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Updated February 24, 2020
National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G)
Mobile Technologies
The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will
telecommunication providers are focused on MMW
increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth
deployments and others on sub-6.
over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn
enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G
The Department of Defense (DOD), however, holds large
technologies are expected to support interconnected or
portions of the usable spectrum. Although DOD uses
autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving
certain MMW frequencies for high-profile military
vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial
applications such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency
machinery, and advanced robotics. In the military realm,
satellites that provide assured global communications for
5G could additionally improve intelligence, surveillance,
U.S. forces, it extensively uses sub-6 frequencies—leaving
and reconnaissance systems and processing; enable new
less sub-6 availability in the United States than in other
methods of command and control; and streamline logistics
countries. The Defense Innovation Board (DIB) advised
systems for increased efficiency, among other uses. As 5G
DOD to consider sharing sub-6 spectrum to facilitate the
technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may
build-out of 5G networks and the development of 5G
consider policies for spectrum management and national
technologies used in the sub-6 band. While DOD has been
security, as well as implications for U.S. military
moving toward greater spectrum sharing, it has expressed
operations.
concern that sharing presents operational, interference, and
security issues for DOD users. As an alternative to
Spectrum Management
spectrum sharing, some analysts have argued that portions
5G requires deployment of technologies that work in
of the sub-6 spectrum should be reserved for commercial
various segments of the electromagnetic spectrum (“the
use. This would require DOD to relocate certain
spectrum”): sub-6, which operates below 6 GHz, and
applications to other parts of the spectrum. The DIB
millimeter wave (MMW), which operates between around
estimates this approach would take around 10 years to
24 and 300 GHz (see Figure 1).
complete, as opposed to 5 years for spectrum sharing.
Figure 1.5G Proposed Spectrum
National Security Concerns
According to a DIB assessment, China is the current leader
in sub-6 technologies and is likely to deploy the world’s
first 5G wide-area network. Chinese companies, which
often receive government subsidies (e.g., subsidized land
for facilities, R&D grants), are therefore well-positioned as
global 5G suppliers. Huawei alone has signed contracts for
the construction of 5G infrastructure in around 30 countries,
including U.S. allies Iceland, Turkey, and the United
Source: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/
Kingdom.
DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF.
Some experts are concerned that vulnerabilities in Chinese
Millimeter waves allow for greater bandwidth and faster
equipment could be used to conduct cyberattacks or
transfer rates, which some telecommunications companies
military or industrial espionage. These experts claim
have argued is required for autonomous vehicles and other
vulnerabilities were introduced through the poor business
data-intensive applications like smart cities; however,
practices of many Chinese companies. However, they note
MMW travel comparatively short distances and can be
that vulnerabilities could also be intentionally introduced
absorbed by rain or disrupted by physical objects such as
for malicious purposes. China’s National Intelligence Law,
buildings and vehicles. As a result, 5G MMW technologies
enacted in June 2017, declares that “any organization and
require installing a higher number of cell sites—at much
citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide
higher cost and on a much slower deployment timeline than
assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and
the sub-6 approach. 5G deployment thus relies on MMW
guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that
for high-speed, high-bandwidth communications and on
they are aware of.” Some analysts interpret this law as
sub-6 waves for nationwide coverage.
requiring Chinese telecommunications companies to
cooperate with intelligence services to include being
Telecommunication companies around the world are
compelled to install backdoors or provide private data to the
deploying 5G in different ways. Chinese
government.
telecommunications companies are focusing on the less
expensive sub-6 approach, while some U.S.
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National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies
Other analysts argue that the risks posed by Chinese
Finally, command and control systems could benefit from
telecommunications equipment vary depending on the
the high speed, low latency capability of 5G. For example,
equipment’s location within the cellular network
the U.S. military currently uses satellite communications
architecture. Most cellular networks are broken into two
for the preponderance of its long-distance communications.
groups: the core network, which provides the gateway to
However, satellites on orbit can significantly increase
the internet and ensures devices meet the provider’s
latency due to the amount of distance a signal needs to
standards, and the radio access network, composed of the
travel, causing delays in the execution of military
cellular towers that broadcast and receive radio signals (see
operations.
Figure 2). These analysts state that, while the risks posed
by Chinese core networks are significant, the risks posed by
Although DOD is in the initial stages of testing and
Chinese radio access networks could be managed. Other
experimentation for 5G applications, it has selected four
analysts have argued that having any Chinese equipment in
military installations as test beds. A draft request for
the network could pose potential security concerns. Such
prototype proposals (RPP) has been issued for Marine
concerns have prompted some analysts to argue that the
Corps Logistics Base Albany, Georgia (smart warehouses),
United States should limit intelligence sharing with any
and Hill Air Force Base, Utah (spectrum sharing). DOD has
country operating Chinese-supplied 5G equipment.
also announced plans to issue RPPs for Joint Base Lewis-
McChord, Washington (augmented and virtual reality), and
Figure 2.Cellular Network Architecture
Naval Base San Diego, California (smart warehouses). The
Department requested $1.5 billion for 5G and
microelectronics in FY2021.
Potential Questions for Congress
What approach to spectrum management (e.g., spectrum
sharing, spectrum reallocation) will best protect DOD
missions while meeting growing commercial demands?
What are the risks to U.S. national security posed by
Chinese 5G infrastructure in allied and partner nations?
Can that risk be managed and, if so, how?
Source: https://medium.com/@miccowang/5g-c-ran-and-the-
What impact would the use of Chinese 5G infrastructure
required-technology-breakthrough-a1b2babf774.
by allied and partner nations have on military
effectiveness and interoperability? Should the United
Implications for Military Operations
States limit intelligence sharing with countries operating
5G technologies could have a number of potential military
Chinese-supplied 5G equipment?
applications, particularly for autonomous vehicles,
Are any changes to operational concepts, force structure,
command and control (C2), logistics, maintenance,
doctrine, or posture required as a result of developments
augmented and virtual reality, and intelligence,
in or applications of military 5G?
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems—all of
which would benefit from improved data rates and lower
CRS Products
latency (time delay).
CRS Report R45485, Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications
Autonomous military vehicles, like their commercial
Technologies: Issues for Congress, by Jil C. Gallagher and
counterparts, could potentially circumvent on-board data
Michael E. DeVine
processing limitations by storing large databases (e.g.,
CRS In Focus IF11155, Defense Primer: Military Use of the
maps) in the cloud. Safe vehicle operations would, in turn,
Electromagnetic Spectrum, by John R. Hoehn
require 5G’s high data rates and low latency to quickly
download off-board information and synthesize it with on-
Other Resources
board sensor data. Likewise, 5G could be used to transfer
sensor data between operators and uninhabited vehicles and
Defense Innovation Board, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks and
to network vehicles, potentially enabling new military
Opportunities for DOD, April 2019, https://media.defense.gov/
concepts of operations, such as swarming (i.e., cooperative
2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/
behavior in which vehicles autonomously coordinate to
DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF
achieve a task).
Defense Science Board, Defense Applications of 5G Network
Technology, June 24, 2019,
5G technologies could also be incorporated into ISR
https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2010s/5G_Executive_Summary_20
systems, which increasingly demand high-bandwidths to
19.pdf.
process, exploit, and disseminate information from a
growing number of battlespace sensors. This could provide
commanders with timely access to actionable intelligence
data, in turn improving operational decisionmaking.
John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and
Similarly, 5G could reduce latency in other data-intensive
Programs
activities, such as logistics and maintenance, and could
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
additionally enable augmented or virtual reality
environments that could enhance training.
Global Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies
IF11251
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11251 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED