Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated June 21, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44972

Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The FFG(X) program is a Navy program to build a class of 20 guided-missile frigates (FFGs).
The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the next 18 at a rate of two per year in
FY2021-FY2029, and the 20th in FY2030. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests
$1,281.2 million for the procurement of the first FFG(X). The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission
shows that subsequent ships in the class are estimated by the Navy to cost roughly $900 million
each in then-year dollars.
The Navy intends to build the FFG(X) to a modified version of an existing ship design—an
approach called the parent-design approach. The parent design could be a U.S. ship design or a
foreign ship design. At least four industry teams are reportedly competing for the FFG(X)
program. Two of the teams are reportedly proposing to build their FFG(X) designs at the two
shipyards that have been building Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) for the Navy—Austal USA of
Mobile, AL, and Fincantieri/Marinette Marine (F/MM) of Marinette, WI. The other two teams are
reportedly proposing to build their FFG(X) designs at General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works, of
Bath, ME, and Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS.
On May 28, 2019, it was reported that a fifth industry team that had been interested in the
FFG(X) program had informed the Navy on May 23, 2019, that it had decided to not submit a bid
for the program. This fifth industry team, like one of the other four, reportedly had proposed
building its FFG(X) design at F/MM.
The Navy plans to announce the outcome of the FFG(X) competition in July 2020.
The FFG(X) program presents several potential oversight issues for Congress, including the
following:
 whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2020 funding request for the
program;
 whether the Navy has appropriately defined the cost, capabilities, and growth
margin of the FFG(X);
 the Navy’s intent to use a parent-design approach for the FFG(X) program rather
than develop an entirely new (i.e., clean-sheet) design for the ship;
 cost, schedule, and technical risk in the FFG(X) program;
 whether any additional LCSs should be procured in FY2020 as a hedge against
potential delays in the FFG(X) program;
 the potential industrial-base impacts of the FFG(X) for shipyards and supplier
firms;
 whether to build FFG(X)s at a single shipyard, as the Navy’s baseline plan calls
for, or at two or three shipyards; and
 the potential impact on required numbers of FFG(X)s of a possible change in the
Navy’s surface force architecture.

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Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report provides background information and discusses potential issues for Congress
regarding the Navy’s FFG(X) program, a program to procure a new class of 20 guided-missile
frigates (FFGs). The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,281.2 million for the
procurement of the first FFG(X).
The FFG(X) program presents several potential oversight issues for Congress. Congress’s
decisions on the program could affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the
shipbuilding industrial base.
This report focuses on the FFG(X) program. A related Navy shipbuilding program, the Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) program, is covered in detail in CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Other CRS
reports discuss the strategic context within which the FFG(X) program and other Navy
acquisition programs may be considered.1
Background
Navy’s Force of Small Surface Combatants (SSCs)
In discussing its force-level goals and 30-year shipbuilding plans, the Navy organizes its surface
combatants into large surface combatants (LSCs), meaning the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers,
and small surface combatants (SSCs), meaning the Navy’s frigates, LCSs, mine warfare ships,
and patrol craft.2 SSCs are smaller, less capable in some respects, and individually less expensive
to procure, operate, and support than LSCs. SSCs can operate in conjunction with LSCs and other
Navy ships, particularly in higher-threat operating environments, or independently, particularly in
lower-threat operating environments.
In December 2016, the Navy released a goal to achieve and maintain a Navy of 355 ships,
including 52 SSCs, of which 32 are to be LCSs and 20 are to be FFG(X)s. Although patrol craft
are SSCs, they do not count toward the 52-ship SSC force-level goal, because patrol craft are not
considered battle force ships, which are the kind of ships that count toward the quoted size of the
Navy and the Navy’s force-level goal.3
At the end of FY2018, the Navy’s force of SSCs totaled 27 battle force ships, including 0 frigates,
16 LCSs, and 11 mine warfare ships. Under the Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049)
shipbuilding plan, the SSC force is to grow to 52 ships (34 LCSs and 18 FFG[X]s) in FY2034,
reach a peak of 62 ships (30 LCSs, 20 FFG[X]s, and 12 SSCs of a future design) in FY2040, and
then decline to 50 ships (20 FFG[X]s and 30 SSCs of a future design) in FY2049.

1 See CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke; CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for
Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke; and CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Michael Moodie.
2 See, for example, CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 For additional discussion of battle force ships, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress

U.S. Navy Frigates in General
In contrast to cruisers and destroyers, which are designed to operate in higher-threat areas,
frigates are generally intended to operate more in lower-threat areas. U.S. Navy frigates perform
many of the same peacetime and wartime missions as U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers, but
since frigates are intended to do so in lower-threat areas, they are equipped with fewer weapons,
less-capable radars and other systems, and less engineering redundancy and survivability than
cruisers and destroyers.4
The most recent class of frigates operated by the Navy was the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class
(Figure 1). A total of 51 FFG-7 class ships were procured between FY1973 and FY1984. The
ships entered service between 1977 and 1989, and were decommissioned between 1994 and 2015.
Figure 1. Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) Class Frigate

Source: Photograph accompanying Dave Werner, “Fighting Forward: Last Oliver Perry Class Frigate
Deployment,” Navy Live, January 5, 2015, accessed September 21, 2017, at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2015/01/05/
fighting-forward-last-oliver-perry-class-frigate-deployment/.
In their final configuration, FFG-7s were about 455 feet long and had full load displacements of
roughly 3,900 tons to 4,100 tons. (By comparison, the Navy’s Arleigh Burke [DDG-51] class
destroyers are about 510 feet long and have full load displacements of roughly 9,300 tons.)
Following their decommissioning, a number of FFG-7 class ships, like certain other

4 Compared to cruisers and destroyers, frigates can be a more cost-effective way to perform missions that do not require
the use of a higher-cost cruiser or destroyer. In the past, the Navy’s combined force of higher-capability, higher-cost
cruisers and destroyers and lower-capability, lower-cost frigates has been referred to as an example of a so-called high-
low force mix. High-low mixes have been used by the Navy and the other military services in recent decades as a
means of balancing desires for individual platform capability against desires for platform numbers in a context of
varied missions and finite resources.
Peacetime missions performed by frigates can include, among other things, engagement with allied and partner navies,
maritime security operations (such as anti-piracy operations), and humanitarian assistance and disaster response
(HA/DR) operations. Intended wartime operations of frigates include escorting (i.e., protecting) military supply and
transport ships and civilian cargo ships that are moving through potentially dangerous waters. In support of intended
wartime operations, frigates are designed to conduct anti-air warfare (AAW—aka air defense) operations, anti-surface
warfare (ASuW) operations (meaning operations against enemy surface ships and craft), and antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) operations. U.S. Navy frigates are designed to operate in larger Navy formations or as solitary ships. Operations
as solitary ships can include the peacetime operations mentioned above.
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decommissioned U.S. Navy ships, have been transferred to the navies of U.S. allied and partner
countries.
FFG(X) Program
Meaning of Designation FFG(X)
In the program designation FFG(X), FF means frigate,5 G means guided-missile ship (indicating a
ship equipped with an area-defense AAW system),6 and (X) indicates that the specific design of
the ship has not yet been determined. FFG(X) thus means a guided-missile frigate whose specific
design has not yet been determined.7
Procurement Quantity and Schedule
Procurement Quantity
The Navy wants to procure 20 FFG(X)s, which in combination with the Navy’s planned total of
32 LCSs would meet the Navy’s 52-ship SSC force-level goal. A total of 35 (rather than 32) LCSs
have been procured through FY2019, but Navy officials have stated that the Navy nevertheless
wants to procure 20 FFG(X)s.
The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Analysis (FSA) that the
Navy conducted in 2016. The Navy conducts a new or updated FSA every few years, and it is
currently conducting a new FSA that is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy
officials have stated that this new FSA will likely not reduce the required number of small surface
combatants, and might increase it. Navy officials have also suggested that the Navy in coming
years may shift to a new surface force architecture that will include, among other things, a larger
proportion of small surface combatants.
Figure 2 shows a Navy briefing slide depicting the potential new surface force architecture, with
each sphere representing a manned ship or an unmanned surface vehicle (USV). Consistent with
Figure 2, the Navy’s 355-ship goal, reflecting the current force architecture, calls for a Navy with
twice as many large surface combatants as small surface combatants. Figure 2 suggests that the
potential new surface force architecture could lead to the obverse—a planned force mix that calls

