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September 4, 2019
Djibouti
The small, arid East African country of Djibouti is
Figure 1. Djibouti
strategically located along one of the world’s busiest
shipping routes on the Bab el Mandeb Strait, which serves
as the gateway from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and
the Indian Ocean. The country has increasingly become a
hub for foreign militaries. It is home to U.S. Africa
Command’s Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA), based at Camp Lemonnier, the only enduring
U.S. military installation in Africa. A former French
colony, Djibouti also hosts a sizable French military
presence and provides facilities for multinational anti-
piracy operations off Somalia’s coast. In 2015, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) opened a liaison
office in Djibouti to enhance regional anti-piracy efforts.
Japan established its first post-World War II overseas
military base there in 2011. China opened its first military
Source: CRS, using ESRI and U.S. State Department data.
base abroad there in 2017. Italy also maintains military
facilities in the country.
Political Situation
President Ismaël Omar Guelleh has led Djibouti since 1999,
With almost no arable land, few natural resources, and little
when he was elected after the retirement of the country’s
industry, Djibouti’s economy depends heavily on its
first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon (Guelleh’s uncle).
services sector and trade through its busy international port
Critics argue that Guelleh’s government is authoritarian and
complex. Rents and related revenue from foreign militaries
corrupt. His political opponents contend that opening the
are an important source of revenue. The country is pursuing
country to foreign bases has shielded the president from
an ambitious agenda to transform itself into a commercial
greater Western criticism of abuses, allowing Guelleh to
trade hub for the broader region. Neighboring Ethiopia, a
tighten his hold on power, despite public discontent.
landlocked country of over 100 million people, relies on
Djibouti for the transit of 90% of its formal trade, recently
In 2010, near the end of Guelleh’s second term in office,
facilitated by a new Chinese-built rail line between the two
the parliament amended the constitution to abolish term
countries. China’s growing engagement with Djibouti is
limits. He has since won reelection two more times, in 2011
multi-faceted, ranging from major investments in
infrastructure to China’s
and 2016 (despite having vowed that his 2011 reelection
establishment, in Djibouti, of a
would be his “third and final time”). The 2016 election,
geostrategic naval base. China, which holds a majority of
Djibouti’s external
which he won with nearly 88% of the vote, was marred by
sovereign debt, considers the country as
reports of government harassment of opposition supporters
part of its Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to connect
and restrictions on freedom of assembly and the press.
countries to Chinese global trade routes. (For more detail,
Opposition parties, some of which boycotted the elections,
see CRS IFxxxxx China’s Engagement in Djibouti.)
asserted that the results were rigged. The next presidential
Humanitarian and Development Situation
polls are scheduled for 2021.
Situated along Somalia’s north-west border and across the
Guelleh’s governing Union for the Presidential Majority
Mandeb strait from Yemen (Figure 1), Djibouti is host to
coalition (UMP after its French acronym) maintains an
more than 29,000 refugees and asylum seekers fleeing
overwhelming majority in parliament, and power within the
conflict in neighboring states. Many refugees transit via
coalition is heavily concentrated in the president’s own
Djibouti to other countries, given limited access to
party. The main opposition parties boycotted the most
livelihood opportunities there. Djibouti’s own population of
recent parliamentary elections, in early 2018.
just under a million people grapples with chronic drought,
which contributes to a high prevalence of acute
The State Department’s latest human rights report cites
malnutrition. More than 80% of its food is imported.
“government abridgement of the ability of citizens to
Djibouti is categorized as a lower-middle-income country,
choose or influence significantly their government” as a key
but it ranks near the bottom of the U.N. Development
issue. The report highlights arbitrary arrests of opposition
Program’s Human Development Index (172 out of 188
members, journalists, academics, and demonstrators;
countries). The official unemployment rate is nearly 40%,
suppression of the opposition; and restrictions on freedom
and more than 20% of the population lives in extreme
of speech and assembly. The report also suggests that
poverty. Female genital mutilation/cutting is prevalent.
“officials engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Djibouti
The Economy
for these facilities, which provide jobs to more than 1,000
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates
local workers and third-country nationals. Under the terms
Djibouti’s GDP at $2.4 billion in 2019, or $2,218 per
of a previous lease agreement, the United States paid
capita. The IMF has assessed that Djibouti’s strategy of
Djibouti more than $30 million annually. President Guelleh
investing in infrastructure to transform itself into a logistics
sought higher fees and additional U.S. contributions to
and commercial hub “offers great opportunity for economic
support Djibouti’s economic growth. Under the follow-on
growth and development.” The IMF cautions, however, that
20-year deal, the United States reportedly pays over $60
the country is in debt distress, with public debt estimated at
million annually. At the time of the lease negotiations, there
104% of GDP. The IMF forecasts annual GDP growth of
were rumors that both China and Russia were considering
6% through 2024.
