The Vacancies Act: A Legal Overview
Updated May 28, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44997

The Vacancies Act: A Legal Overview

Summary
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (Vacancies Act) generally provides the exclusive
means by which a government employee may temporarily perform the nondelegable functions
and duties of a vacant advice-and-consent position in an executive agency. Unless an acting
officer is serving in compliance with the Vacancies Act, any attempt to perform the functions and
duties of that office will have no force or effect.
The Vacancies Act limits a government employee’s ability to serve as an acting officer in two
primary ways. First, the Vacancies Act provides that only three classes of people may serve
temporarily in an advice-and-consent position. As a default rule, the first assistant to a position
automatically becomes the acting officer. Alternatively, the President may direct either a senior
official of the agency or a person serving in any other advice-and-consent position to serve as the
acting officer. Second, the Vacancies Act limits the length of time a person may serve as acting
officer: a person may serve either (1) for a limited time period running from the date that the
vacancy occurred or (2) during the pendency of a nomination to that office. The Vacancies Act is
primarily enforced when a person who has been injured by an agency’s action challenges the
action based on the theory that it was taken in contravention of the Act.
There are, however, a few key limitations on the scope of the Vacancies Act. Notably, the
Vacancies Act has largely been interpreted to govern the ability of a person to perform only those
functions and duties of an office that are nondelegable. Unless a statute or regulation expressly
specifies that a duty must be performed by the absent officer, that duty may likely be delegated to
another government employee. In other words, delegable job responsibilities are outside the
purview of the Vacancies Act. In addition, if another statute expressly authorizes acting service,
that other statute may render the Vacancies Act nonexclusive, or possibly even inapplicable.
This report first describes how the Vacancies Act operates and outlines its scope, identifying
when the Vacancies Act applies to a given office and which offices are exempt from its
provisions. The report then explains who may serve as an acting officer and for how long,
focusing on the limitations the Vacancies Act places on acting service. Next, the report discusses
the Vacancies Act’s enforcement mechanisms. Finally, the report turns to evolving legal issues
regarding the application of the Vacancies Act, including a discussion of how other federal laws
may limit the Act’s reach. Specifically, the report concludes by examining the interaction of the
Vacancies Act with agency-specific statutes, the ability to delegate the duties of a vacant office,
and constitutional considerations.

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The Vacancies Act: A Legal Overview

Background
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution generally requires high-level “officers of the United
States” to be appointed through nomination by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate.1 However, appointment to these advice-and-consent positions can be a lengthy process,
and officers sometimes unexpectedly vacate offices, whether by resignation, death, or other
absence, leaving before a successor has been chosen. In particular, there are often a large number
of vacancies during a presidential transition, when a new President seeks to install new officers in
important executive positions.2 In the case of such a vacancy, Congress has long provided that
individuals who were not appointed to that office may temporarily perform the functions of that
office.3
Generally, to serve as an acting officer for an advice-and-consent position, a government officer
or employee must be authorized to perform the duties of a vacant office by the Federal Vacancies
Reform Act of 1998 (Vacancies Act).4 The Vacancies Act allows only certain classes of
employees to serve as an acting officer for an advice-and-consent position,5 and specifies that
they may serve for only a limited period.6 If a covered acting officer’s service is not authorized by
the Vacancies Act, any attempt by that officer to perform a “function or duty” of a vacant office
has “no force or effect.”7
This report first describes how the Vacancies Act operates and outlines its scope, identifying
when the Vacancies Act applies to a given office and which offices are exempt from its
provisions. The report then explains who may serve as an acting officer and for how long,
focusing on the limitations the Vacancies Act places on acting service. Next, the report discusses
how the Vacancies Act is enforced. Finally, the report turns to evolving legal issues regarding the
application of the Vacancies Act, including a discussion of how other federal laws may limit the
Act’s reach. Specifically, the report concludes by examining the interaction of the Vacancies Act
with agency-specific statutes, the ability to delegate the duties of a vacant office, and
constitutional considerations.
Scope and Operation of the Vacancies Act
The Vacancies Act generally provides “the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting
official to perform the functions and duties of any office of an Executive agency . . . for which

1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). If the vacancy exists
“during the Recess of the Senate,” the Constitution also allows the President to appoint an officer to serve until “the
End of [the Senate’s] next Session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See generally CRS Report RS21308, Recess
Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions, by Henry B. Hogue.
2 See, e.g., CRS Report R40119, Filling Advice and Consent Positions at the Outset of Recent Administrations, 1981–
2009, by Henry B. Hogue, Michael Greene, and Elizabeth Rybicki (available to congressional clients upon request).
3 See, e.g., Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 209–10 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing
vacancies legislation dating back to 1792).
4 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349c.
5 Id. § 3345.
6 Id. §§ 3346, 3349a.
7 Id. § 3348(d).
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appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.”8 As discussed in more detail below, however, the Vacancies Act may sometimes operate
in tandem with agency-specific statutes that provide for a specific official to serve in the case of a
vacancy.9 The Vacancies Act’s requirements are triggered if an officer serving in an advice-and-
consent position in the executive branch “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the
functions and duties of the office.”10 Some have suggested that the Vacancies Act may not apply
in the case of a presidential removal from office11 or in the case of a temporary rather than
permanent absence,12 but the phrase “unable to perform the functions and duties of the office”
appears relatively broad on its face, and the Vacancies Act does not expressly exclude firings or
temporary absences.13
Because the Vacancies Act is generally exclusive and subject to limited exceptions,14 a person
may not temporarily perform “the functions and duties” of a vacant advice-and-consent position
unless that service comports with the Vacancies Act.15 The Vacancies Act specifies that a
“function or duty” is one that, by statute or regulation, must be performed by the officer in
question.16 Section 334817 provides that, “unless an officer or employee is performing the
functions and duties [of an office] in accordance with” the Act,18 “the office shall remain
vacant.”19 If there is no acting officer serving in compliance with the Vacancies Act, then
generally “only the head of [an agency] may perform” the functions and duties of that vacant
office.20 As a result, Section 3348 usually allows three types of people to perform the functions

8 Id. § 3347(a).
9 See infra “Exclusivity of the Vacancies Act.”
10 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345, 3348. The heads of executive agencies are required to report any vacancies, along with
information about acting officers and nominations, “to the Comptroller General of the United States and to each House
of Congress.” Id. § 3349(a).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Valencia, No. 5:17-CR-882-DAE, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200564, at *11–12 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 27, 2018); Ben Miller-Gootnick, Boundaries of the Federal Vacancies Act, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 459, 460
(2019).
12 Cf., e.g., English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 322 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting party’s argument that agency-specific
statute referring to “absence or unavailability” includes only vacancies resulting from “temporary” conditions,
opposing this language to that of the Vacancies Act), appeal dismissed, No. 18-5007, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19856
(D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018).
13 The Vacancies Act expressly refers to at least one form of temporary absence: sickness. See 5 U.S.C. § 3346
(providing that time limits on acting service do not apply to “a vacancy caused by sickness”).
14 See infra “Which Offices?”
15 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3347–3348.
16 Id. § 3348(a)(2); see infra “What Are the “Functions and Duties” of an Office?”
17 This report refers to specific sections of the Vacancies Act using their location in Title 5 of the U.S. Code, rather than
referring to sections of Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-611 (1998).
18 Specifically, the statute requires compliance with Sections 3345, 3346, and 3347. See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b). Section
3345 sets out three classes of people who may serve as acting officers, id. § 3345; Section 3346 prescribes time
limitations for acting service, id. § 3346; and Section 3347 provides that the Vacancies Act is exclusive unless another
statutory provision expressly allows a person to “perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in
an acting capacity,” id. § 3347(1). These requirements are explained in more detail infra, “Vacancies Act Limitations
on Acting Service.”
19 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b).
20 Id. This provision allowing the head of the agency to perform functions and duties of the vacant office does not apply
to an office that is “the office of the head of an Executive Agency.” Id. § 3348(b)(2). Accordingly, if an office
designated vacant under this provision is that of the agency head, it appears likely that no one can temporarily perform
the functions and duties of that office under the Vacancies Act. See S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 19 (1998) (“If the head of
the agency position is vacant for more than 150 days without a nomination being sent to the Senate, the office is to
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and duties of an advice-and-consent office when it is vacant: the agency head, a person
complying with the Vacancies Act, or a person complying with another statute that allows acting
service.21 Section 3348 further provides that “an action taken by any person who” is not
complying with the Vacancies Act “in the performance of any function or duty of a vacant office .
. . shall have no force or effect.”22 The Vacancies Act also states that an agency may not ratify any
acts taken in violation of the statute.23 These enforcement mechanisms are discussed in more
detail below.24
Which Offices?
The Vacancies Act generally applies to advice-and-consent positions in executive agencies.25 The
term “Executive agency”26 is defined broadly in Title 5 of the U.S. Code to mean “an Executive
department, a Government corporation, [or] an independent establishment.”27 However, the
Vacancies Act explicitly excludes certain offices altogether.28 First, the Vacancies Act does not
apply to officers of “the Government Accountability Office.”29 Second, a distinct provision states
that the Vacancies Act does not apply to (1) a member of a multimember board that “governs an
independent establishment or Government corporation”; (2) a “commissioner of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission”; (3) a “member of the Surface Transportation Board”; or (4) a
federal judge serving in “a court constituted under article I of the United States Constitution.”30
Additionally, while not excluded from the other requirements of the Vacancies Act,31 certain
offices are exempt from the provision allowing only agency heads to perform the duties of a
vacant office and the provision that renders noncompliant actions void.32 Specifically, Section
3348(e) states that “this section”—Section 3348—“shall not apply to”
(1) the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board;

remain vacant.”).
21 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b).
22 Id. § 3348(d)(1). 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(1) defines “action” by reference to 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), which in turn defines
“agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
thereof, or failure to act.”
23 Id. § 3348(d)(2).
24 See infra “Consequences of Violating the Vacancies Act.”
25 5 U.S.C. § 3347.
26 Id.
27 See id. § 105 (defining “executive agency” for purposes of Title 5 of the U.S. Code); Applicability of the Fed.
Vacancies Reform Act to Vacancies at the Int’l Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 24 Op. O.L.C. 58, 61 (2000)
(using 5 U.S.C. § 105 to define the term “executive agency,” as used in the Vacancies Act).
28 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345, 3348.
29 Specifically, the general provisions making the Vacancies Act applicable to officers of executive agencies specify
that the relevant executive agencies “includ[e] the Executive Office of the President,” but exclude the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). Id. §§ 3345(a), 3347(a), 3348(b), 3349(a). Although the GAO is generally considered to
be a legislative agency rather than an executive branch agency, see, e.g., Colonial Press Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 788
F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015), it is expressly excluded from the Vacancies Act—likely because another statute, 5
U.S.C. § 104, expressly identifies the GAO as an “independent establishment” falling within the generally applicable
definition of “executive agency” provided in 5 U.S.C. § 105.
30 5 U.S.C. § 3349c.
31 Id. § 3348(e); NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 944 (2017) (concluding 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1) applied to
Acting General Counsel of National Labor Relations Board and holding his service violated the Vacancies Act).
32 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b), (d), (e).
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The Vacancies Act: A Legal Overview

(2) the General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority;
(3) any Inspector General appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate;
(4) any Chief Financial Officer appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate; or
(5) an office of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and
other than the Government Accountability Office) if a statutory provision expressly
prohibits the head of the Executive agency from performing the functions and duties of
such office.33
The legislative history of the Vacancies Act sheds some light on the purpose of this exemption,
suggesting that Congress sought to exclude these “unusual positions” from Section 3348 because
these officials are meant to be “independent” of the commission or agency in which they serve.34
The Senate report accompanying the Act suggests that Congress intended “to separate the official
who would investigate and charge potential violations of the underlying regulatory statute from
the officials who would determine whether that statute had actually been violated.”35 Allowing
the head of the agency to perform the nondelegable duties of these positions would undermine the
independence of these positions.36
It is not entirely clear what the consequences are if an acting officer in one of these exempt
positions violates the Vacancies Act. Because Section 3348 does not apply to those positions, it
appears that any noncompliant actions should not be rendered void.37 Instead, a court might
conclude that any noncompliant acts are merely voidable—or could conclude that even if these
officers violate the Vacancies Act, that law will not invalidate their actions.38 In NLRB v. SW
General, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the service of the Acting General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) violated the Vacancies Act, but noted that this position
was exempt “from the general rule that actions taken in violation of the [Vacancies Act] are void
ab initio.”39 The Court affirmed the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) vacating the Acting General Counsel’s noncompliant actions, but
did not explicitly reconsider the issue of remedy.40
The D.C. Circuit in S.W. General, Inc. had itself clarified that it was not fully exploring the
question of the appropriate remedy and was merely assuming, on the basis of the parties’
arguments, “that section 3348(e)(1) renders the actions of an improperly serving Acting General
Counsel voidable, not void.”41 Because the D.C. Circuit assumed that the contested actions were

