Mozambique: Politics, Economy, and
August 19, 2019
U.S. Relations
Nicolas Cook
Mozambique, a significant recipient of U.S. development assistance, is a southeastern African
Specialist in African Affairs
country nearly twice the size of California, with a population of 27.9 million people. It achieved

rapid growth following a post-independence civil war (1977-1992), but faces a range of political,
economic, and security challenges. These include a political scandal over state-guaranteed,

allegedly corrupt bank loans received by state-owned firms, which created public debt that the
government did not disclose to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This placed the country’s relations with the IMF at
risk and has had major negative repercussions for the economy, donor relations, and Mozambique’s governance record. Other
challenges include unmet development needs, a range of governance shortcomings, organized crime, an ongoing economic
slump, and political conflict and violence involving both mainstream political actors and violent extremists. Mozambique is
also recovering from two powerful cyclones that hit the country in March and April 2019 (addressed in CRS Report R45683,
Cyclones Idai and Kenneth in Southeastern Africa: Humanitarian and Recovery Response in Brief).
Between 2013 and 2016, the country experienced political violence arising from a dispute between the former socialist
majority party, FRELIMO, and the leading opposition political party, RENAMO. (The latter is a former armed rebel group
that fought the FRELIMO government during the civil war.) Their recent dispute, prompted by years of varied RENAMO
grievances linked to FRELIMO’s control of the state, led to numerous armed clashes between government and RENAMO
forces. In 2019, the two parties signed a permanent cease-fire and a final political and military accord to end their dispute, but
they have yet to fully implement those agreements, and the potential for failure remains. Since late 2017, Mozambique also
has faced attacks by a violent Islamist extremist group that is active along its far northern coast. The group—known as Al
Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ), among other names—has killed hundreds, often via beheading.
The loan scandal has had far-reaching consequences: It has spurred local and U.S. criminal prosecutions, led some donor
governments to suspend aid, undermined the state’s credibility, and placed the country in debt distress, reducing its access to
credit financing needed to help fund development and government operations. The scandal also is widely seen as contributing
to a post-2015 slump in economic growth, which had been rapid for most of the post-civil war period. While that growth
expanded the economy and contributed to a decline in extreme poverty, the majority of Mozambicans have remained poor,
and while some socioeconomic indicators have improved, the country faces a range of persistent socioeconomic challenges.
Development gains have remained limited despite large inflows of foreign assistance and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Much of this FDI has financed large industrial projects, many of which have been criticized for being poorly integrated with
the broader domestic economy—in which the informal sector and small-scale economic activity prevail—and for generating
relatively few jobs or broad reductions in poverty.
Mozambique’s future may be transformed by the development of large natural gas reserves, discovered in the county’s north
in 2010. Gas exports are expected to begin in the early to mid-2020s and, together with rising exports of coal, to spur rapid
economic growth. The U.S.-based firms Anadarko and ExxonMobil, the latter in partnership with Italy’s ENI energy firm,
lead international oil company consortia developing the reserves, although a merger involving Anadarko is likely to result in
the sale of its Mozambique assets to France’s Total SA. While the state may face challenges in effectively governing and
managing the large anticipated influx of gas revenue, it has taken some steps to address such challenges. The government
plans to establish a sovereign wealth fund to preserve gas income, which it intends to allocate, in part, to infrastructure
development, poverty reduction, and economic diversification.
U.S.-Mozambican ties are cordial and historically have centered on development cooperation. U.S. assistance, funded at an
annual average of $452 million between FY2016 and FY2018, has focused primarily on health programs. Given recent
events, U.S. engagement and aid may increasingly focus on the development of economic ties and security cooperation,
notably to counter ASWJ, which is active in the area where large-scale gas processing development is underway. For many
years, Mozambique received relatively limited congressional attention, but interest in the country may be growing; the
country hosted congressional delegations in 2016 and 2018. U.S. humanitarian responses to the recent cyclones have also
drawn congressional engagement. Developments in the country—including the rise of violent extremism and prospects for
U.S. private sector investment and U.S. bilateral aid program outcomes in a context in which state corruption poses
substantial challenges—could attract increasing congressional attention in the coming years.
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Overview and U.S. Engagement
Mozambique, in southeastern Africa, faces political, economic, and security headwinds, some
arguably related to the continuous domination of the state by the Mozambique Liberation Front
(FRELIMO) political party. FRELIMO, a former armed liberation movement that fought for self-
determination and freedom Portuguese colonial rule, has held a parliamentary majority since
achieving independence in 1975. Prior to a resurgence of political tensions and violence in 2013
between FRELIMO and RENAMO, a former armed rebel movement that is now the main
opposition party, Mozambique was widely viewed as having made a durable transition to peace
after its post-independence civil war (1977-1992).1 It also made a transition, beginning in the late
1980s, from politically and economically centralized, one-party, socialist rule, to a multiparty
democratic system underpinned by a largely market-based economy.
The development of large offshore natural gas reserves discovered in the country’s north in 2010
is expected to lead to gas exports in the early to mid-2020s and, together with rising exports of
coal, to spur rapid economic growth and reverse a slump that began in 2016. This downturn was
preceded by nearly two decades of post-civil war economic expansion underpinned, in part, by
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) tied to large industrial projects. Mozambique has also
received large inflows of foreign aid aimed at addressing its myriad development challenges.
While there has been marked progress in reducing poverty rates and raising a range of once very
low socioeconomic indicators, most Mozambicans (see Figure 1) have remained poor, and there
are many unmet development needs. There also have been regional and demographic disparities
regarding access to the fruits of growth. Large FDI-driven industrial projects prioritized by the
state, for instance, have helped speed macroeconomic growth rates, but often have provided
relatively few jobs or economic gains for the general population.2
Corruption and elite use of political influence to accumulate private wealth also have grown over
the post-civil war period (see below), with worrisome implications for the economy and stability.
The post-2015 economic decline followed disclosures that the government had failed to report to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over $2 billion in state-guaranteed debt, which violated
the terms of Mozambique’s cooperation with the IMF. Two foreign banks provided these loans, in
an allegedly corrupt manner, to state-owned firms registered as private entities and controlled by
state intelligence officials.
This set of events, known as the “hidden debt affair,” has had far-reaching consequences. It has
spurred an ongoing major political scandal, Mozambican and U.S. prosecutions, and aid
suspensions by multiple donor governments (albeit not by the United States). Along with broader
indicators of corruption, the debt affair also has prompted some observers to question whether the
state has the political will and capacity to administer effectively—and in the public interest—a
large projected windfall of earnings from the energy sector.3 The government recently requested
IMF technical assistance in undertaking an assessment of governance and corruption challenges.

1 The war began in 1977, after Mozambique’s independence from Portugal in 1975. FRELIMO (the acronym for Frente
de Libertação de Moçambique, Portuguese for Mozambique Liberation Front) and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional
Moçambicana, or Mozambican National Resistance) were the main parties to the civil conflict.
2 Cyprian Muchemwa and Geoffrey Thomas Harris, “Mozambique’s Post-War Success Story: Is It Time to Revisit the
Narrative?,” Democracy and Security (15:1), 2019; and Andrew Brooks, “Was Africa rising? Narratives of
Development Success and Failure Among the Mozambican Middle Class,” Territory, Politics, Governance (6:4), 2018.
3 Aslak Orre and Helge Rønning, Mozambique: A Political Economy Analysis, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, 2017; and Lars Buur, The Development of Natural Resource Linkages in Mozambique: The Ruling Elite
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The scandal also reduced Mozambique’s sovereign debt ratings and placed it in debt distress,
reducing the state’s access to credit needed for development projects and government operations.
As of late 2018, Mozambique’s public debt totaled about $15.9 billion—110.5% of gross
domestic product (GDP)—and the country was $1.2 billion in arrears.4
Figure 1. Mozambique at a Glance
(2018 data unless otherwise noted. Totals may not sum due to rounding)
Population and Cultural Demographics
Population (Total/Growth Rate): 27.2 mil ion/2.5%
Youth Population (ages 0-24): 66%
Median Age: 17.4 years
Urban Population (of total): 36%
Languages: Portuguese (official) & 41 local languages (2017)
Literacy Rate (adults): Male 71%, Female 43%) (2015)
Religions: Christian 60% (Catholic 27%, Zionist 16%,
Evangelical/Pentecostal 15%, Anglican 2%), Muslim 19%,
None 14%, Other/Unknown 8% (2017)
Health Measures
Under-5 Mortality Rate: 72 per 1,000 live births (2017)
Life Expectancy (years): 53.3 (male); 54.9 (female)
Adult HIV Prevalence: 12.5 % (ages 15–49 years) (2017)
Economic Measures
Gross Domestic Product (GDP, in dollars), Total/Growth Rate (in
local constant prices): $14.4 bil ion/3.3%
GDP Growth (projected): 4% (2019)
GDP Per Capita: $476
National Poverty Level Share (population %): 46.1 (2014)
Sources: CRS map. Data from CIA World Factbook; World Bank Development Indicators; IMF World Economic
Outlook; U.S. Census, International Data Base databases (April 2019); Ethnologue Languages of the World.
Mozambique also faces security challenges. It is gradually overcoming a destabilizing political
dispute spurred by longstanding RENAMO grievances over alleged electoral misconduct and
continuous de facto FRELIMO control of the state. The dispute turned into a low-level armed
conflict between RENAMO and state forces between 2013 and late 2016, when a temporary
cease-fire was signed. It was later extended. In 2018, the two parties signed political and military
agreements to end their dispute,5 and in August 2019 they signed a permanent cease-fire prior to
signing a comprehensive peace accord.6 Since late 2017, the country also has faced a brutal
insurgency by armed Islamist extremists in its far north, in an area where large-scale gas