5 The designation FF, with two Fs, means frigate in the same way that the designation DD, with two Ds, means
destroyer. FF is sometimes translated less accurately as fast frigate. FFs, however, are not particularly fast by the
standards of U.S. Navy combatants—their maximum sustained speed, for example, is generally lower than that of U.S.
Navy aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. In addition, there is no such thing in the U.S. Navy as a slow frigate.
6 Some U.S. Navy surface combatants are equipped with a point-defense AAW system, meaning a short-range AAW
system that is designed to protect the ship itself. Other U.S. Navy surface combatants are equipped with an area-
defense AAW system, meaning a longer-range AAW system that is designed to protect no only the ship itself, but other
ships in the area as well. U.S. Navy surface combatants equipped with an area-defense AAW system are referred to as
guided-missile ships and have a “G” in their designation.
7 When the ship’s design has been determined, the program’s designation might be changed to the FFG-62 program,
since FFG-61 was the final ship in the FFG-7 program. It is also possible, however, that the Navy could choose a
different designation for the program at that point. Based on Navy decisions involving the Seawolf (SSN-21) class
attack submarine and the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer, other possibilities might include FFG-1000, FFG-
2000, or FFG-2100. (A designation of FFG-21, however, might cause confusion, as FFG-21 was used for Flatley, an
FFG-7 class ship.) A designation of FFG-62 would be consistent with traditional Navy practices for ship class
designations.
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for twice as many small surface combatants than large surface combatants—along with a new
third tier of numerous USVs.8
Figure 2. Navy Briefing Slide on Surface Force Architecture
Each sphere represents a ship or a USV

Source: Il ustration accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy Testing
as NAVSEA Moves Forward with Draft RFP,” USNI News, April 29, 2019. The il ustration was also included as
Slide 2 in a Navy briefing entitled “Designing & Building the Surface Fleet: Unmanned and Small Combatants,” by
Rear Admiral Casey Moton at a June 20, 2019, conference of the American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE).
Notes: Each sphere represents a ship or a USV. LSC means large surface combatant (i.e., cruiser or destroyer);
SSC means small surface combatant (i.e., frigate or Littoral Combat Ship); LUSV means large USV; MUSV means
medium USV. Spheres with multiple colors (the LSCs and SSCs) are ships equipped with a combination of
sensors (green), command and control (C2) equipment (red), and payloads (including weapons) (blue). Spheres
with single colors (the USVs) are equipped with either payloads (blue) or sensors (green).
Procurement Schedule
The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the next 18 at a rate of two per year in
FY2021-FY2029, and the 20th in FY2030. Under the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission, the
first FFG(X) is scheduled to be delivered in July 2026, 72 months after the contract award date of
July 2020.

8 For additional discussion of this possible change in surface force architecture, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Ship Capabilities, Design, and Crewing
Ship Capabilities and Design
As mentioned above, the (X) in the program designation FFG(X) means that the design of the
ship has not yet been determined. In general, the Navy envisages the FFG(X) as follows:
 The ship is to be a multimission small surface combatant capable of conducting
anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), and electromagnetic warfare (EMW) operations.
 Compared to an FF concept that emerged under a February 2014 restructuring of
the LCS program, the FFG(X) is to have increased AAW and EMW capability,
and enhanced survivability.
 The ship’s area-defense AAW system is to be capable of local area AAW,
meaning a form of area-defense AAW that extends to a lesser range than the area-
defense AAW that can be provided by the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers.
 The ship is to be capable of operating in both blue water (i.e., mid-ocean) and
littoral (i.e., near-shore) areas.
 The ship is to be capable of operating either independently (when that is
appropriate for its assigned mission) or as part of larger Navy formations.
Given the above, the FFG(X) design will likely be larger in terms of displacement, more heavily
armed, and more expensive to procure than either the LCS or an FF concept that emerged from
the February 2014 LCS program restructuring.
Figure 3 shows a January 2019 Navy briefing slide summarizing the FFG(X)’s planned
capabilities. For additional information on the FFG(X)’s planned capabilities, see Appendix A.9
Dual Crewing
To help maximize the time that each ship spends at sea, the Navy reportedly is considering
operating FFG(X)s with dual crews—an approach, commonly called blue-gold crewing, that the
Navy uses for operating its ballistic missile submarines and LCSs.10

9 RFI: FFG(X) - US Navy Guided Missile Frigate Replacement Program, accessed August 11, 2017, at
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=d089cf61f254538605cdec5438955b8e&
_cview=0.
10 See, for example, David B. Larter, “The US Navy Is Planning for Its New Frigate to Be a Workhorse,” Defense
News, January 30, 2018.
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Figure 3. Navy Briefing Slide on FFG(X) Capabilities
Presented at Surface Navy Association National Symposium, January 2019

Source: Presentation by Dr. Reagan Campbell, “FFG(X) Update, National Symposium—Surface Navy
Association,” January 15, 2019, briefing slide 3, posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required), January 22,
2019.
Procurement Cost
The Navy wants the follow-on ships in the FFG(X) program (i.e., ships 2 through 20) to have an
average unit procurement cost of $800 million to $950 million each in constant 2018 dollars.11

11 See Sam LaGrone, “NAVSEA: New Navy Frigate Could Cost $950M Per Hull,” USNI News, January 9, 2018;
Richard Abott, “Navy Confirms New Frigate Nearly $1 Billion Each, 4-6 Concept Awards By Spring,” Defense Daily,
January 10, 2018: 1; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Navy Says It Can Buy Frigate For Under $800M: Acquisition Reform
Testbed,” Breaking Defense, January 12, 2018; Lee Hudson, “Navy to Downselect to One Vendor for Future Frigate
Competition,” Inside the Navy, January 15, 2018; Richard Abott, “Navy Aims For $800 Million Future Frigate Cost,
Leveraging Modularity and Commonality,” Defense Daily, January 17, 2018: 3. The $800 million figure is the
objective cost target; the $950 million figure is threshold cost target. Regarding the $950 million figure, the Navy states
that
The average follow threshold cost for FFG(X) has been established at $950 million (CY18$). The
Navy expects that the full and open competition will provide significant downward cost pressure
incentivizing industry to balance cost and capability to provide the Navy with a best value solution.
FFG(X) cost estimates will be reevaluated during the Conceptual Design phase to ensure the
program stays within the Navy’s desired budget while achieving the desired warfighting
capabilities. Lead ship unit costs will be validated at the time the Component Cost Position is
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The Navy reportedly believes that the ship’s cost can be held closer to the $800 million figure.12
By way of comparison, the Navy estimates the average unit procurement cost of the three LCSs
procured in FY2019 at $523.7 million (not including the cost of each ship’s embarked mission
package), and the average unit procurement cost of the three DDG-51 class destroyers that the
Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020 at $1,821.0 million.
As shown in Table 2, the Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,281.2 million for the
procurement of the first FFG(X). The lead ship in the program will be considerably more
expensive than the follow-on ships in the program, because the lead ship’s procurement cost
incorporates most or all of the detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the
class. (It is a traditional Navy budgeting practice to attach most or all of the DD/NRE costs for a
new ship class to the procurement cost of the lead ship in the class.) As shown in Table 2, the
Navy’s FY2020 budget submission shows that subsequent ships in the class are estimated by the
Navy to cost roughly $900 million each in then-year dollars over the next few years.
The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of 20 FFG(X)s at
$20,470.1 million (i.e., about $20.5 billion) in then-year dollars, or an average of about $1,023.5
million each. Since the figure of $20,470.1 million is a then-year dollar figure, it incorporates
estimated annual inflation for FFG(X)s to be procured out to FY2030.
Acquisition Strategy
Parent-Design Approach
The Navy’s desire to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020 does not allow enough time to develop
a completely new design (i.e., a clean-sheet design) for the FFG(X). (The Navy states that using
an unaccelerated acquisition strategy involving a lengthier requirements-evaluation phase and a
clean-sheet design would defer the procurement of the first ship to FY2025.13) Consequently, the
Navy intends to build the FFG(X) to a modified version of an existing ship design—an approach
called the parent-design approach. The parent design could be a U.S. ship design or a foreign ship
design.14