33 5 U.S.C. § 3348(e).
34 S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 20 (1998). This portion of the report was discussing the exemptions for General Counsels,
but the report gave distinct, but substantively similar explanations for exempting the “agency inspectors general.” See
id. The report did not specifically discuss sub-subsection (4), containing the exemption for Chief Financial Officers, see
id., because this provision was added subsequent to the committee’s consideration of the bill, 144 CONG. REC. S12823
(daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson).
35 S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 20 (1998).
36 Id.
37 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d), (e).
38 See SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
39 NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938 n.2 (2017).
40 See id. (noting that the NLRB had not sought certiorari on this issue).
41 SW Gen., Inc., 796 F.3d at 79. Similarly, in Hooks ex rel. NLRB v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., 816 F.3d 550, 564
(9th Cir. 2016), the court dismissed a petition issued by the same Acting General Counsel, citing the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion to conclude that his actions were voidable. However, the court expressly noted that the NRLB had “waived any
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voidable rather than void, the court considered but ultimately rejected two legal doctrines—the
harmless error and de facto officer doctrine—that could have allowed the court to uphold the
NLRB’s action.42 If the Acting General Counsel were not exempt from Section 3348 and his
noncompliance with the Vacancies Act had rendered his acts void ab initio, the court could not
have considered whether these other legal doctrines cured the initial legal error with the Acting
General Counsel’s actions.43
Finally, the Vacancies Act contemplates that other statutes may, under limited circumstances,
either supplement or supersede its provisions.44 Section 3347 provides that the Vacancies Act is
exclusive unless “a statutory provision expressly” authorizes “an officer or employee to perform
the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity.”45 However,
Section 3347 states that a general statute authorizing the head of an executive agency “to delegate
duties statutorily vested in that agency head to, or to reassign duties among, officers or employees
of such Executive agency” will not supersede the limitations of the Vacancies Act on acting
service.46 For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 510, which states generally that the Attorney General may
authorize any other employee to perform any function of the Attorney General, likely would not
render the Vacancies Act nonexclusive.47 To supplement or supersede the Vacancies Act, a statute
must “expressly” authorize “acting” service.48 Under certain circumstances, it might be the case

arguments based on the FVRA’s exemption clause, 5 U.S.C. § 3348(e), and it [did] not otherwise contest the remedy
sought by [the party challenging the petition].” Id. See also Creative Vision Res., L.L.C. v. NLRB, 882 F.3d 510, 528
n.6 (5th Cir. 2018); Quality Health Servs. of P.R., Inc. v. NLRB, 873 F.3d 375, 383 n.7 (1st Cir. 2017); Hooks v.
Remington Lodging & Hospitality, L.L.C., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1178, 1189 (D. Alaska 2014).
42 SW Gen., Inc., 796 F.3d at 79; id. at 81 (holding error had not been rendered harmless by subsequent de novo review
and ratification of the complaint by a properly appointed General Counsel); id. at 82 (holding NLRB had not shown
that the de facto officer doctrine should apply in this case to bar plaintiff’s attack on the complaint because the doctrine
allows collateral attacks against actions taken by officers acting under the color of official title, so long as those
challenges are properly preserved and the agency had reasonable notice of the defect in the officer’s title to office).
43 See id. at 81; 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d), (e).
44 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3347, 3348(b). Nor does the Vacancies Act apply if “the President makes an appointment to fill a
vacancy in such office during the recess of the Senate pursuant to clause 3 of section 2 of article II of the United States
Constitution.” Id. § 3347(a)(2).
45 Id. § 3347(a)(1). 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1)(A) refers to statutes that authorize “the President, a court, or the head of an
Executive department, to designate” acting officers, while 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1)(B) refers to statutes that themselves
designate acting officers. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 102(e) (creating assistant secretary and general counsel positions and
authorizing those officials to serve as acting officials).
46 5 U.S.C. § 3347(b). Legislative history suggests that Congress intended this provision to definitively counter the
assertion of the Department of Justice that “its organic statute’s ‘vesting and delegation’ provision” rendered the
Vacancies Act’s limitations inapplicable. 144 CONG. REC. S11021 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Fred
Thompson). See also id. at S11025 (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd) (“Most importantly . . . it is a bill which will, once
and for all, put an end to these ridiculous, specious, fallacious arguments that the Vacancies Act is nothing more than
an annoyance to be brushed aside.”); id. at S11026 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“[The bill] would make clear that
the act is the sole legal statutory authority for the temporary filling of positions pending confirmation. . . . I think in the
opinion of probably most Senators that loophole does not exist. But, nonetheless, whether it is a real one or an
imaginary one, it has been used by administrations in order to have people temporarily fill positions pending
confirmation for just simply too long a period of time, which undermines the Senate’s advice and consent authority.”);
id. at S11028 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (“[T]he Attorney General’s misguided interpretation of the current
Vacancies Act . . . . practically interprets the Act out of existence”); 144 CONG. REC. S12823 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (“[T]he organic statutes of the Cabinet departments do not qualify as a statutory
exception to this legislation’s exclusivity in governing the appointment of temporary officers.”).
47 See 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1).
48 Id. The committee report on the 1998 bill noted that the bill would “retain[] existing statutes” that contained such an
express authorization. S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 15–16 (1998). For further discussion of how other statutes may interact
with the Vacancies Act, see infra “Exclusivity of the Vacancies Act.”
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that more than one statute governs acting service in a given office,49 and that a person could
lawfully serve as an acting officer under either statute.50
The Vacancies Act also makes certain exemptions for holdover provisions in other statutes:
Section 3349b provides that the Vacancies Act “shall not be construed to affect any statute that
authorizes a person to continue to serve in any office” after the expiration of that person’s term.51
What Are the “Functions and Duties” of an Office?
The Vacancies Act limits an officer or employee’s ability to perform “the functions and duties” of
a vacant advice-and-consent office.52 For the purposes of the Vacancies Act, a “function or duty”
must be (1) established either by statute or regulation and (2) “required” by that statute or
regulation “to be performed by the applicable officer (and only that officer).”53 If the function or
duty is established by regulation, that regulation must have been in effect “at any time during the
180-day period preceding the date on which the vacancy occurs.”54
There is relatively little case law clarifying what “functions and duties” are within the scope of
the Vacancies Act, but one trial court asserted that there are at least two ways to interpret this
definition.55 First, the functions and duties of a vacant office could include all the responsibilities
that are expressly assigned only to one particular office.56 Second, this definition could refer to a
more limited category of duties that are not only assigned to one office, but also may not be
delegated to any other official.57 The text referring to duties “required” to be performed “only” by
the specific officer could support either reading.58
Starting with the second, narrower reading of “function or duty,” if a duty is delegable, one can
say that it may be performed by other officials and therefore is not a duty that may be performed

49 See, e.g., Temporary Filling of Vacancies in the Office of U.S. Attorney, 27 Op. O.L.C. 149, 149 (2003) (“Both
statutes [28 U.S.C. § 546 and the Vacancies Act] are available.”).
50 See United States v. Lucido, 373 F. Supp. 1142, 1150 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (“[U]nder both 28 U.S.C. § 508 and 5
U.S.C. § 3345, the Deputy Attorney General assumes the duties of the vacant position.”). In Lucido, a district court
upheld the actions of an acting officer who had exceeded the time limitations of an older version of the Vacancies Act,
holding that a separate statute, 28 U.S.C. § 508(a), had authorized him to assume the duties of the Attorney General
while acting in his position as Deputy Attorney General. Id. at 1151.
51 5 U.S.C. § 3349b. Additionally, Section 3345, which limits the types of people who can serve as an acting officer,
includes a special provision allowing the President to direct certain officers who serve a fixed term in an executive
department to continue to serve as an acting officer. See infra note 101; 5 U.S.C. § 3345(c)(1). See also Inapplicability
of the Fed. Vacancies Reform Act’s Reporting Requirements When PAS Officers Serve Under Statutory Holdover
Provisions, 23 Op. O.L.C. 178, 179 (1999) (concluding “there is no vacancy to be reported under the Act when a PAS
officer continues service under a holdover provision,” but noting that this conclusion is not entirely clear).
52 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345(a), 3348(b), (d).
53 Id. § 3348(a)(2). The definition of “function or duty” is found in 5 U.S.C. § 3348 and applies only to “this section” of
the Vacancies Act. However, given that Section 3348 creates the Act’s enforcement mechanisms, the definition is
effectively controlling for the rest of the Act, as well. In other words, even if the phrase “functions and duties” as used
in Sections 3345 and 3347 was interpreted to mean something different than the phrase used in Section 3348, a duty
performed by a noncompliant official will have “no force or effect” only if it satisfies the definition in Section 3348.
54 Id. § 3348(a)(2)(B)(ii).
55 L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *68 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020), appeal docketed,
No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2).
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“only” by the officer in the vacant office.59 This understanding appears to be the more common
view of the Vacancies Act: a number of courts,60 along with the executive branch61 and the
Comptroller General,62 have concluded that the Vacancies Act does not prohibit delegation,
allowing agency officials to perform the delegated duties of a vacant office so long as the
delegation is otherwise lawful.63 The legal principles that generally govern courts’ analyses of
whether a delegation is permissible are discussed below.64
Under this view, which finds some support in the legislative history, the Vacancies Act has been
described as applying to only the nondelegable functions and duties of a vacant office.65 Under
this interpretation, an agency could theoretically delegate all of the tasks that had previously been
performed by an officer in a now-vacant advice-and-consent position to another officer or
employee, who could perform all of those delegable tasks without violating the Vacancies Act.66
For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) considered in 2008 whether a senior
official in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, had violated the Vacancies Act by performing the responsibilities of
an absent officer, the Assistant Attorney General for the OLC.67 The GAO concluded that the
principal deputy had not violated the Vacancies Act because he had merely been performing the
duties of his own position, which included the delegated duties of the vacant office.68 The GAO

59 See id.
60 E.g., Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 420–21 (D. Conn. 2008), aff’d, 587 F.3d 132
(2d Cir. 2009). In this case, the Secretary of the Interior delegated all legally delegable duties of a vacant office to an
inferior officer. Id. at 420. One of those duties was the ability to make “tribal acknowledgment decisions.” Id. The
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation challenged the inferior officer’s decision not to acknowledge the tribe, arguing that the
officer was unlawfully exercising a function or duty of a vacant office. Id. at 419. The court considered whether the
authority to make acknowledgement decisions was a nondelegable function and concluded that it was not. Id. at 420–
21. The court also held that it did not matter that the inferior officer had acted after the time period prescribed by the
Vacancies Act because the Act “sets no time limits on redelegations of nonexclusive duties.” Id. at 421.
61 E.g., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, 26 Op. O.L.C. 230, 233–34 (2002).
62 Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 - Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
B-310780, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 101, at *12–13 (Comp. Gen. June 13, 2008).
63 For example, such a delegation will be lawful only if the power was validly delegated by someone with the authority
to do so—which might not be the case if the officer who formerly possessed those powers left without delegating any
responsibilities. See Office of Thrift Supervision v. Paul, 985 F. Supp. 1465, 1474–75 (S.D. Fla. 1997); see also id. at
1475 n.9 (“The Court does not hold that such a designation could be indefinite, and the Court has no occasion to decide
that issue at this time.”).
64 See infra “Delegability of Duties.”
65 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 18 (1998) (“The functions or duties of the office that can be performed only by the
head of the executive agency are therefore defined as the non-delegable functions or duties of the officer . . . .”). Cf,
e.g., Crawford-Hall v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (referring to an office’s “exclusive”
duties).
66 See, e.g., Paul, 985 F. Supp. at 1474–75 (holding that prior version of Vacancies Act was “not implicated” because
officer formerly in vacant office had “validly delegated his responsibilities” to another officer via administrative orders,
and that other officer’s power to act was therefore “derived from the OTS Orders, not the statutory fall back provisions
of the Vacancies Act”).
67 Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 - Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
B-310780, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 101, at *7 (Comp. Gen. June 13, 2008). The Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General had performed these responsibilities after the time periods provided by the Vacancies Act had ended.
Id.
68 Id. at *12–13.
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approved of this delegation after reviewing the relevant statutes and regulations and concluding
that “there [were] no duties” that could be performed only by the Assistant Attorney General.69
The Department of Justice has argued that Congress intended to allow the delegation of “non-
exclusive responsibilities” because Congress “understood” that if only the head of an agency
could perform all of a vacant office’s duties, “the business of the government could be seriously
impaired.”70 This understanding of how government functions also underlies courts’ general
assumption that duties should generally be delegable.71 The Supreme Court has recognized that
an agency head may have so many statutory responsibilities that it would be unreasonable to
think that Congress intended the head to personally perform—or even oversee the performance
of—every single assigned task.72 In the words of the Court, internal agency delegation may be
“necessary for prompt and expeditious action” in circumstances where delay could cause “injury
beyond repair.”73
However, one trial court concluded in March 2020 that the first, broader definition of “function or
duty” described above was more consistent with the operation and purpose of the Vacancies Act.74
Specifically, the court said that the second reading of “function or duty” was “at odds” with
Congress’s intent to prohibit agency heads from invoking general vesting-and-delegation statutes
to evade the Vacancies Act.75 One of the Act’s primary purposes was to prevent the Executive
from appointing “officers of the United States”76 without Senate advice and consent.77
Accordingly, Section 3347 provides that the Vacancies Act is “the exclusive means” to authorize a
person to temporarily perform the duties of a vacant advice-and-consent office, and specifies that
a statute that vests an agency head with the general authority to delegate duties will not suffice to
override the Vacancies Act.78 At the same time, however, a general vesting-and-delegation statute
likely renders many duties of an office delegable,79 and could permit an agency head to delegate
any delegable responsibilities of a vacant office to another official.80 As a result, if the
responsibilities of a particular advice-and-consent position primarily consist of delegable duties, a
general delegation statute could allow an agency employee to perform most of that position’s

