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Updated February 12, 2020
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Overview
So-called “123 agreements” must include the terms,
U.S. companies have provided proposals to Saudi
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, as
authorities in relation to a planned tender for nuclear reactor
well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President
construction in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom’s nuclear
must make a written determination “that the performance of
energy program remains nascent, and, in recent years, the
the proposed agreement will promote and will not constitute
Saudi government has entered into agreements concerning
an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
possible civil nuclear cooperation with several countries
The AEA requires Congress to review a 123 agreement for
(Table 1). In July 2017 the Saudi cabinet approved a
two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. If
National Project for Atomic Energy, including plans to
the President has not exempted the agreement from any
build large and small nuclear reactors for electricity
requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the
production and desalination amid a larger effort to diversify
end of the second period, unless, during that time, Congress
the Saudi economy and expand the use of renewable
adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and
energy. Saudi authorities expressed hopes of signing
the resolution becomes law.
contracts for reactor construction in 2018, but did not do so.
Table 1. Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Developments
Depending on its nature and extent, future U.S.-Saudi
nuclear cooperation may require executive branch
March
Argentine-Saudi joint nuclear R&D venture agreed.
authorizations and/or congressional approval of bilateral
2015
Saudi-South Korean mutual nuclear cooperation
agreements. Saudi plans also are fueling debate in Congress
agreements signed, including an MOU on building
over regional nuclear proliferation and security dynamics.
two small reactors for Saudi water desalination.
June 2015
KA CARE signs a nuclear energy cooperation
Saudi Arabia holds 16% of the world’s proven reserves
agreement with state-owned Rosatom of Russia.
of crude oil, has the world’s fourth-largest reserves of
Agreements signed with France on cooperation,
natural gas, and is the largest oil consumer in the
including EPR reactor feasibility studies.
Middle East, with oil consumption for electricity
generation projected to increase. Oil and natural gas
January
Saudi Arabia and China memorandum of
generate 40% and nearly 60% of the kingdom’s
2016
understanding signed regarding cooperation in the
electricity, respectively. The Saudi Ministry of Energy,
possible future construction of a high-temperature
Industry, and Mineral Resources and the King Abdullah
gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) in the kingdom.
City for Atomic and Renewable Energy agency (KA
October
Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan sign a nuclear
CARE) are considering proposals for the construction
2016
cooperation agreement focused on nuclear fuel.
of two reactors to generate 2.9 GWe of electricity.
March-
Agreement signed for Chinese-Saudi feasibility
August
study of HTGR construction in Saudi Arabia. KA
U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
2017
CARE officials and experts visit China to begin
HTGR study implementation planning. China
In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which stated the
countries’ intentions to cooperate on nuclear activities
Saudi Geological Survey sign agreements on
in
cooperation on uranium exploration.
the fields of medicine, industry, and electricity production.
Previous Administrations had explored a civil nuclear
December
Russia’s Rosatom and KA CARE sign implementing
energy agreement with Saudi Arabia. A State Department
2017
agreement related to small and medium reactors,
official described discussions with Saudi Arabia about a
personnel and fuel management.
nuclear cooperation agreement as “technically ongoing” in
November
KA CARE signs contract with WorleyParsons to
a February 2020 email.
2018
provide project management consultancy services
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Requirements
for the National Project for Atomic Energy.
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
January
KA CARE announces it has received reactor bid
(AEA, 22 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), requires nuclear cooperation
2019
proposals from entities in the United States, Russia,
agreements for significant nuclear cooperation with foreign
France, South Korea, and China.
governments. Such cooperation includes the transfer of
certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to licensing for
April 2019
Argentina’s IAEA Envoy said “Saudi Arabia will have
commercial, medical, and industrial purposes; the export of
to move to a ful scope comprehensive safeguards
reactors and critical reactor components; and other
agreement with subsidiary arrangements” before an
commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission export
Argentinian-designed research reactor is fueled.
licensing authority.
Source: Official statements and media reports.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
The Department of Energy (DOE) in 2017 expeditiously
final report in January 2019. In March 2019, IAEA Director
granted a “Part 810 authorization” (per 10 C.F.R. 810) for
General Yukiya Amano said, “We’re encouraging all
U.S. companies to engage in discussions, including
countries to conclude and implement an additional protocol
marketing, with the Saudi government regarding its civil
and that includes Saudi Arabia.” IAEA safeguards present a
nuclear program. Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows for
significant hurdle to the development of nuclear weapons.
