U.S. Role in the World:
Background and Issues for Congress

Updated September 25, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44891




U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S.
participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world.
The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for
U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and
actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for
interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their
specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global
leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of
freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in
Eurasia.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could
have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could
significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense
plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, the United States is substantially changing the U.S. role in the world. Other
observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, while acknowledging that the
Trump Administration has changed U.S. foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies
pursued by the Obama Administration, argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been
less change and more continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration is substantially
changing the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump Administration, and also
some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the implications of that change as
undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from U.S. global leadership and a
gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an unforced error of immense
proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something of great value to the United
States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70 years.
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were
arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the
world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding
to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests,
particularly in terms of adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the
United States can accomplish, enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making
potential U.S. actions less predictable to potential adversaries, reestablishing respect for national
sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign policy and for organizing international affairs, and
encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend themselves.
Congress’s decisions regarding the U.S role in the world could have significant implications for
numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of
the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Overview of U.S. Role: Four Key Elements ............................................................................. 1
Global Leadership ............................................................................................................... 1
Defense and Promotion of Liberal International Order ...................................................... 2
Defense and Promotion of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights ............................... 3
Prevention of Emergence of Regional Hegemons in Eurasia ............................................. 4
Changes over Time .................................................................................................................... 5
Long-Standing Debate over Its Merits ...................................................................................... 5

Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................................... 5
Is the United States Changing Its Role? .................................................................................... 6
Some Observers Believe the United States Is Changing Its Role ....................................... 6
Other Observers Disagree ................................................................................................... 7
Still Other Observers See a Mixed or Confusing Situation ................................................ 7
Some Observers Argue That Change Began Earlier ........................................................... 8
Potential Combined Perspectives ........................................................................................ 8

Implications of a Changed U.S. Role ........................................................................................ 8
Some Observers View Implications as Undesirable ........................................................... 8
Other Observers View Implications as Helpful .................................................................. 9
Some Related or Additional Issues.......................................................................................... 10
Costs and Benefits of Allies .............................................................................................. 10
U.S. Public Opinion .......................................................................................................... 10
Operation of U.S. Democracy ............................................................................................ 11
Potential Implications for Congress as an Institution ........................................................ 11
Reversibility of a Change in U.S. Role .............................................................................. 11

Additional Writings ................................................................................................................. 12

Appendixes
Appendix A. Glossary of Selected Terms ...................................................................................... 13
Appendix B. Past U.S. Role vs. More Restrained Role................................................................. 16
Appendix C. Additional Writings .................................................................................................. 20

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 29

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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in
the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in
international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in
the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers
for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific
international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and
understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.
Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of more than 70 years
(i.e., since the end of World War II in 1945), the U.S. role in the world under the Trump
Administration is undergoing a potentially historic change. A change in the U.S. role in the world
could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It
could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries,
defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. Congress’s decisions regarding
the U.S role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans,
programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in
U.S. foreign policymaking.
A variety of other CRS reports address in greater depth specific international issues mentioned in
this report. Appendix A provides a glossary of some key terms used in this report, such as
international order or regional hegemon. For convenience, this report uses the term U.S. role as a
shorthand for referring to the U.S. role in the world.
Background
Overview of U.S. Role: Four Key Elements
While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their
specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements:
 global leadership;
 defense and promotion of the liberal international order;
 defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and
 prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia.
The following sections provide brief discussions of these four key elements.
Global Leadership
The U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II is generally described, first and
foremost, as one of global leadership, meaning that the United States tends to be the first or most
important country for identifying or framing international issues, taking actions to address those
issues, setting an example for other countries to follow, organizing and implementing multilateral
efforts to address international issues, and enforcing international rules and norms.
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Observers over the years have referred to U.S. global leadership using various terms, some of
which reflect varying degrees of approval or disapproval of this aspect of the U.S. role. Examples
of such terms (other than global leader itself) include leader of the free world, superpower,
indispensable power, system administrator, hyperpower, world policeman, or world hegemon.
The U.S. role of global leadership has resulted in extensive U.S. involvement in international
affairs, and this, too, has been described with various phrases. The United States has been
described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy, a foreign policy of global engagement or
deep engagement, a foreign policy that provides global public goods, a foreign policy of liberal
order building, liberal internationalism, or liberal hegemony, an interventionist foreign policy, or
a foreign policy of seeking primacy or world hegemony.
Defense and Promotion of Liberal International Order
A second key element of the U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that can be viewed
as inherently related to the first key element above—has been to defend and promote the liberal
international order1 that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after
World War II. Although definitions of the liberal international order vary, key elements of it are
generally said to include the following:
 respect for the territorial integrity of countries, and the unacceptability of
changing international borders by force or coercion;
 a preference for resolving disputes between countries peacefully, without the use
or threat of use of force or coercion, and in a manner consistent with international
law;
 respect for international law, global rules and norms, and universal values,
including human rights;
 strong international institutions for supporting and implementing international
law, global rules and norms, and universal values;
 the use of liberal (i.e., rules-based) international trading and investment systems
to advance open, rules-based economic engagement, development, growth, and
prosperity; and
 the treatment of international waters, international air space, outer space, and
(more recently) cyberspace as international commons rather than domains subject
to national sovereignty.
Most of the key elements above (arguably, all but the final one) can be viewed collectively as
forming what is commonly referred to as a rules-based international order. A traditional antithesis
of a rules-based order is a might-makes-right order (sometimes colloquially referred to as the law
of the jungle), which is an international order (or a situation lacking in order) in which more
powerful countries routinely impose their will arbitrarily on less-powerful countries,
organizations, and individuals, without little or no regard to rules.

1 Other terms used to refer to the liberal international order include U.S.-led international order, postwar international
order
, rules-based international order, and open international order. Observers sometimes substitute world for
international, or omit international or world and refer simply to the liberal order, the U.S.-led order, and so on. In the
terms liberal international order and liberal order, the word liberal does not refer to the conservative-liberal construct
often used in discussing contemporary politics in the United States or other countries. It is, instead, an older use of the
term that refers to an order based on the rule of law, as opposed to an order based on the arbitrary powers of hereditary
monarchs.
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Though often referred to as if it is a fully developed or universally established situation, the
liberal international order, like other international orders that preceded it, is
 incomplete in geographic reach and in other ways;
 partly aspirational;
 not fixed in stone, but rather subject to evolution over time;
 sometimes violated by its supporters;
 not entirely free of right-makes-right behavior;
 resisted or rejected by certain states and nonstate actors; and
 subject to various stresses and challenges.
Some observers, emphasizing points like those above, argue that the liberal international order is
more of a myth than a reality. Other observers, particularly supporters of the order, while
acknowledging the limitations of the order, reject characterizations of it as a myth and emphasize
its differences from international orders that preceded it.
As mentioned above, the liberal international order was created by the United States with the
support of its allies in the years immediately after World War II. At that time, the United States
was the only country with both the capacity and willingness to establish a new international order.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is generally viewed as reflecting a desire by U.S. policymakers to avoid repeating the deadly
major wars and widespread economic disruption and deprivation of the first half of the 20th
century—a period that included World War I, the Great Depression, the rise of communism and
fascism, the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust, and World War II.
U.S. willingness to establish and play a leading role in maintaining the liberal international order
is also generally viewed as an act of national self-interest, reflecting a belief among U.S.
policymakers that it would strongly serve U.S. security, political, and economic objectives.
Supporters of the liberal international order generally argue that in return for bearing the costs of
creating and sustaining the liberal international order, the United States receives significant
security, political, and economic benefits, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of
power on both a global and regional level, and a leading or dominant role in establishing and
operating global institutions and rules for international finance and trade. Indeed, some critics of
the liberal international order argue that it is primarily a construct for serving U.S. interests and
promoting U.S. world primacy or hegemony. The costs and benefits for the United States of
defending and promoting the liberal international order, however, are a matter of debate.
Defense and Promotion of Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights
A third key element of the U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend and
promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and
resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible. This element of the U.S.
role is viewed as consistent not only with core U.S. political values but also with a theory
advanced by some observers (sometimes called the democratic peace theory) that democratic
countries are more responsive to the desires of their populations and consequently are less likely
to wage wars of aggression or go to war with one another.
Defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights is additionally viewed as a key
component of U.S. soft power, because it can encourage like-minded governments, as well as
organizations and individuals in other countries, to work with the United States, and because it
has the potential to shape the behavior of authoritarian and illiberal governments that are acting
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against U.S. interests by shaming those governments and inspiring pro-democracy organizations
and individuals within those countries.
Prevention of Emergence of Regional Hegemons in Eurasia
A fourth element of the U.S. role in the world since World War II—one that U.S. policymakers do
not often state explicitly in public—has been to oppose the emergence of regional hegemons in
Eurasia. This objective reflects a U.S. perspective on geopolitics and grand strategy developed by
U.S. strategists and policymakers during and in the years immediately after World War II that
incorporates two key judgments:
 that given the amount of people, resources, and economic activity in Eurasia, a
regional hegemon in Eurasia would represent a concentration of power large
enough to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests; and
 that Eurasia is not dependably self-regulating in terms of preventing the
emergence of regional hegemons, meaning that the countries of Eurasia cannot
be counted on to be able to prevent, though their own actions, the emergence of
regional hegemons, and may need assistance from one or more countries outside
Eurasia to be able to do this dependably.2
Preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia is sometimes also referred to as
preserving a division of power in Eurasia, or as preventing key regions in Eurasia from coming
under the domination of a single power, or as preventing the emergence of a spheres-of-influence
world, which could be a consequence of the emergence of one or more regional hegemons in
Eurasia.
U.S. actions that can be viewed as expressions of the U.S. goal of preventing the emergence of
regional hegemons in Eurasia include but are not necessarily to the following:
 U.S. participation in World War I3, World War II, the Korean War, and the
Vietnam War;4
 U.S. alliances and security partnerships, including
 the NATO alliance, which was established in large part to deter and counter
attempts by the Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in
Europe;