Capture of New Economic, Opportunities, DIIS Working Paper 3, 2014, among others.
4 Sovereign debt distress, which can signal a potential debt repayment default, occurs when a country enters into debt
repayment arrears or such arrears appear imminent (e.g., a country seeks debt restructuring to avoid arrears). IMF,
Republic of Mozambique: Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Credit Facility, April 10, 2019; and IMF, “Joint
World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries,” March 19, 2019, among others.
5 U.S. Embassy-Maputo, “Congratulations on Announcement of Consensus on Military Issues,” July 12, 2018, and
“Congratulations on Announcement of Agreement on Military Issues,” August 7, 2018.
6 U.S. Embassy-Maputo, “U.S. Embassy Statement on the Signing of the Definitive Ceasefire Agreement in
Mozambique,” August 1, 2019, “U.S. Embassy Statement on the Signing of the Peace and Reconciliation Accord,”
August 6, 2019.
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development operations are underway. Trafficking of persons, wildlife, and illicit drugs, along
with other organized crime activity, also poses security challenges.
Mozambique enjoys cordial relations with the United States and receives sizable U.S. global
health assistance, but has received relatively limited congressional attention since the early 2000s.
However, the country hosted congressional delegations in 2016 and 2018 that focused on such
issues as U.S. health and wildlife aid and the RENAMO-FRELIMO conflict. Recent
developments and policy challenges in Mozambique have the potential to draw increased
congressional attention. These include increasing U.S. private sector stakes in the energy sector,
the implications of state corruption for the government’s integrity and status as a U.S.
development and investment partner, U.S. government counterterrorism concerns, and recovery
from two powerful cyclones that hit the country in March and April 2019. The devastation caused
by the cyclones has prompted an ongoing U.S. assistance response—funded at a level of $74
million as of May 31—in support of humanitarian needs and longer-term recovery efforts,
alongside a broader international response. (On these issues, see CRS Report R45683, Cyclones
Idai and Kenneth in Southeastern Africa: Humanitarian and Recovery Response in Brief.)
Political Background and Dynamics
Mozambique gained independence in 1975, after a long FRELIMO-led armed struggle against
Portuguese colonial rule. In 1977, RENAMO, a guerrilla group initially formed as a proxy of the
white minority regime in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), initiated attacks against the socialist
FRELIMO-led state, sparking a civil war. The war caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, social
displacement, a mass refugee exodus into nearby countries, and widespread destitution. These
effects were exacerbated by natural disasters, as well as by FRELIMO’s abortive attempts to
control the economy, which prompted a turn toward economic liberalization in the late 1980s.
After internationally aided peace talks, a new constitution was ratified in 1990. Peace accords
signed in 1992 ended the war and, along with U.N.-aided peacebuilding efforts, paved the way
for RENAMO’s transformation into a political party and multiparty elections in 1994.7
Post-war politics mainly have centered on intra-FRELIMO competition and polarized rivalry
between FRELIMO, which has held an electoral majority since 1994, and RENAMO. Broad
public post-war support for reconciliation and peacebuilding initially led to a system of informal
bargaining among political elites over policymaking, giving RENAMO influence that it might not
otherwise have had.8 Over time, however, FRELIMO increasingly wielded its electoral majority,
aided by its strong influence over the electoral system, to marginalize RENAMO.
The country’s constitution, which concentrates executive power in the office of the directly
elected president, augmented FRELIMO’s power, as did its influence over the economy and FDI
flows. This was notably the case under former president Armando Guebuza (in office 2005-2015),
a FRELIMO hardliner who accrued substantial private wealth. He centralized power in the

7 On the war, see Alex Vines, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Mozambique Case Study, UK Stabilisation
Unit, February 2018 and sources cited therein; William Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique,
Univ. of California Press, 1992; and Stephen L. Weigert, Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern
Africa, Macmillan, 1996, among others.
8 Carrie Manning, “Conflict Management and Elite Habituation in Postwar Democracy: The Case of Mozambique,”
Comparative Politics, (35:1), 2002, and other work by Manning, among others.
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presidency, appointed loyalists to state posts, and reportedly fostered an influential network of
relatives and associates, many of whom used political ties to advance their business interests.9
Resentful of FRELIMO’s continuous political and economic dominance and of not being
allocated governorships in provinces where it claimed electoral majorities—and due to enduring
bitterness over a narrow 1999 presidential election loss—RENAMO has routinely engaged in a
politics of obstruction and protest.10 It has repeatedly boycotted elections or parliament, usually
citing electoral grievances, and periodically it has threatened to withdraw from the political
process or resort to violence to achieve its aims.
Afonso Dhlakama—RENAMO’s sole post-war leader until his death in 2018—spearheaded this
approach, to mixed effect. While RENAMO’s approach periodically won it concessions, such as
incremental electoral reforms, Dhlakama often appeared to overplay his hand, making weighty
demands that the FRELIMO government often rejected, either outright or after parliamentary
debate. RENAMO was also considered to be afflicted by internal divisions, poor organization,
and erratic leadership under Dhlakama. He also thwarted the emergence of rivals within the party,
which helped spur the formation in 2009 of the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM)
by RENAMO dissidents led by Daviz Simango, the mayor of Beira, a key city. The MDM
became the third-largest party in parliament in 2009 and nearly doubled its gains in the 2014
election. It also won four city elections in 2013, but lost all but Beira in 2018.11
Until late 2012, periodic warnings by RENAMO that it might resort to coercion or violence to
achieve its aims remained only threats, notwithstanding many small-scale, mostly unarmed
confrontations between its supporters and authorities.12 Its potential to employ the force of arms,
however, was always a risk, as the 1992 peace accords had permitted Dhlakama to maintain an
armed personal protection unit with police-like powers. RENAMO also has long held the loyalty
of ex-fighters who were not integrated into the national military at the end of the war, some with
access to civil war-era arms caches and abiding post-war reintegration grievances.
RENAMO-Government Armed Conflict
In late 2012, Dhlakama retreated to his former wartime base and began to marshal a military
force. In early 2013, RENAMO—in a manner reminiscent of its civil war tactics—launched
armed attacks on police and military personnel, state facilities (e.g., health posts), and some
civilian targets. Periodic clashes with state forces led to dozens of fatalities, including of civilians.

9 Armando Emilio Guebuza and Jean Blondel, “The Part Played By Mozambique’s Second President,” in Jean Blondel,
African Presidential Republics, Routledge, 2019; 2; and Indian Ocean Newsletter, “Guebuza Family Has Finger In
Every Pie,” May 31, 2008, among many Indian Ocean Newsletter reports and other sources.
10 Alex Vines, “Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO’s Return to Armed Conflict Since 2013: The Politics of
Reintegration in Mozambique,” in Anders Themnér, ed., Warlord Democrats in Africa: Ex-Military Leaders and
Electoral Politics, ZED Books, 2017; Reuters, “Mozambican Opposition Threatens Election Boycott,” August 14,
1998, AFP, “Mozambique Opposition Threatens To Boycott Peace Celebrations, October 1, 2002; and AIM,
“Dhlakama Insists on Parliamentary Boycott,” January 8, 2010, and “Dhlakama Boycotts Council of State,” July 20,
2013, among others.
11 Carrie Manning, “Mozambique’s Slide into One-Party Rule,” Journal of Democracy, (21:2), 2010; and Alex Vines,
“Renamo’s Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique,” International Peacekeeping, (20:3), 2013.
12 Xinhua, “Mozambican Opposition Leader Refuses to Disband ‘Security Force,” October 6, 2005; Agência de
Informação de Moçambique (hereinafter, AIM), “Dhlakama Accused of Threats and Intimidation,” November 14,
2003, “Prosecutors Will Examine Dhlakama Statements,” April 5, 2007, “Renamo Former Guerrillas Threaten to
Return to War,” November 3, 2009, and “More Threats From Dhlakama,” September 5, 2011, among others.
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Conflict waned for a time after a 2014 pre-election cease-fire accord.13 RENAMO, however,
dissatisfied with the 2014 election results and other responses to its demands, later abandoned the
accord, and hostilities resumed.14 The renewed conflict, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported,
featured “enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, summary killings and destruction of
private property allegedly committed by government forces, and political killings, attacks on
public transport and looting of health clinics by alleged RENAMO forces.”15
Throughout the conflict, there were numerous on-again-off-again peace talks and provisional
agreements, but binding accord was stymied repeatedly by violence, brinksmanship, and
intransigence by the two sides—and by RENAMO’s often shifting demands. At the start of the
conflict, these centered on electoral law reforms and equitable party representation on the
electoral commission (CNE). Later, among other ends, RENAMO sought
 the inclusive and nonpartisan allocation of the fruits of economic growth,
including extractive sector earnings;
 completion of the integration of an agreed number of RENAMO fighters into the
military, command posts for RENAMO officers, and related demands; and
 an end to FRELIMO domination of the state, including through a process of
increased political decentralization under which RENAMO would be allocated
governorships in areas where it has claimed high rates of electoral support.16
A late 2016 cease-fire largely halted hostilities, and in early 2018, President Filipe Jacinto Nyusi
and Dhlakama negotiated a framework accord on political decentralization. Uncertainty over
prospects for the agreement arose after Dhlakama’s death in early May 2018, but weeks later
parliament enacted a series of constitutional amendments largely in line with the accord. These
provide for elected provincial, district, and municipal assemblies, and for the leading delegate of
the party with a simple majority in each assembly to become the chief executive at that level (i.e.,
governor, district administrator, or mayor.17 RENAMO’s disarmament has remained a bone of
contention for FRELIMO. After the May 2018 decentralization reforms, FRELIMO
parliamentarians delayed action on additional legislation necessary to implement the reforms,
pending RENAMO’s disarmament.18 In July 2018, however, the government and RENAMO

