Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated June 8, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32109

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The Navy began procuring Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, also known as Aegis
destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 85 have been procured through FY2020, including three in
FY2020. The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget requests funding for the procurement of two more
DDG-51s, which would be the 86th and 87th ships in the class.
DDG-51s are being procured in FY2018-FY2022 under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract
that Congress approved as part of its action on the Navy’s FY2018 budget. DDG-51s procured in
FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a revised design, cal ed the Flight III design, that
incorporates a new and more capable radar cal ed the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or
SPY-6 radar.
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two DDG-51s requested for
procurement in FY2020 at $3,836.9 mil ion, or an average of $1,918.5 mil ion each. The ships
have received $796.6 mil ion in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) advance
procurement (AP) funding (i.e., funding for up-front batch orders of components of DDG-51s to
be procured under the FY2018-FY2022 MYP contract). The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget
requests the remaining $3,040.3 mil ion in procurement funding needed to complete the estimated
procurement cost of the two DDG-51s, as wel as $29.3 mil ion in EOQ funding for DDG-51s to
be procured under the MYP contract, and $9.6 mil ion in cost-to-complete procurement funding
to cover cost growth on DDG-51s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total amount of
procurement funding requested for the DDG-51 program for FY2021 to $3,079.2 mil ion,
excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The Navy wants to procure the first ship of a new class of large surface combatants in FY2028.
Under the Navy’s plan, FY2027 would be the final year of DDG-51 procurement.
Issues for Congress for FY2021 for the DDG-51 program include the following:
 the potential impact of the COVID-19 (coronavirus) situation on the execution of
U.S. military shipbuilding programs, including the DDG-51 and DDG-1000
programs;
 whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2021 funding request for the
DDG-51 program;
 a projected reduction under the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission in the number
of DDG-51s to be procured in FY2023-FY2025, compared to previous Navy
plans for DDG-51 procurement in those fiscal years, and how this relates, if at
al , to a possible change in the surface force architecture that Navy leaders have
been talking about since 2019; and
 cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 effort.

Congressional Research Service

link to page 17 link to page 27 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendixes
Appendix. Additional Background Information on DDG-1000 Program ................................ 13

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 23

Congressional Research Service

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report presents background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer programs. The
Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget requests funding for the procurement of two DDG-51s.
Decisions that Congress makes concerning destroyer procurement could substantial y affect Navy
capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the DDG-51, DDG-1000, and
other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.1
Background
Navy’s Force of Large Surface Combatants (LSCs)
LSC Definition
Decades ago, the Navy’s cruisers were considerably larger and more capable than its destroyers.
In the years after World War II, however, the Navy’s cruiser designs in general became smal er
while its destroyer designs in general became larger. As a result, since the 1980s there has been
substantial overlap in size and capability of Navy cruisers and destroyers. (The Navy’s new
Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, in fact, are considerably larger than the Navy’s cruisers.)
In part for this reason, the Navy now refers to its cruisers and destroyers col ectively as large
surface combatants (LSCs), and distinguishes these ships from the Navy’s small surface
combatants (SSCs), the term the Navy now uses to refer collectively to its frigates, Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs), mine warfare ships, and patrol craft. The Navy’s annual 30-year
shipbuilding plan, for example, groups the Navy’s surface combatants into LSCs and SSCs.2
LSC Force Levels
In December 2016, the Navy released a goal to achieve and maintain a Navy of 355 ships,
including 104 LSCs. At the end of FY2019, the Navy’s force of LSCs totaled 89 ships, including
22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers3 and 67 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. Under
the Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan, the Navy is to achieve a force
of 104 large surface combatants by FY2029.4

1 See also CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke and Michael Moodie.
2 T he Navy sometimes also uses the term Cru-Des (an abbreviation of cruiser-destroyer, pronounced “crew-dez”) to
refer collectively to its cruisers and destroyers.
3 A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between
1983 and 1994. T he first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too
expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005.
4 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 6

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

DDG-51 Program
Overview
The DDG-51 program was initiated in the late 1970s,5 and the first DDG-51 was procured in
FY1985. The DDG-51 program is one of the longest-running shipbuilding programs in Navy
history, and the DDG-51 class, in terms of number of hulls, is one of the Navy’s largest classes of
ships since World War II.
The DDG-51 (Figure 1) is a multi-mission destroyer with an emphasis on air defense (which the
Navy refers to as anti-air warfare, or AAW) and blue-water (mid-ocean) operations.
Figure 1. DDG-51 Class Destroyer

Source: Navy file photograph accessed October 18, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=134605.
DDG-51s, like the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers, are equipped with the Aegis
combat system, an integrated ship combat system named for the mythological shield that
defended Zeus. CG-47s and DDG-51s consequently are often referred to as Aegis cruisers and
Aegis destroyers, respectively, or collectively as Aegis ships. The Aegis system has been updated
several times over the years. Many DDG-51s (and also some CG-47s) have a capability for
conducting bal istic missile defense (BMD) operations.6

5 T he program was initiated with the aim of developing a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers
that were projected to retire in the 1990s. T he DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s
T iconderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers. For an early discussion of the DDG-51 program, see Alva M. Bowen and
Ronald O’Rourke, “DDG-51 and the Future Surface Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1985: 176-189.
6 T he modification for BMD operations includes, among other things, the addition of a new software program for the
Aegis combat system and the arming of the ship with the SM-3, a version of the Navy’s Standard Missile that is
Congressional Research Service

2

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

As mentioned above, the first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985. It entered service in 1991. A
total of 85 DDG-51s have been procured through FY2020, including 62 in FY1985-FY2005 and
23 in FY2010-FY2020. (In FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring
DDG-51s, the Navy instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, which are
discussed below.)
Design Changes
The DDG-51 design has been modified over time. The first 28 DDG-51s (i.e., DDGs 51 through
78) are cal ed Flight I/II DDG-51s. In FY1994, the Navy shifted DDG-51 procurement to the
Flight IIA DDG-51 design, which incorporated certain changes, including the addition of a
helicopter hangar. A total of 47 Flight IIA DDG-51s (i.e., DDG-79 through DDG-124, plus DDG-
127)7 were procured through FY2016.
In FY2017, the Navy shifted DDG-51 procurement to the Flight III DDG-51 design, which
incorporates a new and more capable radar cal ed the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or
SPY-6 radar, as wel as associated changes to the ship’s electrical power and cooling systems.
DDGs 125 and higher, except for DDG-127 noted above, are to be Flight III DDG-51s.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2018 budget, Congress granted the Navy authority to use a
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2018-
FY2022. This is the fourth MYP contract for the DDG-51 program—previous DDG-51 MYP
contracts covered DDG-51s procured in FY2013-FY2017, FY2002-FY2005, and FY1998-
FY2001.
Shipbuilders, Combat System Lead, and Radar Makers
DDG-51s are built by General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and
Huntington Ingal s Industries/Ingal s Shipbuilding (HII/Ingal s) of Pascagoula, MS. Lockheed is
the lead contractor for the Aegis system instal ed on al DDG-51s. The AMDR—the primary
radar for the Aegis system on Flight III DDG-51s—is made by Raytheon.
Modernization and Service Life Extension
The Navy is modernizing its existing DDG-51s (and some of its CG-47s) so as to maintain their
mission and cost-effectiveness out to the end of their projected service lives. In April 2018, the
Navy announced that it wants to extend the service lives of al DDG-51s to 45 years—an increase
of 5 or 10 years over previous plans to operate DDG-51s to age 35 or 40. Doing this, the Navy
said, would permit the Navy to achieve a total of 355 ships by 2034, or about 20 years earlier than
under the FY2019 budget submission, although the resulting 355-ship fleet of the 2030s would
have more destroyers and fewer ships of other kinds (including attack submarines and aircraft
carriers) than cal ed for in the 355-ship force-level goal.