2 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF10485, Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 Although the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons was not articulated in explicit terms (at least not
widely) by U.S. strategists until World War II and the years immediately thereafter, U.S. participation in World War I
against Germany can in retrospect be viewed as an earlier U.S. action reflecting this goal.
4 U.S. participation in the Vietnam War was justified in part by the so-called domino theory, which argued that a
victory by communist-ruled North Vietnam over South Vietnam could be followed by other countries in the region
falling, like dominos in a row, under communist control. Opponents of the domino theory challenged its validity and
argue that it was disproven when North Vietnam’s defeat of South Vietnam was not followed by other countries in the
region falling under communist control. The theory’s supporters argue that the theory was not disproven, because
years-long U.S. effort to defend South Vietnam, though ultimately unsuccessful in preventing victory by North
Vietnam, gave other countries in the region time and space to develop their political institutions and economies enough
to deter or resist communist movements in their own countries. Valid or not, the domino theory’s use as a justification
links U.S. participation in the war to the goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon (in this case, a
communist hegemon of China and/or the Soviet Union).
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 U.S. alliances with countries in East Asia and the Pacific, which were
established in large part to deter and counter attempts by the Soviet Union or
China to become a regional hegemon in East Asia; and
 U.S. security partnerships with countries in the Persian Gulf region, which
were established in large part to deter or counter attempts by Iran or the
Soviet Union (now Russia) to become a regional hegemon in that region; and
 additional U.S. political, diplomatic, and economic actions to contain and oppose
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, including the Marshall Plan and
subsequent U.S. foreign assistance programs.
In pursuing the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia, U.S.
policymakers have sometimes decided to work with or support non-democratic regimes that for
their own reasons view Russia, China, or Iran as competitors or adversaries. As a consequence,
the goal of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Asia has sometimes been in tension
with defending and promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Changes over Time
Although the U.S. role in the world was generally stable over the past 70 years, the specifics of
U.S. foreign policy for implementing that role have changed frequently for various reasons,
including changes in administrations and changes in the international security environment.
Definitions of the U.S. role have room within them to accommodate some variation in the
specifics of U.S. foreign policy.
Long-Standing Debate over Its Merits
The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not
necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right
one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of
World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter
of long-standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the
public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world.
The most prominent dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to
continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead
adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of
the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a
more restrained U.S. role. (For additional discussion, see Appendix B.)
A second major dimension within the debate over the future U.S. role concerns how to balance or
combine the pursuit of narrowly defined material U.S. interests with the goal of defending and
promoting U.S. or universal values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third major
dimension concerns the balance in U.S. foreign policy between the use of hard power and soft
power. Observers debating these two dimensions of the future U.S. role in the world stake out
varying positions on these questions.
Issues for Congress
The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what
implications this might have for the United States and the world. The sections below provide
some discussion of this issue.
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Is the United States Changing Its Role?
There currently are multiple views on the question of whether the United States under the Trump
Administration is changing the U.S. role in the world; some of which are outlined briefly below.
Some Observers Believe the United States Is Changing Its Role
Some observers, particularly critics of the Trump Administration, argue that under the Trump
Administration, the United States is substantially changing the U.S. role in the world by altering
some or all of the four key elements of the U.S. role described earlier. Although views among
these observers vary in their specifics, a number of these observers argue that the
Administration’s America First construct, its emphasis on national sovereignty as a primary
guidepost for U.S. foreign policy, and other Administration actions and statements form a new
U.S. role characterized by
 a voluntary retreat from or abdication of global leadership,
 a greater reliance on unilateralism,
 a reduced willingness to through international or multilateral institutions and
agreements,
 an acceptance of U.S. isolation or near-isolation on certain international issues,
 a more skeptical view of the value of alliances to the United States,
 a less critical view of certain authoritarian or illiberal governments,
 a reduced or more selective approach to promoting and defending certain
universal values,
 the elevation of bilateral trade balances and commercial considerations above
other foreign policy concerns, and
 an implicit tolerance of the re-emergence of aspects of a might-makes-right
international order.
In support of this view, these observers cite various Administration actions and statements,
including, among other things,
 the Administration’s decisions to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) regional trade agreement, the multilateral Paris climate agreement, and the
Iran nuclear agreement,
 its earlier proposals for reducing State Department funding and foreign assistance
funding, and delays in filling senior State Department positions,
 the president’s skeptical statements regarding the value to the United States of
certain U.S. alliances (particularly with European countries and South Korea) and
more generally his apparent transactional and monetary-focused approach to
understanding and managing alliance relationships,
 what these observers view as the president’s affinity for certain authoritarian or
illiberal leaders, as well as his apparent reluctance to criticize Russia and his
apparent continued desire to seek improved relations with Russia, despite
Russian actions judged by U.S. intelligence agencies and other observers to have
been directed against the United States and overseas U.S. interests,
 the Administration’s focus on pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with various
countries; and
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 the Administration’s infrequent or inconsistent statements in support of
democracy and human rights, including the Administration’s reaction to the
killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the president’s statements regarding the
pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.
Other Observers Disagree
Other observers, particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, disagree with some or all of
the perspective above. While acknowledging that the Trump Administration has changed U.S.
foreign policy in a number of areas compared to policies pursued by the Obama Administration,
these observers argue that under the Trump Administration, there has been less change and more
continuity regarding the U.S. role in the world. In support of this view, these observers cite,
among other things,
 the Administration’s December 2017 national security strategy (NSS) document
and its January 2018 unclassified summary of its supporting national defense
strategy (NDS) document—large portions of which refer to U.S. leadership, a
general emphasis on great power competition with China and Russia, and strong
support for U.S. alliances,
 Administration statements reaffirming U.S. support for NATO, as well as
Administration actions to improve U.S. military capabilities in Europe for
deterring potential Russian aggression in Europe;
 the Administration’s willingness to impose a variety of sanctions on Russia;
 the Administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) construct for guiding
U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region,
 the Administration’s more confrontational policy toward China, including its plan
to increase funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs to compete against
China for influence in Africa, Asia, and the Americas,
 U.S. trade actions that, in the view of these observers, are intended to make free
trade more sustainable over the long run by ensuring that it is fair to all parties,
including the United States; and
 the Administration’s (admittedly belated) support of Hong Kong’s pro-
democracy protestors, its criticism of China’s human rights practices toward its
Muslim Uighur population, and its emphasis on religious freedom as an
component of human rights.
Still Other Observers See a Mixed or Confusing Situation
Still other observers, viewing points made by both of the above sets of observers, see a mixed or
confusing situation regarding whether the United States under the Trump Administration is
changing the U.S. role in the world. For these observers, whether the U.S. role is changing is
difficult to discern, because the president’s apparent views on certain issues—such as the value of
U.S. alliances, the acceptability of certain actions by Russia or North Korea, and the importance
of democracy and human rights as universal values—are frequently in tension with or
contradicted by statements and actions of senior Administration officials, with the president’s
views being more consistent with the change in the U.S. role outlined by the first set of observers
above, and statements and actions of senior Administration officials frequently being more
consistent with a continuation of the U.S. role of the past 70 years outlined by the second set of
observers above.
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Some Observers Argue That Change Began Earlier
Some observers argue that if the U.S. role is changing, that change started not under the Trump
Administration, but under the Obama Administration, particularly regarding the question of
whether the U.S. has reduced or withdrawn from global leadership. In support of this view, these
observers cite what they views as the Obama Administration’s
 focus on reducing the U.S. military presence and ending U.S. combat operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan in favor of focusing more on domestic U.S. rebuilding
initiatives,
 decision to announce but not enforce a “red line” regarding the behavior of the
Syrian government, and
 restrained response to Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and more
generally, its reluctance, for a time at least, to fully acknowledge and adapt to
less cooperative and more confrontation relationships with Russia and China.
Still others view the start of a change in the U.S. role as occurring even sooner, under the George
W. Bush Administration—when that Administration did not respond more strongly to Russia’s
2008 invasion and occupation of part of Georgia—or under the Clinton Administration.
For these observers, a change in the U.S. role in the world under the Trump Administration may
represent not so much a shift in the U.S. role as a continuation or deepening of a change that
began in a prior U.S. Administration.
Potential Combined Perspectives
The perspectives outlined in the preceding sections are not necessarily mutually exclusive—
assessments combining aspects of more than one of these perspectives are possible.
Implications of a Changed U.S. Role
Among observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years, there are multiple views regarding the potential implications of that change.
Some Observers View Implications as Undesirable
Some observers who assess that the United States under the Trump Administration is substantially
changing the U.S. role in the world—particularly critics of the Trump Administration, and also
some who were critical of the Obama Administration—view the implications of that change as
undesirable. They view the change as an unnecessary retreat from U.S. global leadership and a
gratuitous discarding of long-held U.S. values, and judge it to be an unforced error of immense
proportions—a needless and self-defeating squandering of something of great value to the United
States that the United States had worked to build and maintain for 70 years. More specifically,
they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is doing some or all of the
following:
 reducing U.S. power and foreign-policy capacity, particularly by weakening or
hollowing out the State Department and reducing or devaluing elements of U.S.
soft power;
 weakening the U.S. ability to leverage its power and foreign-policy capacity in
international affairs—and isolating the United States on certain international
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issues, effectively turning the concept of America First into “America Alone”—
by
 damaging long-standing and valuable U.S. alliance relationships,
 reducing U.S. participation in multilateral political and trade negotiations and
agreements, and
 making the United States look less reliable as a negotiating partner;
 weakening the U.S.-led international order and encouraging a re-emergence of
aspects of a might-makes-right international order;
 slowing the spread of democracy and tacitly facilitating a re-emergence of
authoritarian and illiberal forms of government;
 disregarding the costly lessons of the first half of the 20th century, and how the
U.S. role in the world of the last 70 years has been motivated at bottom by a
desire to prevent a repetition of the events of that period; and
 creating vacuums in global leadership on certain issues and in regional power
balances that other countries, particularly China and other authoritarian countries,
are moving to fill, sometimes at the expense of U.S. values and interests.
Other Observers View Implications as Helpful
Other observers who assess that there has been a change in the U.S. role in the world in recent
years—particularly supporters of the Trump Administration, but also some observers who were
arguing even prior to the Trump Administration in favor of a more restrained U.S. role in the
world—view the change in the U.S. role, or at least certain aspects of it, as helpful for responding
to changed U.S. and global circumstances and for defending U.S. values and interests. More
specifically, they argue that the change in the U.S. role in recent years that they see is doing some
or all of the following:
 adjusting the U.S. role to one that is more realistic regarding what the United
States can accomplish in the world today and in the future, particularly given
limits on U.S. resources and the reduction in U.S. economic and military
preponderance in recent decades as other countries have grown economically and
developed their militaries;
 enhancing deterrence of potential regional aggression by making potential U.S.
actions less predictable to potential adversaries;
 reestablishing respect for national sovereignty as a guidepost for U.S. foreign
policy and for organizing international affairs;
 encouraging U.S. allies and security partners in Eurasia to do more to defend
themselves, thereby reducing U.S. costs and developing Eurasia’s potential to
become more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional
hegemons;
 placing an emphasis on countering and competing with China, which poses a
uniquely strong and multidimensional challenge to U.S. security and prosperity;
 working to strengthen the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region under
the FOIP construct;
 exploring possibilities for improving relations where possible with countries such
as Russia and North Korea; and
 making trade agreements more fair to the United States.
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Some Related or Additional Issues
The following sections provide brief discussions of some related or additional issues for Congress
regarding the U.S. role in the world.
Costs and Benefits of Allies
Within the overall debate over the U.S. role in the world, one specific question relates to the costs
and benefits of allies. As noted earlier, some observers believe that under the Trump
Administration, the United States is becoming more skeptical of the value of allies, particularly
those in Europe, and more transactional in managing U.S. alliance relationships.
Skeptics of allies and alliances generally argue that their value to the United States is overrated;
that allies are capable of defending themselves without U.S. help; that U.S. allies frequently act as
free riders in their alliance relationships with the United States by shifting security costs to the
United States; that in the absence of U.S. help, these allies would do more on their own to balance
against potential regional hegemons; and that alliances create a risk of drawing the United States
into conflicts involving allies over issues that are not vital to the United States.
Supporters of the U.S. approach to allies and alliances of the past 70 years, while acknowledging
the free-rider issue as something that needs to be managed, generally argue that alliances are
needed and valuable for preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia and for
otherwise deterring potential regional aggression; that alliances form a significant advantage for
the United States in its dealings with other major powers, such as Russia and China (both of
which largely lack similar alliance networks); that although allies might be capable of defending
themselves without U.S. help, they might also choose, in the absence of U.S. help, to bandwagon
with would-be regional hegemons (rather than contribute to efforts to balance against them); that
in addition to mutual defense benefits, alliances offer other benefits, particularly in peacetime,
including sharing of intelligence, information, and technology and the cultivation of soft-power
forms of cooperation; and that a transactional approach to alliances, which encourages the merits
of each bilateral alliance relationship to be measured in isolation, overlooks the collective benefits
of maintaining alliances with multiple countries in a region.
U.S. Public Opinion
U.S. public opinion can be an important factor in debates over the future U.S. role in the world.
Among other things, public opinion can
 shape the political context (and provide the impulse) for negotiating the terms of,
and for considering whether to become party to, international agreements;
 influence debates on whether and how to employ U.S. military force; and
 influence policymaker decisions on funding levels for defense, international
affairs activities, and foreign assistance.
Foreign policy specialists, strategists, and policymakers sometimes invoke U.S. public opinion
poll results in debates on the U.S. role in the world. One issue relating to U.S. public opinion that
observers are discussing is the extent to which the U.S. public may now believe that U.S. leaders
have broken a tacit social contract under which the U.S. public has supported the costs of U.S.
global leadership in return for the promise of receiving certain benefits, particularly steady
increases in real incomes and the standard of living.
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Operation of U.S. Democracy
Another potential issue for Congress is how the operation of democracy in the United States
might affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting
democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government.
During the Cold War, the effective operation of U.S. democracy at the federal level and lower
levels was viewed as helpful for arguing on the world stage that Western-style democracy was
superior, for encouraging other countries to adopt that model, and for inspiring people in the
Soviet Union and other authoritarian countries to resist authoritarianism and seek change in the
direction of more democratic forms of government. The ability of the United State to demonstrate
the effectiveness of democracy as a form of government was something that in today’s parlance
would be termed an element of U.S. soft power.
The end of the Cold War led to a diminution in the ideological debate about the relative merits of
democracy versus authoritarianism as forms of government. As a possible consequence, there
may have been less of a perceived need during this period for focusing on the question of whether
the operation of U.S. democracy was being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other
countries.
The shift in the international environment over the past few years from the post-Cold War era to a
new situation featuring renewed great power competition5 has led to a renewed ideological debate
about the relative merits of Western-style democracy versus 21st-century forms of authoritarian
and illiberal government. Articles in China’s state-controlled media, for example, sometimes
criticize the operation of U.S. democracy and argue that China’s form of governance is more
advantageous. The potential issue for Congress is whether, in a period of renewed ideological
competition, there is now once again a need for focusing more on the question of whether the
operation of U.S. democracy is being viewed positively or otherwise by observers in other
countries.
Potential Implications for Congress as an Institution
Another issue for Congress is what implications a changed U.S. role in the world might have for
Congress as an institution, particularly regarding the preservation and use of congressional
powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic
policy, and more generally the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S.
foreign policymaking. Specific matters here include, among other things, the question of war
powers, the delegation of authority for imposing tariffs, and whether a change in the U.S. role
would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations.
Reversibility of a Change in U.S. Role
Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role in the world would at
some point in the future be reversible, should U.S. policymakers in the future desire to return to a
U.S. role in the world more like that of the past 70 years. Potential questions for Congress include
the following:
 What elements of change in the U.S. role might be more reversible, less
reversible, or irreversible? What elements might be less reversible due to

5 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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technological developments, changes in international power dynamics, or
changes in U.S. public opinion?
 How much time and effort would be required to implement a return to a U.S. role
like that of the past 70 years?
 How might the issue of reversibility be affected by the amount of time that a
change in the U.S. role remains in place before an attempt might be made to
reverse it?
 How might decisions that Congress and the executive branch make in the near
term affect the question of potential downstream reversibility? What actions, if
any, should be taken now with an eye toward preserving an option for reversing
nearer-term changes in the U.S. role?
 What are the views of other countries regarding the potential reversibility of a
change in the U.S. role, and how might those views affect the foreign policies of
those countries?
Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional reading, Appendix C presents a list of recent writings on
whether the United States under the Trump Administration is changing the U.S. role in the world
and what the implications of such a change might be.

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Appendix A. Glossary of Selected Terms
Some key terms used in this report include the following:
Role in the world
The term role in the world generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the overall character,
purpose, or direction of a country’s participation in international affairs or the country’s overall
relationship to the rest of the world. A country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible
expression of its grand strategy (see next item). In this report, the term U.S. role in the world is
often shortened for convenience to U.S. role.
Grand strategy
The term grand strategy generally refers in foreign policy discussions to a country’s overall
approach for securing its interests and making its way in the world, using all the national
instruments at its disposal, including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools
(sometimes abbreviated in U.S. government parlance as DIME). A country’s leaders might deem
elements of a country’s grand strategy to be secret, so that assessments, assumptions, or risks
included in the strategy are not revealed to potential adversaries. Consequently, a country’s
leaders might say relatively little in public about the country’s grand strategy. As mentioned
above, however, a country’s role in the world can be taken as a visible expression of its grand
strategy. For the United States, grand strategy can be viewed as strategy at a global or
interregional level, as opposed to U.S. strategies for individual regions, countries, or issues.
International order/world order
The term international order or world order generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the
collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, norms, and practices that are intended to
organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period.
International orders tend to be established by major world powers, particularly in the years
following wars between major powers, though they can also emerge at other times. Though often
referred to as if they are fully developed or firmly established situations, international orders are
usually incomplete, partly aspirational, sometimes violated by their supporters, rejected (or at
least not supported) by certain states and nonstate actors, and subject to various stresses and
challenges.
Unipolar/bipolar/tripolar/multipolar
In foreign policy discussions, terms like unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar are sometimes
used to refer to the number of top-tier world powers whose actions tend to characterize or give
structure to a given historical period’s international security situation. The Cold War that lasted
from the late 1940s to the late 1980s or early 1990s is usually described as a bipolar situation
featuring a competition between two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and
their allies. The post-Cold War era, which followed the Cold War, is sometimes described as the
unipolar moment, with the United States being the unipolar power, meaning the world’s sole
superpower.
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As discussed in another CRS report,6 observers have concluded that in recent years, there has
been a shift from the post-Cold War era to a new international security situation characterized by
renewed great power competition between the United States, China, and Russia, leading
observers to refer to the new situation as a tripolar or multipolar world. Observers who might list
additional countries (or groups of countries, such as the European Union) as additional top-tier
world powers, along with the United States, China, and Russia, might also use the term
multipolar.
Eurasia
The term Eurasia is used in this report to refer to the entire land mass that encompasses both
Europe and Asia, including its fringing islands, extending from Portugal on its western end to
Japan on its eastern end, and from Russia’s Arctic coast on its northern edge to India on its
southern edge, and encompassing all the lands and countries in between, including those of
Central Asia, Southwest Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Eurasia’s fringing islands include,
among others, the United Kingdom and Ireland in Europe, Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, the
archipelagic countries of Southeast Asia, and Japan. There are also other definitions of Eurasia,
some of which are more specialized and refer to subsets of the broad area described above.
Regional hegemon
The term regional hegemon generally refers to a country so powerful relative to the other
countries in its region that it can dominate the affairs of that region and compel other countries in
that region to support (or at least not oppose) the hegemon’s key policy goals. The United States
is generally considered to have established itself in the 19th century as the hegemon of the
Western Hemisphere.
Spheres-of-influence world
The term spheres-of-influence world generally refers to a world that, in terms of its structure of
international relations, is divided into multiple regions (i.e., spheres), each with its own hegemon.
A spheres-of-influence world, like a multipolar world, is characterized by having multiple top-tier
powers. In a spheres-of-influence world, however, at least some of those top-tier powers have
achieved a status of regional hegemon, while in a multipolar world, few or none of those major
world powers (other than the United States, the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere)
have achieved a status of regional hegemon. As a result, in a spheres-of-influence world,
international relations are more highly segmented on a regional basis than they are in a multipolar
world.
Geopolitics
The term geopolitics is often used as a synonym for international politics or for strategy relating
to international politics. More specifically, it refers to the influence of basic geographic features
on international relations, and to the analysis of international relations from a perspective that
places a strong emphasis on the influence of such geographic features. Basic geographic features
involved in geopolitical analysis include things such as the relative sizes and locations of
countries or land masses; the locations of key resources such as oil or water; geographic barriers

6 CRS Report R43838, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges; and key transportation links such as roads,
railways, and waterways.
Hard power and soft power
In foreign policy discussions, the term hard power generally refers to coercive power, particularly
military and economic power, while the term soft power generally refers to the ability to persuade
or attract support, particularly through diplomacy, development assistance, support for
international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of
cultural elements such as music, movies, television shows, and literature.
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Appendix B. Past U.S. Role vs. More
Restrained Role
This appendix provides additional discussion on the debate over whether the United States should
attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years,
or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs.
Among U.S. strategists and foreign policy specialists, advocates of a more restrained U.S. role
include (to cite a few examples) Andrew Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Ted Galen Carpenter, John
Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble, William Ruger, and Stephen Walt. These and
other authors have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role. Terms
such as offshore balancing, offshore control, realism, strategy of restraint, or retrenchment have
been used to describe some of these variations.7 These variations on the idea of a more restrained
U.S. role would not necessarily match in their details a changed U.S. role that might be pursued
by the Trump Administration.8
Arguments in Favor of a More Restrained U.S. Role
Observers advocating a more restrained U.S. role in the world make various arguments regarding
the United States and other countries. Arguments that they make relating to the United States
include the following:
Costs and benefits. In terms of human casualties, financial and economic
impacts, diplomatic impacts, and impacts on domestic U.S. values, politics, and
society, the costs to the United States of defending and promoting the liberal
international order have been underestimated and the benefits have been
overestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia have
frequently been more costly and/or less successful than anticipated, making a
strategy of intervening less cost-effective in practice than in theory. U.S.
interventions can also draw the United States into conflicts involving other
countries over issues that are not vital or important U.S. interests.
Capacity. Given projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt, the
United States in coming years will no longer be able to afford to play as
expansive a role in the world as it has played for the past 70 years.
Overextending U.S. participation in international affairs could lead to excessive

7 The terms offshore balancing and offshore control refer in general to a policy in which the United States, in effect,
stands off the shore of Eurasia and engages in the security affairs of Eurasia less frequently, less directly, or less
expansively. The term retrenchment is more often used by critics of these proposed approaches.
8 Debate about this dimension of the U.S. role in the world is not limited to one between those who favor continued
extensive engagement along the lines of the past 70 years and those who prefer some form of a more restrained role—
other options are also being promoted. For example, one analyst and former White House aide advocates an approach
that differs from both retrenchment and reassertion, an approach he labels “re-calibration” to the “geopolitical,
economic, technological and other dynamics driving the 21st-century world.” Such an approach, he argues, would entail
a reappraisal of U.S. interests, a reassessment of U.S. power, and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. (See Bruce
Jentleson, “Apart, Atop, Amidst: America in the World,” War on the Rocks, January 2017.)
As another example, a different analyst argues in favor of a U.S. role based on “a better nationalism”—what he
describes as a more benign and constructive form that “would not dismantle the post-war order and America’s post war
project, but would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests.” (Hal Brands, “U.S.
Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and it Alternatives,” Washington Quarterly, Spring 2017:
73-93.)
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amounts of federal debt and inadequately addressed domestic problems, leaving
the United States poorly positioned for sustaining any future desired level of
international engagement.
Past 70 years as a historical aberration. The U.S. role of the past 70 years is an
aberration when viewed against the U.S. historical record dating back to 1776,
which is a history characterized more by periods of restraint than by periods of
high levels of international engagement. Returning to a more restrained U.S. role
would thus return U.S. policy to what is, historically, a more traditional policy for
the United States.
Moral standing. The United States has not always lived up to its own ideals, and
consequently lacks sufficient moral standing to pursue a role that involves
imposing its values and will on other countries. Attempting to do that through an
interventionist policy can also lead to an erosion of those values at home.
Public opinion. It is not clear that U.S. public opinion supports the idea of
attempting to maintain a U.S. role in the world as expansive as that of the past 70
years, particularly if it means making trade-offs against devoting resources to
domestic U.S. priorities. In public opinion polls, Americans often express support
for a more restrained U.S. role, particularly on issues such as whether the United
States should act as the world’s police force, funding levels for U.S. foreign
assistance programs, U.S. participation in (and financial support for) international
organizations, and U.S. defense expenditures for defending allies.
Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
Growing wealth and power. Given the rapid growth in wealth and power in
recent years of China and other countries, the United States is no longer as
dominant globally as it once was, and is becoming less dominant over time,
which will make it increasingly difficult or expensive and/or less appropriate for
the United States to attempt to continue playing a role of global leadership.
Ideas about international order. Other world powers, such as China, have their
own ideas about international order, and these ideas do not match all aspects of
the current liberal international order. The United States should acknowledge the
changing global distribution of power and work with China and other countries to
define a new international order that incorporates ideas from these other
countries.
Eurasia as self-regulating. Given the growth in the economies of U.S. allies and
partners in Europe and Asia since World War II, these allies and partners are now
more capable of looking after their own security needs, and Eurasia can now be
more self-regulating in terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons
in Eurasia. Consequently, the level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
can be reduced without incurring undue risk that regional hegemons will emerge
there. The current substantial level of U.S. intervention in the affairs of Eurasia
discourages countries in Eurasia from acting more fully on their own to prevent
the emergence of regional hegemons.
Hegemons and spheres of influence. Even if one or more regional hegemons
were to emerge in Eurasia, this would not pose an unacceptable situation for the
United States—vital U.S. interests could still be defended. Similarly, the
emergence of a spheres-of-influence world need not be unacceptable for the
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United States, because such a world would again not necessarily be incompatible
with vital U.S. interests.
Arguments in Favor of Continuing U.S. Role of the Past 70 Years
Observers who support a continuation of the U.S. role in the world of the past 70 years generally
reject the above arguments and argue the opposite. Arguments that these observers make relating
to the United States include the following:
Costs and benefits. Although the costs to the United States of its role in the
world over the past 70 years have been substantial, the benefits have been
greater. The benefits are so long-standing that they can easily be taken for
granted or underestimated. U.S. interventions in the security affairs of Eurasia,
though not without significant costs and errors, have been successful in
preventing wars between major powers and defending and promoting vital U.S.
interests and values. A more restrained U.S. role in the world might be less
expensive for the United States in the short run, but would create a risk of
damaging U.S. security, liberty, and prosperity over the longer run by risking the
emergence of regional hegemons or a spheres-of-influence world.
Capacity. Projections regarding future U.S. budget deficits and debt need to be
taken into account, but even in a context of limits on U.S. resources, the United
States is a wealthy country that can choose to play an expansive role in
international affairs, and the costs to the United States of playing a more
restrained role in world affairs may in the long run be much greater than the costs
of playing a more expansive role. Projections regarding future U.S. budget
deficits and debt are driven primarily by decisions on revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures rather than by decisions on defense and foreign-policy-
related expenditures. Consequently, these projections are an argument for getting
the country’s fiscal house in order primarily in terms of revenues and domestic
mandatory expenditures, rather than an argument for a more restrained U.S. role
in the world.
Past 70 years as a historical aberration. Although a restrained U.S. foreign
policy may have been appropriate for the United States in the 18th and 19th
centuries, the world of the 18th and 19th centuries was quite different. For
example, given changes in communication, transportation, and military
technologies since the 18th and 19th centuries, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are
much less effective as geographic buffers between the United States and Eurasia
today than they were in the 18th and 19th centuries. Experiences in more recent
decades (including World Wars I and II and the Cold War) show that a more
restrained U.S. foreign policy would now be riskier or more costly over the long
run than an engaged U.S. foreign policy.
Moral standing. The United States, though not perfect, retains ample moral
authority—and responsibility—to act as a world leader, particularly in
comparison to authoritarian countries such as China or Russia.
Public opinion. Other public opinion poll results show that Americans support a
U.S. global leadership role.
Arguments that these observers make relating to other countries include the following:
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Growing wealth and power. Although the wealth and power of countries such
as China have grown considerably in recent years, future rates of growth for
those countries are open to question. China faces the prospect of declining rates
of economic growth and the aging and eventual shrinkage of its population, while
Russia has a relatively small economy and is experiencing demographic decline.
The United States has one of the most favorable demographic situations of any