13 It provided for the disarmament and demobilization of RENAMO fighters, the integration of some into the military,
and an amnesty for acts of violence by RENAMO. Vines, “Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO’s Return…,” op. cit.
14 AIM, “Dhlakama Again Threatens “parallel Government,” December 31, 2014, “Dhlakama Threatens Violence, If
Elections Are Validated,” December 31, 2014, “Dhlakama Threatens Secessionist Government,” December 5, 2014,
“Renamo Threatens Protests Against Election Results,” January 5, 2015; among others
15 The conflict also prompted thousands of Mozambicans to flee to Malawi as refugees. Human Rights Watch
(hereinafter, HRW), “The Next One to Die”: State Security Force and Renamo Abuses in Mozambique, January 12,
2018, and “Mozambique: Mass Flight Over Reported Army Abuses,” February 22, 2016.
16 Africa Confidential, “My Enemy’s Enemy,” May 2, 2014, “Spoils for All, Please,” May 10,2013, “Frelimo May
Compromise,” September 6 2013, “A Shot at Devolution,” March 6, 2015, and “How Dhlakama and the Peace Talks
Were Ambushed,” October 16, 2015; and Joseph Hanlon, “Renamo Allowed to Keep an Army Until After Elections,”
No. 250, April 7, 2014, “Renamo Renews Attacks But Agrees Talks About Talks,” No. 321, May 19, 2016,
Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, among other articles from these and other sources.
17 The new system, which delegates some powers to local governments but reserves many to the central government, is
to come into effect for cities and provinces with the 2019 elections and for district assemblies with the 2024 elections.
Until then, under a RENAMO-government compromise, the government is to consult with governors regarding district
executive appointments. Joseph Hanlon/CIP, 2018 Local Elections, Mozambique Political Process Bulletin
(hereinafter, MPPB), No 28, May 26, 2018 and Hanlon, Mozambique News Reports & Clippings No. 412, May 23,
2018; and AIM, “Constitutional Amendments Definitively Approved,” May 24, 2018, among others.
18 AIM, “Frelimo Makes Assembly Sitting Conditional on Demilitarisation of Renamo,” June 22, 2018.
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signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on RENAMO military integration and
demobilization.19 Parliament then passed some decentralization laws, and in early August, a plan
for implementing the July military accord was signed. Tensions over RENAMO’s claims of fraud
in the October 2018 local elections slowed the demobilization process, as did late 2018 disputes
over RENAMO integration into the military and police.
2019 Permanent Cease-fire and Peace Agreement
In July 2019, a group of 50 RENAMO fighters began the process of demilitarization,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) at a largely symbolic ceremony at Satunjira, RENAMO’s
wartime headquarters in central Mozambique. The DDR process was conducted by a committee
of government and RENAMO military representatives and foreign military observers, including a
U.S. officer. Six demobilizing RENAMO members handed over weapons. Why more did not turn
in weapons is not clear from news accounts, but this outcome could raise questions over
RENAMO’s commitment to the process if it resulted from a deliberate decision by RENAMO to
defer a more extensive handover of arms.20 DDR began on the same day that the parliament
passed a law providing immunity from prosecution for those accused of crimes related to the
post-2013 armed hostilities between the government and RENAMO.21 On August 1, 2019,
President Nyusi and RENAMO leader Ossufo Momade signed an agreement making the 2016
cease-fire permanent, and on August 6 signed a final peace accord.22 The signing drew
widespread international plaudits. The parliament is to consider the peace accord in late August.
All parties have said they will approve it.23
Successful implementation of the two agreements will require progress on a number of fronts,
including final passage of pending legislation relating to the decentralization of state power and
completion of the DDR process for all of RENAMO’s 5,000-plus fighters.24 Such demobilization
could be hindered by internal RENAMO splits (see below) or if armed RENAMO members’
perceive that they may face threats if they proceed with disarmament. The possible salience of the
latter concern was underscored by RENAMO’s mid-August claim that “dozens” of its members
had “been assaulted by police and members of the ruling Frelimo party across the country” after
the August 6 peace agreement was signed.25

19 It provided for the creation of a joint military affairs commission with technical groups on RENAMO
demobilization, the integration of some RENAMO forces into the military and police, and provisions for monitoring
the accord’s implementation.
20 The foreign observers form an entity called the International Military Component, which includes a U.S. member,
and was established under the July 2018 DDR MOU. Francisco Raiva, “Arranca hoje processo de DDR dos
guerrilheiros da Renamo,” O País, July 29, 2019; AIM, “Demilitarisation of Renamo Begins,” July 30, 2019 and State
Department response to CRS query, July 31, 2019.
21 AIM, “Assembly Passes Amnesty Law,” July 29, 2019.
22 Momade, a RENAMO military official who assumed interim leadership of RENAMO after Dhlakama’s death, was
elected the group’s president in early 2019. AIM, “Ossufo Momade Elected President of Renamo,” January 18, 2019.
23 The peace accord signing was attended by five African heads of state; the European Union's foreign affairs chief,
Federica Mogherini; and Portugal's Foreign Secretary. The signing spurred praise by many governments worldwide.
Manuel Mucari, “‘Peace Here to Stay’ Mozambique President, Opposition Say on Signing Ceasefire,” Reuters, August
1, 2019; Andrew Meldrum, “Mozambique Peace Accord Signed, Paves Way For Elections,” AP, August 6, 2019; and
AIM, “Assembly to Meet in Extraordinary Session,” August 13, 2019, among others.
24 Langelihle Malimela, “Peace Agreement Lowers Risk of Civil War But Fighting Still Likely in Gorongosa
Following Mozambican election,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, August 5, 2019.
25 AFP, “Mozambique's Renamo Says Members Attacked After Peace Deal,” August 16, 2019.
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Other issues could also potentially hinder completion of the peace process. The text of the two
accords has not been publicly released, for instance, and may contain possibly controversial
provisions, and some key issues may be unresolved. The accords—or possibly an informal side
agreement, an “elite bargain” 26— reportedly may provide for the payment of “significant
monetary compensation” to RENAMO leaders.27 Contention over the total amount to be provided
is possible, and the allocation of any such funds within RENAMO could spur disagreement
within the group.
Another matter is the status of RENAMO’s demand that some of its members be integrated into
the State Information and Security Service (SISE). FRELIMO has long opposed such integration.
Some press reports also indicate that RENAMO may not fully disarm until after the 2019
elections and that the government may permit RENAMO to retain a contingent of armed men
until the inauguration of new governors in 2020, after the 2019 elections.28 While RENAMO has
been permitted to maintain an armed unit since 1992, allowing it to continue to do so would be at
odds with the spirit of the 2019 peace accords. Maintenance of an armed unit also could
potentially enable RENAMO to again resort to the threat of violence if it is unsatisfied with the
2019 election process or outcome. While analysts have highlighted such issues, a press outlet that
claims to have seen the text of the peace accord reports that RENAMO has dropped its SISE
demand and that the accord provides for national police to protect Momade, potentially obviating
the rationale for a RENAMO armed unit.29
Another potential hindrance to disarmament—and possibly to RENAMO’s electoral prospects—
are ongoing intra-RENAMO divisions. Such splits emerged in early 2019 when Momade
replaced several top RENAMO civilian and military officials after he was elected president of
RENAMO.30 In June 2019, a group of RENAMO combatants accused Momade—RENAMO’s
2019 presidential candidate—of ethnically centered nepotism over the allocation of internal party
and military integration posts. They also accused him of cooperating with the state intelligence
service and of ordering the execution of two RENAMO officers. They demanded he resign,
threatened to kill him if he did not, and asserted that demobilization would not proceed while he
was leader. 31 The group, whose leaders call themselves the “RENAMO Military Junta,” later
announced a planned a vote on Momade’s removal, criticized the 2019 cease-fire, and reiterated
they would not disarm while Momade remains RENAMO leader. A separate smaller RENAMO
subgroup is also demanding Momade’s departure.32
Recent Elections and Forthcoming 2019 Electoral Contest
General elections were last held in 2014, after tense local elections in 2013, which RENAMO
boycotted. Electoral preparations took place amid armed RENAMO-government clashes, but

26 Alex Vines, Prospects for a Sustainable Elite Bargain in Mozambique Third Time Lucky?, Chatham House, August
2019.
27 Joseph Hanlon, “Secret Peace Accord Signed Yesterday,” Mozambique News Reports and Clippings No. 463,
August 7, 2019.
28 Ibid.; and Manuel Mucari, Emma Rumney, Alistair Smout, “Pact is Reached in Mozambique but Prospects for Peace
Still Uncertain,” Reuters, August 6, 2019
29 Adérito Caldeira, “Ossufo Momade e instalações da Renamo serão protegidas pela PRM,” August 12, 2019.
30 APANEWS, “New Renamo Head Purges Leadership,” February 19, 2019.
31 AFP, “Mozambique Opposition Leader Must Leave or ‘We will kill him’: Group,” June 13, 2019, among others.
32 AIM, “More Renamo Fighers Demand Removal of Momade,” July 1, 2019, “Mozambique: Renamo Dissidents Insist
on Replacing Momade,” August 14, 2019, and “Renamo Dissidents Refuse to Hand Over Weapons,” August 6, 2019,
among others.
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hostilities waned after a pre-vote cease-fire. Because then-President Guebuza was term-limited,
FRELIMO chose as its candidate then-Minister of Defense Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, a longtime party
member from the gas-rich north. Nyusi won the presidency with 57% of the vote—a sharp drop
from Guebuza’s 75% in 2009. Dhlakama won 37%, and MDM leader Simango won 6%.
FRELIMO garnered 144 of 250 seats in parliament, RENAMO, 89, and the MDM, 17.
Despite some local and international criticism of the vote and a reported range of electoral
process irregularities, the results were internationally accepted as generally credible and
confirmed by the constitutional court—although it questioned the vote tabulation process.33
RENAMO rejected the results, boycotted parliament in protest, and demanded the creation of a
joint FRELIMO-RENAMO caretaker government, as well as the appointment of governors,
ministers, and other officials from both parties. FRELIMO rejected these demands and RENAMO
later took its parliamentary seats.34
Local elections in October 2018 were generally peaceful in most of the country, notwithstanding
some electoral violence and procedural irregularities, and allegations of police protection of
FRELIMO supporters involved in violent acts. Prior to the vote, RENAMO threatened to deploy
armed men to stop what it asserted were state efforts to rig the results. After the vote, opposition
parties launched multiple legal appeals, but local courts reportedly rejected nearly all on technical
grounds. RENAMO and the MDM, claiming fraud and irregularities, protested the outcomes in
multiple cities, and RENAMO threatened to halt the peace process, but ultimately did not do so.
As discussed above, the peace process has continued, but remains incomplete.35
National elections are to be held in October 2019. In early August, 23 political parties submitted
lists of proposed parliamentary candidates to the electoral commission, which is now vetting their
eligibility. Among these parties is PODEMOS, a FRELIMO splinter party created in May 2019.36
Some 90% of voting-age adults reportedly registered to vote in spring 2019, but the process
featured indications of possible manipulation by STAE, the election administration secretariat. It
calculated an unusually high adult population in at least two historically pro-FRELIMO provinces
and sent extra registration teams to those areas, while doing the opposite in Zambezia, a
RENAMO stronghold. As a result, registration in several key pro-FRELIMO provinces exceeded
the number of voting-age adults, likely giving FRELIMO nine additional parliamentary seats.
RENAMO appealed in one key province, but its case was thrown out on a technicality.37
RENAMO also accused STAE’s chief of favoring FRELIMO. The government refused to
accredit an EU-backed election monitoring team. The legitimacy of the electoral commission’s
future 2019 decisions had also become a potential election dispute flashpoint, as 9 of its 17

