Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious
Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated June 8, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R43543

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Summary
This report discusses two types of amphibious ships being procured for the Navy: LPD-17 Flight
II class amphibious ships and LHA-type amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by
Huntington Ingal s Industries/Ingal s Shipbuilding (HII/Ingal s) of Pascagoula, MS. The first
LPD-17 Flight II class ship, LPD-30, was procured in FY2018; the Navy’s FY2021 budget
submission estimates its cost at $1,819.6 mil ion (i.e., about $1.8 bil ion). LHA-type amphibious
assault ships are procured once every few years. LHA-8 was procured in FY2017; the Navy’s
FY2021 budget submission estimates its cost at $3,832.0 mil ion (i.e., about $3.8 bil ion).
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presents the second LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship,
LPD-31, as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021, and the next amphibious assault ship,
LHA-9, as a ship projected for procurement in FY2023. Consistent with congressional action on
the Navy’s FY2020 budget, this CRS report treats LPD-31 and LHA-9 as ships that Congress
procured (i.e., authorized and provided procurement—not advance procurement—funding for) in
FY2020. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) decision to present LPD-31 and LHA-9 as ships
requested for procurement in FY2021 and FY2023, respectively, even though Congress procured
both ships in FY2020, poses a potential y significant institutional issue for Congress regarding
the preservation and use of Congress’s power of the purse under Article 1 of the Constitution, and
for maintaining Congress as a coequal branch of government relative to the executive branch.
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of LPD-31 at $2,029.9
mil ion (i.e., about $2.0 bil ion). The ship has received $874.1 mil ion in prior-year procurement
and advanced procurement (AP) funding, including $350 mil ion that Congress provided in
FY2020. The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget requests the remaining $1,155.8 mil ion needed to
complete the ship’s estimated procurement cost.
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of LHA-9, if procured in
FY2023, at $3,873.5 mil ion (i.e., about $3.9 bil ion). Congress provided $350 mil ion for the
ship in FY2019 and $650 mil ion for the ship in FY2020. The Navy’s FY2021 budget
submission, which the Navy submitted to Congress on February 10, acknowledges this funding
but does not program any further funding for the ship until FY2023.
On February 13, the Administration submitted a reprogramming action that transfers about $3.8
bil ion in DOD funding to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) counter-drug activities,
commonly reported to mean the construction of the southern border wal . Included in this action
is the $650 mil ion that Congress appropriated in FY2020 for LHA-9. The reprogramming action
acknowledges that LHA-9 is a congressional special interest item, meaning one that Congress
funded at a level above what DOD had requested. (The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission
programmed LHA-9’s procurement for FY2024 and requested no funding for the ship.) The
reprogramming action characterizes the $650 mil ion as “early to current programmatic need,”
even though it would be needed for a ship whose construction would begin in FY2020. In
discussing its FY2021 budget submission, Navy officials characterize LHA-9 not as a ship whose
procurement the Navy is proposing to delay from FY2020 to FY2023, but as a ship whose
procurement the Navy is proposing to accelerate from FY2024 (the ship’s procurement date
under the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission) to FY2023. The administration’s reprogramming
of the $650 mil ion poses a potential y significant institutional issue for Congress regarding the
preservation and use of Congress’s power of the purse under Article 1 of the Constitution, and for
maintaining Congress as a coequal branch of government relative to the executive branch.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 21 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 17
Congressional Research Service

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on two types of amphibious
ships being procured for the Navy: LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ships and LHA-type
amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by Huntington Ingal s Industries/Ingal s
Shipbuilding (HII/Ingal s) of Pascagoula, MS.
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission poses multiple issues for Congress concerning these two
types of ships, including potential y significant institutional issues regarding the preservation and
use of Congress’s power of the purse under Article 1 of the Constitution, and for maintaining
Congress as a coequal branch of government relative to the executive branch. Congress’s
decisions on the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA programs could also affect Navy capabilities and
funding requirements and the shipbuilding industrial base.
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s new Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program.1
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which amphibious ship and other Navy
shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
Amphibious Ships in General
Roles and Missions
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. The
primary function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport) embarked U.S. Marines and
their equipment and supplies to distant operating areas, and enable Marines to conduct
expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although amphibious ships are designed to
support Marine landings against opposing military forces, they are also used for operations in
permissive or benign situations where there are no opposing forces. Due to their large storage
spaces and their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer people, equipment, and
supplies from ship to shore without need for port facilities,2 amphibious ships are potential y
useful for a range of combat and noncombat operations.3

