2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief
November 27, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46066

link to page 3 link to page 4 link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 7 link to page 10 link to page 15

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Overview1
Heads of state and government from NATO’s 29 member states are scheduled to meet in London,
United Kingdom (UK) on December 3-4, 2019; they last met in Brussels, Belgium, in July 2018.
Two key goals for the meeting will be to commemorate the alliance’s past achievements—2019
marks NATO’s 70th anniversary—and to advance efforts to address new and emerging security
challenges, including renewed Russian aggression, terrorism, and cyber and hybrid threats. The
meeting also could expose heightened political tension within the alliance and divergent views on
a range of issues, including U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe, relations with NATO member
Turkey, and relations with Russia.
NATO and U.S. officials have said they expect the following key deliverables from the London
Leaders’ Meeting:
 Completion of a new Readiness Initiative, under which the alliance would have
at its disposal 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat
vessels ready to use within 30 days.
 Declaration of space as a new operational domain for NATO and advances in
combatting cyber and hybrid threats, including establishing new baseline
requirements for telecommunications infrastructure.
 Increased defense spending by European allies and Canada.
 Renewed commitment to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism
efforts in the Middle East and North Africa.
 Agreement to assess China’s impact on NATO and transatlantic security.
 Progress on finalizing North Macedonia’s accession to NATO.
More broadly, NATO officials hope to use the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary to highlight
NATO’s achievements and the importance of strong U.S.-European relations to these efforts. The
United States was the driving proponent of NATO’s creation in 1949 and has been the
unquestioned leader of the alliance as it has evolved from a collective defense organization of 12
members focused on deterring the Soviet Union to a globally engaged security organization of 29
members. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a
cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy that brings benefits ranging from peace and stability
in Europe to the political and military support of 28 allies, including many of the world’s most
advanced militaries.
The London meeting comes at a tense time for NATO, however. Some European allies question
the Trump Administration’s commitment to NATO and have criticized the Administration for a
perceived unilateral approach to foreign policy issues, including the October 2019 drawdown of
U.S. forces from Syria. Many allies also have criticized fellow NATO member Turkey for its
military operations in Syria and its acquisition of a Russian-made air defense system.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledges ongoing tensions within the alliance,
but stresses that continued transatlantic cooperation has enabled NATO to be more active today
than it has been in decades. Trump Administration officials maintain that the United States
remains committed to NATO, as articulated in the Administration’s National Security and
Defense Strategies. They highlight the Administration’s successful efforts in 2017 and 2018 to

1 This report is based in part on CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin, which offers a more
detailed assessment of U.S. policy toward NATO.
Congressional Research Service
1

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

substantially increase funding for the U.S. force presence in Europe and that Secretary General
Stoltenberg has credited President Trump with playing a role in securing defense spending
increases across the alliance in recent years. Critics of the Trump Administration’s NATO policy
maintain that renewed Russian aggression has been a key factor behind such increases.
Although many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—
regarding burden-sharing, for example—Congress as a whole has demonstrated consistent
support for NATO. During the Trump Administration, congressional support at times has been
viewed as an effort to reassure allies troubled by President Trump’s criticisms of the alliance. At
the same time, Congress continues to assess NATO’s utility and value to the United States and
some Members are concerned about key challenges facing NATO, including burden-sharing,
managing relations with Russia and China, and divergent threat perceptions within the alliance.
Key Agenda Items for the Leaders’ Meeting
According to NATO officials, the formal agenda for the London meeting will include updates on
several initiatives launched over the past two years, particularly on readiness and deterrence. It
also will include the announcement of some new initiatives, including declaring space as an
operational domain for NATO. In addition, the allies are expected to assess NATO’s ongoing
mission in Afghanistan and other counterterrorism efforts and to discuss the implications for
NATO of China’s growing investment in, and engagement with, Europe.2
Deterrence Through Increased Readiness
In the five years since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine, the United States
has supported efforts to renew NATO’s focus on territorial defense and deterring Russian
aggression. Among other measures, NATO member states have deployed an Enhanced Forward
Presence (EFP) totaling about 4,500 troops to the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania) and Poland; increased military exercises and training activities in Central and Eastern
Europe; and established new NATO command structures in six Central and Eastern European
countries.
In London, the allies are expected to announce progress on several new initiatives intended to
enhance NATO’s readiness to respond swiftly to an attack on a NATO member, including by
reinforcing the aforementioned EFP battlegroups. The initiatives include the following:
 Full implementation by the end of 2019 of the so-called Four-Thirties Readiness
Initiative, proposed by the United States in 2018, under which NATO would have
30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to
use within 30 days.
 Progress on improving military mobility across Europe, including establishment
of a new Joint Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, and a new Rapid Air
Mobility agreement that would allow allied aircraft to move across Europe with
priority handling. Other ongoing military mobility initiatives include
infrastructure upgrades, efforts to shorten border-crossing times, and
identification of alternative supply routes capable of handling military transport.

