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Updated November 4, 2019
Belarus: An Overview
In recent years, observers have debated the likelihood of
to slow again from 2019, as a result of the rising cost of
change in the foreign and domestic policies of Belarus, an
Russian crude oil imports (see “Recent Belarus-Russia
authoritarian state in Eastern Europe that has close
Disputes” below).
economic and security ties to Russia (for map, see Figure
1). Although the U.S.-Belarus relationship has been
Russia is Belarus’s largest trading partner. In 2018, almost
difficult, the two countries recently took steps to normalize
half of Belarus’s merchandise trade was with Russia. The
relations. Few observers anticipate major governance or
European Union (EU) as a whole was Belarus’s second-
foreign policy changes in Belarus in the near term. Some,
largest trading partner, making up almost a quarter of its
however, believe incremental shifts may be possible.
merchandise trade. Belarus’s next-largest trading partners
were Ukraine (8%) and China (5%). The United States is
Political Overview
Belarus’s 7th-largest trading partner (1%). In 2018,
Belarus became independent in 1991, after the collapse of
Belarus’s main exports were oil and mineral fuels (25%),
the Soviet Union. President Alexander Lukashenko was
fertilizers (10%), motor vehicles (8%), and dairy products
first elected president in 1994 and has led Belarus for 25
(6%).
years. The country’s next parliamentary elections are
scheduled for November 17, 2019.
Figure 1. Belarus at a Glance
Observers consider Belarus to have an authoritarian system
of governance that restricts most political and civil liberties.
The U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO)
Freedom House gives Belarus a “freedom rating” of “not
free,” the same score it gives Russia.
In recent years, a debate has centered on whether the
Belarusian government is taking steps to become a “softer”
authoritarian regime or whether such steps are more
symbolic than substantive. The government released several
political prisoners in 2015. In 2016, opposition candidates
were allowed to win 2 of the 110 seats in the lower house of
Belarus’ legislature. Some observers predict that the
government will permit more opposition candidates to enter
Sources: International Monetary Fund; U.N. Comtrade Database.
parliament in 2019. International NGOs report that the
Graphic produced by CRS.
Belarusian government continues to suppress independent
media and restrict freedom of assembly.
Relations with Russia
Belarus is one of Russia’s closest security and economic
Economy
partners. It is a member of the Collective Security Treaty
Since independence, the state has played a large role in
Organization (a Russia-led alliance) and shares a joint air
Belarus’s economy. Some argue that because the
defense system with Russia, although Belarus declines to
government avoided difficult market reforms, Belarus
host a Russian military airbase that Moscow has long
experienced a relatively milder post-Soviet decline in the
requested. Belarus also is a member of the Russia-led
1990s than did its neighbors. At present, according to the
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and relies heavily on
International Monetary Fund (IMF), “reforms of the large
Russian loans and subsidized natural gas and oil.
state-owned enterprise sector are critical to tackle
inefficiencies and increase potential growth.” The IMF
In addition, Belarus and Russia are members of a bilateral
states that the Belarusian government’s preference for a
“union state” that came into effect in 2000. In practice, this
“gradual, incremental approach” to reform may lead to
union is largely aspirational. A common labor market is the
“protracted vulnerabilities.”
main characteristic distinguishing it from the economic
integration Belarus and Russia enjoy via EEU membership.
The export of refined oil products, based on subsidized
crude oil imported from Russia, plays a major role in
Tensions between Belarus and Russia have increased in
Belarus’s economy. In 2015-2016, Belarus experienced a
recent years, with the two countries at odds over oil and gas
recession amid declining global oil prices and Russia’s
prices and supplies, Belarusian debt, and Russian border
economic downturn. Over those two years, its gross
controls and trade restrictions. Although these disputes
domestic product (GDP) declined by more than 6%.
occasionally may reflect negotiating tactics more than
Economic growth recovered in 2017-2018 but is predicted
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Belarus: An Overview
genuine rifts, some believe differences between the two
After the Belarusian government released several political
countries are becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile.
prisoners in 2015, the U.S. government waived human
rights-related sanctions it had imposed on a major state-
Tensions between Belarus and Russia relate in part to
owned petrochemical company and eight subsidiaries. The
Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Given the possibility
EU suspended and then lifted most of its human rights-
that Russia could one day take similar action against
related sanctions on Belarus.