designed for BMD operations. For more on Navy BMD programs, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program : Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 T he hull-number discontinuity regarding DDG-127 is an administrative consequence of the ship having been funded
as a Congressional addition to the Navy’s proposed FY2016 shipbuilding request.
Congressional Research Service

3

link to page 17 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Older CRS reports provide additional historical and background information on the DDG-51
program.8
DDG-1000 Program
In FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring DDG-51s, the Navy
instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The Navy plans no further
procurement of DDG-1000s. The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget requests $78.2 mil ion in
procurement funding to help complete the total procurement cost of the three DDG-1000 class
ships.
The DDG-1000 is a multi-mission destroyer with an original y intended emphasis on naval
surface fire support (NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. Consistent with
that mission orientation, the ship was designed with two new-design 155mm guns cal ed
Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs). The AGSs were to fire a new 155mm, gun-launched, rocket-
assisted guided projectile cal ed the Long-Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP, pronounced
LUR-lap). In November 2016, however, it was reported that the Navy had decided to stop
procuring LRLAP projectiles because the projected unit cost of each projectile had risen to at
least $800,000.9 The Navy to date has not announced a replacement munition for the AGSs.10
In the meantime, it was reported in December 2017 that, due to shifts in the international security
environment and resulting shifts in Navy mission needs, the mission orientation of the DDG-
1000s wil be shifted from an emphasis on NSFS to an emphasis on surface strike, meaning the
use of missiles to attack surface ships and perhaps also land targets.11 Under this new plan, the
mix of missiles carried in the 80 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes of each DDG-1000 may now
feature a stronger emphasis on anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles missiles. The two AGSs
on each DDG-1000 wil , for the time being at least, remain for the most part dormant, pending a
final decision on whether to procure a replacement munition for the AGSs (which would require
modifying the AGSs and their below-deck munition-handling equipment, since both were
designed specifical y for LRLAP), or instead pursue another option, such as removing the AGSs
and their below-deck equipment and replacing them with additional VLS tubes.
For additional background information on the DDG-1000 program, see the Appendix.

8 See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke (April 25, 1994; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author), and CRS Report
80-205, The Navy’s Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program : A Com parison With
An Equal-Cost Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke (November 21,
1984; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author).
9 Christopher P. Cavas, “New Warship’s Big Guns Have No Bullets,” Defense News, November 6, 2016; Sam
LaGrone, “Navy Planning on Not Buying More LRLAP Rounds for Zumwalt Class,” USNI News, November 7, 2016;
Ben Guarino, “T he Navy Called USS Zumwalt A Warship Batman Would Drive. But at $800,000 Per Round, Its
Ammo Is T oo Pricey to Fire,” Washington Post, November 8, 2016.
10 See Sam LaGrone, “No New Round Planned For Zumwalt Destroyer Gun System; Navy Monitoring Industry,” USNI
News, January 11, 2018; Richard Abott, “ Navy Still Has No Plans For DDG-1000 Gun Ammo,” Defense Daily,
January 12, 2018: 1-2.
11 Megan Eckstein, “New Requirements for DDG-1000 Focus on Surface Strike,” USNI News, December 4, 2017. See
also Richard Abott, “Navy Will Focus Zumwalt On Offensive Surface Strike,” Defense Daily, December 5, 2017;
David B. Larter, “T he Navy’s Stealth Destroyers to Get New Weapons and a New Mission: Killing Ships,” Defense
News, February 15, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

4

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base
Al cruisers, destroyers, and frigates procured since FY1985 have been built at GD/BIW and
HII/Ingal s. Both yards have long histories of building larger surface combatants. Construction of
Navy surface combatants in recent years has accounted for virtual y al of GD/BIW’s ship-
construction work and for a significant share of HII/Ingal s’ ship-construction work. (HII/Ingal s
also builds amphibious ships for the Navy and cutters for the Coast Guard.) Navy surface
combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at GD/BIW, HII/Ingal s, and other U.S.
shipyards.
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are general y considered the two leading Navy surface combatant
radar makers and combat system integrators. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51
combat system (the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000
combat system, the core of which is cal ed the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure
(TSCE-I). Lockheed has a share of the DDG-1000 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of
the DDG-51 combat system. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop competed to be the maker of the
AMDR to be carried by the Flight III DDG-51. On October 10, 2013, the Navy announced that it
had selected Raytheon to be the maker of the AMDR.
The surface combatant construction industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that
supply materials and components. The financial health of Navy shipbuilding supplier firms has
been a matter of concern in recent years, particularly since some of them are the sole sources for
what they make for Navy surface combatants. Several Navy-operated laboratories and other
facilities support the Aegis system and other aspects of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.
FY2021 Funding Request
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two DDG-51s requested for
procurement in FY2020 at $3,836.9 mil ion, or an average of $1,918.5 mil ion each. The ships
have received $796.6 mil ion in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) advance
procurement (AP) funding (i.e., funding for up-front batch orders of components of DDG-51s to
be procured under the FY2018-FY2022 MYP contract). The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget
requests the remaining $3,040.3 mil ion in procurement funding needed to complete the estimated
procurement cost of the two DDG-51s, as wel as $29.3 mil ion in EOQ funding for DDG-51s to
be procured under the MYP contract, and $9.6 mil ion in cost-to-complete procurement funding
to cover cost growth on DDG-51s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total amount of
procurement funding requested for the DDG-51 program for FY2021 to $3,079.2 mil ion,
excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget also requests $78.2 mil ion in procurement funding to help
complete the total procurement cost of the three DDG-1000 class ships.
Issues for Congress
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Situation
One issue for Congress concerns the potential impact of the COVID-19 (coronavirus) situation on
the execution of U.S. military shipbuilding programs, including the DDG-51 and DDG-1000
programs. For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 10 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

FY2021 Funding Request
One issue for Congress for FY2021 is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2021
funding request for the DDG-51 program. In considering this issue, Congress may consider,
among other things, whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is proposing to do in the
DDG-51 program in FY2021.
Projected DDG-51 Procurement Rate in FY2023-FY2025
Overview
Another issue for Congress is a projected reduction under the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission
in the number of DDG-51s to be procured in FY2023-FY2025, compared to previous Navy plans
for DDG-51 procurement in those fiscal years, and how this relates, if at al , to a possible change
in the surface force architecture that Navy leaders have been talking about since 2019.
Table 1 shows projected procurement rates for DDG-51s and a next-generation LSC cal ed the
Future LSC under the Navy’s FY2020 and FY2021 budget submissions. As can be seen in the
table, for the periods FY2023-FY2025, the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission projects the
procurement of four surface combatants (al DDG-51s), while the Navy’s FY2020 budget
submission had projected the procurement of nine surface combatants (eight DDG-51s plus the
first Future LSC).
Table 1. DDG-51 and Future LSC Procurement, FY2021-FY2025
Under Navy’s FY2020 and FY2021 budget submissions
Total FY21-

FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24
FY25
FY25
FY2020 budget
DDG-51
2
2
3
3
2
12
Future LSC
0
0
0
0
1
1
Total
2
2
3
3
3
13
FY2021 budget
DDG-51
2
2
1
2
1
8
Future LSC
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
2
2
1
2
1
8
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2020 and FY2021 budget submissions.
Navy officials have stated that under the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, the procurement of
the first Future LSC has been deferred from FY2025 to FY2028, in part to provide more time for
the maturation of new technologies that the Navy envisions incorporating into that ship. The
reduction under the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission in the number of DDG-51s projected for
procurement in FY2023-FY2025, meanwhile, may reflect a potential change in the surface force
architecture that Navy leaders have been talking about since 2019. This change is discussed
further in the next section
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Potential Change in Surface Force Architecture
The Navy’s current force-level goal of 355 ships, including 104 large surface combatants (i.e.,
cruisers and destroyers), is the result of a Force Structure Analysis (FSA) that the Navy conducted
in 2016. The Navy conducts a new or updated FSA every few years, and it is currently conducting
a new FSA that is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have suggested
that the Navy in coming years may shift to a new surface force architecture that wil include a
smal er proportion of large surface combatants, a larger proportion of smal surface combatants,
and a third tier of numerous unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). Some observers believe the
results of the new FSA may reflect this potential new surface force architecture.
Figure 2 shows a Navy briefing slide depicting the potential new surface force architecture, with
each sphere representing a manned ship or USV. Consistent with Figure 2, the Navy’s current
355-ship goal cal s for a Navy with twice as many large surface combatants (104) as smal
surface combatants (52). Figure 2 suggests that the potential new surface force architecture could
lead to the obverse—a planned force mix that cal s for twice as many smal surface combatants
than large surface combatants—along with the new third tier of USVs.12
Figure 2. Navy Briefing Slide on Surface Force Architecture
Each sphere represents a ship or a USV

Source: Il ustration accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy Testing
as NAVSEA Moves Forward with Draft RFP,” USNI News, April 29, 2019. The il ustration was also included as

12 For additional discussion of this possible change in surface force architecture, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

7

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Slide 2 in a Navy briefing entitled “Designing & Building the Surface Fleet: Unmanned and Smal Combatants,” by
Rear Admiral Casey Moton at a June 20, 2019, conference of the American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE).
Notes: Each sphere represents a ship or a USV. LSC means large surface combatant (i.e., cruiser or destroyer);
SSC means smal surface combatant (i.e., frigate or Littoral Combat Ship); LUSV means large USV; MUSV means
medium USV. Spheres with multiple colors (the LSCs and SSCs) are ships equipped with a combination of
sensors (green), command and control (C2) equipment (red), and payloads (including weapons) (blue). Spheres
with single colors (the USVs) are equipped with either payloads (blue) or sensors (green).
A January 15, 2019, press report states
The Navy plans to spend this year taking the first few steps into a markedly different future,
which, if it comes to pass, will upend how the fleet has fought since the Cold War. And it
all starts with something that might seem counterintuitive: It’s looking to get smaller.
“Today, I have a requirement for 104 large surface combatants in the force structure
assessment; [and] I have [a requirement for] 52 small surface combatants,” said Surface
Warfare Director Rear Adm. Ronald Boxall. “That’s a little upside down. Should I push
out here and have more small platforms? I think the future fleet architecture study has
intimated ‘yes,’ and our war gaming shows there is value in that.”13
An April 8, 2019, press report states that Navy discussions about the future surface fleet include
the upcoming construction and fielding of the [FFG(X)] frigate, which [Vice Admiral Bill
Merz, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems ] said is surpassing
expectations already in terms of the lethality that industry can put into a small combatant.
“The FSA may actually help us on, how many (destroyers) do we really need to modernize,
because I think the FSA is going to give a lot of credit to the frigate—if I had a crystal bal
and had to predict what the FSA was going to do, it’s going to probably recommend more
small surface combatants, meaning the frigate … and then how much fewer large surface
combatants can we mix?” Merz said.
An issue the Navy has to work through is balancing a need to have enough ships and be
capable enough today, while also making decisions that will help the Navy get out of the
top-heavy surface fleet and into a better balance as soon as is feasible.
“You may see the evolution over time where frigates start replacing destroyers, the Large
Surface Combatant [a future cruiser/destroyer-type ship] starts replacing destroyers, and in
the end, as the destroyers blend away you’re going to get this healthier mix of small and
large surface combatants,” he said—though the new FSA may shed more light on what that
balance will look like and when it could be achieved.14
Potential Oversight Questions
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 To what degree, if any, does the reduction in the projected number of DDG-51s
to be procured in FY2023-FY2025 reflect the potential change in surface force
architecture that Navy leaders have been talking about?
 In terms of potential shipyard workloads and employment levels, how might a
reduction in DDG-51 procurement in FY2023-FY2025 be offset by procurement

13 David B. Larter, “US Navy Moves T oward Unleashing Killer Robot Shps on the World’s Oceans,” Defense News,
January 15, 2019.
14 Megan Eckstein, “ Navy Sees No Easy Answer to Balance Future Surface Fleet ,” USNI News, April 8, 2019. Ellipsis
as in original.
Congressional Research Service