the establishment of military facilities in Djibouti, spurring
speculation that these prospects may have factored into the
Regional Relations
increased cost. To reinforce the strategic partnership with
Djibouti’s relations with its neighbors in the Horn of Africa
Djibouti and maintain basing access, Congress provided
are evolving, amid shifting alignments in the broader region
enhanced authority in P.L. 113-291 for the Department of
around the Red Sea. The Arab Gulf countries, Turkey, and
Defense (DOD) to acquire goods and services of Djibouti
China are playing a growing role in the region, as countries
for activities in AFRICOM’s area of responsibilities. In
in the Horn, each facing various domestic challenges, look
2016, Congress broadened that authority to cover other
abroad for investment, development financing, and
strategic African partners in P.L. 114-328.
diplomatic support. Djibouti’s relationship with the United
Arab Emirates (UAE)—an increasingly important player in
The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Food for
the Horn—is strained over a dispute with Dubai’s state-
Peace program maintains a warehouse in Djibouti for pre-
owned DP World. DP World is in a legal battle with
positioned food assistance commodities; it serves as a hub
Djibouti over its 2018 termination of DP World’s 30-year
for rapid response to humanitarian emergencies in the
contract to operate the Doraleh Container Terminal. A
broader region. Djibouti also hosts a U.S.-funded regional
Chinese port operator now reportedly manages the facility.
center for preventing and countering violent extremism.
Djibouti has generally enjoyed good relations with East
U.S. Assistance and Security Cooperation
African governments, with the exception of neighboring
U.S. bilateral aid administered by the State Department and
Eritrea. Djibouti and Eritrea fought a brief border conflict in
USAID totaled over $18 million in FY2018, with some
2008 over the remote but strategically important peninsula
additional funding allocated from regionally and centrally
of Ras Doumeira, near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. After
managed programs, including for emergency humanitarian
various negotiations and prisoner of war exchanges, Eritrea
aid. The State Department has requested $8 million for
and Djibouti declared an end to their dispute and an intent
FY2020 (an increase from the $2 million requested for
to normalize relations in September 2018.
FY2019), with almost $6 million requested in military aid
U.S. Relations
and $2 million to address youth unemployment.
The Trump Administration characterizes Djibouti as a “key
Djibouti receives security assistance from the United States
U.S. partner on security, regional stability, and
through a variety of programs administered by the State
humanitarian efforts across the region.” U.S. military
Department and DOD, most of which are not reflected in
facilities in Djibouti serve as an important base for U.S.
the State Department’s annual bilateral request referenced
operations in the region, elevating the tiny country’s
above. These programs include border and coastal security
importance for U.S. officials. The Horn of Africa is a hub
and related regional stabilization and counterterrorism
for U.S. counterterrorism efforts: U.S. officials estimate
initiatives, which aim to protect both the host country and
that regional Al Qaeda affiliates such as Al Shabaab in
U.S. forces stationed there and to promote military
Somalia and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in
professionalization. U.S. security assistance funding has
nearby Yemen continue to pose a significant transnational
significantly outweighed development aid to Djibouti.
threat. The presence of elements of the Islamic State
(IS/ISIS) in the region have also been raised as a concern.
In 2011, Djibouti deployed military forces to join the AU
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Djibouti has received U.S.
More than 4,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are
training and assistance in support of that deployment
deployed at Camp Lemonnier, an enduring forward
(currently estimated at roughly 1,000 troops), including
operating site maintained by the U.S. Navy. These forces
through State Department Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
contribute to counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations, as
funds. The State Department has also provided security
well as regional stabilization efforts. Some of these forces
assistance through a regional initiative, the Partnership for
are deployed to support CJTF-HOA, which serves as an
Regional East Africa Counter-Terrorism (PREACT). State
operational headquarters for countering violent extremist
Department anti-terrorism funds for civilian security forces
groups in East Africa, most notably Al Shabaab in Somalia,
have supported efforts to improve port and airport security,
and conducting security cooperation, crisis response, and
and refurbish border posts. DOD has notified Congress of
personnel recovery/casualty evacuation missions.
roughly $100 million in “global train-and-equip”
counterterrorism assistance to Djibouti since FY2006.
The U.S. military has expanded its infrastructure in Djibouti
since it originally deployed forces in 2002, and in 2015, the
Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs
Navy opened the first permanent U.S. military barracks in
Sarah R. Collins, Research Assistant
Africa there. In 2014, the Obama Administration negotiated
with the Guelleh government new terms to renew its lease
IF11303
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Djibouti
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