69 Id. at *5 (emphasis added). The GAO noted first that there were “no statutory functions or duties for the position of
Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, either non-delegable or delegable.” Id. at *8. The GAO then concluded that
although regulations assigned a number of duties to the Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, and specifically vested
that officer with supervisory responsibility, the regulations were not “sufficiently prescriptive for [the OLC] to
conclude that they assign non-delegable duties.” Id. at *11.
70 Guidance on Application of Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 23 Op. O.L.C. 60, 72 (1999).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Mango, 199 F.3d 85, 91–92 (2d Cir. 1999).
72 Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 122–23 (1947).
73 Id.
74 L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *68 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020), appeal docketed,
No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
75 Id. at *74.
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
77 See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S11021 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (“As participants in
the appointments process, we Senators have an obligation, I believe, to ensure that the appointments clause functions as
it was designed, and that manipulation of executive appointments not be permitted.”).
78 5 U.S.C. § 3347. As discussed supra note 46, the legislative history suggests that legislators were especially
concerned with the fact that the Department of Justice was using general vesting-and-delegation statutes to evade the
Vacancies Act’s limitations on acting service.
79 See L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *69.
80 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per
curiam).
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responsibilities even though that employee was not appointed to that position through the advice-
and-consent process.81 The trial court said that by allowing “the mere existence of . . . vesting-
and-delegation statutes” to “negate” the Vacancies Act’s enforcement mechanisms, the second
reading would be inconsistent with the law’s purpose.82
The court also said that the first reading was supported by the Act’s “lookback” provision
defining “function or duty” to include regulatory duties only if the regulations were in effect
during the 180-day period preceding the vacancy.83 The court stated that this lookback provision
was enacted to prevent agencies from using their general vesting-and-delegation authorities to
circumvent the limits imposed by Vacancies Act.84 In the court’s view, agencies could only “use
their organic authorities to issue rules reassigning duties” if they acted at least 180 days before the
vacancy occurs.85 And although the trial court did not note this particular argument, one could say
that a duty may be performed “only” by a particular officer if that duty is expressly assigned to
that officer and has not, in fact, been delegated to any other officer.86
But as mentioned, the first reading interpreting the Vacancies Act to govern only a narrow set of
nondelegable duties has seemed to be the prevailing view.87 The interpretation of the phrase
“function or duty” has significant implications for an agency’s ability to delegate the duties of a
vacant office and for determining the consequences of violating the Vacancies Act. Both issues
are discussed in more detail below.88
Vacancies Act Limitations on Acting Service
Section 3348 of the Vacancies Act allows only certain officers or employees to perform the
“functions and duties” of a vacant advice-and-consent office.89 Unless an acting officer is serving
in compliance with the Vacancies Act, only the agency head can perform a nondelegable duty of a
vacant advice-and-consent office.90 The Vacancies Act creates two primary types of limitations on
acting service: it limits (1) the classes of people who may serve as an acting officer,91 and (2) the
time period for which they may serve.92

81 L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *68.
82 Id. at *74.
83 Id. at *71.
84 Id.
85 Id. at *72, 76.
86 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2).
87 See, e.g., ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ACTING AGENCY OFFICIALS AND
DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY 28 (2019) (discussing agency practice of using delegations as a substitute for acting
service under the Vacancies Act); Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 12
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (implicitly adopting the narrower view of function or duty).
88 See infra “Delegability of Duties” and “Consequences of Violating the Vacancies Act.”
89 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b).
90 Id. §§ 3345, 3346, 3348. Additionally, as discussed supra notes 44 to 50 and accompanying text, the Vacancies Act
allows a person to perform the duties of an office if another statute expressly authorizes “an officer or employee to
perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity.” Id. §§ 3347, 3348.
91 Id. § 3345.
92 Id. § 3346.
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Who Can Serve as an Acting Officer?
Section 3345 allows three classes of government officials or employees to temporarily perform
the functions and duties of a vacant advice-and-consent office under the Vacancies Act.93 First, as
a default and automatic rule, once an office becomes vacant, “the first assistant to the office”
becomes the acting officer.94 The term “first assistant” is a term of art under the Vacancies Act.95
Nonetheless, the term is not defined by the Act and its meaning is not entirely clear.96 The
Vacancies Act’s legislative history suggests that the term refers to an office’s “top deputy.”97 For
some offices, a statute or regulation explicitly designates an office to be the “first assistant” to
that position.98 However, not all offices have such statutory or regulatory designations, and in
those cases, who qualifies as the “first assistant” to that office may be open to debate.99 One
additional open question is whether a first assistant must be serving at the time the vacancy
occurs, or whether a person who later steps into the first assistant position can also serve as an
acting officer under this provision of the Vacancies Act.100
Alternatively, the President “may direct” two other classes of people to serve as an acting officer
of an agency instead of the “first assistant.”101 First, the President may direct a person who has

93 Id. § 3345.
94 Id. § 3345(a)(1).
95 See 144 CONG. REC. S12822 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (“The term ‘first assistant
to the officer’ has been part of the Vacancies Act since 1868 . . . and the change in wording [to ‘first assistant to the
office’] is not intended to alter case law on the meaning of the term ‘first assistant.’”). Cf., e.g., L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli,
No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *52–53 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020) (looking to a dictionary to determine the
ordinary meaning of the term “first assistant”), appeal docketed, No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
96 Compare Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 156 F.3d 190, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[W]hether
internal [agency] documents referring to Fiechter as a ‘first assistant’ rendered him such for the purposes of the
Vacancies Act is a matter of considerable uncertainty. Our opinion in Doolin [I] recognized that, according to ‘one line
of authority,’ the position of ‘first assistant’ must be created by statute before the automatic succession provision of the
Vacancies Act applies.”) (quoting Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision (Doolin I), 139 F.3d 203, 209
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998)), with Guidance on Application of Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 23 Op. O.L.C. 60, 63
(1999) (“At a minimum, a designation of a first assistant by statute, or by regulation where no statutory first assistant
exists, should be adequate to establish a first assistant for purposes of the Vacancies Reform Act.”).
97 144 CONG. REC. S11037 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (describing “first assistant”
as “a term of art that generally refers to the top deputy”). See also L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *50
(ruling that an official was not a “first assistant” because he occupied a temporary position that would never “serve in a
subordinate role—that is, as an ‘assistant’—to any other . . . official”).
98 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 508 (“[F]or the purpose of section 3345 of title 5 the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant
to the Attorney General.”); 28 C.F.R. § 0.137(b) (2019) (“Every office within the Department to which appointment is
required to be made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . shall have a First Assistant within
the meaning of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998. Where there is a position of Principal Deputy to the . . .
office, the Principal Deputy shall be the First Assistant. Where there is no position of Principal Deputy . . . , the First
Assistant shall be the person whom the Attorney General designates in writing.”).
99 See supra note 96; see also Designating an Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, slip op. at 8
(Op. O.L.C. Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1220591/download (stating that where an agency has
multiple deputy directors, “none of them is obviously the . . . Director’s ‘first assistant’”).
100 See, e.g., L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *50 (noting that this “dispute poses a difficult question that the
Office of Legal Counsel has answered differently at different times”). Compare Guidance on Application of Federal
Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 23 Op. O.L.C. 60, 64 (1999) (concluding that an officer “must be the first assistant
when the vacancy occurs in order to be the acting officer by virtue of being the first assistant”), with Designation of
Acting Associate Attorney General, 25 Op. O.L.C. 177, 180 (2001) (concluding that the Vacancies Act “does not
require that the first assistant be in place at the time the vacancy occurred to be the acting officer by virtue of being the
first assistant”).
101 5 U.S.C. § 3345. This directive may come only from the President. Id. There is one additional class who may serve
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been confirmed to a different advice-and-consent position to serve as acting officer.102 Second, the
President can select a senior “officer or employee” of the same executive agency, if that employee
served in that agency for at least 90 days during the year preceding the vacancy and is paid at a
rate equivalent to at least a GS-15 on the federal pay scale.103
Ability to Serve If Nominated to Office
Section 3345 places an additional limitation on the ability of these three classes of people to serve
as acting officers for an advice-and-consent position. As a general rule, if the President nominates
a person to the vacant position, that person “may not serve as an acting officer” for that
position.104 Thus, if the President nominates a person who is currently the acting officer for that
position, that person usually may not continue to serve as acting officer without violating the
Vacancies Act.105 The President can name another qualified person to serve as an acting officer
instead of the nominated person.106
The limitations of the Vacancies Act can create the need to shift government employees to
different positions within the executive branch. For example, in January 2017, shortly after
entering office, President Trump named Noel Francisco as Principal Deputy Solicitor General.107
Francisco then began to serve as Acting Solicitor General.108 In March, the President announced
that he would be nominating Francisco to serve permanently as the Solicitor General.109 After this
announcement, Francisco was moved to another role in the department and Jeffrey Wall, who was
chosen by Francisco to be the new Principal Deputy Solicitor General, became the acting
Solicitor General.110 This last shift may have been done to comply with the Vacancies Act.111
Ultimately, the Senate confirmed Francisco to the position of Solicitor General on September 19,
2017.112

as an acting officer: if an officer serves a fixed term rather than serving at the pleasure of the President, and the
President has nominated that officer “for reappointment for an additional term to the same office in an Executive
department without a break in service,” then the President may direct that officer to serve, subject to the same time
limitations imposed by the Vacancies Act on any other acting officer. Id. § 3345(c)(1).
102 Id. § 3345(a)(2).
103 Id. § 3345(a)(3).
104 See id. § 3345(b); NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 935 (2017). In NLRB v. SW General, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1) applied to all three classes of persons who might serve as acting officers under
the Vacancies Act, rather than only to first assistants serving under 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 938.
For more on this decision, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1840, Help Wanted: Supreme Court Holds Vacancies Act
Prohibits Nominees from Serving as Acting Officers, by Valerie C. Brannon.
105 SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 944.
106 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b); SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 944.
107 Marcia Coyle, Noel Francisco, Trump’s Solicitor General Pick, Is Sidelined for Now, NAT’L LAW J. (Apr. 6, 2017),
http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202783127057.
108 Id. Francisco replaced Ian Gershengorn in this role, who had himself been a Principal Deputy Solicitor General
serving as Acting Solicitor General. See Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Statement on Planned Departure of
Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. (June 2, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-
statement-planned-departure-solicitor-general-donald-b.
109 Coyle, supra note 107.
110 Id.
111 See id.; see also Amy Howe, Opinion analysis: Court limits “acting” appointments to fill vacancies, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-court-limits-acting-appointments-fill-vacancies.
112 163 CONG. REC. S5835 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2017) (recording Rollcall Vote No. 201 Ex.).
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There is an exception to this limitation: a person who is nominated to an office may serve as
acting officer for that office if that person is in a “first assistant” position to that office and either
(1) has served in that position for at least 90 days113 or (2) was appointed to that position through
the advice-and-consent process.114 Returning to the example of the Solicitor General position, it
appears that this exception would not have allowed Noel Francisco to continue to serve as the
Acting Solicitor General, once nominated to that position.115 Although Francisco may have been
in a first assistant position, as the Principal Deputy Solicitor General,116 he had not served in that
position for 90 days, nor had he been appointed to that position through the advice-and-consent
process.117
For How Long?
The Vacancies Act generally limits the amount of time that a vacant advice-and-consent position
may be filled by an acting officer.118 Section 3346 provides that a person may serve “for no longer
than 210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs,” or, “once a first or second nomination
for the office is submitted to the Senate, from the date of such nomination for the period that the
nomination is pending in the Senate.”119 These two periods run independently and concurrently.120
Consequently, the submission and pendency of a nomination allows an acting officer to serve
beyond the initial 210-day period.121