established in 3rd QTR FY19 prior to the Navy awarding the Detail Design and Construction
contract.
(Navy information paper dated November 7, 2017, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs
to CRS and CBO on November 8, 2017.)
The Navy wants the average basic construction cost (BCC) of ships 2 through 20 in the program to be $495 million per
ship in constant 2018 dollars. BCC excludes costs for government furnished combat or weapon systems and change
orders. (Source: Navy briefing slides for FFG(X) Industry Day, November 17, 2017, slide 11 of 16, entitled “Key
Framing Assumptions.”)
12 See, for example, Justin Katz, “FFG(X) Follow-On Ships Likely yo Cost Near $800M, Down from $950M
Threshold,” Inside the Navy, January 21, 2019; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Squeezing Costs Out of GG(X) Program as
Requirements Solidify,” USNI News, January 22, 2019; David B. Larter, “The US Navy’s New, More Lethal Frigate Is
Coming into Focus,” Defense News, January 28, 2019.
13 Source: Slide 3, entitled “Accelerating the FFG(X),” in a Navy briefing entitled “Designing & Building the Surface
Fleet: Unmanned and Small Combatants,” by Rear Admiral Casey Moton at a June 20, 2019, conference of the
American Society of Naval Engineers (ASNE).
14 For articles about reported potential parent designs for the FFG(X), see, for example, Chuck Hill, “OPC Derived
Frigate? Designed for the Royal Navy, Proposed for USN,” Chuck Hill’s CG [Coast Guard] Blog, September 15, 2017;
David B. Larter, “BAE Joins Race for New US Frigate with Its Type 26 Vessel,” Defense News, September 14, 2017;
“BMT Venator-110 Frigate Scale Model at DSEI 2017,” Navy Recognition, September 13, 2017; David B. Larter, “As
the Service Looks to Fill Capabilities Gaps, the US Navy Eyes Foreign Designs,” Defense News, September 1, 2017;
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Using the parent-design approach can reduce design time, design cost, and cost, schedule, and
technical risk in building the ship. The Coast Guard and the Navy are currently using the parent-
design approach for the Coast Guard’s polar security cutter (i.e., polar icebreaker) program.15 The
parent-design approach has also been used in the past for other Navy and Coast Guard ships,
including Navy mine warfare ships16 and the Coast Guard’s new Fast Response Cutters (FRCs).17
No New Technologies or Systems
As an additional measure for reducing cost, schedule, and technical risk in the FFG(X) program,
the Navy envisages developing no new technologies or systems for the FFG(X)—the ship is to
use systems and technologies that already exist or are already being developed for use in other
programs.
Number of Builders
Given the currently envisaged procurement rate of two ships per year, the Navy’s baseline plan
for the FFG(X) program envisages using a single builder to build the ships.18 Consistent with U.S.
law,19 the ship is to be built in a U.S. shipyard, even if it is based on a foreign design. Using a
foreign design might thus involve cooperation or a teaming arrangement between a U.S. builder
and a foreign developer of the parent design. The Navy has not, however, ruled out the option of
building the ships at two or three shipyards. At a December 12, 2018, hearing on Navy readiness
before two subcommittees (the Seapower subcommittee and the Readiness and Management
Support subcommittee, meeting jointly) of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following
exchange occurred:
SENATOR ANGUS KING (continuing):
Talking about industrial base and acquisition, the frigate, which we’re talking about, there
are 5 yards competing, there are going to be 20 ships. As I understand it, the intention now
is to award all 20 ships to the winner, it’s a winner take all among the five. In terms of
industrial base and also just spreading the work, getting the—getting the work done faster,
talk to me about the possibility of splitting that award between at least two yards if not
three.

Lee Hudson, “HII May Offer National Security Cutter for Navy Future Frigate Competition,” Inside the Navy, August
7, 2017; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Beyond LCS: Navy Looks To Foreign Frigates, National Security Cutter,” Breaking
Defense, May 11, 2017.
15 For more on the polar security cutter program, including the parent-design approach, see CRS Report RL34391,
Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke
16 The Navy’s Osprey (MCM-51) class mine warfare ships are an enlarged version of the Italian Lerici-class mine
warfare ships.
17 The FRC design is based on a Dutch patrol boat design, the Damen Stan Patrol Boat 4708.
18 See, for example, Lee Hudson, “Navy to Downselect to One Vendor for Future Frigate Competition,” Inside the
Navy, January 15, 2018.
19 10 U.S.C. 7309 requires that, subject to a presidential waiver for the national security interest, “no vessel to be
constructed for any of the armed forces, and no major component of the hull or superstructure of any such vessel, may
be constructed in a foreign shipyard.” In addition, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes
appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account) typically contains
these provisos: “ ... Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction or
conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign facilities
for the construction of major components of such vessel: Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this
heading shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards.... ”
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SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RICHARD SPENCER:
You bring up an interesting concept. There’s two things going on here that need to be
weighed out. One, yes, we do have to be attentive to our industrial base and the ability to
keep hands busy and trained. Two, one thing we also have to look at, though, is the
balancing of the flow of new ships into the fleet because what we want to avoid is a spike
because that spike will come down and bite us again when they all go through regular
maintenance cycles and every one comes due within two or three years or four years. It
gets very crowded. It’s not off the table because we’ve not awarded anything yet, but we
will—we will look at how best we can balance with how we get resourced and, if we have
the resources to bring expedition, granted, we will do that.20
Block Buy Contracting
As a means of reducing their procurement cost, the Navy envisages using one or more fixed-price
block buy contracts to procure the ships.21
Competing Industry Teams
As shown in Table 1, at least four industry teams are reportedly competing for the FFG(X)
program. Two of the teams are reportedly proposing to build their FFG(X) designs at the two
shipyards that have been building Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) for the Navy—Austal USA of
Mobile, AL, and Fincantieri/Marinette Marine (F/MM) of Marinette, WI. The other two teams are
reportedly proposing to build their FFG(X) designs at General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works
(GD/BIW), of Bath, ME, and Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of
Pascagoula, MS.
As also shown in Table 1, a fifth industry team that had been interested in the FFG(X) program
reportedly informed the Navy on May 23, 2019, that it had decided to not submit a bid for the
program.22 As shown in the table, this fifth industry team, like one of the other four, reportedly
had proposed building its FFG(X) design at F/MM.
Table 1. Industry Teams Reportedly Competing for FFG(X) Program
Industry team leader
Parent design
Shipyard that would build the ships
At least four industry teams, shown below, are reportedly competing for the FFG(X) program
Austal USA
Independence (LCS-2) class LCS design
Austal USA of Mobile, AL
Fincantieri Marine
Italian Fincantieri FREMM (Fregata
Fincantieri/Marinette Marine (F/MM) of
Group
Europea Multi-Missione) frigate
Marinette, Wi
General Dynamics/Bath
Spanish Navantia Álvaro de Bazán-class
General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works
Iron Works
F100 frigate
(GD/BIW) of Bath, ME
Huntington Ingalls
[Not disclosed]
Huntington Ingalls Industries/ Ingalls
Industries
Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS
A fifth industry team reportedly informed the Navy on May 23, 2019, that it had decided to not submit a
bid—details below are for the bid that it was reportedly developing

20 Source: Transcript of hearing posted at CQ.com.
21 For more on block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
22 Sam LaGrone, “Lockheed Martin Won’t Submit Freedom LCS Design for FFG(X) Contest,” USNI News, May 28,
2019.
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Industry team leader
Parent design
Shipyard that would build the ships
Lockheed Martin
Freedom (LCS-1) class LCS design
F/MM of Marinette, WI
Source: Sam LaGrone and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Picks Five Contenders for Next Generation Frigate FFG(X)
Program,” USNI News, February 16, 2018; Sam LaGrone, “Lockheed Martin Won’t Submit Freedom LCS Design
for FFG(X) Contest,” USNI News, May 28, 2019. See also David B. Larter, “Navy Awards Design Contracts for
Future Frigate,” Defense News, February 16, 2018; Lee Hudson, “Navy Awards Five Conceptual Design Contracts
for Future Frigate Competition,” Inside the Navy, February 19, 2018.
On February 16, 2018, the Navy awarded five FFG(X) conceptual design contracts with a value
of $15.0 million each to the leaders of the five industry teams shown in Table 1.23 Being a
recipient of a conceptual design contract was not a requirement for competing for the subsequent
Detailed Design and Construction (DD&C) contract for the program.
The Navy plans to announce the outcome of the FFG(X) competition—the winner of the DD&C
contract—in July 2020.
Program Funding
Table 2 shows funding for the FFG(X) program under the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission.
Table 2. FFG(X) Program Funding
Millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest tenth.
Prior

years
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24
Research and development
84.6
137.7
132.8
59.0
85.3
75.4
70.7
72.1
Procurement
0
0
0 1,281.2
2,057.0
1,750.4
1,792.1
1,827.9
(Procurement quantity)

(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
Source: Navy FY2020 budget submission.
Note: Research and development funding is located in PE (Program Element) 0603599N, Frigate Development,
which is line 54 in the FY2020 Navy research and development account.
Issues for Congress
FY2020 Funding Request
One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2020 funding
request for the program. In assessing this question, Congress may consider, among other things,
whether the work the Navy is proposing to do in the program in FY2020 is appropriate, and
whether the Navy has accurately priced that work.

23 Department of Defense, Contracts, Press Operations, Release No: CR-032-18, February 16, 2018 (i.e., the DOD
contracts award page for February 16, 2018). See also Ben Werner, “Navy Exercises Options For Additional Future
Frigate Design Work,” USNI News, July 31, 2018; Rich Abott, “Navy Awards Mods To FFG(X) Design Contracts,”
Defense Daily, August 1, 2018; Kris Osborn, “The Navy Is Moving Fast to Build a New Frigate. Here Is What We
Know,” National Interest, August 1, 2018.
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Cost, Capabilities, and Growth Margin
Another issue for Congress is whether the Navy has appropriately defined the cost, capabilities,
and growth margin of the FFG(X).
Analytical Basis for Desired Ship Capabilities
One aspect of this issue is whether the Navy has an adequately rigorous analytical basis for its
identification of the capability gaps or mission needs to be met by the FFG(X), and for its
decision to meet those capability gaps or mission needs through the procurement of a FFG with
the capabilities outlined earlier in this CRS report. The question of whether the Navy has an
adequately rigorous analytical basis for these things was discussed in greater detail in earlier
editions of this CRS report.24
Balance Between Cost and Capabilities
Another potential aspect of this issue is whether the Navy has arrived at a realistic balance
between its desired capabilities for the FFG(X) and its estimated procurement cost for the ship.
An imbalance between these two could lead to an increased risk of cost growth in the program.
The Navy could argue that a key aim of the five FFG(X) conceptual design contracts and other
preliminary Navy interactions with industry was to help the Navy arrive at a realistic balance by
informing the Navy’s understanding of potential capability-cost tradeoffs in the FFG(X) design.
Number of VLS Tubes
Another potential aspect of this issue concerns the planned number of Vertical Launch System
(VLS) missile tubes on the FFG(X). The VLS is the FFG(X)’s principal (though not only) means
of storing and launching missiles. As shown in Figure 3 (see the box in the upper-left corner
labeled “AW,” meaning air warfare), the FFG(X) is to be equipped with 32 Mark 41 VLS tubes.
(The Mark 41 is the Navy’s standard VLS design.)
Supporters of requiring the FFG(X) to be equipped with a larger number of VLS tubes, such as
48, might argue that the FFG(X) is to be roughly half as expensive to procure as the DDG-51
destroyer, and might therefore be more appropriately equipped with 48 VLS tubes, which is one-
half the number on recent DDG-51s. They might also argue that in a context of renewed great
power competition with potential adversaries such as China, which is steadily improving its naval
capabilities,25 it might be prudent to equip the FFG(X)s with 48 rather than 32 VLS tubes, and
that doing so might only marginally increase the unit procurement cost of the FFG(X).
Supporters of requiring the FFG(X) to have no more than 32 VLS tubes might argue that the
analyses indicating a need for 32 already took improving adversary capabilities (as well as other
U.S. Navy capabilities) into account. They might also argue that the FFG(X), in addition to
having 32 VLS tubes, is also to have a separate, 21-cell Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) missile
launcher (see again the “AW” box in the upper-left corner of Figure 3), that the Navy plans to
deploy additional VLS tubes on Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs),26 and that
increasing the number of VLS tubes on the FFG(X) from 32 to 48 would increase the

24 See, for example, the version of this report dated February 4, 2019.
25 For more on China’s naval modernization effort, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
26 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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procurement cost of a ship that is intended to be an affordable supplement to the Navy’s cruisers
and destroyers.
A May 14, 2019, Navy information paper on expanding the cost impact of expanding the FFG(X)
VLS capacity from 32 cells to 48 cells states:
To grow from a 32 Cell VLS to a 48 Cell VLS necessitates an increase in the length of the
ship with a small beam increase and roughly a 200-ton increase in full load displacement.
This will require a resizing of the ship, readdressing stability and seakeeping analyses, and
adapting ship services to accommodate the additional 16 VLS cells.
A change of this nature would unnecessarily delay detail design by causing significant
disruption to ship designs. Particularly the smaller ship designs. Potential competitors have
already completed their Conceptual Designs and are entering the Detail Design and
Construction competition with ship designs set to accommodate 32 cells.
The cost is estimated to increase between $16M [million] and $24M [million] per ship.
This includes ship impacts and additional VLS cells.27
Compared to an FFG(X) follow-on ship unit procurement cost of about $900 million, the above
estimated increase of $16 million to $24 million would equate to an increase in unit procurement
cost of about 1.8% to about 2.7%.
Growth Margin
Another potential aspect of this issue is whether, beyond the specific question of the number of
VLS tubes, the Navy more generally has chosen the appropriate amount of growth margin to
incorporate into the FFG(X) design. As shown in the Appendix A, the Navy wants the FFG(X)
design to have a growth margin (also called service life allowance) of 5%, meaning an ability to
accommodate upgrades and other changes that might be made to the ship’s design over the course
of its service life that could require up to 5% more space, weight, electrical power, or equipment
cooling capacity. As shown in the Appendix A, the Navy also wants the FFG(X) design to have
an additional growth margin (above the 5% factor) for accommodating a future directed energy
system (i.e., a laser or high-power microwave device) or an active electronic attack system (i.e.,
electronic warfare system).
Supporters could argue that a 5% growth margin is traditional for a ship like a frigate, that the
FFG(X)’s 5% growth margin is supplemented by the additional growth margin for a directed
energy system or active electronic attack system, and that requiring a larger growth margin could
make the FFG(X) design larger and more expensive to procure.
Skeptics might argue that a larger growth margin (such as 10%—a figure used in designing
cruisers and destroyers) would provide more of a hedge against the possibility of greater-than-
anticipated improvements in the capabilities of potential adversaries such as China, that a limited
growth margin was a concern in the FFG-7 design,28 and that increasing the FFG(X) growth
margin from 5% to 10% would have only a limited impact on the FFG(X)’s procurement cost.

27 Navy information paper entitled “FFG(X) Cost to Grow to 48 cell VLS,” dated May 14, 2019, received from Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs on June 14, 2019.
28 See, for example, See U.S. General Accounting Office, Statement of Jerome H. Stolarow, Director, Procurement and
Systems Acquisition Division, before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic
Committee on The Navy’s FFG-7 Class Frigate Shipbuilding Program, and Other Ship Program Issues, January 3,
1979, pp. 9-11.
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A potential oversight question for Congress might be: What would be the estimated increase in
unit procurement cost of the FFG(X) of increasing the ship’s growth margin from 5% to 10%?
Parent-Design Approach
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the parent-design approach for the
program. One alternative would be to use a clean-sheet design approach, under which
procurement of the FFG(X) would begin about FY2024 and procurement of LCSs might be
extended through about 2023.
As mentioned earlier, using the parent-design approach can reduce design time, design cost, and
technical, schedule, and cost risk in building the ship. A clean-sheet design approach, on the other
hand, might result in a design that more closely matches the Navy’s desired capabilities for the
FFG(X), which might make the design more cost-effective for the Navy over the long run. It
might also provide more work for the U.S. ship design and engineering industrial base.
Another possible alternative would be to consider frigate designs that have been developed, but
for which there are not yet any completed ships. This approach might make possible
consideration of designs, such as (to cite just one possible example) the UK’s new Type 26 frigate
design, production of which was in its early stages in 2018. Compared to a clean-sheet design
approach, using a developed-but-not-yet-built design would offer a reduction in design time and
cost, but might not offer as much reduction in technical, schedule, and cost risk in building the
ship as would be offered by use of an already-built design.
Cost, Schedule, and Technical Risk
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns cost, schedule, and technical risk in the
FFG(X) program. The Navy can argue that the program’s cost, schedule, and technical risk has
been reduced by use of the parent-design approach and the decision to use only systems and
technologies that already exist or are already being developed for use in other programs, rather
than new technologies that need to be developed.
Skeptics, while acknowledging that point, might argue that lead ships in Navy shipbuilding
programs inherently pose cost, schedule, and technical risk, because they serve as the prototypes
for their programs, and that, as detailed by CBO29 and GAO,30 lead ships in Navy shipbuilding
programs in many cases have turned out to be more expensive to build than the Navy had
estimated. A May 2019 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on the status of
various Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs states the following about the
FFG(X) program:
Current Status
The FFG(X) program continues conceptual design work ahead of planned award of a lead
ship detail design and construction contract in September 2020. In May 2017, the Navy
revised its plans for a new frigate derived from minor modifications of an LCS design. The
current plan is to select a design and shipbuilder through full and open competition to
provide a more lethal and survivable small surface combatant.

