Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy
Updated June 3, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RS21513

Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

Summary
Kuwait has been pivotal to the decades-long U.S. effort to secure the Persian Gulf region because
of its consistent cooperation with U.S. military operations in the region and its key location in the
northern Gulf. Kuwait and the United States have a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement
(DCA), under which the United States deploys over 13,000 military personnel in country and
prepositions substantial quantities of military equipment.
Kuwait is a partner not only of the United States but also of the other hereditary monarchies of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Bahrain, and Oman). Kuwaiti forces are part of the Saudi-led coalition that is trying to defeat the
Iran-backed “Houthi” rebel movement in Yemen, while at the same time mediating a possible
resolution to that and other regional conflicts. Kuwait is attempting to heal the intra-GCC rift that
erupted in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia and the UAE moved to isolate Qatar. Kuwait has
refrained from intervening in Syria’s civil war, instead hosting several donor conferences for
victims of the Syrian civil conflict. Kuwait also has provided funds for Iraq’s recovery from the
Islamic State chal enge and to ameliorate the effects of regional conflict on Jordan’s economy.
Kuwait has not followed some of the other GCC states in building ties to the government of
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel.
Kuwait general y supports U.S. efforts to counter Iran and has periodical y arrested Kuwaiti Shias
that the government says are spying for Iran, but it also engages Iran at high levels and has not
advocated U.S. or GCC confrontation of Iran. Kuwait has consistently engaged the post-Saddam
governments in Baghdad, in part to prevent tensions with the large neighbor and prevent any
repeat of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. U.S. government reports have praised steps by
Kuwait to counter the financing of terrorism, but reports persist that wealthy Kuwaitis are stil
able to donate to regional Islamist extremists.
Experts have long assessed Kuwait’s political system as a potential regional model for its
successful incorporation of secular and Islamist political factions, both Shia and Sunni. However,
since the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Kuwait has followed other GCC states in incarcerating and
revoking the citizenship of social media and other critics. Kuwait’s fundamental political stability
has not been in question, but long-standing parliamentary opposition to the ruling Sabah family’s
political dominance has in recent years been joined by public pressure for political and economic
reform. The Amir’s declining health, necessitating hospitalization in the United States during
August-October 2019, might have contributed to the reigniting of political fissures in Kuwait that
caused the resignation of the government and appointment of a new Prime Minister in November
2019.
Years of political paralysis have arguably contributed to economic stagnation relative to Kuwait’s
more economical y vibrant Gulf neighbors such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Like the other GCC states, Kuwait has struggled with reduced income from oil exports since
2014, and these levels have fal en further in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As of June 1,
2020, the country has reported 28,600 COVID-19 infections and about 225 deaths. Kuwait
receives negligible amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, and has offset some of the costs of U.S.
operations in the region since Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
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Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

History and Governance
Kuwait’s optimism after the 2003 fal of its nemesis, Saddam Hussein, soured after the January
15, 2006, death of Amir (ruler) Jabir Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. From then until 2013, Kuwait
underwent repeated political crises that produced economic stagnation.
The origin of modern Kuwait dates to the early 18th century, when the Banū Utūb families of the
ʿAnizah tribe in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula, migrated to the area that is now Kuwait. In
1756, the settlers appointed the Ṣabāḥ family to exercise political authority. Toward the end of the
19th century, Kuwaiti leaders aligned with the Ottoman Empire but did not come under Ottoman
rule. The Al Sabah ruler known as Mubārak the Great (who came to power by assassinating his
brother) later built close ties to Britain to counter Ottoman threats. An 1899 treaty basical y
granted Britain control of Kuwait’s foreign affairs. Following the outbreak of World War I (1914–
1918), Kuwait became a British protectorate. On June 19, 1961, Britain recognized Kuwait’s
independence.
Leadership Structure
Under Kuwait’s 1962 constitution, an Amir (Arabic word for prince, but in this context means
“ruler”) is the head of state and ruler of Kuwait. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
appoints al judges, and can suspend the National Assembly. The Amir appoints a Prime Minister
as head of government, who in turn appoints a cabinet. The Prime Minister has always been a
member of the Sabah family, and until 2003 the Prime Minister and Crown Prince/heir apparent
posts were held by a single person. It is typical of Kuwaiti cabinets that most of the key ministries
(defense, foreign policy, and finance) are led by Sabah family members.
At the time of Amir Jabir’s death, his designated successor, Shaykh Sa’ad bin Abdullah Al Sabah,
was infirm. A brief succession dispute among rival branches of the ruling Al Sabah family was
resolved with then-Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, the younger
brother of the late Amir, becoming Amir on January 29, 2006. Amir Sabah is over 90 years old
and discussions within Al Sabah circles about the succession have expanded, particular after his
hospitalization in the United States during August-October 2019 necessitated postponement of a
planned meeting in Washington, D.C., with President Trump.
Table 1. Senior Leaders in Kuwait
Amir (Ruler)
Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah
Crown Prince
Nawwaf al-Ahmad Al Sabah
Prime Minister
Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad Al Sabah
First Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister
Ahmad Mansour Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah
Foreign Minister
Dr.Ahmad Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber
Al-Sabah
National Assembly Speaker
Marzuq al-Ghanim
Elected National Assembly
The National Assembly, established by Kuwait’s November 1962 constitution, is the longest-
serving al -elected body among the Gulf monarchies. Fifty seats are elected, and up to 15
members of the cabinet serve in the Assembly ex-officio. The government has expanded the
electorate gradual y: in the 1990s, the government extended the vote to sons of naturalized
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Kuwaitis and Kuwaitis naturalized for at least 20 (as opposed to 30) years. Kuwaiti women
obtained suffrage rights when the National Assembly passed a government bil to that effect in
May 2005. In recent elections, about 400,000 Kuwaitis have been eligible to vote.
Kuwait’s National Assembly has more scope of authority than any legislative or consultative
body in the GCC states, in part because it drafts legislation as wel as acting on legislation drafted
by the government. The Assembly does not confirm cabinet nominees (individual y or en bloc),
but it frequently questions ministers (“gril ing”). It can, by simple majority, remove ministers in a
vote of “no confidence,” and can oust a prime minister by voting “inability to cooperate with the
government.” Kuwait’s leaders have, on nine occasions (1976-1981, 1986-1992, 2003, 2006,
2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2016), conducted a constitutional dissolution of the Assembly,
mandating new elections within 60 days. Some oppositionists seek a constitutional monarchy in
which an elected Assembly majority would name a Prime Minister, who would form a cabinet.
Factions in and Outside the National Assembly
Political parties are not permitted, and factions compete in Assembly elections as “currents,”
“trends,” or “political societies.” These factions also organize at a paral el traditional Kuwaiti
forum cal ed the diwaniyya—informal evening social gatherings, hosted by elites of al
ideologies. Factions in Kuwait general y group as follows:1
Government Supporters
 “Tribalists.” Draw support from general y less educated, tribal-oriented
constituents in towns and vil ages in the outer rings of Kuwait City. Sometimes
referred to as “service deputies”—primarily focused on steering government
largesse and patronage to their constituents.
 Shias. Most Shias in the Assembly are Islamists, organized in a bloc cal ed the
National Islamic Al iance. These parliamentarians have tended to side with the
government.
 Women. The women elected to the National Assembly, to date, have al tended to
support the government.
Government Critics/Opponents
 “Liberals” and Youths. The leaders of this grouping are highly educated, secular
elites. Since 2008, Kuwaiti youth groups have organized to support Kuwait’s
liberal figures, using such names as the “Orange Movement” or “Fifth Fence.”
 Sunni Islamists. Kuwait’s Sunni Islamists general y criticize the royal family as
secular. The Sunni Islamists have tended to affiliate either with the Muslim
Brotherhood supporters (Islamic Constitutional Movement, ICM), or harder-line
“Salafists.” Neither has a record of violence. However, the government has
sought to disband the Brotherhood’s Kuwaiti charity arm, Islah.

1 T he descriptions of Kuwait’s factions are widely discussed among experts, many of whom might differ somewhat in
their descriptions. T his sketch of Kuwait’s factions is a product of multiple conversations between the author and
Kuwaiti and other observers of Kuwaiti politics.
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Political Turmoil: Repeated Assembly Suspensions and Elections
Disputes between the Al Sabah and oppositionists in the Assembly after Amir Jabir’s death in
2006 manifested as repeated Assembly suspensions and elections, none of which resolved
differences over the power balance between the executive and the Assembly. The State
Department has consistently cal ed Kuwait’s elections “general y free and fair.
In three National Assembly elections during 2006-2009 (June 26, 2006; May 17, 2008; and May
16, 2009), divisions between the government and powerful National Assembly deputies emerged
over the role of the Assembly in overseeing government decisions. During the period, the
government accepted an Assembly demand to reduce the number of electoral districts to five
(from 25), and the first women were al owed to run (2006) and won seats (2009).
The Arab uprisings that began in early 2011 expanded the divisions between the government and
the elites in the National Assembly to the broader citizenry. In January 2011, opposition deputies,
supported by youths, forced the Interior Minister to resign for failing to prevent the use of torture
in prisons. Following al egations that two Kuwaiti banks had deposited $92 mil ion into the
accounts of several parliamentarians, on November 16, 2011, oppositionists in and outside the
Assembly stormed the Assembly building and demanded the Prime Minister’s resignation. On
November 28, 2011, he did so, and the Amir appointed then-Defense Minister Shaykh Jabir al-
Mubarak Al Sabah to that post. He was sworn in without first naming a new cabinet, a technical
constitutional breach.
 February 2, 2012, Election. On December 6, 2011, Amir Sabah dissolved the
National Assembly and set new elections for February 2, 2012. Opposition
candidates advocating a fully elected government and legalization of political
parties won 32 of the 50 seats, but none of the 19 female candidates was elected.
Turnout was about 62%. A leading opposition figure, Ahmad al-Sadun, returned
to the Speaker post he held during 1985-1999, and four oppositionists were
named to the cabinet. In June 2012, when the Assembly requested to gril the
Interior Minister, the Amir exercised his constitutional authority to suspend the
Assembly for one month.
 December 2012 Election Triggered by Court. On June 20, 2012, the
constitutional court voided the December 2011 Assembly suspension on technical
grounds and reinstated the May 2009 Assembly. The Amir set new elections for
December 1, 2012, and decreed that each voter would cast a bal ot for one
candidate (per district), rather than four – a change that appeared intended to
complicate opposition efforts to forge al iances. A boycott by Sunni Islamist
factions produced a “pro-government” Assembly, including an unprecedented 17
Shias. Three women were elected, as were some independent Sunni Islamists.
 Another Court-Triggered Election on July 27, 2013. On June 16, 2013, the
Constitutional Court upheld the Amir’s decree that each person would vote for
only one candidate per district (see above), but dissolved the Assembly for
improper technicalities in the Amir’s election decree. New elections were held on
July 27, 2013, and eight women ran (out of 418 candidates). Several opposition
groups, including the ICM, boycotted again, producing another pro-government
Assembly. A miscount deprived one of the two women winners of her seat, and
the other resigned in 2014. The cabinet included one Shia and four Salafists.
 November 26, 2016 Election. Public demonstrations general y subsided after
2013, and oppositionists indicated that they would participate in the next
Assembly elections. Citing “circumstances in the region” (an apparent reference
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to the region’s several conflicts) the Amir suspended the Assembly and set new
elections for November 26, 2016—earlier than planned. Of the 454 candidates,
15 were women. The main opposition political societies participated, and the vote
produced an Assembly split between pro-government and opposition deputies.
Recent Developments
To forestal Assembly chal enges, the Amir dissolved the cabinet in October 2017, but appointed
a new government in December 2017 with a policy outlook little different from its predecessor.
The Amir’s son, Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah, was appointed First Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister. Two of the appointees were women—the Minister of Social and
Labor Affairs, and the Minister of State for Housing and for Services Affairs.
Following the Amir’s returned to Kuwait on October 16, 2019, after medical treatment in the
United States, parliamentary questioning of al eged corruption led to chal enges to two ministers,
including one of the women cabinet ministers, Minister of Public Works Jenan Bushehri, who
resigned before a likely vote of no confidence. On November 14, 2019, the government of Prime
Minister Jabir al-Mubarak Al Sabah, resigned, and the Amir named Shaykh Sabah al-Khalid Al
Sabah, who was serving as foreign minister, as the new Prime Minister. In concert with the
reshuffle, the Amir also dismissed his son from his senior posts for accusing a rival, the Interior
Minister, of al owing embezzlement of almost $800 mil ion in public funds.2
The next National Assembly elections are due to be held in late 2020—four years after the last
election.
Table 2. Composition of the National Assembly
Feb.
2008
2012
Dec. 2012
July 2013
Ideology/Affiliation
Vote
2009 Vote
Vote
Vote
Vote
Nov. 2016 Vote
Sunni Islamist (opposition)
24
14
23
4
3
16
Muslim Brotherhood (ICM) and
(al Salafi, no
(roughly equal numbers of
Salafi
ICM)
ICM and Salafi)
Liberals and al ies (opposition)
7
10
9
1
9
8
Shia (pro-government)
5
9
7
17
8
6
Sunni Independents (tribalists,
14
17
11
28
30
20
pro-business deputies, and
women). Pro-government
Women (pro-government)
0
4
0
3
1
1
included in categories above
Source: CRS, based on articles and analysis from various observers.
Note: Some members of the National Assembly might span several different categories, and several sources
often disagree on precise categorizations of the members of the Assembly.

2 “Kuwait’s ruler fires son over feud with fellow minister.” Associated Press. November 18, 2019.
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Broader Human Rights Issues3
The State Department human rights report for 2019 identifies the principal human rights issues in
Kuwait as: “reports of torture; arbitrary detention; political prisoners; arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy; restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet, including
criminalization of libel, censorship, and internet site blocking; interference with the rights of
peaceful assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement; trafficking
in persons; criminalization of consensual adult male same-sex sexual conduct; and reports of
forced labor, principal y among foreign workers.”
Two of the most prominent independent human rights organizations in Kuwait are the Kuwait
Society for Human Rights and the Kuwait Association for the Basic Evaluation of Human Rights,
both of which have been al owed access to Kuwait’s prisons. Another human rights organization
in the country is the Human Rights Diwan (office).
Readouts of most high-level U.S.-Kuwait meetings indicate that U.S.-Kuwait discussions focus
mainly on security and regional issues.4 However, some U.S. democracy promotion funds have
been used for Kuwait to train civil society activists, enhance the capabilities of independent
Kuwaiti media, and promote women’s rights. In FY2016, the United States gave about $51,000 to
the National Endowment for Democracy, for an unspecified grantee, to promote civil society in
Kuwait. Some of the $4.5 mil ion registered by the “USAID Explorer” database for FY2017, and
the $3.1 mil ion registered for FY2018, was obligated for civil society training and related
functions in Kuwait, but it is unclear what proportion of those funds were spent on Kuwaitis/in
Kuwait.5 For FY2018, about $235,000 was obligated for programs to combat trafficking in
persons specifical y in Kuwait. No funds were spent on civil society programs in Kuwait in
FY2019, and none was requested for FY2020 or FY2021, according to the State Department
foreign operations budget justifications for FY2021.
Women’s Rights
Kuwaiti women enjoy substantial legal rights, but are not treated equal y by custom and tradition.
The law does not specifical y prohibit domestic violence, although courts try such cases as
assault. Kuwaiti women who marry non-Kuwaiti men cannot give their spouses or children
Kuwaiti citizenship, although Kuwaiti men can give their foreign spouses and their children
citizenship. Female police officers in public places combat sexual harassment.
Women serve in national appointed positions and, since 2006, have been able to run and vote in
national elections, although the number of women elected to the National Assembly has always
been smal (see the table above). Women are al owed to drive and own businesses. An estimated
16% of the oil sector workforce is female. Women run several Kuwaiti organizations dedicated to
women’s rights, such as the Kuwait Women’s Cultural and Social Society,

