May 14, 2020
Protecting Against Rogue Drones
Rules for Unmanned Aircraft
around New York City. The helicopter landed safely, but
As of March 2020, the Federal Aviation Administration
the incident damaged the main rotor assembly, where
(FAA) had registered more than 1.5 million unmanned
fragments of the drone were found. The following month, a
aircraft systems (UAS), often referred to as drones. More
drone struck a chartered turboprop near Quebec City,
than 70% are operated by recreational users. FAA estimates
Canada. That aircraft also was damaged but managed to
that by 2024, about 2.3 million UAS, including 1.5 million
land safely. FAA-sponsored research has found that
recreational drones and model aircraft and about 800,000
collisions with drones weighing 8 pounds or less can cause
commercial UAS, will be registered to fly in U.S. airspace.
more structural damage than collisions with birds of similar
As the UAS market expands, there may be an increasing
weight. Experts fear that a collision between a small drone
risk that rogue drones that either fail to obey safety rules or
and a manned aircraft, or a drone being ingested into a jet
are operated for nefarious purposes could threaten manned
engine, could be catastrophic.
aircraft operations, airports, critical infrastructure facilities,
Airport officials have treated drone threats with
and high-profile events. These concerns have prompted
considerable caution. In December 2018, hundreds of
Congress to examine options for detecting and interdicting
flights at London’s Gatwick airport were canceled over a
drones.
three-day period after multiple drone sightings near the
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L.
runway. Three weeks later, London’s Heathrow airport was
112-95) mandated that FAA develop a plan to integrate
also briefly shut down due to a drone sighting, as was
UAS into the national airspace and promulgate regulations
Newark-Liberty Airport in New Jersey in January 2019.
allowing certain commercial drone operations. In 2016,
In addition to careless and reckless drone operations,
FAA issued regulations (14 C.F.R. Part 107) allowing
homeland security and law enforcement agencies have
routine operations of commercial UAS weighing less than
uncovered incidents involving drones transporting illegal
55 pounds so long as they are conducted during daylight
drugs across U.S. borders, dropping contraband into prison
hours, in good visibility, and at low altitude, provided the
yards, and conducting industrial espionage. The Federal
drones remain within the operator’s visual line of sight and
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned of an escalating
away from airports and manned aircraft. FAA may grant
threat that terrorists and transnational criminal
waivers to these restrictions on a case-by-case basis.
organizations might launch domestic drone attacks on
UAS flown strictly for noncommercial purposes, including
critical infrastructure facilities, landmarks, and high-profile
recreational drones and radio-controlled model aircraft that
mass gatherings, citing the use of reconnaissance and
can sometimes be much larger than the 55-pound limit for
weaponized drones by insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
commercial UAS, were exempted from these rules and,
Syria. In 2011, the FBI thwarted a terrorist plot to attack the
instead, operate under safety guidelines set by recreational
Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol with explosives-laden model
user groups. Like commercial operators, recreational users
aircraft.
must register with FAA and may do so through an online
registration system. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018
Controlling the Threat
(P.L. 115-254) imposed additional requirements for
FAA has encouraged UAS manufacturers to incorporate
hobbyists, limiting recreational drone flights to altitudes at
technology that could reduce the risk of rogue operations,
or below 400 feet and mandating FAA institute testing to
such as built-in “geofencing” capabilities that prevent the
assess operators’ knowledge of airspace and safety
drone from entering airspace that is off-limits to UAS.
regulations. FAA is in the process of implementing these
These systems, however, may not have current information,
testing requirements.
as they usually require the operator to keep airspace data up
to date. FAA has also developed the Low Altitude
Potential Threats from UAS
Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC)
These requirements that recreational drones remain at low
system to disseminate information regarding low-altitude
altitudes and that operators learn safety rules were imposed
controlled airspace in the vicinity of airports and to grant
following close calls and collisions with manned aircraft.
airspace access to certain commercial UAS operations on a
Between 2016 and 2019, airline pilots reported, on average,
case-by-case basis. In the future, FAA envisions that these
more than 100 drone sightings per month to FAA, and
resources will be integrated with “Remote Identification”
social media have transmitted photos and videos taken by
capabilities to monitor compliance.
drones in close proximity to airports and passenger
airliners. In September 2017, a hobby drone launched from
Remote Identification
a park in Brooklyn, NY, was intentionally flown beyond its
The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L.