29 See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2018, p.
25, including Figure 10.
30 See Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for
Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP, June 2018, p. 8.
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As stated in the FFG(X) acquisition strategy, the Navy awarded conceptual design
contracts in February 2018 for development of five designs based on ships already
demonstrated at sea. The tailoring plan indicates the program will minimize technology
development by relying on government-furnished equipment from other programs or
known-contractor-furnished equipment.
In November 2018, the program received approval to tailor its acquisition documentation
to support development start in February 2020. This included waivers for several
requirements, such as an analysis of alternatives and an affordability analysis for the total
program life cycle. FFG(X) also received approval to tailor reviews to validate system
specifications and the release of the request for proposals for the detail design and
construction contract….
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office did not have any comments.31
Procurement of LCSs in FY2020 as Hedge against FFG(X) Delay
Another potential issue for Congress is whether any additional LCSs should be procured in
FY2020 as a hedge against potential delays in the FFG(X) program. Supporters might argue that,
as detailed by GAO,32 lead ships in Navy shipbuilding programs in many cases encounter
schedule delays, some quite lengthy, and that procuring additional LCSs in FY2020 could hedge
against that risk at reasonable cost by taking advantage of hot LCS production lines. Skeptics
might argue that the Navy does not have a requirement for any additional LCSs, and that funding
the procurement of additional LCSs in FY2020 could reduce FY2020 funding available for other
Navy or DOD programs, with an uncertain impact on net Navy or DOD capabilities.
Potential Industrial-Base Impacts of FFG(X) Program
Another issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base impacts of the FFG(X) for
shipyards and supplier firms.
Shipyards
One aspect of this issue concerns the potential impact on shipyards of the Navy’s plan to shift
procurement of small surface combatants from LCSs to FFG(X)s starting in FY2020, particularly
in terms of future workloads and employment levels at the two LCS shipyards, if one or both of
these yards are not involved in building FFG(X)s.
If a design proposed for construction at one of the LCS shipyards is chosen as the winner of the
FFG(X) competition, then other things held equal (e.g., without the addition of new work other
than building LCSs), workloads and employment levels at the other LCS shipyard (the one not
chosen for the FFG(X) program), as well as supplier firms associated with that other LCS
shipyard, would decline over time as the other LCS shipyard’s backlog of prior-year-funded
LCSs is completed and not replaced with new FFG(X) work. If no design proposed for
construction at an LCS shipyard is chosen as the FFG(X)—that is, if the winner of the FFG(X)

31 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Limited Use of Knowledge-Based
Practices Continues to Undercut DOD’s Investments, GAO-19-336SP, p. 132.
32 See Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipbuilding[:] Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for
Future Investments, GAO-18-238SP, June 2018, p. 9.
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competition is a design to be built at a shipyard other than the two LCS shipyards—then other
things held equal, employment levels at both LCS shipyards and their supplier firms would
decline over time as their backlogs of prior-year-funded LCSs are completed and not replaced
with FFG(X) work.33
As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s current baseline plan for the FFG(X) program is to build
FFG(X)s at a single shipyard. One possible alternative to this baseline plan would be to build
FFG(X)s at two or three shipyards, including one or both of the LCS shipyards. This alternative is
discussed further in the section below entitled “Number of FFG(X) Builders.”
Another possible alternative would be would be to shift Navy shipbuilding work at one of the
LCS yards (if the other wins the FFG(X) competition) or at both of the LCS yards (if neither wins
the FFG(X) competition) to the production of sections of larger Navy ships (such as DDG-51
destroyers or amphibious ships) that undergo final assembly at other shipyards. Under this option,
in other words, one or both of the LCS yards would function as shipyards participating in the
production of larger Navy ships that undergo final assembly at other shipyards. This option might
help maintain workloads and employment levels at one or both of the LCS yards, and might
alleviate capacity constraints at other shipyards, permitting certain parts of the Navy’s 355-ship
force-level objective to be achieved sooner. The concept of shipyards producing sections of larger
naval ships that undergo final assembly in other shipyards was examined at length in a 2011
RAND report.34
Supplier Firms
Another aspect of the industrial-base issue concerns the FFG(X) program’s potential impact on
supplier firms (i.e., firms that provide materials and components that are incorporated into ships).

33 For additional discussion, see, for example, Roxana Tiron, “Shipyards Locked in ‘Existential’ Duel for Navy’s New
Frigate,” Bloomberg, February 20, 2019; Paul McLeary, “Saudis Save Wisconsin Shipbuilder: Fills Gap Between LCS
& Frigates At Marinette,” Breaking Defense, January 17, 2019.
34 Laurence Smallman et al., Shared Modular Build of Warships, How a Shared Build Can Support Future
Shipbuilding, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2011 (report TR-852), 81 pp. The Navy in recent years has made some use of
the concept:

All Virginia-class attack submarines have been produced jointly by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat division
(GD/EB) and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), with each yard in effect
acting as a feeder yard for Virginia-class boats that undergo final assembly at the other yard.

Certain components of the Navy’s three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers were produced by HII’s
Ingalls Shipyard (HII/Ingalls) and then transported to GD’s Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW), the primary builder
and final assembly yard for the ships.

San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships were built at the Ingalls shipyard at Pascagoula, MS, and the
Avondale shipyard near New Orleans, LA. These shipyards were owned by Northrop and later by HII. To
alleviate capacity constraints at Ingalls and Avondale caused by damage from Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
Northrop subcontracted the construction of portions of LPDs 20 through 24 (i.e., the fourth through eighth
ships in the class) to other shipyards on the Gulf Coast and East Coast, including shipyards not owned by
Northrop.
For more on the Virginia-class joint production arrangement, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774)
Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. Regarding the LPD-
17 program, see Laurence Smallman et al., Shared Modular Build of Warships, How a Shared Build Can Support
Future Shipbuilding, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2011 (report TR-852), pp. 45-48. See also David Paganie, “Signal
International positions to capture the Gulf,” Offshore, June 1, 2006; Peter Frost, “Labor Market, Schedule Forces
Outsourcing of Work,” Newport News Daily Press, April 1, 2008; Holbrook Mohr, “Northrop Gets LPD Help From
General Dynamics,” NavyTimes.com, April 1, 2008; and Geoff Fein, “Northrop Grumman Awards Bath Iron Works
Construction Work On LPD-24,” Defense Daily, April 2, 2008.
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Some supporters of U.S. supplier firms argue that the FFG(X) program as currently structured
does not include strong enough provisions for requiring certain FFG(X) components to be U.S.-
made, particularly since two of the five industry teams reported to be competing for the FFG(X)
program (see the earlier section entitled “Competing Industry Teams”) are reportedly using
European frigate designs as their proposed parent design. For example, the American
Shipbuilding Suppliers Association (ASSA)—a trade association for U.S. ship supplier firms—
states
The US Navy has historically selected US manufactured components for its major surface
combatants and designated them as class standard equipment to be procured either as
government-furnished equipment (GFE) or contractor-furnished equipment (CFE). In a
major departure from that policy, the Navy has imposed no such requirement for the
FFG(X), the Navy’s premier small surface combatant. The acquisition plan for FFG(X)
requires proposed offerings to be based on an in-service parent craft design. Foreign
designs and/or foreign-manufactured components are being considered, with foreign
companies performing a key role in selecting these components. Without congressional
direction, there is a high likelihood that critical HM&E components on the FFG(X) will
not be manufactured within the US shipbuilding industrial supplier base.….
The Navy’s requirements are very clear regarding the combat system, radar, C4I suite,35
EW [electronic warfare], weapons, and numerous other war-fighting elements. However,
unlike all major surface combatants currently in the fleet (CGs [cruisers], DDGs
[destroyers]), the [Navy’s] draft RFP [Request for Proposals] for the FFG(X) does not
identify specific major HM&E components such as propulsion systems, machinery
controls, power generation and other systems that are critical to the ship’s operations and
mission execution. Instead, the draft RFP relegates these decisions to shipyard primes or
their foreign-owned partners, and there is no requirement for sourcing these components
within the US shipbuilding supplier industrial base.
The draft RFP also does not clearly identify life-cycle cost as a critical evaluation factor,
separate from initial acquisition cost. This ignores the cost to the government of initial
introduction [of the FFG(X)] into the [Navy’s] logistics system, the training necessary for
new systems, the location of repair services (e.g., does the equipment need to leave the
US?), and the cost and availability of parts and services for the lifetime of the ship.
Therefore, lowest acquisition cost is likely to drive the award—certainly for component
suppliers.
Further, the US Navy’s acquisition approach not only encourages, but advantages, the use
of foreign designs, most of which have a component supplier base that is foreign. Many of
these component suppliers (and in some cases the shipyards they work with) are wholly or
partially owned by their respective governments and enjoy direct subsidies as well as other
benefits from being state owned (e.g., requirements relaxation, tax incentives, etc.). This
uneven playing field, and the high-volume commercial shipbuilding market enjoyed by the
foreign suppliers, make it unlikely for an American manufacturer to compete on cost. As
incumbent component manufacturers, these foreign companies have a substantial
advantage over US component manufacturers seeking to provide equipment even if costs
could be matched, given the level of non-recurring engineering (NRE) required to facilitate
new equipment into a parent craft’s design and the subsequent performance risk.
The potential outcome of such a scenario would have severe consequences across the US
shipbuilding supplier base…. the loss of the FFG(X) opportunity to US suppliers would
increase the cost on other Navy platforms [by reducing production economies of scale at
U.S. suppliers that make components for other U.S. military ships]. Most importantly,
maintaining a robust domestic [supplier] manufacturing capability allows for a surge

