Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development June 8, 2020
Private companies, universities, and governmental entities are wo rking to develop a vaccine for
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Vaccines are biological products regulated under the
Kevin J. Hickey
Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and the Federal Food, Dru g, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act).
Legislative Attorney
New vaccines must generally be licensed by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) before

they can be marketed and used in the United States. To obtain licensure, the vaccine must be
tested in human subjects through clinical trials. The clinical trials inform the dosing schedule and
Erin H. Ward
labeling that will be used for the approved vaccine. Sponsors use the data from clinical trials,
Legislative Attorney

along with other information, to prepare a biologics license application (BLA) to submit to FDA.
FDA approves the BLA if it determines that the vaccine is safe, potent, and pure.

Because the development and review process can be lengthy, the FD&C Act provides several avenues to accelerate this
process for pharmaceutical products intended to treat or prevent serious diseases or conditions. FDA may grant fast track
product and breakthrough-therapy designation at the sponsor’s request for products that are intended to fill an unmet need or
improve on existing therapies. Both designations entitle the sponsor to increased communication with FDA regarding the
clinical trial design and data collected, as well as rolling review of the BLA. Products may also qualify for accelerated
approval based on intermediate or surrogate endpoints likely to predict a clinical benefit. In addition, FDA may designate
products for priority review.
In certain emergency situations, FDA may temporarily authorize the use of unapproved products or approved products for
unapproved uses through an emergency use authorization (EUA). For FDA to issue an EUA, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) must determine (1) that a qualifying emergency exists caused by a biological, chemical, radiological,
or nuclear (BCRN) agent and (2) that the BCRN agent can cause a serious or life-threatening disease. The Secretary, through
FDA, must also determine for each product that (3) it is reasonable to believe, based on the totality of the evidence available,
that the product may treat or prevent the disease caused by the BCRN agent and that the known and potential benefits
outweigh the known and potential risks, and (4) there are no approved, adequate, and available alternatives. If FDA issues an
EUA, the product may be marketed and used for the authorized use while the emergency persists unless FDA revokes the
EUA. FDA may also modify or waive good manufacturing practice and prescription requirements when issuing an EUA.
FDA approval of a vaccine allows for its marketing, but does not guarantee that the vaccine will be widely available or
affordable. Because patents grant inventors the exclusive rights in a patented invention, patents may influence COVID-19
vaccine affordability and access. Federal agencies and funding support many of th e COVID-19 vaccine candidates in
development, which may affect the allocation and scope of patent rights. The Bayh-Dole Act allows a federal contractor to
obtain the patent on a federally funded invention, but the government retains a free license to use the invention and may
“march in” to grant patent licenses to third-party manufacturers in limited circumstances. If federal support is provided
through an “other transaction” agreement, however, the allocation of patent rights will depend on the terms of that contract.
The federal government has several authorities that it could exercise should patent rights limit the affordability of or access to
a COVID-19 vaccine. For vaccines developed with federal funding or support, the government may secure up-front
guarantees on pricing or distribution via funding or purchasing contracts with vaccine developers. For vaccines protected by
patents subject to the Bayh-Dole Act, the funding agency could seek to invoke march-in rights to enable other producers to
manufacture the vaccine. For any U.S. patent, the federal government could use its “eminent domain” powers under 28
U.S.C. § 1498, which allows the government to make and use patented inventions without license—so long as the use is by
or for the United States and compensation is provided to the patent holder. As U.S. patent rights are a creation of Congress,
targeted legislation is another option, subject to the constraints of the U.S. Constitution and international treaties.
A COVID-19 vaccine is likely to be subject to specialized rules limiting legal liability under the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act. To encourage the expeditious development and deployment of medical
countermeasures, the Secretary of HHS has declared COVID-19 to be a public health emergency and invoked the PREP Act
to limit liability for losses relating to the use of covered medical countermeasures during the public health emergency. Under
HHS’s declaration, covered persons—including COVID-19 vaccine developers, manufacturers, distributors, and health care
professionals who administer a vaccine—are generally immune from legal liability for losses relating to administration or use
of an FDA-approved COVID-19 vaccine, except for willful misconduct resulting in death or serious physical injury.
However, individuals who are injured or die as a result of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine may seek compensation through the
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, a regulatory process administered by HHS.
Congressional Research Service

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

round the world, private companies, universities, and governmental entities are rapidly
working to develop a vaccine for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19).1 In the United
A States alone, private industry and universities are developing and testing dozens of
COVID-19 vaccine candidates,2 often in collaboration with federal agencies and/or supported by
federal funding. For example, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
(BARDA) has partnered with Janssen Pharmaceuticals (a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary) and
Sanofi to help develop and scale up manufacturing capacity for each company’s COVID-19
vaccine candidate.3 Together with the National Institute of Al ergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID), BARDA is also collaborating with Moderna to support the development of its COVID-
19 vaccine candidate.4
More general y, the Trump Administration recently announced the creation of a program cal ed
Operation Warp Speed, which seeks to use coordinated government support to accelerate the
development, manufacturing, and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and other medical
countermeasures.5 With respect to vaccines, the program initial y selected fourteen promising
vaccine candidates, which was subsequently narrowed to five candidates.6 Under Operation Warp
Speed, the federal government is investing in scaling up manufacturing and distribution for
selected COVID-19 vaccine candidates “at risk” (that is, before safety and efficacy is
demonstrated).7 For example, under the program, BARDA has entered into agreements to
accelerate the development and manufacturing of a vaccine candidate being developed by the
University of Oxford and AstraZeneca.8

1 See Draft Landscape of COVID-19 Candidate Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (June 2, 2020),
https://www.who.int/who-documents-detail/draft -landscape-of-covid-19-candidate-vaccines (listing 133 COVID-19
vaccine candidates in various stages of development worldwide); Jeff Craven, COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, REG. AFF.
PROFS. SOC’Y (June 1, 2020), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2020/3/covid-19-vaccine-tracker
(tracking COVID-19 vaccine candidates currently in clinical trials).
2 See T ung T hanh Le et al., The COVID-19 Vaccine Development Landscape, NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY (Apr. 9,
2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41573-020-00073-5 (breaking down COVID-19 vaccine candidates by
geographical location of lead developer).
3 See Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS, Janssen Join Forces On Coronavirus
Vaccine (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/02/11/hhs-janssen-join-forces-on-coronavirus-
vaccine.html; Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Engages Sanofi’s Recombinant
T echnology for 2019 Novel Coronavirus Vaccine (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/02/18/hhs-
engages-sanofis-recombinant -technology-for-2019-novel-coronavirus-vaccine.html.
4 See Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Accelerates Clinical T rials, Prepares for
Manufacturing of COVID-19 Vaccines (Mar. 30, 2020).
5 See Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, T rump Administration Announces Framework
and Leadership for “ Operation Warp Speed” (May 15, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/15/trump -
administration-announces-framework-and-leadership-for-operation-warp-speed.html.
6 See Noah Weiland & David E. Sanger, Trump Administration Selects Five Coronavirus Vaccine Candidates as
Finalists, N.Y. T IMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/politics/coronavirus-vaccine-trump-
moderna.html. T he five candidates are vaccines being developed by (1) Moderna/NIAID; (2) University of
Oxford/AstraZeneca; (3) Johnson & Johnson; (4) Merck; and (5) Pfizer/BioNT ech. See id.
7 See Jennifer Jacobs and Drew Armstrong, Trump’s ‘Operation Warp Speed’ Aims to Rush Coronavirus Vaccine,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020 -04-29/trump-s-operation-warp-speed-
aims-to-rush-coronavirus-vaccine.
8 Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, T rump Administration’s Operation Warp Speed
Accelerates AstraZeneca COVID-19 Vaccine to be Available Beginning in October (May 21, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/21/trump -administration-accelerates-astrazeneca-covid-19-vaccine-to-be-
available-beginning-in-october.html.
Congressional Research Service
1

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

This report overviews certain legal issues in COVID-19 vaccine development, testing, licensing,
production, and administration, focusing on three areas: (1) vaccine testing, authorization, and
licensure by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA); (2) patent and other intel ectual
property (IP) rights that may protect a COVID-19 vaccine; and (3) liability and compensation
issues for individuals harmed by the testing or administration of a vaccine.
First, this report explains the existing legal requirements for clinical trials and FDA authorization
or licensure of new vaccines, including different options to accelerate those processes. Second, it
analyzes who might own the patent rights in a potential COVID-19 vaccine, and the federal
government’s legal options should patent rights restrict the affordability or availability of a
vaccine. Third, it reviews the protections from legal liability available to vaccine developers,
manufacturers, administrators, and healthcare professionals under the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act.
FDA Law Considerations: Bringing a New Vaccine
to Market
Vaccines are intended to prevent diseases and general y work by introducing pathogens to the
human body (usual y by injection) to trigger an immune response to the disease (i.e., producing
antibodies to the pathogen).9 Vaccines are biological products approved and regulated by FDA’s
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) under Section 351 of the Public Health
Service Act (PHSA).10 A biologic such as a vaccine general y cannot be introduced into
commerce unless FDA approves it.11 To be approved, FDA must determine that the vaccine is
safe, potent, and pure based on data from laboratory studies and clinical trials.12 This section
discusses the legal framework for developing, testing, and licensing (i.e., approving) new
vaccines under the PHSA and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), as wel as
existing legal avenues that would al ow that process to be expedited to bring a new vaccine to
market sooner.
Clinical Trials of Investigational New Drugs
Sponsors use clinical trials to generate the data needed to obtain FDA approval to market their
products. Because clinical trials expose human subjects to unapproved pharmaceutical products,
they risk causing unanticipated serious adverse side effects in the participants. To manage these
risks, the FD&C Act and FDA regulations have imposed procedural requirements, such as
advance and ongoing scientific and ethical review, on clinical trials to help protect the
participants by minimizing risks, requiring informed consent, and ensuring that the studies collect
the data needed to determine whether to approve the product.