33 AIM, “Mozambique: Elections ‘Partly Free and Fair and Not Very Transparent,’” January 4, 2015; Adriano Nuvunga
“Mozambique’s 2014 Elections: A Repeat of Misconduct, Political Tension and Frelimo Dominance,” Journal of
African Elections (16:2), 2017; Carter Center, Presidential, Legislative, and Provincial Assembly Elections in
Mozambique, 2014; and State Department, “Mozambique,” 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
34 AIM, “Dhlakama Again Threatens to Set Up His Own Government,” December 23, 2014, “Renamo Boycott Comes
At a Cost,” February 12, 2015, “Assembly Meets, Renamo Boycotts,” January 12, 2015, among others.
35 AIM, “FRELIMO Condemns RENAMO Threats,” October 6, 2018, and “RENAMO Threatens to Break Off Talks
with Government,” October 13, 2018; Joseph Hanlon/Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP), “2018 Local Elections,”
MPPB No. 70, October 21, 2018; and other MPPB 2018 election coverage.
36 AIM, “26 Parties Deliver Lists of Candidates,” August 2, 2019.
37 Joseph Hanlon/CIP, “2019 General Elections,” MPPB No. 32, June 11, 2019, and prior editions; AIM, “Renamo
Vows to Use All Legal Means to Overturn Gaza Voter Registration,” July 15, 2019, and “CNE Sticks To Its Gaza
Figures, Refuses To Comment On Contradiction With Official Statistics,” July 19, 2019; and Liesl Louw-Vaudran,
“Mozambique's Electoral Commission Should Do the Right Thing,” Institute for Security Studies, July 25, 2019.
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members’ terms had nominally expired, but in late July the parliament extended the tenure of all
members until April 2020.38
Violent Islamist Extremism
Mozambique faces a growing security threat that is separate and distinct from the RENAMO-
state conflict. Since October 2017, members of an Islamist extremist group have carried out many
attacks in mostly Muslim coastal districts of Cabo Delgado Province, adjacent to Tanzania. The
group is known as locally as “Al Shabaab” (“the youth” in Arabic, and also the name of a
separate Al Qaeda-linked Somali group) and as Ansar al Sunnah (“Defenders of the Sunnah”
[Islamic prophetic tradition]) or Al Sunnah wa Jama’ah (ASWJ, “Adherents of the Sunnah”).39
The group, whose leadership and aims remain opaque, has targeted police stations, other state
facilities and personnel, and local civilians—along with contractors working for the U.S.-based
energy firm Anadarko. ASWJ attackers have raided provisions and arms and used arson to cause
extensive destruction to village buildings and crops. They often employ crude weapons, notably
machetes, but also guns and explosives and have reportedly killed more than 300 people—often
by beheading—spurring population displacements. Group members often reportedly target those
they view as cooperating with the state.40
Information on the group is limited and contested, as access to the affected area by journalists and
researchers has been curtailed by insecurity largely viewed as attributable to the group and by
systemic state obstruction and harassment of journalists in the area. The group may include
members of a violent Islamist Tanzanian movement and may have ties to the potentially Islamic
State (IS)-linked central African Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) group in central Africa; several
reported ADF members from Uganda with alleged links to ASWJ have been arrested in
Mozambique. In May 2018, a group of putative ASWJ members posted a social media video
stating that they planned to pledge allegiance to IS, which in June 2019 claimed an attack in
Mozambique.41
ASWJ was reportedly formed in 2014 by two or more local Islamists, some of who may have
received military training abroad, and foreign African Islamist extremists.42 It may also have roots
in a group formed by dissidents from the state-affiliated Islamic Council who formed a group
called Ansar al Sunna in the late 1990s. The group generally does not claim its attacks and has

38 AIM, “Renamo Demands Sacking of STAE Director,” April 24, 2019, “RENAMO Tells CNE Head: Sack STAE
Director, Problems Worst in Renamo Zones,” May 8, 2019, “Renamo Accuses, STAE Denies,” May 29, 2019, and
“Assembly Changes Law on CNE,” July 30, 2019.
39 The two Al Shabaab groups do not have publicly stated formal ties. Various transliterations exist for the group’s
latter names, which may have origins with preexisting Islamic groups with potential ties to ASWJ. Eric Morier-
Genoud, “Tracing the History of Mozambique’s Mysterious and Deadly Insurgency,” The Conversation, February 18,
2019; and Liazzat Bonate, “Why the Mozambican Government’s Alliance with the Islamic Council of Mozambique
Might Not End the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado,” Zitamar News, June 14, 2019, among others.
40 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); CRS communication with Zitamar News, June 20, 2019;
and news wire accounts of attacks.
41 The ADF, an armed group of Ugandan origin now primarily active in eastern DRC, advocates radical Islamist goals,
but local ethnic and politics factors also strongly inform its actions. European Institute of Peace, The Islamic State in
East Africa, 2018; and Caleb Weis, “Islamic State Claims First Attack in Mozambique,” June 4, 2019, and “Analysis:
Islamic State Claims in the DRC,” May 30, 2019, both in The Long War Journal; and Congo Research Group, Inside
the ADF Rebellion: A Glimpse into the Operations of Democratic Republic of Congo’s Secretive Jihadist Group, 2018.
42 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Yussuf Adam “The Emergence of Violent Extremism in Northern Mozambique,”
March 25, 2018, Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).
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issued few statements about its goals. Some researchers report that the group espouses jihad
(armed struggle against perceived enemies of Islam), the creation of a Sharia (Islamic law)-based
state, and rejection of state institutions and services (e.g., education, taxation, and voting).43 Its
ideas may be influenced by foreign Islamist ideologies, and by trade and social ties to the Swahili
Coast, a cultural-linguistic and religious region extending northward to southern Somalia.44 Some
accounts suggest that the group has been influenced, in particular, by Sheikh Aboud Rogo
Mohammed, a Kenyan preacher whose Swahili language teachings circulated widely in East
Africa. Rogo, who was subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions for supporting Somalia’s Al Shabaab,
was assassinated in 2012.45
ASWJ members reportedly initially proselytized locally to advance their beliefs and build a base
of adherents, and later employed a mix of payments and coercion to recruit. Their activities
attracted a mix of local opposition, including from the provincial officials of the national Islamic
Council—and local support.46 ASWJ reportedly has provided business loans and employment to
locals in exchange for fealty to the group. Poor young males with limited education appear to be
key targets, and ASWJ may sponsor the Islamic education abroad of some.47
Some analysts contend that ASWJ, like many African Islamist armed groups, largely comprises
disaffected youth who may be influenced by Islamist ideology but are driven primarily by anger
over local grievances (e.g., economic disparities, limited or poor state services, and high
unemployment). Other notably intense sources of local anger that the group may exploit include
the loss of local agricultural and fishing livelihoods, the seizure of land by local and state elites,48
and nontransparency and corruption in compensation processes associated with the growth of the
natural gas and gemstone mining industries.49 Other local sources of local tension are rivalries,
including over land and political party affiliation, between the mostly Catholic Makonde and
mostly Muslim Mwani people, among other local ethnic groups.50