3 Much of this section, including all subsections, is from the State Department’s country report on human rights
practices for 2019. “ Kuwait.”
4 For example: T he White House. “ Remarks by President Obama and Amir Sabah Al-Sabah of Kuwait after Bilateral
Meeting.” September 13, 2013.
5 USAID Explorer Database. Kuwait. FY2017, 2018, and 2019. Accessed in May 2020.
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Trafficking in Persons and Labor Rights6
For eight years ending in 2015, Kuwait was designated by the State Department’s Trafficking in
Persons report as “Tier Three” (worst level). Kuwait’s rating was assessed in the 2016, 2017, and
2018 reports as “Tier 2: Watch List,” and was further upgraded to “Tier 2” in the report for 2019
(latest available). The 2019 report credits Kuwait for deploying a specialized unit to initiate more
criminal investigations of trafficking crimes and for increasing prosecutions under the anti-
trafficking law.
On broader labor issues, there have been repeated reports of beatings and rapes of domestic
workers, who are almost always expatriates, by their Kuwaiti employers. These reports have
occasional y caused diplomatic difficulties for Kuwait. In February 2018, following reports that a
Filipina maid had been found dead in an apartment freezer in Kuwait, Philippines President
Rodrigo Duterte barred travel by Philippines citizens to Kuwait. In 2016, the Kuwaiti government
set a minimum monthly wage for maids working in Kuwait.
Kuwait’s labor laws protect the right of workers to form and join unions, conduct legal strikes,
and bargain collectively, but contain significant restrictions on labor activism. However, the only
trade federation authorized by the government, to date, is the Kuwait Trade Union Federation
(KTUF). Foreign workers, with the exception of domestic workers, are al owed to join unions .
Since 2011, some strikes have taken place, including by employees of Kuwait Airways.
Status of Noncitizens and “Stateless Persons“ (Bidoons)
Non-Gulf Arabs, Asians, and stateless residents continue to face discrimination, and the issue of
their citizenship rights remains unresolved. According to Kuwait government figures, there are
approximately 88,000 stateless persons (“bidoons,” the Arabic word for “without”) in the country,
while Human Rights Watch estimated the Bidoon population at more than 100,000 in 2018. In
March 2011, the government set a deadline of 2017 to resolve the status of the Bidoons, but that
deadline was not met. According to the State Department human rights report, since 2010 the
government has given citizenship to smal numbers of Bidoons.
Freedom of Expression and Media Freedoms
Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Kuwait has increasingly restricted freedom of
expression. Since 2014, the government has revoked the citizenship of some naturalized Kuwaitis
for criticizing the government, but it cannot legal y revoke the citizenship of Kuwait-born
citizens. In July 2015, Kuwait enacted a cybercrimes law that punishes insulting religious figures,
criticizing the Amir, or harming Kuwait’s relations with other countries.
An official end to government press censorship in 1992 fostered the growth of a vibrant
independent media, but the Press and Publications Law of 2006 establishes topics that are off
limits for publication and discussion. Publishers and bloggers must be licensed by the Ministry of
Information. Kuwait (like other GCC states) has increasingly used and enacted laws against the
use of social media to criticize the government. Kuwait’s penal code (Article 25) provides for up
to five years in jail for “objecting to the rights and authorities of the Amir or faulting him.” On the
other hand, in September 2019 one Kuwaiti court ruled that “such freedom [to express political
opinion on social media] is “enshrined” in the country’s constitution.7

6 T he most recent State Department “Trafficking in Person” report is for 2019.
7 State Department Human Rights Report for 2019. Kuwait.
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Religious Freedom8
Recent State Department religious freedom reports have noted little change in Kuwait’s respect
for religious freedoms. There is no registration requirement for religious groups, but al non-
Muslim religious groups must obtain a license to establish official places of worship. Religious
groups are general y able to worship without interference, but they report difficulties obtaining
permission to construct new facilities. Despite opposition from Kuwaiti Islamists, the government
has licensed seven Christian churches to serve the approximately 750,000 Christians in Kuwait
(almost al are expatriates): Protestant, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Coptic Orthodox,
Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, and Anglican. About 400 Baha’i’s, 100,000 Buddhists,
250,000 Hindus, and 10,000 Sikhs (mostly noncitizens) also work in Kuwait. Among Kuwaiti
citizens, about 300 are Christian, several are Baha’i, and none are Jewish.
Of the 30% of Kuwait’s population that are Shia Muslims, about half are Arabs original y from
Saudi Arabia, and half are of Persian origin. Kuwaiti Shias are wel represented in the rank and
file of the military and security apparatus as wel as government, and are able to select their own
clerics without government interference. However, some Kuwaiti Shias continue to report official
discrimination, including limited access to religious education and places of worship.
U.S.-Kuwait Relations and Defense Cooperation
Kuwait was not strategical y or political y close to the United States until the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988), when Kuwait, then a backer of Iraq, sought U.S. help against Iranian attacks. Prior
to that, a U.S. consulate opened in Kuwait in October 1951 and was upgraded to an embassy upon
Kuwait’s independence from Britain in 1961. Kuwait was the first Gulf state to establish relations
with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, perhaps reflecting the political strength of relatively left-wing
Kuwaiti figures. The U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait is Alina Romanowski, who formerly was the
principal deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department.
Amir Sabah has met with President Trump on several occasions, most recently in September
2018. His scheduled August 2019 meeting with President Trump was postponed when the Amir
was hospitalized.
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), Strategic Dialogue, and
Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) Status
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the U.S. role in ending the Iraqi occupation,
deepened the U.S.-Kuwait defense relationship. A formal bilateral Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) was signed on September 19, 1991, seven months after the U.S.-led expulsion
of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. The DCA had an initial duration of 10
years, but remains in effect.9 The text is classified, but reportedly provides for mutual discussions
in the event of a crisis; joint military exercises; U.S. evaluation of, advice to, and training of
Kuwaiti forces; U.S. arms sales; prepositioning of U.S. military equipment; and U.S. access to a
range of Kuwaiti facilities.10 The DCA is accompanied by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),