major power, and retains numerous advantages in terms of economic and
financial strength, military power, technology, and capacity for innovation.
Although the United States is no longer as dominant globally as it once was, it
remains the world’s most powerful country, particularly when all dimensions of
power are taken into consideration.
Ideas about international order. The liberal international order reflects U.S.
interests and values; a renegotiated international order incorporating ideas from
authoritarian countries such as China would produce a world less conducive to
defending and promoting U.S. interests and values. Americans have long lived in
a world reflecting U.S. interests and values and would not welcome a world
incorporating Chinese values on issues such as the rule of law; the scope of civil
society; political and human rights; freedom of speech, the press, and
information; and privacy and surveillance.
Eurasia as self-regulating. Eurasia historically has not been self-regulating in
terms of preventing the emergence of regional hegemons, and the idea that it will
become self-regulating in the future is a risky and untested proposition.
Hegemons and spheres of influence. A regional hegemon in Eurasia would have
enough economic and other power to be able to threaten vital U.S. interests. In
addition to threatening U.S. access to the economies of Eurasia, a spheres-of-
influence world would be prone to war because regional hegemons historically
are never satisfied with the extent of their hegemonic domains and eventually
seek to expand them, coming into conflict with other hegemons. Leaders of
regional hegemons are also prone to misjudgment and miscalculation regarding
where their spheres collide.
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Appendix C. Additional Writings
As potential sources of additional reading, this appendix presents a list of recent writings on
whether the United States under the Trump Administration is changing the U.S. role in the world
and what the implications of such a change might be, listed in chronological order, with the most
recent on top.
James Fallows, “The End of the Roman Empire Wasn’t That Bad, Maybe the End of the
American One Won’t Be Either,” Atlantic, October 2019.
Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.S. Threat to Withdraw From Postal Treaty Prompts Emergency Talks,”
New York Times, September 25, 2019.
Elbridge Colby, “Don’t Let Iran Distract From China,” Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2019.
Michael Crowley, “Trump Celebrates Nationalism in U.N. Speech and Plays Down Iran Crisis,”
New York Times, September 24, 2019.
Sarah Dilorenzo (Associated Press), “US Steps Up Pressure on China over Treatment of
Muslims,” Washington Post, September 24, 2019.
Editorial Board, “Trump Tell UN the Truth About Globalism and Nationalism,” New York Post,
September 24, 2019.
Fred Kaplan, “Trump Is No Longer Even Pretending to Care About the Ideals of the U.N.,” Slate,
September 24, 2019.
Jen Kirby, “Trump Goes to the United Nations to Argue Against Everything It Stands For—
Again,” Vox, September 24, 2019.
Anita Kumar, “Decoding Trump’s Speech Before the United Nations,” Politico, September 24,
2019.
Edith M. Lederer, “UN Chief Warns of a World Divided Between US and China,” Associated
Press
, September 24, 2019.
Jonathan Lemire and Deb Riechmann, “Trump Attacks Globalism, While Putting Pressure on
Iran,” Associated Press, September 24, 2019.
Michael McCaul, “The United States Can’t Cede the U.N. to China,” Foreign Policy, September
24, 2019.
Caitlin Oprysko and Anita Kumar, “Trump Pushes Aggressive ‘America First’ Message to World
Leaders,” Politico, September 24, 2019.
Humeyra Pamuk and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Leads Condemnation of China for ‘Horrific’
Repression of Muslims,” Reuters, September 24, 2019.
Jennifer Peltz (Associated Press), “NATO Leader: Tricky Times Show Need for International
Groups,” Military Times, September 24, 2019.
Fan Peng, “Why China’s Politics Scores Above the West’s,” Global Times, September 24, 2019.
Matthew Petti, “Trump Airs Nationalism and Globalism Gripes at the UN,” National Interest,
September 24, 2019.
Ayesha Rascoe, “Trump To U.N. General Assembly: ‘The Future Does Not Belong To
Globalists,’” NPR, September 24, 2019.
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Tom Rogan, “Trumps Stands Up for Positive Nationalism, But Forgets His UN Audience,”
Washington Examiner, September 24, 2019.
Vivian Salama, “At U.N., Trump Urges Nations to Place Their Citizens First, Rejects
‘Globalists,’” Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2019.
Alex Ward, “Trump at UN Offers His Most Forceful Support for Hong Kong Yet,” Vox,
September 24, 2019.
Katie Bo Williams, “Trump Delivers Populist Message to the UN—and US Voters,” Defense One,
September 24, 2019.
Joseph Bosco, “Remembering Otto Warmbier’s Death, Trump Renews Pressure on North Korea,
The Hill, September 23, 2019.
Peter Harris, “A Recession Won’t Stop America’s Reckless Military Spending,” National Interest,
September 23, 2019.
Emilie Kao and Joel Griffith, “Trump’s Focus on Religious Freedom at the U.N. Should Lead the
Way,” Heritage Foundation, September 23, 2019.
Anita Kumar, “Trump Tries to make America Relevant Again to the U.N.,” Politico, September
23, 2019.
Michelle Nichols and David Brunnstrom, “At U.N., Trump Pushes Religious Freedom at Event
Slamming China over Uighurs,” Reuters, September 23, 2019.
Franco Ordonez, “Trump Returns To The U.N. This Week Facing Growing Unease About U.S.
Leadership,” NPR, September 23, 2019.
Alex Pascal, “Against Washington’s ‘Great Power’ Obsession,” Atlantic, September 23, 2019.
Kelsey Zorzi, “Trump Stands Up for Religious Freedom,” Wall Street Journal, September 23,
2019.
Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “The World Comes to the U.N.—but the U.S. Is largely
Missing,” Foreign Policy, September 22, 2019.
Ali Wyne, “How Not to Confront China,” National Interest, September 22, 2019.
Hal Brands, “A Filipino Battleground of the China-U.S. Cool War,” Bloomberg, September 19,
2019.
Edward Luce, “Trump Is Serious About US Divorce from China,” Financial Times, September
19, 2019.
Josh Rogin, “The Trump Administration Prepares a New Assault on U.S. Soft Power,”
Washington Post, September 19, 2019.
Jim Townsend, “Trump’s Defense Cuts in Europe Will Backfire,” Foreign Policy, September 17,
2019.
Katie Bo Williams, “How Trump is Remaking Republican Foreign Policy,” Defense One,
September 19, 2019.
Grant T. Harris and Michael McFaul, “How Vladimir Putin Is Outplaying the U.S. in Africa,”
Washington Post, September 17, 2019.
Kristine Lee, “Coming Soon to the United Nations: Chinese Leadership and Authoritarian
Values,” Foreign Affairs, September 16, 2019.
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David Nakamura, “‘I Don’t Blame Kim Jong Un’: In Dismissing Bolton, Trump Sides with North
Korean Leader—Again,” Washington Post, September 12, 2019.
Rick Noack, “Why U.S. Foes Around the World Will Welcome Bolton’s Departure, and Why
They Shouldn’t Get Too Excited,” Washington Post, September 11, 2019.
Thomas Wright, “Bolton’s Departure Signals Trump’s Foreign-Policy Pivot,” Atlantic, September
11, 2019.
Charles Edel, “Democracy Is Fighting for Its Life,” Foreign Policy, September 10, 2019.
Dexter Filkins, “How John Bolton Got the Better of President Trump,” New Yorker, September
10, 2019.
Beverly Gage, “The Koch Foundation Is Trying to Reshape Foreign Policy. With Liberal Allies.”
New York Times, September 10, 2019.
Dov S. Zakheim, “Donald Trump and the Art of the Perpetual Bluff,” National Interest,
September 10, 2019.
Janusz Bugajski, “The US Can Play China Against Russia,” The Hill, September 9, 2019.
Richard Fontaine, “Great-Power Competition Is Washington’s Top Priority—but Not the
Public’s,” Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2019.
Greg Myre, “Are The U.S. And China headed For A Cold War?” NPR, September 9, 2019.
Nick Wadhams, Glen Carey, and Jennifer Jacobs, “Failed Afghan Talks Underscore Trump’s
Foreign Policy Setbacks,” Bloomberg, September 9, 2019.
Katie Bo Williams, “Once Again, Trump Lurches to End a War, But Troops Remain,” Defense
One
, September 9, 2019.
Colin Dueck, “The End of the Wilsonian Century?” National Interest, September 8, 2019.
Seth G. Jones and Tom Karako, “Where Did ‘Maximum Pressure’ Go?” Wall Street Journal,
September 8, 2019.
James Jay Carafano, “Trump Should Use U.N. Meeting to Champion Religious Liberty,”
Heritage Foundation, September 6, 2019.
Larry Diamond, “America’s Silence Helps Autocrats Triumph,” Foreign Policy, September 6,
2019.
Seth Kaplan, “When Everything Is a Human Right, Nothing Is,” Foreign Policy, September 6,
