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Updated March 9, 2020
Moldova: An Overview
Moldova is one of three post-Soviet states—together with
After the election, Moldova lacked a new government for
Ukraine and Georgia—that has sought greater integration
almost three months while leading parties held coalition
with the West while dealing with separatist territories
negotiations. Eventually, ACUM and the Socialists, who
occupied by Russian forces. Many Members of Congress
had placed first in the elections, agreed to form a
have long supported Moldova’s democratic trajectory and
government. The two parties came together to unseat the
territorial integrity and have called on Russia to respect
PDM and then-leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, a wealthy
Moldova’s sovereignty and withdraw its military forces.
businessman. Many observers say the PDM and Plahotniuc
had “captured” Moldova’s state institutions for personal
Recent Developments
and party gain.
In November 2019, a short-lived coalition government fell
after one coalition partner, the socially conservative,
Table 1. February 2019 Parliamentary Elections
Russian-leaning Party of Socialists, filed a motion of no
Party List Single Mandate Total
confidence against the government of then-Prime Minister
Party
Seats (%)
Seats
Seats
Maia Sandu. Sandu is the co-leader of ACUM (or “Now”),
a reform-oriented, Western-leaning alliance. President Igor
Party of Socialists
18 (31%)
17
35
Dodon is the Party of Socialists’ unofficial leader.
PDM
13 (24%)
17
30
ACUM
14 (27%)
12
26
The Socialists initiated the no-confidence vote after Sandu
Shor Party
5 (8%)
2
7
moved to give herself greater control over the appointment
Independents
—
3
3
of the country’s prosecutor-general. Sandu reportedly made
the move because she feared Dodon and the Socialists were
Source: Central Election Commission of the Republic of Moldova.
seeking to sabotage judicial reforms.
After the Sandu government formed, Moldova’s
From the outset, many observers were uncertain if the
Constitutional Court, which observers considered to be
under the PDM’s influence,
reformist Sandu and Russian-leaning Dodon could jointly
issued a series of rulings
govern given their different policy orientations. After
pronouncing the new government illegitimate and
coming to power, Sandu said the coalition was not a
authorizing the then-acting PDM prime minister to act as
“natural partnership,” while Dodon called for the Socialists
president, dissolve parliament, and call new elections.
to set aside their differences with ACUM and work as “a
united team.” Strains within the coalition persisted. In
For a week, tensions escalated as Moldova had two rival
November 2019, a Socialist candidate defeated ACUM’s
governments. Facing unified international discontent, the
other co-leader in a key election for the office of mayor of
PDM backed down, and Plahotniuc left the country.
Chisinau, Moldova’s capital. Nine days later, Socialist
Plahotniuc currently is wanted in Moldova on suspicion of
deputies filed the motion of no confidence against the
money laundering and other crimes related to a bank fraud
Sandu government.
scandal involving the alleged loss of some $1 billion,
equivalent to more than 12% of Moldova’s gross domestic
The new government is led by Ion Chicu, who served in a
product (GDP). The PDM gained power in 2016 after the
previous government as minister of finance. Chicu and
prior government collapsed amid fallout from the scandal.
many other cabinet ministers have no party affiliation,
although most have ties to Dodon or the Party of Socialists.
Another politician who reportedly fled Moldova was Ilan
The Chicu government was formed with the support of
Shor, a regional mayor and head of the fourth party in
members of the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM),
parliament. Shor is appealing a seven-year prison sentence
which led the government from 2016 until June 2019 when
for his alleged role in the bank fraud.
it failed in an effort to use Moldova’s Constitutional Court
Transnistrian Conflict
to block the Sandu government from coming to power.
Since becoming independent in 1991, Moldova has coped
Political Background
with the secession of Transnistria, a Russian-backed
The Sandu government formed after February 2019
territory with more than 10% of the country’s population
parliamentary elections (for results, see Table 1).
and a substantial but faltering industrial base. Despite its
International observers said the elections were competitive
separatist status, Transnistria has economic relations with
but “tainted by allegations of pressure on public employees,
the European Union (EU), the destination for more than
strong indications of vote buying, and the misuse of state
half of its exports.
resources.”
