 Paveway II Kits
Agreed to in the Senate on
and the proposed transfer of 16,000 GBU-10 Paveway II Kits.
06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays

51-45, Record Vote Number
179)
Passed in the House on
07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays
238-190, Rol no. 487)
Vetoed by President on
07/24/2019
Failed of passage in Senate
over veto on 07/29/2019
(Yeas and Nays 45-39,
Record Vote Number 232)
CRS-23

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.J.Res. 38
Senator Robert Menendez
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed export Introduced and referred to
(D)—New Jersey
to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
the Committee on Foreign
Northern Ireland of certain defense articles and services.
Relations on 06/05/2019
Would disapprove of the proposed transfer of defense articles, defense services,
Agreed to in the Senate on
and technical data to support the manufacture of the Aurora Fuzing System for
06/20/2019 (Yeas and Nays
the Paveway IV Precision Guided Bomb Program.
53-45, Record Vote Number
178)
Passed in the House on
07/17/2019 (Yeas and Nays
237-190, Rol no. 488)
Vetoed by President on
07/24/2019
Passage over veto failed in
Senate on 07/29/2019 (Yeas
and Nays 46-41, Record
Vote Number 233)
CRS-24

link to page 37
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.J.Res. 7
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Would direct the President to remove United States Armed Forces from
Introduced 01/30/2019
Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), and
hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed
Motion to discharge the
Senator Christopher Murphy
Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, by not
Senate Foreign Relations
(D-CT)
later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption of the joint
Committee from further

resolution (unless the President requests and Congress authorizes a later date),
consideration of S.J.Res. 7
and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of
agreed to on 03/13/2019 by
United States Armed Forces has been enacted.
voice vote
For purposes of the resolutions’ directive section, the term “hostilities” includes
Motion to table S.Amdt. 194
in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the
agreed to (Yeas and Nays
ongoing civil war in Yemen. Would state that nothing in the resolution shall be
52-48, Record Vote Number
construed to influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.
47)
Also would require reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and the
S.Amdt. 193 and S.Amdt.
civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional
195 agreed to by voice vote
humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with
respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen; Agreed to in the Senate with
and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces
amendments on 3/13/2019
abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi
(Yeas and Nays 54-46,
Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.
Record Vote Number 48)
As introduced in the 116th Congress, reflected provisions of S.J.Res. 54 from the
Passed in the House on
115th Congress, as amended in the Senate (see Table 2 below).
04/04/2019 (Yeas and Nays
247-175, Rol no. 153)
Amended during Senate consideration on 03/13/2019 to include S.Amdt. 193
stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed as authorization
Vetoed by President on
for use of military force and S.Amdt. 195 stating that nothing in the joint
04/16/2019
resolution should be construed to “influence or disrupt” Yemen-related
Failed of passage in Senate
intelligence col ection, analysis, or sharing deemed necessary for national security
over veto on 05/02/2019
reasons by the President.
(Yeas and Nays 53-45,
Record Vote Number 94)
CRS-25

link to page 37
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.J.Res. 37
Representative Ro Khanna
Would direct the President to remove United States Armed Forces from
Introduced 01/30/2019

(D)—California et al
hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed
Reported by the Committee
Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda or associated forces, by not
on Foreign Affairs on
later than the date that is 30 days after the date of the adoption of the joint
02/08/2019 (H.Rept. 116-7)
resolution (unless the President requests and Congress authorizes a later date),
and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use of
Considered under the
United States Armed Forces has been enacted.
provisions of rule H.Res. 122
on 02/13/2019
For purposes of the resolutions’ directive section, the term “hostilities” includes
in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the
H.Amdt. 41 agreed to on
ongoing civil war in Yemen. Would state that nothing in the resolution shall be
02/13/2019 (Yeas and Nays
construed to influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.
252-177, Rol no. 81)
Also would require reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and the
H.Amdt. 42 agreed to on
civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional
02/13/2019 by voice vote
humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with
Passed in the House on
respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen; 02/13/2019 (Yeas and Nays
and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces
248-177, 1 Present, Rol no.
abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi
83)
Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.

As introduced in the 116th Congress, reflected provisions of S.J.Res. 54 from the
115th Congress, as amended in the Senate (see Table 2 below).
Amended during House consideration on 02/13/2019 to include H.Amdt. 41
stating that nothing in the joint resolution should be construed to “influence or
disrupt” Yemen-related intelligence col ection, analysis, or sharing deemed
necessary by the President and H.Amdt. 42 regarding anti-Semitism.
H.J.Res 56
Representative Justin Amash
Would direct the President to terminate the use of the United States Armed
Introduced and referred to
(R)—Michigan
Forces with respect to the military intervention led by Saudi Arabia in the
the Committee on Foreign
Republic of Yemen not later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on
Affairs on 04/10/19
the date of the enactment of the joint resolution unless and until a declaration of
war or specific authorization for such use of the Armed Forces had been enacted
into law.
H.Con.Res. 50
Representative Wil Hurd
Would condemn human rights violations, violence against civilians, and
Introduced and referred to
(R)—Texas
cooperation with Iran by the Houthi movement and its allies in Yemen.
the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs on 07/17/19
CRS-26

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.Con.Res. 21
Senator Tom Cotton (R)—
Would condemn human rights violations, violence against civilians, and
Introduced and referred to
Arkansas
cooperation with Iran by the Houthi movement and its allies in Yemen.
the Committee on Foreign
Relations on 06/27/2019
S.Res. 169
Senator Jeff Merkley (D)—
Would request a statement under section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act
Introduced and referred to
Oregon
of 1961 with respect to violations of human rights by the Government of Saudi
the Committee on Foreign
Arabia, specifically regarding measures the Government of Saudi Arabia is taking
Relations on 04/11/2019
to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and to reduce the risk of harm to
civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of that
Government in Yemen.
H.R. 910
Representative Ted Lieu
Would prohibit the use of federal funds to provide for in-flight refueling of Saudi
Introduced and referred to
(D)—California,
or Saudi-led coalition aircraft conducting missions as part of the ongoing coalition
the Committee on Foreign
Representative Tom
intervention in Yemen.
Affairs and the Committee
Malinowski (D)—New Jersey,
on Armed Services on
Representative Ted Yoho
01/30/2019
(R)—Florida
S. 398
Senator Robert Menendez
Revises and reintroduces provisions of S. 3652 from the 115th Congress (see
Introduced and referred to
(D)—New Jersey
below)
Committee on Foreign
The bil would require additional reporting on Russia’s activities and objectives in
Relations on 02/07/2019
Yemen; the parties’ implementation of the Stockholm Agreement; and U.S. in-
Reported by Committee on
flight refueling services for Saudi or Saudi-led coalition non-United States aircraft
Foreign Relations and placed
conducting missions as part of the civil war in Yemen between March 2015 and
on Senate Legislative
November 11, 2018. Also would add emergency protections under U.S. law for
Calendar under General
Yemeni cultural property.
Orders, Calendar No. 167
on 07/30/2019

CRS-27

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S. 2066
Senators Risch (R-ID),
To review United States Saudi Arabia policy, and for other purposes. Would
Introduced and referred to
Shaheen (D-NH), Rubio (R-
require regular briefings on ending the war in Yemen from the Secretary of State,
the Committee on Foreign
FL), and Coons (D-DE)
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development,
Relations on 07/09/2019
the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence. Would
require reporting on actions by Iranian individuals with regard to Yemen and
related sanctions actions. Would require reporting on the causes and
consequences of civilian harm occurring in the armed conflict in Yemen, including
war crimes and gross violations of human rights, as a result of the actions of all
parties involved in hostilities in Yemen. Would require reporting on il icit arms
shipments to Yemen and U.S. and other interdiction efforts. Would direct the
President, subject to humanitarian exceptions and waiver authority, to enact
sanctions against persons hindering humanitarian access and threatening the
peace or stability of Yemen. Would direct the President to impose sanctions on
entities providing material and financial support to the Houthis if the President is
unable to certify that the Houthis have “engaged meaningful y” with U.N.-led
peace efforts. Would authorize joint defense research and development efforts
with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to protect against unmanned
aerial systems. Would authorize technical assistance to the Central Bank of
Yemen. Would expand protections for Yemeni cultural property. Would amend
Section 1290 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232) to extend certification requirements regarding
Saudi Arabia and UAE operations in Yemen.