2019.
Hunter Marston, “The U.S.-China Cold War Is a Myth,” Foreign Policy, September 6, 2019.
Nahal Toosi, “Trump Plan Would Steer Foreign Aid to ‘Friends and Allies,’” Politico, September
6, 2019.
Colum Lynch and Robbie Gramer, “Senior Officials Concede Loss of U.S. Clout as Trump
Prepares for U.N. Summit,” Foreign Policy, September 5, 2019.
Nicholas Phillips, “The Trade War Is Smart Geopolitics,” National Review, September 5, 2019.
Walter Russell Mead, “The Rules of Geopolitics Are Different in Asia,” Wall Street Journal,
September 2, 2019.
Fred Kaplan, “At the G-7, Trump Showed Again That He’s a Terrible Negotiator,” Slate, August
27, 2019.
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William Saletan, “Trump Did Not Represent the U.S. at the G-7,” Slate, August 27, 2019.
Editorial Board, “A G-7 Fiasco to Remember, Without U.S. Leadership, the World Is a More
Dangerous Place,” Bloomberg, August 26, 2019.
Uri Friedman and Peter Nicholas, “A Defining Moment for Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Atlantic,
August 23, 2019.
Peter Nicholas, “America’s Allies Seem to Be Moving On Without Trump,” Atlantic, August 26,
2019.
Tal Axelrod, “Here Are the US Allies That Have Been Caught in Trump’s Crosshairs,” The Hill,
August 24, 2019.
Nate Anderson and Jon Soltz, “One Step at a Time: Congress’ Charge to Reshape American
Foreign Policy,” Military Times, August 23, 2019.
Fred Kaplan, “This Is What a World Without American Leadership Looks Like,” Slate, August
23, 2019.
Michael Hirsh, “Why Trump Fails at Making Deals,” Foreign Policy, August 21, 2019.
Fred Kaplan, “The Greenland Gambit, Trump’s Latest Obsession Shows What’s Wrong with
Treating Every Foreign Policy Issue Like a Real Estate Deal,” Slate, August 21, 2019.
Howard Lavine and James Ron, “To Protect Human Rights Aboard, Preach to Trump Voters,”
Foreign Policy, August 21, 2019.
Abigail Tracy, “‘He Had Made Us a Laughing Stock’: Diplomats Stunned by Trump’s Feud With
Denmark,” Vanity Fair, August 21, 2019.
Thomas Wright, “Trump Has Defected,” Atlantic, August 21, 2019.
James Kitfield, “America Adrift: ‘Bringing The World To Crisis,’” Breaking Defense, August 20,
2019.
Richard Haass, “Trump Doesn’t Negotiate. He Makes Demands.” Washington Post, August 19,
2019.
Edward Wong, “Waning of American Power? Trump Struggles With an Asia in Crisis,” New York
Times
, August 13, 2019.
Robbie Gramer, “Hiring Freeze Put U.S. Diplomats Under Threat Worldwide, Report Says,”
Foreign Policy, August 9, 2019.
Michael Hirsh, “America Ignored,” Foreign Policy, August 9, 2019.
Gideon Rachman, “What Happens When the World Cannot Rely on the US?” Financial Times,
August 9, 2019.
Eliana Johnson, “Trump’s Vision Meets Growing Global Chaos,” Politico, August 8, 2019.
James Jay Carafano, “Ensuring a Twenty-Second Century America,” Heritage Foundation,
August 6, 2019.
Gideon Rachman, “The Asian Strategic Order is Dying,” Financial Times, August 5, 2019.
Anna Applebaum, “Non-Americans, Be Warned: There Will Be No Return to Normal After
Trump,” Washington Post, August 4, 2019.
Derek Grossman, “The Biggest Threat to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy? Washington Itself.”
Diplomat, August 1, 2019.
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Paul R. Pillar, “Diplomatic Meltdown: Why America Has an Ineffective Department of State,”
National Interest, July 29, 2019.
Kori Schake, “The Bill for America First Is Coming Due,” Atlantic, July 27, 2019.
Daniel Sneider, “Northeast Asia Unraveling Amid US Retreat,” Asia Times, July 25, 2019.
Walter Russell Mead, “Trump’s Hesitant Embrace of Human Rights,” Wall Street Journal, July
22, 2019.
Paul R. Pillar, “Mike Pompeo’s Human Rights Problem,” National Interest, July 22, 2019.
Stephen M. Walt, “Restraint Isn’t Isolationism—and It Won’t Endanger America,” Foreign
Policy
, July 22, 2019.
Matthew Lee, “Pompeo Takes Aim at China at Religious Freedom Conference,” Associated
Press
, July 18, 2019.
Editorial Board, “Pompeo Gets Religion,” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2019.
Michael Hirsh, “America’s Road to Reputational Ruin,” Foreign Policy, July 17, 2019.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “America Should Rethink Its Commitments to Allies,” National Interest,
July 14, 2019.
Edward Wong, “Trump’s Asia Gamble: Shatter Enduring Strategies on China and North Korea,”
New York Times, July 11, 2019.
Anthony Leonardi, “Pompeo Launches Commission to Review Unalienable Rights in US Foreign
Policy,” Washington Examiner, July 8, 2019.
Eric Tucker, “Trump Administration Reviews Human Rights’ Role in US Policy,” Associated
Press
, July 8, 2019.
Michael Pompeo, “Unalienable Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, The Founders’ Principles Can
Help Revitalize Liberal Democracy Worldwide,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2019.
Thomas Wright, “Trump Couldn’t Ignore the Contradictions of His Foreign Policy Any Longer,”
Atlantic, July 5, 2019.
Nahal Toosi, “Trump’s ‘Natural Law’ Human Rights Panel Readies for Launch,” Politico, July 3,
2019.
Fareed Zakaria, “The Self-Destruction of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019.
Editorial Board, “The Trump Doctrine, With This President, the Diplomacy Is Always Personal,”
Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2019.
Nick Wadhams, “Trump Helps Bring Shunned Authoritarians Back In From the Cold,”
Bloomberg, June 30, 2019.
Peter Baker, “Trump Once Again Assails America’s Friends as He Opens Overseas Visit,” New
York Times
, June 27, 2019.
Anne Pierce, “‘America First’ Should Not translate top ‘Democracy Last,’” National Interest,
June 26, 2019.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Wrong: Trump is Not An Isolationist,” National Interest, June 23, 2019.
Curt Mills, “The Battle for the Soul of Trump Foreign Policy,” National Interest, June 22, 2019.
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Anrew Restuccia, “Trump’s ‘No Rush’ Foreign Policy, The President Is Affording Himself Ample
Room for Protracted Negotiations—and Protecting Himself in Case His Strategy Goes Awry,”
Politico, June 22, 2019.
Greg Jaffe, “A Dangerous Confusion at the Heart of Trump’s Foreign Policy, Washington Post,
June 21, 2019.
Kori Schake, “Worse Than Obama’s Red-Line Moment,” Atlantic, June 21, 2019.
Hal Brands, “New U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Isn’t Going to Scare China,” Bloomberg, June 18,
2019.
Peter Harris, “Where is Trump the Realist? For Better or Worse, Donald Trump Listens to His
Advisors on Foreign Policy.” National Interest, June 17, 2019.
Fred Hiatt, “Trump Inherited America’s Foreign Policy Riches. He’s Frittering Them Away.”
Washington Post, June 16, 2019.
Christopher Preble, “The Peace Problem: Is America Saving the World or Destroying It?”
National Interest, June 16, 2019.
Zack Beauchamp, “Trump, Election Interference, and Hollow Nationalism,” Vox, June 13, 2019.
Francois Delattre, “The World Grows More Dangerous by the Day,” New York Times, June 13,
2019.
Bret Stephens, “Hong Kong and the Future of Freedom,” New York Times, June 13, 2019.
Stephen M. Walt, “Nobody’s Asking for Trump to Be a Genius,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2019.
Anne Gearan, Toluse Olorunnipa, and James McAuley, “‘Don’t Poke the Bear’: European
Leaders Refine Their Approach to Trump,” Washington Post, June 7, 2019.
Adam Gopnik, “Europe and America Seventy-Five Years After D Day,” New Yorker, June 6,
2019.
Peter Feaver, “The Lessons of 1944 Are in Jeopardy,” Foreign Policy, June 5, 2019.
Michael Hirsh, “D-Day’s Dying Legacy,” Foreign Policy, June 5, 2019.
Brett McGurk, “American Foreign Policy Adrift,” Foreign Affairs, June 5, 2019.
Jennifer Rubin, “A Low Point for America Overseas,” Washington Post, June 5, 2019.
Yasmeen Serhan and Peter Nicholas, “Using D-Day to Remind Trump Who His Real Allies Are,”
Atlantic, June 5, 2019.
Walter Russell Mead, “Trump’s Case Against Europe,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2019.
David Nakamura, “Trump’s Reliance on Pressure Tactics Is Showing Diminishing Returns,”
Washington Post, June 1, 2019.
Fred Kaplan, “Who Speaks for the United States?” Slate, May 29, 2019.
Doug Bandow, “Questionable Alliances: Why America Needs to Reexamine Its International
Relationships,” National Interest, May 28, 2019.
David Ignatius, “How to Make Sense of the Clown Show That Is Trump’s Foreign Policy,”
Washington Post, May 28, 2019.
Joshua Keating, “Why Would Any Country Trust America Again?” Slate, May 24, 2019.
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Fareed Zakaria, “Trump’s Approach to Foreign Policy Provokes an Anti-American Response,”
Washington Post, May 16, 2019.
Max Boot, “Trump’s Pet Intellectuals Are Embarrassing Themselves,” Washington Post, May 15,