8 State Department report on International Religious Freedom for 2018. Released June 21, 2019.
9 Department of State fact sheet. “ U.S. Security Cooperation with Kuwait.” March 20, 2020.
10 Hajjar, Sami. U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges and Prospects. U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute.
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an agreement that the U.S. Department of Defense typical y requires to ensure that U.S. forces are
subject only to U.S. law. Since 2016, the United States and Kuwait have held regular “Strategic
Dialogue” meetings on bilateral security cooperation.11
Kuwait’s military has more than regained its pre-Iraq invasion strength of 17,000. U.S. officials
say that the U.S. training and mentorship has improved the quality of the Kuwaiti military,
particularly the Air Force. Kuwait, like other manpower-short GCC states, has sometimes used
military help from third countries such as Pakistan.12
U.S. Troops in Kuwait and Facilities Used
At the time of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, nearly 14,000 U.S. troops remained in
Kuwait under the DCA.13 Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis noted during a December 2017
visit to Kuwait that only Germany, Japan, and South Korea host more U.S. forces than Kuwait
does. The U.S. force includes Army combat troops, not purely support forces, giving the United
States the capability to project ground force power in the region. Kuwait hosts the headquarters
for the U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State (Operation Inherent Resolve) and has made
its military facilities available to coalition partners in that military campaign. The numbers of
U.S. military personnel deployed to Kuwait might sometimes fluctuates, but the number is
roughly at the 2011 level as of early 2020 – about one-third of the total U.S. forces deployed in
and around the Gulf, including in Iraq and Afghanistan.14
U.S. forces in Kuwait are stationed at several facilities that include Camp Arifjan (the main U.S.
headquarters in Kuwait, 40 miles south of Kuwait City); a desert training base and firing range
cal ed Camp Buehring (near the border with Saudi Arabia); Ali Al Salem Air Base; Ahmad al-
Jabir Air Base; and a naval facility cal ed Camp Patriot. In addition, U.S. forces are using a large
facility at Kuwait’s international airport as the largest U.S. air logistics in the region. This
function is scheduled to relocate to West Al Mubarak Air Base when that facility is completed in
2023.15 The United States maintains about 2,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
vehicles in Kuwait,16 and U.S. armor prepositioned in Kuwait was used for the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. (In December 2005, U.S. forces vacated Camp Doha, the headquarters for U.S. forces in
Kuwait during the 1990s.)
Major Non-NATO Ally Status
Recognizing Kuwait’s consistent and multifaceted cooperation with the United States, on April 1,
2004, the George W. Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a “major non-NATO al y
(MNNA),” a designation held by only one other Gulf state (Bahrain). The designation qualifies
Kuwait for increased defense-related research and development cooperation with the United
States, but does not expedite U.S. executive branch approval of arms sales to Kuwait.

11 Department of State. Remarks with Kuwait First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al-
Khaled al-Hamad al-Saba at the U.S.-Kuwait Strategic Dialogue.
12 Middle East Media Research Institute. April 22, 2014.
13 T hom Shanker. “In Kuwait, Panetta Affirms U.S. Commitment to Middle East,” New York Times, December 11,
2012.
14 U.S. Central Command figures provided to the Congressional Research Service. January 2020.
15 Naser al-Wasmi. “ Kuwait to host largest US milit ary airport in Middle East .” The National, July 15, 2018.
16 State Department Fact Sheet on Security Cooperation with Kuwait.
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Operational Defense Cooperation: 1980s-the Present
The fol owing sections discuss U.S.-Kuwait defense cooperation in regional conflicts.
1980s: Iran-Iraq War
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran had sought to compel Kuwait to end its financial and logistical
support for Iraq by striking Kuwaiti oil facilities, such as the Al Ahmadi terminal, with cruise
missiles. In 1987-1988, the United States established a U.S. naval escort and tanker reflagging
program to protect Kuwaiti and international shipping from Iranian naval attacks (Operation
Earnest Wil ).
1990s: Operation Desert Storm and Iraq Containment
Kuwait’s leaders were shaken by the August 2, 1990, Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait,
which lasted until U.S.-led coalition forces of nearly 500,000 expel ed Iraqi forces from Kuwait
in “Operation Desert Storm” (January 16, 1991-February 28, 1991). Kuwait’s leaders, who spent
the occupation period in Saudi Arabia, were restored to power. Kuwait paid $16.059 bil ion to
offset the U.S. incremental war costs.17
After the war, about 4,000 U.S. military personnel—and enough prepositioned U.S. armor to
outfit two combat brigades—were stationed at Kuwaiti facilities to contain Iraq. The 1992-2003
enforcement of a “no fly zone” over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch, OSW) involved
1,000 U.S. Air Force personnel deployed at Kuwaiti air bases. Kuwait contributed about $200
mil ion per year for U.S. costs of these operations,18and two-thirds of the $52 mil ion per year
U.N. budget for the 1991-2003 Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) that monitored the
Iraq-Kuwait border.19
2003-2011: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Post-Saddam Iraq
Kuwait supported the U.S. decision to militarily overthrow Saddam Hussein, and hosted the bulk
of the U.S. OIF force of about 250,000, as wel as the other coalition troops that entered Iraq in
March 2003. Kuwait also provided $266 mil ion to support the U.S. combat effort. Kuwaiti forces
did not enter Iraq. During 2003-2011, there were about 25,000 U.S. troops based in Kuwait, not
including those deploying to Iraq. According to the Defense Department, Kuwait contributed
about $210 mil ion per year in similar in-kind support to the costs incurred by the U.S. military in
Kuwait during 2003-2011.
2014-Present: Operation Inherent Resolve
Kuwait, along with the other GCC states, joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in
September 2014. It has hosted the operational headquarters for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).
“ARCENT”—the U.S. Army component of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)—is based in
Kuwait, and the ARCENT commander serves as overal U.S. commander of OIR. Kuwait also

17 Office of Management and Budget from data provided by Departments of Defense, State, and T reasury. Provided to
CRS, 1991.
18 Author conversation with U.S. military official in Kuwait. February 2014.
19 Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (S/2003/393). March 31, 2003.
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has al owed other coalition partners to base military equipment for their participation in OIR.20
Kuwait did not conduct any air strikes against the Islamic State in Syria.
For FY2020, according to the Appendix, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2020, Kuwait was expected to make estimated contributions to U.S. operations as follows: $136
mil ion for the Al ied Contributions and Cooperation Account (compensate local employees,
military construction, and supplies and services); and $198 mil ion to the Mutual y Beneficial
Account (for construction, maintenance, and repair projects beneficial to DoD and to Kuwaiti
forces. It is not known whether those anticipated contribution levels have been affected by the
sharp fal in the price of oil, exports of which Kuwait depends upon, that resulted from the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Defense Cooperation with Other Countries/NATO Center
Kuwait has supported efforts to promote greater military coordination among the GCC countries,
including the GCC decision in 2013 to form a joint military command. Kuwait has also sought
cooperation with other non-Arab U.S. partners. In December 2011, NATO and Kuwait began
discussing opening a NATO center in Kuwait City as part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
(ICI) initiated in 2004. The NATO center, formal y titled the NATO-ICI Regional Center, opened
on January 24, 2017.21 On October 1, 2018, the NATO-ICI Regional Center held its first annual
meeting to review the center’s performance.22 In November 2018, Kuwait opened a diplomatic
office at NATO. In November 2017, Kuwait signed an agreement with France to strengthen their
defense cooperation. The two countries hold military exercises in Kuwait each November.
U.S. Arms Sales to Kuwait
U.S. arms sales to Kuwait are intended, according to Defense Department notification to
Congress, to promote interoperability with U.S. forces. Kuwait is considered a wealthy state that
can fund its own purchases. Kuwait has, in some years, received smal amounts of U.S. assistance
in order to qualify Kuwait for a discount to send its officers for training in the United States, but it
is not eligible to receive U.S. excess defense articles. As of March 2020, according to the State
Department security cooperation fact sheet cited above, the United States has $19.3 bil ion in
active government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. Among the major U.S.
sales to Kuwait are:
 Missile Defense Systems. Since the late 1990s, Kuwait has bought U.S.-made
Patriot antimissile fire units as wel as al owed the United States to deploy U.S.-
owned Patriots in Kuwait.23 Kuwait has not announced whether it wil buy the
more sophisticated U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missile defense system. On May 28, 2020, the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency said the State Department had approved the sale of 84 Patriot Advanced
Capability (PAC-3) interceptor missiles and related equipment for an estimated
cost of $800 mil ion.24

