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Updated July 11, 2019
Moldova: An Overview
On June 14, 2019, a political crisis in Moldova ended when
After the election, Moldova lacked a new government for
the formerly ruling Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM)
almost three months, while leading parties held coalition
agreed to dissolve the outgoing government in favor of a
negotiations. A political crisis arose on June 8, when the
new, democratically elected coalition. The coalition
Constitutional Court, which observers considered to be
consists of a reform-oriented, Western-leaning alliance,
under the PDM’s influence, issued a series of controversial
ACUM (or “Now”) and the socially conservative, Russian-
rulings pronouncing the newly announced ACUM-Socialist
leaning Party of Socialists, which placed first in Moldova’s
government illegitimate and authorizing then-acting prime
February 2019 elections. The coalition came together to
minister Pavel Filip (of the PDM) to act as president,
unseat the PDM; given the parties’ differing policy
dissolve parliament, and call new elections.
orientations, it is uncertain how long it will last.
Figure 1. Moldova at a Glance
Moldova is one of three post-Soviet states, together with
Ukraine and Georgia, that have sought greater integration
with the West while coping with separatist territories
occupied by Russian forces. Many Members of Congress
have long supported Moldova’s democratic trajectory and
territorial integrity and have called on Russia to respect
Moldova’s sovereignty and to withdraw its military forces.
Rising Discontent
Moldova’s political environment was increasingly
contentious before the recent transition. The PDM gained
power in 2016 after the prior government collapsed amid
fallout from a bank fraud case involving the alleged loss of
some $1 billion, equivalent to more than 12% of Moldova’s
gross domestic product (GDP).
ACUM leaders and many observers contend that the PDM,
Source: Moldova National Bureau of Statistics and IMF (does not
in particular then-party leader and wealthy businessman
include Transnistria). Figure created by CRS.
Vlad Plahotniuc, effectively “captured” Moldova’s state
institutions for personal and party gain. In summer 2018,
For a week, tensions escalated as Moldova had two rival
protestors opposed a court decision to annul a snap mayoral
governments. After parliament approved the ACUM-
election in Chisinau, Moldova’s capital, which had been
Socialist Cabinet, Prime Minister Maia Sandu appealed to
won by Andrei Nastase, who later became one of ACUM’s
Moldova’s civil servants and the international community
two co-leaders (and is now minister of internal affairs).
to recognize its authority. PDM leaders, including Filip and
Plahotniuc, insisted on the legality of the court’s rulings;
Political Transition
they also claimed the Socialists had accepted illegal
Elections to Moldova’s 101-seat parliament were held on
financing from Russia and accused Russia of plotting to
February 24, 2019 (for results, see Table 1). International
establish dominance over Moldova by taking advantage of
observers said the elections were competitive but “tainted
the inexperienced ACUM.
by allegations of pressure on public employees, strong
indications of vote buying, and the misuse of state
Facing unified international discontent, the PDM backed
resources.”
down on June 14 and Plahotniuc left Moldova (temporarily,
he says). Another politician that reportedly fled was Ilan
Table 1. February 2019 Parliamentary Elections
Shor, a regional mayor and head of another party to enter
parliament. Shor is appealing a seven-year prison sentence
Party List Single Mandate Total
Party
Seats (%)
Seats
Seats
for his alleged role in Moldova’s $1 billion bank fraud.
Party of Socialists
18 (31%)
17
35
After the transition, the Constitutional Court repealed its
ACUM
14 (27%)
12
26
controversial rulings and the court’s chairman resigned. The
PDM
13 (24%)
17
30
court’s other judges followed suit, after the Council of
Shor Party
5 (8%)
2
7
Europe’s Venice Commission, an international legal
Independents
—
3
3
advisory body, issued an opinion that found that conditions
for dissolving parliament “clearly did not exist.”