9 Vaccines: The Basics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/vpd-vac-
basics.html (last updated Mar. 14, 2012); Understanding How Vaccines Work, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/conversations/understanding-vacc-work.html (last updated Aug. 17,
2018).
10 42 U.S.C. § 262; Vaccine Product Approval Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-
blood-biologics/development -approval-process-cber/vaccine-product -approval-process (last updated Jan. 30, 2018)
[hereinafter FDA Vaccine Approval Process].
11 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1).
12 Id. § 262(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 601.2.
Congressional Research Service
2

link to page 6 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

Using Clinical Trials to Collect Substantial Evidence
Sponsors must submit “substantial evidence” to FDA that their products are safe and effective (or
safe, potent, and pure) to obtain FDA approval.13 Section 505(d) of the FD&C Act defines
substantial evidence to mean adequately and wel -controlled investigations on the basis of which
qualified scientific experts could fairly and responsibly conclude that the product has the
purported effect.14 FDA assesses both the quality and quantity of the data provided when
determining whether a product meets this standard.15
Quality refers to the strength of the evidence and the amount of certainty it provides as to the
product’s safety and effectiveness—that is, whether the investigation is “adequate” and “wel -
controlled.”16 The quality of the evidence depends on how the clinical trial is designed and how
the study is conducted.17 Under FDA regulations, the design must al ow for a valid comparison of
the product to a control, such as a placebo, an existing therapy, or no treatment.18 FDA also
evaluates whether the study’s method for selecting participants and assigning them to groups is
adequate to ensure that meaningful data are collected.19 The methodology must also include a
wel -defined and reliable means of assessing the participants’ responses and explain the analytical
and statistical methods used to assess the results.20 Final y, sponsors must provide a clear
statement of the investigation’s objectives and take adequate measures to minimize bias in the
study.21 FDA may, however, waive any of these criteria for a specific investigation if the sponsor
can show that the criteria are not reasonably applicable to the study and an alternative approach
yields substantial evidence of effectiveness.22 FDA guidance further clarifies how sponsors
should select their clinical trial design, endpoints, and statistical methods.23
As for quantity, FDA general y requires that sponsors complete two “adequate and wel -
controlled clinical investigations” to meet the substantial evidence standard.24 FDA notes in its
guidance that completing two studies, particularly if they are designed and conducted differently,
reduces the likelihood of a design flaw, bias, or other issue or anomaly that could result in
erroneous conclusions.25 However, under the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997,26 FDA
may al ow sponsors to rely on one large multicenter adequate and wel -controlled clinical
investigation supported by another form of additional data,27 such as data regarding the

13 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
14 Id.
15 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUG AND
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 3 (Dec. 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/133660/download
[hereinafter 16 Id. at 5.
16 Id. at 5.
17 21 C.F.R. § 314.126.
18 Id. § 314.126(b)(2).
19 Id. § 314.126(b)(3) & (4).
20 Id. § 314.126(b)(6) & (7).
21 Id. § 314.126(b)(1) & (5).
22 Id. § 314.126(c).
23 DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 5.
24 Id. at 8.
25 Id. at 9-10.
26 Pub. L. No. 105-115 § 115, 111 Stat. 2313 (1997).
27 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
Congressional Research Service
3

link to page 6 link to page 6 link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

effectiveness of other drugs in the same pharmacological class.28 In deciding whether to al ow a
sponsor to rely on a single study, FDA states that it considers, among other factors, the
seriousness of the disease, whether there is an unmet medical need, and whether additional trials
would be ethical and practicable.29
Given the flexibility afforded sponsors in designing and conducting their clinical trials, FDA uses
written guidance and individual meetings to help sponsors ensure that their investigations wil
generate the substantial evidence needed for approval.30 Sponsors that obtain fast track product or
breakthrough therapy designation for their products are entitled to additional assistance from and
communication with FDA staff to craft efficient and effective clinical trial designs.31
Submitting an Investigational New Drug Application to FDA
New drugs and biological products that are being tested in clinical trials are referred to as
investigational new drugs.32 Section 505(i) of the FD&C Act, Section 351(a)(3) of the PHSA, and
their implementing regulations al ow investigational new drugs to be used for research before
they are approved.33 To conduct clinical trials of investigational new drugs, the company
developing the product (i.e., sponsor) must general y receive FDA approval for the investigation
and comply with regulatory requirements for human subjects research.34
Sponsors obtain FDA approval to test an investigational new drug on human subjects through an
investigational new drug application (IND).35 The IND gives FDA an opportunity to ensure that
the study wil protect the safety and rights of its human subjects and gather scientific data that
adequately show the product’s safety and effectiveness.36 The sponsor may begin its clinical trials
30 days after submitting an IND unless FDA notifies the sponsor that it is either (1) authorizing
the IND and the study can begin immediately or (2) imposing a clinical hold due to concerns
about the study.37 If FDA imposes a clinical hold, the study cannot begin (or resume, for ongoing
investigations) pending further notification.38
FDA regulations prescribe the information that sponsors must include in an IND.39 The IND must
contain information about the product, such as the substance and formulation; existing data on
use in animals or humans if available; and anticipated risks and side effects.40 The IND must also
contain a general investigational plan, which explains why the sponsor is undertaking the study
and includes, among other things, the indications being studied, the sponsor’s approach to
evaluating the product, the kinds of clinical trials being conducted, the anticipated number of

28 DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 12.
29 Id. at 10.
30 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 312.47; DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 15.
31 See “Shortening the Development and Review Processes.”
32 21 C.F.R. § 312.3.
33 21 U.S.C. § 355(i); 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(3); 21 C.F.R. § 312.2(a).
34 See generally 21 C.F.R. Parts 50, 56, & 312.
35 21 C.F.R. § 312.20; Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/investigational-new-drug-ind-application (last updated May 12, 2020).
36 21 C.F.R. § 312.22.
37 Id. §§ 312.40 & 312.42.
38 Id. § 312.42(a) & (e).
39 Id. § 312.23.
40 Id.
Congressional Research Service
4

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

participants, and any anticipated risks.41 Along with the general investigational plan, the IND
must include specific protocols for each clinical trial phase.42 The sponsor must also general y
certify that an institutional review board (IRB) wil provide initial and continuing review of each
study, including the proposed protocols and any subsequent changes to the study.43 FDA may,
however, waive any IRB requirements, including the requirement of IRB review itself.44
Institutional Review Board Review and Approval
An IRB is a group convened by an institution to review and approve biomedical research
involving humans.45 IRBs evaluate the initial clinical study design and protocols, along with any
changes implemented during the investigation, in an effort to ensure that the rights and wel -being
of the human subjects are protected.46 To that end, IRBs assess whether risks to the participants
are minimized and reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits, both to the participants
directly and from the knowledge expected to be gained through the study.47 IRBs also aim to
ensure that the researchers wil obtain adequate informed consent from al participants (unless an
exemption applies) and that selection of the participants wil be equitable.48 IRBs may also
require (as appropriate) that the research plan provide for monitoring of the collected data to
protect the participants’ safety and privacy.49 To the extent the study may include participants
from populations that may be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence (e.g., children, prisoners),
IRBs must ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place to protect these populations in participant
selection and during the clinical trials.50
IRBs review clinical trial plans and protocols from various standpoints, including ensuring that
the study complies with legal, ethical, and professional standards; is scientifical y sound; and is
free from il icit discrimination. Accordingly, to ensure adequate and independent review, IRBs
must have at least five members from multiple backgrounds, including at least one member with a
scientific background and at least one with a nonscientific background.51 At least one member
must be independent from the institution running the clinical trials, and the IRB members cannot
have any financial or other conflicting interests in the project.52 IRB review must comply with
any other requirements relating to IRBs and human subject research found in Parts 50 and 56 of
Chapter 21 of the Code of Federal Regulation.
Clinical Trial Phases
Clinical trials for a new pharmaceutical product general y proceed in three phases, transitioning
from smal er trials focused on initial safety early on to larger trials assessing safety and

41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 21 C.F.R. § 56.105(c).
45 Id. § 56.102(g).
46 Id.
47 Id. § 56.111(a)(1)-(2).
48 Id. § 56.111(a)(3)-(5).
49 Id. § 56.111(a)(6)-(7).
50 Id. § 56.111(b) & (c).
51 Id. § 56.107(a)-(c).
52 Id. § 56.107(d)-(e).
Congressional Research Service
5

link to page 5 link to page 5 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

effectiveness to inform approval and labeling.53 The size, duration, and specific purpose of each
clinical trial phase varies from product to product depending on such factors as the type of
product (e.g., a vaccine, treatment, or preventative medication), how the product works, and the
relevant underlying patient population. However, as defined by FDA regulations, a clinical
investigation general y proceeds as follows:
 Phase 1 Trials. Phase 1 trials are the first time the product is introduced in
human subjects.54 These careful y controlled trials typical y involve 20 to 80
patients or volunteer subjects, though the exact numbers may vary depending on
the product.55 Phase 1 trials general y assess how the product acts in the body and
evaluate initial safety (i.e., side effects).56 They may also be used to determine the
dosing levels to use in phase 2 (e.g., the maximum safe dose or what dose is
required to have an effect).57 Depending on the product, phase 1 trials may also
provide some initial indication as to whether the product may be effective.58 In
the case of vaccines specifical y, phase 1 trials also assess their ability to provoke
an immune response in the body (i.e., immunogenicity).59
 Phase 2 Trials. Phase 2 trials continue to assess safety but also evaluate the
product’s effectiveness and common short-term side effects or other risks
associated with the product.60 Phase 2 trials are also used to determine the
optimal dose of the product.61 For vaccines, phase 2 assesses how much of the
vaccine to administer and on what dosing schedule (e.g., whether a boost is
needed to maximize its effectiveness or whether the vaccine must be
administered on a regular schedule to maintain immunity).62 As with phase 1
studies, phase 2 studies are carefully controlled.63 However, phase 2 involves a
larger (though stil relatively limited) number of volunteer subjects—general y no
more than a few hundred participants.64
 Phase 3 Trials. Phase 3 trials involve an expanded number of participants—from
several hundred to thousands—and are used to assess the product’s safety and
effectiveness across a wide range of patient categories through controlled and
uncontrolled studies.65 These trials are intended to present a clearer picture of

53 Id. § 312.21.
54 Id. § 312.21(a).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 FDA Vaccine Approval Process, supra note 10.
60 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
61 See, e.g., Kert Viele & Jason T . Connor, Dose Finding Trials: Optimizing Phase 2 Data in the Drug Development
Process, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2294, 2294 (2015), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2473474 .
62 FDA Vaccine Approval Process, supra note 10.
63 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
64 Id.
65 Id. § 312.21(c).
Congressional Research Service
6

link to page 6 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

expected risks and benefits under real-world conditions.66 The information
obtained from phase 3 trials also forms the basis for the product’s labeling.67
Sponsors must general y complete al three phases to obtain FDA approval unless they obtain
accelerated approval,68 in which case FDA requires postapproval trials to confirm the expec ted
clinical benefit.69 FDA may also require, at its discretion, additional clinical trials after approval
(i.e., phase 4 trials) for any approved product to continue assessing the product’s safety and
effectiveness once on the market.70
Considerations for Congress
The current legal framework seeks to balance various competing interests, which may be
amplified in the current crisis. The FD&C Act and implementing regulations provide standards
and factors to consider but otherwise give FDA and IRBs discretion to evaluate investigational
plans and clinical trial protocols for investigational new drugs. FDA may also waive requirements
relating to IRB review and clinical trial design. To the extent Congress may seek to direct how
FDA and IRBs exercise that discretion with respect to any potential COVID-19 vaccine, Congress
could consider implementing legislation that provides more specific direction on how to approach
clinical trials either specifical y for the current COVID-19 pandemic or in epidemic, pandemic, or
other emergency situations more general y. For example, courts have determined that Congress
can cabin FDA’s discretion by imposing mandatory (e.g., “shal ”) rather than permissive (e.g.,
“may”) language in a statute.71
In light of the multiple companies involved in developing potential COVID-19 vaccines,
Congress could also consider facilitating the coordination of any clinical trials or appointing a
neutral scientific body to consider the ethical and scientific considerations and generate
guidelines or a master protocol. The World Health Organization (WHO) employed this approach
to facilitate development of an Ebola vaccine following the 2014 to 2016 Ebola epidemic.72
Congress could also direct or fund increased global collaboration between regulators to promote
information sharing, which could potential y result in more streamlined clinical investigations
with fewer participants being exposed to investigational vaccines.73 Congress could also consider
providing additional funding or other resources to facilitate the clinical trials themselves or any
research directed toward understanding the SARS-CoV-2 virus or COVID-19 disease to al ow for
improved risk minimization in future clinical trials.