CRS-28

link to page 37 link to page 37
Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019
H.R. 648
Representative Nita Lowey
Explanatory statement for Division E on State Department and Foreign
Introduced 01/17/2019
(D)—New York
Operations states “Funds in the Act for assistance for Yemen shall be made
Passed in the House on
available for stabilization and humanitarian assistance, including for United
01/23/2019 (Yeas and Nays
Nations stabilization and governance facilities.”
234-180, Rol no. 49)
Statement generally directs the Administration to comply with the directives,
Received in the Senate
reporting requirements, and instructions contained in H.Rept. 115-829
01/24/2019 and placed on
accompanying H.R. 6385 and S.Rept. 115-282 accompanying S. 3108 from the
Senate Legislative Calendar
115th Congress unless specifically directed to the contrary.
under General Orders,
See Table 2 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced
Calendar No. 16 on
reports. The statement notes that language expressing an opinion or making an
01/28/2019
observation in the House or Senate reports from the 115th Congress represents
the view of the respective committee unless specifically endorsed in the
explanatory statement.
H.J.Res 31/P.L. 116-
Representative Lucil e Roybal-
Explanatory statement (H.Rept. 116-9) for Division F on State Department and
Introduced 01/17/2019
6
Allard (D)—California
Foreign Operations directs the Administration to comply with the directives,
Passed in the House on
reporting requirements, and instructions contained in H.Rept. 115-829
01/24/2019 (Yeas and Nays
accompanying H.R. 6385 and S.Rept. 115-282 accompanying S. 3108 from the
231-180, Rol no. 51)
115th Congress unless specifically directed to the contrary.
Conference report H.Rept.
See Table 2 below for relevant comments on Yemen from these referenced
116-9 agreed to in the
reports. The statement notes that language expressing an opinion or making an
Senate on 02/14/2019 (Yeas
observation in the House or Senate reports from the 115th Congress represents
and Nays 83-16, Record
the view of the respective committee unless specifically endorsed in the
Vote Number 26)
explanatory statement.
Signed by the President and
Division F, Sec. 7041(l) would make funds under the heading Economic Support
became P.L. 116-6 on
Fund available for stabilization assistance for Yemen.
02/15/2019

CRS-29

Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020
H.R. 2839
Representative Nita Lowey
Sec. 7041(l) would have continued prior year language permitting funds under the
Introduced 05/20/2019
(D)—New York
heading Economic Support Fund to be made available for stabilization assistance
Reported from the House
for Yemen.
Committee on
H.Rept. 116-78 expresses Committee concern over “continued denial of
Appropriations (H.Rept.
humanitarian access to populations in need in Yemen.” Requires a report within
116-78) and placed on the
45 days of enactment from the Secretary of State, in consultation with the USAID Union Calendar, Calendar
Administrator that addresses delivery of humanitarian assistance, including access
No. 54 on 05/20/2019
for humanitarian organizations to deliver assistance; the capacity of Yemeni ports
Incorporated into
to receive commercial and humanitarian goods; and the conditions required to
consolidated appropriations
transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development assistance.
bil as Division D of H.R.
2740 by H.Res. 431
Passed in the House
06/18/2019 (Yeas and Nays
226-203, Rol no. 367)

Further Consolidated Appropriations Act 2020
H. R. 1865/P.L. 116-
Representative Bil Pascrell
Sec. 7041(l) of Division G (the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Introduced in House
94
(D)—New Jersey
Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020) permits bilateral
03/25/2019

economic assistance funds from this Act and prior Acts to be made available for
Passed/agreed to in House
stabilization assistance for Yemen.

10/28/2019
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Act specifies that the

Passed/agreed to in Senate
agreement provides $40,000,000 for stabilization assistance for Yemen, “including
11/12/2019

for a contribution for United Nations stabilization and governance facilities, and
Became Public Law No: 116-

to meet the needs of vulnerable populations, including women and girls.”
94 12/20/2019

CRS-30

National Defense Authorization Act, 2020
H.R. 2500
Representatives Kildee (D-
House Rules Committee Amendment 285—would have required the DoD
Made in order as
MI), Speier (D-CA), Khanna
to report to Congress on civilian casualties caused by Saudi air strikes in Yemen
Amendment 221 in H.Rept.
(D-CA), and Malinowski (D-
and whether the Saudi strikes would have complied with the DoD’s rules of
116-143
NJ)
engagement and interpretation of international law.
Adopted by voice vote
Section 1270M in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
07/11/2019 as part of en
Revised version included in P.L. 116-92 as Section 1274 (see below).
bloc H.Amdt. 543
H.R. 2500
Representatives Khanna (D-
House Rules Committee Amendment 339—would have prohibited support Made in order as
CA), Schiff (D-CA), Smith,
to and participation in the Saudi-led coalition’s military operations against the
Amendment 26 in H.Rept.
Adam (D-WA), Jayapal (D-
Houthis in Yemen.
116-143
WA)
Section 1270H in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
Agreed to 07/11/2019 as
The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790.
H.Amdt. 524 (Yeas and Nays
240-185, Rol no. 450)
Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.
H.R. 2500
Representatives Tulsi Gabbard House Rules Committee Amendment 377—would have prohibited funds
Made in order as
(D)—Hawaii and Ted Lieu
from the Special Defense Acquisition Fund to aid Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Amendment 23 in H.Rept.
(D)—California
Emirates if such assistance could be used to conduct or continue hostilities in
116-143
Yemen.
Agreed to 07/11/2019 as
Section 1270F in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
H.Amdt. 522 (Yeas and Nays
The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790.
239-187 (Rol no. 448)
Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.
H.R. 2500
Representatives Ted Lieu
House Rules Committee Amendment 418—prohibits in-flight refueling to
Made in order as
(D)—California, David
non-United States aircraft that engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in
Amendment 256 in H.Rept.
Cicil ine (D)—Rhode Island,
Yemen for two years, or until a specific authorization has been enacted.
116-143
and Tom Malinowski (D)—
Section 1270N in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
Adopted by voice vote
New Jersey
Enacted as Section 1273 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 (see below).
07/11/2019 as part of en
bloc H.Amdt. 544
H.R. 2500
Representatives Malinowski
House Rules Committee Amendment 473—would have provided for a
Made in order as
(D-NJ), Cicil ine (D-RI), Lieu
one-year prohibition on the sale of air-to-ground munitions used in the conflict in
Amendment 438 in H.Rept.
(D-CA), Khanna (D-CA),
Yemen to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while
116-143
Omar (D-MN), Trone (D-
providing an exemption for any export or license suspensions that would incur a
Agreed to 07/12/2019 as
MD), Engel (D-NY), Smith,
cost to the United States Government.
H.Amdt. 561 (Yeas and Nays
Adam (D-WA)
Section 1099X in House-passed version of H.R. 2500.
236-182, Rol no. 470)
The House receded during conferee consideration of S. 1790.
Not included in conference report H.Rept. 116-333.
CRS-31