Belarus to secure the two countries’ integration,
Lukashenko reportedly has become wary of Russian
As of November 2019, the United States still retains human
intentions and seeks to protect Belarus’s national
rights-related sanctions on 16 Belarusians, including
sovereignty and his regime’s independence. In part, this has
Lukashenko. Sanctions on Belarus were first introduced in
meant making overtures to the United States and the EU.
the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-347, 22
U.S.C. 5811) and were expanded in the Belarus Democracy
Nonetheless, Lukashenko is wary of popular discontent that
Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-480) and the Belarus
could lead to protests and destabilization. This wariness, in
Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-82).
addition to Russian subsidies, has encouraged him to stay
close to Moscow. The Russian government, for its part, has
The United States and Belarus have taken steps to
sought maximum loyalty from Lukashenko while
normalize their relations. Since 2008, the United States has
attempting to limit the economic cost of subsidizing his
had a limited diplomatic presence but no ambassador in
regime.
Belarus, originally due to restrictions imposed by Minsk. In
January 2019, the Belarusian government reportedly agreed
Recent Belarus-Russia Disputes
to expand the U.S. diplomatic presence in Belarus, and in
In the last year, new disputes have arisen between Belarus
September 2019, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political
and Russia regarding oil exports to Belarus and the status of
Affairs David Hale and Belarusian Foreign Minister
their integration. In late 2018, the Belarusian government
Vladimir Makei announced that the two countries were
sought compensation from Moscow in anticipation of a
ready to exchange ambassadors “as the next step in
Russian tax reform that gradually reduces informal
normalizing our relationship.”
subsidies for domestic oil supplies within Russia as of
2019. This “tax maneuver” has the added effect of
Since 2015, U.S. officials have made some high-level visits
increasing crude oil prices for Belarus, leading to a decline
to Belarus. In the Obama Administration, then-Deputy
in revenues from its refined oil exports.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Carpenter visited
Minsk in 2016. In the Trump Administration, in addition to
The Russian government has said that compensation for
Under Secretary Hale, then-Assistant Secretary of State
Belarus’s losses would be possible only as part of an
Wess Mitchell visited Minsk in 2018 and then-National
agreement that deepens the integration of the two countries.
Security Adviser John Bolton visited in August 2019.
This is something the Belarusian government has resisted
so far.
During his September 2019 visit to Minsk, Under Secretary
Hale said the United States “welcomes Belarus’ increased
In an ostensibly unrelated dispute, Belarus temporarily
cooperation on issues of non-proliferation, border security,
suspended the operation of a Russian oil import pipeline in
economic cooperation, and information sharing on matters
April 2019, a week after announcing that the pipeline would
of shared security.” Belarus reportedly also has investigated
be shut for repairs in retaliation for Russian restrictions on
the possibility of importing U.S. oil, as part of a broader
the import of certain Belarusian products. According to
effort to diversify its sources of crude oil.
Minsk, the closure resulted from the discovery of
contaminated oil in the pipeline system. In a rare
In recent years, Belarus has sought to encourage more
concession, the Russian government acknowledged the
international travel to the previously more insular country.
presence of the contaminated oil but blamed it on an
In 2017, the government introduced a limited visa-free
independent supplier. After the pipeline reopened, Russia
travel regime. In 2018, it expanded this regime, allowing
reportedly agreed to increase Belarus’s oil transit fees as
30-day visa-free airport entry to Belarus for citizens of
compensation.
more than 70 countries, including the United States and EU
member states.
In April 2019, the Russian government made another
concession, agreeing to remove its ambassador to Belarus.
EU assistance to Belarus from 2014 to 2018 amounted to
Belarusian officials had complained that the ambassador,
€110 million (around $122 million at the current exchange
who had been in office for eight months, was treating
rate). The United States provides less assistance to Belarus:
Belarus more like a subject of the Russian Federation than
around $42 million from FY2014 to FY2018. U.S.
an independent state.
assistance is designed to support civil society, small
business development, and vulnerable populations.
Relations with the United States and EU
U.S. and EU relations with Belarus have been challenging
Cory Welt, Analyst in European Affairs
for many years, although all sides periodically have sought
to improve relations. Efforts to achieve a new
IF10814
rapprochement began in 2015, in the wake of Russia’s 2014
invasion of Ukraine.
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Belarus: An Overview
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