2 NATO officials had hoped to welcome North Macedonia as the alliance’s 30th member at the London meeting, but
ratification of North Macedonia’s accession has been delayed in some member states and is not expected to be
complete until early 2020. North Macedonia has been invited to participate in the meeting as an observer.
Congressional Research Service
2

link to page 9 2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Although the allies have continued to support and contribute to NATO deterrence initiatives,
some analysts question the effectiveness and sustainability of these efforts. For example, the
authors of a February 2016 report by the RAND Corporation contend that “as presently postured,
NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members.”3 Some allies,
including Poland and the Baltic States, have urged other NATO members to deploy more forces
to the region to reinforce that alliance’s deterrence posture.
Other allies, including leaders in Western European countries such as Germany, Italy, and France,
have stressed the importance of a dual-track approach to Russia that complements deterrence with
dialogue. These allies contend that efforts to rebuild cooperative relations with Moscow should
receive as much attention as efforts to deter Russia. Accordingly, these allies are reluctant to
endorse permanently deploying troops in countries that joined NATO after the collapse of the
Soviet Union due to concerns that this would violate the terms of the 1997 NATO-Russia
Founding Act; in consideration of these terms, NATO’s EFP has been referred to as “continuous”
but rotational rather than “permanent.”4
Addressing New Security Challenges: Cyber, Hybrid, and Space
In London, the allies are expected to note progress made in responding to cyber and hybrid
threats and to formally declare space as a new operational domain for the alliance.
Since naming cyber defense a core NATO competence in 2014, the alliance has adopted measures
to protect NATO networks from cyberattacks and to assist member states in bolstering national
cyber defense capabilities. NATO has made available Cyber Rapid Reaction teams to help allies
respond to cyberattacks, and in 2018 it announced plans to establish a new NATO Cyberspace
Operations Center in Brussels. The new cyber center will focus on integrating allies’ national
cyber capabilities into NATO missions and operations. Although NATO member states maintain
full ownership of these capabilities—as they do with other military capabilities deployed to
NATO missions—the new operations center is tasked with incorporating cyber defense into all
levels of NATO planning and operations.
NATO also has sought to bolster capabilities to counter heightened hybrid warfare threats,
including propaganda, deception, sabotage, and other nonmilitary tactics. NATO’s focus has been
on enhancing strategic communications, developing appropriate exercise scenarios, and
strengthening coordination with the European Union (EU) to respond to hybrid threats. At their
meeting in 2018, NATO leaders agreed to establish counter-hybrid support teams to provide
tailored assistance to allies in preparing against and responding to hybrid activities. NATO
deployed the first of these teams to Montenegro in November 2019. As discussed in more detail
below (see “Assessing China’s Impact on NATO and Transatlantic Security”), in London, NATO
leaders are expected to endorse new baseline requirements for allies with respect to the resilience
of telecommunications infrastructure, including 5G systems.
U.S. and NATO officials have said that in London, NATO leaders will formally declare space as
an operational domain for NATO, alongside air, land, sea, and cyber.5 Secretary General