43 Saide Habibe, Salvador Forquilha, João Pereira, Radicalização Islâmica No Norte de Moçambique: O Caso da
Mocímboa da Praia, May 23, 2018; Simone Haysom, Where Crime Compounds Conflict: Understanding Northern
Mozambique’s Vulnerabilities, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018; Eric Morier-Genoud,
“Mozambique’s Own Version of Boko Haram is Tightening Its Deadly Grip,” The Conversation, June 11, 2018;
Gregory Pirio, et al., “The Emergence …,” op. cit.; and multiple presenters at Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) conference, Understanding Extremism in Northern Mozambique, June 6, 2019, among others.
44 Bonate, “Why the Mozambican ...,” op. cit.
45 Gregory Pirio, Robert Pittelli, and Yussuf Adam “The Many Drivers Enabling Violent Extremism in Northern
Mozambique,” ACSS, May 20, 2019; Gregory Pirio, et al., “The Emergence …,” op. cit.; Habibe, et al., Radicalização
Islâmica…, op cit; and Haysom, Where Crime …,” op. cit.
46 Gregory Pirio, et al., “The Emergence …” and “The Many Drivers…, both op. cit.; and Haysom, Where Crime …,”
op. cit.
47 Ibid; Habibe et al., Radicalização…; and ExxAfrica, Mozambique: Special Report: Islamist Insurgency Resumes in
Northern Mozambique After Cyclone, May 30, 2019.
48 Mozambican researcher Yussuf Adam sees the group’s action as “a revolt, a peasant uprising … [maybe a] popular
uprising, because they [ASWJ members] are people of the region who feel exploited and discriminated against.” Bruno
Sousa, “Yussuf Adam Nega ‘Jihadismo’ Nos Ataques de Cabo Delgado,” Euronews, May 10, 2018. See also Pirio, et
al.,“The Many Drivers…,”; and Haysom, Where Crime …,” op. cit., among others.
49 Such issues may at times be attributable to local actors and intermediaries of foreign investors, but foreign firms may
be at fault in some instances. A large foreign gemstone-mining firm accused of human rights abuses relating to the
expulsion of locals from its large mining concession recently settled a case brought by hundreds of local victims. Jan
Cronje, “Gemfields Settles R100m Mozambican Claim, Denies Liability,” Fin24, January 29, 2019.
50 Morier-Genoud, “Mozambique’s Own …,” op. cit.; and Habibe, et al., Radicalização…, op. cit.
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Some analysts believe that ASWJ is directly involved in illicit activity that is prevalent in the
region.51 Others suggest that the group does not “not control any major contraband trade” and that
the “illicit economy as a whole provides varied opportunities” exploited by the group, which in
the future could potentially become more deeply involved in illicit trafficking and other
networks.52 Illicit activity in the affected region includes petty corruption (e.g., police and public
services bribery), trafficking of heroin, persons, ivory and other poached wildlife items, gold, and
gemstones, as well as illicit timber trade and an untaxed cross-border trade in consumer goods.
State officials are key reported beneficiaries of such trade.53
State security forces’ heavy-handed, arguably often ineffective responses to ASWJ violence also
appear to have alienated local populations. Security forces reportedly often arrive at attack sites
well after the insurgents have departed and arrest locals whom they identify as linked to the
group, often on dubious grounds. Detainees have been beaten or treated inhumanely and illegally
detained by military forces, or held by police without charges and beyond the legally permitted
period. Some have reported torture, and there are unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial killings by
security forces. Mass arrests, starting after ASWJ’s October 2017 initiation of conflict, have been
followed by mass trials of alleged perpetrators of ASWJ-linked crimes.54
Economy, Development Challenges, and Aid
Mozambique sustained rapid post-civil war growth: GDP grew by an annual average of 8.4%
from 1993, at the end of the war, through 2015. In 2016, however, growth fell to 3.8% from 6.6%
in 2015, and in 2018 has slumped further, to 3.3%. The IMF has attributed this decline to weak
global commodity prices, poor weather conditions, and “the issue of undisclosed loans in the
spring of 2016 and the ensuing freeze in donor support.”55 The RENAMO-government conflict
also may have contributed to the slowdown, and the effects of the two cyclones in 2019 may
further reduce growth in the short- to medium-term.
While Mozambique’s long period of post-civil war growth reduced extreme poverty, poverty
rates generally remain high. In 1996, shortly after the war, 83% of the population lived on less
than $1.90 a day (the international comparative poverty line, as measured in constant 2011
dollars); by 2014 (when last measured) 62.4% did so. Mozambicans have remained among the
world’s poorest people, with an estimated average GDP per capita of $476 in 2018 (current
dollars)—the seventh-lowest globally, and down from a peak of $620 in 2014.56 In addition,
income is unequally distributed.57 Similarly, while multiple social indicators have improved since

51 Habibe, et al., Radicalização…, op. cit.
52 Quote from Haysom, Where Crime … and Pirio, et al., “The Emergence…,” both cited above.
53 Haysom, Where Crime…
54 Human Rights Watch (HRW), Mozambique: Security Forces Abusing Suspected Insurgents, December 4, 2018;
HRW presentation at Center for Strategic and International Studies forum Understanding Extremism in Northern
Mozambique, June 6, 2019; and AIM, “Terrorist Suspects Must Not Be Killed, Says Nyusi,” October 3, 2018, and other
news coverage of the trials.
55 IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2017 Article IV Consultation with Republic of Mozambique,” March 7,
2018; and GDP data from IMF, World Economic Outlook database (hereinafter, WEO), April 2019.
56 The $1.90 a day figure is measured in constant 2011 dollars international dollars, a hypothetical comparative unit of
measurement used to compare purchasing power across countries. GDP data IMF, WEO. Poverty data from World
Bank, World Development Indicators database (hereinafter, WDI).
57 In 2014 (most recent data), 45.5% of income accrued to the top 10% of earners. World Bank, WDI; and Carlos Nuno
Castel-Branco, “Growth, Capital Accumulation and Economic Porosity in Mozambique: Social Losses, Private Gains,”
Review of African Political Economy (41:S1), 2014, inter alia.
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the war (e.g., rates of child and maternal mortality and access to health care and education), they
have advanced from a very low starting point, and many remain poor by regional and global
standards. Mozambique ranked 180th among 189 countries assessed on the 2018 U.N. Human
Development Index (HDI, a comparative statistical composite measure), and is making limited
progress toward achieving most of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.58
Development gains may have remained limited due to a growth pattern in which FDI inflows
have centered on large export-oriented industrial projects (e.g., bauxite smelting, power plants,
mining, large-scale agriculture, and, recently, natural gas development). While such projects have
helped spur high aggregate GDP growth rates, they often have functioned as commercial enclaves
with weak linkages to the broader economy. Many such projects have generated relatively few
permanent jobs or other benefits for the general population, and some have enjoyed state policy
favoritism and tax breaks that tend to benefit project investors, rather than society at large.
Financial gains from such activities have strongly favored politically connected elites involved in
such projects as investor intermediaries, technical experts, regulators, and local business
partners.59 Some megaprojects, such as large mines, have resulted in loss of farmland and
population displacements, sometimes to marginal areas where subsistence farming is difficult.60
Some large projects, however, may be starting to benefit the broader society, as with extractive
sector investment in multi-use infrastructure (e.g., roads and railways).
The disjuncture between the local economy and megaproject activity is significant. Most
Mozambicans, an estimated 86% or more of the work force, make their living in the informal
sector, often as subsistence and cash crop farmers, fishermen, and small-scale manufacturers and
traders. Productivity within this large segment of the economy, however, is constrained by little
access to credit, business training, or technical expertise.61 Youth unemployment is a particular
challenge. Nearly 68% of Mozambicans are age 25 or younger, and many young people from
rural areas, home to 65% of the population in 2017, often gravitate toward cities, where job
growth has not kept up with increasing education and training rates—even though these are low.62
Mozambique’s socioeconomic development gains have remained moderate, despite sizable
inflows of net official development assistance (ODA). Such aid averaged $1.96 billion annually
from 2008 through 2017, making the country the 15th-largest recipient globally in the period,
during which the United States provided an average of $367 million annually (19% of net ODA)
and was the largest bilateral donor.63

58 U.N. Development Program, Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking; and SDG Index and Dashboards Report
2018: Implementing the Goals, Country Profiles Edition, 2018, by Sustainable Development Solutions
Network/Bertelsmann Stiftung [German policy foundation].
59 Orre and Rønning, Mozambique…,” op. cit.; and Lars Buur and Celso M. Monjane, “Elite Capture and the
Development of Natural Resource Linkages in Mozambique,” in Melanie Pichler, et al., (eds.), Fairness and Justice in
Natural Resource Politics (Routledge), 2017, inter alia.
60 HRW, “What is a House without Food?” Mozambique’s Coal Mining Boom and Resettlements, 2013; and Amnesty
International, “Our Lives Mean Nothing”: The Human Cost of Chinese Mining in Nagonha, Mozambique, 2018.
61 Estimates of the sector’s contribution to GDP are scarce, but one put it at 40% in 2012. International Labor
Organization (ILO), ILO Thesaurus and “The ILO in Mozambique,” 2016; and Danish Trade Council for International
Development and Cooperation (DTU), Labour Market Profile 2017 Mozambique.
62 While access to primary education is universal, the completion rate, at 46%, is among the lowest globally. While
35% of students go on to enroll in secondary education, 18% attain at least a lower secondary education. U.S. Census,
International Data Base and CRS calculations; World Bank, WDI; and DTU, Labour Market…, op. cit.
63 Amounts by calendar years, not U.S fiscal years, as reported by Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). Annual U.S. levels ranged between $227 million (2008) to $541 million (2013). OECD, “Net
ODA by Recipients and Donors,” OECD.Stat database, May 2019.
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Investment Climate and Sectoral Trends
Despite some improvements in the ease of doing business, the economy remains constrained by
high transaction costs and taxes, cumbersome regulations and laws, poor transport and other
infrastructure, and corruption (see below). Mozambique scored 16th out of 48 sub-Saharan
African countries assessed in the World Bank Doing Business 2019 survey score, but it scored
135th out of 190 countries globally. Its indicators for starting a business, access to credit, certain
investor protections, and tax payment complexity were notably poor.64
Recent FDI activity has centered on the growing coal sector and natural gas development (see
below). FDI peaked at $6.2 billion in 2013 but has since declined steadily, to $2.3 billion in 2017
(latest data), though levels remain far higher than prior to the discovery of gas. Mozambique is a
top regional FDI destination; it received the sixth-largest FDI inflows in Africa in 2017. Its total
FDI stock is also large; at $37.5 billion in 2017, it was the fourth-largest in Africa. Annual U.S.
FDI into Mozambique from 2013 to 2017 averaged $824 million a year (18% of such FDI).65
Agriculture. Agriculture is the backbone of the domestic economy and plays an indirect role in
ensuring stability, as a source both of incomes and affordable food for urban consumers.66
Mozambique has extensive agricultural land and water resources and favorable agro-climatic
conditions in many areas, though soil quality is often nutrient-poor, and droughts and floods are
frequent.67 In 2017, the sector employed an estimated 72% of the labor force and contributed
about 21% of GDP. The sector is dominated by smallholders (about 90% of producers) but has
attracted more than 400 large commercial investment projects over the past two decades. Such
projects have centered on food production, sugar, tobacco, cotton, cashew nuts, biofuels, and
timber, and attracted at least $6.5 billion in investment between 2002 and 2012. The sector, and
notably agro-processing, remains a key source of FDI opportunities.68
Notwithstanding agriculture’s prominence in the economy and in state economic plans, for years
the sector has reportedly received relatively limited state funding.69 Key challenges include low
productivity rates and diverse constraints (e.g., relating to transport, input and credit access, and
underinvestment in various areas),70 and contested land rights.71 The impacts of large FDI agro-