66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Accelerated Approval, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast -track-breakthrough-therapy-
accelerated-approval-priority-review/accelerated-approval (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
69 DEMONSTRATING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 15, at 2.
70 21 C.F.R. § 312.85.
71 See, e.g., Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
72 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO R&D BLUEPRINT – AD-HOC WORKSHOP ON EBOLA VACCINES: DELIBERATIONS ON
DESIGN OP TIONS FOR CLINICAL TRIALS TO ASSESS THE SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF INVESTIGATIONAL EBOLA VACCINES
(Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.who.int/docs/default -source/blue-print/ebola-vaccine-meeting-
report.pdf?sfvrsn=9dd492f4_2.
73 See, e.g., Summary of FDA & EMA Global Regulators Meeting on Data Requirements Supporting First-in-Human
Clinical Trials with SARS-CoV-2 Vaccines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-
meetings-conferences-and-workshops/summary-fda-ema-global-regulators-meeting-data-requirements-supporting-first-
human-clinical-trials (last updated Mar. 18, 2020).
Congressional Research Service
7

link to page 5 link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

FDA Approval and Options for Bringing a New Vaccine to Market
Faster
If the clinical trials are successful, the sponsor may seek FDA approval to market its new vaccine.
FDA approves new vaccines through biologics license applications (BLAs) reviewed by CBER.74
BLAs contain data from the laboratory and clinical studies and information about how and where
the biologic wil be manufactured.75 As courts have recognized, FDA exercises its scientific
judgment when deciding whether to license vaccines based on such studies.76 Biologics that are
approved through a BLA receive 12 years of regulatory exclusivity, during which time FDA
cannot approve any biosimilars (i.e., abbreviated applications for the same biologic that depend
on the clinical data in the BLA to demonstrate safety, potency, and purity).77
The process of developing and testing a new vaccine to the point where it meets the safety, purity,
and potency standard can be a lengthy process. The FD&C Act provides several options that may
al ow a sponsor to bring a new vaccine to market faster.78 General y, these options use one of two
approaches. First, FDA can direct more of its resources to the product to accelerate the
development and/or review processes (e.g., fast track product designation, breakthrough therapy
designation, and priority review). Second, FDA can modify how it evaluates the risks and benefits
of the vaccine before al owing its use, either by relying on different types of evidence (e.g., the
accelerated approval process) or lowering the evidentiary standard in emergency situations (e.g.,
emergency use authorization). (For ease of reference, this section uses the general term “biologic”
because vaccines are biological products, but the pathways discussed below are also available for
traditional smal molecule drugs.)
Shortening the Development and Review Processes
Several avenues are available for expediting the development and review processes for biologics
used to treat or prevent serious or life-threatening conditions and diseases. In its guidance, FDA
general y considers a condition or disease serious if it substantial y affects day-to-day functioning
and is irreversible, persistent, or recurrent.79 A condition or disease may be found to be serious as
a matter of clinical judgment based on its effect on survival, day-to-day functioning, or the
likelihood that it wil progress to a more serious condition if left untreated.80 As a matter of
course, FDA considers any life-threatening condition or disease to be serious.81 The drug must
also be intended to treat the serious condition or disease by having an effect on the disease itself
or a serious aspect of the disease, such as a symptom or other manifestation.82 Among the

74 21 U.S.C. § 262(a); FDA Vaccine Approval Process, supra note 10. For additional information about the biologics
licensing process, see CRS Report R45666, Drug Pricing and Intellectual Property Law: A Legal Overview for the
116th Congress, coordinated by Kevin J. Hickey, at 17-27.
75 21 C.F.R. § 601.2.
76 Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
77 21 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A).
78 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 356.
79 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS – DRUGS AND
BIOLOGICS 2-3 (2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/86377/download [hereinafter EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS
CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE].
80 21 C.F.R. § 312.300(b)(1).
81 EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 3.
82 Id.
Congressional Research Service
8

link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

examples FDA provides in its guidance is a product intended to prevent the serious condition.83
Given that COVID-19 is life threatening, a vaccine intended to prevent COVID-19 seems likely
to qualify as a drug used to treat or prevent a serious or life-threatening condition or disease—
making it eligible for the following designations to accelerate the approval process.
Fast Track Product Designation
Section 506 of the FD&C Act al ows FDA to designate certain biologics as fast track products,
which receive FDA assistance in expediting development and review.84 A biologic may be
designated as a fast track product if FDA determines that the biologic wil treat or prevent a
serious or life-threatening disease or condition and fil an unmet medical need.85 An unmet
medical need exists when available therapies do not adequately address treating or diagnosing a
condition or disease.86 FDA recognizes in its guidance that an unmet medical need necessarily
exists if there is no available therapy.87 Sponsors may provide FDA with nonclinical or clinical
data to demonstrate that the drug has the potential to fil that unmet medical need.88 Given that
there are no approved vaccines for COVID-19, any vaccine that showed potential to prevent
COVID-19 in laboratory or clinical trials would seem likely to qualify for fast track designation.
On May 12, 2020, FDA designated Moderna’s COVID-19 vaccine as a fast track product after it
completed its Phase 1 trials.89
At its discretion, the biologic’s sponsor requests fast track designation for its product.90 It may
request fast track designation when it submits an IND or any time thereafter.91 FDA has 60 days
to determine if the biologic qualifies for the designation.92 Once FDA designates a biologic as a
fast track product, FDA must facilitate its development and expedite review of the biologic.93 In
practice, this process general y means that the biologic’s sponsor has greater access to FDA
through written and in-person communications during the development and testing process to
improve efficiency and ensure that appropriate data are collected.94 FDA may also review the
BLA for a fast track product on a rolling basis as sections are complete (rather than waiting for a
completed application) if initial clinical testing shows the biologic may be effective.95

83 Id.
84 21 U.S.C. § 356(b).
85 Id.
86 EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 4.
87 Id. at 5.
88 Id. at 9.
89 Press Release, Moderna, Moderna Receives FDA Fast T rack Designation for mRNA Vaccine (mRNA -1273) Against
Novel Coronavirus (May 12, 2020), https://investors.modernatx.com/news-releases/news-release-details/moderna-
receives-fda-fast-track-designation-mrna-vaccine-mrna.
90 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(2).
91 Id.
92 Id. § 356(b)(3).
93 Id.
94 EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 9; Fast Track, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast -track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review/fast -
track (last updated Jan. 4, 2018).
95 EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 10; U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Fast T rack (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast -track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-
review/fast -track.
Congressional Research Service
9

link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

Breakthrough Therapy Designation
Section 506 of the FD&C Act also al ows FDA to designate certain biologics as breakthrough
therapies, which similarly heightens FDA involvement in the development and review process.96
Breakthrough therapy designation is based on preliminary clinical evidence showing the biologic
may be a substantial improvement over available therapies for one or more clinical y significant
endpoints.97 Endpoints measure the outcome of a clinical trial.98 Under FDA guidance, a clinical y
significant endpoint general y measures an effect on irreversible morbidity or mortality or on
symptoms representing serious consequences of the disease or condition.99 Unlike fast track
product designation, which can be based on laboratory data, breakthrough therapy designation
requires evidence from clinical trials.100 FDA exercises its judgment in determining whether the
data show a substantial improvement over existing therapies, taking into consideration both the
magnitude of the biologic’s effects on the endpoint and the importance of the effect measured by
that endpoint to treating the disease or condition.101 When there are no existing therapies, such as
with a COVID-19 vaccine, FDA compares the biologic to a placebo or wel -documented
historical control.102 A COVID-19 vaccine may be eligible for breakthrough therapy designation
if the sponsor can demonstrate potential effectiveness in early clinical trials.
At its discretion, the sponsor requests breakthrough therapy designation and may do so with
submission of an IND or at any time thereafter.103 FDA must determine whether the biologic
qualifies as a breakthrough therapy within 60 days of receipt.104 As with fast track product
designation, the FD&C Act directs FDA to expedite the development and review of applications
for breakthrough therapies.105 Per FDA guidance, expedited development and review of
breakthrough therapies entails (1) intensive assistance from FDA on efficient development and
clinical trial design; (2) organizational commitment from FDA, including senior management and
experienced staff; (3) rolling review of the BLA; and (4) other actions to expedite review, such as
priority review discussed below.106 Extensive FDA assistance during the development process and
the involvement of senior managers distinguishes breakthrough therapy designation from fast
track product designation.
Accelerated Approval
Section 506 of the FD&C Act also al ows FDA to approve certain biologics based on surrogate or
intermediate endpoints, referred to as accelerated approval.107 In general, sponsors select

96 21 U.S.C. § 356(a).
97 Id. § 356(a)(1).
98 Surrogate Endpoint Resources for Drug and Biologic Development, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development -resources/surrogate-endpoint -resources-drug-and-biologic-development (la
updated July 24, 2018).
99 EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 12.
100 Id. at 11-12; compare 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(1), with id. § 356(b)(1).
101 EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS, supra note 79, at 12.
102 Id.
103 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)(2).
104 Id. § 356(a)(3)(A).
105 Id. § 356(a)(3)(B).
106 EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at 13-15.
107 21 U.S.C. § 356(c); see also Accelerated Approval, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast -
track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review/accelerated-approval (updated Jan. 4, 2018).
Congressional Research Service
10

link to page 14 link to page 11 link to page 14 link to page 14 link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

endpoints that directly measure the clinical outcome (i.e., the benefits expected from the
biologic), such as whether the patient feels better or lives longer.108 Surrogate and intermediate
endpoints do not measure the clinical benefit directly but instead measure an effect that is
expected to predict a clinical benefit.109 For example, a drug to treat strokes would have an
intended clinical outcome of reducing the incidence or severity of strokes.110 But rather than
measuring the incidence of strokes directly, an investigator might measure the drug’s effect on
blood pressure as a surrogate endpoint due to the strong correlation between strokes and blood
pressure.111
To qualify for accelerated approval, (1) the biologic must treat a serious or life-threatening
condition or disease and (2) FDA must determine that the biologic has an effect on a surrogate or
intermediate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict a clinical benefit. When deciding
whether to approve a biologic on this basis, FDA must consider how severe, rare, or prevalent the
condition is and the availability of alternative treatments. A vaccine for COVID-19 could qualify
for accelerated approval if investigators identified a surrogate or intermediate endpoint that could
reasonably predict the vaccine would be effective against the virus.
Priority Review
Once a BLA is submitted, FDA can designate the BLA for standard review or priority review.112
FDA aims to act on priority review applications within 6 months, compared to 10 months or more
for standard review applications.113 FDA makes this determination for every application, though a
sponsor can expressly request priority review.114 FDA may designate a BLA for priority review if
it represents a “significant improvement” over existing treatments in terms of safety or
effectiveness in treating, diagnosing, or preventing the disease or condition.115 In the absence of
any approved vaccine for COVID-19, FDA would likely designate for priority review any BLA
for such a vaccine.
Emergency Use Authorizations Before Approval
In certain emergency situations, Section 564 of the FD&C Act al ows FDA to authorize the use of
a drug or biologic (e.g., a vaccine) before it is approved (i.e., an Emergency Use Authorization or
EUA).116 FDA may issue an EUA only if the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) has