35 This is a reference to the ship’s collection of command and control, communications, and computer equipment.
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capability by ensuring rapidly scalable capacity when called upon to support major military
operations—a theme frequently emphasized by DOD and Navy leaders.
These capabilities are a critical national asset and once lost, it is unlikely or extremely
costly to replicate them. This would be a difficult lesson that is not in the government’s
best interests to re-learn. One such lesson exists on the DDG-51 [destroyer production]
restart,36 where the difficulty of reconstituting a closed production line of a critical
component manufacturer—its main reduction gear—required the government to fund the
manufacturer directly as GFE, since the US manufacturer for the reduction gear had ceased
operations.37
Other observers, while perhaps acknowledging some of the points made above, might argue one
or more of the following:
 foreign-made components have long been incorporated into U.S. Navy ships (and
other U.S. military equipment);
 U.S-made components have long been incorporated into foreign warships38 (and
other foreign military equipment); and
 requiring a foreign parent design for the FFG(X) to be modified to incorporate
substitute U.S.-made components could increase the unit procurement cost of the
FFG(X) or the FFG(X) program’s acquisition risk (i.e., cost, schedule, and
technical risk), or both.
Current U.S. law requires certain components of U.S. Navy ships to be made by a manufacturer
in the national technology and industrial base. The primary statute in question—10 U.S.C.
2534—states in part
§2534. Miscellaneous limitations on the procurement of goods other than United States
goods
(a) Limitation on Certain Procurements.-The Secretary of Defense may procure any of the
following items only if the manufacturer of the item satisfies the requirements of subsection
(b):…
(3) Components for naval vessels.-(A) The following components:
(i) Air circuit breakers.
(ii) Welded shipboard anchor and mooring chain with a diameter of four inches or less.
(iii) Vessel propellers with a diameter of six feet or more.
(B) The following components of vessels, to the extent they are unique to marine
applications: gyrocompasses, electronic navigation chart systems, steering controls,
pumps, propulsion and machinery control systems, and totally enclosed lifeboats.
(b) Manufacturer in the National Technology and Industrial Base.-
(1) General requirement.-A manufacturer meets the requirements of this subsection if the
manufacturer is part of the national technology and industrial base….

36 This is a reference to how procurement of DDG-51 destroyers stopped in FY2005 and then resumed in FY2010. For
additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
37 Source: American Shipbuilding Suppliers Association (ASSA) point paper, “The Impact of FFG(X) on the US
Shipbuilding Supplier Industrial Base,” undated, received by CRS from ASSA on May 1, 2019, pp. 1, 2-3.
38 For example, foreign warships incorporate, among other things, U.S.-made combat system components and U.S.-
made gas turbine engines.
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(3) Manufacturer of vessel propellers.-In the case of a procurement of vessel propellers
referred to in subsection (a)(3)(A)(iii), the manufacturer of the propellers meets the
requirements of this subsection only if-
(A) the manufacturer meets the requirements set forth in paragraph (1); and
(B) all castings incorporated into such propellers are poured and finished in the United
States.
(c) Applicability to Certain Items.-
(1) Components for naval vessels.-Subsection (a) does not apply to a procurement of spare
or repair parts needed to support components for naval vessels produced or manufactured
outside the United States….
(4) Vessel propellers.-Subsection (a)(3)(A)(iii) and this paragraph shall cease to be
effective on February 10, 1998….
(d) Waiver Authority.-The Secretary of Defense may waive the limitation in subsection (a)
with respect to the procurement of an item listed in that subsection if the Secretary
determines that any of the following apply:
(1) Application of the limitation would cause unreasonable costs or delays to be incurred.
(2) United States producers of the item would not be jeopardized by competition from a
foreign country, and that country does not discriminate against defense items produced in
the United States to a greater degree than the United States discriminates against defense
items produced in that country.
(3) Application of the limitation would impede cooperative programs entered into between
the Department of Defense and a foreign country, or would impede the reciprocal
procurement of defense items under a memorandum of understanding providing for
reciprocal procurement of defense items that is entered into under section 2531 of this title,
and that country does not discriminate against defense items produced in the United States
to a greater degree than the United States discriminates against defense items produced in
that country.
(4) Satisfactory quality items manufactured by an entity that is part of the national
technology and industrial base (as defined in section 2500(1) of this title) are not available.
(5) Application of the limitation would result in the existence of only one source for the
item that is an entity that is part of the national technology and industrial base (as defined
in section 2500(1) of this title).
(6) The procurement is for an amount less than the simplified acquisition threshold and
simplified purchase procedures are being used.
(7) Application of the limitation is not in the national security interests of the United States.
(8) Application of the limitation would adversely affect a United States company….
(h) Implementation of Naval Vessel Component Limitation.-In implementing subsection
(a)(3)(B), the Secretary of Defense-
(1) may not use contract clauses or certifications; and
(2) shall use management and oversight techniques that achieve the objective of the
subsection without imposing a significant management burden on the Government or the
contractor involved.
(i) Implementation of Certain Waiver Authority.-(1) The Secretary of Defense may
exercise the waiver authority described in paragraph (2) only if the waiver is made for a
particular item listed in subsection (a) and for a particular foreign country.
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(2) This subsection applies to the waiver authority provided by subsection (d) on the basis
of the applicability of paragraph (2) or (3) of that subsection.
(3) The waiver authority described in paragraph (2) may not be delegated below the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
(4) At least 15 days before the effective date of any waiver made under the waiver authority
described in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register and submit
to the congressional defense committees a notice of the determination to exercise the
waiver authority.
(5) Any waiver made by the Secretary under the waiver authority described in paragraph
(2) shall be in effect for a period not greater than one year, as determined by the Secretary....
In addition to 10 U.S.C. 2534, the paragraph in the annual DOD appropriations act that makes
appropriations for the Navy’s shipbuilding account (i.e., the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy,
or SCN, appropriation account) has in recent years included this proviso:
…Provided further, That none of the funds provided under this heading for the construction
or conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall
be expended in foreign facilities for the construction of major components of such
vessel….
10 U.S.C. 2534 explicitly applies to certain ship components, but not others. The meaning of
“major components” in the above proviso from the annual DOD appropriations act might be
subject to interpretation.
The issue of U.S.-made components for Navy ships is also, for somewhat different reasons, an
issue for Congress in connection with the Navy’s John Lewis (TAO-205) class oiler shipbuilding
program.39
Number of FFG(X) Builders
Another issue for Congress whether to build FFG(X)s at a single shipyard, as the Navy’s baseline
plan calls for, or at two or three shipyards. As mentioned earlier, one possible alternative to the
Navy’s current baseline plan for building FFG(X)s at a single shipyard would be to build them at
two or three yards, including potentially one or both of the LCS shipyards. The Navy’s FFG-7
class frigates, which were procured at annual rates of as high as eight ships per year, were built at
three shipyards.40 Supporters of building FFG(X)s at two or three yards might argue that it could
 boost FFG(X) production from the currently planned two ships per year to four
or more ships per year, substantially accelerating the date for attaining the Navy’s
small surface combatant force-level goal;

39 See CRS Report R43546, Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
40 The 51 FFG-7s were procured from FY1973 through FY1984 in annual quantities of 1, 0, 3, 6, 8, 8, 8, 5, 6, 3, 2, and
1. The three FFG-7 builders were GD/BIW, Todd Shipyards/San Pedro, CA, and Todd Shipyards/Seattle, WA. The two
Todd shipyards last built Navy ships in the latter 1980s. (See, for example, U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the
Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2020, March 2019, p. 16.) Todd/San Pedro
closed at the end of the 1980s. Todd/Seattle was purchased by and now forms part of Vigor Shipyards, a firm with
multiple facilities in the Puget Sound area and in Portland, OR. Vigor’s work for the Navy in recent years has centered
on the overhaul and repair of existing Navy ships, although it also builds ships for other customers.
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 permit the Navy to use competition (either competition for quantity at the margin,
or competition for profit [i.e., Profit Related to Offers, or PRO, bidding])41 to
help restrain FFG(X) prices and ensure production quality and on-time deliveries;
and
 perhaps complicate adversary defense planning by presenting potential
adversaries with multiple FFG(X) designs, each with its own specific operating
characteristics.
Opponents of this plan might argue that it could
 weaken the current FFG(X) competition by offering the winner a smaller
prospective number of FFG(X)s and perhaps also essentially guaranteeing the
LCSs yard that they will build some number of FFG(X)s;
 substantially increase annual FFG(X) procurement funding requirements so as to
procure four or more FFG(X)s per year rather than two per year, which in a
situation of finite DOD funding could require offsetting reductions in other Navy
or DOD programs; and
 reduce production economies of scale in the FFG(X) program by dividing
FFG(X) among two or three designs, and increase downstream Navy FFG(X)
operation and support (O&S) costs by requiring the Navy to maintain two or
three FFG(X) logistics support systems.
Potential Change in Navy Surface Force Architecture
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on required numbers
of FFG(X)s of a possible change in the Navy’s surface force architecture. As mentioned earlier,
Navy officials have stated that the new Force Structure Assessment (FSA) being conducted by the
Navy may shift the Navy to a new fleet architecture that will include, among other thing, a larger
proportion of small surface combatants—and, by implication, a smaller proportion of large
surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers). A change in the required number of FFG(X)s
could influence perspectives on the annual procurement rate for the program and the number of
shipyards used to build the ships. A January 15, 2019, press report states
The Navy plans to spend this year taking the first few steps into a markedly different future,
which, if it comes to pass, will upend how the fleet has fought since the Cold War. And it
all starts with something that might seem counterintuitive: It’s looking to get smaller.
“Today, I have a requirement for 104 large surface combatants in the force structure
assessment; [and] I have [a requirement for] 52 small surface combatants,” said Surface
Warfare Director Rear Adm. Ronald Boxall. “That’s a little upside down. Should I push
out here and have more small platforms? I think the future fleet architecture study has
intimated ‘yes,’ and our war gaming shows there is value in that.”42
An April 8, 2019, press report states that Navy discussions about the future surface fleet include