64 Its World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 2018 Global Competitiveness Index score was similar; it scored 133rd out of
140 countries assessed. World Bank, Doing Business 2019, and WEF, Global Competitiveness Report 2018, 2018. See
also State Department, 2018 Investment Climate Statements: Mozambique, July 19, 2018 and resources linked therein.
65 CRS calculations using data U.N. Conference on Trade and Development data (UNCTAD). UNCTAD, Annex
Tables, World Investment Report 2018, and CRS-UNCTAD communication, June 14, 2019.
66 Mozambique has an urbanization rate of 4.4% (14th highest globally in 2017) and was rocked by urban food riots in
2010 and 2008. World Bank, WDI; and USAID, “Mozambique Country Profile,” Land-Links.org, June 2018.
67 Agricultural land comprises 64% of the national territory. Such land includes arable land (7% of the total land area),
permanent crops (0.4%), and pastures and meadows (the balance). World Bank, WDI; and CIA Factbook.
68 F. Di Matteo and G. C. Schoneveld, Agricultural Investments in Mozambique: An Analysis of Investment Trends,
Business Models, and Social and Environmental Conduct, Center for International Forestry Research, 2016; and
Deloitte/FSD Moçambique, Investment Opportunities in Mozambique Agribusiness Edition, October 2016, inter alia.
69 Joseph Cotterill, “Mozambican Agriculture Needs a Rethink to Break the Cycle of Poverty,” Financial Times,
November 9, 2017; Club of Mozambique/LUSA, “OMR Warns That State Budget Allocation for Agriculture Is
Insufficient-Mozambique,” November 5, 2018; Carolina Milhorance, New Geographies of Global Policy-Making:
South-South Networks and Rural Development Strategies (Routledge), 2018, among others.
70 Joseph Cotterill, “Mozambican Agriculture Needs a Rethink to Break the Cycle of Poverty,” Financial Times,
November 9, 2017; and Club of Mozambique/LUSA, “OMR Warns That State Budget Allocation for Agriculture Is
Insufficient-Mozambique,” November 5, 2018, among others.
71 The state owns all land and allocates it under leases and customary and other land use rights. Smallholder land rights
are vulnerable to capture by state-linked elites, causing conflict between smallholders, the state, and/or agriculture,
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projects have been mixed. Some have been given preferential access to prime land by the state
and/or displaced smallholders, but a number have created jobs, often via smallholder contract
farming involving the provision of technical assistance and inputs. Many also contribute to the
national food supply; farming projects targeting local markets have enjoyed particular success.
Mining. Mozambique is reported to have up to 25.6 billion tons of coal reserves, although the
amount that may be recovered on economically favorable terms may be far smaller. Production
and exports began in 2010 and have risen rapidly, notwithstanding price-induced slump in coal
export volumes in 2016. Mozambique is now Africa’s second-largest coal producer (after South
Africa). Coal exports contributed 45% of all export value in 2017 and are expected to rise.72
Mining of other resources is also growing. Exports of graphite (used in lithium ion batteries),
titanium, and related ores (niobium and tantalum) are increasing: these exports contributed 4% of
export value in 2017. Mozambique has long exported precious stones (3% of exports in 2017) and
has other varied, largely untapped mineral and ore reserves.73
Power Sector. About 27% of Mozambicans had access to electricity in 2017.74 The power sector
is a key focus of FDI and state investment, both for export and local use. Hydropower accounts
for about 81% of installed capacity, but there are several coal, natural gas, and solar electricity
generation projects underway, primarily for industrial and commercial use, and sizable further
generation potential. Key challenges include grid weaknesses, regional domestic access
disparities, poverty (i.e., an inability to pay), and regulatory and policy challenges (e.g., a need
for price, market, and sector financing reforms). In 2017, the World Bank provided $150 million
to upgrade the grid and improve the public utility.75 Mozambique also receives support under the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Power Africa program.
Natural Gas. Mozambique is estimated to have at least 100 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of proved
reserves of natural gas (hereinafter, “gas”), placing it among the top 15 countries in terms of
reserves. Some sources report far higher estimates, and further exploration and assessment is
underway.76 Energy firms are building gas extraction and processing infrastructure to export
output from the main reserves, which were discovered beginning in 2010 in a complex of
offshore gas fields in the Rovuma Basin, a geologic zone in Mozambique’s far north. Such
activity is expected to grow; the IMF has projected that total Rovuma Basin investments may
exceed $100 billion.
U.S-based Anadarko Petroleum leads one international consortium developing the Rovuma
reserves, with production slated to begin in 2024.77 U.S-based ExxonMobil leads development of

logging, and mining firms. USAID, “Mozambique Country Profile…,” op. cit.; Matteo and Schoneveld, op. cit.
72 Metallurgical coal (used in steel-making) makes up about 66% of production; the balance is less valuable thermal
coal used in power generation. International Energy Agency (IEA), Coal Information 2018 and Coal 2018: Analysis
and Forecasts to 2023; and Mozambique Mining Cadastre Portal; Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC),
“Mozambique Exports 2017,” among others.
73 These include iron ore, copper, vanadium, apatite, marble, bentonite, bauxite, kaolin, and gold. OEC, “Mozambique
Exports 2017”; and ITA, Mozambique Country Commercial Guide, 2018, among others.
74 World Bank. WDI.
75 IEA, World Energy Statistics 2018 and Energy Access Outlook 2017; and World Bank, “Mozambique Receives $150
Million from World Bank to Improve Power Distribution,” September 28, 2017.
76 Proved reserves are those recoverable under current economic conditions. U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA), “Mozambique’s Key Energy Statistics,” 2018 and IEA, Natural Gas Information 2018, among others; and IMF,
Country Report No. 16/10, January 2016.
77 Total SA of France, however, may soon become the lead operator in the Anadarko-led zone, as it is slated to acquire
all of Anadarko’s African oil and gas holdings under an ongoing merger between Anadarko and Occidental Petroleum.
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a second area in partnership with Italy’s ENI and several smaller energy firms. An ENI-operated
offshore floating liquefied gas processing and export platform is expected to produce
Mozambique’s first Rovuma exports in 2022. Additional offshore blocks are also being
explored.78 Gas exports are expected to greatly expand public revenues—after the state’s share of
capital development costs are paid off—and fuel rapid GDP growth. The IMF projects a gas-
linked spike in GDP growth from 4% in 2022 to 11.1% in 2024.79 Gas is also forecast to be used
domestically in a variety of industries.80 Since 2004, gas has been exported via a pipeline to South
Africa from two smaller onshore gas fields in central Mozambique. The pipeline also feeds a
power plant in Mozambique.
Natural Gas Development in Northern Mozambique: Challenges and Controversy
Anadarko is developing a large onshore gas liquefaction plant in cooperation with ExxonMobil at a site called the
Afungi LNG Park, along with additional nearby logistics facilities, in the area where the ASWJ extremist group is
active. This multifaceted effort is technically challenging, as it is being built from the ground up in a remote
region.81 This large industrial complex is politically controversial, as its construction requires the displacement of
communities and has spurred speculation in land in adjacent areas. There have been reports of minimally
reimbursed or uncompensated land seizures, associated losses of local traditional livelihoods, and an alleged lack of
promised LNG-related jobs for locals. Determining responsibility for such problems, which have allegedly been
aggravated by local state and business corruption, is difficult. In addition, researchers and journalists report that
the state prevents access to the affected area, and that civil society groups seeking to probe or address such issues
face state obstruction, harassment, and intimidation.82 Anadarko asserts that it is working to prevent and address
such problems and reports that as of early 2019, 5,000 workers—40% locals and 4% foreigners—were working on
pre-plant construction work, including the resettlement vil age.83
Mozambican Government Debt Controversy and U.S. Prosecutions
Beginning in 2013, the government guaranteed a series of allegedly corrupt, off-budget bank
loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) totaling more than $2 billion. It did not report this debt to
the IMF until 2016, well after the loans were revealed in the press. This failure to report violated
its obligations to the IMF and created an ongoing scandal that led some donors to suspend some
aid.84 The funds at issue, loans or securities syndicated by foreign private banks, went to three
SOEs owned by the State Information and Security Service (SISE), the Defense Ministry, and