S. 1790/P.L. 116-92
Senator James Inhofe (R)—
Section 1288 of S.1790 as reported to the Senate would have required regular
Introduced 06/11/2019
Oklahoma
reporting from the Secretary of Defense detailing the expenses incurred by the
Reported by Committee on
United States in providing in-flight refueling services for Saudi or Saudi-led
Armed Services 06/11/2019
coalition non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in
(S.Rept. 116-48)
Yemen during the period of March 1, 2015, through November 11, 2018, and the
extent to which such expenses have been reimbursed by members of the Saudi-
Agreed to in the Senate with
led coalition.
amendments on 6/27/2019

(Yeas and Nays 86-8, Record
As enacted, P.L. 116-92 includes:
Vote Number 188)
Section 1273, which prohibits in-flight refueling to non-United States aircraft that
Amended in House under
engage in hostilities in the ongoing civil war in Yemen for a two-year period
unanimous consent to strike
fol owing the enactment of this Act, “unless and until a declaration of war or a
text of Senate-passed bil and
specific statutory authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces has
substitute text of H.R.2500
been enacted.” (Originally passed by House as Amendment 256 in H.Rept. 116-
as previously passed by the
143.)
House. Agreed to in House
Section 1274 requires reports from the Secretary of Defense on civilian casualties 09/17/2019
caused by the Saudi-led coalition strikes in Yemen, not later than 90 days after
Conference report H.Rept.
the enactment of this Act and thereafter annually for two years. (Revised version
116-333 filed 12/09/2019
of Amendment 221 in H.Rept. 116-143.)
Conference report agreed
Section 1275 requires monthly reports on expenses incurred for in-flight
to in the House, 12/11/2019
refueling of Saudi coalition aircraft conducting missions relating to civil war in
Yemen from March 2015 to November 2018, and the extent to which such
Conference report agreed
expenses have been reimbursed. (Section 1288 in original Senate-passed version
to in the Senate, 12/17/2019
of S.1790.)
Became Public Law No: 116-

92, 12/20/2019

CRS-32

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020
H.R. 2968
Representative Peter J.
Title X incorporated language from S.J.Res. 7/H.J.Res. 37 that would have
Reported by the House
Visclosky (D)—Indiana
directed the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the
Committee on
Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress, with rules of
Appropriations (H.Rept.
construction regarding continued military operations and cooperation with Israel,
116-84) and placed on the
regarding intelligence sharing, and regarding no authorization for the use of
Union Calendar, Calendar
military force. Would have required a report on increased risk of terrorist
No. 59 on 05/23/2019
attacks to United States Armed Forces abroad, allies and the continental United
Incorporated into
States if Saudi Arabia ceases Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United
consolidated appropriations
States.
bil as Division C of H.R.
This provision was not included in final FY2020 Defense Appropriations Act
2740 by H.Res. 431.
(Division A of P.L. 116-93). Joint explanatory statement for that act states that
Passed in the House
“the language contained in the House and Senate reports warrant ful compliance
06/18/2019 (Yeas and Nays
and carry the same weight as language included in this explanatory statement
226-203, Rol no. 367)
unless specifically addressed to the contrary in the bil or this explanatory
statement.”
The House Appropriations Committee report on its version of the bil directed
the Secretary of Defense to update the report required by H.Rept. 115-769
under the heading “Report on U.S. Defense Assistance to Saudi Arabia and
United Arab Emirates Coalition in Yemen'' not later than 90 days after the
enactment of this Act. The Committee further expressed concern about reports
regarding allegations of torture by members of the United Arab Emirates security
forces in Yemen and urges the Secretary of Defense to consider such reporting
when making a determination on whether to prohibit assistance to units of
foreign security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights.

Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and House Rules Committee.

CRS-33

Table 2. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 115th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 115th Congress
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation
S.Res. 114
Senator Todd Young (R)—
Among other things, would have stated the sense of the Senate that the United
Resolution agreed to in
Indiana, and Senator Benjamin
States should support efforts to hold accountable those responsible for deliberate Senate with an amendment
Cardin (D)—Maryland
restrictions on humanitarian access in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen.
and an amended preamble by
unanimous consent on
09/26/2017
S.J.Res. 40
Senator Christopher Murphy
Would have prohibited the transfer to Saudi Arabia of U.S. air-to-ground
Introduced and referred to

(D)—Connecticut
munitions until the President certified to Congress that, among other things,
the Senate Foreign Relations
Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners were taking all feasible precautions to
Committee on 04/06/17
H.J.Res. 104
Representative Ted Lieu
(D)—California
reduce the risk of civilian harm and exercising proportional use of force in the
H.J.Res. 104 referred to the
course of military actions, and were making demonstrable efforts to facilitate the
House Committee on
flow of critical humanitarian aid and commercial goods. The joint resolutions also
Foreign Affairs on
would have required a briefing on U.S. government support for the Saudi-led
05/25/2017
coalition’s military operations in Yemen, to include an assessment, among other
things, of whether operations in Yemen constituted legitimate self-defense and
whether operations had deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure in Yemen.
S.J.Res. 42
Senator Christopher Murphy
Would have disapproved of the transfer to Saudi Arabia of defense articles,
Motion to discharge the

(D)—Connecticut
including defense services and technical data, described in the certification
Senate Foreign Relations
Transmittal No. DDTC 15-132, Transmittal No. DDTC 16-011, and Transmittal
Committee from further

No. DDTC 16-043 (JDAM, bomb fuzes, and Paveway Weapons Systems).
consideration of S.J.Res. 42
H.J.Res. 102
Representative Justin Amash
not agreed to in the Senate
(R)—Michigan

on 06/13/2017 (Yeas and
Nays 47-53, Record Vote
Number 143)
H.R. 2795
Representative Karen Bass
Would have required the Secretaries of State and Defense in coordination with
Referred to the
(D)—California
the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development to provide
Subcommittee on Middle
Congress with a report on U.S. security and humanitarian interests in Yemen,
East and North Africa,
including: the strategic objectives of the United States in Yemen, including
House Foreign Affairs
humanitarian support to civilian populations under threat of famine, and the
Committee on 06/27/2017
criteria for determining the success of such objectives; a description of efforts to
coordinate civilian and military efforts with respect to Yemen; and a description
of the diplomatic strategy with respect to regional partners seeking to end the
civil war in Yemen.
CRS-34

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 4603
Representative Ileana Ros-
Would, among other things, have required the President to impose sanctions on
H.R. 4603 referred to the
Lehtinen (R)—Florida
a foreign person that the President determines knowingly provided significant
Committee on Foreign
financial, material, or technological support for, among others, the Ansar Allah in
Affairs and the Committee
Yemen (Houthis). The bil also would have required the President to report on
on the Judiciary on
Iranian activities in Yemen.
12/07/2017 for a period to
be subsequently determined
by the Speaker, in each case
for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee
concerned
H.Con.Res. 81
Representatives Khanna (D-
Would have directed the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities Unanimous consent agreed
CA), Massie (R-KY), Pocan
in the Republic of Yemen, except those engaged in operations directed at Al
to without objection on
(D-WI), and Jones (R-NC)
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, within 30 days after adoption of this concurrent
10/11/2017, that the
resolution, unless the President requested and Congress authorized a later date,
provisions of Section 7 of
and unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for the use of
the War Powers Resolution
U.S. Armed Forces had been enacted.
(50 U.S.C. 1546) did not
apply to H.Con.Res. 81
earlier than November 2,
2017, but on the same terms
that would have adhered on
October 13, 2017
H.Con.Res. 138
Representative Ro Khanna
Would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers
Introduced and referred to
(D)—California
Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), to remove United States Armed Forces from
the House Committee on
hostilities in the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged
Foreign Affairs on
in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
09/26/2018
(P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), not later than 30 days after the date of the
adoption of the concurrent resolution unless and until a declaration of war or
specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces had been
enacted into law.
CRS-35

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.Con.Res. 142
Representative Ro Khanna
Would have directed the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers
Introduced and referred to
(D)—California
Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(c)), to remove United States Armed Forces from
the House Committee on
hostilities in the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged
Foreign Affairs on
in operations authorized under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
11/29/2018
(P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), not later than 30 days after the date of the
adoption of the concurrent resolution unless and until a declaration of war or
specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces had been
enacted into law.
H.J.Res 142
Representative Justin Amash
Would have directed the President to terminate the use of the United States
Introduced and referred to
(R)—Michigan
Armed Forces with respect to the military intervention led by Saudi Arabia in the
the House Committee on
Republic of Yemen not later than the end of the period of 30 days beginning on
Foreign Affairs on
the date of the enactment of the joint resolution unless and until a declaration of
11/29/2018
war or specific authorization for such use of the Armed Forces had been enacted
into law.
H.Res. 599
Representative Ro Khanna
Among other things, expressed the urgent need for a political solution in Yemen
Unanimous consent that it
(D)—California
consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216; denounced the
be in order at any time to
conduct of activities in Yemen and areas affected by the conflict that were,
consider in the House
directly or indirectly, inconsistent with the laws of armed conflict; and
H.Res. 599 with one hour of
condemned Iranian activities in Yemen in violation of UNSCR 2216. Called on all
debate and that
responsible countries to take appropriate and necessary measures against the
notwithstanding any previous
Government of Iran, including the interdiction of Iranian weapons to the Houthis,
order of the House, the
and the bilateral and multilateral application of sanctions against Iran for its
provisions of Section 7 of
violations of UNSCR 2216.
the War Powers Resolution
(50 U.S.C. 1546) shall not
apply to H.Con.Res. 81
Agreed to without objection
on 11/01/2017
Passed in the House on
11/13/2017 (Yeas and Nays
366-30, 1 present, and 35
not voting, Rol no. 623)

CRS-36

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.J.Res. 54
Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT), As introduced, would have directed the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces
Motion to table a motion to
Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), and
from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except U.S. Armed Forces
discharge the Senate Foreign
Senator Christopher Murphy
engaged in operations directed at Al Qaeda or associated forces within 30 days of Relations Committee from
(D-CT)
adoption unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such
further consideration of

use of U.S. Armed Forces had been enacted.
S.J.Res. 54 agreed to in the
As amended and agreed to in the Senate, would have directed the President to
Senate on 03/20/2018 (Yeas
remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic
and Nays 55-44, Record
of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at
Vote Number 58)
al Qaeda or associated forces, by not later than the date that is 30 days after the
Motion to discharge the
date of the adoption of the joint resolution (unless the President requested and
Senate Foreign Relations
Congress authorized a later date), and unless and until a declaration of war or
Committee from further
specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces had been
consideration of S.J.Res. 54
enacted. For purposes of the resolution’s directive section, the term “hostilities”
agreed to in the Senate on
included in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft conducting missions as
11/28/2018 (Yeas and Nays
part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen.
63-37, Record Vote Number
Would have stated that nothing in the resolution was to be construed to
250)
influence or disrupt cooperation with Israel.
Motion to proceed to
Also would have required reporting on risks posed to United States citizens and
consideration of S.J.Res. 54
the civilian population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the risk of regional
agreed to in the Senate on
humanitarian crises if the United States were to cease support operations with
12/12/2018 (Yeas and Nays
respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen; 60-39, Record Vote Number
and, the increased risk of terrorist attacks on United States Armed Forces
261)
abroad, allies, and to the continental United States if the Government of Saudi
Point of order that
Arabia were to cease Yemen-related intelligence sharing with the United States.
amendments offered under
50 U.S.C. 1546a be germane
to the underlying joint
resolution to which they are
offered, considered well
taken in the Senate on
12/12/2018 (Yeas and Nays
96-3, Record Vote Number
262)
Agreed to in the Senate with
amendments on 12/13/2018
(Yeas and Nays 56-41,
Record Vote Number 266)
CRS-37

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.Amdt. 4080 to
Senator Todd Young (R)—
Clarified that S.J.Res. 54 would have prohibited United States Armed Forces from Agreed to in the Senate on
S.J.Res. 54
Indiana
refueling non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part of the civil war in
12/13/2018 (Yeas and Nays
Yemen.
58-41, Record Vote Number
263)
S.Amdt. 4096 to
Senator John Cornyn (R)—
Provided that nothing in S.J.Res. 54 was to be construed to influence or disrupt
Agreed to in the Senate on
S.J.Res. 54
Texas
any military operations and cooperation with Israel.
12/13/2018 (Yeas and Nays
99-0, Record Vote Number
264)
S.Amdt. 4098 to
Senator Tom Cotton (R)—
Would have clarified that the requirement in S.J.Res. 54 to remove United States
Not agreed to in the Senate
S.J.Res. 54
Arkansas
Armed Forces would not have applied to forces engaged in operations to support on 12/13/2018 (Yeas and
efforts to disrupt Houthi attacks against locations outside of Yemen, such as
Nays 45-54, Record Vote
ballistic missile attacks, unmanned aerial vehicle attacks, maritime attacks against
Number 265)
United States or international vessels, or terrorist attacks against civilian targets.
S.Amdt. 4090 to
Senator John Cornyn (R)—
To require a report assessing risks posed by ceasing support operations with
Agreed to in the Senate by
S.J.Res. 54
Texas
respect to the conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis in Yemen. voice vote on 12/13/2018
S.Amdt. 4095 to
Senator John Cornyn (R)—
To require a report assessing the increased risk of terrorist attacks in the United
Agreed to in the Senate by
S.J.Res. 54
Texas
States if the Government of Saudi Arabia were to cease Yemen-related
voice vote on 12/13/2018
intelligence sharing with the United States.
S.Amdt. 4097 to
Senator Tom Cotton (R)—
Would have clarified that the requirement to remove United States Armed
Request for unanimous
S.J.Res. 54
Arkansas
Forces would not have applied to the provision of materials and advice intended
consent not agreed to in
to reduce civilian casualties or further enable adherence to the Law of Armed
Senate by voice vote on
Conflict.
12/13/2018
S.J.Res. 55
Senator Todd Young (R)—
Would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of U.S. funds for in-flight
Introduced and referred to
Indiana, and Senator Jeanne
refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft that were not
the Senate Foreign Relations
Shaheen (D)—New
conducting select operations if certain certifications were not made and
Committee, 03/08/2018
Hampshire
maintained at 30-, 180-, and 360-day intervals. Criteria included undertaking an
Elements incorporated into
urgent and good faith effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations to end the civil
Section 1290 of the
war in Yemen and appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in
conference version of H.R.
Yemen by increasing access for all Yemenis to food, fuel, and medicine.
5515/P.L. 115-232
CRS-38