3 David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, RAND Corporation,
February 2016.
4 In the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the allies agreed not to permanently station “substantial combat forces” in
countries that joined NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
5 NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of Meetings of NATO Ministers of
Foreign Affairs,” November 19, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_170972.htm. Hereinafter,
NATO, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers.”
Congressional Research Service
3

link to page 7 2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Stoltenberg has stated that the declaration reflects a consensus desire within NATO to strengthen
defense and deterrence in all areas, including space, where NATO allies reportedly own about
half of the approximately 2,000 satellites estimated to be in orbit currently.6 Stoltenberg has
stressed that NATO has no intention of deploying weapons in space and that NATO’s approach
will remain defensive and in line with international law. Others have questioned whether China,
which has a growing presence in space, might view the NATO declaration as a provocation.
Defense Spending and Burden-Sharing
A primary focus of the Trump Administration’s policy toward NATO has been to urge allies to
increase their national defense budgets in line with past agreements intended to ensure an
equitable distribution of defense responsibilities within the alliance. In London, President Trump
is expected to continue these calls. Secretary General Stoltenberg has credited President Trump
with playing a key role in spurring increases in European allied defense spending over the past
five years.7 However, critics of the U.S. President express concern that his strident criticism of
what he considers insufficient defense spending by some allies could damage NATO cohesion
and credibility.
In 2006, NATO members informally agreed to aim to allocate at least 2% of gross domestic
product (GDP) to their national defense budgets annually and to devote at least 20% of national
defense expenditure to procurement and related research and development. These targets were
formalized at NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, when the allies pledged to halt declines in defense
expenditures and “move towards the 2% guideline within a decade.”8
U.S. and NATO officials say they are encouraged that defense spending by European allies and
Canada has grown for five consecutive years (see Figure 1). According to Secretary General
Stoltenberg, by the end of 2020, European allies and Canada “will have added a cumulative total
of well over one hundred billion U.S. dollars” in defense spending since 2014.9 Whereas 3 allies
met the 2% guideline in 2014, in 2019, 8 allies are expected to meet that guideline and 16 allies
are expected to meet the 20% benchmark for spending on major equipment.10 President Trump
and others continue to criticize those NATO members perceived to be reluctant to achieve
defense-spending targets, however. One such member is Europe’s largest economy, Germany,
which currently spends about 1.36% of GDP on defense and has plans to reach 1.5% of GDP by
2024.

6 NATO, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers.”
7 David Wemer, “NATO’s Stoltenberg Credits Trump as Allies Increase Defense Spending,” Atlantic Council, July 11,
2018, at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/stoltenberg-nato-engages/.
8 NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, September 5, 2014, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_112964.htm.
9 NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meetings of NATO Defence
Ministers,” June 27, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_167245.htm?selectedLocale=fr.
10 The eight allies meeting the 2% benchmark are Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following
the Meetings of NATO Defence Ministers,” June 27, 2019; NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2012-
2019), June 25, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
4

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Figure 1. Defense Spending by NATO Members, 2012-2019

Source: NATO, Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries, June 25, 2019.
Although all allied governments agreed to the Wales commitments, many, including Germany,
emphasize that allied contributions to ongoing NATO missions and the effectiveness of allied
military capabilities should be considered as important as total defense spending levels. For
example, an ally spending less than 2% of GDP on defense could have more modern, effective
military capabilities than an ally that meets the 2% target but allocates most of that funding to
personnel costs and relatively little to ongoing missions and modernization.
Analysts on both sides of the Atlantic also have argued that a relatively narrow focus on defense
inputs (i.e., the size of defense budgets) should be accompanied by an equal, if not greater, focus
on defense outputs (i.e., military capabilities and the effectiveness of contributions to NATO
missions and activities). The alliance’s target to devote at least 20% of each member’s national
defense expenditure to new equipment and related research and development reflects this goal.
Secretary General Stoltenberg has emphasized a broad approach to measuring contributions to the
alliance, using a metric of “cash, capabilities, and contributions.”11 Proponents of this approach
argue that a broad assessment of allied contributions that takes into account factors beyond the
2% of GDP defense spending metric would be more appropriate given NATO’s wide-ranging
strategic objectives, some of which may require capabilities beyond the military sphere.
In London, allied leaders are expected to consider a U.S. proposal to reduce assessed U.S.
contributions, and increase German contributions, to NATO’s relatively small pot of common
funds. National contributions to NATO’s common funds—about $2.6 billion total in 2019—pay
for the day-to-day operations of NATO headquarters, as well as some collective NATO military
assets and infrastructure. According to NATO, in 2018, the U.S. share of NATO’s common-
funded budgets was about 22%, or about $570 million, followed by Germany (15%), France
(11%), and the UK (10%). The U.S. proposal to be considered in London reportedly would bring
both the U.S. and German contributions to about 16% each.12