operator’s line of sight and collided with a U.S. Army
114-190) required FAA to develop standards for the remote
Black Hawk helicopter patrolling a temporary no-fly zone
identification of UAS and to coordinate with the National
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Protecting Against Rogue Drones
Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop
drone-related incidents. P.L. 114-190 directed FAA to
technologies for managing UAS traffic. P.L. 115-254
establish procedures for imposing unmanned aircraft
authorized FAA to require remote identification for all
restrictions around critical infrastructure and other sensitive
drones, including recreational drones. FAA recently
“fixed site” facilities, including amusement parks, and to set
published a proposed rule that would require all UAS to
up a pilot program to detect unmanned aircraft near
transmit location and identification information. This
airports. P.L. 115-254 expanded the list of eligible fixed-
requirement could necessitate extensive retrofitting or
site facility types and also included language explicitly
replacement of existing drones. Educating operators about
prohibiting operators from affixing dangerous weapons to
compliance and enforcing remote identification
unmanned aircraft.
requirements on older UAS could pose significant
challenges to effective implementation.
P.L. 115-254 established criminal penalties for operators of
drones that interfere with firefighting, law enforcement, or
Detection and Interdiction Technologies
other emergency response to wildfires. It directed the
Given the potential threat posed by rogue drones, there is
Department of Transportation to work with the Department
considerable interest in deploying counter-UAS systems
of Defense to streamline the deployment of counter-UAS
that can detect and interdict unauthorized unmanned
technologies and required FAA to establish a pilot program
aircraft.
to assess the use of remote detection and identification
technologies to conduct safety oversight and carry out
Commercial airports have a particular interest in drone
enforcement actions against drone operators. P.L. 115-254
detection technologies because they have a regulatory
also authorized the Department of Justice and the
responsibility to inform airlines about airfield conditions
Department of Homeland Security, including the Coast
that may adversely affect the safety of flight operations. An
Guard, to interdict hostile or unauthorized drones in certain
industry task force examining UAS mitigation at airports
instances to protect critical infrastructure and designated
urged FAA to take a more active role in partnering with
high-profile events and mass gatherings (see Figure 1). The
airports to establish and implement UAS detection
language parallels authorities granted to the Department of
standards and capabilities.
Defense and the Department of Energy in the National
U.S. airports and state and local law enforcement agencies
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (P.L. 114-
that protect them do not have specific legal authority to
328) to protect certain military and nuclear facilities in the
deploy counter-UAS technologies. FAA has warned that
United States from drones.
these technologies pose potential risks to manned aircraft
and to surveillance, navigation, and communications signals
Figure 1. Department of Homeland Security Counter-
used by air traffic control. Rather than trying to capture,
UAS Authorities
destroy, or disable drones operating near airports, airport
security personnel and local authorities must rely solely on
detection capabilities to help locate and apprehend
operators.
While interdicting drones near airports is particularly
difficult because of potential safety implications, protecting
other facilities and high-profile events may depend on
effective interdiction capabilities to neutralize drone threats.
Available interdiction systems rely primarily on jamming
Source: Department of Homeland Security.
devices that disrupt flight control signals between the drone
and the controller, but these may not be able to stop fully
While these federal agencies have been granted limited
autonomous drones and may interfere with air navigation
authority to deploy counter-UAS systems, FAA has issued
signals and other radio transmissions. Other techniques
stern warnings to event organizers and local authorities that
involve systems that transmit signals to spoof drone
have deployed such systems of their own accord to protect
guidance systems or take over control of the drone, capture
high-profile events. Unauthorized use of counter-drone
drones in nets, or disable or destroy drones with lasers.
technologies is potentially in violation of both FAA and
These technologies are nascent, and may not be as effective
Federal Communications Commission regulations, as well
as some manufacturers and advocates may assert. The
as federal aviation laws. The National Football League,
absence of standards raises questions about performance
which has teamed with FAA to educate fans about drone
and safety of interdiction technologies, especially near
restrictions, has urged Congress to extend counter-UAS
airports where radiofrequency jamming could impact flight
authorities to state and local law enforcement in order to
operations, and mass gatherings where interdiction could
enforce temporary flight restrictions around large sporting
pose a hazard to people on the ground.
events. In considering such requests, Congress faces
Legal Restrictions and Authorities
complex trade-offs in weighing the inherent risks of
expanding counter-UAS authorities against the level of
Certain civil and criminal penalties have been enacted to
threat posed by rogue drones.
punish violations involving UAS, and, in some instances,
unlawful drone flights have been prosecuted. FAA relies
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy
extensively on assistance from federal, state, and local
public safety and law enforcement agencies to investigate
IF11550
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Protecting Against Rogue Drones
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11550 · VERSION 1 · NEW