Source: Central Election Commission of the Republic of Moldova.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Moldova: An Overview
Political Outlook
Foreign Policy
Prime Minister Sandu’s government states it will seek to
Moldova has pursued a pro-Western foreign policy for
restore the rule of law and reform the political system. Her
many years, although a sizeable number of Moldovans
Cabinet includes economic and foreign policy professionals
support a closer relationship to Russia. Unlike the similarly
who have been educated or worked abroad (Sandu worked
pro-Western Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova is a
at the World Bank and served as Moldova’s Minister of
constitutionally neutral state. Moldova does not aspire to
Education). The government seeks closer engagement with
join NATO but maintains close relations with the alliance
the European Union (EU) and the United States.
and, especially, NATO member Romania. Moldovans are
related to Romanians by ethnicity and language; at least
Prime Minister Sandu acknowledges the ACUM-Socialist
half a million Moldovans hold Romanian citizenship.
coalition is not a “natural partnership.” She suggests
ACUM has united temporarily with the Socialists to combat
The main framework for EU-Moldova relations is their
corruption and restore the rule of law. For now, President
Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2016
Igor Dodon has called for the Socialists to set aside their
and includes a free-trade agreement. The EU also provides
differences with ACUM and work as “a united team” to
Moldovans with visa-free travel. In November 2018, the
implement needed reforms. As part of the coalition
EU indefinitely suspended a €100 million macro-financial
agreement, President Dodon and the Socialists have control
program, which had been conditional on respect for
of the security, defense, and conflict resolution portfolios.
“effective democratic mechanisms.” The EU has pledged to
renew financial assistance to the Moldovan government,
How long the two parties will be able to govern in tandem
pending implementation of agreed-upon reforms.
given differing policy orientations remains to be seen. It is
uncertain whether the Sandu government will investigate
Looming over Moldova’s democratic political transition,
PDM accusations of illicit Russian financial support to the
and of interest to many in Congress, is the question of
Socialists.
Russia’s influence and intentions. During Moldova’s crisis,
Western and Russian positions were aligned, which
Transnistrian Conflict
observers considered unusual given their adversarial
Since becoming independent in 1991, Moldova has coped
relations. For many, it is difficult to imagine Russia
with the secession of Transnistria, a Russian-backed
standing aside if ACUM appears successful in its efforts to
territory with more than 10% of the country’s population
lead Moldova into a European community of democratic
and a substantial but faltering industrial base. Despite its
and rule-of-law based states.
separatist status, Transnistria has economic relations with
Economy
the EU, the destination for more than half of its exports.
Moldova is a relatively poor country, although it has made
“significant progress in reducing poverty and promotin
Russia stations approximately 1,500-2,000 forces in
g
inclusive growth,” according to the World Bank. Moldova’s
Transnistria, a few hundred of which Moldova accepts as
peacekeepers. In 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled that
annual GDP growth has averaged around 4.3% since 2010
Russia’s troop presence was unconstitutional and
and is forecast to grow 3.5%-4% in 2019 and 2020.
parliament adopted a declaration calling on Russia to
Agriculture and agro-processing make up approximately
withdraw. In 2018, the U.N. General Assembly passed a
one-third of GDP and one-third of Moldova’s labor force.
resolution calling on Russia to withdraw its troops
Moldova also depends on labor remittances, which have
“unconditionally and without further delay.”
totaled almost 20% of GDP over the past five years.
In 2018, Moldova’s top-five merchandise trading partners
A political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict remains
distant. The Moldovan government supports a “special
were Romania (18%), Russia (11%), Germany (8%), Italy
status” for Transnistria
(8%), and Ukraine (8%). As a whole, the EU accounted for
within Moldova, but the Russia-
56% of Moldova’s total trade and 70% of its exports.
backed Transnistrian authorities have resisted agreement.
U.S. Relations
The conflict-resolution process operates in a “5+2” format
The U.S. State Department welcomed Moldova’s “peaceful
under the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and
transfer of power” and expressed a commitment “to
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with the OSCE, Russia,
working with all Moldovans as they build a more
and Ukraine as mediators and the EU and the United States
prosperous and democratic future.” In recent years, U.S.
as observers. In 2016, Chisinau and Transnistria committed
assistance to Moldova has grown: $45 million in FY2016,
“to engage in a substantive, result-oriented dialogue”
$66 million in FY2017, and $74 million in FY2018.
focused on a set of practical issues and confidence-building
measures known as the “package of eight.” Since then, the
In 2018, during the 115th Congress, parallel resolutions
sides have resolved several issues related to transit,
were introduced in the House and Senate to support
education, and agriculture.
Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as
an enhanced U.S.-Moldova partnership (H.Res. 745, S.Res.
The EU supports conflict management through its Border
629).
Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM).
EUBAM seeks to help the two countries combat
Cory Welt, Specialist in European Affairs
transborder crime, facilitate trade, and resolve the conflict
over Transnistria, which shares a long border with Ukraine.
IF10894
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Moldova: An Overview
Disclaimer
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