11 NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Ahead of the Meetings of NATO Defense
Ministers,” October 23, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169891.htm.
12 Anne Gearan and Michael Birnbaum, “Trump May Score Symbolic Victory in Long Fight with Germany over
Congressional Research Service
5

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Afghanistan and Counterterrorism
In London, the allies are expected to renew their commitment to NATO’s ongoing training
mission in Afghanistan, despite speculation about a possible drawdown of U.S. forces in the
country. In January 2015, following the end of its 11-year-long combat mission in Afghanistan,
NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise, and assist Afghan security
forces. Between 2015 and late 2018, NATO allies and partners steadily matched U.S. increases in
troop levels to RSM. As of November 2019, about 8,700 of the 17,178 troops contributing to
RSM were from NATO members and partner countries other than the United States. After the
United States (8,475 troops), the top contributors to the mission were Germany (1,300), the UK
(1,100), Italy (895), non-NATO-member Georgia (871), and Romania (797).13
European allies have reacted to reports of a possible drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan
with surprise and concern. Allied reactions have reflected dismay that allies and partners were not
previously consulted on possible drawdown plans and insistence that any such plans be carried
out in close coordination with the allies.14 Some allied officials and analysts also question the
viability of the NATO mission without continued U.S. participation at current levels. Other
officials and analysts have indicated that some allies could withdraw their own forces in the event
of a U.S. withdrawal.
President Trump consistently has called on NATO to expand its counterterrorism efforts beyond
Afghanistan, and terrorist threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region are key European concerns as well. Over the past several years, NATO leaders have
launched several new initiatives aimed at countering terrorism and addressing instability in the
MENA region. These initiatives include the noncombat NATO Training Mission in Iraq, carried
out by about 300 allied military trainers; the “Package on the South,” an initiative that includes a
range of partnership activities to enhance cooperation initiatives with MENA countries, including
Tunisia and Jordan; and establishment of a NATO Regional Hub for the South in Naples, Italy, to
coordinate NATO responses to crises emanating from “the South.” NATO also has deployed
aerial surveillance aircraft (AWACS) to assist the global coalition fighting the Islamic State
terrorist organization.
Several factors have limited enhanced NATO engagement on security challenges emanating from
the MENA region. These factors include a belief among some allies that the EU is the appropriate
institution to lead Europe’s response to terrorism and migration issues and a related reluctance to
cede leadership on these issues to NATO. France, for example, has advocated strong European
responses to terrorism and conflict in the Middle East but has generally opposed a larger role for
NATO. Some allies also disagree on what the appropriate response should be to some of the
security challenges in the MENA region, with some appearing hesitant to involve NATO in a way
that could be seen as endorsing military action.

NATO Spending,” Washington Post, September 3, 2019. Percentage shares of the common funds are negotiated among
the allies based on per capita income and other factors. U.S. shares for the three funds have fallen over the past three
decades. NATO, Funding NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm.
13 NATO, Resolute Support Mission: Key Facts and Figures, November 2019, at https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_11/20191106_2019-11-RSM-Placemat.pdf.
14 See, for example, “Germany Worried at Possible U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” DeutscheWelle, December 28,
2018; Ben Farmer, “Britain Left in Dark over U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Telegraph, December 21, 2018.
Congressional Research Service
6