108 See Surrogate Endpoint Resources for Drug and Biologic Development, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development -resources/surrogate-endpoint -resources-drug-and-biologic-development (last
updated July 24, 2018).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102 -571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992); Priority Review, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast -track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-
review/priority-review. (last updated Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Priority Review].
113 Priority Review, supra note 112; EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79, at
24-25.
114 Priority Review, supra note 112.
115 Priority Review, supra note 112; EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS: FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 79,
at 24-25.
116 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3; see also Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-
use-authorization#2019-ncov (last updated May 22, 2020).
Congressional Research Service
11

link to page 4 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

declared that circumstances exist justifying emergency authorized use of the medical product.117
Of relevance to the COVID-19 pandemic, on February 4, 2020, the Secretary determined that
there is a public health emergency that has a significant potential to affect national security or the
health and security of U.S. citizens living abroad, and that involves a biological, chemical,
radiological, or nuclear agent (BCRN agent)—namely, the virus that causes COVID-19.118 Based
on this determination, the Secretary has authorized the emergency use of several diagnostic
tests.119 On March 2, 2020, the Secretary determined that circumstances exist to al ow for the
emergency use of certain respirators not approved by the agency,120 and FDA issued an EUA
al owing for the emergency use of such respirators.121
After the Secretary determines a public health emergency exists (one of four bases for declaring
an emergency or threat), FDA may issue an EUA for a specific product if the Secretary concludes
that
1. the BCRN agent can cause a serious or life-threatening disease or condition;
2. it is reasonable to believe, based on the totality of the scientific evidence available, that
a. the product may be effective in diagnosing, treating, or preventing the disease or
condition caused by the BCRN agent; and
b. the known and potential benefits of the product outweigh the known and potential
risks; and
3. there is no adequate, approved, and available alternative to the product.122
In evaluating a product for an EUA, FDA uses a lower evidentiary standard, determining whether
the product “may be effective” in diagnosing, treating, or preventing a disease rather than
evaluating its “effectiveness” in doing so.123 As discussed above, COVID-19 is a serious or life-
threatening disease, confirmed by the fact that FDA has already issued EUAs in connection with
COVID-19 for diagnostic tests and certain personal protective equipment.124 There is also no
alternative to a COVID-19 vaccine at this time.125 Any decision by FDA to issue an EUA for a

117 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b).
118 Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Determination of a Public Health Emergency and
Declaration that Circumstances Exist Justifying Authorizations Pursuant to Section 564(b) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/135010/download.
119 See Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-
response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization#2019-ncov (last updated May 22,
2020).
120 Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Declaration that Circumstances Exist Justifying
Authorizations Pursuant to Section 564(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (Mar. 2,
2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/135787/download.
121 Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Dr. Redfield, Director, Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/135763/download.
122 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c).
123 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES:
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 12 (Jan. 2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download.
124 Emergency Use Authorization, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-
response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization#2019-ncov (last updated May 22,
2020).
125 Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIH Clinical T rial of Investigational Vaccine for COVID-19 Begins (Mar. 16,
2020), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-clinical-trial-investigational-vaccine-covid-19-begins;
WHO Draft Landscape of COVID-19 Candidate Vaccines, supra note 1.
Congressional Research Service
12

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

COVID-19 vaccine would accordingly depend on whether the totality of the evidence available to
FDA shows that it is reasonable to believe that (1) the vaccine may be effective in preventing
COVID-19 and (2) those benefits outweigh any known or potential risks from the vaccine. FDA
would have to conduct this evaluation for each vaccine that is developed and submitted for an
EUA.
The FD&C Act requires FDA to impose certain conditions on EUAs as necessary and appropriate
to protect the public health.126 The conditions vary depending on whether the product is
unapproved or approved but for a different use.127 In general, the conditions provide for
monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping as wel as ensuring that the health care professionals
administering the product and the individuals being treated with the product are informed about
the benefits and risks of using the product.128 FDA may also waive good manufacturing practices
(GMP) and certain prescription requirements when issuing an EUA and may impose conditions
related to advertising the product.129
Considerations for Congress
The current legal regime for approving new pharmaceutical products such as vaccines general y
aims to strike a balance between bringing products to market sooner and ensuring that products
on the market are safe and effective. For serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions or in
emergency situations, the law gives FDA a certain amount of discretion to shift that balance. FDA
general y expedites the process one of two ways: shifting its resources or shifting its standard in
evaluating the risks and benefits.
In considering avenues to facilitate the development of a COVID-19 vaccine, Congress has
similar options. Congress could consider providing additional resources to FDA to exercise its
existing authorities. Congress is already employing this approach: The Coronavirus Preparedness
and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, enacted on March 6, appropriated $61
mil ion to FDA “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus, domestical y or
international y, including the development of necessary medical countermeasures and vaccines,
advanced manufacturing for medical products, the monitoring of medical product supply chains,
and related administrative activities.”130 Alternatively, Congress could direct FDA to strike a
different balance when evaluating the risks versus the benefits specifical y in the context of
potential COVID-19 vaccines. In assessing that balance, Congress and FDA would face weighing
the benefits from disseminating a vaccine to the public sooner (e.g., limiting the spread of the
virus or reducing the economic consequences) against the risk that the vaccine may have been
authorized prematurely and prove ineffective or unsafe, potential y leading to worse public health
outcomes. Any alteration to this balance that requires FDA to exceed or contradict its existing
authority would require an act of Congress to amend the agency’s statutory authority.
Should FDA authorize or approve a COVID-19 vaccine, other considerations may come to bear.
For example, registered manufacturers may not be able to produce an adequate supply of the
vaccine. FDA is currently addressing hand sanitizer shortages by exercising its enforcement
discretion with respect to production by over-the-counter drug manufacturers and

126 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(e).
127 Id. § 360bbb-3(e)(1) & (2).
128 Id.
129 Id. § 360bbb-3(e)(3) & (4).
130 Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146 (2020) (emphasis added).
Congressional Research Service
13

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

compounders.131 Congress may consider other avenues for increasing supply of the vaccine. In
addition, existence of a vaccine would raise questions of mandatory vaccination to address the
public health crisis, which is addressed in a CRS Legal Sidebar.132
Patent Rights in COVID-19 Vaccines: Incentives,
Access, and Affordability
FDA authorization or licensure of a COVID-19 vaccine would permit the manufacturer to market
the vaccine, but does not guarantee that the vaccine wil be widely available or affordable. A
significant factor that may influence COVID-19 vaccine affordability and access is the existence
and al ocation of IP rights in a vaccine, such as patent rights.133 If some element of a successful
COVID-19 vaccine was patented, for example, the patent holder would have the exclusive right
to make and use that COVID-19 vaccine within the United States.134
Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about whether a COVID-19 vaccine and other
medical countermeasures, if shown to be safe and effective, wil be affordable and accessible to
the public—especial y if federal funds contribute to their development.135 Several of the
congressional responses to the COVID-19 pandemic contain provisions that relate to this issue.
First, under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, most private
health insurance plans must cover a COVID-19 vaccine and other COVID-19 preventative
services without cost sharing (e.g., deductibles or co-pays).136 Although this provision aims to

131 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Provides Guidance on
Production of Alcohol-Based Hand Sanitizer to Help Boost Supply, Protect Public Health (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-provides-guidance-
production-alcohol-based-hand-sanitizer-help-boost ; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TEMPORARY POLICY FOR
PREP ARATION OF CERTAIN ALCOHOL-BASED HAND SANITIZER PRODUCTS DURING THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
(COVID-19): GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, https://www.fda.gov/media/136289/download (updated June 1, 2020); U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR TEMPORARY COMPOUNDING OF CERTAIN ALCOHOL-BASED HAND SANITIZER
PRODUCTS DURING THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY: IMMEDIATELY IN EFFECT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
https://www.fda.gov/media/136118/download (updated June 1, 2020).
132 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10300, An Overview of State and Federal Authority to Impose Vaccination Requirements,
by Wen S. Shen.
133 See, e.g., Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders, MSF Calls for No Patents or Profiteering on COVID-
19 Drugs, Tests, and Vaccines in Pandem ic, MSF ACCESS CAMPAIGN (Mar. 27, 2020), https://msfaccess.org/msf-calls-
no-patents-or-profiteering-covid-19-drugs-tests-and-vaccines-pandemic (urging suspension of patent rights in COVID-
19 countermeasures to ensure affordability and access); Jennifer Hillman, Drugs and Vaccines Are Com ing—But to
Whom ?, FOREIGN AFF. (May 19, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020 -05-19/drugs-and-vaccines-
are-coming-whom (expressing concern that “ intellectual property rights could prevent vaccines or drugs from reaching
the poor and vulnerable”); but see Daniel Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pharmaceutical Profits and Public
Health Are Not Incom patible, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020) (arguing that encouraging COVID-19 countermeasure
development need not come at the cost of reducing patient access).
134 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
135 See Ariel Cohen, Senators Worry About COVID-19 Vaccine Affordability, Distribution, INSIDE HEALTH POLICY
(May 14, 2020), https://insidehealthpolicy.com/daily-news/senators-worry-about-covid-19-vaccine-affordability-
distribution; Letter from Reps. James E. Clyburn & Carolyn Maloney to Sec. Alex M. Azar II (June 2, 2020),
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020 -06-
02.Clyburn%20CBM%20to%20HHS%20re%20Vaccine%20and%20T reatment%20Contracts.pdf ; Letter from Rep.
Jan Schakowsky et al. to President Donald J. T rump (Feb. 20, 2020), https://freepdfhosting.com/20bf1d75af.pdf.
136 Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3203 (2020). Most specifically, this requirement applies to COVID-19 vaccines
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and to group health plans and health insurance issuers offering group or individual healt h insurance as
defined by PHSA Section 2791. See id. § 3203(b)(1), (3). For an analysis of the current federal insurance coverage
Congressional Research Service
14