41 For more on PRO bidding, see Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research
Service, before the House Armed Services Committee on Case Studies in DOD Acquisition: Finding What Works, June
24, 2014, p. 7.
42 David B. Larter, “US Navy Moves Toward Unleashing Killer Robot Shps on the World’s Oceans,” Defense News,
January 15, 2019.
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the upcoming construction and fielding of the [FFG(X)] frigate, which [Vice Admiral Bill
Merz, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems] said is surpassing
expectations already in terms of the lethality that industry can put into a small combatant.
“The FSA may actually help us on, how many (destroyers) do we really need to modernize,
because I think the FSA is going to give a lot of credit to the frigate—if I had a crystal ball
and had to predict what the FSA was going to do, it’s going to probably recommend more
small surface combatants, meaning the frigate … and then how much fewer large surface
combatants can we mix?” Merz said.
An issue the Navy has to work through is balancing a need to have enough ships and be
capable enough today, while also making decisions that will help the Navy get out of the
top-heavy surface fleet and into a better balance as soon as is feasible.
“You may see the evolution over time where frigates start replacing destroyers, the Large
Surface Combatant [a future cruiser/destroyer-type ship] starts replacing destroyers, and in
the end, as the destroyers blend away you’re going to get this healthier mix of small and
large surface combatants,” he said—though the new FSA may shed more light on what that
balance will look like and when it could be achieved.43
A May 16, 2019, press report states:
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems said Wednesday [May 15] he
thinks the upcoming Force Structure Assessment (FSA) will focus on smaller surface
combatants as the service looks to build up to a 355-ship Navy.
“I certainly don’t see that [FSA fleet] number going down, but it is going to be more
reflective of the DMO [Distributed Maritime Operations] construct and it includes not just
the battle force ships, but the logistics ships, the trainers, the maritime operations centers,
everything that we pull together to keep this machine running,” Vice Adm. William Merz
said during an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“What we think is going to happen with this FSA is there will be more emphasis on the
smaller surface combatants, mostly because the frigate looks like it’s coming along very
well and it’s going to be more lethal than we had planned,” Merz said.
Merz explained the likely outcome by comparing it to how Rear Adm. Ron Boxall, director
of surface warfare (N96), talks about how the Navy has too many large surface combatants
and needs to get more balanced.
“When you look at the lethality of the frigate, yeah that makes sense. So we’ll see how the
FSA handles the lethality of that – and then how does that bleed over into the other
accounts,” Merz said.44
Legislative Activity for FY2020
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request
Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 funding request for the LCS
program.

43 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Sees No Easy Answer to Balance Future Surface Fleet,” USNI News, April 8, 2019. Ellipse
as in original.
44 Rich Abott, “Merz Says FSA To Emphasize Smaller Ships,” Defense Daily, May 16, 2019. For additional discussion
of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2020 FFG(X) Program Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth.

Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Research and development
59.0
59.0
59.0

59.0

Procurement
1,281.2
1,266.2
1,281.2

1,281.2

(Procurement quantity)
(1)
(1)
(1)

(1)

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on FY2020 Navy budget submission, committee and conference reports,
and explanatory statements on the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act and the FY2020 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.
Research and development funding is located in PE (Program Element) 0603599N, Frigate Development, which is
line 54 in the FY2020 Navy research and development account.
FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2500/S. 1790)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-20 of June 19, 2019) on H.R.
2500, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 3. The
recommended reduction of $15.0 million in procurement funding is for “Change order early to
need.” (Page 379)
Section 810 of H.R. 2500 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 810. APPLICATION OF LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF GOODS
OTHER THAN UNITED STATES GOODS TO THE FFG-FRIGATE PROGRAM.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, amounts authorized to carry out the FFG-
Frigate Program may be used to award a new contract that provides for the acquisition of
the following components regardless of whether those components are manufactured in the
United States:
(1) Auxiliary equipment (including pumps) for shipboard services.
(2) Propulsion equipment (including engines, reduction gears, and propellers).
(3) Shipboard cranes.
(4) Spreaders for shipboard cranes.
Section 811 of H.R. 2500 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 811. CONSIDERATION OF PRICE IN PROCUREMENT OF THE FFG(X)
FRIGATE.
In evaluating proposals for a contract to procure a FFG(X) frigate, the Secretary of the
Navy shall ensure price is a critical evaluation factor set forth in the request for proposal
(solicitation number N0002419R2300) for the procurement of the frigate.
H.Rept. 116-120 states:
Frigate requirements review
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The committee supports the Navy’s efforts to leverage mature technologies and systems
for the new Frigate class (FFG(X)), and continues to encourage the Secretary of the Navy
to emphasize risk reduction efforts, commonality, and reduced life-cycle sustainment costs
in developing a best-value solution. The committee also believes that the Navy should not
trade warfighting capabilities for other considerations, particularly in anti-submarine
warfare (ASW). Given ongoing efforts by adversarial nations to increase the capability,
lethality, and size of their respective submarine fleets, the committee recognizes the
projected role the FFG(X) will play in performing ASW missions. As such, it is imperative
that the platform be deployed with the most capable ASW technology available. (Page 18)
H.Rept. 116-120 also states:
Sourcing of Domestic Components for U.S. Navy Ships
The committee is concerned with the sourcing of non-domestic components on U.S. Navy
ships. The committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the
congressional defense committees by December 1, 2019, on the feasibility of sourcing
domestic components such as: auxiliary equipment, including pumps; propulsion system
components, including engines, reduction gears, and propellers; shipboard cranes and
spreaders for shipboard cranes; and other components on all Navy ships. (Page 186)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11, 2019) on S.
1790, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 3.
S.Rept. 116-48 states:
Guided missile frigate (FFG(X))
The committee applauds the Navy's decision to procure a guided missile frigate (FFG(X))
with increased lethality, survivability, and endurance to meet the requirement for Small
Surface Combatants in the most recent Navy Force Structure Assessment. While
maintaining the Navy's "high/low" mix of ships, the FFG(X) program greatly expands upon
the capabilities of the Littoral Combat Ship program, returning to the force and improving
on many of the multi-mission warfighting attributes of Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates,
including the ability to operate in more contested environments.
As the Navy prepares to issue the FFG(X) request for proposals, the committee continues
to support a full and open competition with a single source detail design and construction
award in fiscal year 2020. The committee also supports the Navy's approach to
commonality with existing Navy platforms, such as the Mark-41 Vertical Launch System
and Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, to reduce acquisition and sustainment costs. The
committee encourages the Navy not to sacrifice warfighting capability for other
considerations. (Pages 45-46)
FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2968)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-84 of May 23, 2019) on H.R.
2968, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 3.
Section 8108 of H.R. 2968 as reported by the committee states
Sec. 8108. None of the funds provided in this Act for the TAO Fleet Oiler program or the
FFG-Frigate program shall be used to award a new contract that provides for the acquisition
of the following components unless those components are manufactured in the United
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States: Auxiliary equipment (including pumps) for shipboard services; propulsion
equipment (including engines, reduction gears, and propellers); shipboard cranes; and
spreaders for shipboard cranes.
Regarding Section 8108, a Navy information paper states
The Navy does not agree with the proposed language in [Section 8108 of H.R. 2968 as
reported by the House Appropriations Committee]. If enacted, it will result in the potential
for: redesign, loss of commonality with the rest of the US Fleet, increases in cost, and delay
to the FFG(X) Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) contract award. There is no direct
impact on the TAO Fleet Oiler program.
There are several FFG(X) components that would fall into this broad language which are
not currently available in the US marketplace (e.g., Auxiliary Propulsion Units and exhaust
cooling, etc.) which would result in redesign to obtain equivalent capability with US made
parts. Finding US suppliers would drive developmental systems into the program as new
equipment is engineered and qualified to US standards (e.g., shock, electromagnetic
interference, etc.). Additionally, this use of developmental systems is not in accordance
with the FFG(X) strategy of commonality with the Fleet and will drive cost risk into our
production and support.
The FFG(X) program is nearing completion of Conceptual Design (and has a final
NAVSEA Chief Engineer approved specification), the primary purpose of which is to
stabilize requirements and mature the designs in advance of the competition for DD&C.
The proposed language would delay the Primes readiness to respond to a DD&C Request
for Proposal. The Primes have already released Purchase Technical Specifications (and in
some cases, made selections) to support their DD&C proposals while adhering to current
law (41 U.S.C. 10a-10d Buy American Act and 10 U.S.C 2534). Examples of foreign
sourced materials are main propulsion diesel engines, diesel generator sets, main reduction
gearing, and auxiliary equipment for shipboard services. Many of these foreign sourced
components are common with other US Navy platforms (e.g. fuel oil purifiers). Selecting
new equipment would necessitate new vendor relationships which will take several months
(and may increase cost).
The Conceptual Design phase was further intended to reduce costs by providing flexibility
to the Primes to make selections while still complying with government-developed System
Specification requirements. This language would reduce competition at the component
level, increasing the cost of an FFG(X). These increasing costs may take some or all of the
competitors outside the competitive range for our contract.
The FFG(X) program utilized a strategy to require parent designs to reduce cost, technical,
and schedule risk to get to a competitive DD&C contract award. As such, many of the
referenced components are proven on the parent designs. An insertion of change of this
magnitude would negate much of the progress achieved during the Conceptual Design
phase. This would result in a loss of design maturity and the FFG(X) DD&C award will be
delayed a minimum of one year.45