20 “Kuwait Plays Uneasy Host as Canadian Jets Join Anti-ISIS Campaign.” Canada Television News, October 29, 2014.
21 NAT O press announcement. January 24, 2017.
22 Kuwait News Agency. October 1, 2018.
23 “Kuwait Calls U.S. Decision to Remove Missile Systems ‘Routine.’” Reuters, September 26, 2018.
24 “U.S. State Department clears $1.4 billion sale of Patriot air and missile system to Kuwait .” Reuters, May 8, 2020.
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 Combat Aircraft/F-18s. The core of Kuwait’s fleet of combat aircraft is 40
F/A-18 combat aircraft Kuwait bought in 1992. In 2015, Kuwait asked to buy up
to 40 additional F/A-18s.25 The Obama Administration notified Congress of the
sale of up to 32 F-18s. Kuwait later ordered 28 of them (estimated value of $5
bil ion).26
 Tanks. In 1993, Kuwait bought 218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 bil ion.
Delivery was completed in 1998. Kuwait has not bought U.S. tanks since, but in
2017 it bought new tank hulls, armament, and engines for its U.S.-made tank
force, at an estimated sale value of $29 mil ion.27
 Apache Helicopters. In September 2002, Kuwait bought 16 AH-64 (Apache)
attack helicopters, valued at about $940 mil ion.
 Tactical Missiles. In 2008, Kuwait bought 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). On July 30, 2018, DSCA notified
Congress of a potential sale to Kuwait of 300 additional Hel fire air-to-ground
missiles, with an estimated value of $30.4 mil ion.
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
In some past years (FY2007-2010), Kuwait received very smal amounts ($10,000-$20,000 per
year) in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding. The aid was provided
primarily to qualify Kuwait for discounts on the training it pays for its officers to undergo in the
United States. Kuwait spends a total of about $10 mil ion per year on this program, which funds
approximately 200 Kuwaiti military personnel to study intel igence, pilot training, and other
disciplines at various U.S. military institutions.
Foreign Policy Issues
Kuwait has long been aligned with the United States and the other GCC states. Kuwait has tended
to act within a GCC consensus and to try to preserve GCC unity as an effective means for
countering regional threats. Amir Sabah has been the key Gulf mediator of the intra-GCC rift that
erupted in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain—asserting that Qatar implements
policies fundamental y at odds with other GCC states—broke relations with Qatar and denied it
land, air, and sea access to their territories. Then-Secretary of State Rex Til erson conducted
largely unsuccessful “shuttle diplomacy” on the issue from Kuwait in July 2017, and later that
year Amir Sabah worked with President Trump to broker brief direct talks between Qatar’s Amir
Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al
Saud. Kuwait did not join Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE in withdrawing their ambassadors
from Qatar for several months in 2014 over similar issues.
In at least one instance, Kuwait has acted militarily to defend the leaders of other GCC countries
from internal unrest. Kuwait sent a naval unit to support the March 14, 2011, intervention of the
GCC’s “Peninsula Shield” unit to assist Bahraini security forces against an uprising that began

25 “Kuwait Says Sticks to F-18 Jets Despite Approval Delays.” Reuters, January 21, 2016; “Kuwait to Sign Eurofighter
Jet Deal with Italy: Minister. Gulf News, February 12, 2016. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, T he Government
of Kuwait –F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Aircraft with Support. T ransmittal No. 16 -21. November 17, 2016.
26 White House. Remarks by President T rump and Emir Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah of Kuwait in Joint Press
Conference. September 7, 2017.
27 DSCA T ransmittal Number 17-16. October 16, 2017.
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that month, but did not send ground troops into Bahrain. The Kuwaiti naval unit departed in July
2011. Kuwait’s involvement came despite opposition from some Kuwaiti Shias.
Relations with Iraq
Kuwait’s contentious relationship with Iraq long predated the rule of Saddam Hussein. At the
1922 Conference of Al-ʿUqayr, Britain negotiated the Kuwait-Saudi border, with substantial
territorial loss to Kuwait. A memorandum in 1923 set out the border with Iraq on the basis of an
unratified 1913 convention. The first Iraqi claim to Kuwait surfaced in 1938, the year oil was
discovered in the emirate. Although neither Iraq nor the Ottoman Empire had ever actual y ruled
Kuwait, Iraq asserted a claim to at least part of Kuwait, notably the islands of Bubiyan and Al-
Warbah. Immediately after Britain recognized Kuwait’s independence in June 1961, Iraq renewed
its claim, which was rebuffed by British and Arab League forces. It was not until October 1963
that Iraq formal y recognized both Kuwait’s independence and, subsequently, its borders, while
continuing to press for access to the islands.
The threat from Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq was not the only concern for Kuwait. Pro-Iranian
Shia opposition groups in Iraq conducted attacks in Kuwait. The December 1983 bombings of the
U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and an attempted assassination of the Amir in May 1985
were attributed to the Iran-inspired Iraqi Da’wa (Islamic Cal ) Party. Seventeen Da’wa activists
were arrested for those attacks. Da’wa activists hijacked a Kuwait Airlines plane in 1987.
Even though two of Iraq’s post-Saddam leaders (Nuri al-Maliki and Haider Al Abadi) had been
members of the Da’wa Party’s political wing, Kuwait has built political ties to them and other
Shia politicians in Iraq that have been prominent in Iraq’s post-Saddam leadership. On July 18,
2008, Kuwait named its first ambassador to Iraq since the 1990 Iraqi invasion. On January 12,
2011, then-Prime Minister Nasser became the first Kuwait Prime Minister to visit Iraq since the
invasion. Then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki visited Kuwait in 2011 and 2012, paving the
way for Amir Sabah’s attendance at the March 27-29, 2012, Arab League summit in Baghdad that
marked Iraq’s return to the Arab fold. The speaker of Kuwait’s National Assembly visited Iraq on
February 28, 2019, to mark the anniversary of the end of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Kuwait
ran a humanitarian operation center (HOC) that gave over $550 mil ion in assistance to Iraqis
from 2003 to 2011. In 2008, Kuwait hosted a regional conference on Iraq’s stability attended by
the United States and Iran. In 2018, Kuwait held a conference that raised $30 bil ion to help Iraq
reconstruct after its announced defeat of the Islamic State organization, which seized large parts
of Iraqi territory in 2014.
Residual Issues from the Iraqi Invasion
Some residual issues from the Iraqi invasion remain. In August 2012, the Iraqi government vowed
to “end al pending issues with Kuwait before the start of [2013]”—a statement that reflected
Iraq’s insistence that the U.N. Security Council remove any “Chapter 7” (of the U.N. Charter)
mandates on Iraq stemming from the invasion. During a visit to Iraq by Kuwait’s Prime Minister
on June 12, 2013, the two countries agreed to take the issues of stil -missing Kuwaitis and
Kuwaiti property out of the Chapter 7 supervision of the United Nations and replac e them with
alternative mechanisms, as discussed below. On December 15, 2010, the U.N. Security Council
passed three resolutions—1956, 1957, and 1958—that ended Saddam-era sanctions against Iraq
but did not end the “Chapter 7” U.N. mandate or the 5% automatic revenue deductions for
reparations payments, discussed below.
Reparations Payments. Until 2014, 5% of Iraq’s oil revenues were devoted to funding a U.N.
escrow account that, since 1991, has been compensating the victims of the Iraqi invasion of
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Kuwait. The U.N. Compensation Commission (UNCC), created by the post-Desert Storm U.N.
resolutions, paid out about $52 bil ion awarded to over 100 governments and 1.5 mil ion
individual claimants by the time it ended in April 2015. As of that time, the last remaining amount
to be paid was $4.6 bil ion of a $14.7 bil ion awarded for damage to Kuwaiti oilfields during the
Iraqi occupation. Since then, Iraq has made several payments and reduced the outstanding
balance to about $3.7 bil ion.28 In the context of the COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020, Iraq has
asked Kuwait to cancel or accept a delay in further payments of reparations.
Missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti National Archives. The U.N. resolutions of December 2010
continued the effort, required under post-1991 war U.N. Security Council resolutions (primarily
687), to resolve the fate of the 605 Kuwaitis and third party nationals missing and presumed dead
from the 1991 war, as wel as that of the Kuwaiti national archives. A U.N. envoy, Gennady
Tarasov, was U.N. High-Level Coordinator for these issues. The June 16, 2013, visit to Iraq of the
Kuwaiti Prime Minister resulted in an Iraq-Kuwait joint recommendation to remove these issues
of missing property and persons from the Chapter 7 U.N. mandate. That recommendation was
endorsed in the U.N. Secretary-General’s report of June 17, 2013. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2107 of June 27, 2013, abolished the High-Level Coordinator mandate and transferred
the supervision of these issues to the U.N. Assistance Mission—Iraq (UNAMI)—under Chapter
VI of the U.N. Charter.29
As of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the search process had located the remains of 236 Kuwaitis,
leaving 369 cases unresolved. More than 10,000 trenches have been dug to search for remains,
and former members of Saddam’s regime have been interviewed. In August 2019, some progress
was announced with the handover to Kuwait of the remains of 48 Kuwaiti citizens discovered in a
mass grave in southern Iraq.30 This leaves about 321 cases yet to be resolved. Kuwait has been a
donor to the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, which is the lead Iraqi agency trying to determine
the fate of the Kuwaitis.
As far as the Kuwaiti National Archives, Annex I to a June 17, 2013, report (U.N. document
S/2013/357) contained a list of al the Kuwaiti property returned to Kuwait by Iraq since 2002. In
June 2012, Iraq returned to Kuwait numerous boxes of tapes from Kuwait’s state radio, books
belonging to Kuwait University, and keys to Kuwait’s Central Bank. In November 2018, Iraqi
President Barham Salih brought to Kuwait some Kuwaiti archival material that had been found.
Kuwait-Iraq Border. Disputes over the Iraq-Kuwait border, some of which apparently were a
factor in Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, have been mostly resolved. Under post-1991 Gulf War
U.N. Security Council Resolution 833, the Council accepted the U.N.-demarcated border between
them. Kuwait insisted that post-Saddam Iraqi governments formal y acknowledge Iraq’s
commitments under that resolution to pay some of the costs of border markings and signs. As a
consequence of the March 2012 Maliki visit to Kuwait, Iraq agreed to pay its portion of the costs
of maintaining the border markings. Sea border markings and related issues were resolved in
2013. In 2017, Iraq ceded to Kuwait greater access to the shared Khor Abdullah waterway.
Other Outstanding Bilateral Disputes/Iraqi Airways. Kuwait has not forgiven about $25 bil ion
in Saddam-era debt, but Kuwait has not apparently been pressing the Iraqi government for
payment. The March 2012 Maliki visit resolved Kuwait Airways’ assertion that Iraq owed Kuwait
$1.2 bil ion for planes and parts stolen during the Iraqi invasion with agreement for Iraq to pay

28 “Kuwait receives $270m in war reparations.” T he Times, July 23, 2019.
29 Actions under Chapter VI do not carry the enforcement mechanisms of those adopted under Chapter VII.
30 “Iraq Hands over Human Remains to Kuwait.” Reuters, August 8, 2019.
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Kuwait $300 mil ion in compensation, and to invest $200 mil ion in an Iraq-Kuwait joint airline
venture. Subsequent to the visit, Iraq-Kuwait direct flights resumed.
Iran
Kuwait undertakes consistent high-level engagement with Iran, in part reflecting a legacy of
Kuwait’s perception of Iran as a counterweight to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. After 1991, Kuwait
often hosted pro-Iranian anti-Saddam Iraqi Shia oppositionists for talks, some of whom were
members of groups that had conducted attacks in Kuwait in the 1980s. Amir Sabah visited Iran in
June 2014, including meetings with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i. Iran’s
President Hassan Rouhani visited Kuwait and Oman in February 2017, in an unsuccessful attempt
to establish a broader Iran-GCC dialogue.
Yet, as a GCC and Sunni Arab state and a close U.S. al y, Kuwaiti leaders support U.S. efforts to
reduce Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in the region. Kuwaiti firms have not been cited for
any violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran, and Kuwait has not pursued a plan to import Iranian
natural gas. In January 2016, Kuwait downgraded relations with Iran over the sacking of Saudi
diplomatic facilities in Tehran and Mashhad by demonstrators protesting the Saudi execution of
dissident Saudi Shia cleric Nimr al Baqr Al Nimr.
Kuwait publicly supported the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
JCPOA), and Kuwait’s Foreign Ministry reacted to the Trump Administration’s May 8, 2018,
announcement of its exit from the JCPOA by expressing “understanding” that U.S. suggestions
for improving the accord were not adopted.31 Kuwaiti officials have indicated that the country
wil join a U.S.-backed Middle East Strategic Al iance (MESA) to counter Iran, if such a bloc is
formed, but discussions on the pact have general y stal ed amid the continuing intra-GCC rift.
Kuwait reportedly told U.S. officials it would join a U.S.-led maritime security coalition to try to
deter further Iranian attacks on Gulf commercial shipping, which Iran conducted during May–
July 2019 in response to U.S. sanctions. The security operation, termed the International
Maritime Security Construct, was inaugurated in Bahrain in November 2019.32 Kuwait has also
purchased missile defense equipment that supports U.S. efforts to forge a joint GCC missile
defense network against Iran. At the same time, Kuwait has advocated de-escalation of U.S.-Iran
tensions – tensions that have led to some hostilities.33
Kuwait has been vigilant in preventing Iran from undermining security inside Kuwait. In 2010,
Kuwait arrested some Kuwaiti civil servants and stateless residents for al egedly helping the
IRGC-QF plot to blow up Kuwaiti energy facilities.34 In September 2015, Kuwait arrested 25
Kuwaiti Shias and one Iranian who had reportedly hidden explosives near the border with Iraq.35
In January 2016, a criminal court sentenced two of the defendants, including the Iranian (in
absentia), to death, and 12 to prison terms. Another 12 were acquitted.

31 “Kuwait Follows up U.S. Announcement on Iran’s Nuclear Deal with Great Interest.” Kuwait News Agency, May 9,
2018.
32 “Qatar, Kuwait told U.S. they will join naval coalition, official says.” Reuters, November 25, 2019.
33 See: CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J.
McInnis, and Clayton T homas
34 “Iran Cell Planned Attacks in Kuwait, Minister Says. Reuters, April 21, 2011.
35 “Kuwait charges 'terror cell tied to Iran and Hezbollah'” Al Jazeera, September 1, 2015.
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Syria
Kuwait’s leaders asserted that Syrian President Bashar Al Asad should leave office in the face of
the 2011 rebel ion there and Kuwait, along with the other GCC states, closed its embassy in
Damascus in 2012. Kuwaiti officials say the government has not funded or armed any Syrian
rebel groups, and neither Kuwait nor any GCC state deployed ground forces to Syria. In
December 2014, Kuwait al owed Syria to reopen its embassy in Kuwait to perform consular
services for the approximately 140,000 Syrians living there. Kuwaiti officials have said they
would work within an Arab League consensus on the question of rebuilding ties to the Asad
regime.36
Kuwait has focused on helping civilian victims of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, including
hosting several major donors’ conferences for victims of the Syria and co-chairing a donors’
conference for victims of the conflict, held on April 4-5, 2017, in Brussels. It has provided several
bil ion in humanitarian support for this purpose.37 Al of Kuwait’s donations have been composed
mostly of donations to nine U.N. agencies and to the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). Kuwait hosts about 145,000 Syrians who fled that conflict.
In October 2018, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE donated $2.5 bil ion to Jordan to help it
cope with the financial burdens of hosting Syrian and Iraqi refugees.
Yemen
After an Arab Spring-related uprising in Yemen in 2011, Kuwait and its GCC al ies brokered a
transition that led to the departure of longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh in January 2012.
However, in January 2015, the elected government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi fled in the face
of an offensive by Iran-backed Zaydi Shia Houthi rebels. In March 2015, Kuwait joined the
Saudi-led coalition that intervened militarily to try to restore the Hadi government. Kuwait’s has
conducted air strikes on Houthi-led positions using Kuwait’s U.S.-made F-18s.38 In part because
of its wil ingness to engage Iran, the key backer of the Houthis, Kuwait has also hosted U.N.-
mediated talks between the warring sides.
Kuwaiti Policy on Other Regional Conflicts and Issues
Kuwait’s positions do not always align with al of its GCC partners.
Egypt/Muslim Brotherhood
Kuwaiti leaders, as do those of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, claim that the Islamist organization
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt supports Brotherhood-linked oppositionists in the GCC, including
members of Kuwait’s Brotherhood-linked factions. Since President Mohammad Morsi, a senior
Brotherhood figure who was elected president in 2012, was deposed by the Egyptian military in
July 2013, Kuwait has given at least $8 bil ion to Egypt in grants, loans, and investments. Kuwait
also has arrested and deported some Egyptians in Kuwait for conducting (pro-Muslim
Brotherhood) political activities.

36 “Kuwait expects more Arab countries to reopen embassies in Damascus: KUNA.” Reuters, December 31, 2018.
37 T heodore Karasik and T ristan Ober” Kuwait’s Apprehension about Normalizing Relations with Syria.” Atlantic
Council, May 21, 2019.
38 Kuwait Air Force chief inspects troops with coalition in Yemen. Kuwait News Agency, March 13, 2018.
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Palestinian-Israeli Dispute
Kuwaiti leaders were at odds with then-Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat for opposing war to end
Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, and they expel ed about 450,000 Palestinian workers after the 1991
war. Kuwait subsequently built and has maintained ties to Hamas, an Islamist rival to Arafat’s
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA).39
Kuwaiti officials say they wil not follow the lead of Oman, UAE, and Saudi Arabia in building
quiet ties to Israel’s government,40 or forging a U.S.-brokered “non-aggression pact” with Israel.
Kuwait remains supportive of a Palestinian state. In 2018, Kuwait used its seat on the U.N.
Security Council to block U.S.-backed efforts to censure PA President Mahmoud Abbas for an
anti-Semitic speech, and it blocked U.S. condemnation of Hamas attacks on Israel.41 Kuwait has
increased donations to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to about $50
mil ion per year, since the Trump Administration ended U.S. donations to that organization in
January 2018.42 Kuwait opposed the Trump Administration’s recognition that Israel’s capital is in
Jerusalem, and it did not attend the June 2019 U.S.-sponsored “workshop” in Bahrain at which
the Trump Administration presented its economic proposals for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Yet,
Kuwait’s Foreign Ministers attended a U.S.-sponsored Middle East conference in Warsaw, Poland
during February 13-14, 2019, during which Arab state foreign ministers discussed regional topics
alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Earlier, during 1992 to 1997, Kuwait attended—but did not host—multilateral working group
talks with Israel on arms control, water resources, refugees, and other issues related to Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations. In 1994, Kuwait and the other GCC states ceased enforcement of the
secondary (trade with firms that deal with Israel) and tertiary (trade with firms that do business
with blacklisted firms) Arab boycotts of Israel. However, Kuwait did not, as did Qatar and Oman,
subsequently exchange trade offices with Israel, and it retained the Arab League boycott on trade
with Israel (“primary boycott”).
North Korea
Like other GCC states, Kuwait has hosted a significant number of North Korean laborers (about
3,000), whose earnings are mostly remitted to the North Korean government. In concert with
increased U.S. pressure on North Korea in 2017, Kuwait expel ed North Korea’s ambassador (the
only North Korean ambassador in the Gulf) and four other North Korean diplomats in September
2017. North Korea’s embassy in Kuwait City subsequently remained open but with only a smal
staff. Kuwait also ceased renewing visas for North Korean workers, causing them to start leaving,
and it halted trade ties and direct flights between the two.43

39 “Kuwait Seizes the Palestinian Cause.” Jerusalem Post, reprinted in Middle East Forum. June 16, 2018.
40 “Kuwait Rejects Israel T ie Normalisation Claims.” Gulf News, February 17, 2019.
41 Jonathan Schanzer and Varsha Koduvayur. “Kuwait Best Get with the Program - or be Prepared to Face T rump’s
Wrath.” Op-ed. New York Post, June 29, 2018.
42 See: CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by Jim Zanotti
43 “Qatar, Kuwait Stop Renewing Visas for North Korean Workers.” Reuters, September 19, 2017.
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Domestic Terrorism and Counterterrorism Cooperation44
Kuwait has prevented most, but not al , terrorist attacks by the Islamic State and other groups,
since an Islamic State attack on a mosque in Kuwait City on June 26, 2015, kil ed 27 persons. In
July 2016, Kuwait said its security forces thwarted three planned Islamic State terrorist attacks in
Kuwait, including a plot to blow up a Shia mosque.45 In October 2016, an Islamic State-inspired
individual of Egyptian origin drove a truck into a vehicle carrying U.S. military personnel, but no
U.S. personnel were injured or kil ed. In April 2017, a suspected mid-ranking leader of the
Islamic State was extradited from the Philippines to Kuwait for involvement in operational
planning to attack Kuwait.46 Kuwait has claimed to have uncovered and foiled multiple Iran-
backed attacks in Kuwait in recent years.
U.S. agencies help Kuwait’s counterterrorism efforts, border control, and export controls. Recent
State Department fact sheets on security cooperation with Kuwait, referenced above, state that
Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior and National Guard participate in U.S. programs to work with local
counterterrorism units via training and bilateral exercises. At the September 8, 2017, U.S.-Kuwait
Strategic Dialogue meeting in Washington, D.C., Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior signed a
counterterrorism information sharing arrangement with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and the U.S. Customs and Border Control signed an agreement to share customs
information with Kuwait’s director general of customs. Kuwait also has ratified a Saudi-led GCC
“Internal Security Pact” to enhance regional counterterrorism cooperation. In 2011, Kuwait
introduced biometric fingerprinting at Kuwait International Airport and has since extended that
system to land and sea entry points.
Kuwait long sought the return of two prisoners held at the U.S. facility in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, under accusation of belonging to Al Qaeda. Both were returned to Kuwait by January 2016.
Kuwait built a rehabilitation center to reintegrate them into society after their return.
Terrorism Financing Issues
The State Department report on international terrorism for 2018, cited above, general y praises
Kuwait government efforts to counter the financing of terrorism, but the report cited few new
Kuwaiti initiatives. Earlier State Department reports cited the Central Bank of Kuwait for
implementing a “same business-day” turnaround policy for imposing U.N. terrorism financing-
related measures requiring banks to monitor U.N. sanctions lists proactively. A 2013 Kuwaiti law
provided a legal basis to prosecute terrorism-related crimes and freeze terrorist assets. In June
2015, the National Assembly passed a law that criminalized online fundraising for terrorist
purposes.
Kuwait is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF).
Kuwait developed an action plan to meet the broader FATF’s standards of anti-money laundering
and counterterrorism financing (AML/CTF) and, in 2014, Kuwait was deemed no longer deficient
on AML/CFT by the FATF. In 2017, Kuwait joined two counter terrorism-financing conventions,
the Egmont Group and the U.S.-GCC “Terrorist Financing Targeting Center” (TFTC). However,
Kuwait declined to designate Lebanese Hezbol ah Secretary-General Hassan Nasral ah as a
sanctioned entity.