8

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

of Navy FFG(X) frigates,15 Navy amphibious ships,16 Coast Guard National
Security Cutters (NSCs), and Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs)?17 To
what degree, if at al , are Navy and Coast Guard officials assessing the collective
potential impacts on the shipbuilding industrial base of developments regarding
procurement of DDG-51s, FFG(X)s, amphibious ships, NSCs, and OPCs?
Cost, Technical, and Schedule Risk in Flight III DDG-51 Effort
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns cost, technical, and schedule risk for the Flight III
DDG-51.
October 2019 CBO Report
An October 2019 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s
shipbuilding programs stated the following about the Flight III DDG-51:
To meet combatant commanders’ goal of improving future ballistic missile defense
capabilities beyond those provided by existing DDG-51s—and to replace 15 Ticonderoga
class cruisers when they are retired in the 2020s —the Navy is substantially modifying the
design of the DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyer to create a Flight III configuration. That
modification will incorporate the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or SPY-6,
which will be larger and, recent testing indicates, nearly 100 times more powerful than the
radar on current DDG-51s. For the AMDR to operate effectively in the new Flight III
configuration, however, the ships must have a greater capacity to generate electrical power
and cool major systems.
With those improvements incorporated into the design of the Flight III and the associated
increases in the ships’ displacement, CBO estimates that the average cost per ship over the
entire production run would be $1.8 billion—about 7 percent more than the Navy’s
estimate of $1.7 billion. Costs could be higher or lower than CBO’s estimate, however,
depending on the eventual cost and complexity of the AMDR and the associated changes
to the ship’s design to integrate the new radar. Completion of the first Flight III ship is
several years away.18
June 2020 GAO Report
A June 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected DOD
acquisition programs stated the following in its assessment of the Flight III DDG-51:
Current Status
Flight III ships include considerable changes to DDG 51’s design to incorporate the
AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar and restore ship weight and stability safety margins. The program
delayed the start of power and integration testing for the AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar from
January 2019 to April 2020 due to software-related deficiencies that, according to program
officials, are now resolved. Despite this delay, the Navy plans to deliver equipment,
complete testing and installation on the ship, and activate the combat system for s hipboard

15 For more on the FFG(X) program, see CRS Report R44972, Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16 For more on Navy amphibious ship programs, see CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious
Ship Program s: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
17 For more on the NSC and OPC programs, see CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
18 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2020 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2019, p. 24.
Congressional Research Service

9

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

testing by January 2022. Further, it expects both the radar and software developed for the
ship’s combat system to be delivered before the power and integration testing is completed
at the combat system development site, limiting opportunities to fix any issues prior to
activation.
The Navy plans to complete an integrated test and evaluation master plan for the ship,
AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar, and the Aegis combat system by the time of combat system
activation in January 2022. The plan, according to Navy officials, will not include the use
of an unmanned self-defense test ship, although DOD’s Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation and the Navy previously disagreed on whether an unmanned ship was necessary
to validate the end-to-end performance of Flight III ships—including the self-defense
capability—during operational testing.
The Navy continues construction on the lead Flight III ship, DDG 125, with plans for
delivery in fiscal year 2023. Construction of the second ship is planned to start in April
2020. Officials report that the Navy has procured 11 ships using multiyear procurement
authority and plans to award a contract for a 12th ship in fiscal year 2020. The current
acquisition strategy includes 22 ships but, according to Navy officials, the total number of
Flight III ships depends on the Navy’s plans for its future large surface combatant ships.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program stated it has delivered 67 ships and is on track for delivery and initial
capability of the first Flight III ship. According to the program, it rebaselined the radar test
and delivery schedule to better align production and testing and is on track to complete
radar testing prior to the start of shipboard testing. Further, the program said the
development of the radar and software are on track to support integration.19
Regarding the AMDR specifical y, the report stated the following:
Technology Maturity, Design Stability, and Production Readiness
In April 2019, the Navy approved AMDR to procure its 10th low-rate initial production
radar in fiscal year 2020. According to the program, it has mature critical technologies, a
stable design, and production processes in control. However, we continue to disagree that
the technologies are fully mature. While the Navy continues to demonstrate some
technologies through land-based testing at its Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) and
plans to integrate AMDR with the Aegis combat system at a separate land-based site for
simulation and testing, AMDR’s critical technologies cannot be assessed as fully mature
until the Navy integrates AMDR and Aegis on the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship in 2022
during the Aegis Light Off (ALO) event. Following ALO, the Navy will operationally test
AMDR and Aegis in a realistic, at-sea environment on the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship in
2023. While AMDR’s design is currently stable, it remains at risk for disruption until the
Navy completes this testing. In part, this risk is driven by the fact that the Navy is procuring
more than two-thirds of its 22 total radars prior to completing operational testing. Any
deficiencies the Navy discovers during at-sea testing could require revisions to existing
design drawings or retrofitting to already built radars, which would likely increase costs or
delay radar deliveries.
In order to support initial radar integration and testing with Aegis beginnin g in 2020, the
Navy plans to install production radar components at the Aegis combat system land -based
test site in New Jersey. Program officials said this is the first opportunity for AMDR and
Aegis contractors to integrate the systems to test interfaces and software compatibility. The

19 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment[:] Drive to Deliver Capabilities Faster
Increases Im portance of Program Knowledge and Consistent Data for Oversight, GAO-20-439, June 2020 p. 145.
Congressional Research Service

10

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

land-based tests will inform software development and integration of AMDR and Aegis in
support of ALO on the lead DDG 51 Flight III ship in 2022.
AMDR is well into low-rate initial production but has yet to demonstrate statistical control
of its critical manufacturing processes—an approach inconsistent with acquisition best
practices. In December 2019, the program exercised contract options that brought the
number of low-rate production units purchased to nine. However, the contractor continues
to experience cost and schedule growth on production radars due to issues with its Digital
Receiver Exciter (DREX)—a critical technology—and price variances on component
materials, which could affect the program’s procurement cost estimate if issues are not
resolved. Officials said a DREX subcomponent does not meet its vibration specifications,
despite a recent contractor redesign. The program is exploring multiple mitigation options.
The contractor reported that these issues have delayed delivery of the first radar to at least
August 2020, 4 months later than the contract’s delivery date. Program officials said they
could mitigate the issue by delivering the radar to the ship without the DREX unit and
installing the unit later with minimal impact to the schedule. However, delays have already
consumed schedule margin and may threaten the first DDG 51 Flight III installation in
2020 as well as AMDR/DDG 51 Flight III operational testing in 2023.
Software and Cybersecurity
AMDR has completed six of its nine software deliveries to support core radar capabilities,
but additional development remains to add capabilities, integrate cybersecurity measures,
and integrate AMDR with Aegis. Software is incrementally released every 4 months for
testing before the final build is delivered to the end user every 10-12 months. Program
officials said this aligns with Aegis software development, which is being developed
concurrently. AMDR and Aegis software development will continue through 2021 while
both systems integrate and test software.
The Navy has conducted some initial cybersecurity testing with AMDR but will not fully
test cybersecurity capabilities with Aegis until at least 2023. However, the program reports
some cost growth due to implementing cybersecurity controls. If cybersecurity issues arise
during testing, additional software development may cause further cost growth or disrupt
operational testing.
Other Program Issues
The program is developing an Advanced Distributed Radar (ADR) capability that leverages
existing Navy technologies. The ADR capability increased the program’s cost estimate,
and the Navy projects it will require additional development funds through 2027. ADR is
expected to improve AMDR capability through radar enhancements. ADR will be
integrated on existing AMDR systems through software upgrades. The Navy plans to
finalize ADR requirements and begin development in 2020. Full ADR capability will not
be fielded until after the first AMDR-equipped DDG 51 Flight III is fielded in 2024.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. It
stated that AMDR design is stable but software deficiencies might be discovered during
testing; AMDR’s demonstrated performance exceeded its performance thresholds during
land-based testing; and initial radar and Aegis integration began in 2016 and is on track to
support ALO and operational testing. The program office also said the contract type for the
low-rate initial production units minimizes the impact of component price variances and
some radar components have been delivered to support DDG 51 Flight III construction
Congressional Research Service

11

link to page 16 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

schedules. According to the program office, initial cybersecurity updates are on track to
complete in 2021.20
Legislative Activity for FY2021
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding Request
Table 2 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2021 procurement funding requests
for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.
Table 2. Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding Request
Mil ions of dol ars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
DDG-51 procurement
3,040.3

DDG-51 EOQ advance procurement (AP)
29.3

DDG-51 cost to complete
9.6

DDG-1000 procurement
78.2

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2021 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.

20 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Limited Use of Knowledge-Based
Practices Continues to Undercut DOD’s Investments, GAO-20-439, June 2020, p. 116.
Congressional Research Service

12

link to page 17

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix. Additional Background Information on
DDG-1000 Program
This appendix presents additional background information on the DDG-1000 program.
Overview
The DDG-1000 program was initiated in the early 1990s.21 The DDG-1000 (Figure A-1) is a
multi-mission destroyer with an original y intended emphasis on naval surface fire support
(NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. (NSFS is the use of naval guns to
provide fire support for friendly forces operating ashore.)
Figure A-1. DDG-1000 Class Destroyer

Source: U.S. Navy photo 151207-N-ZZ999-435, posted December 8, 2015, with a caption that reads in part:
“The future USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) is underway for the first time conducting at-sea tests and trials in the
Atlantic Ocean Dec. 7, 2015.”
The DDG-1000 was original y intended to replace, in a technological y more modern form, the
large-caliber naval gun fire capability that the Navy lost when it retired its Iowa-class battleships
in the early 1990s,22 to improve the Navy’s general capabilities for operating in defended littoral

21 T he program was originally designated DD-21, which meant destroyer for the 21st century. In November 2001, the
program was restructured and renamed DD(X), meanin g a destroyer whose design was in development. In April 2006,
the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000.
22 T he Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. T he ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
Congressional Research Service

13

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

waters, and to introduce several new technologies that would be available for use on future Navy
ships. The DDG-1000 was also intended to serve as the basis for a planned cruiser cal ed CG(X)
that was subsequently canceled.23
The DDG-1000 is to have a reduced-size crew of 175 sailors (147 to operate the ship, plus a 28-
person aviation detachment), compared to roughly 300 on the Navy’s Aegis destroyers and
cruisers, so as to reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The ship incorporates a significant
number of new technologies, including an integrated electric-drive propulsion system24 and
automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew.
With an estimated full load displacement of 15,612 tons, the DDG-1000 design is roughly 64%
larger than the Navy’s current 9,500-ton Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and larger than any Navy
destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured
in FY1957.
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007-FY2008; the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission estimates their
combined procurement cost at $9,242.3 mil ion. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009
and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010; the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission estimates its
procurement cost at $3,789.9 mil ion.
The first DDG-1000 was commissioned into service on October 15, 2016, although its delivery
date was revised in the Navy’s FY2018 budget submission to May 2018, and revised further in
the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission to December 2018, creating an unusual situation in which
a ship was commissioned into service more than two years prior to its delivery date. The delivery
dates for the second and third ships were revised in the Navy’s FY2018 budget submission to
May 2020 and December 2021, respectively, and were revised further in the Navy’s FY2019
budget submission to September 2020 and September 2022, respectively.25
Program Origin
The program known today as the DDG-1000 program was announced on November 1, 2001,
when the Navy stated that it was replacing a destroyer-development effort cal ed the DD-21
program, which the Navy had initiated in the mid-1990s, with a new Future Surface Combatant
Program aimed at developing and acquiring a family of three new classes of surface
combatants:26

23 For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
24 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
25 T he revised delivery dates for the three ships reflect Section 121 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act
(S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016), a provision that establishes standards for determining vessel delivery
dates and which also required the Secretary of the Navy to certify that the delivery dates for certain ships, including the
three DDG-1000s, had been adjusted in accordance with the provision. T he Navy’s original plan for the DDG-1000
program was to install certain elements of each DDG-1000’s combat system after delivering the ship and
commissioning it into service. Section 121 of P.L. 114-328 in effect requires the Navy to defer the delivery date of a
DDG-1000 until those elements of the combat system are installed. By the time P.L. 114-328 was enacted, DDG-1000,
per the Navy’s original plan, had already been commissioned into service without those elements of its combat system.
26 T he DD-21 program was part of a Navy surface combatant acquisition effort begun in the mid-1990s and called the
SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) program. T he SC-21 program envisaged a new destroyer called DD-21
and a new cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant Program in 2001,
development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, while the start of development work on the CG-
Congressional Research Service

14

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

 a destroyer called DD(X) for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire
mission;
 a cruiser called CG(X) for the air defense and bal istic missile mission; and
 a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter
submarines, smal surface attack craft (also cal ed “swarm boats”), and mines in
heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.27
On April 7, 2006, the Navy announced that it had redesignated the DD(X) program as the DDG-
1000 program. The Navy also confirmed in that announcement that the first ship in the class,
DDG-1000, is to be named the Zumwalt, in honor of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of
Naval operations from 1970 to 1974. The decision to name the first ship after Zumwalt was made
by the Clinton Administration in July 2000, when the program was stil cal ed the DD-21
program.28
New Technologies
The DDG-1000 incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including a wave-
piercing, tumblehome hull design for reduced detectability,29 a superstructure made partly of large
sections of composite (i.e., fiberglass-like) materials rather than steel or aluminum, an integrated
electric-drive propulsion system,30 a total-ship computing system for moving information about
the ship, automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew, a dual-band radar, a new kind
of vertical launch system (VLS) for storing and firing missiles, and two copies of a new 155mm
gun cal ed the Advanced Gun System (AGS).
Shipbuilders and Combat System Prime Contractor
GD/BIW is the builder for al three DDG-1000s, with some portions of each ship being built by
HII/Ingal s for delivery to GD/BIW. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the DDG-1000’s
combat system (its collection of sensors, computers, related software, displays, and weapon
launchers).
Under a DDG-1000 acquisition strategy approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on February 24, 2004, the first DDG-1000
was to have been built by HII/Ingal s, the second ship was to have been built by GD/BIW, and
contracts for building the first six were to have been equal y divided between HII/Ingal s31 and
GD/BIW.

21 was still years in the future. T he current DDG-1000 destroyer CG(X) cruiser programs can be viewed as the
descendants, respectively, of the DD-21 and CG-21. T he acronym SC-21 is still used in the Navy’s research and
development account to designate the line item (i.e., program element) that funds development work on both the DDG-
1000 and CG(X).
27 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
28 For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
29 A tumblehome hull slopes inward, toward the ship’s centerline, as it rises up from the waterline, in contrast to a
conventional flared hull, which slopes outward as it rises up from the waterline.
30 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
31 At the time of the events described in this section, HII was owned by Northrop Grumman and was called Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
Congressional Research Service

15

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

In February 2005, Navy officials announced that they would seek approval from USD AT&L to
instead hold a one-time, winner-take-al competition between HII/Ingal s and GD/BIW to build
al DDG-1000s. On April 20, 2005, the USD AT&L issued a decision memorandum deferring this
proposal, stating in part, “at this time, I consider it premature to change the shipbuilder portion of
the acquisition strategy which I approved on February 24, 2004.”
Several Members of Congress also expressed opposition to the Navy’s proposal for a winner-
take-al competition. Congress included a provision (§1019) in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13 of May 11, 2005) prohibiting a winner-take-
al competition. The provision effectively required the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but did not specify the share of the program that is to go to the additional
shipyard.
On May 25, 2005, the Navy announced that, in light of Section 1019 of P.L. 109-13, it wanted to
shift to a “dual-lead-ship” acquisition strategy, under which two DDG-1000s would be procured
in FY2007, with one to be designed and built by HII/Ingal s and the other by GD/BIW.
Section 125 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163) again prohibited
the Navy from using a winner-take-al acquisition strategy for procuring its next-generation
destroyer. The provision again effectively requires the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but does not specify the share of the program that is to go to the
additional shipyard.
On November 23, 2005, the USD AT&L granted Milestone B approval for the DDG-1000,
permitting the program to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As
part of this decision, the USD AT&L approved the Navy’s proposed dual-lead-ship acquisition
strategy and a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships (one more than the Navy
subsequently planned to procure).
On February 14, 2008, the Navy awarded contract modifications to GD/BIW and HII/Ingal s for
the construction of the two lead ships. The awards were modifications to existing contracts that
the Navy has with GD/BIW and HII/Ingal s for detailed design and construction of the two lead
ships. Under the modified contracts, the line item for the construction of the dual lead ships is
treated as a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) item.
Until July 2007, it was expected that HII/Ingal s would be the final-assembly yard for the first
DDG-1000 and that GD/BIW would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On September 25,
2007, the Navy announced that it had decided to build the first DDG-1000 at GD/BIW, and the
second at HII/Ingal s.
On January 12, 2009, it was reported that the Navy, HII/Ingal s, and GD/BIW in the fal of 2008
began holding discussions on the idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG-
1000s, in exchange for HII/Ingal s receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be
procured under the Navy’s July 2008 proposal to stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-
51 procurement.32
On April 8, 2009, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with HII/Ingal s and
GD/BIW to shift the second DDG-1000 to GD/BIW, and to have GD/BIW build al three ships.
HII/Iingal s wil continue to make certain parts of the three ships, notably their composite
deckhouses. The agreement to have al three DDG-1000s built at GD/BIW was a condition that
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates set forth in an April 6, 2009, news conference on the FY2010

32 Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
Congressional Research Service

16

link to page 22 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

defense budget for his support for continuing with the construction of al three DDG-1000s
(rather than proposing the cancel ation of the second and third).
Reduction in Procurement to Three Ships
Navy plans for many years cal ed for ending DDG-51 procurement in FY2005, to be followed by
procurement of up to 32 DDG-1000s and some number of CG(X)s. In subsequent years, the
planned total number of DDG-1000s was reduced to 16 to 24, then to 7, and final y to 3.
At the end of July 2008, in a major reversal of its destroyer procurement plans, the Navy
announced that it wanted to end procurement of DDG-1000s and resume procurement of DDG-
51s. In explaining this reversal, which came after two DDG-1000s had been procured, the Navy
stated that it had reevaluated the future operating environment and determined that its destroyer
procurement now needed to emphasize three missions: open-ocean antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and countering bal istic missiles. Although
the DDG-1000 could perform the first two of these missions and could be modified to perform
the third, the Navy concluded that the DDG-51 design could perform these three missions
adequately and would be less expensive to procure than the DDG-1000 design.
The Navy’s proposal to stop procuring DDG-1000s and resume procuring DDG-51s was
presented in the Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget, which was submitted to Congress in 2009.
Congress, in acting on the Navy’s FY2010 budget, approved the idea of ending DDG-1000
procurement and restarting DDG-51 procurement, and procured a third DDG-1000 as the final
ship in the class.
In retrospect, the Navy’s 2008 reversal in its destroyer procurement plans can be viewed as an
early indication of the ending of the post-Cold War era (during which the Navy focused its
planning on operating in littoral waters against the land- and sea-based forces of countries such as
Iran and North Korea) and the shift in the international security environment to a new situation
featuring renewed great power competition (during which the Navy is now focusing its planning
more on being able to operate in mid-ocean waters against capable naval forces from near-peer
competitors such as China and Russia).33
Increase in Estimated Procurement Cost
As shown in Table A-1 below, the estimated combined procurement cost for al three DDG-
1000s, as reflected in the Navy’s annual budget submission, has grown by $4,298.5 mil ion, or
47.9%, since the FY2009 budget (i.e., the budget for the fiscal year in which the third DDG-1000
was procured).

33 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Im plications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

17

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Table A-1. Estimated Combined Procurement Cost of DDG-1000, DDG-1001, and
DDG-2002
In mil ions, rounded to nearest tenth, as shown in annual Navy budget submissions
Estimated combined
Change from prior
Cumulative change
Budget
procurement cost
year’s budget
from FY2009 budget
submission
(millions of dollars)
submission
submission
FY09
8,977.1
—
—
FY10
9,372.5
+395.4 (+4.4%)
+395.4 (+4.4%)
FY11
9,993.3
+620.8 (+6.6%)
+1,016.2 (+11.3%)
FY12
11,308.8
+1,315.5 (+13.2%)
+2,331.7 (+26.0%)
FY13
11,470.1
+161.3 (+1.4%)
+2,493.0 (+27.8%)
FY14
11,618.4
+148.3 (+1.3%)
+2,641.3 (+29.4%)
FY15
12,069.4
+451.0 (+3.9%)
+3,092.3 (+34.4%)
FY16
12,288.7
+219.3 (+1.8%)
+3,311.6 (+36.9%)
FY17
12,738.2
+449.5 (+3.7%)
+3,761.1 (+41.9%)
FY18
12,882.0
+143.8 (+1.1%)
+3,904.0 (+43.5%)
FY19
13,032.2
+150.2 (+1.2%)
+4,055.1 (+45.1%)
FY20
13,195.5
+163.3 (+1.3%)
+4,218.4 (+47.0%)
FY21
13,275.6
+80.1 (+ 0.6%)
+4,298.5 (+47.9%)
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data in annual Navy budget submissions.
Some of the cost growth in the earlier years in the table was caused by the truncation of the DDG-
1000 program from seven ships to three, which caused some class-wide procurement-rated costs
that had been allocated to the fourth through seventh ships in the program to be real ocated to the
three remaining ships.
The Navy states that the cost growth shown through FY2015 in the table reflects, among other
things, a series of incremental, year-by-year movements away from an earlier Navy cost estimate
for the program, and toward a higher estimate developed by the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As one
consequence of a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach experienced by the DDG-1000 program in 2010
(see discussion below), the Navy was directed to fund the DDG-1000 program to CAPE’s higher
cost estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015, and to the Navy’s cost estimate for FY2016 and
beyond. The Navy states that it implemented this directive in a year-by-year fashion with each
budget submission from FY2010 through FY2015, moving incremental y closer each year
through FY2015 to CAPE’s higher estimate. The Navy stated in 2014 that even with the cost
growth shown in the table, the DDG-1000 program as of the FY2015 budget submission was stil
about 3% below the program’s rebaselined starting point for calculating any new Nunn-McCurdy
cost breach on the program.34

34 Source: Navy briefing for CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the DDG-1000 program, April 30,
2014.
Congressional Research Service

18

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Procurement Cost Cap
Section 123 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006)
limited the procurement cost of the fifth DDG-1000 to $2.3 bil ion, plus adjustments for inflation
and other factors. Given the truncation of the DDG-1000 program to three ships, this unit
procurement cost cap appears moot.
2010 Nunn-McCurdy Breach, Program Restructuring, and
Milestone Recertification
On February 1, 2010, the Navy notified Congress that the DDG-1000 program had experienced a
critical cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provision. The Nunn-McCurdy provision (10
U.S.C. 2433a) requires certain actions to be taken if a major defense acquisition program exceeds
(i.e., breaches) certain cost-growth thresholds and is not terminated. Among other things, a
program that experiences a cost breach large enough to qualify under the provision as a critical
cost breach has its previous acquisition system milestone certification revoked. (In the case of the
DDG-1000 program, this was Milestone B.) In addition, for the program to proceed rather than be
terminated, DOD must certify certain things, including that the program is essential to national
security and that there are no alternatives to the program that wil provide acceptable capability to
meet the joint military requirement at less cost.35
The Navy stated in its February 1, 2010, notification letter that the DDG-1000 program’s critical
cost breach was a mathematical consequence of the program’s truncation to three ships.36 Since
the DDG-1000 program has roughly $9.3 bil ion in research and development costs, truncating
the program to three ships increased to roughly $3.1 bil ion the average amount of research and
development costs that are included in the average acquisition cost (i.e., average research and
development cost plus procurement cost) of each DDG-1000. The resulting increase in program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC)—one of two measures used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for
measuring cost growth37—was enough to cause a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach.
In a June 1, 2010, letter (with attachment) to Congress, Ashton Carter, the DOD acquisition
executive (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), stated
that he had restructured the DDG-1000 program and that he was issuing the certifications
required under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for the restructured DDG-1000 program to
proceed.38 The letter stated that the restructuring of the DDG-1000 program included the
following:
 A change to the DDG-1000’s design affecting its primary radar.
 A change in the program’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from FY2015 to
FY2016.

35 For more on the Nunn-McCurdy provision, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz and Charles V. O'Connor.
36 Source: Letter to congressional offices dated February 1, 2010, from Robert O. Work, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
to Representative Ike Skelton, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on February 24, 2010.
37 PAUC is the sum of the program’s research and development cost and procurement cost divided by the number of
units in the program. T he other measure used under the Nunn -McCurdy provision to measure cost growth is average
program unit cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the number of units in the
program.
38 Letter dated June 1, 2010, from Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, T echnology and Logistics)
to the Honorable Ike Skelton, with attachment. The letter and attachment were posted on InsideDefense.com
(subscription required) on June 2, 2010.
Congressional Research Service

19

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

 A revision to the program’s testing and evaluation requirements.
Regarding the change to the ship’s design affecting its primary radar, the DDG-1000 original y
was to have been equipped with a dual-band radar (DBR) consisting of the Raytheon-built X-
band SPY-3 multifunction radar (MFR) and the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 Volume Search
Radar (VSR). (Raytheon is the prime contractor for the overal DBR.) Both parts of the DBR
have been in development for the past several years. An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter
stated that, as a result of the program’s restructuring, the ship is now to be equipped with “an
upgraded multifunction radar [MFR] and no volume search radar [VSR].” The change eliminates
the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 VSR from the ship’s design. The ship might retain a space and
weight reservation that would permit the VSR to be backfitted to the ship at a later point. The
Navy states that
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification process, the Volume Search Radar (VSR)
hardware was identified as an acceptable opportunity to reduce cost in the program and
thus was removed from the current baseline design....
Modifications will be made to the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR) with the focus of
meeting ship Key Performance Parameters. The MFR modifications will involve software
changes to perform a volume search functionality. Shipboard operators will be able to
optimize the SPY-3 MFR for either horizon search or volume search. While optimized for
volume search, the horizon search capability is limited. Without the VSR, DDG 1000 is
still expected to perform local area air defense....
The removal of the VSR will result in an estimated $300 million net total cost savings for
the three-ship class. These savings will be used to offset the program cost increase as a
result of the truncation of the program to three ships. The estimated cost of the MFR
software modification to provide the volume search capability will be significantly less
than the estimated procurement costs for the VSR.39
Regarding the figure of $300 mil ion net total cost savings in the above passage, the Navy during
2011 determined that eliminating the SPY-4 VSR from the DDG-1000 increased by $54 mil ion
the cost to integrate the dual-band radar into the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class
aircraft carriers.40 Subtracting this $54 mil ion cost from the above $300 mil ion savings figure
would bring the net total cost savings to about $246 mil ion on a Navy-wide basis.
A July 26, 2010, press report quotes Captain James Syring, the DDG-1000 program manager, as
stating the following: “We don’t need the S-band radar to meet our requirements [for the DDG-
1000],” and “You can meet [the DDG-1000’s operational] requirements with [the] X-band [radar]
with software modifications.”41
An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter stated that the PAUC for the DDG-1000 program had
increased 86%, triggering the Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach, and that the truncation of the
program to three ships was responsible for 79 of the 86 percentage points of increase. (The
attachment stated that the other seven percentage points of increase are from increases in
development costs that are primarily due to increased research and development work content for
the program.)