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

ensure that consumers with private health insurance wil not pay co-payments for accessing a
COVID-19 vaccine, it does not directly address other pricing issues, such as the potential cost to
health care providers, health insurance companies, persons without health insurance, or the
federal government.137
The Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act (CPRSA)
contains two general provisions related to the affordability of COVID-19 countermeasures. First,
products purchased by the federal government using funds appropriated by CPRSA, including
vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics for COVID-19, “shal be purchased in accordance with
Federal Acquisition Regulation guidance on fair and reasonable pricing.”138 Second, CPRSA
states that the Secretary of HHS “may take such measures authorized under current law to ensure
that vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics developed from funds provided in [CPRSA] wil be
affordable in the commercial market.”139 These general statements were repeated in the
appropriations for COVID-19 vaccines and other medical countermeasures in the CARES Act.140
This section reviews IP rights provisions under current law that the federal government could use
to try to ensure that COVID-19 countermeasures such as a vaccine are accessible and affordable.
Other actions that the federal government might hypothetical y take—such as additional
spending, direct production by federal agencies, contractual guarantees from vaccine
manufacturers, governmental negotiation, or price controls—are not discussed, in that such
measures do not implicate IP rights and may require additional legislative action beyond the
“current law” referenced in CPRSA and the CARES Act.
Patent Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance
Patent Basics
Under the Patent Act,141 any person who “invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” may apply for a patent on the invention with the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).142 PTO patent examiners evaluate the application to

requirements for COVID-19 testing, treatments, and vaccinations, see CRS Report R46359, COVID-19 and Private
Health Insurance Coverage: Frequently Asked Questions, by Vanessa C. Forsberg.
137 It is likely that the federal government will be a primary purchaser and distributor of a COVID-19 vaccine. T he
federal government currently purchases over half of the pediatric vaccines administered in the United States (primarily
for children who are uninsured or eligible for Medicaid). See Christoph Diasio, Pediatric Vaccination: Who Bears The
Burden?, HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160209.053058/full/; see
generally Vaccines for Children Program (VFC), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/index.html; COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF VACCINE PURCHASE
FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES, FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY 4
(2003), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221813/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK221813.pdf .
During the 2009 to 2010 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the H1N1 vaccine and ancillary suppli es (needles, syringes, etc.)
were purchased by the federal government and distributed to health care providers, who could charge only for the
administration of the vaccine. See Questions and Answers on 2009 H1N1 Vaccine Financing , CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 30, 2009), https://www.cdc.gov/H1N1flu/vaccination/statelocal/vaccine_financing.htm.
138 Pub. L. No. 116-123, tit. III, 134 Stat. 146, 149 (2020).
139 Id.
140 See Pub. L. No. 116-136, tit. VIII (2020).
141 See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390).
142 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 111.
Congressional Research Service
15

link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

ensure it meets al the applicable legal requirements to merit the grant of a patent.143 If the patent
examiner concludes that the claimed invention is new, nonobvious, useful, directed at patentable
subject matter, and adequately disclosed and claimed,144 PTO wil issue the patent.145 If granted,
patents typical y expire 20 years after the initial patent application is filed.146
Patents are available for almost every field of technology, including biotechnology, chemistry,
computer hardware, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, and manufacturing
processes.147 In the pharmaceutical context, if an inventor is the first to synthesize a particular
chemical that is useful in treating disease, she may seek a patent claiming the chemical itself.148
That said, patents on a pharmaceutical’s active ingredient are only a subset of patents relating to
pharmaceuticals and other medical treatments.149 Particular drug formulations, methods of using
the pharmaceutical to treat a particular disease, methods and technologies to administer a
pharmaceutical, methods and technologies to manufacture a pharmaceutical, as wel as methods
and technologies for testing for and diagnosing disease, are al patentable if they meet the Patent
Act’s requirements.150
To encourage innovation, a valid patent holder has the exclusive right to make, use, sel , and
import (collectively, “practice”) the patented invention in the United States.151 Patents are thus
said to confer a “temporary monopoly” on the patent holder: anyone else who wishes to practice
the invention needs to obtain permission from the patent holder to do so (and, typical y, pays for
that permission).152 In some situations, patent rights can confer substantial market power on
patent holders, enabling them to charge higher-than-competitive prices for the patented product,
as a monopolist would.153 Some empirical studies have found patent rights are among the most
important factors driving high prices for pharmaceutical products.154 At least to some extent,

143 Id. § 131.
144 Id. §§ 101, 102-103, 112. For a summary of the requirements for patentability, see generally CRS Report R44962,
Patent Law: A Prim er and Overview of Em erging Issues, by Kevin J. Hickey, at 2-4.
145 35 U.S.C. § 151, 153.
146 Id. § 154(a)(2).
147 See id. § 101; Patent Technology Centers Management, U.S. PATENT & T RADEMARK OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/patent-technology-centers-management (last visited May 29, 2020)
(listing technological divisions for PT O examiners). For a full discussion of the scope of patentable subject matter, see
generally CRS Report R45918, Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Reform in the 116th Congress, by Kevin J. Hickey.
148 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing patents on “ any new and useful . . . composition of matter”).
149 See Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary”
Pharm aceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 4-6 (2012).
150 See Hickey et al., supra note 74, at 12-13.
151 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). T hese actions are the core of direct patent infringement. There are also a variety of ways to
indirectly infringe a patent, such as actively inducing another person to infringe a patent or selling a component
especially made or especially adapted for an infringing use. See id. § 271(b)-(c), (f)-(g).
152 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (characterizing pat ents
as a “temporary monopoly”). It should be noted that this usage of “monopoly” is somewhat imprecise, because the
exclusive rights provided by IP law do not necessarily confer monopolistic market power in the economic sense —for
example, there may be noninfringing substitutes for a patented good in the relevant market. See WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 22 (2003) (“ [IP] protection creates a
monopoly, in the literal sense in which a person has a monopoly in the house he owns but [only] occasionally in a
meaningful economic sense as well because there may be no good substitutes for a particular intellectual work.”).
153 See FT C v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147 (2013) (“ [Patent rights] may permit the patent owner to charge a higher-
than-competitive price for the patented product .”).
154 See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and
Prospects for Reform , 316 JAMA: J. AM. MED. ASS’N 858, 861 (2016) (“ The most important factor that allows
Congressional Research Service
16

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

higher prices are part of the patent system’s design, in that they enable inventors to recoup the
costs of research and development necessary to produce the invention in the first place.155 IP law
thus seeks to balance the importance of providing incentives to innovate against the costs that IP
rights impose on the public in the form of higher prices and reduced competition.156
Inventions Made with Federal Assistance
Patent rights initial y vest in the individual inventor or inventors, as a general rule.157 Commonly,
however, employees agree by contract to assign their patent rights to inventions made in the
course of their employment to their employer, who may seek a patent on an employee’s behalf.158
When private parties rely on federal assistance to develop an invention, any resulting patent rights
wil typical y be owned by either the U.S. government or the federal contractor, depending on the
nature of federal involvement. For inventions made by federal employees during their official
duties, the federal government wil typical y obtain title to the patent.159 The federal government’s
general policy for federal y owned inventions, under the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act160 and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986,161 is to encourage their
commercialization by licensing the federal y owned patent rights to private parties—a process
cal ed “technology transfer.”162 Under technology transfer agreements, federal agencies grant
private parties the exclusive or nonexclusive right to practice the invention,163 while the U.S.
government retains (1) a “nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license . . . to practice the
invention . . . by or on behalf of” the United States (the “government-use license”);164 and (2) the

manufacturers to set high drug prices for brand-name drugs is market exclusivity, which arises from 2 forms of legal
protection against competition [i.e., patent rights and FDA regulatory exclusivities.]”); Generic Com petition and Drug
Prices, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/ucm129385.htm (finding
association between generic competition and lower drug prices).
155 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent laws promote [the progress of
the useful arts] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often
enormous costs in terms of t ime, research, and development.”); Emily Michiko Morris, T he Myth of Generic
Pharm aceutical Com petition under the Hatch -Waxm an Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 252
(2012) (“ [P]harmaceuticals are also widely recognized as one of the industries most dependent on patent protection to
recoup its enormous research, development, regulatory, and post -marketing costs . . . .”).
156 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[D]efining the scope of [patents
and copyrights] involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society ’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand . . . .”); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free
Riding, 83 T EX. L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“ [Traditionally,] the proper goal of intellectual property law is to give as
little protection as possible consistent with encouraging innovation.”).
157 Bd. of T rustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 785 (2011) (“Our
precedents confirm the general rule that rights in an invention belong to the inventor.”); see 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(f), 101.
158 See Roche, 563 U.S. at 793 (noting “common practice” of assignment of patent rights in inventions from employees
to their employer); 35 U.S.C. §§ 118, 152, 261.
159 See 37 C.F.R. § 501.6(a).
160 Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (1980).
161 Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (1986).
162 See 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a) (“The Federal Government shall strive where appropriate to transfer federally owned or
originated technology to State and local governments an d to the private sector.”); 35 U.S.C. § 209 (conditions for
licensing of federally owned inventions).
163 35 U.S.C. § 209(a).
164 Id. § 209(d)(1).
Congressional Research Service
17

link to page 22 link to page 22 link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

power “to terminate the license in whole or in part” based on grounds similar to the conditions for
“march-in rights” (discussed below).165
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (Bayh-Dole),166 as amended, applies to inventions that a federal
contractor conceives or first reduces to practice during the performance of a funding agreement
with a federal agency.167 Under Bayh-Dole, the federal contractor may elect to retain the patent
rights for a federal y funded invention.168 In exchange, however, the contractor provides the
federal agency with a government-use license,169 and the United States retains the authority to
grant compulsory licenses to third parties in certain circumstances (“march-in rights”).170
Although Bayh-Dole, by its terms, only applies to federal contractors that are nonprofit
organizations or smal businesses, long-standing executive practice (codified by regulation) has
applied Bayh-Dole to al federal contractors, regardless of size.171
Final y, federal laboratories and private parties may enter into cooperative research and
development agreements (CRADAs) in which both parties agree to provide services, facilities,
equipment, IP, or other resources, but the federal government does not provide federal funding to
the nonfederal party.172 In this situation, ownership of IP rights may depend on the terms of the
agreement. That said, the federal laboratory general y has the authority to license existing
federal y owned IP to a private party as part of a CRADA, as wel as to license or assign
inventions made in whole or part by a federal employee working under a CRADA.173 In return,
the federal government retains a government-use license174 and compulsory-licensing authority
similar to Bayh-Dole march-in rights.175
These general rules for patent ownership are subject to various exceptions and waivers,
depending on the agency and circumstances. For example, some agencies (including BARDA and
National Institutes of Health [NIH]) have the authority to enter into transactions that are not
contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements, known as “other transaction” authority.176 Other