113 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1)(A).
114 See id. § 3345(b)(2).
115 See id. § 3345(b).
116 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.137(b) (2019) (“Every office within the Department to which appointment is required to be made
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . shall have a First Assistant within the meaning of the
[Vacancies Act]. Where there is a position of Principal Deputy to [an advice-and-consent position], the Principal
Deputy shall be the First Assistant.”).
117 See Jimmy Hoover, Jones Day Attys Nab Key Legal Jobs in Trump Administration, LAW 360 (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/883009/jones-day-attys-nab-key-legal-jobs-in-trump-administration; Amy Howe,
Francisco confirmed as solicitor general, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/
francisco-confirmed-solicitor-general/.
118 These time limitations do not apply, however, to “a vacancy caused by sickness.” 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a).
119 Id.
120 See id. Thus, as a technical matter, the submission of a nomination does not stop the clock on the 210-day period.
That 210-day counter keeps running. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the President’s submission of a nomination to
Congress renders the 210-day period irrelevant. Often, the submission and pendency of a nomination will take longer
than 210 days. But even if a nomination is rejected, withdrawn, or returned before 210 days have passed, that return
will trigger a new 210-day period, as discussed infra note 130 and accompanying text. See 5 U.S.C. § 3346(b).
121 See 5 U.S.C. § 3346.
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Figure 1. Two Limited Periods of Service

Source: 5 U.S.C. § 3346.
The 210-day time limitation is tied to the vacancy itself, rather than to any person serving in the
office, and the period generally begins on the date that the vacancy occurs.122 This period does not
begin on the date an acting officer is named, and because it runs continuously from the
occurrence of the vacancy, the time limitation is unaffected by any changes in who is serving as
acting officer.123 The period is extended during a presidential transition period when a new
President takes office.124 If a vacancy exists on the new President’s inauguration day or occurs
within 60 days after the inauguration,125 then the 210-day period begins either 90 days after
inauguration or 90 days after the date that the vacancy occurred, depending on which is later.126 If
an acting officer attempts to perform a function or duty of an advice-and-consent office after the
210-day period has ended, and if the President has not nominated anyone to the office, that act
will have no force or effect.127
Alternatively, Section 3346 allows an acting officer to serve while a nomination to that position
“is pending in the Senate,” regardless of how long that nomination is pending.128 The legislative
history of the Vacancies Act suggests that an acting officer may serve during the pendency of a
nomination even if that nomination is submitted after the 210-day period has run following the
start of the vacancy.129 “If the first nomination for the office is rejected by the Senate, withdrawn,

122 See id. § 3346(a)(1). However, “[i]f a vacancy occurs during an adjournment of the Congress sine die, the 210-day
period . . . shall begin on the date that the Senate first reconvenes.” Id. § 3346(c). Additionally, “[i]f the last day of any
210-day period under section 3346 is a day on which the Senate is not in session, the second day the Senate is next in
session and receiving nominations shall be deemed to be the last day of such period.” Id. § 3348(c).
123 See id. § 3346(a)(1) (stating that an acting officer may serve in the office “for no longer than 210 days beginning on
the date the vacancy occurs”) (emphasis added).
124 See id. § 3349a.
125 This provision refers to the “transitional inauguration day,” defined as “the date on which any person swears or
affirms the oath of office as President, if such person is not the President on the date preceding the date of swearing or
affirming such oath of office.” Id. § 3349a(a). The relevant period in which a vacancy must exist is “the 60-day period
beginning on a transitional inauguration day.” Id. § 3349a(b).
126 Id. § 3349a(b). In effect, an acting official may serve for a 300-day period during a presidential transition. Id.
127 See id. § 3348. The Comptroller General is required to report any officer “serving longer than the 210-day period
including the applicable exceptions to such period” to various congressional committees, the President, and the Office
of Personnel Management. Id. § 3349(b).
128 Id. § 3346(a)(2). However, 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b) generally limits the ability of a person to serve as acting officer if
that person is the one nominated to the position, as discussed supra “Ability to Serve If Nominated to Office.”
129 144 CONG. REC. S11022 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson) (“The acting officer may
continue to serve beyond [210] days if the President submits a nomination for the position even if that occurs after the
[210th] day. So at the [210]-day expiration, the President still has it within his sole discretion to make the nomination;
just simply send the nomination up and the acting officer can come back once again and assume his duties.”). See also
Guidance on Application of Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 23 Op. O.L.C. 60, 68 (1999) (describing 5 U.S.C.
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or returned to the President by the Senate,” then an acting officer may continue to serve for
another 210-day period beginning on the date of that rejection, withdrawal, or return.130 If the
President submits a second nomination for the office, then an acting officer may continue to serve
during the pendency of that nomination.131 If the second nomination is also “rejected, withdrawn,
or returned,” then an acting officer may continue for one last 210-day period.132 However, an
acting officer may not serve beyond this final period—the Vacancies Act will not allow acting
service during the pendency of a third nomination, or any subsequent nominations.133 Again, if
the acting officer serves beyond the pendency of the first or second nomination and the
subsequent 210-day periods, any action performing a function or duty of the office will have no
force or effect.134
Figure 2. Period of Service After Submission of Nomination

Source: 5 U.S.C. § 3346.

§ 3346 as containing a “spring-back provision, which permits an acting officer to begin performing the functions and
duties of the vacant office again upon the submission of a nomination”).
130 5 U.S.C. § 3346(b)(1).
131 Id. § 3346(b)(2)(A).
132 Id. § 3346(b)(2)(B).
133 See id. § 3346(a)(2).
134 See id. § 3348.
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Consequences of Violating the Vacancies Act
The Vacancies Act may be enforced through both the political process and through litigation.
Several provisions of the Vacancies Act are centrally enforced through political measures rather
than through the courts. For example, while the Act provides that an “office shall remain vacant”
unless an acting officer is serving “in accordance with” the Vacancies Act, the statute does not
create a clear mechanism to directly implement this provision.135 Accordingly, the text of the
Vacancies Act does not contemplate a means of removing any noncompliant acting officers from
office.
Similarly, if the Comptroller General determines that an officer has served “longer than the 210-
day period,” the Comptroller General must report this to the appropriate congressional
committees.136 However, this provision itself does not require the Comptroller General to make
any such determination and contains no additional enforcement mechanism.137 But if the
Comptroller General does make such a report to Congress, this reporting mechanism may prompt
congressional action pressuring the executive branch to comply with the Vacancies Act, exerted
through normal channels of oversight.138 For instance, in March 2018, the House Committee on
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security held a hearing on a vacancy in the office of
the Commissioner of Social Security.139 The day before the hearing, the Comptroller General
issued a letter reporting that the Acting Commissioner, Nancy Berryhill, was violating the
Vacancies Act.140 Shortly thereafter, Berryhill reportedly stepped down from the position of
Acting Commissioner, serving instead in her position of record as Deputy Commissioner of
Operations.141
The most direct means to enforce the Vacancies Act is through private suits in which courts may
nullify noncompliant agency actions.142 Violations of the Vacancies Act are generally enforced
only if a third party with standing (such as a regulated entity that has been injured by agency

135 Id. § 3347.
136 Id. § 3349(b). GAO’s website has a searchable database containing the vacancies that agencies have reported to
them. Search Vacancies, GAO, https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/federal-vacancies-reform-act#search (last
visited May 28, 2020).
137 See 5 U.S.C. § 3349(b).
138 See generally, e.g., Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 MARQ. L.
REV. 881 (2014). The reporting requirement may result in the GAO issuing a formal opinion about whether a particular
acting officer is complying with the Vacancies Act. See, e.g., Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 - Assistant Attorney
Gen. for the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, B-310780, 2008 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 101 (Comp.
Gen. June 13, 2008).
139 See Hearing on Lacking a Leader: Challenges Facing the SSA after over 5 Years of Acting Commissioners, H.
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/event/hearing-lacking-leadership-
challenges-facing-ssa-5-years-acting-commissioners.
140 Violation of the Time Limit Imposed by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998—Commissioner, Social
Security Administration, B-329853 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 6, 2018).
141 Joe Davidson, Social Security Is Now Headless because of Trump’s Inaction. Will Other Agencies Be Decapitated?,
WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/03/12/social-security-now-
headless-because-of-trumps-inaction-will-others-agencies-be-decapitated/. See also, e.g., Extension of Expiration Dates
for Two Body System Listings, 83 Fed. Reg. 13863 (Apr. 2, 2018) (signed by “Nancy Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner
for Operations, performing the duties and functions not reserved to the Commissioner of Social Security”).
142 See S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 19–20 (1998) (“The Committee expects that litigants with standing to challenge
purported agency actions taken in violation of these provisions will raise non-compliance with this legislation in a
judicial proceeding challenging the lawfulness of the agency action.”).
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action) successfully challenges the action in court.143 The Vacancies Act renders noncompliant
actions “void ab initio,”144 meaning that they were “null from the beginning,”145 by providing that
such actions have “no force or effect.”146 The consequences that flow from a determination that
an action is “void” are more severe than if a court were to announce that the action was merely
“voidable.”147 A “voidable” action is one that may be judged invalid because of some legal defect,
but that “is not incurable.”148 For instance, before a court strikes down a voidable agency
decision, it will often inquire into whether the legal defect created actual prejudice.149 If an error
is harmless, the court may uphold the agency action.150 In contrast, acts that are “void” may not
be ratified or rendered harmless, meaning that another person who properly exercises legal
authority on behalf of an agency may not subsequently approve or replicate the act, thereby
rendering it valid.151 The Vacancies Act affirms this consequence by explicitly specifying that an
agency may not ratify any acts taken in violation of the statute.152

143 Although the court ultimately upheld the agency’s action, one example of such a challenge is found in Schaghticoke
Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 419–20 (D. Conn. 2008), aff’d, 587 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2009). Cf.
Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363, 1364, 1367 (D.D.C. 1973) (considering whether Vacancies Act authorized
person’s service as Acting Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the context of a suit brought by Senators
to remove person from that position).
144 See NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938 n.2 (2017).
145 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “void ab initio” as “[n]ull from the beginning, as from the first
moment when a contract is entered into”). E.g., Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 467 U.S. 354,
358 (1984) (noting that if tariff is rendered void ab initio, “whatever tariff was in effect prior to the adoption of the
rejected rate becomes the applicable tariff for the period.”).
146 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348(d).
147 See, e.g., Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a void
contract “produces no legal obligation,” but that a voidable contract does impose legal obligations unless rescinded).
See also Quality Health Servs. of P.R., Inc. v. NLRB, 873 F.3d 375, 383 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that the issue of
validity of agency action had been waived under exhaustion statute, in part because complaints issued by Acting
General Counsel of NLRB were, at most, voidable rather than void).
148 Easley v. Pettibone Mich. Corp., 990 F.2d 905, 909 (6th Cir. 1993). The court in Easley considered both legal and
ordinary definitions of the term “voidable,” as distinct from the term “void,” and decided that because it was
considering the effect of an admitted legal error that could be cured, the most appropriate term to describe this
particular type of defective action was “invalid.” Id. at 909–10. Accord Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. Co. (In re Coho
Res., Inc.), 345 F.3d 338, 344 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[V]iolations [of a certain provision of the bankruptcy code] are merely
‘voidable’ and are subject to discretionary ‘cure.’”). Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (stating that the
term “voidable” “describes a valid act that may be voided rather than an invalid act that may be ratified.”).
149 See, e.g., SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2015), aff’d 137 S.Ct. 929, 944 (2017); Prof’l Air
Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982); L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *77–79 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
150 See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce Cty., 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986) (“We would be most reluctant to conclude that every
failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action . . . . When, as here, there are
less drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts should not assume that Congress intended
the agency to lose its power to act.”).
151 See, e.g., Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U.S. 646, 652 (1897) (“Did the decree of the district court . . . abolishing the
city of San Angelo . . . operate to render its incorporation void ab initio, and to nullify all its debts and obligations
created while its validity was unchallenged? Or can it be held, consistently with legal principles, that the abolition of
the city government, as at first organized, because of some disregard of law, and its reconstruction so as to include
within its limits the public improvements for which bonds had been issued during the first organization, devolved upon
the city so reorganized the obligations that would have attached to the original city if the State had continued to
acquiesce in the validity of its incorporation?”); FEC v. Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d 704, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating, in
description of party arguments, that the Federal Election Commission’s subsequent ratification of a defective civil
enforcement proceeding could not cure error rendering that proceeding void ab initio).
152 5 U.S.C. § 3348. Legislative history suggests that Congress was specifically concerned with overruling the decision
of the D.C. Circuit in Doolin Security Savings Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
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Federal district courts have, on occasion, vacated agency actions as void (as opposed to voidable)
after determining the challenged actions were taken by officials improperly performing the duties
of a vacant office.153 In reviewing these agency actions, these courts have cited not only the “no
force or effect” provision of the Vacancies Act, but also a provision of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) that directs courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” any agency action that is
“not in accordance with law.”154 For example, in L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, a federal district court
expressly ruled that both the Vacancies Act and the APA authorized the court to vacate the
agency’s actions.155 But in applying the APA provision, the court considered the mitigating
doctrine of harmless error mentioned above, asking whether the plaintiffs were prejudiced by the
error.156 The court ultimately concluded that the error was not harmless because a different acting
officer, serving properly, might have taken different actions.157 The L.M.-M. court did not,
however, consider any mitigating doctrines before concluding the actions had no force or effect
under the Vacancies Act, holding that the Act barred the court from considering the ratification
doctrine.158
The Vacancies Act’s enforcement mechanisms—the no-force-or-effect provision and the no-
ratification provision—apply if a person performs a “function or duty” of the vacant office.159
Consequently, their application is subject to the interpretive dispute described above regarding the
proper interpretation of “function or duty.”160 As the L.M.-M. court noted, the Vacancies Act
provision defining “function or duty” as duties that may be performed “only” by the relevant
officer could be susceptible to two different readings: (1) functions that are expressly assigned to
only one office; or (2) functions that are expressly assigned to one office and may not be
delegated to any other official.161
In April 2019, the D.C. Circuit appeared to adopt the second interpretation in Guedes v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, in line with prevailing views, holding that the
Attorney General had validly ratified an action taken by an acting official who allegedly served in
violation of the Vacancies Act.162 After stating that the plaintiffs had accepted the validity of the
Attorney General’s ratification, the federal appeals court observed that the Vacancies Act only
precludes the ratification of nondelegable duties and that another statute allows the Attorney
General generally to delegate “any function of the Attorney General.”163 The D.C. Circuit

in which that court had held that because a successor “effectively ratified” the action of an acting officer, the court did
not need to decide whether that acting officer had “lawfully occupied the position.” See S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 5
(1998) (noting Doolin “underscored” the “need for new legislation”). This Senate report expressed concern that “the
ratification approach taken by the court in Doolin would render enforcement of the [Vacancies Act] a nullity in many
instances.” Id. at 20. See also 144 CONG. REC. S11022 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1998) (statement of Sen. Fred Thompson)
(referencing Doolin as reason to enact bill).
153 L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *79 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020), appeal docketed,
No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020); Crawford-Hall v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
154 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *76; Crawford-Hall, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1154.
155 L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *79.
156 Id. at *77. The court also considered and rejected application of the de facto officer doctrine. Id. at *77–79.
157 Id. at *77.
158 Id. at *72–76, *79.
159 5 U.S.C. § 3348.
160 See supra “What Are the “Functions and Duties” of an Office?”
161 L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *68.
162 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
163 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 510) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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apparently read the general delegation statute to encompass the challenged action and concluded
that because the relevant action was delegable, it was therefore not void under the Vacancies
Act.164 Thus, the court appeared to rule that the agency action could be ratified because the duty
was delegable, even though the duty had not in fact been delegated to another official.165
In L.M.-M., the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia viewed this issue differently.166
Citing Guedes, the government argued that even if an acting Director of United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) had violated the Vacancies Act, a properly appointed official
could ratify his actions.167 The government claimed that the Vacancies Act’s non-ratification
provision applied only to nondelegable duties: “duties that are assigned to a single official and
that may not be reassigned.”168 The government further argued that none of the USCIS Director’s
duties were nondelegable because a federal statute vested all the functions of the Department of
Homeland Security in the Secretary and authorized the Secretary to delegate those functions to
“any officer” in the Department.169
The trial court disagreed with the government and adopted the first, broader view of “function or
duty” described above, saying that the second approach was contrary to the text and purpose of
the Vacancies Act.170 Accordingly, the court held that because the relevant duty was assigned to
the USCIS Director and had not been reassigned by the Secretary, it was a “function or duty”
subject to the Vacancies Act and the improperly acting Director’s attempt to perform that duty
had “no force or effect.”171 It remains to be seen whether other courts will agree with this March
2020 decision, and the Department of Homeland Security appealed the ruling on May 18, 2020.172
As noted above, in NLRB v. SW General, Inc., the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question
of remedy with respect to those officials who are carved out of Section 3348.173 Certain offices
are exempt from the provision that nullifies the noncompliant actions of an acting officer,174 and
the statute does not otherwise specify what consequences follow, if any, if a person temporarily
serving in one of those offices violates the Vacancies Act.175 The D.C. Circuit and the Supreme
Court in SW General accepted the parties’ apparent agreement that the actions of a noncompliant

164 See id.
165 See id.
166 L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *73 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020), appeal docketed,
No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
167 Id. Although the government made this argument, no official had “attempted to ratify the directives.” Id. at *66. The
court nonetheless went on to consider how to define “function or duty” because “the same definition . . . applies both
to” the no-force-or-effect provision and the no-ratification provision, and the no-force-or-effect provision was at issue,
given that the court believed the acting official had violated the Vacancies Act. Id.
168 Id. at *66.
169 Id. at *67 (quoting 6 U.S.C. § 112) (internal quotation mark omitted).
170 Id. at *70–74. The trial court dismissed the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Guedes essentially by concluding that the
statements in that opinion were dicta: “[T]he meaning of the vacant-office provision was neither disputed nor decided
in Guedes. Indeed, neither below nor on appeal did the parties dispute whether the official’s appointment satisfied the
[Vacancies Act], . . . nor did the parties contest that, by the time the dispute reached the D.C. Circuit, the challenged
rule had been validly ratified by a properly appointed official . . . .” Id. at *73 (citations omitted).
171 Id. at *76, *79. The court said, however, that agencies could still delegate a vacant office’s duties and avoid the
consequences of violating the Vacancies Act, “so long as they do so 180 days before the vacancy arises.” Id. at *76
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(B)(ii)).
172 See L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, appeal docketed, No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
173 NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 938 n.2 (2017); 5 U.S.C. § 3348. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
174 5 U.S.C. § 3348(e).
175 See id. § 3348.
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Acting General Counsel of the NLRB—one of the excepted offices—were voidable.176 The
determination that an agency action is voidable, rather than void, might have important
consequences for the outcome of any court challenge because it could allow a court to consider
mitigating arguments such as the harmless error doctrine or the ratification doctrine.177 Indeed,
the D.C. Circuit later held in another case that complaints initially filed by the improperly
appointed General Counsel had been ratified by a properly appointed General Counsel, and
therefore could not be challenged on the basis of the initial improper appointment.178
However, notwithstanding its decision to accept the parties’ litigating postures in SW General, the
D.C. Circuit expressly left open the possibility that the Vacancies Act might “wholly insulate the
Acting General Counsel’s actions,” so that the actions of an acting officer in one of these named
offices are not even voidable.179 It is possible that the Vacancies Act does not undermine the
legality of the actions of these specified officers, even if they violate the Act, and that, under this
interpretation, these positions could be indefinitely filled by acting officers without consequence
under the Vacancies Act.
These questions may be clarified in future litigation, but Congress could, if it so chose, add
statutory language more explicitly addressing or otherwise clarifying the consequences of
violating the Vacancies Act, particularly with respect to those offices exempt from the
enforcement mechanisms contained in Section 3348.180 Congress could also amend the existing
enforcement mechanisms, possibly by altering the reporting requirements or by adding additional
consequences for violations of the Vacancies Act.181
Evolving Legal Issues
Thus far, this report has discussed the Vacancies Act in isolation. The remainder of this report
turns to selected, evolving legal issues that involve questions about how other federal laws,
including both statutes and the Constitution, interact with the Vacancies Act. It also highlights
special considerations for Congress.
Exclusivity of the Vacancies Act
The Vacancies Act provides “the exclusive means” to authorize “an acting official to perform the
functions and duties” of a vacant office—unless another statute “expressly”
(A) authorizes the President, a court, or the head of an Executive department, to designate
an officer or employee to perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily
in an acting capacity; or

176 See SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 938 n.2; SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
177 See SW Gen., Inc., 796 F.3d at 79.
178 Midwest Terminals of Toledo Int’l, Inc v. NLRB, 783 Fed. Appx. 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
179 See SW Gen., Inc., 796 F.3d at 79. Counsel for NLRB apparently had not raised this argument, and accordingly the
D.C. Circuit “express[ed] no view” on whether it was correct. Id.
180 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348.
181 See id. §§ 3348, 3349. See also, e.g., H.R. 1847, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019) (providing that “[i]f the President fails to
make a formal nomination for a vacant Inspector General position” within 210 days of the vacancy occurring, the
President must submit to Congress “(1) the reasons why the President has not yet made a formal nomination; and (2) a
target date for making a formal nomination”); S. 1761, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (providing that “[a]n individual who
performs the duties of an office in any Executive agency . . . temporarily in excess of” the Vacancies Act’s time limits
“may not receive pay for each day such duties are performed”).
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(B) designates an officer or employee to perform the functions and duties of a specified
office temporarily in an acting capacity[.]182
Across the executive branch, there are many statutes that expressly address who will temporarily
act for specified officials in the case of a vacancy in the office.183 In fact, the Senate report on the
Vacancies Act identified 40 agency-specific provisions that “would be retained by” the Act.184 To
take one example, the Senate report anticipated that the Vacancies Act would not disturb the
provision governing a vacancy in the office of the Attorney General.185 That statute provides that
“[i]n case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the
Deputy Attorney General may exercise all the duties of that office.”186
In the event that there is an agency-specific statute designating a specific government official to
serve as acting officer, the Vacancies Act will no longer be exclusive.187 But even if the Vacancies
Act does not exclusively apply to a specific position, it will not necessarily be wholly
inapplicable.188 It is possible that both the agency-specific statute and the Vacancies Act may be
available to temporarily fill a vacancy.189 The Senate report can be read to support this view: it
states that “even with respect to the specific positions in which temporary officers may serve
under the specific statutes this bill retains, the Vacancies Act would continue to provide an
alternative procedure for temporarily occupying the office.”190 A number of courts have held that
this principle applies to the statute governing Attorney General vacancies quoted above, ruling
that the President may invoke the Vacancies Act to name an acting official and override the
statutory line of succession provided in the agency-specific statute.191
When two statutes simultaneously apply to authorize acting service, it may be unclear which
statute governs in the case of a conflict. If there are inconsistences between the two statutes and
an official’s service complies with only one of the two statutes, such a situation may prompt

182 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a).
183 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 102 (“The Department has a Deputy Secretary of Transportation . . . . The Deputy
Secretary . . . acts for the Secretary when the Secretary is absent or unable to serve or when the office of Secretary is
vacant.”).
184 S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 16–17 (1998). See also O’CONNELL, supra note 87, app. A at 74 (2019) (compiling agency-
specific provisions).
185 S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 16 (1998).
186 28 U.S.C. § 508(a). The statute further provides that “for the purpose of section 3345 of title 5 the Deputy Attorney
General is the first assistant to the Attorney General.” Id. This reference to the Vacancies Act has been in that statute at
least since its codification in Pub. L. No. 89-554 § 4(c), 80 Stat. 612 (1966).
187 See 5 U.S.C. § 3347.
188 See, e.g., Designating an Acting Director of National Intelligence, slip op. at 4 (Op. O.L.C. Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1220586/download (“In a series of opinions dating back to 2003, this Office has
consistently explained that the Vacancies Reform Act remains available to the President as a means for designating an
acting official even when an office-specific statute provides that someone else ‘shall’ serve in that role.”). See also
Hooks ex rel. NLRB v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., 816 F.3d 550, 556 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[The Vacancies Act] form[s]
the exclusive means for filling a vacancy in an Executive agency office unless another statute expressly provides a
means for filling such a vacancy. Because [29 U.S.C. § 153(d)] does so, neither the [Vacancies Act] nor [29 U.S.C. §
153(d)] is the exclusive means of appointing an Acting General Counsel of the [National Labor Relations Board].”).
189 Temporary Filling of Vacancies in the Office of U.S. Attorney, 27 Op. O.L.C. 149, 149 (2003) (concluding that the
Vacancies Act and a separate statute, 28 U.S.C. § 546(a), were both “available” to temporarily fill the position).
190 S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 17 (1998).
191 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109, 139 (D.D.C. 2019),
aff’d on other grounds, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam); see also United States v. Castillo, 772 Fed. Appx.
11, 13 n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (collecting cases).
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challenges to the authority of that acting official.192 The Vacancies Act sets out a detailed scheme
delineating three classes of governmental officials that may serve as acting officers193 and
expressly limits the duration of an acting officer’s service.194 By contrast, agency-specific statutes
tend to designate only one official to serve as acting officer195 and often do not specify a time
limit on that official’s service.196 Accordingly, for example, if an acting officer is designated by
the President to serve under the Vacancies Act but is not authorized to serve under the agency-
specific statute, a potential conflict may exist between the two laws.197
Where two statutes encompass the same conduct, courts will, if possible, “read the statutes to give
effect to each.”198 Courts are generally reluctant to conclude that statutes conflict and will usually
assume that two laws “are capable of co-existence . . . absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary.”199 With this principle in the background, judges have sometimes
concluded that the Vacancies Act should operate concurrently with these agency-specific statutes,
and that government officials should be able to temporarily serve under either statute.200
Accordingly, courts have resolved any potential conflict by holding that whichever statute is
invoked is the controlling one.201 At times, however, this method of reconciling the relevant
statutes could conflict with the general interpretive rule that more specific statutes should usually
prevail over more general ones—even where the more general statutes were enacted after the
more specific ones.202

192 See, e.g., Lower E. Side People’s Fed. Credit Union v. Trump, 289 F. Supp. 3d 568, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(dismissing a suit that challenged the authority of an acting officer designated under the Vacancies Act by arguing that
an agency-specific statute provided the sole authority for someone to serve as acting director of the agency).
193 5 U.S.C. § 3345.
194 Id. § 3346.
195 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 633(b)(1) (designating Deputy Administrator of the Small Business Administration to act for
Administrator); 50 U.S.C. § 3037(b)(2) (designating Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to act for
Director). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 508 (designating Deputy Attorney General to act for Attorney General and providing that
Attorney General may designate “further order of succession”); 42 U.S.C. § 902(b)(4) (designating Deputy
Commissioner of Social Security to act for Commissioner “unless the President designates another officer of the
Government”).
196 See S. REP. NO. 105-250, at 17 (1998); see also, e.g., United States v. Guzek, 527 F.2d 552, 560 (8th Cir. 1975)
(ruling that official serving under an agency-specific statute “succeeded to all the powers of the office . . . without
circumscription by the 30-day limitation” created by a prior version of Vacancies Act). But see, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (“[N]o person . . . designated [to act as General Counsel of the NLRB] shall so act (1) for more than forty days
when the Congress is in session unless a nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the Senate, or (2)
after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination was submitted.”).
197 See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10036, UPDATE: Who’s the Boss at the CFPB?, by Valerie C. Brannon and Jared P.
Cole (describing conflict over vacancy in the position of the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in
which the Deputy Director claimed that an agency-specific statute authorizing the Deputy to serve as Acting Director
was the sole legal authority governing the vacancy, while the President invoked the Vacancies Act to name a different
person as Acting Director).
198 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981).
199 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
200 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109, 139 (D.D.C. 2019),
aff’d on other grounds, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam); English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 319
(2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-5007, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19856 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018); United States v.
Lucido, 373 F. Supp. 1142, 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
201 See, e.g., Lucido, 373 F. Supp. at 1151.
202 See, e.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (“It is a basic principle of statutory
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted
statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”). But see, e.g., English, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 325 (declining to apply this
canon because it was “not clear” that the agency-specific statute was “more ‘specific’” than the Vacancies Act, “as
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For example, in Hooks ex rel. NLRB v. Kitsap Tenant Support Services, one federal court of
appeals rejected a litigant’s contention that an agency-specific statute displaced the Vacancies Act
and provided “the exclusive means” to temporarily fill a vacant position.203 The agency-specific
statute at issue in that case provided that if the office of the NLRB’s General Counsel is vacant,
“the President is authorized to designate the officer or employee who shall act as General Counsel
during such vacancy.”204 It also provided for a shorter term of acting service than the Vacancies
Act.205 The President, however, had invoked the Vacancies Act to designate an Acting General
Counsel.206 The court concluded that “the President is permitted to elect between these two
statutory alternatives to designate” an acting officer.207 Accordingly, the court rejected the
argument that because the officer’s designation did not comply with the agency-specific statute,
“the appointment was necessarily invalid.”208
But the two statutes governing a vacant office might not always be so readily reconciled. In
Hooks, both the Vacancies Act and the agency-specific statute expressly authorized the President
to select an acting officer.209 A more difficult question may be raised when an agency-specific
statute instead seems to expressly limit succession to a particular official.210 The federal courts
considered such a contention in a dispute over who was authorized to serve as the Acting Director
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The position of CFPB Director became
vacant in late 2017, and the President invoked the Vacancies Act to designate Mick Mulvaney, the
Director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, to serve as Acting Director of the
CFPB.211 The Deputy Director of the CFPB, Leandra English, filed suit,212 arguing that she was
the lawful Acting Director under an agency-specific statute that provided that the CFPB’s Deputy
Director “shall . . . serve as acting Director in the absence or unavailability of the Director.”213
English argued that the agency-specific statute displaced the Vacancies Act under normal
principles of statutory interpretation, as a later-enacted and more specific statute.214
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected these arguments and held that the
President had permissibly invoked the Vacancies Act to designate Mulvaney as Acting Director.215

applied to” the specific circumstances of the case).
203 Hooks ex rel. NLRB v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs., 816 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 2016).
204 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
205 See Hooks, 816 F.3d at 555.
206 Id. at 553.
207 Id. at 556.
208 Id.
209 See id. at 555–56.
210 See, e.g., Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief at 2-3, English v. Trump, No. 18-5007 (D.C. Cir. 2018),
http://guptawessler.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/English-v-Trump-Brief-1.30.pdf.
211 English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d 307, 314 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-5007, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS
19856 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2018).
212 For a more in-depth discussion of this lawsuit, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10036, UPDATE: Who’s the Boss at the
CFPB?, by Valerie C. Brannon and Jared P. Cole.
213 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5).
214 English, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 317. See generally United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532–33 (1998)
(noting that in the case of “plain inconsistency” between two statutes, later-enacted, more specific statutes generally
trump prior, general statutes).
215 English, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 319. The district court’s ruling was on a motion for a preliminary injunction, so
technically, the court held only that “English is not likely to succeed on the merits of her claim that Dodd-Frank’s
Deputy Director provision displaces the President’s ability to name an acting Director of the CFPB pursuant to the
FVRA.” Id. at 331. However, much of the court’s language was not so qualified.
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In the trial court’s view, both statutes were available: the agency-specific statute “requires that the
Deputy Director ‘shall’ serve as acting Director, but . . . under the [Vacancies Act] the President
‘may’ override that default rule.”216 The court invoked two interpretive canons, the rule that
statutes should be read in harmony and the rule against implied repeals, and concluded that under
the circumstances, an “express statement” was required to displace the Vacancies Act entirely.217
Accordingly, because the agency-specific statute was “silent regarding the President’s ability to
appoint an acting director,” it did not render the Vacancies Act unavailable.218 English appealed
this decision to the D.C. Circuit, but decided to discontinue her appeal before the appellate court
issued its decision.219
In cases such as Hooks and English, courts are considering how to reconcile statutory provisions.
Congressional silence on the relationship between agency-specific provisions and the Vacancies
Act can raise difficult questions for courts trying to discern how to resolve any perceived
inconsistencies between these statutes. Congress can itself resolve tensions between the Vacancies
Act and agency-specific statutes by clarifying the conditions under which these statutes apply. For
example, the statute governing vacancies in the office of Attorney General provides that “for the
purpose of section 3345 of title 5 the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant to the Attorney
General.”220 This statute expressly clarifies—in at least one respect—how the two statutes
interact.221 To take another example, the statutory provisions governing acting service in the
office of the Secretary of Homeland Security state that the agency-specific provisions apply
“notwithstanding” the Vacancies Act,222 indicating an intent to render the Vacancies Act
inapplicable to this position.223 Congress could also amend the Vacancies Act itself—for example,
to clarify that an agency-specific statute containing a mandatory provision for acting service not
only renders the Vacancies Act nonexclusive, but also inapplicable.224

216 English, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 319.
217 Id. at 320 (noting that the agency-specific statute provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided expressly by law, all
Federal laws dealing with public or Federal . . . officers . . . shall apply to the exercise of the powers of the Bureau”).
See also id. at 324–25 (invoking the presumption against implied repeals).
218 Id. at 322 (emphasis omitted).
219 Appellant’s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, English v. Trump, No. 18-5007 (D.C. Cir. July 9, 2018).
220 28 U.S.C. § 508.
221 Cf. United States v. Lucido, 373 F. Supp. 1142, 1150–51 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (considering how to reconcile 28 U.S.C.
§ 508 with a prior version of the Vacancies Act); Authority of the President to Name an Acting Attorney Gen., 31 Op.
O.L.C. 208, 209–10 (2007) (holding President’s designation of an acting officer under the Vacancies Act would trump
Attorney General’s designation of a successor under 28 U.S.C. § 508(b)).
222 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(1) (“Notwithstanding chapter 33 of title 5, the Under Secretary for Management shall serve as the
Acting Secretary if . . . neither the Secretary nor Deputy Secretary is available to exercise the duties of the Office of the
Secretary.”); id. § 113(g)(2) (“Notwithstanding chapter 33 of title 5, the Secretary may designate such other officers of
the Department in further order of succession to serve as Acting Secretary.”).
223 See, e.g., Designating an Acting Director of National Intelligence, slip op. at 6,
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1220586/download (Op. O.L.C. Nov. 15, 2019). See generally, e.g., Cisneros v. Alpine
Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) (“[T]he use of such a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention
that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any other section.”).
224 See, e.g., Accountability for Acting Officials Act, H.R. 6689, 116th Cong. § 2(g) (2020) (“[A]ny statutory provision
. . . that contains a non-discretionary order or directive to designate an officer or employee to perform the functions and
duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity shall be the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an
acting official to perform the functions and duties of such office.”).
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Delegability of Duties
As discussed above, there is some dispute regarding how to interpret what “functions and duties”
are covered by the Vacancies Act.225 Nonetheless, the Vacancies Act has often been interpreted to
encompass only the nondelegable functions and duties of a vacant advice-and-consent position.226
Under this view, unless a statute or regulation requires the holder of an office—and only that
officer—to perform a function or duty, the Vacancies Act permits an agency to delegate those
duties to any other employee, who may then perform that duty without violating the Vacancies
Act.227 Therefore, according to this interpretation of the Act, in many circumstances an agency
official who has not been appointed to a particular advice-and-consent position could perform the
responsibilities of that position pursuant to a proper delegation.
The prevailing view of the Vacancies Act as applying only to nondelegable duties implicates legal
principles that guide courts in interpreting not only the Vacancies Act, but also the organic
statutes that grant authority to federal officials. In the context of the Vacancies Act, there are few
cases considering what types of duties may be nondelegable. Those courts that have considered
the issue have generally upheld the ability of government officials to perform the delegated duties
of a vacant office, so long as the delegation is otherwise lawful under the legal principles that
ordinarily govern delegations.228 Outside the context of the Vacancies Act, courts often presume
that delegation is permissible “absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent.”229
A statute that expressly prohibited delegation of a duty—for example, stating that a duty “‘may
only be delegated to,’ ‘may not [be] delegate[d],’ ‘may not be reledegated,’ ‘shall not be
redelegated,’ or is ‘not subject to delegation,’”—would likely render that duty nondelegable.230

225 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348; supra “What Are the “Functions and Duties” of an Office?”
226 See, e.g., Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F. Supp. 3d 136, 142–43 (D.D.C. 2018). Cf., e.g.,
L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *76 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020) (“Department heads
and other officials may . . . delegate duties to multiple officials, so long as they do so 180 days before the vacancy
arises.”), appeal docketed, No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
227 See, e.g., Guidance on Application of Fed. Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 23 Op. O.L.C. 60, 72 (1999). Of course,
other statutes or regulations might affect the analysis of whether a particular delegation of authority, or a particular
exercise of delegated authority, is lawful. See, e.g., Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1196 (D. Utah
2004) (considering the scope of an executive order delegating “authority otherwise vested” in the President to perform
certain functions); Action for Boston Cmty. Dev. v. Shalala, 983 F. Supp. 222, 228–29 (D. Mass. 1997) (considering
whether agency had offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate Secretary of Health and Human Services had properly
delegated decisionmaking authority to regional administrator).
228 Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F. Supp. 3d 136, 149 (D.D.C. 2018); Schaghticoke Tribal
Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 421 (D. Conn. 2008), aff’d, 587 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2009); Office of Thrift
Supervision v. Paul, 985 F. Supp. 1465, 1474–75 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
229 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004). See also Loma Linda Univ. v. Schweiker, 705
F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Express statutory authority for delegation is not required . . . .”). But see Cudahy
Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 361 (1942) (holding officer could not delegate subpoena power, where 29
U.S.C. § 209 and 15 U.S.C. § 49 provided that the officer “shall have power” of subpoena). In Cudahy Packing Co., the
Court considered whether the delegation of the subpoena power was authorized by a statute providing that “[t]he
principal office of the [officer] shall be in the District of Columbia, but he or his duly authorized representative may
exercise any or all of his powers in any place.” Id. at 360 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 204). The Court rejected this contention,
stating that “[a] construction of the Act which would thus permit the Administrator to delegate all his duties, including
those involving administrative judgment and discretion which the Act has in terms given only to him, can hardly be
accepted unless plainly required by its words.” Id. at 361.
230 Stand Up for California!, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 143. See also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1790d(i)(4)(A) (“Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the [National Credit Union Administration] Board may not delegate the authority of the Board under
this subsection.”) (emphasis added); 25 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (“The [National Indian Gaming] Commission shall have the
power, not subject to delegation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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Courts have also recognized that some statutes may limit the class of officers to whom a duty is
delegable, meaning by implication that the duties are not delegable outside of that specified
class.231
In contrast to the majority of decisions approving of delegations, one federal district court ruled in
February 2019 that a statute precluded the delegation of a specific duty in the context of a
Department of the Interior decision to take property into trust at the request of the Santa Ynez
Band of Chumash Mission Indians.232 This decision provides another example of a law that
implicitly precluded delegation. Federal law authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire
land in trust “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.”233 Pursuant to agency regulations
delegating this authority and outlining procedures for its use, the Assistant Secretary-Indian
Affairs (AS-IA) assumed jurisdiction over an administrative appeal reviewing the agency’s
decision to acquire the land for this tribe.234 However, while the internal appeal was pending, the
AS-IA resigned.235 The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (PDAS) initially
served as Acting AS-IA as the first assistant under the Vacancies Act, but “reverted” to his
position as PDAS after 210 days.236 After the expiration of the 210-day period, the PDAS issued a
decision rendering the land acquisition final, citing “the authority delegated to [the PDAS] by 25
C.F.R. § 2.20(c).”237 This regulation authorized the AS-IA to issue decisions in administrative
appeals, but also allowed the AS-IA to assign decisionmaking authority to “a Deputy.”238 The
regulation further said that if a decision “is signed by the [AS-IA], it shall be final . . . and
effective immediately.”239 By contrast, if a Deputy signed the decision, the regulation provided
that such a decision could be appealed to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.240
As framed by the trial court, the relevant question was therefore “whether 25 C.F.R. § 2.20(c)
exclusively reserves with the [AS-IA] the authority to issue final decisions . . . , or whether the
[AS-IA’s] authority to issue final appeals decisions is delegable to a Deputy.”241 Although the
regulation did not explicitly state that this authority was exclusive to the AS-IA or otherwise
expressly preclude delegation,242 the court nonetheless held that the duty to render final decisions
was exclusive to the AS-IA and nondelegable for the purposes of the Vacancies Act.243 The court
observed that the regulation expressly stated that if a decision were “signed by a Deputy to the
[AS-IA],” it would be subject to further appeal, meaning that “only” the AS-IA “may issue a final

231 See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 507–08 (1974) (holding “Congress did not intend the power to
authorize wiretap applications to be exercised by any individuals other than the Attorney General or an Assistant
Attorney General specially designated by him”); Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (concluding
statute that authorized Transportation Secretary to “delegate the duties and powers conferred by this subtitle to any
officer, employee, or member of the Coast Guard,” 46 U.S.C. § 2104(a), prohibited the “delegation of . . . functions to a
non-Coast Guard official”).
232 Crawford-Hall v. United States, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
233 25 U.S.C. § 5108.
234 Crawford-Hall, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1129.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 25 C.F.R. § 2.20(c) (2018).
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Crawford-Hall, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1136 (emphasis added).
242 See id. at 1143.
243 Id. at 1137.
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decision on the appeal.”244 The court further concluded that, in light of “the history and purpose
behind the [AS-IA’s] authority over appeals,” the regulation was “intended to restrict the [AS-
IA’s] permissible delegation authority.”245 Finally, the court looked to the nature of the challenged
function and inferred that the agency “contemplated that . . . [this] authority . . . would be used
with restraint,” suggesting that the duty should not “be freely delegable.”246
As discussed above,247 courts have disagreed about whether Congress intended the Vacancies Act
to bar the performance of only nondelegable functions or duties. Although the prevailing view
appears to be that agencies may delegate the duties of a vacant office without violating the
Vacancies Act, at least one district court has pointed out that this interpretation may be contrary to
Congress’s goals in adopting the 1998 version of the Act.248 If Congress were concerned about
agencies delegating duties of vacant offices, it could amend either the Vacancies Act or the
organic acts creating those duties. For instance, Congress could amend the definition of “function
or duty” in the Vacancies Act to more clearly prohibit delegation once an office becomes
vacant.249 Congress could also enact other statutory limitations on the ability of certain officers to
delegate their authority.250 There are already a number of statutes that grant authority to executive
branch officials but expressly provide that those authorities may not be delegated, or may only be
delegated to specific officials.251 Beyond placing additional substantive limitations on the types of
duties that are delegable, Congress could also create procedural limitations on the way in which
duties may be delegated.252 For example, some statutes require delegations to be in writing,253
while others provide that duties may only be delegated if certain conditions are met.254

244 Id.
245 Id. at 1139.
246 Id. at 1147.
247 See supra “What Are the “Functions and Duties” of an Office?”
248 L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19-2676, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35897, at *74 (D.D.C. Mar. 1 2020), appeal docketed,
No. 20-5141 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2020).
249 See 5 U.S.C. § 3348. As discussed, however, at least one district court held that the Vacancies Act already prohibits
the performance of delegated duties unless the delegation predates the vacancy by 180 days. L.M.-M., 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35897, at *76.
250 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3535(q)(2) (“The Secretary may delegate authority to approve a waiver of a regulation only to
an individual of Assistant Secretary rank or equivalent rank, who is authorized to issue the regulation to be waived.”).
251 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(E)(iii) (“The responsibilities of the Director under this subparagraph may not be
delegated.”); see also supra note 230. Cf., e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(11)(A) (“The term ‘Secretary of the Treasury’
means the Secretary of the Treasury, personally, and shall not include any delegate of his.”).
252 See generally Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 448 (1935) (noting that where Congress has delegated
legislative power “subject to a condition, it is a requirement of constitutional government that the condition be
fulfilled”).
253 See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 301 (authorizing President to delegate functions but requiring delegation to “be in writing,
[and] . . . be published in the Federal Register”); 10 U.S.C. § 138(c) (“[A]n Assistant Secretary may not issue an order
to a military department unless . . . the Secretary of Defense has specifically delegated that authority to the Assistant
Secretary in writing; and . . . the order is issued through the Secretary of the military department concerned.”).
254 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-53, § 211, 109 Stat. 468, 535 (1995) (transferring certain functions of Comptroller
General to Director of Office of Management and Budget and providing that “[t]he Director may delegate any such
function, in whole or in part, to any other agency or agencies if the Director determines that such delegation would be
cost-effective or otherwise in the public interest”).
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Constitutional Considerations
Some have questioned whether the Vacancies Act is consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s
Appointments Clause, at least with respect to particular types of acting service.255 The
Appointments Clause creates specific requirements for the appointment of “Officers of the United
States”: generally, officers must be appointed through presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation.256 However, while principal officers may only be appointed through Senate
confirmation, Congress can vest the appointment of “inferior Officers . . . in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”257 Accordingly, to determine whether an
official’s appointment complied with the Appointments Clause, courts ask whether the official is
a principal officer, inferior officer, or a “non-officer employee.”258 The Supreme Court has said
that a federal official is a principal or inferior officer subject to the Appointments Clause if the
official (1) performs duties that are “continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary”259;
and (2) exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”260 To
distinguish a principal officer from an inferior officer, the Supreme Court asks whether the
officer’s “work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”261 Stated another way, the
relevant question is whether the officer has a “superior other than the President.”262
Some have argued that temporary service under the Vacancies Act might violate the
Appointments Clause by allowing government officials to act as “Officers of the United States”
absent appointment through the proper constitutional processes.263 Justice Thomas expressed this
concern in a concurring opinion in NLRB v. SW General, Inc., arguing that the President could not
act alone to appoint someone to serve as the NLRB’s general counsel.264 A person performing the
duties of an office that is generally subject to Senate confirmation will likely be performing—

255 See, e.g., NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The [Vacancies Act]
authorizes the President to appoint both inferior and principal officers without first obtaining the advice and consent of
the Senate. Appointing inferior officers in this manner raises no constitutional problems. . . . Appointing principal
officers under the [Vacancies Act], however, raises grave constitutional concerns because the Appointments Clause
forbids the President to appoint principal officers without the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
256 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). See
generally CRS Report R44083, Appointment and Confirmation of Executive Branch Leadership: An Overview, by
Henry B. Hogue and Maeve P. Carey.
257 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63
(1997) (discussing distinction between principal and inferior officers).
258 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
259 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1878).
260 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
261 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
262 NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 947 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
671–72 (1988) (relying on four factors to conclude that an official was an inferior officer: that the official (1) was
“subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official”; (2) “perform[ed] only certain, limited duties”; (3) held an
office that was “limited in jurisdiction”; and (4) held an office that was “limited in tenure”).
263 See, e.g., Patrick v. Whitaker, No. 5:19-CV-52-BO, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215930, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2019)
(noting plaintiff’s argument “that Mr. Whitaker’s designation as Acting Attorney General violated the Appointments
Clause”); Joshua L. Stayn, Note, Vacant Reform: Why the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 Is Unconstitutional,
50 DUKE L.J. 1511, 1513 (2001).
264 See SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 948.
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perhaps temporarily—continuing statutory duties that may qualify as “significant” for purposes of
the Appointments Clause.265 Thus, acting officials performing these continuing, significant duties
could thereby qualify as officers subject to constitutional appointment procedures.266 If their
performance of those duties is not supervised by anyone other than the President, they might even
be viewed as principal officers.267 If acting officials could be considered principal officers when
they perform a principal officer’s duties, they would have to be appointed through Senate
confirmation.268 Under the Vacancies Act, however, acting officials are not appointed to serve
through advice-and-consent procedures, but instead may serve pursuant to the operation of the
statute or presidential designation alone.269 Another possible concern not raised by Justice
Thomas is that even if acting officials could be considered inferior officers rather than principal
officers, the Vacancies Act may violate the Appointments Clause to the extent that it allows non-
officer employees to automatically serve as acting officials by virtue of being first assistants.270
A number of trial courts have concluded that officials temporarily acting under the Vacancies Act
did not violate the Appointments Clause.271 A few different theories have been offered to explain
why acting service under the Vacancies Act does not violate the Appointments Clause—although
some of these theories may justify only certain categories of service authorized by the Vacancies
Act. First, for some officers who have already been appointed in accordance with the
Appointments Clause, acting service could be seen as a conditional duty of the office to which
they were originally appointed.272 For example, a statute outlining the duties of the Senate-
confirmed Deputy Secretary of Defense states that the Deputy will “act for, and exercise the
powers of” the Secretary of Defense if the Secretary “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to
perform the functions and duties of the office.”273 Under these circumstances, acting service can
be seen as a contingent duty of the office—a duty that the President and Congress were aware of
when appointing the Deputy Secretary.274 In one opinion, the OLC argued that the Vacancies Act
similarly makes acting service “part and parcel of the office” for all officers appointed after the