Reuters, “Algeria to Take Months to Make Final Total Deal Decision,” May 29, 2019, among others
78 ENI, “Eni Completes Sale of 25% Interest in Mozambique Area 4 to ExxonMobil,” December 12, 2017, and “Eni
Begins Construction of the Hull for Coral South Floating LNG Unit,” June 9, 2018, among others.
79 Anadarko, 2018 Annual Report; and IMF, WEO, op. cit.
80 Examples include gas to liquids refining; production of methanol, fertilizer, steel, and power; and agro-processing.
Deloitte, Mozambique’s Economic Outlook: Governance Challenges Holding Back Economic Potential, 2016.
81 ENI, Mozambique: Energy, Society, Sustainability, October 2016; and Aileen Jamieson/Turner & Townsend,
“Momentum Grows in Mozambique Mega Gas Projects, but Multiple Challenges Lie Ahead,” Perspectives, June 2018.
82 Chapter on land acquisitions and the development of Afungi by Padil Salimo, in J. Schubert, et al., Extractive
Industries and Changing State Dynamics in Africa: Beyond the Resource Curse, 1st ed. (Routledge), 2018; Rainforest
Action Network, et al., Mozambique case study in Banking on Climate Change: Fossil Fuel Finance Report Card
2019, and Friends of Earth report cited therein, inter alia.
83 The firm says the village will comprise “homes, religious buildings, schools, [a] medical clinic, recreational
facilities, community buildings and supporting utilities.” On Anadarko’s resettlement, compensation, and livelihood
restoration and social development projects, see Anadarko, Mozambique LNG Project in Detail, August 10, 2018
(quote source), and Fourth-Quarter 2018 Operations Report, February 5, 2019; and AIM, “Armed Attacks Not
Affecting Anadarko,” February 1, 2019.
84 U.S. aid was reviewed, but not suspended. Thea Fourie, “Fitch Downgrades Mozambique’s Credit Risk Rating to
CCC, While Program Aid Partners Suspends Funding,” IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, May 6, 2016, among others.
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other state agencies. The SOEs’ affairs could be kept confidential because technically they were
private and because SISE classified their activities as secret on national security grounds.
SISE ostensibly formed the SOEs—ProIndicus, Mozambique Asset Management (MAM), and
Empresa Moçambicana de Atum (Ematum)—to, respectively, perform coastal surveillance; to
build and maintain shipyards; and to engage in tuna fishing. Ematum reportedly was also to be
used as a channel for off-budget maritime security spending. The SOEs’ business plans were
based on dubious assumptions and the firms pursued few of their ostensible intended purposes.
None turned a profit and all entered credit default, saddling the state with repayment.85
In late 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted three Mozambican officials, an
executive of Privinvest, a foreign shipbuilding firm, and foreign investment bankers whom DOJ
accused of a joint conspiracy “to defraud investors and potential investors” in relation to the
SOEs’ loans. DOJ said the indictees “created the maritime projects” in order to divert parts of the
financing to “pay at least $200 million in bribes and kickbacks to themselves,” state officials, and
others. The loans at issue were provided by Russian state-owned VTB Bank and multinational
investment bank Credit Suisse—and/or syndicated as securities sold by the latter. Indictees
include then-Finance Minister Manuel Chang, a SISE official, and a representative of the office
of then-President Guebuza. They collaborated with two Privinvest officials and three Credit
Suisse employees, all indictees in the case. No employees of VTB Bank were charged.86
DOJ also charged that “to hide from the public and the IMF” the fraud-related “near bankruptcy”
of the SOEs, the indicted bankers proposed an exchange of Mozambican-issued Eurobonds for
Credit Suisse securities sold to fund the EMATUM loan. The state and EMATUM’s investors
accepted the exchange in April 2016. The three SOEs then defaulted on their loans.
After the debts were revealed, the government resisted disclosing further information about the
loans, but was forced to do so as a condition for continuing cooperation with IMF, which has
publicly linked the loans to corruption. The IMF and the World Bank demanded an audit, which
the independent firm Kroll Associates conducted on behalf of Mozambique’s national prosecutor.
The government restricted Kroll’s access to documents, but the firm was able to identify $713
million in apparent deal price inflation and $500 million in unaccounted-for financing.87
Mozambique’s parliament also investigated the loans, and national judicial authorities are
pursuing criminal prosecutions, although local civil society groups have criticized these efforts as
slow and selective.88 Local arrests in the case, including a son of ex-president Guebuza, SISE
officials, and other high-profile figures, began only after the U.S. indictment was issued.
In late 2018, Chang was arrested in South Africa on a U.S. extradition warrant, but South African
officials instead accepted an extradition request from Mozambique. In late May 2019, the
government and its creditors provisionally agreed to restructure the Ematum Eurobond bonds and
$535 million in VTB MAM debts. The case has generated multiple lawsuits, including a

85 Parliamentary Inquiry, Relatorio Final, November 30, 2016; Joseph Hanlon, “Special Report on the Secret $2 Billion
Debt,” Mozambique (359), February 13, 2017; and Department of Justice (DOJ, United States V. Jean Boustani, et al.,
Court Docket 18-CR-681, filed December 19, 2018, Eastern District of New York, among others.
86 The DOJ indictment alleged violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and/or U.S. financial and securities
laws, and bank due diligence and reporting controls. The loans included $535 million for MAM (VTB), $622 million
for ProIndicus (Credit Suisse, partly funded by securities and VTB), and $850 million for Ematum (Credit Suisse
securities-backed loans to Privinvest, an Ematum partner). The indictment uses pseudonyms for the two banks, but
press and IMF reporting make clear that Credit Suisse and VTB Capital, a VTB Bank subsidiary, are the banks at issue.
87 Kroll, Independent Audit Related to Loans Contracted by ProIndicus S.A., EMATUM S.A. and Mozambique Asset
Management S.A., June 23, 2017.
88 Centro de Integridade Pública, “Beatriz Buchilli, Demita-Se!,” January 21, 2019.
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government effort to negate portions of the debt. One indicted banker has pled guilty, and two are
fighting UK extradition to the United States. More legal and financial fallout is possible,
particularly if the government of President Nyusi—the Defense Minister when the loans were
signed—does not effectively ensure that those responsible are held to account, or if indictees in
the case reveal new information or other cases of corruption.
Meanwhile, local and international civil society groups are advocating nonpayment of the debt
and asserting that the debt is “odious,” or morally and legally illegitimate, and thus subject to
repudiation. On June 4, the Mozambique Constitutional Council ruled that the Ematum debt was
illegal, but the implications are unclear.89
Corruption and Crime
The debt scandal is the highest-profile instance of corruption, but it is not unique. Corruption,
both small- and large-scale, is “endemic ... particularly in the police, judiciary and civil service,”
but corruption prosecutions, especially of officials, are rare.90 The country ranked 158 out of 180
countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, and its World
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) rankings also have declined.91 While the IMF
reports that Mozambique has a “relatively comprehensive anti-corruption legislative framework,”
the institutional capacity to implement the framework has remained weak, as has judicial
accountability. Heavy state involvement in multiple economic sectors, and nontransparency in
state processes, contracting, and outcomes, the IMF reports, also create opportunities for
corruption and conflicts of interest, notably in the extractive sector.92
A nexus also reportedly exists between public corruption, organized crime, and large black
markets in goods. Drug trafficking has been reported to fund political party activity, and
corruption may be tied to some political killings.93 The analytical nonprofit Global Financial
Integrity (GFI) reports that illicit financial outflows (i.e., business bribery, tax evasion, money
laundering, and trade and transfer mis-pricing/mis-invoicing) may have contributed as much as
48% of the country’s trade with advanced economies in 2015.94 According to the State
Department, “[f]inancial fraud, especially tax evasion, and drug trafficking,” alongside
“misappropriation of state funds, kidnappings, human trafficking … and wildlife trafficking,”
generate a large share of money laundering. Trafficking is facilitated by a “largely unpatrolled
coastline, porous land borders, and a limited rural law enforcement presence,” making the country
a major corridor for flows of illicit goods.95
Drug trafficking is a notable challenge. Mozambique has long been and remains a transit point for
illicit trafficking of heroin (mostly from South Asia, notably Pakistan, via sea), cocaine (from

89 Bondholders assert that the ruling does not apply to the Eurobonds swapped for Ematum loan securities, while other
observers claim that the opposite. CIP, How to Avoid the Repetition of “Odious” Debts? [conference paper set], April
7, 2019; and Reuters, “Mozambique’s Top Court Says State-Guaranteed Eurobond Illegal,” June 4, 2019, inter alia.
90 Marise Castro, “Mozambique: Recent History,” Africa South of the Sahara 2019 (48th) ed., Routledge, 2018.
91 WGI aggregates third party data sets to measure a variety of governance trends.
92 IMF, Republic of Mozambique: Request for Disbursement…, op. cit. See also State Department, International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 2019, among others.
93 On daily corruption, see Inge Tvedten and Rachi Picardo, “’Goats Eat Where They Are Tied Up’: Illicit and Habitual
Corruption in Mozambique,” Review of African Political Economy (45:158), 2018. On criminal trafficking networks
and political killings, see Haysom, Where Crime … op. cit., inter alia.
94 GFI, Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148 Developing Countries: 2006-2015, 2019, among others.
95 Quotes from State Department, INCSR, op. cit., Vol. II. See also Haysom, Where Crime …, op. cit.
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South America, via air), and precursor chemicals. Most narcotics are reportedly bound for South
Africa and other countries in the region, but some transit onward to Europe and North America.
The heroin trade is especially well developed. The volume trafficked through the country may
total 40 tonnes or more a year and contribute $100 million or more to the local economy.96
Given the weakness of fiscal and anticorruption institutions, some observers have questioned
whether the state has the political will and ability to effectively govern the large expected influx
of gas revenue. The government has taken some steps to address such challenges. For instance, in
2009, Mozambique joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary
international effort to make extractive industry revenue contracts and revenue payment and
receipt data publicly accessible, and to increase related fiscal accountability. The government
plans to require beneficial ownership and business interest transparency, to establish a sovereign
wealth fund to preserve and manage gas income, and to allocate a fixed share of gas revenue to
fund infrastructure development, poverty reduction and economic diversification.97
U.S. Relations and Assistance
Bilateral relations are cordial, although the United States has expressed concern over the hidden
debts affair—a concern underlined by the late 2018 U.S. DOJ indictment of several high-ranking
Mozambican officials in the matter. Stated U.S. policy goals in Mozambique include democratic,
transparent, and inclusive governance; enhanced health and education; sustainable economic
growth, trade, poverty reduction, and investment; and food security and access to nutrition. U.S.
aid programs also have sought to strengthen Mozambique’s ability to respond to transnational
crime, including trafficking in persons, narcotics, and wildlife.98 Efforts to counter the growing
extremist threat in an area that hosts large U.S. natural gas industrial operations is another
growing priority. The United States also is the leading bilateral donor in international efforts to
address humanitarian and rebuilding needs caused by widespread destruction in central and
northern areas hit by massive cyclones in early 2019.99 The State Department projects that
cyclone recovery may require billions of dollars in the years ahead.100
The United States also supports efforts to reach a durable settlement between RENAMO and the
government. It is a member of the ad hoc international contact group on Mozambique, which
helps mediate between the two parties and includes the European Union, China, Botswana, the
UK, Norway, and Switzerland (the group’s chair). The United States also planned to deploy
military observers to join a team that was to monitor implementation of the 2014 cease-fire, but
never did, as the accord fell apart due to RENAMO’s refusal to disarm.
Cooperative bilateral ties were reflected in a five-year, $506.9 million Millennium Challenge
Corporation compact signed in 2007 and completed in 2013. The compact supported increased
access to clean water and sanitation, transportation upgrades, land tenure improvements, and