165 Compare id. § 209(d)(3)(A)-(D) with 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)-(4); see infra “March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole
Act (35 U.S.C. § 203).”
166 Act of Dec. 12, 1980 to Amend the Patent and T rademark Laws (Bayh -Dole Act), Pub. L. No, 96-517, § 6, 94 Stat.
3015, 3018-27 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. ch. 18).
167 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), (e).
168 Id. § 202(a).
169 Id. § 202(c)(4).
170 Id. § 203; see generally Hickey et al., supra note 74, at 17.
171 37 C.F.R. § 401.1(b) (Bayh-Dole regulations apply “ to all funding agreements with business firms regardless of
size”); Exec. Order No. 12591, Facilitating Access to Science & T echnology, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414, 13,414 (Apr. 10,
1987) (granting “ to all contractors, regardless of size, the title to patents made in whole or in part with Federal funds, in
exchange for royalty-free use by or on behalf of the governmen t”).
172 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(a)(1) (CRADA authority); id. § 3710a(d)(1) (CRADA definition).
173 See id. § 3710a(a)(2), (b)(1)-(2); 35 U.S.C. §§ 207, 209.
174 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(b)(1)(A), (2).
175 See id. § 3710a(b)(1)(C)(i)-(iii) (grounds for compulsory licensing of inventions “made in whole or in part by a
[federal] laboratory employee” under a CRADA). In the case of inventions “made solely by [the private collaborating
party’s] employee” in the course of a CRADA, the federal agency retains a government -use license, but need not
impose march-in rights. Com pare id. § 3710a(b)(1) with 3710a(b)(2).
176 42 U.S.C. § 247d-7e(c)(5) (granting Secretary of HHS authority to enter into other transactions for BARDA
projects); id. § 282(n) (granting director of NIH other transaction authority in certain contexts). Because NIAID is one
of NIH’s research institutes, see id. § 281(b)(6), this authority could apply to NIAID projects approved by the Director
of NIH. In the case of COVID-19 projects, NIH authority for use of other transactions when “ urgently required to
respond to a public health threat” appears applicable. See id. § 282(n)(1)(C). For a general overview of other
Congressional Research Service
18

link to page 21 link to page 22 link to page 11 link to page 11 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

transactions are exempt from many statutory provisions and procurement regulations, including
Bayh-Dole’s requirements.177
Thus, for other transactions, the al ocation of IP rights between the government and private
contracting entities wil depend on the agreement. For example, BARDA’s template for other
transactions includes contractual patent provisions much like those of Bayh-Dole, including
march-in rights provisions.178 These patent provisions are “fluid and negotiable,” however, and
may be different for particular transactions.179 In addition, both Stevenson-Wydler’s and Bayh-
Dole’s requirements contain specific exceptions. For example, Bayh-Dole’s patent provisions do
not apply to contractors located outside the United States, nor in “exceptional circumstances,”
including if necessary “to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against
nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions.”180
Governmental Compulsory Patent Licenses
As explained above, a patent holder general y has the exclusive right to make, use, sel , and
import an invention.181 Thus, any other person who wishes to practice that invention wil
ordinarily need a license (i.e., permission) from the patent holder, or else be exposed to legal
liability. In certain cases, however, patents may be subject to a “compulsory license,” which
al ows another person to practice the invention without the consent of the patent holder.182
Compulsory licenses require the sanction of a governmental entity and the payment of
compensation to the patent holder.183 Compulsory licenses differ from ordinary licenses in two
important respects. First, the person seeking to use the invention need not obtain permission from
the patent holder.184 Second, the compensation paid to the patent holder is determined by
operation of law, not by private contractual negotiations between the licensee and the patent
holder.185
March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act (35 U.S.C. § 203)
Although Bayh-Dole general y al ows federal contractors to take title to patents on inventions
created with federal funding,186 the federal government retains the authority to “march in” and

transactions, see U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, USE OF ‘OTHER TRANSACTION’ AGREEMENTS LIMITED
AND MOSTLY FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 3-12 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/asset s/680/674534.pdf
[hereinafter GAO OT A REPORT].
177 See GAO OT A REPORT, supra note 176, at 4-5; 35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (defining “funding agreements” subject to Bayh -
Dole to include “any contract, grant, or cooperative agreement”).
178 See Other T ransaction for Advanced Research (OT AR) T emplate, BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND
DEVELOP MENT AUTHORITY, https://www.phe.gov/about/amcg/otar/Documents/otar-consortium.pdf (last visited May
31, 2020), at pp. 16-21 [hereinafter BARDA OT A T emplate]; see generally Other T ransaction Agreements,
BIOMEDICAL ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
https://www.phe.gov/about/amcg/otar/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May 31, 2020).
179 BARDA OT AR T emplate, supra note 178, at 16.
180 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200, 202(a)(ii),
181 Id. § 271(a).
182 See generally Hickey et al., supra note 74, at 16-17.
183 Id. at 1.
184 See Hickey et al., supra note 74, at 16.
185 Id.
186 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)-(b).
Congressional Research Service
19

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

grant compulsory licenses to third parties in some circumstances.187 Specifical y, the federal
agency that provided the funding may require the federal contractor to grant a patent license to a
third party if the agency determines that either
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected
to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the
subject invention in such field of use;
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied
by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees;
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specified by federal regulations
and such requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees;
or
(4) action is necessary because the agreement [to prefer U.S. manufacturing of the
invention by the contractor’s exclusive licensees] has not been obtained or waived or
because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United
States is in breach of its agreement [to prefer U.S. manufacturing].188
A license granted under Bayh-Dole’s march-in provisions must be “upon terms that are
reasonable under the circumstances,”189 which may require that the licensee pay compensation to
the patent holder (i.e., the federal contractor or its assignee).190
The federal government has never exercised march-in rights under Bayh-Dole.191 Advocacy
groups have petitioned NIH several times to exercise march-in rights based on the high prices of
certain drugs developed with federal funding, such as treatments for HIV/AIDS.192 NIH has
rejected these petitions, contending that pricing concerns alone are insufficient to exercise march-
in rights—so long as the invention is on the market and available to patients.193 In the context of a
pandemic like COVID-19, the “health or safety needs” language would appear to provide a
possible basis for the exercise of march-in rights, should the funding agency determine that
compulsory licensing is necessary to address public health needs unmet by a federal contractor.194
Governmental Use Rights (28 U.S.C. § 1498)
A broader statutory authority than march-in rights, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (Section 1498), applies to
any patented invention—not just inventions made with federal funding.195 Under Section 1498,

187 Id. § 203.
188 Id. § 203(a)(1)-(4).
189 Id. § 202(a).
190 See id § 203(a); Jennifer Penman & Fran Quigley, Better Late than Never: How the U.S. Government Can and
Should Use Bayh-Dole March-in Rights to Respond to the Medicines Access Crisis, 54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 171, 178
(2017).
191 Id.
192 See id. at 8-10 (reviewing petitions to exercise march-in rights).
193 See, e.g., National Institutes of Health, Office of the Director, In the Case of Norvir Manufactured by Abbott
Laboratories, Inc. (July 29, 2004), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March -In-Norvir.pdf, at
pp. 5-6.
194 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). A federal contractor adversely affected by the exercise of march -in rights may challenge an
agency’s determination through an administrat ive process, see 37 C.F.R. § 401.6, and may appeal an adverse
determination through a petition in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, see 35 U.S.C. § 203(b).
195 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (reaching “any invention described in and covered by a patent of the United St ates”). Section
1498 does not apply to patent rights granted by other nations.
Congressional Research Service
20

link to page 25 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

sometimes described as an “eminent domain” provision for patents,196 the U.S. government has
the authority to use or manufacture any patented invention “without license.”197 In practice, this
means that if the U.S. government determines that it needs to practice an invention, it need not
ask permission from the patent holder to do so, and—despite the existence of the patent—courts
wil not order the government to cease infringing activity.198 The patent holder, however, has the
right to sue in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for “reasonable and entire compensation” for the
government’s use of the patented invention.199 In effect, then, Section 1498 al ows the United
States to issue itself a compulsory license to make and use any patented invention without
obtaining the permission of the patent holder, in exchange for consenting to liability in a suit
seeking reasonable compensation for the government’s use.200
In the context of COVID-19 medical countermeasures, the U.S. government could rely on Section
1498 to make and use any patented invention without the consent of the patent holder. Because
Section 1498 extends to infringement “by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or
corporation for the [U.S.] Government and with the authorization or consent of the [U.S.]
Government,”201 the federal government could also extend its Section 1498 authority to the
actions of private entities by authorizing them to practice a patented invention on behalf of the
government.
Targeted Legislation and the Takings Clause
U.S. patent rights were created by an act of Congress. Thus, should patent rights inhibit access to
or affordability of COVID-19 countermeasures such as a vaccine, and should Congress conclude
that existing legal authorities are insufficient, targeted legislation is a possible option. Although
the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to create a patent system,202 it does not require
Congress to do so. Congress therefore has wide discretion in designing the patent system’s scope
and operation.203 So long as it operates prospectively (and consistent with its international treaty
obligations),204 Congress may exclude certain technologies from patent protection. For example, a
provision in the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act prohibits the PTO from issuing a patent
on inventions “directed to or encompassing a human organism.”205

196 See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984 ) (“T he theoretical basis for [Section
1498] recovery is the doctrine of eminent domain.”).
197 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
198 Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 583 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Motorola, 729 F.2d at 768 n.3.
199 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); see generally Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966-69 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
200 See Amanda Mitchell, Tamiflu, the Takings Clause, and Compulsory Licenses: An Exploration of the Government’s
Options for Accessing Medical Patents, 95 CAL. L. REV. 535, 541-42 (2007) (analogizing Section 1498 to a compulsory
license).
201 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
202 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
203 See, e.g., McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) (“[T]he powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject
of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exe rcise, there can be no
limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in existing
patents.”). T here are, of course, some limits on the power granted Congress in the IP Clause. See generally, e.g., Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199-208 (2003); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 -10 (1966).
204 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
205 Pub. L. No, 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
Congressional Research Service
21

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

When legislation operates retroactively to invalidate a patent or diminish patent rights, however,
it raises issues under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The
Takings Clause states that if “private property [is] taken for public use” by the U.S. government,
it must provide “just compensation.”206 The Supreme Court has suggested several times that
patents are private property under the Takings Clause,207 but it has never held so explicitly.
Presuming that patents are private property under the Fifth Amendment,208 legislation that
retroactively impairs patent rights could give rise to a constitutional claim for just
compensation.209 Recognizing this, Congress has often provided for compensation in past
legislation that has retroactively invalidated patents. For example, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
“revoked” existing patents on “any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization
of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon,” while providing a process to
provide just compensation to any such patent holder.210
If Congress seeks to preclude the exercise of exclusive patent rights over COVID-19 medical
countermeasures, it could pass legislation preventing the PTO from issuing such patents, or
invalidating already issued patents relating to countermeasures. In the latter case, some
mechanism for compensation to the patent holder might be required under the Takings Clause. In
either case, such legislation could raise issues under the United States’ treaty obligations,
including the treaty on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel ectual Property Rights of the Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), in which WTO members agree to
make patents available in “al fields of technology,” with some exceptions.211 In addition,
limitations on patent rights could reduce incentives to create and develop medical
countermeasures against COVID-19.212