link to page 10 2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Assessing China’s Impact on NATO and Transatlantic Security
The Trump Administration and some Members of Congress have urged NATO to assess the
security implications of growing Chinese investment in Europe and to work to counter potential
negative impacts on transatlantic security. As expressed in the December 2017 U.S. National
Security Strategy, U.S. officials have grown increasingly concerned that “China is gaining a
strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key
industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure.”15 U.S. officials express particular concern
about Chinese investment in critical infrastructure and telecommunications systems, such as 5G
networks. Some U.S. defense officials have suggested that the United States might limit military
cooperation and intelligence sharing with allies that allow Chinese investment in 5G networks.
In October 2019, NATO defense ministers agreed to update the alliance’s baseline requirements
for civilian telecommunications to reflect emerging concerns about 5G technology.16 The allies
agreed to assess the risks to communications systems associated with cyber threats, and the
consequences of foreign ownership, control, or direct investment. Although the EU is attempting
to develop common guidelines to govern contracting decisions on 5G networks, these decisions
would remain the prerogative of individual national governments.
As noted above, U.S. officials have warned European allies and partners that using Huawei or
other Chinese 5G equipment could impede intelligence sharing with the United States due to fears
of compromised network security. Although some allies, such as the UK and Germany, have said
they would not prevent Chinese companies from bidding on 5G contracts, these allies have
stressed that they would not contract with any companies that do not meet their national security
requirements.17 Other countries, such as Poland, have considered formally excluding Huawei
from their telecommunications sector, and Czech Republic intelligence officials publicly labeled
Huawei a national security risk.18
Despite U.S. concerns about China’s growing footprint in Europe, Administration officials have
expressed optimism that the United States and Europe can work together to meet the various
security and economic issues posed by a rising China. Analysts, too, cite numerous concerns
shared on both sides of the Atlantic and contend that joint U.S.-European pressure on China
would be more effective than either partner’s individual dealings with China.
Enlargement to North Macedonia19
Since NATO leaders last met in July 2018, newly renamed North Macedonia has been formally
invited to join NATO, a decision that requires ratification by member state governments (see
Figure 2 for a map of NATO members and accession dates). NATO officials had hoped the
ratification process would be complete in time for the London Leaders’ Meeting, but Secretary
General Stoltenberg has indicated this will not happen until early 2020.20 As of early November

15 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 47.
16 NATO, “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meetings of NATO Defense
Ministers,” October 25, 2019, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_170972.htm?selectedLocale=uk.
17 Julian E Barnes and Adam Satariano, “U.S. Campaign to Ban Huawei Overseas Stumbles as Allies Resist,” New
York Times, March 17, 2019.
18 Philip Heijmans, “The U.S.-China Tech War Is Being Fought in Central Europe,” The Atlantic, March 6, 2019.
19 For more on North Macedonia and the accession process, see CRS Report R45739, North Macedonia: In Brief, by
Sarah E. Garding.
20 NATO, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers.”
Congressional Research Service
7

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

2019, 25 of 29 allies had ratified North Macedonia’s accession; the U.S. Senate approved U.S.
ratification on October 22, 2019, but President Trump had yet to formally ratify the Senate’s
decision.21 NATO officials underscore that delays in the ratification timeline are not due to
political opposition to North Macedonia’s accession but rather to parliamentary procedures in
some member states.
Figure 2. NATO Members and Dates of Accession

Source: Congressional Research Service.
Political Tensions and Divergent Views
Deliberations in London could draw attention to heightened tension and divergent views within
the alliance on a range of issues, including U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe, Turkey’s
standing as a member of the alliance, EU security and defense policy, and NATO’s relations with
Russia.22 Disagreement within the alliance on whether and how to respond to these and other
issues has prompted some, including French President Emmanuel Macron, to question NATO’s
strategic direction and future. Many officials and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic also have
suggested that President Trump’s vocal criticism of NATO and the lack of transatlantic
coordination on policies related to Syria and Afghanistan have seriously undermined the
alliance.23 Secretary General Stoltenberg and others maintain that disagreement among allies is

21 Conversations with U.S. State Department officials, October 2019.
22 For a more detailed account of broader tensions in the transatlantic relationship, see CRS Report R45745,
Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues, coordinated by Kristin Archick; for more on NATO’s relations
with Russia, see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin.
23 See, for example, Joe Gould, “U.S., European Lawmakers Swipe Trump and Turkey in New Syria Joint Statement,”
Defense News, October 21, 2019.
Congressional Research Service
8

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

not a new phenomenon and stress that “Europe and North American are doing more together in
NATO today than we have for decades.”24
Allied Concerns Regarding the U.S. Commitment to NATO
Some analysts and allied leaders question the Trump Administration’s level of commitment to
NATO and express concern that President Trump’s criticisms of the alliance could cause lasting
damage to NATO cohesion and credibility. In addition to admonishing European allies for failing
to meet agreed NATO defense spending targets President Trump has repeatedly questioned
NATO’s value to the United States.25 Although he is not the first U.S. President to press the allies
to increase defense spending, none has done so as stridently and none has called into question the
U.S. commitment to NATO as openly or to the same extent as President Trump. Trump
Administration officials underscore that the Administration remains committed to NATO and to
upholding European security, including through increased funding for U.S. defense activities in
Europe such as the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI).26
Some NATO member state governments argue that growing divergence between the United States
and many European allies on a range of key foreign and security policy issues, from Iran’s
nuclear program to fighting the Islamic State terrorist organization in Syria, has impeded
cooperation in NATO and exposed strategic rifts within the alliance. Some European allies have
expressed particular concern about what they portray as a lack of U.S. coordination on policy in
Syria, where many European countries have been fighting alongside the United States to counter
the Islamic State. Some maintain that the U.S. drawdown of forces in Syria in October 2019
enabled Turkey’s subsequent military operations against Kurdish forces in the country.27
In a widely reported November 2019 interview, French President Macron cited these divergences
when he proclaimed that, “we are currently experiencing the brain death of NATO.” Referring to
concerns about the drawdown of U.S. forces from Syria in October 2019 and subsequent military
operations by Turkey, he lamented, “You have partners together in the same part of the world, and
you have no coordination whatsoever of strategic decision-making between the United States and
its NATO allies. None. You have an uncoordinated aggressive action by another NATO ally,
Turkey, in an area where our interests are at stake. There has been no NATO planning, nor any
coordination.”28
Tensions with Turkey29
Some of Turkey’s fellow NATO members have sharply criticized Turkey’s October 2019 military
operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria as well as its planned deployment of a

24 NATO, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers”; “Transcript: Emmanuel Macron
in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019.
25 Atlantic Council, “Trump Again Questions U.S. Commitment to Defend NATO Allies,” December 12, 2017, at
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/trump-again-questions-us-commitment-to-defend-nato-allies; Tessa
Berenson, “Europe Worries as President Trump Heads to NATO Summit,” Time, July 10, 2018.
26 For background on the European Deterrence Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10946, The European Deterrence
Initiative: A Budgetary Overview, by Pat Towell and Aras D. Kazlauskas.
27 See, for example, James McAuley and Rick Noack, “Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Northern Syria Angers,
Worries Europeans,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019.
28 “Transcript: Emmanuel Macron in His Own Words,” The Economist, November 7, 2019.
29 For more detail on Turkey and NATO-Turkey relations, see CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background, U.S.
Relations, and Sanctions In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas; and CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background
Congressional Research Service
9

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Russian S-400 air defense system, with some policymakers calling into question Turkey’s
qualification for continued membership in the alliance.30 Turkey has been a NATO member since
1952 and has participated in numerous NATO missions, including ongoing operations in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Western Balkans. NATO, in turn, has invested substantially in military
facilities in Turkey, including naval bases and radar sites. Since 2013, NATO members have
provided Turkey with air defense support through the deployment of defensive missile systems
along its southern border.31
During an October 11, 2019, visit to Turkey, Secretary General Stoltenberg acknowledged
Turkey’s “legitimate” security concerns but urged Turkey to “act with restraint” and do
everything it can to preserve the gains that have been made against the Islamic State.32
Stoltenberg has said that Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air defense system is “not good” for
NATO, but he stressed that Turkey could continue to participate in NATO’s integrated air and
missile defense systems if the S-400 is excluded from these systems.33 Some allied leaders have
argued that NATO should exclude Turkey from NATO’s defense systems if it deploys the S-400.34
The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain provisions explicitly authorizing NATO allies to take
action against another NATO member without its consent. However, the United States and other
NATO members could take measures to affect the character of allied cooperation with Turkey—
for example, by changing their contributions of equipment or personnel, or their participation in
specific activities in Turkey. On October 14, 2019, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper stated that
he would “press our other NATO allies to take collective and individual diplomatic and economic
measures in response to these egregious Turkish actions.”35
EU Security and Defense Policy
Some European leaders, including French President Macron, have argued that uncertainty about
the future U.S. role in European security should add urgency to long-standing efforts to develop
coordinated European defense capabilities and policies, independent of but complementary to

and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
30 The only explicit mechanism for leaving NATO in the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 13, which allows parties to
leave one year after giving a notice of denunciation to the United States. Article 2 of the treaty states that its parties
“will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration
between any or all of them.”
31 In spring 2018, the Italian parliament voted to end its deployment of one of two missile defense systems currently
under NATO command in southern Turkey by the end of 2019; the other system is under Spanish command. NATO,
“NATO Patriot Mission in Turkey,” at https://shape.nato.int/ongoingoperations/nato-patriot-mission-in-turkey-; Emre
Peker, “NATO Chastises Turkey over Syria, But Fears Driving It Toward Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, October
11, 2019.
32 NATO, “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Turkey,” October 11, 2019.
33 In July 2019, Turkey reportedly began taking delivery of Russian S-400 components. Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan said then that the system would be fully deployed by April 2020. In November, the head of Turkey’s
defense procurement agency said the delivery of some components might be delayed beyond the planned timeline over
talks on technology sharing and joint production. See CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background, U.S. Relations, and
Sanctions In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
34 Nick Wadhams, “NATO Chief Says Turkey Remains Important Ally Despite S-400 Deal,” Bloomberg, July 17,
2019.
35 Department of Defense, “Statement by Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper Regarding Turkey, Syria Border
Actions,” October 14, 2019, at https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1988372/statement-by-
secretary-of-defense-dr-mark-t-esper-regarding-turkey-syria-border.
Congressional Research Service
10

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

NATO. For two decades, the EU has sought to develop its Common Security and Defense Policy
to bolster its common foreign policy, strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to security crises, and
enhance European military capabilities. Improving European military capabilities has been
difficult, however, especially given many years of flat or declining European defense budgets. In
recent years, the EU has announced several new defense initiatives, including a European
Defense Fund (EDF) to support joint defense research and development activities and a new EU
defense pact (known as Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO) aimed at spending
defense funds more efficiently.
Secretary General Stoltenberg has expressed support for further EU defense integration and
cooperation but emphasizes that these efforts should strengthen the European pillar within
NATO—22 NATO members are also members of the EU—rather than replace or supplant NATO.
Stoltenberg also has stressed that EU defense initiatives should be careful not to duplicate NATO
capacities and should complement NATO initiatives.36 In addition, the Trump Administration has
expressed concern that the EDF and PESCO could restrict U.S. defense companies from
participating in the development of pan-European military projects. Supporters of EU defense
integration highlight that PESCO’s initial priority projects were identified in consultation with
NATO and that several of these projects focus on enhancing military mobility across Europe, a
key NATO priority.
Issues for Congress
Congress was instrumental in creating NATO in 1949 and has played a critical role in shaping
U.S. policy toward the alliance ever since. Although many Members of Congress have criticized
specific developments within NATO—regarding burden-sharing, for example—Congress as a
whole has consistently demonstrated strong support for active U.S. leadership of and support for
NATO.
Congressional support for NATO traditionally has buttressed broader U.S. policy toward the
alliance. During the Trump Administration, however, demonstrations of congressional support for
NATO have at times been viewed primarily as an effort to reassure allies about the U.S.
commitment to NATO after President Trump’s criticisms of the alliance. For example, during the
Trump Administration, both chambers of Congress have passed legislation expressly reaffirming
U.S. support for NATO at times when some allies have questioned the President’s commitment.37
Some analysts portrayed House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell’s joint invitation to Secretary General Stoltenberg to address a joint session of
Congress on April 3, 2019, in commemoration of NATO’s 70th anniversary as an additional
demonstration of NATO’s importance to Congress.
Although Congress has expressed consistent support for NATO and its cornerstone Article 5
mutual defense commitment, congressional hearings on NATO in the 115th and 116th Congresses
have reflected disagreement regarding President Trump’s impact on the alliance.38 Some in
Congress argue that President Trump’s criticism of allied defense spending levels has spurred