96 Datapoints from Joseph Hanlon, “The Uberization of Mozambique’s Heroin Trade,” LSE Working Paper, No.18-
190, July 2018. See also Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw, The Heroin Coast: A Political Economy
Along the Eastern African Seaboard, ENACT/OGOIAC, June 2018, and State Department, INCSR, op. cit., Vol. I.
97 Quote from Matthew Hill and Borges Nhamire, “Mozambique Plans Sovereign Wealth Fund to Manage Gas
Revenue,” Bloomberg, March 27, 2019. See also AIM, “Mineral Resources Belong to All Mozambicans – Nyusi,”
March 27, 2019 and EITI, “Mozambique,” December 20, 2018.
98 State Department, FY2020 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (CBJ) and prior CBJs, inter
alia.
99 On this issue, see CRS Report R45683, Cyclones Idai and Kenneth in Southeastern Africa: Humanitarian and
Recovery Response in Brief.
100 State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 14, 2019.
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increased farmer income and production, primarily in northern Mozambique. In addition, a 196-
volunteer member Peace Corps program supports education and health care projects.
According to the FY2020 State Department budget request for Mozambique, U.S. bilateral aid
seeks to address key drivers of instability in northern Mozambique, including ineffective
local governance and government service delivery, and a pervasive lack of jobs, especially
for youth. Assistance will help local institutions to transparently and effectively address
citizens’ basic needs; support the government in providing high quality basic education
services; and catalyze private sector investment to help the large youth population develop
workforce skills essential to participate in emerging economic opportunities.
U.S. nonemergency bilateral development aid totaled nearly $472 million in FY2018
appropriations. Of this, $428 million was for health programs, nearly $40 million for
development activities, $0.7 million for International Military Education and Training (IMET),
and $3.6 million for food aid. The Trump Administration requested $251.7 million in
development aid for Mozambique for FY2019, of which it proposed to allocate 97% to health
programs. While Congress has enacted FY2019 foreign aid appropriations, country allocations—
which the Administration and appropriators negotiate annually—have not yet been finalized. The
FY2020 request is for $403.5 million, of which health aid would compose 98.5% ($397.5
million); $5.6 million would be provided for other development activities and $0.5 million for
IMET.
Health care programs have been the main focus of U.S. aid programs for years. The bulk of
funding has supported HIV/AIDS programming to address Mozambique’s high adult HIV
prevalence rate of 12.5% (2017). Most of this aid has been funded under the Global Health
Program (GHP)-State Department account and administered under the U.S. President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Additional GHP-USAID funds support programs to
combat malaria—the cause of roughly 29% of all deaths and 42% of deaths of children under the
age of five—under the President’s Malaria Initiative. Such funds also support programs to combat
tuberculosis and enhance maternal and child health, family planning and reproductive health, and
nutrition. Until FY2017, agricultural development, mostly under the U.S. Feed the Future (FTF)
initiative, was another priority area for U.S. aid. FTF activities have focused on enhancing
agricultural productivity, improving nutrition, and connecting farmers to markets, notably in
north-central Mozambique in areas with poor nutrition that contain or are near key trade
corridors. Basic education was a key priority in FY2018, with funding at $13.7 million, but
requested funding for education decreased to $3.5 million in FY2019 and $3 million in FY2020.
Aid has also supported good governance programs, with a focus on building the capacity of civil
society groups to engage in policy analysis and advocacy.
Mozambique periodically receives some U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service funding, and USAID
supports a range of wildlife law enforcement capacity building, conservation, and CBNRM
programs. In recent years, USAID has also supported coastal urban city governments’ adaptation
to rising sea levels and regional conservation and management, as in the Limpopo River Basin.
Wildlife-centered programs aim to address widespread wildlife poaching, wildlife trafficking—
both of wildlife from Mozambique and that trafficked through Mozambique to and from other
countries, and the recovery of wildlife populations that in some areas were systematically
depleted by hunting during the civil war. In addition to being a key ivory source country,
Mozambique is a key regional wildlife trafficking transit country, notably of elephant ivory and
rhino horn destined for Asia. Other key species, including lions and other big cats, are also
systematically poached in Mozambique.
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Security Issues
According to the State Department, Mozambique’s government lacks adequate capacity to deal
with the “complexity of violent extremism.”101 The Department is helping the government to
develop a comprehensive counter-extremism approach, including a “holistic security, community
engagement, and communications approach … to address governance and development issues”
while also helping to build the capabilities of Mozambican security forces. Together with other
donor governments, the State Department is working to help foster those outcomes and increase
U.S. counter-extremism program assistance. U.S. government interagency teams and experts have
consulted in Mozambique with state, civil society, academic, and private sector actors to better
understand the drivers of violent extremism and unmet socioeconomic needs and grievances that
may underlie the phenomenon. They have also compiled an “extensive list of recommended
interventions” aimed at countering the growth of extremism and addressing unmet needs.
The State Department nevertheless reports that “there are still significant gaps in our
understanding of the violent extremism affecting northern Mozambique … [including] the extent
of the groups, their motivations, objectives and funding sources.”102 It plans to adjust the U.S.
strategy as knowledge increases. According to State Department Southern African Affairs
Director Stefanie Amadeo, some recommended activities are underway, including
[a] grant program to promote constructive dialogue between local residents and youth,
religious leaders, and security forces in Cabo Delgado province through the Islamic
Council; a baseline assessment and strategic communications program to assist key
stakeholders with more effective youth messaging and outreach; the provision of U.S.
logistics and communications advisors to support the Mozambican government’s efforts;
and programs to build the capacity of civilian law enforcement to engage with affected
communities and investigate suspected acts of terrorism.103
USAID is also funding a $2 million program centered on mitigating drivers of instability and
violent extremism in Cabo Delgado through efforts to increase youth economic and civic
empowerment, foster constructive community-local government engagement, and build local
governments’ capacity to address community and youth priorities.
In addition, in mid-2018, Mozambique became a Partnership for Regional East Africa
Counterterrorism (PREACT) country. PREACT activities have yet to be determined, but may
include participation in regional PREACT events and funding for law enforcement, justice,
military, and civil society programs. PREACT is a multiyear, multisector initiative that supports a
range of counter-extremism programs and efforts to contain and/or disrupt terrorist networks.
Programs range from vocational and educational efforts to counter extremist messaging and
economic inducements to law enforcement, military, and specialized counterterrorism unit
training and capacity-building to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment and
technical assistance.104

101 All direct quotes in this paragraph from remarks as delivered by Stefanie Amadeo, State Department Southern
African Affairs Director, at Understanding Extremism in Northern Mozambique, CSIS, June 6, 2019. Her remarks are
available via video at CSIS’s website. CRS was also provided with a written copy of the remarks.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 State Department response to CRS inquiry, June 14, 2019; and State Department web resources on PREACT.
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International narcotics smuggling through Mozambique is a longstanding U.S. concern.105 In
2017, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) opened an office in Maputo, and it is
currently “developing mechanisms to facilitate future information sharing on money laundering.”
These include a “working relationship” with Mozambique’s Attorney General and National
Criminal Investigations Service (SERNIC), the lead antidrug law enforcement agency, which in
2018 “agreed to establish a joint DEA/SERNIC drug investigative unit to combat transnational
organized crime.” The State Department reports that while a range of weaknesses remain, the
government has shown progress in enforcing anti-money-laundering (AML) laws and
regulations—including by investigating ties between heroin trafficking and official corruption—
and that efforts are under way to establish bilateral AML records-exchange procedures.106
In addition, Mozambique engages in military-to-military cooperation with the U.S. Defense
Department’s Africa Command (AFRICOM), and in early 2019 participated in Cutlass Express
2019, a multination naval exercise. A portion of the exercise focused on combatting illegal
trafficking, maritime piracy, and the interception of illegal fishing vessels in Pemba and offshore
waters near Mozambique’s gas fields.107
Trade
Mozambique is eligible for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA,
Title I, P.L. 106-200, as amended), including textile benefits, but its AGOA exports are limited.
They accounted for less than 1% of an average annual $123 million in total exports to the United
States from 2014 through 2018. U.S. exports to the country averaged $231 million a year during
the same period.108 To help the government increase firms’ use of AGOA, USAID supported
development of a Mozambique AGOA utilization strategy, released in May 2018. Mozambique
hosted the U.S. Corporate Council on Africa’s US-Africa Business Summit in June 2019, which
was attended by a U.S. high-level delegation.109 The U.S. Commercial Service has recently
expanded its presence in Mozambique, in part due to rising U.S. investment in the energy sector.
Outlook
Mozambique may enjoy substantial economic growth after expected gas exports begin in the mid-
2020s, and as coal exports rise, but the government may face significant challenges in effectively
using those resources for the benefit of its people. A range of governance challenges—including
corruption, state institutional weaknesses, and an untested new system of political
decentralization—may continue to hinder socioeconomic development. The still-incomplete
peace process between RENAMO and the government also poses a risk to stability, as does the

105 In 2010, President Obama designated Mozambican businessman Mohamed Bachir Suleman as a drug kingpin under
the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. Department, “Treasury Sanctions Entities Owned By Drug Kingpin
Mohamed Bachir Suleman: Treasury Action Targets Narcotics Trafficking Network in Mozambique, Builds on
President Obama’s Drug Kingpin Identification,” June 1, 2010.
106 Quotes and information in this paragraph from State Department, INCSR, op. cit., Vol. I and Vol. II.
107 State Department, “Chargé d’Affaires Hunt’s Remarks for Cutlass Express 2019 Senior Leaders Seminar,” February
8, 2019; and U.S. Navy, “Exercise Cutlass Express 2019 Begins,” January 29, 2019, and “Ships of Exercise Cutlass
Express 2019,” February 6, 2019, among others.
108 Key Mozambican exports to the United States include precious/semiprecious stones, titanium ores, and nut products.
U.S. exports are diverse, but top products include petroleum products, rail locomotives, aircraft and parts thereof, motor
vehicles, and soy oil. Trade data from U.S. International Trade Commission DataWeb.
109 Delegation members included Deputy Secretary of Commerce Karen Kelly, USAID Administrator Mark Greene
and State Department Assistant Secretary for African affairs Tibor Nagy. Amadeo, CSIS forum June 6, 2019, op. cit.
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geographically limited but extremely brutal extremist violence in the north. The United States is
providing assistance to help the country address these challenges, in addition to continuing to
provide significant amounts of assistance for the health sector. If recent-year aid allocation trends
are maintained, such cooperation is likely to persist in the coming years.

Author Information

Nicolas Cook

Specialist in African Affairs

Disclaimer
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Congressional Research Service
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