206 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
207 Compare James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881) (“[By issuing a patent, the United States] confers on the
patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
without just compensation . . . .”), with Oil Stat es Energy Servs. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018)
(holding that the grant of a patent is matter of public rights but stating t hat “ our decision should not be misconstrued as
suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the T akings Clause.”).
208 Legal academics have debated this point. Compare Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007), with Davida H. Isaacs, Not All
Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are
Right to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2007). Notably, in a recent Federal Circuit case, the PT O conceded that
patents were “private property” under the T akings Clause. See Celgene Corp. v. Peter, 931 F.3d 1342, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1074 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2020).
209 See, e.g., Celgene, 931 F.3d at 1358 (rejecting claim that retroactive application of inter partes review procedures is
an unconstitutional taking of patent rights). For analyses of potential T akings Clause claims as applied to patents, see
generally, e.g., Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016); Joshua I. Miller,
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and the Unconstitutional Taking of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2010); Christopher S. Storm,
Federal Patent Takings, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1 (2008); Justin T orres, The Governm ent Giveth, and the
Governm ent Taketh Away: Patents, Takings, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498 , 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 315 (2007); Jesse S.
Chui, To What Extent Can Congress Change the Patent Right Without Effecting a Taking? , 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
447 (2007); Shubha Ghosh, Toward A Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open
After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000).
210 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181(a), 2187.
211 T RIPS: Agreement on T rade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World T rade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T .S. 299 (1994),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm, at art . 27. For analysis of how the limits of T RIPS
might apply to exclusions from patent protection or compulsory licensing in the COVID -19 pandemic, see CRS Legal
Sidebar LSB10436, COVID-19: International Trade and Access to Pharm aceutical Products, by Nina M. Hart .
212 See, e.g., Fred Reinhart, Exercising Bayh-Dole March-in Rights Would Handicap Covid-19 Innovation, STAT (May
4, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/04/bayh -dole-march-in-rights-handicap-covid-19-innovation/; James
Congressional Research Service
22

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

The PREP Act: Liability and Compensation for
COVID-19 Vaccine Injuries
To encourage the expeditious development and deployment of medical countermeasures during a
public health emergency, the PREP Act213 authorizes the Secretary of HHS to limit legal liability
for losses relating to the administration of medical countermeasures, including diagnostics,
treatments, and vaccines.214 In a declaration effective February 4, 2020 (the COVID-19 PREP Act
Declaration), the Secretary of HHS invoked the PREP Act and declared COVID-19 to be a public
health emergency warranting liability protections for covered countermeasures.215 Under the
COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration, covered persons are general y immune from legal liability for
losses relating to the administration or use of covered countermeasures against COVID-19.216 The
sole exception to PREP Act immunity is for death or serious physical injury caused by “wil ful
misconduct.”217 However, individuals who die or suffer serious injuries directly caused by the
administration of covered countermeasures may be eligible to receive compensation through an
HHS administrative process cal ed the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program
(CICP).218
Courts have characterized PREP Act immunity as “sweeping.”219 It applies to al types of legal
claims under state and federal law.220 For example, under state tort law, individuals who suffer
injuries caused by the intentional or negligent acts or omissions of another person may general y
sue that person to recover monetary compensation.221 Thus, in the health care context, if a health
care provider negligently administers a drug or device that causes a foreseeable injury to a
patient, the injured person may be able to sue the provider for compensation.222
Federal laws such as the PREP Act may preempt state tort laws—as wel as other state and federal
laws—in certain contexts.223 Preemptive federal legislation displaces state law to alter the usual
liability rules or immunize certain individuals from liability.224 In the PREP Act, Congress made
the judgment that, in the context of a public health emergency, immunizing certain persons and

Edwards, We Won’t Stop Coronavirus Without IP, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/03/10/wont -stop-coronavirus-without -ip/id=119735/.
213 Pub. L. 109-148, div. C, 119 Stat . 2680, 2818-32 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e).
214 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1).
215 Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act for Medical Countermeasures Against
COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,198 (Mar. 17, 2020) (effective Feb. 4, 2020) [hereinafter COVID-19 PREP Act
Declaration].
216 Id. at 15,201-02; 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
217 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1).
218 Id. § 247d-6e; 42 C.F.R. pt. 110.
219 See Parker v. St. Lawrence Cty. Pub. Health Dep’t, 102 A.D.3d 140, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
220 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
221 See generally CRS In Focus IF11291, Introduction to Tort Law, by Kevin M. Lewis.
222 Id. at 1.
223 See generally CRS Report R45825, Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer, by Jay B. Sykes and Nicole Vanatko.
224 See, e.g., CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10461, Federal Legislation Shielding Businesses and Individuals from Tort
Liability: A Legal and Historical Overview, by Kevin M. Lewis (summarizing federal statutes that either insulate
particular entities from tort liability or otherwise displace state tort law).
Congressional Research Service
23

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

entities from liability was necessary to ensure that potential y life-saving countermeasures wil be
efficiently developed, deployed, and administered.225
So long as the COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration remains in effect, COVID-19 vaccine
manufacturers, distributors, and qualified health care providers are general y immune from legal
liability for losses relating to the use or administration of that vaccine. Instead, individuals who
are injured or die as a result of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine may seek compensation through
CICP. This section explains the scope of this PREP Act immunity as it applies to COVID-19
countermeasures, including vaccines, as wel as the contours and availability of CICP
compensation.
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act
Scope of Immunity from Liability
For the PREP Act to apply, the Secretary of HHS must determine that a disease or other threat to
health constitutes a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk of such an
emergency.226 The Secretary shal consider the desirability of encouraging the design,
development, testing, manufacture, and use of countermeasures in determining whether to issue a
PREP Act declaration.227 The Secretary must publish the PREP Act declaration in the Federal
Register and identify, for each countermeasure, the particular disease, time period, population,
and geographical area that the declaration covers.228
If within the scope of the declaration, the PREP Act immunizes a covered person from legal
liability for al claims for loss relating to the administration or use of a covered
countermeasure.229 The requirements for PREP Act immunity thus break down into four elements:
(1) the individual or entity must be a “covered person”; (2) the legal claim must be for a “loss”;
(3) the loss must have a “causal relationship” with the administration or use of a covered
countermeasure; and (4) the medical product that caused the loss must be a “covered
countermeasure.”
“Covered Persons”
The PREP Act defines covered persons to include (i) the United States; (i ) manufacturers and
distributors of covered countermeasures; (i i) “program planners”; and (iv) “qualified persons”

225 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H12264 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2005) (statement of Rep. Deal) (“Unfortunately, there is no
business model that would have vaccine manufacturers take on the tremendous liability risks to produce [a pandemic
flu] vaccine. We must address this concern or we will have non e. It’s really that simple. . . . What the [PREP Act] does
is provide authority to the Secretary[:] the ability to declare limited liability protection. T he Secretary can use these
declarations to make sure the vaccine gets developed and to make sure docto rs are willing to give it when the time
comes.”).
226 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1).
227 Id. § 247d-6d(b)(6). A PREP Act declaration is distinct from the Secretary’s power to declare a public health
emergency under Section 319 of the PHSA, which has a separate set of legal implications. Id. § 247d; see generally
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Office of the Assistant Sec. for Preparedness and Response, Public Health
Emergency Declaration (Nov. 26, 2019) (describing powers of Secretary of HHS under Section 31 9). T he Secretary of
HHS made the Section 319 declaration for COVID-19 on January 31, 2020. Alex M. Azar II, Sec’y of the Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists,
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019 -nCoV.aspx (Jan. 31, 2020).
228 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b)(1)-(3).
229 Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
Congressional Research Service
24

link to page 32 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

who prescribe, administer, or dispense covered countermeasures.230 Program planners include
Indian Tribes, state governments, and local governments who supervise programs that dispense,
distribute, or administer covered countermeasures, or provide policy guidance, facilities, and
scientific advice on the administration or use of such countermeasures.231 Qualified persons
include licensed health professionals and other individuals authorized to prescribe, administer, or
dispense covered countermeasures under state law, as wel as other categories of persons
identified by the Secretary in a PREP Act declaration.232 Employees and agents of al these
persons and entities are also covered persons.233
Covered “Claims for Loss”
PREP Act immunity reaches “al claims for loss” under federal and state law.234 Loss is broadly
defined to mean “any type of loss,” including (i) death; (i ) physical, mental, or emotional injury,
il ness, disability, or condition; (i i) fear of such injury, including medical monitoring costs; and
(iv) loss of or damage to property, including business interruption loss.235 This language would
seem to include, at a minimum, most state law tort, medical malpractice, and wrongful death
claims resulting from the administration of covered countermeasures.
Causal Relationship Between the Loss and the Countermeasure
To be preempted by the PREP Act, the claims for loss must have a causal relationship to the
administration and use of a covered countermeasure.236 As with the other elements, the PREP
Act’s causation language sweeps broadly. PREP Act immunity applies to any claim for loss that
has “a causal relationship with the design, development, clinical testing or investigation,
manufacture, labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase,
donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, or use” of a covered
countermeasure.237
“Covered Countermeasures”
Final y, the medical product at issue must be a covered countermeasure. The PREP Act specifies
three general types of covered countermeasures: (i) a qualified “pandemic or epidemic product”;
(i ) a “security countermeasure”; and (i i) a drug, biological product, or device that FDA has
authorized for emergency use.238 As discussed below, Congress recently added a fourth covered
countermeasure category specifical y for respiratory protective devices.239
A pandemic or epidemic product includes any drug, biological product, or device developed “to
diagnose, mitigate, prevent, treat, or cure a pandemic or epidemic.”240 In addition, drugs,