36 NATO, “Press Conference Ahead of Meetings of NATO Foreign Affairs Ministers.”
37 This includes legislation passed by the House in January 2019 (H.R. 676) seeking to limit the president’s ability to
unilaterally withdraw from NATO; similar legislation has been introduced in the Senate (S.J.Res. 4 and S. 482).
38 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance,
hearing, March 13, 2019, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2019/3/nato-at-70-an-indispensable-alliance; U.S.
Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance, hearing, September 5,
2018, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/assessing-the-value-of-the-nato-alliance-090518.
Congressional Research Service
11

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

recent defense spending increases by NATO members that were not forthcoming under prior
Administrations, despite long-standing U.S. concern.
Other Members of Congress counter that President Trump’s admonition of U.S. allies and his
questioning of NATO’s utility have damaged essential relationships and undermined NATO’s
credibility and cohesion. They contend that doubts about the U.S. commitment to the alliance
could embolden adversaries, including Russia, and ultimately weaken other allies’ commitment to
NATO. Critics also have lamented the Administration’s reported lack of coordination with its
allies on policies that have significant security ramifications for Europe, such as countering the
Islamic State in Syria.
Despite disagreement over President Trump’s impact on the alliance, most Members of Congress
continue to express support for robust U.S. leadership of NATO, in particular to address potential
threats posed by Russia. Many Members have called for enhanced NATO and U.S. military
responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine, and others have advocated stronger European
contributions to collective defense measures in Europe. Increasingly, some Members of Congress
have questioned whether NATO should take formal action against an ally, such as Turkey, which
pursues foreign and defense policies that they believe could threaten alliance security.
In light of these considerations, Members of Congress could focus on several key questions
regarding NATO’s future, including the following:
 addressing the strategic value of NATO to the United States and the United
States’ leadership role within NATO;
 examining whether the alliance should adopt a new strategic concept that better
reflects views of the security threat posed by Russia and new and emerging
threats in the cyber and hybrid warfare domains (NATO’s current strategic
concept was adopted in 2010);
 examining NATO’s capacity and willingness to address other security threats to
the Euro-Atlantic region, including from the MENA region, posed by challenges
such as terrorism and migration;
 examining the possible consequences of member states’ failure to meet agreed
defense spending targets;
 assessing U.S. force posture in Europe and the willingness of European allies to
contribute to NATO deterrence efforts and U.S. defense initiatives in Europe,
such as the ballistic missile defense program and EDI;
 examining options to sanction allies that act in ways that jeopardize allied
security;
 revisiting the allies’ commitment to NATO’s stated “open door” policy on
enlargement, especially with respect to the membership aspirations of Georgia
and Ukraine; and
 developing a NATO strategy toward China, particularly given U.S. and other
allies’ concerns about the security ramifications of increased Chinese investment
in Europe.
Congressional Research Service
12

2019 NATO Leaders’ Meeting: In Brief

Author Information

Paul Belkin

Analyst in European Affairs

Acknowledgments
Special thanks to CRS Visual Information Specialists Jamie Hutchinson and Amber Wilhelm for creating
the graphics in this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R46066 · VERSION 1 · NEW
13