1 CRS Report R46374, Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
2 Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing
(VT OL) fixed-wing aircraft ; and well decks for storing and launching their landing craft . (A well deck is a large,
garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return to the
ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door. )
3 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarian-
assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership -building activities, such
as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist
foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime -security
operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counter-terrorism operations; and larger-scale
ground combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining
forward-deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 5 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas. Forward-deployed U.S. Navy amphibious
ships are often organized into three-ship formations cal ed amphibious ready groups (ARGs).4 On
average, two or perhaps three ARGs might be forward-deployed at any given time. Amphibious
ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis to lower-threat operating areas,
particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for
responding to smal er-scale or noncombat contingencies.
Types of Amphibious Ships
Navy amphibious ships can be divided into two main groups—the so-cal ed “big-deck”
amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like medium-sized aircraft
carriers, and the smal er (but stil sizeable) amphibious ships designated LPD or LSD, which are
sometimes cal ed “smal -deck” amphibious ships.5 The LHAs and LHDs have large flight decks
and hangar decks for embarking and operating numerous helicopters and vertical or short takeoff
and landing (V/STOL) fixed-wing aircraft, while the LSDs and LPDs have much smal er flight
decks and hangar decks for embarking and operating smal er numbers of helicopters. The LHAs
and LHDs, as bigger ships, in general can individual y embark more Marines and equipment than
the LSDs and LPDs.
Current Amphibious Force-Level Goal
The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, released in December 2016, cal s for achieving and
maintaining a 38-ship amphibious force that includes 12 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD-17 class
ships, and 13 LSD/LPD-type ships (12+13+13).6 The goal for achieving and maintaining a force
of 38 amphibious ships relates primarily to meeting wartime needs for amphibious lift. Navy and
Marine Corps officials have testified in the past that fully meeting U.S. regional combatant
commander requests for day-to-day forward deployments of amphibious ships would require a
force of 50 or more amphibious ships.7

4 An ARG notionally includes three amphibious ships—one LHA or LHD, one LSD, and one LPD. T hese three
amphibious ships together can embark a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) consisting of about 2,200 Marines, their
aircraft, their landing craft, their combat equipment, and about 15 days’ worth of supplies. ARGs can operate in
conjunction with carrier strike groups (CSGs) t o form larger naval task forces; ARGs can also be broken up into
individual ships that are sent to separate operating areas.
5 U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious landing. LHA can be
translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter -capable, well
deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD can be translated as landing ship,
well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well decks. T he exceptions are LHAs 6
and 7, which do not have well decks and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an ex planation of
well decks, see footnote 2.
6 For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force
structure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Am phibious Ship
Procurem ent: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For example, in testimony to the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on February 25, 2015, Marine Corps Lieutenant General Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr., Deputy Commandant for
Combat Development and Integration and Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
stated that the number needed to fully meet regional combatant commander demands for forward-deployed amphibious
ships is “close to 54.” (Source: Spoken testimony of Lieutenant General Glueck, as reflected in transcript of hearing.)
Congressional Research Service

2

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Potential Change in Amphibious Force-Level Goal
Overview
The Navy’s ship force-level goals, including its force-level goal for amphibious ships, are
determined in a Navy analysis cal ed a Force Structure Assessment (FSA). The Navy conducts a
new FSA (or updates the most recent FSA) once every few years. The Navy recently completed a
new FSA to succeed the one whose results were released in December 2016. Navy officials have
stated that the new FSA is undergoing final review within DOD and may be released sometime
during 2020.8 Statements from the Commandant of the Marine Corps suggest that the new FSA
wil change the Navy’s amphibious ship force to an architecture based on a new amphibious lift
target and a new mix of amphibious ships.
The current 38-ship amphibious ship force-level goal is intended to meet a requirement for having
enough amphibious lift to lift the assault echelons of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades
(MEBs), a requirement known as the 2.0 MEB lift requirement. The 2.0 MEB lift requirement
dates to 2006. The translation of this lift requirement into a Marine Corps-preferred force-level
goal of 38 ships dates to 2009, and the Navy’s formal incorporation of the 38-ship goal (rather
than a more fiscal y constrained goal of 33 or 34 ships) into the Navy’s overal ship force-
structure goal dates to the 2016 FSA, the results of which were released in December 2016.9
In July 2019, General David H. Berger, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, released a
document entitled Commandant’s Planning Guidance that states that the Marine Corp wants to,
among other things, move away from the 38-ship amphibious ship force-level goal and the 2.0
MEB lift force-planning metric, and shift to a new and different mix of amphibious ships that
includes not only LHA/LHD-type amphibious assault ships and LPD/LPD-type amphibious
ships, but other kinds of ships as wel , including smal er amphibious ships, ships like the Navy’s
Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) and Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) ships, ships based on
commercial-ship hull designs, and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). The Commandant’s
Planning Guidance, which effectively announces a once-in-a-generation change in Marine Corps
thinking on this and other issues relating to the Marine Corps, states in part (emphasis as in the
original):
Our Nation’s ability to project power and influence beyond its shores is increasingly
challenged by long-range precision fires; expanding air, surface, and subsurface threats;
and the continued degradation of our amphibious and auxiliary ship readiness. The ability
to project and maneuver from strategic distances will likely be detected and contested from
the point of embarkation during a major contingency. Our naval expeditionary forces must
possess a variety of deployment options, including L-class [amphibious ships] and E-class
[expeditionary ships] ships, but also increasingly look to other available options such as
unmanned platforms, stern landing vessels, other ocean -going connectors, and smaller
more lethal and more risk-worthy platforms. We must continue to seek the affordable
and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future
amphibious portion of the fleet.
We must also explore new options, such as inter-theater connectors and commercially
available ships and craft that are smaller and less expensive, thereby increasing the
affordability and allowing acquisition at a greater quantity. We recognize that we must

8 For additional discussion of the FSA process and the next FSA, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 For additional discussion of the 2.0 MEB lift goal and earlier amphibious lift goals dating back to 1980, see Appendix
A of, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

3

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

distribute our forces ashore given the growth of adversary precision strike capabilities, so
it would be illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The
adversary will quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the
preferred option. We need to change this calculus with a new fleet design of smaller, more
lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms. We must be fully integrated with the Navy to
develop a vision and a new fleet architecture that can be successful against our peer
adversaries while also maintaining affordability. To achieve this difficult task, the Navy
and Marine Corps must ensure larger surface combatants possess mission agility across sea
control, littoral, and amphibious operations, while we concurrently expand the quantity of
more specialized manned and unmanned platforms….
We will no longer use a “2.0 MEB requirement” as the foundation for our arguments
regarding amphibious ship building, to determine the requisite capacity of vehicles or other
capabilities, or as pertains to the Maritime Prepositioning Force. We will no longer
reference the 38-ship requirement memo from 2009, or the 2016 Force Structure
Assessment, as the basis for our arguments and force structure CRS Report RL34476, Navy
LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourkejustifications. The ongoing 2019 Force Structure Assessment wil
inform the amphibious requirements based upon this guidance. The global options for
amphibs [types of amphibious ships] include many more options than simply LHAs, LPDs,
and LSDs. I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) to ensure there are adequate numbers of the right types of ships, with
the right capabilities, to meet national requirements.
I do not believe joint forcible entry operations (JFEO) are irrelevant or an operational
anachronism; however, we must acknowledge that different approaches are required given
the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) threat capabilities in mutually contested
spaces. Visions of a massed naval armada nine nautical miles off-shore in the South China
Sea preparing to launch the landing force in swarms of ACVs [amphibious combat
vehicles], LCUs [utility landing craft], and LCACs [air-cushioned landing craft]are
impractical and unreasonable. We must accept the realities created by the proliferation of
precision long-range fires, mines, and other smart-weapons, and seek innovative ways to
overcome those threat capabilities. I encourage experimentation with lethal long -range
unmanned systems capable of traveling 200 nautical miles, penetrating into the adversary
enemy threat ring, and crossing the shoreline—causing the adversary to allocate resources
to eliminate the threat, create dilemmas, and further create opportunities for fleet maneuver.
We cannot wait to identify solutions to our mine countermeasure needs, and must make
this a priority for our future force development efforts….
Over the coming months, we will release a new concept in support of the Navy’s
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept and the NDS called – Stand-in Forces.
The Stand-in Forces concept is designed to restore the strategic initiative to naval forces
and empower our allies and partners to successfully confront regional hegemons that
infringe on their territorial boundaries and interests. Stand-in Forces are designed to
generate technically disruptive, tactical stand-in engagements that confront aggressor
naval forces with an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms
and payloads. Stand-in forces take advantage of the relative strength of the contemporary
defense and rapidly-emerging new technologies to create an integrated maritime defense
that is optimized to operate in close and confined seas in defiance of adversary long-range
precision “stand-off capabilities.”
Creating new capabilities that intentionally initiate stand-in engagements is a disruptive
“button hook” in force development that runs counter to the action that our adversaries
anticipate. Rather than heavily investing in expensive and exquisite ca pabilities that
regional aggressors have optimized their forces to target, naval forces will persist forward
with many smaller, low signature, affordable platforms that can economically host a dense
array of lethal and nonlethal payloads.
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 10 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

By exploiting the technical revolution in autonomy, advanced manufacturing, and artificial
intelligence, the naval forces can create many new risk-worthy unmanned and minimally-
manned platforms that can be employed in stand-in engagements to create tactical
dilemmas that adversaries will confront when attacking our allies and forces forward.10
Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program
As one reflection of the potential change in the amphibious force-level goal discussed above, the
Navy is now envisioning procuring a class of 28 to 30 smal er amphibious ships cal ed Light
Amphibious Warships (LAWs). A separate CRS report discusses the LAW program in detail.11
Current and Projected Force Levels
The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2019 included 32 ships, including 9
amphibious assault ships (1 LHA and 8 LHDs), 11 LPD-17 Flight I ships, and 12 LSD-41/49
class ships. The LSD-41/49 class ships, which are the ships to be replaced by LPD-17 Flight II
ships, are discussed in the next section.
The Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan projects that the Navy’s force
of amphibious ships wil increase gradual y to 38 ships by FY2026, remain at a total of 36 to 38
ships in FY2027 to FY2034, decline to 34 or 35 ships in FY2035-FY2038, increase to 36 or 37
ships in FY2039-FY2046, and remain at 35 ships in FY2047-FY2049. Over the entire 30-year
period, the force is projected to include an average of about 35.8 ships, or about 94% of the
required figure of 38 ships, although the resulting amount of lift capability provided by the ships
would not necessarily equate to about 94% of the amphibious lift goal, due to the mix of ships in
service at any given moment and their individual lift capabilities.
Existing LSD-41/49 Class Ships
The Navy’s 12 aging Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class ships (Figure 1) were
procured between FY1981 and FY1993 and entered service between 1985 and 1998.12 The class

10 U.S. Marine Corps, Commandant’s Planning Guidance, 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, undated, released
July 2019, pp. 4-5, 10. See also Megan Eckstein, “ New Commandant Berger Sheds 38 -Amphib Requirement in Quest
to Modernize USMC for High-End Fight,” USNI News, July 18, 2019; Paul McLeary, “ Sacred Cows Die As Marine
Commandant Changes Course On Amphibs,” Breaking Defense, July 26, 2019; David Ignatius, “ T he Marines’ New
Commandant Has Set the Bar for Real Military Reform,” Washington Post, August 8, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Marine
Planners Using Commandant’s Guidance to Start Crafting Future of the Corps,” USNI News, September 18, 2019;
Shawn Snow, “An Unmanned Ship T hat Can T ravel 500 Nautical Miles Without Resupply —the Corps Is Looking at
It,” Marine Corps Times, September 19, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Both Considering Something Like an
Offshore Support Vessel to Supplement Amphibs,” USNI News, September 20, 2019; David Axe, “U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps Want Small Ships to Land T roops in a War,” National Interest, September 21, 2019; Megan Eckstein,
“Navy, Marines Rethinking How t o Build Future Fleet with Unmanned, Expeditionary Ships,” USNI News, September
26, 2019; David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “A Striking New Vision for the marines, and a Wakeup Call for the Other
Services,” War on the Rocks, October 1, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Berger: Marine 2030 Force Design Is Nearly
Complete; Concepts Now Being Modeled, T ested,” USNI News, October 3, 2019; Patrick T ucker, “The Future of the
Marines Is Smaller, More Robotic, More Naval,” Defense One, October 3, 2019.
11 CRS Report R46374, Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
12 T he class was initially known as the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class. T he final four ships in the class, beginning with
Harpers Ferry (LSD-49), were built to a modified version of the original LSD-41 design, prompting the name of the
class to be changed to the Harpers Ferry/Whidbey Island (LSD-41/49) class. Some sources refer to these 12 ships as
two separate classes. T he first three were built by Lockheed Shipbuilding of Seattle, WA, a firm that subsequently
exited the Navy shipbuilding business. T he final nine were built by Avondale Shipyards of New Orleans, LA, a
Congressional Research Service

5

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

includes 12 ships because they were built at a time when the Navy was planning a 36-ship
(12+12+12) amphibious force. They have an expected service life of 40 years; the first ship wil
reach that age in 2025. The Navy’s FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that the 12 ships
wil retire between FY2026 and FY2038.
Figure 1. LSD-41/49 Class Ship

Source: U.S. Navy photo accessed May 7, 2014, at http://www.navy.mil/gal ery_search_results.asp?terms=
lsd+52&page=4&r=4. The Navy’s caption for the photo states that the photo is dated July 13, 2013, and that it
shows the Pearl Harbor (LSD-52) anchored off Majuro atol in the Republic of the Marshal Islands during an
exercise cal ed Pacific Partnership 2013.
Amphibious Warship Industrial Base
Huntington Ingal s Industries/Ingal s Shipbuilding (HII/Ingal s) of Pascagoula, MS, is the Navy’s
current builder of both LPDs and LHA-type ships, although other U.S. shipyards could also build
amphibious ships.13 The amphibious warship industrial base also includes many supplier firms in
numerous U.S. states that provide materials and components for Navy amphibious ships. HII
states that the supplier base for its LHA production line, for example, includes 457 companies in
39 states.14

shipyard that eventually became part of the ship building firm Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). Avondale, like
Lockheed Shipbuilding, no longer builds Navy ships. HII wound down Navy shipbuilding operations at Avondale in
2014, after Avondale finished building LPD-25, the ninth LPD-17 class ship. HII continues to operate two other
shipyards that build Navy ships—Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, MS (HII/Ingalls), and Newport News
Shipbuilding in Newport News, VA (HII/NNS). HII’s construction of amphibious ships, previously divided between
Avondale and Ingalls, now takes place primarily at Ingalls.
13 Amphibious ships could also be built by U.S. shipyards such as HII/Newport News Shipbuildin g (HII/NNS) of
Newport News, VA; General Dynamics/National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA;
and (for LPDs at least) General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME. T he Navy over the years has from
time to time conducted competitions among shipyards for contracts to build amphibious ships.
14 Source: HII statement as quoted in Frank Wolfe, “Navy Budget Plan Delays Buy of Amphibious Ships,” Defense
Daily, March 15, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 12 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

LPD-17 Flight II Program
Program Name
The Navy decided in 2014 that the LSD-41/49 replacement ships would be built to a variant of
the design of the Navy’s San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships. (A total of 13 LPD-17
class ships [LPDs 17 through 29] were procured between FY1996 and FY2017.) Reflecting that
decision, the Navy announced on April 10, 2018, that the replacement ships would be known as
the LPD-17 Flight II ships.15 By implication, the Navy’s original LPD-17 design became the
LPD-17 Flight I design. The first LPD-17 Flight II ship is designated LPD-30. Subsequent LPD-
17 Flight II ships are to be designated LPD-31, LPD-32, and so on.
Whether the LPD-17 Flight II ships constitute their own shipbuilding program or an extension of
the original LPD-17 shipbuilding program might be a matter of perspective. As a matter of
convenience, this CRS report refers to the Flight II shipbuilding effort as a separate program.
Years from now, LPD-17 Flight I and Flight II ships might come to be known collectively as
either the LPD-17 class, the LPD-17/30 class, or the LPD-17 and LPD-30 classes.
On October 10, 2019, the Navy announced that LPD-30, the first LPD-17 Flight II ship, wil be
named Harrisburg, for the city of Harrisburg, PA.16 As a consequence, LPD-17 Flight II, if treated
as a separate class, would be referred to as Harrisburg (LPD-30) class ships.
Design
Compared to the LPD-17 Flight I design, the LPD-17 Flight II design (Figure 2) is somewhat
less expensive to procure, and in some ways less capable—a reflection of how the Flight II design
was developed to meet Navy and Marine Corps operational requirements while staying within a
unit procurement cost target that had been established for the program.17 In many other respects,
however, the LPD-17 Flight II design is similar in appearance and capabilities to the LPD-17
Flight I design. Of the 13 LPD-17 Flight I ships, the final two (LPDs 28 and 29) incorporate some
design changes that make them transitional ships between the Flight I design and the Flight II
design.

15 Megan Ecsteain, “Navy Designates Upcoming LX(R) Amphibs as San Antonio -Class LPD Flight II,” USNI News,
April 11, 2018. Within a program to build a class of Navy ships, the term flight refers to a group of ships within the
class that are built to a particular version of the class design. T he LPD-17 Fight II program was previously known as
the LX(R) program. In the designation LX(R), the X meant that the exact design of the ship had not yet been
determined, and the R meant that the ships are intended as replacements for the LSD -41/49 class ships. Prior to being
referred to as the LX(R) program, the program was referred to as the LSD(X) program, meaning an LSD-type ship
whose design had not yet been determined. T he program’s designation was changed to LX(R) in 2012 to signal that the
replacement for the existing LSD-41/49 class ships would be an amphibious ship that would best meet future Navy and
Marine Corps needs, regardless of whether that turned out to be a ship that one might refer to as an LSD. For an article
discussing this earlier change in the program’s designation, see Christopher P. Cavas, “ Different Missions Might Await
New USN Amphib,” Defense News, November 12, 2012.
16 Secretary of the Navy Public Affairs, “SECNAV Names Future Amphibious T ransport Dock Ship in Honor of the
city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,” Navy News Service, October 10, 2019.
17 T he Navy’s unit procurement cost targets for the LPD-17 Flight II program were $1,643 million in constant FY2014
dollars for the lead ship, and an average of $1,400 million in constant FY2014 dollars for ships 2 through 11. (Source:
Navy briefing on LX(R) program to CRS and CBO, March 23, 2015.) T he cost target for the lead ship was greater than
the cost target for the subsequent ships primarily because the procurement cost of the lead ship incorporates much or all
of the detail design and nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the program. Incorporating much or all of the
DD/NRE costs of for a shipbuilding program into the procurement cost of the lead ship in the program is a traditional
Navy shipbuilding budgeting practice.
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 19

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Figure 2. LPD-17 Flight II Design
Artist’s rendering

Source: Huntington Ingal s Industries rendering accessed April 22, 2019, at https://www.huntingtoningal s.com/
lpd-flight-ii/.
Procurement Quantity
Consistent with the Navy’s 38-ship amphibious force-level goal, the Navy wants to procure a
total of 13 LPD-17 Flight II ships.
Procurement Schedule
Overview
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presents the second LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship,
LPD-31, as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021. Consistent with congressional action on
the Navy’s FY2020 budget, this CRS report treats LPD-31 as a ship that Congress procured (i.e.,
authorized and provided procurement—not advance procurement—funding for) in FY2020. (For
additional discussion, see the Appendix.)18 Under the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, the
third and fourth LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e., LPDs 32 and 33) are programmed for
procurement in FY2023 and FY2025.
Procurement Cost
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates the procurement costs of LPDs 30, 31, 32, and
33 as $1,819.6 mil ion, $2,029.9 mil ion, $1,847.6 mil ion, and $1,864.7 mil ion, respectively
(i.e., about $1.8 bil ion, $2,0 bil ion, $1.8 bil ion, and $1.9 bil ion, respectively).

18 An appendix in another CRS report —CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke—provides a similar discussion regarding the procurement
dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9, and includes an additional discussion of the procurement date of a third ship, the aircraft
carrier CVN-81.
Congressional Research Service

8

link to page 13

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

LHA-9 Amphibious Assault Ship
LHA-type amphibious assault ships are procured once every few years. LHA-8 (Figure 3) was
procured in FY2017; the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates its cost at $3,832.0 mil ion
(i.e., about $3.8 bil ion).
Figure 3. LHA-8 Amphibious Assault Ship
Artist’s rendering

Source: Photo accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “The Next America Class Amphibious Assault Ship Wil Almost
Be In a Class of its Own,” The Drive, April 17, 2018. A note on the photo credits the photo to HII.
The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission projected the procurement of the next amphibious assault
ship, LHA-9, for FY2024. Some in Congress have been interested in accelerating the
procurement of LHA-9 from FY2024 to an earlier year, such as FY2020 or FY2021, in part to
achieve better production learning curve benefits in shifting from production of LHA-8 to LHA-9
and thereby reduce LHA-9’s procurement cost in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms. As part of its
action on the Navy’s proposed FY2019 budget, Congress provided $350 mil ion in unrequested
advance procurement (AP) funding for LHA-9, in part to encourage the Navy to accelerate the
procurement of LHA-9 from FY2024 to an earlier fiscal year, such as FY2020 or FY2021. As
part of its action on the Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget, Congress provided an additional $650
mil ion in procurement (not AP) funding for the ship, and included a provision (Section 127) in
the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019) that
authorizes the Navy to enter into a contract for the procurement of LHA-9 and to use incremental
funding provided during the period FY2019-FY2025 to fund the contract.
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presents LHA-9 as a ship projected for procurement in
FY2023. Consistent with the above-noted congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 budget,
this CRS report treats LHA-9 as a ship that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 19 link to page 19 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

procurement—not advance procurement—funding for) in FY2020. (For additional discussion, see
Appendix.)19
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of LHA-9, if procured in
FY2023, at $3,873.5 mil ion (i.e., about $3.9 bil ion). The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission,
which the Navy submitted to Congress on February 10, acknowledges the $350 mil ion in
FY2019 advanced procurement (AP) funding and $650 mil ion in FY2020 procurement funding
that Congress provided for the ship, but does not program any further funding for the ship until
FY2023.
On February 13, the Administration submitted a reprogramming action that transfers about $3.8
bil ion in DOD funding to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) counter-drug activities,
commonly reported to mean the construction of the southern border wal . Included in this action
is the $650 mil ion that Congress appropriated in FY2020 for LHA-9.20 The reprogramming
action acknowledges that LHA-9 is a congressional special interest item, meaning one that
Congress funded at a level above what DOD had requested. (The Navy’s FY2020 budget
submission requested no funding for the ship.) The reprogramming action characterizes the $650
mil ion as “early to current programmatic need,” even though it would be needed for a ship
whose construction would begin in FY2020. In discussing its FY2021 budget submission, Navy
officials characterize LHA-9 not as ship whose procurement the Navy is proposing to delay from
FY2020 to FY2023, but as a ship whose procurement the Navy is proposing to accelerate from
FY2024 (the ship’s procurement date under the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission) to FY2023.
Issues for Congress
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Situation
One issue for Congress concerns the potential impact of the COVID-19 (coronavirus) situation on
the execution of U.S. military shipbuilding programs, including the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA
programs. For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Procurement Dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9, and Congress’s Power of
the Purse
A potential y significant institutional issue for Congress concerns the treatment in the Navy’s
proposed FY2021 budget of the procurement dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9. As discussed earlier,
the Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presents LPD-31 as a ship requested for procurement in
FY2021 and LHA-9 as a ship projected for procurement in FY2023. Consistent with
congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 budget regarding the procurement of LPD-31 and
LHA-9 (see the Appendix), this CRS report treats LPD-31 and LHA-9 as ships that Congress
procured (i.e., authorized and provided procurement funding for) in FY2020. Potential oversight
issues for Congress include the following:

19 An appendix in another CRS report —CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke—provides a similar discussion regarding the procurement
dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9, and includes an additional discussion of the procurement date of a third ship, the aircraft
carrier CVN-81.
20 Department of Defense, Reprogramming action (form DD 1 415), DOD Serial Number FY 20-01 RA, February 13,
2020, page 3 of 5.
Congressional Research Service

10

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

 By presenting LPD-31 as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021 (instead of
a ship that was procured in FY2020) and LHA-9 as a ship projected for
procurement in FY2023 (instead of a ship that was procured in FY2020), is
DOD, in its FY2021 budget submission, disregarding or mischaracterizing the
actions of Congress regarding the procurement dates of these three ships? If so:
 Is DOD doing this to inflate the apparent number of ships requested for
procurement in FY2021 and the apparent number of ships included in the
five-year (FY2021-FY2025) shipbuilding plan?
 Could this establish a precedent for DOD or other parts of the executive
branch in the future to disregard or mischaracterize the actions of Congress
regarding the procurement or program-initiation dates for other Navy ships,
other Navy programs, other DOD programs, or other federal programs? If so,
what implications might that have for the preservation and use of Congress’s
power of the purse under Article 1 of the Constitution, and for maintaining
Congress as a coequal branch of government relative to the executive
branch?
Reprogramming of $650 Million for LHA-9 and Congress’s Power
of the Purse
Another potential y significant institutional issue for Congress concerns the Administration’s
reprogramming of $650 mil ion in FY2020 procurement funding for LHA-9 to DHS counter-drug
activities, commonly reported to mean the construction of the southern border wal , even though
the reprogramming action acknowledges that LHA-9 is a congressional special interest item,
meaning one that Congress funded at a level above what DOD had requested. As discussed
earlier, some in Congress have been interested in accelerating the procurement of LHA-9 from
FY2024 to an earlier year, such as FY2020 or FY2021, and Congress has provided funding in
both FY2019 and FY2020 in support of that goal. Potential oversight issues for Congress include
the following:
 By reprogramming this funding to another purpose, is DOD, in its FY2021
budget submission, disregarding the expressed intent of Congress regarding the
procurement of LHA-9?
 If so, could this establish a precedent for DOD or other parts of the executive
branch in the future to disregard the intent of Congress regarding the
procurement or program-initiation dates for other Navy ships, other Navy
programs, other DOD programs, or other federal programs? What implications
might that have for the preservation and use of Congress’s power of the purse
under Article 1 of the Constitution, and for maintaining Congress as a coequal
branch of government relative to the executive branch?
Potential Change in Required Number of LPD-17 Flight II and
LHA-Type Ships
Another potential issue for Congress is whether the Navy’s next FSA wil change the required
number of LPD-17 Flight II and LHA-type amphibious ships, and if so, whether that might
change Navy plans for procuring these ships in future fiscal years. As discussed earlier,
statements from the Commandant of the Marine Corps suggest that the new FSA that is to be
Congressional Research Service

11

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

completed by the end of 2019 might change the Navy’s amphibious ship force to an architecture
based on a new amphibious lift target and a new mix of amphibious ships.
Technical and Cost Risk in LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Programs
Another potential issue for Congress is technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA
programs.
Technical Risk
Regarding technical risk in the LPD-17 Flight II program, a June 2020 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report—the 2020 edition of GAO’s annual report surveying DOD
major acquisition programs—states the following about the LPD-17 Flight II program:
Current Status
The Navy purchased the first Flight II ship—LPD 30—in March 2019 and plans to begin
construction in April 2020 after a production readiness review in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2020. It made about 200 design changes from the first to second flight, including
replacing the composite mast with a steel stick, which the Navy plans to complete prior to
lead ship construction. Program officials stated that the updated design does not rely on
any new technologies. However, the Navy plans to install the new Enterprise Air
Surveillance Radar (EASR), which is still in development, on Flight II ships. Live radar
system testing on an EASR prototype is underway. Although program officials consider
this low risk, the Navy will begin ship construction with little time to incorporate any
lessons learned from radar testing, which could require the Navy to absorb costly changes
and rework during ship construction if test results require design changes….
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
Program officials said the Navy has subsumed LPD 17 Flight II into the LPD 17 program
and existing cost baseline. Program officials also stated that EASR testing is ongoing as of
March 2020. Further, these officials stated that the Navy acquired LPD 30 under a sole
source contract with Huntington Ingalls Incorporated. In addition, program officials
reported they have completed LPD 30 critical design and production readiness reviews and
intend to begin construction as planned.21
Regarding technical risk in the LHA program, the June 2020 GAO report stated the following
about the LHA program:
Current Status
The Navy began construction in October 2018 with about 61 percent of the LHA 8 product
model completed—an approach inconsistent with shipbuilding best practices, which cal
for the completion of modeling before construction begins. Ninety -nine percent of the
product model is now complete, with the exception of the mast and two other compartments
on the top of the ship. LHA 8 construction is now 5 percent complete.
The LHA 8 program office has not identified any critical technologies, but has identified
risks from its reliance on technology from another Navy program. Specifically, LHA 8
program officials identified the use of the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar (EASR)—a
rotating radar system derived from the preexisting Air and Missile Defense Radar
program—as the program’s highest development risk. EASR is planned to be delivered in

21 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment[:] Drive to Deliver Capabilities Faster
Increases Im portance of Program Knowledge and Consistent Data for Oversight, GAO-20-439, June 2020, p. 147.
Congressional Research Service

12

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

August 2021 and provide self-defense and situational awareness capabilities for LHA 8.
Officials stated that during EASR development, they found that the mast blocked EASR’s
field of view. They said that to reduce the obstruction and electromagnetic interference
from EASR, they have to reconfigure the mast and nearby antennas, which may affect the
ship’s planned delivery date of January 2024. Officials said they would test the
configuration in a laboratory environment to determine the impact of EASR prior to its
delivery to the ship.
The program has also encountered construction challenges that have increased schedule
risk. Program officials said that the subcontractor manufacturing the ship’s Main Reduction
Gears (MRG) encountered quality issues that delayed their delivery. Officials report that
the contractor had been following a more aggressive construction schedule for ship
delivery, but that the delay to the MRGs pushed them back to the contract’s schedule.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
Officials stated that LHA 8 is progressing well and is 12 percent complete as of March
2020. Officials stated that the Navy has reduced risk in the topside design changes and
finalized them with the contractor, and that EASR remains a development risk that the
Navy is managing closely.22
Cost Risk
Regarding cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II program, an October 2019 Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s shipbuilding programs states the following:
The Navy estimates that the LPD-17 Flight IIs would cost $1.6 billion each, on average,
and that the lead ship would cost $1.7 billion to $1.8 billion.… To achieve its cost goal for
the LPD-17 Flight II, the Navy plans to further alter the LPD-17 design and, perhaps, to
change the way it buys them: The Flight II variant would have substantially less capability
than the LPD-17 class, and the Navy might use block-buy or multiyear authority to
purchase the ships, although it has not yet stated an intention to do so. Such authority would
commit the government to buying a group of ships over several years, thereby realizing
savings as a result of the predictable and steady work provided to the construction shipyard
and to the vendors that provide parts and components to the shipbuilder. The authority
would be similar to that provided for the Arleigh Burke class destroyers, Virginia class
attack submarines, and LCSs [Littoral Combat Ships].
CBO estimates that the LPD-17 Flight II class would cost an average of $1.9 billion per
ship. The agency [CBO] used the existing LPD-17 hull as the starting point for its estimate
and then adjusted the ship’s size to reflect the reduced capability it expects for the Flight
II. CBO’s estimate reflects the assumption that the Navy would ultimately use multiyear
or block-buy procurement authority to purchase the ships.23
The June 2020 GAO report states:
Program officials stated that they have sufficient funding for LPD 30 construction, but that
without multi-year procurement authority to buy multiple ships across up to 5 years with a
single contract, they will be challenged to achieve the current cost requirement and
complete construction of s hips. Statute requires programs requesting multi-year authority

22 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment[:] Drive to Deliver Capabilities Faster
Increases Im portance of Program Knowledge and Consistent Data for Oversight, GAO-20-439, June 2020, p. 146.
23 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2020 Shipbuilding Plan , October 2019, pp. 26-
27.
Congressional Research Service

13

link to page 18 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

to have a realistic cost estimate, among other things. The LPD 17 program does not have
an independent cost estimate for Flight II ships nor plans to establish a cost baseline
specific to Flight II. Consequently, the Navy does not have an accurate and credible
estimate of Flight II costs.24
Regarding cost risk in the LHA program, the October 2019 CBO report states the following:
The Navy estimates that the LHA-6 class amphibious assault ships would cost $3.4 billion
each …. Under the 2020 plan, a seven-year gap separates the last LHA-6 class ship ordered
in 2017 and the next one, slated to be purchased in 2024, which in CBO’s estimation would
effectively eliminate any manufacturing learning gleaned from building the first 3 ships of
the class. As a result, CBO’s estimate is higher than the Navy’s, at $3.9 billion per ship.25
Legislative Activity for FY2021
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding Request
Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2021 funding request for LPD-31 and
LHA-9.
Table 1. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2021 Procurement
Funding Request
Mil ions of dol ars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
LPD-31
1,155.8

LHA-9
0

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2021 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.

24 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment[:] Drive to Deliver Capabilities Faster
Increases Im portance of Program Knowledge and Consistent Data for Oversight, GAO-20-439, June 2020, p. 147.
25 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2020 Shipbuilding Plan , October 2019, p. 26.
Congressional Research Service

14

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Appendix. Procurement Dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9
This appendix presents background information on congressional action regarding the
procurement dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9. In reviewing the bullet points presented below, it can
be noted that procurement funding is funding for a ship that is either being procured in that fiscal
year or has been procured in a prior fiscal year, while advance procurement (AP) funding is
funding for a ship that is to be procured in a future fiscal year.26
LPD-31—an LPD-17 Flight II Amphibious Ship
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presents LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship,
as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021. This CRS report treats LPD-31 as a ship that
Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided procurement funding for) in FY2020, consistent
with the following congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 budget regarding the procurement
of LPD-31:
 The House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 116-120 of June 19,
2019) on H.R. 2500, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II ship in
FY2020, showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (not just AP) funding for the program.27
 The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11,
2019) on S. 1790, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II ship in
FY2020, showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.28
 The conference report (H.Rept. 116-333 of December 9, 2019) on S. 1790/P.L.
116-92 of December 20, 2019, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
authorized the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II ship in FY2020, showing a
quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending
procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.29 Section 129 of S.
1790/P.L. 116-92 authorizes the Navy to enter into a contract, beginning in
FY2020, for the procurement of LPD-31, and to use incremental funding to fund
the contract.
 The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-103 of September
12, 2019) on S. 2474, the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act, recommended
funding for the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II ship in FY2020, showing a
quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending
procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.30
 The final version of the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R.
1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2019) provides procurement (not AP) funding
for an LPD-17 Flight II ship. The paragraph in this act that appropriates funding

26 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett .
27 H.Rept. 116-120, p. 379, line 012.
28 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 433, line 12. See also pp. 23-24 for associated report language.
29 H.Rept. 116-333, p. 1566, line 012. See also p. 1144 for associated report language.
30 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 118, line 12. See also p. 122 for associated report language.
Congressional Research Service

15

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

for the Navy’s shipbuilding account, including this ship, includes a provision
stating “Provided further, That an appropriation made under the heading
‘Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy’ provided for the purpose of ‘Program
increase—advance procurement for fiscal year 2020 LPD Flight II and/or
multiyear procurement economic order quantity’ shal be considered to be for the
purpose of ‘Program increase—advance procurement of LPD–31’.” This
provision relates to funding appropriated in the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act
(Division A of H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245 of September 28, 2018) for the
procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II ship in FY2020, as original y characterized
in the explanatory statement accompanying that act.31
LHA-9 Amphibious Assault Ship
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presents the amphibious assault ship LHA-9 as a ship
projected for procurement in FY2023. This CRS report treats LHA-9 as a ship that Congress
procured (i.e., authorized and provided procurement funding for) in FY2020, consistent with the
following congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 budget regarding the procurement of
LHA-9:
 The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11,
2019) on S. 1790, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of LHA-9 in FY2020, showing a
quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending
procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.32
 The conference report (H.Rept. 116-333 of December 9, 2019) on S. 1790/P.L.
116-92 of December 20, 2019, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
authorized the procurement of LHA-9 in FY2020, showing a quantity increase of
one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending procurement (rather than
AP) funding for the program.33 Section 127 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 authorizes the
Navy to enter into a contract for the procurement of LHA-9 and to use
incremental funding provided during the period FY2019-FY2025 to fund the
contract.
 The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-103 of September
12, 2019) on S. 2474, the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act, recommended
funding for the procurement of an LHA amphibious assault ship in FY2020,
showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.34
 The final version of the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R.
1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2019) provides procurement (not AP) funding
for an LHA amphibious assault ship. The explanatory statement for Division A of
H.R. 1158/P.L. 116-93 states that the funding is for LHA-9.35

31 See PDF page 176 of 559, line 12, of the explanatory statement for H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245.
32 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 433, line 15.
33 H.Rept. 116-333, p. 1566, line 015.
34 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 118, line 15.
35 Explanatory statement for Division A of H.R. 1158, PDF page 175 of 414, line 15.
Congressional Research Service

16

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R43543 · VERSION 75 · UPDATED
17