45 Navy information paper entitled “Impacts of draft HAC-D FY20 appropriations bill on FFG(X),” May 17, 2019,
received by CRS from Navy Legislative Affairs Office on June 5, 2019.
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Appendix A. Navy Briefing Slides from July 25,
2017, FFG(X) Industry Day Event
This appendix reprints some of the briefing slides that the Navy presented at its July 25, 2017,
industry day event on the FFG(X) program, which was held in association with the Request for
Information (RFI) that the Navy issued on July 25, 2017, to solicit information for better
understanding potential trade-offs between cost and capability in the FFG(X) design. The
reprinted slides begin on the next page.

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Slides from Navy FFG(X) Industry Day Briefing

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Source: Slides from briefing posted on July 28, 2017, at RFI: FFG(X) - US Navy Guided Missile Frigate
Replacement Program, https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=
d089cf61f254538605cdec5438955b8e&_cview=0, accessed August 11, 2017.
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Appendix B. Competing Industry Teams
This appendix presents additional background information on the industry teams competing for
the FFG(X) program.
February 16, 2018, Press Report About Five Competing Industry
Teams
A February 16, 2018, press report about the five competing industry teams reportedly competing
for the FFG(X) program (i.e., the five industry teams shown in Table 1) stated the following:
The Navy would not confirm how many groups bid for the [FFG(X)] work. At least one
U.S.-German team that was not selected for a [conceptual] design contract, Atlas USA and
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, told USNI News they had submitted for the [DD&C]
competition....
During last month’s Surface Navy Association [annual symposium], several shipbuilders
outlined their designs for the FFG(X) competition.
Austal USA
Shipyard: Austal USA in Mobile, Ala.
Parent Design: Independence-class [i.e., LCS-2 class] Littoral Combat Ship
One of the two Littoral Combat Ship builders, Austal USA has pitched an upgunned variant
of the Independence-class LCS as both a foreign military sales offering and as the answer
to the Navy’s upgunned small surface combatant and then frigate programs. Based on the
3,000-ton aluminum trimaran design, the hull boasts a large flight deck and space for up to
16 Mk-41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) cells.
Fincantieri Marine Group
Shipyard: Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisc.
Parent Design: Fincantieri Italian FREMM
As part of the stipulations of the FFG(X) programs, a contractor can offer just one design
in the competition as a prime contractor but may also support a second bid as a
subcontractor. Fincantieri elected to offer its 6,700-ton Italian Fregata europea multi-
missione (FREMM) design for construction in its Wisconsin Marinette Marine shipyard,
as well as partner with Lockheed Martin on its Freedom-class pitch as a subcontractor. The
Italian FREMM design features a 16-cell VLS as well as space for deck-launched anti-ship
missiles.
General Dynamics Bath Iron Works
Shipyard: Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine
Parent Design: Navantia Álvaro de Bazán-class F100 Frigate
The 6,000-ton air defense guided-missile frigates fitted with the Aegis Combat System
have been in service for the Spanish Armada since 2002 and are the basis of the Australian
Hobart-class air defense destroyers and the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates. The
Navantia partnership with Bath is built on a previous partnership from the turn of the
century. The F100 frigates were a product of a teaming agreement between BIW, Lockheed
Martin and Navantia predecessor Izar as part of the Advanced Frigate Consortium from
2000.
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Huntington Ingalls Industries
Shipyard: Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Miss.
Parent Design: Unknown
Out of the competitors involved in the competition, HII was the only company that did not
present a model or a rendering of its FFG(X) at the Surface Navy Association symposium
in January. A spokeswoman for the company declined to elaborate on the offering when
contacted by USNI News on Friday. In the past, HII has presented a naval version of its
Legend-class National Security Cutter design as a model at trade shows labeled as a “Patrol
Frigate.”
Lockheed Martin
Shipyard: Fincantieri Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisc.
Parent Design: Freedom-class [i.e., LCS-1 class] Littoral Combat Ship
Of the two LCS builders, Lockheed Martin is the first to have secured a foreign military
sale with its design. The company’s FFG(X) bid will have much in common with its
offering for the Royal Saudi Navy’s 4,000-ton multi-mission surface combatant. The new
Saudi ships will be built around an eight-cell Mk-41 vertical launch system and a 4D air
search radar. Lockheed has pitched several other variants of the hull that include more VLS
cells.
“We are proud of our 15-year partnership with the U.S. Navy on the Freedom-variant
Littoral Combat Ship and look forward to extending it to FFG(X),” said Joe DePietro,
Lockheed Martin vice president of small combatants and ship systems in a Friday evening
statement.
“Our frigate design offers an affordable, low-risk answer to meeting the Navy’s goals of a
larger and more capable fleet.”46
May 28, 2019, Press Report About One Industry Team Deciding to
Not Submit a Bid
On May 28, 2019, it was reported that one of the five industry teams that had been interested in
the FFG(X) program had informed the Navy on May 23 that it had decided to not submit a bid for
the program. The May 28, 2019, press report about this industry team’s decision stated:
Lockheed Martin won’t submit a bid to compete in the design of the Navy’s next-
generation guided-missile (FFG(X)) frigate competition, company officials told USNI
News on Tuesday [May 28].
The company elected to focus on its involvement developing the frigate combat system
and other systems rather than forward its Freedom-class LCS design for the detailed design
and construction contract Naval Sea Systems Command plans to issue this summer, Joe
DePietro, Lockheed Martin vice president of small combatants and ship systems, told
USNI News.
“We reviewed the entire program and obviously, given some of the stuff that has already
happened that is outside of the contract for the program—that includes the designation of
our combat management system, COMBATSS 21, derived off of Aegis; we have the

46 Sam LaGrone and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Picks Five Contenders for Next Generation Frigate FFG(X) Program,”
USNI News, February 16, 2018. See also David B. Larter, “Navy Awards Design Contracts for Future Frigate,”
Defense News, February 16, 2018; Lee Hudson, “Navy Awards Five Conceptual Design Contracts for Future Frigate
Competition,” Inside the Navy, February 19, 2018.
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Mk-41 vertical launch system; the processing for our anti-submarine warfare area;
advanced [electronic warfare] and platform integration,” he said.
“As we evaluated all of those different areas, we determined not to pursue, as a prime
contractor, the FFG(X) detailed design and construction.”
The company informed the Navy on May 23 it would not join the other bidders for the hull
design, two sources familiar with the notification told USNI News.
While the design passed two Navy reviews, the company told the service it felt the Freedom
design would be stretched too far to accommodate all the capabilities required, one source
told USNI News….
While Lockheed is moving away from leading a frigate team, the company will be heavily
involved with whoever wins. The FFG(X)’s COMBATSS-21 Combat Management
System will be derived from the company’s Aegis Combat System, and Lockheed Martin
makes the ship’s vertical launch system.47

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
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copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

47 Sam LaGrone, “Lockheed Martin Won’t Submit Freedom LCS Design for FFG(X) Contest,” USNI News, May 28,
2019.
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