265 Id. at 946–47.
266 See id. at 947.
267 See id. at 947–48; see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (“Special trial judges are not inferior
officers for purposes of some of their duties . . . , but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities. The fact
that an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the
Appointments Clause does not transform his status under the Constitution.”).
268 See SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 947–48.
269 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345.
270 Cf. E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power over Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 219 (2018) (discussing
the “automatic-promotion mechanism” in the context of a first assistant who is an inferior officer performing the duties
of a principal office).
271 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109, 153 (D.D.C. 2019)
(holding that Acting Attorney General serving under the Vacancies Act did not violate the Appointments Clause), aff’d
on other grounds, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam); United States v. Santos-Caporal, No. 1:18 CR 171
AGF (ACL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19282, at *11–12, 17 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 9, 2019) (same). But see Patrick v. Whitaker,
No. 5:19-CV-52-BO, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215930, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2019) (“The Court is inclined to agree
with plaintiff that the President’s designation of Mr. Whitaker as a principal officer pursuant to the [Vacancies Act]
‘raises grave constitutional concerns . . . .’ However, because the Court concludes that plaintiff lacks standing, it
dismisses his claims.” (quoting SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 946)).
272 See, e.g., West, supra note 270, at 219.
273 10 U.S.C. § 132(b).
274 See, e.g., Ben Miller-Gootnick, Note, Boundaries of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 459,
491 n.163 (2019).
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enactment of the Vacancies Act, suggesting that the provisions authorizing acting service could be
seen as creating a conditional duty for any covered offices.275
Another argument broadly justifying acting service is based on two Supreme Court cases that
may suggest that when a government official temporarily performs duties, the temporary nature
of the duties may prevent the official from being considered an officer, rather than an
employee.276 In United States v. Germaine and Auffmordt v. Hedden, the Supreme Court held that
officials who were only occasionally asked to act on behalf of the government should not be
considered constitutional officers.277 The Court has since emphasized that to qualify as an officer,
an official must “hold a continuing office established by law,” and may not serve only
“temporarily or episodically.”278 However, in both Germaine and Auffmordt, the officials were
performing duties that, per statute, were themselves temporary.279 It is not clear whether the same
principles would apply to an official temporarily performing continuing statutory duties—
although some have suggested that they might.280
A different Supreme Court case seems more directly on point and has been cited for the
proposition that officials temporarily serving in a continuing office should be considered, at most,
inferior officers who may be appointed by the President or a department head acting alone.281 In a
case from the late 1800s, United States v. Eaton, the Supreme Court held that it did not violate the
Appointments Clause for a vice-consul appointed by the Secretary of State to “temporarily
perform[] the functions of the consular office” during the illness of the consul-general.282 The
Court said that where “the subordinate officer is charged with the performance of the duty of the
superior for a limited time and under special and temporary conditions, he is not thereby
transformed into the superior and permanent official.”283 Eaton suggests that the Court views
temporary acting service differently than the permanent performance of duties.284

275 Designation of Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121, 122 n.3 (2003); see
also 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2) (“[T]he President (and only the President) may direct a person who serves in an office for
which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity . . . .”).
276 See Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890) (holding that a merchant appraiser who “acts only occasionally
and temporarily” was not a constitutional officer); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878) (holding that a
surgeon who exercised “occasional and intermittent” duties, acting only “when called on . . . in some special case” was
not a constitutional officer).
277 See Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 327; Germaine, 99 U.S. at 512.
278 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018).
279 See Auffmordt, 137 U.S. at 327; Germaine, 99 U.S. at 512.
280 United States v. Peters, No. 6:17-CR-55-REW-HAI-2, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204067, at *8 n.11 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 3,
2018) (“[A]s an academic observation, the Supreme Court’s delineation of constitutional ‘Officer’ characteristics
suggests that an ‘Acting’ official could be considered a ‘lesser functionar[y]’ employee for which ‘the Appointments
Clause cares not a whit about who named them.’” (quoting Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051)).
281 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109, 148 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has held . . . that an official designated to perform the duties of a principal office temporarily, on an
acting basis, need not undergo Senate confirmation.”), aff’d on other grounds, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per
curiam).
282 United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898).
283 Id.
284 See also, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988) (holding that an independent counsel appointed under
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was an inferior officer that could permissibly be appointed by a court, and
noting, among other factors, that the office was “limited in tenure,” citing Eaton). In SW General, Inc., Justice Thomas
distinguished Eaton by noting that the official serving as acting General Counsel had “served for more than three years
in an office limited by statute to a 4-year term, and he exercised all of the statutory duties of that office,” saying that
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On this basis, the OLC has argued that acting officials temporarily performing a principal
officer’s duties should be considered only inferior officers, and that when the President designates
an official to serve under the Vacancies Act, he is appointing an inferior officer consistently with
the Appointments Clause.285 The Vacancies Act says that the President may “direct” Senate-
confirmed officers and senior agency officials to serve as acting officials, rather than saying that
the President may “appoint” these officials to serve.286 Nonetheless, the OLC and at least one trial
court have concluded that this provision should be interpreted as authorizing an appointment
consistent with Appointments Clause procedures.287
The OLC’s Eaton-based argument may have some limitations. For example, the argument does
not, on its own, appear to account for first assistants who automatically serve pursuant to the
operation of the Vacancies Act, because these officials are not appointed to the acting position in
accordance with the Appointments Clause.288 At least one scholar has argued that for first
assistants, automatic acting service should be viewed as “contingent powers appended to the
original office.”289 However, this contingent-duties and Eaton-based argument may not extend to
a first assistant who is a non-officer employee that was not appointed by the President or
department head.290 Eaton described the vice-consul temporarily filling the vacant office as an
inferior officer.291 Under the Appointments Clause, an inferior officer may be granted “significant
authority,” while a mere employee may not.292 Accordingly, it is not clear whether Eaton supports
the automatic designation of a non-officer employee to serve as an acting officer—even an
inferior officer. Further, some have argued that because Eaton involved a temporary absence—an
illness—it should not be interpreted to authorize an inferior officer to fill a permanent vacancy in
a principal office.293

there was “nothing ‘special and temporary’ about Solomon’s appointment.” NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929,
946 n.3 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring). It is unclear whether the full Supreme Court or lower courts would take a
similar view of acting service or, for Justice Thomas, what duration of service or amount of responsibility suffices to
transform an acting official. Cf., e.g., Bhatti v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1218 (D. Minn. 2018)
(ruling that “determining whether an otherwise validly appointed acting officer has served for ‘too long’ [in violation of
the Appointments Clause] is a non-justiciable political question”).
285 Designating an Acting Attorney General, slip op. at 9 (Op. O.L.C. Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download; Designation of Acting Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121, 123–24 (2003).
286 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2)–(3).
287 Designation of Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C. 121, 124–25 (2003);
Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109, 154–55 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d on
other grounds, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
288 See 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1).
289 West, supra note 270, at 219.
290 See id. (arguing that first assistants can lawfully serve if “(1) the inferior officer’s original appointment satisfies the
Appointments Clause (i.e., she was lawfully appointed by the President, head of the department, or a court of law) and
(2) the contingent duties are . . . ‘special and temporary’” (quoting United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898))).
291 See United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898); see also, e.g., Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173–74
(10th Cir. 2016) (describing the vice consul as an example of an inferior officer). The vice-consul had been appointed
by the Secretary of State, the department head. Eaton, 169 U.S. at 337.
292 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
293 E.g., Thomas Berry, Is Matthew Whitaker’s Appointment Constitutional? An Examination of the Early Vacancies
Acts, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/is-matthew-whitakers-
appointment-constitutional-an-examination-of-the-early-vacancies-acts-by-thomas-berry (noting that an official
stepping in during a temporary absence is still subject to the supervision of the absent official and asserting that early
executive branch practice treated short vacancies differently than more lengthy vacancies).
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An alternative argument justifying acting service relies on the principle that Senate-confirmed
officers can be given additional germane duties, even if those duties were not contemplated at the
time the official was appointed.294 In Shoemaker v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected a
legal challenge arguing that Congress violated the Appointments Clause by naming federal
officials to serve on a parks commission, unconstitutionally “appointing” the officers.295 The
Court, emphasizing that the Senate had already confirmed the officials to their existing positions,
held that Congress could grant these officers “additional duties, germane to the offices already
held by them” without providing for a new appointment.296
Similarly, in Weiss v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that the Appointments Clause did
not require a second appointment for military judges, upholding a statute that allowed military
officials to assign commissioned officers to serve as judges.297 Thus, unlike in Shoemaker,
Congress had not granted new duties to specifically named officials, but authorized an executive
branch official to designate “an indefinite number of military judges . . . from among hundreds or
perhaps thousands of qualified commissioned officers.”298 Accordingly, the Court was not sure
whether Shoemaker should control its analysis, saying that in Weiss, there was “no ground for
suspicion . . . that Congress was trying to both create an office and also select a particular
individual to fill the office.”299 But even assuming that Shoemaker’s germaneness inquiry
governed, the Weiss Court concluded that the test was satisfied.300 Noting that “all military
officers, consistent with a long tradition, play a role in the operation of the military justice
system,” the Court held that “the role of military judge is ‘germane’ to that of military officer.”301
Some who do not believe that Eaton justifies acting service have argued that at least some
applications of the Vacancies Act can be justified on these grounds.302 If an official has been
appointed through a constitutionally compliant procedure, under Shoemaker and Weiss, Congress
may, through the Vacancies Act, authorize that official to take on additional duties, germane to
their original appointment, without triggering the need for a second appointment.303 However,
Shoemaker and Weiss both approved of assigning new duties to Senate-confirmed officers.304 It is
not clear that these cases could authorize acting service by an inferior officer or a non-officer
employee.305 In addition, acting service may not satisfy the germaneness test if the acting official
was confirmed to a position in another department and usually performs duties unrelated to those
of the vacant office.306 Further, the Court’s decision in Weiss may suggest that if a statute allows
an executive branch official to assign new duties to an official selected from a large pool of

294 See, e.g., id.
295 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300–01 (1893).
296 Id. at 301.
297 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994).
298 Id. at 174.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 175–76.
302 See, e.g., Thomas A. Berry, S.W. General: The Court Reins in Unilateral Appointments, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
151, 178–79 (2017); see also Designation of Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 27 Op. O.L.C.
121, 122 n.3 (2003).
303 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 293.
304 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 170; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893).
305 See, e.g., Berry, supra note 293 (“Matthew Whitaker was not serving in a Senate-confirmed position at the time of
his ascension, and so the Shoemaker/Weiss doctrine cannot apply to him.”).
306 See Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 301.
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candidates—like the Vacancies Act—Shoemaker’s germaneness inquiry might not apply.307
Shoemaker was concerned with curbing congressional encroachment on the executive branch’s
appointment authority.308 Accordingly, one could argue that the germaneness test should not be
invoked to validate a questionable appointment, particularly where the relevant statute looks like
the one considered in Weiss.
A court might also consider the long history of the Vacancies Act as support for the
constitutionality of acting service. In “separation-of-powers case[s]” interpreting the
Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court has put “significant weight upon historical practice.”309
One district court upholding the constitutionality of an acting appointment under the Vacancies
Act highlighted the “unbroken string of legislative enactments” authorizing acting service starting
in 1792.310 While there has been some “interbranch conflict” regarding various iterations of the
Vacancies Act,311 the executive branch has agreed that at least some temporary appointments are
constitutional.312 The executive branch has even, at times, argued that the President has the
inherent power “to make temporary . . . appointments in cases of need without conforming to the
requirements of the Appointments . . . Clause.”313 Accordingly, historical practice suggests that
Congress and the executive branch have considered at least some forms of acting service to be
constitutional. And in particular, since 1868, prior versions of the Vacancies Act have provided
for first assistants to automatically take on acting service.314
It is likely that litigants challenging the validity of acting officials’ service will continue to raise
constitutional arguments under the Appointments Clause. Further judicial consideration of the
issue may shed light on what types of acting officials are constitutionally problematic and which
of the theories described above may justify acting service.

Author Information

Valerie C. Brannon

Legislative Attorney

307 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 174.
308 See Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at 301.
309 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 514 (2014).
310 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 356 F. Supp. 3d 109, 148 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d on
other grounds, 920 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Accord, e.g., Designating an Acting Attorney General, slip
op. at 10–16 (Op. O.L.C. Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1112251/download.
311 NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 935 (2017).
312 See, e.g., id. at 935–36; The Vacancies Act, 22 Op. O.L.C. 44 (1998).
313 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 161–62 (1996).
Cf., e.g., Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (saying that if such a power existed, it would
be only in “emergency situations,” and pointing out “[s]everal constitutional problems . . . presented by a temporary
appointive power”).
314 See Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168.
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