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.J.Res. 58
Senators Young (R-IN),
Would have revised S.J.Res. 55 to add a reduction of civilian harm criterion to
Introduced and referred to
Shaheen (D-NH), Col ins (R-
the initial certification, amend the description of operations not subject to
the Senate Foreign Relations
ME), and Coons (D-DE)
restrictions in absence of certification, and to add a strategy submission
Committee on 04/11/2018
requirement.
Elements incorporated into
Section 1290 of the
conference version of H.R.
5515/P.L. 115-232
S.J.Res. 69
Senators Corker (R-TN),
Stated, inter alia, that the Senate demanded that all parties seek an immediate
Introduced in the Senate on
McConnell (R-KY), Rubio (R-
cease-fire and negotiated political solution to the Yemen conflict and increased
12/13/2018
FL), Portman (R-OH), Ernst
humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict; condemned the
Agreed to by voice vote on
(R-IA), Boozman (R-AR),
Government of Iran’s provision of advanced lethal weapons to Houthi rebels;
12/13/2018
Crapo (R-ID), Toomey (R-
condemned Houthi rebels for egregious human rights abuses, including torture,
PA), Gardner (R-CO), Isakson
use of human shields, and interference with, and diversion of, humanitarian aid
(R-GA), Sanders (I-VT), Kaine
shipments; demanded that the Saudi-led coalition and all parties to the Yemen
(D-VA), and Reed (D-RI)
conflict seek to minimize civilian casualties at all times; supported the peace
negotiations being managed by United Nations Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and
encouraged the United States Government to provide all possible support to
these diplomatic efforts; declared that there was no statutory authorization for
United States involvement in hostilities in the Yemen civil war; and supported the
end of air-to-air refueling of Saudi-led coalition aircraft operating in Yemen.
S.Res. 714
Senator Lindsey Graham
Would have stated that the Senate called on the Government of the Kingdom of
Introduced and referred to
(R)—South Carolina
Saudi Arabia to negotiate directly with representatives of the Houthi movement
the Committee on Foreign
in order to end the war in Yemen, agree on a political resolution, reverse the
Relations on 12/05/2018
humanitarian crisis, and refocus efforts on defeating al Qaeda and ISIS in Yemen.
H.Res. 1142
Representative Dan
Provided for consideration of the bil (H.R. 6784) to provide for removal of the
Motion in Rules Committee
Newhouse (R)—Washington
gray wolf in the contiguous 48 States from the List of Endangered and Threatened to strike Section 4 of the
Wildlife published under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and providing for
rule, not agreed to on
proceedings during the period from November 19, 2018, through November 26,
11/13/2018 (Yeas-Nays 2-6,
2018.
Rules Committee Record
House considered this rule with provision in Section 4 stating: “The provisions of
Vote No. 281)
section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546) shall not apply to
Agreed to in the House on
House Concurrent Resolution 138.”
11/14/2018 (Yeas and Nays
H.Con.Res. 138 would have directed the President pursuant to section 5(c) of
201-187, Rol no. 418)
the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from
hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress.
CRS-39

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.Res. 1176
Representative Dan
Provided for consideration of the conference report to accompany the bil (H.R.
Motion in Rules Committee
Newhouse (R)—Washington
2) to provide for the reform and continuation of agricultural and other programs
to strike Section 2 of the
of the Department of Agriculture through fiscal year 2023, and for other
rule, not agreed to on
purposes.
12/11/2018 (Yeas-Nays 2-7,
House considered this rule with provision in Section 2 stating: “The provisions of
Rules Committee Record
section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546) shall not apply during
Vote No. 284)
the remainder of the One Hundred Fifteenth Congress to a concurrent
Agreed to in the House on
resolution introduced pursuant to section 5 of the War Powers Resolution (50
12/12/2018 (Yeas and Nays
U.S.C. 1544) with respect to the Republic of Yemen.”
206-203, Rol no. 432)
S. 3623
Senator Tim Kaine (D)—
Would have prohibited obligation or expenditure of funds available to the
Referred to the Senate
Virginia
Department of Defense for any fiscal year beginning before the date of enactment Committee on Armed
for aerial refueling of aircraft owned or operated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Services on 11/14/2018.
S. 3652
Senator Robert Menendez
Would have stated the sense of the Senate on U.S. policy toward Yemen and
Referred to the Senate
(D)—New Jersey
required periodic briefings from the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the
Foreign Relations
United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense,
Committee on 11/15/2018
and the Director of National Intel igence on the progress of the United States
strategy to end the war in Yemen until a complete cessation of hostilities in the
Yemen civil war.
Would have required a report describing the causes and consequences of civilian
harm occurring in the armed conflict in Yemen, including war crimes, and gross
violations of human rights as a result of the actions of all parties to the conflict.
Would have suspended weapons transfers to Saudi Arabia of items designated
under Category III, IV, VII, or VIII on the United States Munitions List with the
exception of ground-based missile defense systems. President could have waived
this suspension if certification of specific Saudi-led coalition and Houthi activities
were made.
Would have prohibited the use of federal funds to provide in-flight refueling of
Saudi or Saudi-led coalition non-United States aircraft conducting missions as part
of the civil war in Yemen.
Would have required the President to impose property and travel sanctions on
individuals and entities the President determined inter alia were hindering or
restricting humanitarian aid delivery or providing support to the Houthi
movement.
Would have directed the Comptrol er General to review U.S. military support to
the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
CRS-40

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
National Defense Authorization Act, 2019
H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-
Representative Mac
Section 1286 (HASC Reported)—requires the Secretary of Defense to
Reported to House on
232
Thornberry (R)—Texas
submit to the congressional defense committees not later than February 1, 2019,
05/15/2018
a report describing the strategy of the U.S. Armed Forces with respect to Yemen, Conferees removed the
including current activities, costs, interests, goals, success metrics, estimated
report requirement from the
resource needs through FY2022, and current legal authorities.
bil text and in place made it
a requirement of the
conference report (H.Rept.
115-874)
Conference report agreed to
in the House on 07/26/2018
(Yeas and Nays 359-54, Rol
no. 379)
Conference report agreed to
in the Senate on 08/01/2018
(Yeas and Nays 87-10,
Record Vote Number 181)
Signed by the President and
became P.L. 115-232 on
08/13/2018
H.R. 5515
Representative Beto
House Rules Committee Amendment 312—would have required the
Submitted on 05/17/2018
O'Rourke (D)—Texas, and
Secretary of Defense to report every 90 days on any mid-air refueling for any
Not made in order by Rules
Representative Ro Khanna
non-U.S. aircraft of the Saudi-led coalition for any anti-Houthi missions in Yemen
Committee
(D)—California
to include recipient aircraft information, targets struck by such aircraft, associated
damage, and any records required by cross-servicing agreements.
H.R. 5515
Representative Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 323—would have required the
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—California, and
Secretary of Defense to issue a declassified report on the effect of the war in
Not made in order by Rules
Representative Barbara Lee
Yemen on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Committee
(D)—California
H.R. 5515
Representative Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 325—would have prohibited the use
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—California, and
of funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act “for refueling non-United
Not made in order by Rules
Representative Walter Jones
States military aircraft for missions conducted against the Houthi in Yemen.”
Committee
(R) North Carolina
CRS-41

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-
Representative Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 338—requires the Secretary of
Submitted on 05/17/2018
232
(D)—California, and
Defense to investigate whether coalition partners or U.S. military or intelligence
Made in order as
Representative Barbara Lee
personnel violated federal law or Department of Defense policy with regard to
Amendment 120 in H.Rept.
(D)—California
interrogations or gross violations of internationally recognized human rights while 115-702 Adopted by voice
conducting operations in Yemen.
vote as part of en bloc
H.Amdt. 657
Engrossed in the House on
05/24/2018
In conference, an
amendment was made by the
Senate to require an
additional review of U.S.
Armed Forces and coalition
partners conducting
operations in Yemen along
with a report on detention
operations of allies and
partners. All incorporated
into Section 1274
H.R. 5515
Representative Ted Lieu
House Rules Committee Amendment 367—would have prohibited the
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—California, and
obligation or expenditure of federal funds for refueling of non-U.S. aircraft in
Not made in order by Rules
Representative Ted Yoho
Yemen with some exceptions unless the Department of State in conjunction with
Committee
(R)—Florida
the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence certified that the
Saudi-led coalition in Yemen was making a good-faith effort on diplomatic
negotiations, not obstructing the flow of critical humanitarian aid, not supporting
radical Salafi militias, and providing the U.S. Government with battle damage
assessments of air strikes in Yemen for which the United States provided
refueling. Would have required a briefing within 30 days on operations in Yemen
and a range of civilian protection and other issues.
H.R. 5515
Representative Rick Nolan
House Rules Committee Amendment 399—Would have prohibited the
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—Minnesota
use of funds authorized by the Act “to deploy members of the Armed Forces to
Not made in order by Rules
participate in the ongoing civil war in Yemen.”
Committee
CRS-42

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 5515
Representative Pramila Jayapal
House Rules Committee Amendment 456—Would have prohibited the
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—Washington
use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act to refuel or assist in
Not made in order by Rules
targeting of air strikes led by Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates against
Committee
Houthi forces in Yemen or for Special Operations ground missions in support of
anti-Houthi operations until the Secretary of Defense certified that Yemen’s
Hudaydah port was “completely open to aid and commercial flow of food, fuel,
and medicine.”
H.R. 5515
Representative Mark Pocan
House Rules Committee Amendment 507—Would have required the
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—Wisconsin
Secretary of Defense to submit a report within 120 days of enactment regarding
Not made in order by Rules
all activities conducted by members of the U.S. Armed Forces and civilian
Committee
personnel of the Department of Defense in providing assistance to the military
coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Houthi forces
in Yemen.
H.R. 5515
Representative Mark Pocan
House Rules Committee Amendment 508—Would have prohibited the
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—Wisconsin, and
use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act to transfer precision
Not made in order by Rules
Representative Justin Amash
guided munitions to Saudi Arabia until the Secretary of Defense certified that U.S. Committee
(R)—Michigan
Armed Forces had withdrawn from all forms of participation in the hostilities led
by Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates against Houthi forces in Yemen,
unless such participation had been specifically authorized by Congress.
H.R. 5515
Representative Karen Bass
House Rules Committee Amendment 561—Would have required a
Submitted on 05/17/2018
(D)—California
comprehensive report within 90 days by Department of State, Department of
Made in order as
Defense, and USAID on U.S. security and humanitarian interests in Yemen.
Amendment 37 in H.Rept.

115-702
Adopted by voice vote as
part of en bloc H.Amdt. 645
Engrossed in the House on
05/24/2018
In conference, was removed
by the House due to a prior
provision that encompasses
this amendment
CRS-43

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S. 2987
Senator James Inhofe (R)—
Section 1266 (SASC Reported)—Prohibits the obligation or expenditure of
Reported to Senate on
Oklahoma
U.S. funds for in-flight refueling operations of Saudi and Saudi-led coalition aircraft 06/05/2018
that are not conducting select operations if certain certifications cannot be made

and maintained at 30-, 180-, and 360-day intervals. Criteria include identifying
whether the Government of Saudi Arabia is: undertaking an urgent and good faith In conference, an
effort to conduct diplomatic negotiations to end the civil war in Yemen;
amendment was made to
alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing access (including
require reporting and
through the port of Hudaydah) for all Yemenis to food, fuel, and medicine;
certification on the United
reducing delays to shipments resulting from secondary Saudi coalition inspections
Arab Emirates in addition to
other than those associated with the United Nations Verification and Inspections
Saudi Arabia
Mechanism (UNVIM); and reducing the risk of harm to civilians resulting from
Incorporated as Section
Saudi-led military operations. Enables the Secretary of State to waive the
1290 of the conference
certification requirement for national security purposes if the Secretary provides
version of H.R. 5515/P.L.
an unclassified explanatory justification to the appropriate committees. Also
115-232
requires a report on, among other things, U.S. objectives in Yemen and a detailed
strategy to accomplish those objectives.
Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019
H.R. 6157
Senators Murphy (D-CT),
Senate Amendment 3793 to Senate Amendment 3695—Would have
Submitted on 08/20/2018
S.Amdt. 3793
Schatz (D-HI), Warren (D-
amended the Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to prohibit the use
MA), Feinstein (D-CA),
of funds made available by the act for the Defense Department for U.S. support
Carper (D-DE), Blumenthal
of the Saudi Arabia-led intervention in Yemen until the Secretary of Defense
(D-CT), and Kaine (D-VA)
certified, in writing, to Congress that the Saudi-led coalition air campaign did “not
violate the principles of distinction and proportionality within the rules for the
protection of civilians.” The provision would not have applied “to ongoing
support for counterterrorism operations” against Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.
H.R. 6157
Representative Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 79—Would have prohibited the use
Not made in order by Rules
(D)—California
of funds made available by the Act to transfer munitions to Saudi Arabia or the
Committee
United Arab Emirates in missions against the Houthis in Yemen.
H.R. 6157
Representatives Khanna (D-
House Rules Committee Amendment 83—Would have prohibited the use
Not made in order by Rules
CA) and Jones (R-NC)
of funds made available by the Act to transfer fuel to Saudi Arabia or the United
Committee
Arab Emirates in missions against the Houthis in Yemen.
H.Rept. 115-769 on
House Committee on
Requests a classified report from the Secretary of Defense, no later than 120
Reflected in Division A of
H.R. 6157
Appropriations
days after the date of enactment of the Act, submitted to the congressional
Conference Report H.Rept.
defense committees detailing activities by the Department of Defense in providing 115-952 by reference
assistance to the Saudi-led coalition beginning in March 2015.
CRS-44

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2019
S.Rept. 115-282 on
Senate Committee on
Noted that 22 mil ion people were in need of assistance in Yemen and 8 mil ion
Reported to the Senate on
S. 3108
Appropriations
people were at risk of starvation.
06/21/2018
Urges the Administration to (1) work with all parties involved in the conflict to
respect their obligations under international humanitarian law and take all feasible
precautions to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure from the impact of
hostilities; and (2) take steps to ensure that vital humanitarian aid and commercial
goods can continue to flow through the port of Hudaydah and other key entry
points.
H.Rept. 115-829 on
House Committee on
Expresses Committee concern about “the significant humanitarian needs in
Reported to the House on
H.R. 6385
Appropriations
Yemen and the lack of consistent access to allow relief to be provided in Yemen.” 07/16/2018
Requires a report within 45 days of enactment from the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the USAID Administrator, addressing humanitarian assistance
delivery, humanitarian access, Yemeni port capacity, and “the conditions required
to transition from humanitarian assistance to longer-term development
assistance.”
Report urges the Secretary of State “to press for access, including for food and
fuel, into all Red Sea Ports, which are critical lifelines for the Yemeni population.”
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
H.Amdt. 865 to
Representative Dan Lipinski
Would have required an annual report from the Director of National Intelligence
Approved in House by voice
H.R. 6237
(D)—Il inois
describing Iranian expenditures on military and terrorist activities outside the
vote on 07/12/2018
country, such as on Hezbol ah, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas, and proxy forces
in Iraq and Syria.
CRS-45