Russia stations approximately 1,500 soldiers in
Transnistria, a few hundred of which Moldova accepts as
peacekeepers. In 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that
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Moldova: An Overview
Russia’s troop presence in Moldova was unconstitutional,
Economy
and parliament adopted a declaration calling on Russia to
One of Europe’s poorest countries, Moldova has made
withdraw. In 2018, the U.N. General Assembly passed a
“significant progress in reducing poverty and promoting
resolution calling on Russia to withdraw its troops from
inclusive growth,” according to the World Bank. Moldova’s
Moldova “unconditionally and without further delay.”
annual GDP growth has averaged around 4.3% since 2010
and is forecast to grow 3.5% in 2019 and 3.8% in 2020.
A political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict appears
Agriculture and agro-processing make up approximately
distant. The Moldovan government supports a special local
one-third of GDP and one-third of Moldova’s labor force.
governance status for Transnistria, but Russia and
Many Moldovans work abroad; labor remittances have been
authorities in Transnistria have resisted agreement.
estimated at 15-20% of GDP over the past five years.
The conflict-resolution process operates in a “5+2” format
In 2018, Moldova’s top-five merchandise trading partners
under the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and
were Romania (18%), Russia (11%), Germany (8%), Italy
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the OSCE, Russia,
(8%), and Ukraine (8%). As a whole, the EU accounted for
and Ukraine as mediators and the EU and the United States
70% of Moldova’s exports and 56% of its total trade.
as observers. The EU also supports conflict management
Figure 1. Moldova at a Glance
through a Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and
Ukraine (EUBAM). EUBAM seeks to help the two
countries combat transborder crime, facilitate trade, and
resolve the conflict over Transnistria, which shares a long
border with Ukraine.
In 2016, Chisinau and Transnistria committed “to engage in
a substantive, result-oriented dialogue” focused on a set of
practical issues and confidence-building measures known as
the “package of eight.” Since then, the sides have resolved
several issues related to transit, education, agriculture, and
the recording of civil statistics, such as births and
marriages.
Foreign Policy
Moldova pursued a pro-Western foreign policy for many
years, although a sizeable number of Moldovans support a
closer relationship with Russia. Unlike Ukraine and
Source: Moldova National Bureau of Statistics and IMF (does not
Georgia, Moldova is a constitutionally neutral state.
include Transnistria). Figure created by CRS.
Moldova does not aspire to join NATO but maintains close
U.S. Relations
relations with the alliance and, especially, NATO member
The United States “supports the OSCE-led 5+2 negotiations
Romania. Moldovans are related to Romanians by ethnicity
and language; reportedly at least half a million Moldovans
to find a comprehensive settlement that will provide a
hold Romanian citizenship (for a map, see Figure 1).
special status for the separatist region of Transnistria within
a territorially whole and sovereign Moldova.” In July 2019,
The main framework for EU-Moldova relations is an
a resolution was introduced in the House to affirm support
Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2016
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova, as
well as of Ukraine and Georgia (H.Res. 510).
and includes a free-trade agreement. The EU also provides
Moldovans with visa-free travel. After suspending financial
assistance to Moldova under the PDM government, the EU
In November 2019, the U.S. Embassy in Moldova said the
dismissal of the Sandu government was “unfortunate” and
resumed assistance under the Sandu government, which the
that “Moldovans deserve leaders who will work for the
EU commended for engaging in a “significant and
substantial structural reform process.” An EU spokesperson
good of the country and will free it from the corruption that
has prevented Moldova from reaching its potential.”
said the dismissal of the Sandu government sent “worrying
signals for the reform process in the country.”
In January 2020, the United States imposed a visa ban on
Looming over Moldova’s political transition, and of interest
former PDM leader Plahotniuc (and his family) for
to many in Congress, is the question of Russia’s influence
involvement in “corrupt acts that undermined the rule of
and intentions. Many observers believed it unlikely that
law and severely compromised the independence of
Russia would stand aside as the Sandu government
democratic institutions in Moldova.” U.S. Secretary of State
implemented reforms that could help promote Moldova’s
Michael Pompeo said the visa ban “sends a strong signal
Western integration. Many consider the November 2019
the United States does not tolerate corruption and stands
consolidation of power by Dodon and the Socialists to be in
with the people of Moldova in their fight against it.”
Russia’s interest. The Socialists, however, say they are
maintaining a European orientation.
U.S. assistance to Moldova was $66 million in FY2017,
$74 million in FY2018, and $56 million in FY2019.
Cory Welt, Specialist in European Affairs
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Moldova: An Overview
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