39 Source: Undated Navy information paper on DDG-51 program restructuring provided to CRS and CBO by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs on July 19, 2010.
40 Source: Undated Navy information paper on CVN-78 cost issues, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to
CRS on March 19, 2012.
41 Cid Standifer, “Volume Radar Contracted For DDG-1000 Could Be Shifted T o CVN-79,” Inside the Navy, July 26,
2010.
Congressional Research Service

20

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Carter also stated in his June 1, 2010, letter that he had directed that the DDG-1000 program be
funded, for the period FY2011-FY2015, to the cost estimate for the program provided by the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office (which is a part of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense [OSD]), and, for FY2016 and beyond, to the Navy’s cost estimate for the program.
The program was previously funded to the Navy’s cost estimate for al years. Since CAPE’s cost
estimate for the program is higher than the Navy’s cost estimate, funding the program to the
CAPE estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015 wil increase the cost of the program as it appears
in the budget for those years. The letter states that DOD “intends to address the [resulting]
FY2011 [funding] shortfal [for the DDG-1000 program] through reprogramming actions.”
An attachment to the letter stated that the CAPE in May 2010 estimated the PAUC of the DDG-
1000 program (i.e., the sum of the program’s research and development costs and procurement
costs, divided by the three ships in the program) as $7.4 bil ion per ship in then-year dollars
($22.1 bil ion in then-year dollars for al three ships), and the program’s average procurement unit
cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the three ships in the
program, as $4.3 bil ion per ship in then-year dollars ($12.8 bil ion in then-year dollars for al
three ships). The attachment stated that these estimates are at a confidence level of about 50%,
meaning that the CAPE believes there is a roughly 50% chance that the program can be
completed at or under these cost estimates, and a roughly 50% chance that the program wil
exceed these cost estimates.
An attachment to the letter directed the Navy to “return for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
review in the fal 2010 timeframe when the program is ready to seek approval of the new
Milestone B and authorization for production of the DDG-1002 [i.e., the third ship in the
program].”
On October 8, 2010, DOD reinstated the DDG-1000 program’s Milestone B certification and
authorized the Navy to continue production of the first and second DDG-1000s and commence
production of the third DDG-1000.42
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
June 2020 GAO Report
A June 2020 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the
following of the DDG-1000 program:
Technology Maturity, Design Stability, and Production Readiness
The DDG 1000 program has fully matured most, but not all, of its nine original current
critical technologies and reports a stable design. According to the Navy, the vertical launch
system, infrared signature, and total ship computing environment are each continuing to
approach maturity. The Navy expects to fully mature these systems as it completes ship
construction, certification, and testing over the next 2 years. In addition to these nine
technologies, the Navy has now added three critical technologies to meet its new mission:
a communication system, an intelligence system, and the seeker on an offensive st rike
missile. These technologies are planned to be mature when they are integrated onto the
ship, but this integration will not occur until several years after the ship undergoes testing.
The Navy plans to complete operational testing of the lead ship in September 2021.

42 Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Approves Key Milestone For Multibillion -Dollar Destroyer,” Inside the Navy,
November 22, 2010.
Congressional Research Service

21

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

As of January 2020, the DDG 1000 program continues to finish construction on all three
ships while still maturing the remaining critical technologies and further defining the ship’s
new mission. The Navy planned to complete delivery of the DDG 1000 with its combat
systems in April 2020—a delay of 6 months from last year’s review. In total, the lead ship
is now 2 years late compared to the Navy’s original plans to complete this milestone.
The Navy plans to complete delivery of the DDG 1001 wit h its combat systems in
September 2020. Navy program officials stated that by leveraging lessons learned from
DDG 1000 combat system activation, they can complete DDG 1001 combat systems
delivery in less than 3 years. Lastly, the Navy plans to deliver DDG 1002 with its combat
systems in September 2022—a 9-month delay from last year’s estimate.
Software and Cybersecurity
As we reported last year, the Navy plans to complete software development for the class
in September 2020—a delay of 24 months since our 2018 assessment largely due to
optimistic schedules for development. As a result, the Navy has had to delay some testing
that the ship must complete before it is ready to deploy. In addition, although the lead ship
was delivered in 2016, the program is still continuing to deliver software builds that achieve
some of the promised automation. Since the software is not as capable and does not enable
as much automation as originally planned, among other things, the Navy has permanently
added 31 sailors to the crew compared to initial estimates, increasing life-cycle costs.
The program plans to complete a cybersecurity vulnerability evaluation in fiscal year 2021
connected with section 1647 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2016. The program expects that this evaluation, along with the remainder of a 2-year
regimen of certifications and several different tests in September 2020, will demonstrate
the full functionality of the ship’s systems, including cybersecurity capability. According
to program officials, no cybersecurity issues have been identified to date.
Other Program Issues
In January 2018, the Navy changed the ship class’s primary mission from land attack to
offensive surface strike and updated its requirements document to reflect this new mission
in July 2018. To begin to enable the new surface strike mission over the next 5 or more
years, the Navy is requesting $160 million for four new systems for the ships: two missile
systems, a communications system, and an intelligence system. On e missile system is
planned to be installed on all three ships by September 2021 at a cost of $66 million. The
second missile system is not planned to be installed on any of the ships for at least 5 years
and needs significant development at a cost of $45 million—additional funds will be
needed to purchase and install the system. The communications system will be installed on
all three ships by fiscal 2023 and costs $22 million. Lastly, the intelligence system is not
planned to be installed on any of the ships for at least 5 years and needs significant
development at a cost of $40 million—additional funds will be needed to purchase and
install the system.
The cost to develop and install these four systems is in addition to the program’s
procurement cost as it is accounted for in other procurement and research and development
funding. According to Navy officials, the Navy may continue to add capability to support
the new mission.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment for program office review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The office stated that it is making good progress in delivering DDG 1000 class ships to the
fleet. After our date for assessing new information from programs, the office stated that in
March 2020 the DDG 1000 had achieved sufficient combat system installation and
activation for the Navy to take delivery and transition to the next phase of developmental
Congressional Research Service

22

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

and integrated at-sea testing. Further, the office said that in 2019, the DDG 1000 spent
more than 100 days at sea to maintain crew proficiency, support fleet operations, conduct
testing and provide an early opportunity for the ship to engage in operational scenarios. It
also said the DDG 1001 completed its combat availability in March 2020 with a successful
sea trial and is transitioning to combat systems activation. The office also said the final
ship of the class, DDG 1002, is under construction and 93 percent complete, and that
integration of the new systems will add offensive capability against targets afloat and
ashore across the DDG 1000 class.43

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

43 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment[:] Drive to Deliver Capabilities Faster
Increases Im portance of Program Knowledge and Consistent Data for Oversight, GAO-20-439, June 2020, p. 122.
Congressional Research Service
RL32109 · VERSION 231 · UPDATED
23