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
National Defense Authorization Act, 2018
H.R. 2810
Representative Mac
Section 1277 (House-passed)—Would have required the President to
Engrossed in the House on
(NDAA)/P.L. 115-
Thornberry (R)—Texas
provide the appropriate congressional committees with a report that contains a
07/14/2017
91
security strategy for Yemen, including, among other things, a discussion of the
The Senate engrossed
strategy’s compliance with applicable legal authorities and a detailed description
amendment contained no
of the roles of the U.S. Armed Forces in implementing the strategy.
similar provision
Section 1275 (Agreed to in Conference)—Requires the President to
In conference, the
provide the appropriate congressional committees with a report that contains a
prohibition on funds
security strategy for Yemen, including, among other things, “an explanation of the
contained in Section 1277(e)
legal authorities supporting the strategy; a detailed description of the political and
[see below] was removed
security environment in Yemen; a detailed description of the threats posed by Al
and conferees adopted the
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Yemen
security strategy provisions
Province, including the intent, capabilities, strategic aims, and resources
contained in Section 1277
attributable to each organization; a detailed description of the threats posed to
with clarifying changes and
freedom of navigation through the Bab al Mandab Strait and waters in proximity
incorporated them into
to Yemen as well as any United States efforts to mitigate those threats; a detailed
Section 1275 in P.L. 115-91
description of the threats posed to the United States and its allies and partners
by the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons in Yemen; a detailed
description of the threats posed to United States interests by state actors in
Yemen; a discussion of United States objectives regarding long-term stability and
counterterrorism in Yemen; a plan to integrate the United States diplomatic,
development, military, and intelligence resources necessary to implement the
strategy; and a detailed description of the roles of the United States Armed
Forces in supporting the strategy.”
CRS-46

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 2810
Representative Ted Lieu (D-
House Rules Committee Amendment 274—Would have required the
Submitted on 07/12/2017
(NDAA)/P.L. 115-
CA), Representative Ruben
Secretaries of State and Defense to provide the appropriate congressional
Made in order as
91
Gallego (D-AZ), and
committees with a report on military action of Saudi Arabia and its coalitions
Amendment 93 in H.Rept.
Representative Yvette Clarke
partners in Yemen, including, among other things, the extent to which the
115-217
(D-NY)
Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners in Yemen are abiding by
their “No Strike List and Restricted Target List,” and the roles played by U.S.
Adopted by voice vote as
military personnel with respect to operations of such coalition partners in
part of en bloc H.Amdt. 195.
Yemen.
Incorporated as Section
1293 and engrossed in the
Section 1265 (Agreed to in Conference)—Requires the Secretaries of State
House on 07/14/2017
and Defense to provide the appropriate congressional committees with a report
on military action of Saudi Arabia and its coalitions partners in Yemen, including,
Agreed to in conference
among other things, the extent to which the Government of Saudi Arabia and its
(with clarifying changes) and
coalition partners in Yemen are taking demonstrable actions to “reduce the risk
incorporated as Section
of harm to civilians and civilian objects, in compliance with obligations under
1265 in P.L. 115-91
international humanitarian law; facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid and
The conference agreement
commercial goods into Yemen, including commercial fuel and commodities not
changed the reporting
subject to sanction or prohibition under United Nations Security Council
requirement from an annual
Resolution 2216 (2015); and target al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates report with no time limit to
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as part of the coalition’s military operations
an annual report issued for
in Yemen.” Would also require an assessment of “the role of United States
two years
military personnel with respect to operations of such coalition partners in
Yemen” and “progress made by the Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition
partners in avoiding and investigating, if necessary, civilian casualties, including
improvements to (A) targeting methodology; (B) the strike approval process; and
(C) training of personnel, including by implementing the recommendations of the
Joint Incident Assessment Team.”
CRS-47

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 2810
Representative Rick Nolan
House Rules Committee Amendment 159—Would have prohibited the
Submitted on 07/12/2017
(NDAA)/P.L. 115-
(D)—Minnesota
use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act to deploy members of the
Made in order as
91
Armed Forces to participate in the civil war in Yemen.
Amendment 84 in H.Rept.
115-217
Adopted by voice vote as
part of en bloc H.Amdt. 194.
Incorporated as Section
1277(e) and engrossed in the
House on 07/14/2017
The Senate struck the
prohibition on funds in
conference
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Representative Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 70—Would have required
Submitted on 07/12/2017
(D)—California
certifications for provision of air-to-ground munitions to countries relating to the
Not made in order by Rules
civil war in Yemen.
Committee
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Representative Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 71—Would have required an
Submitted on 07/12/2017
(D)—California
investigation to determine if employees of the Department of Defense violated
Not made in order by Rules
federal law or Department of Defense policy while conducting operations in
Committee
Yemen.
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Representatives Khanna (D-
House Rules Committee Amendment 73—Would have prohibited the use
Submitted on 07/12/2017
CA), Jones (R-NC), Conyers
of funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act for refueling for missions over
Not made in order by Rules
(D-MI), Pocan (D-WI), Lee
northern and western Yemen and required a reoccurring report to Congress.
Committee
(D-CA), Grijalva (D-AZ), and
Clarke (D-NY)
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Representative Warren
House Rules Committee Amendment 386—Would have prohibited the
Submitted on 07/12/2017
Davison (R)—Ohio
use of funds authorized to be appropriated by the Act or otherwise available to
Made in order as
the Department of Defense for FY2018 to conduct military operations in Yemen
Amendment 120 in H.Rept.
with the exception of: Activities carried out in ful compliance with the
115-217
Authorization for Use of Military Force (P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), the
provision of humanitarian assistance, the defense of U.S. Armed Forces, and
Adopted by voice vote as
support for freedom of navigation operations.
part of en bloc H.Amdt. 196.
Incorporated as Section
1298 and engrossed in the
House on 07/14/2017
CRS-48

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Representatives Gwen Moore
House Rules Committee Amendment 188—Would have required the U.S.
Submitted on 07/12/2017
(D)—Wisconsin, and Yvette
strategy on Yemen to also consider the political and humanitarian environment in
Not made in order by Rules
Clarke (D)—New York
Yemen, ways to mitigate harms to civilians caused by the ongoing conflict, and
Committee
efforts to improve access to food, water, and health care. Would have required
an assessment of how military and other support to regional allies wil help to
achieve this strategy, including how the United States wil ensure that such aid is
not used to harm civilians. Would have required that future budget requests
specifically identify costs associated with implementing the required strategy.
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Senator Elizabeth Warren
Senate Amendment 439—Would have required the Secretary of Defense, in
Submitted on 07/27/2017
S.Amdt. 439
(D)—Massachusetts
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, to provide Congress with
Not considered
a report assessing whether the use of air-to-ground munitions sold or otherwise
supplied by the United States to the Government of Saudi Arabia have resulted in
civilian casualties, and providing recommendations on actions to be taken to
mitigate the incidence of civilian casualties in Yemen.
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Senator Todd Young (R)—
Senate Amendment 585—Would have prohibited the sale or export of any
Submitted on 07/27/2017
S.Amdt. 585
Indiana
defense article to the government of Saudi Arabia during FY2018 until the
Not considered
Secretary of State certifies that, among other things, the Government of Saudi
Arabia is complying ful y with its obligations in Yemen under international law;
and that the government of Saudi Arabia is facilitating the delivery and installation
of cranes to the port of Hudaydah. Would also have required the Comptrol er
General to report on whether the conclusions in the certification are ful y
supported.
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Senator Christopher Murphy
Senate Amendment 896—Would have required the Secretary of Defense to
Submitted on 09/11/2017
S.Amdt. 896
(D)—Connecticut
certify certain government of Saudi Arabia action before funds may be authorized
Not considered
by the Act for the refueling of aircraft of Saudi Arabia or its military coalition
partners in Yemen. The certification would not have applied for refueling
missions related to counterterrorism operations. The Secretary of Defense
would have the option to waive the certification requirement.
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Senator Marco Rubio (R)—
Senate Amendment 923—Would have required the Secretaries of State and
Submitted on 09/11/2017
S.Amdt. 923
Florida
Defense to jointly report on the military action of Saudi Arabia and its coalitions
Not considered
partners in Yemen, including, among other things, the extent to which the
Government of Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners in Yemen are abiding by
their “No Strike List and Restricted Target List” and the roles played by U.S.
military personnel with respect to operations of such coalition partners in
Yemen.
CRS-49