230 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(2).
231 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(6).
232 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(8).
233 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(2)(B)(v).
234 Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
235 Id. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
236 Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
237 Id. § 247d-6d(a)(2)(B).
238 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(A)-(C).
239 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(D); see infra “Recent Congressional Actions on COVID-19 Countermeasures Liability.”
240 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(A)(i). T he PREP Act incorporates the general definitions of “drug,” “biological product,”
Congressional Research Service
25

link to page 14 Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

biological products, or devices uses to treat the side effects of a pandemic or epidemic product, or
to enhance their effects, may themselves be covered countermeasures.241 In either case, to be a
covered countermeasure, the pandemic or epidemic product must be approved, licensed, or
authorized for emergency use by FDA.242
A security countermeasure refers to a drug, biological product, or device used “to diagnose,
mitigate, prevent, or treat harm from any biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent”
identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as a material threat to national security.243
The emergency use category of covered countermeasure includes drugs, biological products, and
devices that FDA has authorized for use outside its ordinary regulatory process through an
EUA.244 FDA has made wide use of its emergency authorities in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, issuing EUAs for certain in vitro diagnostic products (i.e., tests for COVID-19),
antibody tests, personal protective equipment (e.g., respirators and face shields), devices modified
for use as ventilators, and therapeutic drugs.245
Thus, so long as FDA licensed or authorized a COVID-19 vaccine, it would be a covered
countermeasure within the scope of the PREP Act, either as a “pandemic or epidemic product” or
through the emergency use category in the case of authorization through an EUA. Prior to
licensure or authorization of a COVID-19 vaccine, the PREP Act would also afford liability
protections for injuries that may occur in the clinical testing process, if the vaccine is “the object
of research for possible use” as a pandemic or epidemic product and subject to an investigational
use exemption.246
The Willful Misconduct Exception
If a claim for loss is within the PREP Act’s scope, a covered person is general y immune from
legal liability.247 The “sole exception” to immunity is when a covered person proximately causes
death or serious physical injury to another person through wil ful misconduct.248 A serious
physical injury must be life threatening, permanently impair a body function, permanently
damage a body structure, or require medical intervention to avoid such permanent impairment or
damage.249 Wil ful misconduct requires that the covered person acted (i) intentional y to achieve a
wrongful purpose; (i ) knowingly without legal or factual justification; and (i i) in disregard of a

and “device” under the FD&C Act and PHSA. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), (h); 42 U.S.C. § 262(i).
241 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(A)(ii)-(iii).
242 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(B)(i), (iii).
243 Id. §§ 247d-6b(c)(1)(B), 247d-6d(i)(1)(B).
244 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(1)(C); see supra “Emergency Use Authorizations Before Approval.”
245 Emergency Use Authorization: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) EUA Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-
framework/emergency-use-authorization#covid19euas (last updated June 1, 2020) (listing FDA’s current EUAs for
COVID-19 diagnostics, antibody tests, personal protective equipment, therapeutics, and ventilators).
246 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(7)(B)(ii).
247 Id. § 247d-6d(a)(1).
248 Id. § 247d-6d(d)(1). In the case of actions by or against the United States, the PREP Act shall not “be construed to
abrogate or limit any right, remedy, or authority that the United States or any agency thereof may possess under any
other provision of law or to waive sovereign immunity or to abrogate or limit any defense or protection available to the
United States or its agencies, instrumentalities, officers, or employees under any other law . . . .” Id. § 247d-6d(f).
249 Id. § 247d-6d(i)(10).
Congressional Research Service
26

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm wil outweigh
the benefit.250
The process by which an injured person (or their representative) may prove wil ful misconduct
under the PREP Act is limited in several ways. Before filing a suit claiming wil ful misconduct,
the injured person must first seek compensation through CICP, and they cannot sue if they elect to
receive that compensation.251 If they choose to file a lawsuit, injured persons may sue only in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.252 Such lawsuits are assigned to a three-judge
panel, must meet heightened standards for pleading and discovery, and are subject to procedural
provisions general y favorable to defendants.253 Injured persons must prove wil ful misconduct by
clear and convincing evidence,254 a higher standard of proof than a typical civil case. Recovery
for noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering is limited.255
In addition to these procedural and substantive limitations, the PREP Act contains two statutory
defenses to claims of wil ful misconduct. First, program planners and qualified persons cannot be
found to have engaged in wil ful misconduct if they “acted consistent with applicable directions,
guidelines, or recommendations by the Secretary regarding the administration or use of a covered
countermeasure,” and notify either the Secretary or a state or local health authority of the injury
or death al egedly caused by the countermeasure within seven days.256 Second, countermeasure
manufacturers and distributors may rely on regulatory compliance as a complete defense to a
“wil ful misconduct” al egation.257 When the act or omission al eged to be wil ful misconduct is
“subject to regulation” under the PHSA or the FD&C Act, an injured person cannot succeed on a
wil ful misconduct claim unless the Secretary of HHS or the Attorney General has brought certain
“enforcement actions” against the manufacturer or distributor that result in the imposition of
particular penalties.258
The Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program
An individual seriously injured or kil ed by the administration of a covered countermeasure,
whether or not as a result of wil ful misconduct, may seek compensation through CICP.259 CICP
is a regulatory process administered by HHS’s Health Resources and Services Administration.260

250 Id. § 247d-6d(c)(1)(A).
251 Id. § 247d-6e(d)(1), (5).
252 Id. § 247d-6d(e)(1).
253 See id. § 247d-6d(e)(3)-(6), (10).
254 Id. § 247d-6d(c)(3).
255 Id. § 247d-6d(e)(7)-(8).
256 Id. § 247d-6d(c)(4).
257 Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5).
258 Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5)(A)(i)-(ii). T he necessary “enforcement actions” include criminal prosecutions, civil monetary
proceedings based on willful misconduct, mandatory product recalls, or revocations, suspensions or withdrawals, based
on willful misconduct, of FDA approval, licensure, or authorization. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5)(B)(i). Before a willful
misconduct claim can proceed, the enforcement action must conclude with the imposition of a “covered remedy” such
as a criminal conviction, an injunction, a civil monetary payment, a product recall, or a suspension or withdrawal of
FDA approval or licensure. Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5)(B)(ii).
259 Id. § 247d-6e(a)-(b).
260 See generally Countermeasure Injury Compensation Program , HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/index.html (last visited May 28, 2020).
Congressional Research Service
27

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

HHS regulations govern CICP’s procedures and eligibility determinations.261 In general, eligible
individuals (or their survivors) who suffer death or serious physical injury directly caused by the
administration of a covered countermeasure may receive reimbursement through CICP for
reasonable medical expenses, loss of employment income, and survivor benefits in the case of
death.262 Serious physical injuries under CICP are general y limited to those that warrant
hospitalization or lead to a significant loss of function or disability.263 Congress funds CICP
compensation through emergency appropriations to the Covered Countermeasure Process
Fund.264
CICP is distinct from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,265 which provides
compensation for injuries caused by most vaccines routinely administered in the United States,
such as childhood vaccines (e.g., MMR, polio, hepatitis A) and nonpandemic seasonal influenza
vaccines.266 By contrast, CICP only applies to countermeasures covered by a PREP Act
declaration of a public health emergency, such as those issued for COVID-19, pandemic influenza
(e.g., the 2009 H1N1 “swine flu”), and the Ebola virus.267
The COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration
On March 10, 2020, the Secretary of HHS invoked the PREP Act and determined that COVID-19
constitutes a public health emergency.268 The COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration therefore
authorizes PREP Act immunity for the “manufacture, testing, development, distribution,
administration, and use” of covered countermeasures.269 This immunity applies to al covered
persons as defined in the PREP Act, including any person authorized by state and local public
health agencies (or an EUA) to “prescribe, administer, deliver, distribute or dispense” covered
countermeasures.270 Covered countermeasures include “any antiviral, any other drug, any
biologic, any diagnostic, any other device, or any vaccine, used to treat, diagnose, cure, prevent,
or mitigate COVID-19.”271 The “administration” of a covered countermeasure includes “physical
provision of the countermeasures” to patients, as wel as “activities and decisions directly relating
to . . . delivery, distribution and dispensing of” the countermeasures.272 The declaration provides
PREP Act immunity “without geographic limitation,” beginning on February 4, 2020, and ending
as late as October 1, 2025.273

261 See 42 C.F.R. pt. 110.
262 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(a), (b), (e)(3), (e)(5); 42 C.F.R. § 110.2(a).
263 42 C.F.R. § 110.3(z).
264 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(a).
265 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-34; 42 C.F.R. pt. 100.
266 See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Covered Vaccines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN,
https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/covered-vaccines/index.html (last updated Mar. 2020).
267 See HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN, COUNTERMEASURES INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM: FACT SHEET (Oct.
2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/cicp/cicpfactsheet.pdf .
268 COVID-19 PREP Act Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. at 15,201.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 15,201-02.
271 Id. at 15,202.
272 Id.
273 See id.
Congressional Research Service
28

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

Recent Congressional Actions on COVID-19 Countermeasures
Liability
Three recent congressional enactments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, al now signed
into law, relate to the scope of immunity for individuals engaged in the COVID-19 response.
Section 6005 of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act274 and Section 3103 of the CARES
Act275 amend the PREP Act to clarify that certain “personal respiratory protective devices” (such
as N95 respirators) are covered countermeasures. To be covered by the PREP Act, the respiratory
protective device must be (i) approved by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) under 42 C.F.R. Part 84; and (ii) determined by the Secretary of HHS to be a
priority for use during a public health emergency.276
Section 3215 of the CARES Act contains an independent immunization from liability for
volunteer health care professionals responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under Section 3215,
licensed health care professionals are general y immune from state or federal liability for harm
they cause while providing health care services in response to the COVID-19 public health
emergency as a volunteer, if they act within the scope of their license and in good faith.277 There
are two exceptions to this immunity: (1) if the volunteer health care professional’s acts
constituted wil ful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious
flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed;278 or (2) if the volunteer
health care professional rendered health care services under the influence of drugs or alcohol.279
Section 3215 immunity may overlap with PREP Act immunity, or extend beyond it in some cases
(e.g., situations not involving a covered countermeasure).
Final y, both the CARES Act and CPRSA appropriate funding that HHS may use for the Covered
Countermeasure Process Fund, upon which CICP relies. CPRSA appropriates $3.1 bil ion to the
Secretary of HHS to respond to COVID-19, including the development and purchase of
countermeasures and vaccines, while al owing these funds to “be transferred to, and merged
with” the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund.280 The CARES Act appropriates $27 bil ion to
the Secretary of HHS for similar purposes, again providing that the Secretary may transfer these
funds to the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund.281

274 Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 6005, 134 Stat. 178, 207 (2020).
275 Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3103 (2020).
276 42 U.S.C. § 247-6d(i)(1)(D). Prior to these amendments, FDA issued an EUA on March 2, 2020 for the use of
NIOSH-approved filtering respirators intended for general use in healthcare settings, and expressed its view that the
PREP Act covered these respirators prior to the amendment because of their medical use. See Letter from Denise M.
Hinton, Chief Scientist, FDA, to Robert R. Redfield, Director Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (March 28,
2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/135763/download.
277 Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3215(a).
278 Id. § 3215(b)(1).
279 Id. § 3215(b)(2).
280 Pub. L. No. 116-123, tit. III, 134 Stat. 146, 149 (2020).
281 Pub. L. No. 116-136, tit. VIII.
Congressional Research Service
29

Legal Issues in COVID-19 Vaccine Development

Author Information

Kevin J. Hickey
Erin H. Ward
Legislative Attorney
Legislative Attorney

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46399 · VERSION 1 · NEW
30