2019.
Eliana Plott, “Ignoring Trump’s Orders, Hoping He’ll Forget,” Atlantic, May 15, 2019.
David Ignatius, “Foreign Adversaries Have Figured Trump Out,” Washington Post, May 14,
2019.
Zack Beauchamp, “Hungary’s Leader Is Waging War on Democracy. Today, He’s at the White
House.” Vox, May 13, 2019.
Akshobh Giridharadas, “Trump: Trade, Tirade and Transatlantic Relations,” National Interest,
May 11, 2019.
Paul Krugman, “Killing the Pax Americana,” New York Times, May 11, 2019.
Anne Applebaum, “Trump Has the Attention Span of a Gnat. It’s Destroying Our Foreign Policy.”
Washington Post, May 10, 2019.
Henry Olsen, “Trump’s Critics Were Wrong. He’s Not a Madman in Foreign Policy.” Washington
Post
, May 10, 2019.
David Frum, “Trump Has Just One Trick—And It’s Not Working Anymore,” Atlantic, May 9,
2019.
Joshua Keating, “The People Want ‘America First,’ in Theory,” Slate, May 9, 2019.
Robert D. Blackwill, “Trump Deserves More Credit for His Foreign Policies,” Foreign Policy,
May 7, 2019.
Joseph S. Nye, “American Soft Powwer in the Age of Trump,” Project Syndicate, May 6, 2019.
Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Defining and Refining the Indo-Pacific Concept,”
Comparative Connections, May-August 2019.
Karen DeYoung and Josh Dawsey, “For Inured Foreign Officials, the Sting of Trump’s Tweets
Has Begun to Dull,” Washington Post, April 30, 2019.
Max Boot, “Trump Again Shows How Easily He’s Manipulated by Dictators,” Washington Post,
April 30, 2019.
Amy Mackinnon, “Trump May Like Putin. His Administration Doesn’t.” Foreign Policy, April
29, 2019.
Steven A. Cook, “Loving Dictators Is as American as Apple Pie,” Foreign Policy, April 26, 2019.
Stephen M. Walt, “America Isn’t as Powerful as It Thinks It Is,” Foreign Policy, April 26, 2019.
Henry Farrell, Abraham Newman, “By Punishing Iran, Trump Is Weakening America,” Foreign
Policy
, April 24, 2019.
Michael Anton, “The Trump Doctrine, An Insider Explains the President’s Foreign Policy,”
Foreign Policy, April 20, 2019.
Alex Horton, “Trump Soured Relations in Latin America. China and Russia Have Welcomed the
Chaos.” Washington Post, April 20, 2019.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “Trump Should Have Already Left NATO,” National Interest, April 17,
2019.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Jermi Suri, “The Long Rise and Sudden Fall of American Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy, April 17,
2019.
Stephen M. Walt,” The United States Will Be Shocked by Its Future,” Foreign Policy, April 16,
2019.
James Jay Carafano, “America’s Next 5 Moves in the Indo-Pacific Region, Donald Trump Has
Done Much to Alter U.S. Influence in Asia,” National Interest, April 7, 2019.
Yoram Hazony and Ofir Haivry, “Why America Needs New Alliances,” Wall Street Journal, April
5, 2019.
Ted Galen Carpenter, “It’s Time to Rethink America’s Foreign Alliance Commitments,” National
Interest
, April 4, 2019.
Henry Olsen, “It’s Time to Rethink the NATO Alliance,” Washington Post, April 4, 2019.
James Stavridis, “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former
Commander,” Time, April 4, 2019.
Doug Bandow, “The Outdated Alliance?” Foreign Policy, April 3, 2019.
Kathy Gilsinan and Peter Nicholas, “Trump Learns to Live With NATO—And Vice Versa,”
Atlantic, April 3, 2019.
Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute, “NATO’s Biggest Problem is President Trump,” Washington
Post
, April 2, 2019.
Alex Ward, “Trump Has a Strong Foreign Policy Narrative for 2020,” Vox, April 1, 2019.
Robert D. Blackwill, “Trump’s Foreign Policies Are Better Than They Seem,” Council on
Foreign Relations, April 2019.
Jason Horowitz, “Italy’s Deal With China Signals a Shift as U.S. Influence Recedes,” New York
Times
, March 30, 2019.
Walter Russell Mead, “NATO Is Dying, but Don’t Blame Trump,” Wall Street Journal, March 25,
2019.
Nicholas Johnston, “Under Trump, America Increasingly Loses Its Global Lead,” Axios, March
22, 2019.
Theodore R. Bromund, “Trump’s Right: U.S. Allies Need to do More,” Heritage Foundation,
March 19, 2019.
Idrees Ali, “French Minister Expresses Concern About Long-Term U.S. Commitment to NATO,”
Reuters, March 18, 2019.
Bojan Pancevski and Laurence Norman, “Germany Plans to Renege on Pledge to Raise Military
Spending, Defying Trump,” Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2019.
Michael Birnbaum, “NATO Members Increase Defense Spending for Fourth Year in Row
Following Trump Pressure,” Washington Post, March 14, 2019.
Jeffrey Prescott, “Trump Doesn’t Deserve Any Credit for His Disruptive Foreign Policy,” Foreign
Policy
, March 14, 2019.
Nick Cumming-Bruce, “U.S. Steps Up Criticism of China for Detentions in Xinjiang,” New York
Times
, March 13, 2019.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Lesley Wroughton and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Says China’s Treatment of Muslim Minority
Worst Abuses ‘Since the 1930s,’” Reuters, March 13, 2019.
David E. Sanger, “State Dept. Accuses China of Rights Abuses Not Seen ‘Since the 1930s,’” New
York Times
, March 13, 2019.
Robbie Gramer and Colum Lynch, “Despite Pompeo’s Call for ‘Swagger,’ Trump Slashes
Diplomatic Budget,” Foreign Policy, March 11, 2019.
Lindsay Wise and Bryan Lowry, “Pompeo Defends Trump Budget; Says 23 Percent Cut Won’t
Hurt State Department’s ‘Swagger,’” McClatchy, March 11, 2019.
Anne Gearan, Philip Rucker, and Dan Lamothe, “Trump Invokes New Demand for Extracting
Billions of Dollars from U.S. Allies,” Washington Post, March 9, 2019.
Jenifer Jacobs, “Trump Seeks Huge Premium From Allies Hosting U.S. Troops,” Bloomberg,
March 8, 2019.
Kevin Baron, “Critics Blast Trump ‘Protection Racket’ Offer as ‘Pure Idiocy,’” Defense One,
March 8, 2019.
Hal Brands and Charles Edel, “The End of Great Power Peace,” National Interest, March 6, 2019.
Anne Gearan and Robert Costa, “‘I Think You Mean That, Too’: Trump’s Aides Struggle to
Defend, Explain His Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, March 6, 2019.
Ariane Tabatabai, “Maximum Pressure Yields Minimum Results,” Foreign Policy, March 6,
2019.
Editorial Board, “China Believes Canada’s Huawei Case Is Political. Trump Does Nothing But
Confirm It.” Washington Post, March 5, 2019.
Thomas L. Friedman, “The Trump Musical: ‘Anything Goes,’” New York Times, March 5, 2019.
Stephen M. Walt, “The Tragedy of Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2019.
Mark Helprin, “The U.S. Is Ceding the Pacific to China,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2019.
Michael Hirsh, “Despite Setbacks, Trump’s Blunt Diplomacy Could Eventually Work,” Foreign
Policy
, March 1, 2019.
Hunter DeRensis, “Should America Tackle All Authoritarian Governments?” National Interest,
February 28, 2019.
Robert D. Kaplan, “Japan Grows Nervous About the U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, February 28,
2019.
Michael D. Shear, “For Trump, It’s Just ‘Trust,’ No ‘Verify,’” New York Times, February 28,
2019.
James Jay Carafano, “Instead of Democracy Promotion, Sell Trumpism to the World,” National
Interest
, February 27, 2019.
Stephen Wertheim, “A Clash Is Coming Over America’s Place in the World,” New York Times,
February 26, 2019.
Catherine Rampell, “Trump Is Treating Our Allies Like His Old Contractors: Not Well,”
Washington Post, February 25, 2019.
Doug Bandow, “War Weary: Why Washington Needs to Bring Its Troops Home,” National
Interest
, February 21, 2019.
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U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

Helle C. Dale, “Pompeo’s Tough Diplomacy on Display in Europe,” Heritage Foundation,
February 21, 2019.
Thomas Wright, “The Moment the Transatlantic Charade Ended,” Atlantic, February 19, 2019.
Jacob Heilbrunn, “Munich Conference Exposes the Decline of the West,” National Interest,
February 18, 2019.
Ali Wyne, “Can America Remain Number One?” National Interest, February 18, 2019.
Steven Erlanger and Katrin Bennhold, “Rift Between Trump and Europe Is Now Open and
Angry,” New York Times, February 17, 2019.
Matthew Karnitschnig and David M. Herszenhorn, “Munich Insecurity Conference,” Politico,
February 16, 2019.
Griff Witte and Michael Birnbaum, “Trump Foreign Policy Under Attack from All Sides at
European Security Conference,” Washington Post, February 16, 2019.
Mark Santora, “In Eastern Europe, U.S. Officials Talk Deals, Not Erosion of Democracy,” New
York Times
, February 15, 2019.
John Hannah, “Trump’s Foreign Policy Is a Work in Progress,” Foreign Policy, February 14,
2019.


Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke
Michael Moodie
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Assistant Director and Senior Specialist in Foreign

Affairs, Defense and Trade



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