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
H.R. 2810 (NDAA)
Senators Todd Young (R)—
Senate Amendment 1081—Similar to SA Amendment 896, would have
Submitted on 09/14/2017
S.Amdt. 1081
Indiana, Christopher Murphy
required the Secretary of Defense to certify certain government of Saudi Arabia
Not considered
(D)—Connecticut, and Dean
action before funds may be authorized by the Act for the refueling of aircraft of
Heller (R)—Nevada
Saudi Arabia or its military coalition partners in Yemen. This certification would
have required, among other things, that the Government of Saudi Arabia facilitate
the delivery and installation of cranes to the port of Hudaydah.
H.R.3219—Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018 (Defense Appropriations)
H.R. 3219 (FY2018
Representative Rick Nolan
House Rules Committee Amendment 35—Would have prohibited the use
Not made in order by Rules
Defense
(D)—Minnesota
of funds made available by the Act to deploy members of the U.S. Armed Forces
Committee
Appropriations)/
to participate in the ongoing civil war in Yemen.
Division I, H.R.
3354
H.R. 3219 (FY2018
Representative Warren
House Rules Committee Amendment 104—Would have prohibited the
Made in order as
Defense
Davidson (R)—Ohio
funds appropriated or otherwise made available by the Act from being used with
Amendment 45 in H.Rept.
Appropriations)/
respect to Yemen in contravention of the War Powers Resolution.
115-261
Division I, H.R.

Considered as H.Amdt. 268
3354
on 07/27/2017 and failed by
voice vote
H.R. 3219 (FY2018
Representatives Khanna (D-
House Rules Committee Amendment 13—Would have prohibited the use
Not made in order by Rules
Defense
CA), Jones (R-NC), Amash (R-
of funds made available by the Act to transfer munitions to Saudi Arabia or the
Committee
Appropriations)/
MI), and Pocan (D-WI)
United Arab Emirates.
Division I, H.R.
3354
H.R. 3219 (FY2018
Representatives Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 20—Would have prohibited the use
Not made in order by Rules
Defense
(D)—California, and Walter
of funds made available by the Act to transfer fuel to Saudi Arabia or the United
Committee
Appropriations)/
Jones (R)—North Carolina
Arab Emirates, except in connection with Operation Inherent Resolve and
Division I, H.R.
operations conducted by Special Operations Command-Central or under
3354
Operating Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa.
H.R. 3219 (FY2018
Representatives Amash (R-
House Rules Committee Amendment 44—Would have prohibited the use
Not made in order by Rules
Defense
MI), Conyers (D-MI), Jones
of funds made available by the Act from being used to transfer or authorize the
Committee
Appropriations)/
(R-NC), Pocan (D-WI), Lee
transfer of cluster munitions to the Government of Saudi Arabia.
Division I, H.R.
(D-CA), McGovern (D-MA),
3354
and, Lieu (D-CA)
CRS-50

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Consolidated Appropriations FY2018
H.R. 3354
Representative Ro Khanna
House Rules Committee Amendment 45—Would have reduced funds for
Submitted on 09/12//2017
(“minibus”)
(D)—California
the International Military Education & Training (IMET) program for Saudi Arabia
Not made in order by Rules
and increased the State Department’s international disaster assistance program
Committee
for Yemen.

Joint Resolutions of Disapproval on U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia
S.J.Res. 42
Senator Rand Paul, (R)—
Would have disapproved of the proposed export to the Government of the
Considered in the Senate on

Kentucky
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of certain defense articles, such as joint direct attack
06/13/2017
munitions (JDAMs), Paveway laser-guided munitions kits, and programmable
H.J.Res 102
Representative Justin Amash,
Motion to discharge
(R)—Michigan
bomb fuzes.
resolution from the Senate
Foreign Relations
Committee rejected (Yeas
and Nays 47-53, Record
Vote Number 143)
Source: Congress.gov, Congressional Record, and House Rules Committee.

Table 3. Legislation on the Conflict in Yemen in the 114th Congress
Bills, Resolutions, and Amendments offered in the 114th Congress
Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
Resolutions and Stand-alone Legislation
S.J.Res. 32
Senator Christopher Murphy
Would have prohibited the transfer to Saudi Arabia of United States air-to-
Introduced and referred to

(D)—Connecticut
ground munitions until the President certified to Congress that, among other
the Senate Committee on
things, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners were taking all feasible precautions
Foreign Relations on
H.J.Res 90

to reduce the risk of civilian harm and exercising proportional use of force in the
04/13/2016
Representative Ted Lieu
course of military actions, and were making demonstrable efforts to facilitate the
(D)—California
Introduced and referred to
flow of critical humanitarian aid and commercial goods. The joint resolution also
the House Committee on
would have required a briefing on U.S. government support for the Saudi-led
Foreign Affairs on
coalition’s military operations in Yemen, to include an assessment, among other
04/20/2016
things, of whether operations in Yemen constituted legitimate self-defense and
whether operations had deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure in Yemen.
CRS-51

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S.Res. 524
Senator Christopher Murphy
A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate on the conflict in Yemen that,
Introduced 07/11/2016
(D)—Connecticut
among other things, “all sides to the current conflict in Yemen should abide by
Reported to Senate without

international obligations to protect civilians; facilitate the delivery of humanitarian
amendment by Senate
relief throughout the country; and respect negotiated cease-fires and work
Committee on Foreign
toward a lasting political settlement,” and that, “United States-supported Saudi
Relations on 07/14/2016
military operations in Yemen should take all feasible precautions to reduce the
risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects, in compliance with international
humanitarian law; and increase prioritization of targeting of designated foreign
terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.”
S. 2119
Senator Ben Cardin (D)—
Would have required regular reporting on, among other things, Iranian support
Introduced and referred to

Maryland
to Houthi fighters in Yemen and assessment of Iranian strategy in Yemen.
the Senate Committee on
Incorporated into S. 3267.
Foreign Relations on

10/01/2015
S. 3267
Senator Bob Corker (R)—
Tennessee
Introduced and referred to
the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on
07/14/2016

National Defense Authorization Act, 2016
H.R. 1735
Representatives John Dingell
House Rules Committee Amendment 103—would have expressed the Sense of
Made in order as
and John Conyers (D)--
Congress that the President should exercise his authorities to evacuate U.S.
Amendment 114 in H.Rept.
Michigan
citizens and nationals from Yemen during the ongoing conflict.
114-112
Section 1042 in House engrossed version of H.R. 1735.
Agreed to by voice vote as
Removed by conferees. Conferees in H.Rept. 114-270 “encourage the President
part of en bloc H.Amdt. 236
to work with international partners, to the extent practicable, to protect non-
on 05/15/2016
combatants and assist in the evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals as well as
the citizens and nationals of other states from Yemen.”
CRS-52

Bill Number
Principal Sponsors
Summary
Status
S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 Senator John McCain (R)—
Section 1209 prohibits, subject to a “notice and wait” national security exception,
Passed in the House
Arizona
amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for the Department
11/05/2015 (Yeas and Nays
of Defense by the Act to be used to provide security assistance to an entity in
370-58, Rol no. 618)
Yemen that is control ed by members of the Houthi movement.
Agreed to in Senate on
11/10/2015 (Yeas and Nays
91-3, Record Vote Number
301)

CRS-53

Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2020

Author Information

Jeremy M. Sharp
Sarah R. Collins
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Research Assistant

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Acknowledgments
CRS interns Carmelina Palmer and Christopher Mellon provided research support for this product.

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Congressional Research Service
R45046 · VERSION 25 · UPDATED
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