44 Information in this section from: State Department Country Reports on T errorism: 2018. Release d October 2019.
45 “Kuwait Says It T hwarted 3 Planned ISIS Attacks.” Reuters, July 3, 2016.
46 Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 14, 2017.
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Stil , Kuwaiti donors have been able provide funds for various regional armed factions, including
the Al Qaeda affiliate Al Nusra Front operating in Syria (which publicly severed its connection to
Al Qaeda and changed its name in August 2016).47 A Treasury Department official said on March
4, 2014, that the appointment of a leading Kuwaiti donor to Al Nusra, Nayef al-Ajmi, as Minister
of Justice and Minister of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf), was “a step in the wrong direction.”48
Subsequently, Ajmi resigned his posts.49 On August 6, 2014, the Treasury Department imposed
sanctions on two Ajmi tribe members and one other Kuwaiti50 under Executive Order 13224,
which sanctions entities involved in terrorism. In March 2017, two Kuwaitis were sanctioned by
the United Nations Security Council for al egedly providing financial support to Al Nusra Front,
and the Treasury Department sanctioned a Kuwaiti person under E.O 13324 for providing support
to Al Nusrah Front and Al Qaeda. Earlier, in June 2008, the Treasury Department froze the assets
of a Kuwait-based charity—the Islamic Heritage Restoration Society—for al eged links to Al
Qaeda, under E.O. 13224.
Countering Violent Extremism. State Department terrorism reports also praise Kuwait’s programs
that encourage moderation in Islam in Kuwait. The government supports a number of local
counter-messaging campaigns on radio, television, and bil boards. In late 2015, the government
moved a “Center for Counseling and Rehabilitation” from Central Prison to a new facility with an
expanded faculty and broadened mandate. In July 2017, the government established a new
Directorate for Cybersecurity within the Higher Authority for Communication to “fight violent
extremism.” In 2018, Kuwait’s Ministry of Education implemented a program to counter
extremist ideology in schools through teacher training and student counseling.
U.S. Assistance
Although Kuwait is a wealthy state that gets virtual y no U.S. foreign assistance, the United
States has, at times, provided very smal amounts of aid in the form of training to improve
Kuwait’s counter terrorism financing and law enforcement authorities.51 In FY2016, about $3,000
was provided for counter-narcotics programs. For FY2017, about $4 mil ion (mostly Economic
Support Funds, ESF) was obligated for programs in Kuwait to combat weapons of mass
destruction, and about $460,000 was provided by DoD for counter-narcotics programs. No funds
have been provided since or requested for FY2021, according to the USAID Explorer database
and State Department budget documents.
Economic Issues
Global economic experts recommend that Kuwait should reduce its economic dependence on oil
exports, but hydrocarbons sales stil represent about 90% of government export revenues and
about 54% of its gross domestic product (GDP).52 Because Kuwait requires that crude oil sel for
about nearly $75 per barrel to balance its budget—wel above prices for most of the time since
2014—Kuwait has run budget deficits of about $15 bil ion per year since 2015. Kuwait’s

47 Ben Hubbard. “Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria.” New York Times, November 13, 2013.
48 Department of the Treasury. Remarks of Under Secretary for T errorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen
before the Center for New American Security on “Confronting New T hreats in T errorist Financing.” March 4, 2014.
49 Karen DeYoung. “Kuwait Cabinet Minister Resigns after Allegations.” May 13, 2014.
50 Department of the Treasury, Office of the Press Secretary. August 6, 2014.
51 Obligations provided in: USAID “Explorer” Database, accessed in July 2019.
52 World Bank. “ Kuwait's Economic Update — April 2020.” April 16, 2020.
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budgetary deficiencies have been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic that has caused oil prices
to fal to wel below Kuwait’s “break-even price.” Even before the COVID-19 outbreak, Kuwait
had been deferring capital infrastructure investment and reducing public sector salaries and
subsidies, according to the IMF and other observers.
Kuwait has a large sovereign wealth fund, managed by the Kuwait Investment Authority, with
holdings estimated at nearly $600 bil ion.53 Kuwait produces about 2.5 mil ion barrels per day
(mbd) of crude oil, adhering to OPEC production agreements.
Using National Assembly legislation that took effect in 2010, the government has moved to
privatize some state-owned industries. However, the privatization of Kuwait Airways was
cancel ed, in part because of opposition from the airline’s workforce. Domestic political disputes
delayed opening Kuwait’s northern oil fields to foreign investment to generate about 500,000
barrels per day of extra production. However, as part of the country’s “New Kuwait 2035”
economic strategy, in March 2018, Kuwait announced a vision to develop a large “Northern
Gateway” economic opportunity zone encompassing five natural islands in northern Kuwait.54
That project has since been retitled “Silk City,” after attracting investment from China as part of
that country’s region-wide Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The project, which might involve
almost $90 bil ion in total investment, wil encompass a new airport, railways, and port facilities.
Nuclear Power. As do other Gulf states, Kuwait sees peaceful uses of nuclear energy as important
to its economy over the long term. In 2012, Kuwait formal y abandoned plans announced in 2011
to build up to four nuclear power reactors. The government delegated any continuing nuclear
power research to its Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR). Kuwait is cooperating with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure international oversight of any nuclear
work in Kuwait. In FY2015, the United States provided about $38,000 to help train Kuwaiti
personnel in nuclear security issues, and about $58,000 was provided in FY2016 for this purpose.
No U.S. funds have been provided since, according to the USAID Explorer Database.
U.S.-Kuwait Economic Issues
In 1994, Kuwait became a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In
February 2004, the United States and Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has
said it seeks. In the course of the September 8, 2017, U.S.-Kuwait Strategic Dialogue, the U.S.
Department of Commerce finalized a memorandum of understanding with Kuwait’s Direct
Investment Promotion Authority to encourage additional investments in both countries. Kuwait
gave $500 mil ion worth of oil to U.S. states affected by Hurricane Katrina. In July 20119,
Kuwait signed a contract with U.S. oil services firm Hal iburton, reportedly worth about $600
mil ion, to explore for oil offshore in Kuwait – a first such deal with a U.S. firm for the Kuwait
Petroleum Corp.
The United States’ imports of oil from Kuwait have been declining as U.S. oil imports have
declined general y. Total U.S. exports to Kuwait were less than $3 bil ion in 2018, and imports
were about $2.1 bil ion. Exports to Kuwait were at about that same level in 2019, but imports
declined to about $1.3 bil ion, reflecting reduced U.S. oil imports.55 U.S. exports to Kuwait
consist mostly of commercial aircraft, automobiles, industrial equipment, and foodstuffs.

53 http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/.
54 T he National (UAE). March 21, 2018.
55 U.S. Census Bureau. Foreign T rade Statistics. Accessed May 2020.
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Figure 1. Kuwait at a Glance

Population: About 4.6 mil ion, of which 1.4 mil ion are citizens
GDP (purchasing power parity, PPP): $300 bil ion
Religions: Muslim 85% (of which: Sunni 70%, Shia 30%); other (Christian, Hindu, Parsi) 15%
GDP per capita (PPP): $70,000/year
GDP growth rate: 2% (2019), but expected to decline in 2020 due to COVID-19 outbreak
Unemployment: 2%
Inflation: 2.5%
Oil (proven reserves): 102 bil ion barrels, 6% of world proven reserves
Oil production: 2.5 mil ion barrels per day
Oil exports: 2.15 mil ion barrels per day
Sources: Map created by CRS using data from Department of State, Esri, and Google Maps (2013). Fact
information from CIA, The World Factbook, and IMF; various press.

Author Information

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Congressional Research Service
RS21513 · VERSION 127 · UPDATED
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