limited cooperation related to the “development or
The U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Precedent
production of any special nuclear material outside of the
United States” if that activity has been authorized by the
A commitment to forgo enrichment or reprocessing is not
Secretary of Energy following a determination that it “will
required for 123 agreements. Still, some 123 agreements
not be inimical to the interest of the United States.” A 123
contain provisions designed to discourage national
agreement is not necessary for such authorizations, which
enrichment and reprocessing programs in the Middle East.
mostly involve unclassified nuclear technology transfer and
The 123 agreement reached in 2009 with the United Arab
services, such as nuclear reactor designs, nuclear facility
Emirates (UAE) provides the United States the right to
operational information and training, and nuclear fuel
terminate nuclear cooperation with that country if it
fabrication. Part 810 authorizations are not subject to
“possesses sensitive nuclear facilities within its territory or
congressional review. A March 2019 DOE press statement
otherwise engages in activities within its territory relating to
confirmed that the Administration has approved seven 810
enrichment of uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.”
authorizations related to Saudi Arabia.
(For more information, see CRS Report R40344, The
Proliferation, Fuel, and Policy Choices
United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and Proposed U.S.
Nuclear Cooperation.) An Agreed Minute to that agreement
Analysts have examined Saudi nuclear plans and proposals
for decades in light of the kingdom’s
states that its terms “shall be no less favorable in scope and
economic profile,
effect than those which may be accorded” to other countries
energy resources, and security dilemmas. Saudi state policy
underscores that the kingdom’s nuclear energy pursuits
in the Middle East. The minute also explains that, if the
are
U.S. government concludes a more-favorable agreement
limited to peaceful purposes, but senior officials, including
with another regional government, the United States will, at
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also have stated in
the UAE’s request, consult with the UAE “regarding the
2018 that if Iran pursues or obtains a nuclear weapon, then
possibility of amending” the agreement in order to make its
the kingdom also would work to do so.
terms equally favorable to the new agreement.
The most proliferation-sensitive nuclear technology is the
capability to produce fuel for nuclear reactors, by either
Neither Saudi nor U.S. officials have publicly confirmed
enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to
whether Riyadh would be willing to accept UAE-style
obtain plutonium. Both highly enriched uranium and
restrictions on enrichment as part of a 123 agreement. In
plutonium can be used as fuel in some types of nuclear
February 2018, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir said
reactors but also are used as fissile material in nuclear
“we want to have the same rights as other countries,” a
weapons. Consequently, enrichment and reprocessing
presumed reference to Iran. In May 2018, Secretary of State
facilities frequently generate concern that ostensibly
Mike Pompeo said in Senate testimony, “we want a gold-
peaceful facilities may aid nuclear weapons programs
standard Section 123 Agreement from them, which would
Conversely, a program without such facilities generally
not permit them to enrich.” The FY2020 Further
poses little proliferation risk, but may pose security and/or
Consolidated Appropriations Act prohibits the use of
environmental risks. KA CARE is considering low-
appropriated funds for Export-Import Bank support for
enriched uranium fuel for reactors in Saudi Arabia.
nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia, until Saudi Arabia has a
123 agreement in effect, commits to renouncing uranium
The 2008 U.S.-Saudi MOU, which is a statement of intent
enrichment and reprocessing, and has signed an Additional
and is not legally binding, described the Saudi
Protocol with the IAEA (Section 7041[h] of Division G,
government’s intent “to rely on existing international
P.L. 116-94).
markets for nuclear fuel services as an alternative to the
pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.” However, KA
General Security Concerns
CARE has said that it may use indigenous uranium
Threats to the security of critical Saudi infrastructure may
resources for fuel, and, in September 2019, Saudi Energy
raise concerns about the security of future nuclear facilities.
Minister Prince Abd al Aziz bin Salman Al Saud said, “We
The U.S. government describes terrorist threats in Saudi
want to make sure that even if we scale up [nuclear power],
Arabia as persistent, including ongoing instances of
we scale up to the notion that we want to go to the full
attempted attacks against government installations; Saudi
cycle, to producing the uranium, enriching the uranium,
forces have disrupted major planned attacks. Missile and
using the uranium.”
rocket attacks from Yemen have struck inside the kingdom,
International mechanisms designed to restrict the spread of
and U.S. officials attributed a major September 2019
sensitive nuclear technology could complicate Saudi efforts
missile and drone attack on Saudi infrastructure to Iran.
to identify suitable suppliers of enrichment technology.
U.S.-Saudi security cooperation mechanisms are robust and
Saudi Arabia is a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation
remain focused on mitigating these threats and others.
Treaty (NPT), and its nuclear facilities, including any Saudi
enrichment or reprocessing facilities, would be required to
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Affairs
safeguards. IAEA officials completed a nuclear
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
infrastructure review in Saudi Arabia in 2018 and issued a
IF10799
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Prospects for Enhanced U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10799 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED