Navy Irregular Warfare and
Counterterrorism Operations:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated June 19, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RS22373

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations

Summary
In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Navy has carried out a
variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily
visible of these were operations carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in the Middle East and
Afghanistan, as well as the May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that
killed Osama bin Laden.
During these years, the Navy took certain actions intended to improve its IW capabilities. For
example, the Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in
October 2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of
a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy also established the
Navy Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in
January 2010, and established “a community of interest” (COI) to develop and advance ideas,
collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.
The Navy during these years also reestablished its riverine force and initiated The Global
Maritime Partnership, which was a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of
cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. In addition, the
Navy operated the Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS),
which were Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that deployed to the
Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries
in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries
and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations.
The Navy’s current IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for
Congress, including how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in Navy budgets,
particularly in a context of constraints on Navy budgets and Navy desires to devote resources to
developing “high end” combat capabilities for countering improved conventional military
capabilities of countries such as China and Russia.
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Introduction
This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress on the Navy’s
irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) operations. The Navy’s IW and CT activities
pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including how much emphasis to place
on IW and CT activities in Navy budgets, particularly in a context of constraints on Navy budgets
and Navy desires to devote resources to developing “high end” combat capabilities for countering
improved conventional military capabilities of countries such as China and Russia. Congress’s
decisions regarding Navy IW and CT operations can affect Navy operations and funding
requirements, and the implementation of the nation’s overall IW and CT strategies.
This report focuses on Navy IW and CT operations. Another CRS report discusses U.S. special
operations forces (SOF) across the military services.1
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which Navy IW and CT operations may
be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations
Note on Terminology
The Navy has sometimes used the phrase confronting irregular challenges (CIC) instead of the
term irregular warfare. For purposes of convenience, this report continues to use the term
irregular warfare and the abbreviation IW.
Navy IW Operations in Middle East and Afghanistan
In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Navy carried out a variety
of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of
these were operations carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in the Middle East and
Afghanistan. Regarding current operations in the Middle East, the Department of the Navy
(DON) states the following in its FY2020 budget highlights book:
The Marine Corps has an active duty force of approximately 1,300 Marines ashore in the
U.S. CENTCOM area of operations (AOR) and another roughly 850 Marine Reserve
members supporting CENTCOM. Beyond the Marines participating in counterinsurgency,
security cooperation, and civil-military operations; on any given day there are about 1,000
Sailors ashore and another roughly 6,500 afloat throughout the CENTCOM AOR. These
sailors are conducting activities such as air operations, maritime infrastructure protection,
combat construction engineering, cargo handling, combat logistics, maritime security,
detainee operations, customs inspections, civil affairs, base operations, and other forward
presence activities.2

1 CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew
Feickert.
2 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2020 Budget, 2019, p. 8-2.
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Navy IW Operations Elsewhere
In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Navy
IW operations in the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2011, have also
included the following:
 security force assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy ships
have exercised and worked with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime
police forces, so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security
operations;
 civic assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including
Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval
construction units have provided medical and construction services in foreign
countries as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in
those countries;
 disaster relief operations, of which Navy forces have performed several in
recent years; and
 counter-piracy operations, particularly off the Horn of Africa.
DON states in its FY2020 budget highlights book that
In the past year, the Marine Corps executed 170 operations, eight amphibious operations,
115 theater security cooperation events and participated in 51 exercises and relief
operations for Hurricanes Maria, Florence, and Michael. Within the context of these
efforts, Amphibious Ready Groups / Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEU) supported
Combatant commands along-side regional partners providing a range of deliberate and
crisis response options. Major exercises were held in Romania, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia,
and off the coast of Djibouti. The Marine Corps also participated in theater security
cooperation (TSC) exercises held in Brazil, Latvia, Jordan, Mexico, and Philippines that
enhanced military cooperation, capability, and interoperability with partner nations while
sustaining a ready, forward presence in support of the Combatant Commander
requirements….
The Navy has active and reserve forces continually deployed in support of contingency
operations overseas serving as members of Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike
Groups, Special Operating Forces, Seabee units, Marine forces, and medical units; some
also serve as Individual Augmentees (IAs).3
Navy Individual Augmentees (IAs)
Some of the Navy’s contributions to IW operations around the world in the years following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—
individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. DON stated in 2014 that
Navy IAs are providing combat support and combat service support for Army and Marine
Corps personnel in Afghanistan. As IAs they are fulfilling vital roles by serving in
traditional Navy roles such as USMC support, maritime and port security, cargo handling,
airlift support, Seabee units, and as a member of joint task force/Combatant Commanders
staffs. Non-traditional roles include detainee operations, custom inspections teams, and
civil affairs.4

3 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2020 Budget, 2019, pp. 2-8 and 8-2.
4 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 7-3.
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Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations
In General
Navy CT operations (and anti-terrorism/force protection activities) at various points since the late
1990s, and particularly in the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have
included the following:
 Operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym
standing for Sea, Air, and Land), that have been directed against terrorists;5
 Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and
facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on March 3 and May 1,
2008,6 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of
U.S. embassies in East Africa;7
 surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas;
 maritime intercept operations (MIO) that were aimed at identifying and
intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially
threatening ships or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an
activity that has included Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI);8
 protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified
following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in
October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;9
 protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities;
 working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (or MDA,
meaning a real-time understanding of activities on the world’s oceans), and

5 For an account of a series of missions reportedly conducted by SEALS over a six-week period in November and
December 2003 to plant cameras in Somalia for the purpose of conducting surveillance on terrorists, see Sean D.
Naylor, “Hunting Down Terrorists,” Army Times, November 7, 2011: 22.
6 Edmund Sanders, “U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008; Stephanie
McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post,
May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,” New York Times,
May 2, 2008.
7 For an article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, “Report: 1998 Strike Built bin Laden-Taliban Tie,”
NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), August 22, 2008.
8 For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
9 For a discussion of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke (out of print, but available to congressional clients upon
request). A September 13, 2014, press report states the following:
The first ever attack by the newly-announced Indian Subcontinent branch of Al Qaeda went really,
really, poorly. The attack launched last Saturday [September 13] in Pakistan seems to have targeted
the wrong ship.
Fighters of the Islamic terror group branch that was unveiled two weeks ago had planned to storm
an American aircraft carrier at a Karachi port, but found a Pakistani Navy ship in its place, The
Telegraph reports. The attackers suffered heavy casualties as the Pakistani Navy easily
overpowered their attempt. Three of the al-Qaeda fighters were killed and seven were arrested
according to Pakistani officials. Two Pakistani Naval guards were wounded.
(Andrew Hart, “New Al Qaeda Branch Attacks Wrong Ship,” Huffington Post
(www.huffingtonpost.com), September 13, 2014.)
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engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime
Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly
in the area of MDA;
 assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;10
 developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint
Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain
Awareness (MDA); and
 operations by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), for which
combating terrorism is a core mission area.11
DON stated in 2014 that
While forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces will be
positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism.... Expanded Maritime Interdiction
Operations are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense to
intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel that
poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.....
We have done small, precise attacks against terrorist cells and missile attacks against
extremist sanctuaries.12
DON stated in 2013 that
Our defense efforts are aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as
well as upholding our commitments to allies and partner states. These armed adversaries
such as terrorists, insurgents, and separatist militias are a principal challenge to U.S.
interests in East Africa.13

10 See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, “Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness System ‘Up And Running’,” Defense
Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, “New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide,”
Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383,
Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and
CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak
and John Frittelli (out of print, but available to congressional clients upon request).
11 NCIS states on its website that “the NCIS mission is to investigate and defeat criminal, foreign, and terrorist
intelligence threats to the United States Navy and Marine Corps, wherever they operate: ashore, afloat, or in
cyberspace,” and that combating terrorism is a core mission area for NCIS. Regarding this mission, the website states
that
Protecting the naval forces from violent extremist organizations and individuals is one of NCIS’
highest priorities. As the primary law enforcement and counterintelligence component for the naval
services, NCIS is focused on countering threats to the physical security of Sailors, Marines, and
Department of the Navy (DON) civilian personnel and on preventing terrorist attacks against
installations and ships.
NCIS is responsible for detecting, deterring, and disrupting terrorism worldwide through a wide
array of offensive and defensive capabilities. Offensive operations aim at identifying and
interdicting terrorist activities. In defensive operations, NCIS supports key DON leaders with
protective services and performs physical security assessments of military installations and related
facilities—including ports, airfields, and exercise areas to which naval expeditionary forces deploy.
(Source: http://www.ncis.navy.mil/CoreMissions/CT/Pages/default.aspx, accessed on November
29, 2011.)
12 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 7-2.
13 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2013, p. 7-4.
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An April 8, 2013, press report about U.S. counterterrorism operations stated, regarding one
particular operation, that
The uncertainties were evident nine months into Mr. Obama’s first term, when intelligence
agencies tracked down Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a suspect in the attacks on two American
embassies in East Africa in 1998.
The original plan had been to fire long-range missiles to hit Mr. Nabhan and others as they
drove in a convoy from Mogadishu, Somalia, to the seaside town of Baraawe. But that plan
was scrubbed at the last minute, and instead a Navy SEALs14 team helicoptered from a ship
and strafed Mr. Nabhan’s convoy, killing him and three others. The SEALs landed to
collect DNA samples to confirm the identities of the dead.15
May 1-2, 2011, U.S. Military Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden
The May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin
Laden—reportedly called Operation Neptune’s Spear—reportedly was carried out by a team of
23 Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs (an acronym standing for Sea, Air, and
Land). The SEALs reportedly belonged to an elite unit known unofficially as Seal Team 6 and
officially as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).16 The SEALs reportedly
were flown to and from Abbottabad by Army special operations helicopters. Bin Laden’s body
reportedly was flown by a U.S. military helicopter from Abbottabad to a base in Afghanistan, and
from there by a Marine Corps V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft to the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson (CVN-70),
which was operating at the time in the Northern Arabian Sea. A few hours later, bin Laden’s body
reportedly was buried at sea from the ship. Differing accounts have been published regarding
certain details of the operation.17
Press reports in July 2010 stated that U.S. forces in Afghanistan included at that time a special
unit called Task Force 373, composed of Navy SEALs and Army Delta Force personnel, whose
mission is “the deactivation of top Taliban and terrorists by either killing or capturing them.”18
A July 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report19 and a separate CRS report20
provide additional background information on the SEALs. Another CRS report provides further
discussion of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.21

14 The Navy’s special operations forces are known as SEALs; SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land.
15 Scott Shane, “Targeted Killing Comes To Define War On Terror,” New York Times, April 8, 2013: 1.
16 See, for example, Sean D. Naylor, “SEAL Team 6 by the Numbers,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2015.
17 See, for example, Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden,” The New Yorker, August 8, 2011, accessed online
August 10, 2011 at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle; Peter Bergen, “The
Last Days Of Osama Bin Laden,” Time, May 7, 2012; Mark Bowden, “The Hunt For ‘Geronimo,’” Vanity Fair,
November 2012: 144; Chuck Pfarrer, SEAL Target Geronimo: The Inside Story of the Mission to Kill Osama bin Laden
(St. Martin’s Press, 2011), 240 pp.; Mark Owen (pseudonym) and Kevin Maurer, No Easy Day: The Firsthand Account
of the Mission That Killed Osama Bin Laden (Dutton Adult, 2012), 336 pp.; Peter Bergen, “Who Really Killed Bin
Laden,” CNN.com, March 26, 2013.
18 Matthias et al., “US Elite Unit Could Create Political Fallout For Berlin,” Spiegel (Germany), July 26, 2010. See also
C. J. Chivers et al., “Inside the Fog Of War: Reports From The Ground In Afghanistan,” New York Times, July 26,
2010: 1.
19 Government Accountability Office, Special Operations Forces[:] Opportunities Exist to Improve Transparency of
Funding and Assess Potential to Lessen Some Deployments, GAO-15-571, July 2015, Appendix III (pp. 45-47).
20 CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew
Feickert.
21 CRS Report R41809, Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations, coordinated by John W. Rollins.
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Detention of Terrorist Suspects on U.S. Navy Ships
An August 16, 2015, press report stated the following:
After a suspected militant was captured last year to face charges for the deadly 2012 attacks
on Americans in Benghazi, Libya, he was brought to the U.S. aboard a Navy transport ship
on a 13-day trip that his lawyers say could have taken 13 hours by plane.
Ahmed Abu Khattala faced days of questioning aboard the USS New York from separate
teams of American interrogators, part of a two-step process designed to obtain both
national security intelligence and evidence usable in a criminal prosecution.
The case, still in its early stages, is focusing attention on an interrogation strategy that the
Obama administration has used in just a few recent terrorism investigations and
prosecutions. Abu Khattala’s lawyers already have signaled a challenge to the process,
setting the stage for a rare court clash over a tactic that has riled civil liberties groups but
is seen by the government as a vital and appropriate tool in prosecuting suspected terrorists
captured overseas.
“I think they view it as important to show that terrorists can be prosecuted in U.S. courts,
and this is an attempt to find a compromise between using people they capture as
intelligence assets and prosecuting them in U.S. courts,” said David Deitch, a former
Justice Department terrorism prosecutor. “It’s a very hard balance to strike—and may not
be possible.”
The administration has turned to questioning in international waters as an alternative to
past practices in which suspects were sent to the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, or secret CIA prisons. The process ordinarily begins with questioning from a
specialized team of interrogators who collect intelligence that can inform government
decisions, such as for drone strikes, but cannot be used in court. Then a team of FBI
investigators starts from scratch, advising the detainee of his Miranda rights, such as the
right to remain silent, and gathering statements that prosecutors can present as evidence in
a trial.
Some legal experts expect the hybrid interrogation technique to survive legal challenges.
But defense lawyers are concerned that such prolonged detention can be used to wrangle a
confession or amounts to an end-run around the government’s obligation to promptly place
a suspect before a judge.
“Basically by holding the suspects on a ship and delaying their presentment in federal court,
they're able to get a leg up in interrogations,” said Seton Hall University law professor
Jonathan Hafetz, who has handled terrorism cases.
Abu Khattala is facing charges in Washington in the Sept. 11-12, 2012, attack on the U.S.
diplomatic mission in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other
Americans. Following his June 2014 capture in Libya by U.S. special forces, he was placed
aboard a Navy ship that his lawyers say made its way to the U.S. as slowly as possible to
allow maximum time for interrogation. They say Abu Khattala was questioned for days by
representatives from the High Value Detainee Interrogation Group, then for another stretch
by FBI agents....
One early point of contention in the court case is the onboard interrogation. Abu Khattala’s
lawyers submitted court filings this month contending that the government held him
“captive on a military ship—without the protection of and in spite of constitutional
guarantees—for the explicit purpose of illegally interrogating him for almost two weeks.”
Federal prosecutors have yet to respond.
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Whatever a judge decides, the case taps into a broader legal debate about the prosecution
of terrorist suspects and presents a rare opportunity for a possible ruling on the
admissibility of statements gathered aboard a military vessel.22
For additional background information on detention of terrorist suspects on U.S. Navy ships, see
Appendix E.
Navy Initiatives to Improve Its IW and CT Capabilities
In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Navy took certain actions
intended to improve its IW and CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.
Some of the actions the Navy took during those years are described briefly below.
Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO)/Navy Warfare Group (NWG)
The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office (NIWO) so as to
“institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal
defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency].”23
In January 2013, the Navy directed the establishment of a Navy Warfare Group (NWG) “to
provide a dedicated organization to systematically evaluate, develop, and implement new
strategic concepts deemed useful to the service....” NIWO was disbanded, and its responsibilities
were transferred to NWG, which is to “[s]erve as the Navy lead for irregular warfare (IW) to
incorporate IW into Navy capstone documents and to inform the PPBE [Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution] process.”24
2010 Navy Vision Statement for Countering Irregular Challenges
The Navy in January 2010 published a vision statement for countering irregular challenges, which
stated the following in part:
The U.S. Navy will meet irregular challenges through a flexible, agile, and broad array of
multi-mission capabilities. We will emphasize Cooperative Security as part of a
comprehensive government approach to mitigate the causes of insecurity and instability.
We will operate in and from the maritime domain with joint and international partners to
enhance regional security and stability, and to dissuade, deter, and when necessary, defeat
irregular forces.25
The full text of the vision statement is reproduced in Appendix C.

22 Eric Tucker (Associated Press), “Benghazi Prosecution Focuses Attention on US Interrogation Strategy As Defense
Seeks Dismissal,” U.S. News & World Report, August 15, 2015. See also Spencer S. Hsu, “U.S. Defends Seizure and
Interrogation of Benghazi Terrorism Suspect,” Washington Post, September 2, 2015.
23 Zachary M. Peterson, “New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,” Inside the Navy,
September 1, 2008.
24 Source: Navy administrative message accessed August 19, 2016, at http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/
reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2013/NAV13014.txt.
25 Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges,
January 2010, p. 3.
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Navy Community of Interest (COI) for Countering Irregular Challenges
The Navy in December 2010 established “a community of interest [COI] to develop and advance
ideas, collaboration and advocacy related to confronting irregular challenges (CIC).”26
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)
The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006.
NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a
role in IW operations. DON stated in 2014 that
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of expeditionary
combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint warfighting commanders.
It is responsible for centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources,
manning, training and equipping of a scalable, self-sustaining, integrated expeditionary
force of active and reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the
globe, supporting contingency operations and Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security
Cooperation Plans, providing a forward presence of waterborne and ashore anti-terrorism
force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief.27
DON also stated in 2014 that
The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component
forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within
NECC. Blending the AC and RC brings strength to the force and is an important part of
the Navy’s ability to carry out the Naval Maritime Strategy from blue water into green and
brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force. The Navy Reserve trains and equips
over half of the Sailors supporting NECC missions, including naval construction and
explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM region, as well as maritime expeditionary
security, expeditionary logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil affairs,
expeditionary intelligence, and other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated with
operational forces around the world. In addition, Coastal Riverine Group 2 has taken on a
new armed escort mission for High Value Units (HVU) which has traditionally been
provided by the U.S. Coast Guard. The escort enhances force protection for HVUs while
transiting into and out of CONUS ports during restricted maneuvering.28
Global Maritime Partnership
The Global Maritime Partnership was a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of
cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces,
for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. DON stated in 2014
that “through partnerships with a growing number of nations, including those in Africa and Latin
America, we will strive for a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity.”29

26 Source: Memorandum dated December 22, 2010, from S. M. Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, on the
subject, “Confronting Irregular Challenges Community of Interest (COI) Charter.” A copy of the memorandum was
posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required). For an article discussing the Navy’s establishment of this
community of interest, see Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Taps Other Services, Elite Forces For Irregular Warfare
Advice,” Inside the Navy, January 17, 2011.
27 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, pp. 3-12 and 3-13.
28 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 3-20.
29 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2015 Budget, 2014, p. 7-1. For more on the
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Partnership Stations
The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) were Navy
ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that deployed to the Caribbean and to
waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions,
particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for increasing
the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS
can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-mentioned global maritime
partnership. A July 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report discussed the APS.30
Coastal Riverine Force
The Navy in May 2006 reestablished its riverine force by standing up Riverine Group 1 at Naval
Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA (now part of Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort
Story, or JEBLC-FS). Riverine Group 1 included three active-duty riverine squadrons of 12 boats
each that were established in 2006-2007. Operations of the squadrons from 2006 to 2011 included
multiple deployments to Iraq for the purpose, among other things, of relieving Marines who until
2006 had been conducting maritime security operations in Iraqi ports and waterways.
On June 1, 2012, the Navy merged the riverine force and the Maritime Expeditionary Security
Force (MESF) to create Coastal Riverine Force (CORIVFOR). The Navy stated that CORIVFOR
“performs core maritime expeditionary security missions in the green and brown waters, bridging
the gap between traditional Navy blue water operations and land-based forces, providing port and
harbor security for vital waterways and protection of high value assets and maritime
infrastructure.”31 The Navy stated that CORIVFOR was scheduled to reach initial operating
capability (IOC) in October 2012 and full operational capability (FOC) in October 2014, and that
“all current and scheduled routine deployments will continue as normal.”32
A July 14, 2014, news report states the following:
In 2012, the Navy merged Riverine Forces and Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces to
form the Coastal Riverine Force. There are currently seven squadrons. Squadrons 1, 3 and
11 are home ported on the west coast and Squadrons 2, 4, 8 and 10 are home ported on the
east coast. The force currently consists of both active and reserve service members who
man and operate more than 100 boats, ranging from rubber combat raiding crafts to 53-
foot command boats that can carry up to 26 personnel.33
A January 18, 2013, Navy news report stated the following:

Navy’s contribution to multinational antipiracy operations near the Horn of Africa, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off
the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard et al. (out of print, but available to congressional clients upon request).
30 Government Accountability Office, Defense Management[:]Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa, GAO-10-794, July 2010, 63 pp.
31 Kay Savarese, “NECC Establishes Coast Riverine Force,” Navy News Service, June 1, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012,
at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=67545. See also Corinne Reilly, “New Navy Command To
Incorporate Riverines,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, May 16, 2012; Megan Eckstein, “Coastal Riverine Force Expanding
Its Reach Following June 1 Merger,” Inside the Navy, June 11, 2012; and Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy
Reorganizes Post-War Riverine Forces,” Defense News, May 7, 2012: 4. See also Matthew M. Burke, “Reviving the
Riverines,” Stars and Stripes, November 1, 2012: 1.
32 Naval Expeditionary Combat Command Public Affairs, “NECC Announces Formation of Coastal Riverine Force,”
Navy News Service, May 14, 2012, accessed May 15, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=
67167.
33 Dominique J. Shelton, “Coast Riverine Force: The Brown Water Navy,” Navy News Service, July 14, 2014.
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Sailors, former Riverines, and family members attended a disestablishment ceremony for
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command’s Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 3 at Naval
Weapons Station Yorktown, Jan. 17.
The disestablishment marks the merger of offensive Riverine forces with defensive
Maritime Expeditionary Security Forces to form the Coastal Riverine Force (CORIVFOR),
formally established June 1[, 2012]....
CORIVFOR’s primary mission is to conduct maritime security operations across all phases
of military operations by defending high value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports
and harbors, both inland and on coastal waterways, and when commanded, conduct
offensive combat operations.
The budget-initiated merger moved portions of the force to San Diego as part of the
National Defense Strategy’s rebalance to the Pacific, which will bring Riverine capability
to the West coast for the first time since 1974, according to Capt. Eric B. Moss, commander
of Coastal Riverine Group 1, formerly Maritime Expeditionary Security Group 1.
“The Riverine forces will do what they’ve always done, which is continuing to hone their
skills and work in brown water and green water areas,” said Moss. “There is no abatement
of requirements. We continue to get missions and are sourced to meet those requirements.
We’re doing the same with less.”
The merge cuts the former seven active Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF)
squadrons and three active RIVRONs down to three active Coastal Riverine squadrons and
four reserve squadrons.
“This is a reduction in capacity, but not in capability,” said Moss. “I would say this is a
very affordable force. We are light, expeditionary, and bring a lot capability in small
packages. We are familiar with disaggregated operations, so immediately we give the
combatant commander a tailor-able and scalable force.”...
Commissioned July 6, 2007, RIVRON 3 served two deployments in Iraq, fulfilling a total
of 502 combat missions, 268 water security operations and countless U.S./Iraq tactical
convoy operations.34
Other Organizational Initiatives
Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a
reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of
officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception
operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, and an intelligence data-mining
capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).
Appendices with Additional Background Information
For additional information on Navy and Marine Corps special operations forces, see the prepared
statements of the Navy and Marine Corps witnesses for an April 1,1 2018, hearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee reprinted in Appendix A.
The Navy outlined its IW activities as of 2011 in its prepared statement for a November 3, 2011,
hearing on the services’ IW activities before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee. For the text of the Navy’s prepared statement, see
Appendix B.

34 Shannon M. Smith, “RIVRON 3 Disestablishes at Naval Weapon Station Yorktown,” Navy News Service, January
18, 2013.
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As noted earlier, for the text of the Navy’s January 2010 vision statement for irregular warfare,
see Appendix C.
A 2012 report on maritime irregular warfare from RAND Corporation, a research firm, provides
additional background information on U.S. maritime irregular warfare operations, both historical
and more recent (i.e., up to the time of the report’s writing).35 The report also made a series of
findings and recommendations relating to U.S. maritime irregular warfare; for a summary of
these findings and recommendations, see Appendix D.
As noted earlier, for additional background information on detention of terrorist suspects on U.S.
Navy ships, see Appendix E.
FY2020 Funding Request
Overview
DON states that the proposed FY2020 budget “continues funding to counter the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and for operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other
locations in theater, as well as for the European Deterrence Initiative,” and “supports building a
more experienced, better trained, and more capable force by increasing the number of Marines
with special skills, like those required for special operations, intelligence operations, electronic,
information, and cyber warfare.”36 Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM’s) proposed
FY2020 budget requests, among other things,
 $72.6 million in the FY2020 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,
Defense-Wide (RDT&EDW) account for Program Element (PE) 1160483BB,37
maritime systems (line 263 in the FY2020 RDT&EDW account), including $45.2
million for Project S0417: Underwater Systems, and $27.4 million for S1684:
Surface Craft; and
 $59.0 million in the FY2020 Procurement, Defense-Wide (PDW) appropriation
account for procurement of underwater systems for SOCOM (line 63 in the
FY2020 PDW account).
For additional background information on the FY2020 funding requests for lines 263 and 63, see
Appendix F.
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Degree of Emphasis on IW in Navy Budgets
One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns how much emphasis to place on IW activities
in Navy budgets, particularly in a context of constraints on Navy budgets and Navy desires to
devote resources to developing “high end” combat capabilities for countering improved
conventional military capabilities of countries such as China and Russia.38 Although the Navy, as

35 Molly Dunigan et al., Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, 111 pp.
36 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2020 Budget, 2019, pp. 8-1, 2-7.
37 In DOD research and development accounts, line items are referred to as program elements, or PEs.
38 For more on China’s military capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for
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discussed earlier in this report, took actions in the years following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, that were intended to improve its IW capabilities, the Navy in more recent
years has taken other actions that might be viewed as reflecting a reduced Navy emphasis on IW.
In that connection, the following points were provided to CRS by the Joint Staff J-7 Irregular
Warfare office in August 2016:
 “US Navy IW funding and force structure have declined over the last few years.”
 “NIWO’s responsibilities now belong to OPNAV N515 [i.e., the office within the
Chief of Naval Operations that oversees the NWG], with dedicated IW staff
decreasing from 13 government/military personnel along with 6 contractors led
by a RDML [rear admiral] to 2 contractors and one O-5 [an officer that in the
Navy is a commander] under O-6 [an officer that in the Navy is a captain]
oversight.”
 In May 2014, the Navy closed its Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training
Command (MCAST), an action “which reduced civil affairs (CA) and security
force assistance (SFA) capacity. The MCAST’s mission was to train sailors to
perform civil-military affairs and security force assistance missions. It also
provided approximately 50 percent of Navy expeditionary training.... MCAST
functions are now distributed across the Navy. The Naval Education and Training
Security Assistance Field Activity serves as the focal point for security assistance
training issues. The Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center processes individual
augmentees for deployment. Civil affairs functions were not replaced.” A July
2015 Navy memo states “that the Navy does not ‘possess dedicated CA units or
members.’”
 The Navy’s FY2017 budget requested funding to preserve Helicopter Sea
Combat (HSC) Squadron 85, a unit that “supports Naval Special Warfare and
other SOCOM [Special Operations Command] assets,” which was “a positive
development.” On the other hand, the Navy in March 2016 “disbanded HSC 84, a
sister squadron providing similar support.... This action essentially cut
experienced, operational capacity in half. Whether the TSUs [i.e., the two
Tactical Support Units that are to be stood up under the Navy’s proposed FY2017
budget] will meet SOF requirements remains to be seen.”
 The Navy Community of Interest (COI) for Countering Irregular Challenges
“does not extend beyond the Navy Analytic Group. This body, tied to the
Community of Interest, submits IW program gap, technical demonstration, and
study initiatives to N515 for funding. Members include Fleet Forces Command,
the NECC, the Navy Undersea Warfare Center, and the Navy War College. The
larger COI has not [as of August 2016] had a formal meeting in approximately 3
years.”39
A January 17, 2019, press report stated:
After spending the better part of the past two decades supporting wars in a desert region,
the U.S. Navy is starting to bring the SEALs back into the fold as it faces threats from
major powers such as China and Russia.

U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R44196, The
Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Ian E. Rinehart.
39 Source: Email to CRS from Joint Staff J-7 Irregular Warfare office, August 18, 2016.
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The Navy is incorporating its elite special warfare teams into strategic calculations for
every potential major power combat scenario, from China and Russia to Iran and North
Korea, said Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran in a round-table with
reporters at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium.
The movement toward reconnecting with the blue water force (the Navy’s regular ships,
aircraft and submarine forces) started under former Naval Special Warfare Command head
Rear Adm. Brian Losey, who retired in 2016. The effort has continued to grow under
subsequent commanders, said Moran.
“It’s to the point now where we include them in all of our exercises, our war games, our
tabletops — because as much as it is their chance to ‘re-blue,’ it’s our chance to reconnect
from the blue side," he added. “We’ve grown used to not having them in a lot of those
situations. Now as we’ve done the tabletops, the exercises and the war games, we see:
‘Wow, there is some great capability here that can set the conditions for the kind of
operations in every single one of those campaigns.’ And that will continue to grow, I think.”
There have been indications that the SEALs are specifically eyeing environments similar
to those in the South China Sea. A recent environmental assessment obtained by the
Honolulu Star Advertiser revealed that the SEALs were looking to triple the amount of
training time spent in the Hawaiian islands, expanding from Oahu and Hawaii island to
Kauai, Maui, Molokai and Lanai.40
A January 30, 2019, press report similarly stated:
Having spent 17 years conducting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in
the deserts and mountains of the Middle East, the Naval Special Warfare community is
shifting its focus to threats from China, Russia and aspiring adversaries.
Navy operations planners are including Navy SEALs in all aspects of planning and
training, such as war games, exercises and tabletop scenarios, Vice Chief of Naval
Operations Adm. Bill Moran told reporters Jan. 16 at the Surface Navy Association's
annual conference.
The shift began in 2013 when Rear Adm. Brian Losey, then-commander of Naval Special
Warfare Command, began making "a concerted effort to talk to his teams about getting
back to the 'blue side,'" Moran said, referring to the Navy's large fighting forces of ships,
submarines and aircraft.
That focus has continued since Losey retired in 2016, Moran added.
"[Losey] saw the 'great power competition,' he saw the threats of an emerging Russia,
China, North Korea and Iran," Moran said. [SEALs] have a very specific and important
role to play in all situations."
Since the U.S. insertion into Afghanistan in 2001, special operations forces, including the
SEALs, have focused on a specific selection of their skill sets, including small-scale strikes
and offensive actions, counterinsurgency, hostage rescue, counterterrorism and countering
weapons of mass destruction.
But these forces have other expertise that is relevant to both large-scale military conflicts
as well as the type of posturing and competing for regional and global dominance that
currently is happening, according to a 2017 report by David Broyles and Brody
Blankenship, analysts at CNA, an Arlington, Virginia-based think tank that concentrates
on the U.S. Navy.

40 David B. Larter, “After years Fighting Terrorism, the SEALs Turn Their Eyes Toward Fighting Big Wars,” Defense
News, January 17, 2019.
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Those skills include preparing an environment for operations, reconnaissance,
unconventional operations, military information support operations and foreign
humanitarian assistance, according to the report, The Role of Special Operations Forces in
Global Competition.
"Special operations forces have a greater role to play in today's global competition through
a counteractive approach to adversary maneuvers," Broyles and Blankenship wrote. "The
United States has only recently recognized that adversaries are exploiting the U.S. view of
'preparing for future war' vice 'competing in the here and now.' "
Moran agreed that Navy SEALs have a unique talent set that the "blue side" had largely
forgotten.
"We've grown used to not having them in a lot of situations. ... Wow, there are some great
capabilities here that can set the conditions in the world for the kind of operations we are
going to need in every single one of our campaigns," he said.
A draft environmental assessment published by the Navy on Nov. 8 indicated that the
SEALs are planning to increase training in Hawaii, asking to increase the number of
exercises from the 110 events allowed now on non-federally owned land to as many as 330
training events on non-federal land or waterways and 265 training events on federal
property.
The proposed training also would expand the area for conducting exercises to include
Kauai, Lanai, Maui and Molokai, in addition to Oahu and Hawaii.
The training, in a location relatively near to and similar in climate to the South China Sea,
where China continues to assert its dominance, is necessary to enhance the Navy Special
Warfare Command's traditional skill sets, including diving and swimming; operating with
submersibles and unmanned aircraft systems; insertion and extraction; reconnaissance and
parachuting; and rope suspension training activities, according to the report.
Moran said the SEALs' return to their roots will bolster lethality of the Navy as a whole.
"As much as it's their chance to re-blue, it's our chance to reconnect from the blue side," he
said. "That will continue to grow, I think."41
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 How do current Navy IW capabilities and capacity compare with those of 5 or 10
years ago? Under proposed Navy budgets, how will Navy IW capabilities and
capacity in coming years compare to those of today?
 In a context of constraints on Navy budgets and Navy desires to devote resources
to developing “high end” combat capabilities for countering improved
conventional military capabilities of countries such as China and Russia, is the
Navy striking the right balance between funding for IW capabilities and capacity
and funding for other Navy priorities?
 Does Congress have sufficient visibility into the operations of U.S. SOF,
including Navy SEALs, to support congressional oversight over those
operations?42

41 Patricia Kime, “As Russia, China Threaten, Navy SEALs Get a New Focus,” Military.com, January 30, 2019.
42 For articles relating to this issue, see, for example, Wesley Morgan, “Behind the Secret U.S. War in Africa, Despite
Pentagon Assertions, Secret Programs Allow American Troops to Direct Combat Raids in Somalia, Kenya, Niger and
Other African nations,” Politico, July 2, 2018; Nick Turse, “Special Operations Forces Continue to Expand Across the
World—Without Congressional Oversight, The Nation, July 17, 2018.
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Role of Naval Special Warfare Development Group (Seal Team 6)
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the role of Seal Team 6 in Navy CT and
IW operations. A June 6, 2015, press report states the following:
They have plotted deadly missions from secret bases in the badlands of Somalia. In
Afghanistan, they have engaged in combat so intimate that they have emerged soaked in
blood that was not their own. On clandestine raids in the dead of the night, their weapons
of choice have ranged from customized carbines to primeval tomahawks.
Around the world, they have run spying stations disguised as commercial boats, posed as
civilian employees of front companies and operated undercover at embassies as male-
female pairs, tracking those the United States wants to kill or capture.
Those operations are part of the hidden history of the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, one of the
nation’s most mythologized, most secretive and least scrutinized military organizations.
Once a small group reserved for specialized but rare missions, the unit best known for
killing Osama bin Laden has been transformed by more than a decade of combat into a
global manhunting machine.
That role reflects America’s new way of war, in which conflict is distinguished not by
battlefield wins and losses, but by the relentless killing of suspected militants.
Almost everything about SEAL Team 6, a classified Special Operations unit, is shrouded
in secrecy—the Pentagon does not even publicly acknowledge that name—though some
of its exploits have emerged in largely admiring accounts in recent years. But an
examination of Team 6’s evolution, drawn from dozens of interviews with current and
former team members, other military officials and reviews of government documents,
reveals a far more complex, provocative tale.
While fighting grinding wars of attrition in Afghanistan and Iraq, Team 6 performed
missions elsewhere that blurred the traditional lines between soldier and spy. The team’s
sniper unit was remade to carry out clandestine intelligence operations, and the SEALs
joined Central Intelligence Agency operatives in an initiative called the Omega Program,
which offered greater latitude in hunting adversaries.
Team 6 has successfully carried out thousands of dangerous raids that military leaders
credit with weakening militant networks, but its activities have also spurred recurring
concerns about excessive killing and civilian deaths....
When suspicions have been raised about misconduct, outside oversight has been limited.
Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees SEAL Team 6 missions, conducted its
own inquiries into more than a half-dozen episodes, but seldom referred them to Navy
investigators. “JSOC investigates JSOC, and that’s part of the problem,” said one former
senior military officer experienced in special operations, who like many others interviewed
for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity because Team 6’s activities are
classified.
Even the military’s civilian overseers do not regularly examine the unit’s operations. “This
is an area where Congress notoriously doesn’t want to know too much,” said Harold Koh,
the State Department’s former top legal adviser, who provided guidance to the Obama
administration on clandestine war....
Like the C.I.A.’s campaign of drone strikes, Special Operations missions offer policy
makers an alternative to costly wars of occupation. But the bulwark of secrecy around
Team 6 makes it impossible to fully assess its record and the consequences of its actions,
including civilian casualties or the deep resentment inside the countries where its members
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operate. The missions have become embedded in American combat with little public
discussion or debate.43
Legislative Activity for FY2020
DOD’s proposed FY2020 budget requests, among other things,
 $72.6 million in the FY2020 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,
Defense-Wide (RDT&EDW) account for Program Element (PE) 1160483BB,44
(Special Operations Command [SOCOM]) maritime systems (line 263 in the
FY2020 RDT&EDW account), including $45.2 million for Project S0417:
Underwater Systems, and $15.6 million for S1684: Surface Craft; and
 $27.4 million in the FY2020 Procurement, Defense-Wide (PDW) appropriation
account for procurement of underwater systems for SOCOM (line 63 in the
FY2020 PDW account).
Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the above funding requests.
Table 1. Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Research and Development, Defense-Wide
[SOCOM] Maritime Systems (line 263)
72.6

72.6

75.6

Procurement, Defense-Wide
[SOCOM] Underwater systems (line 63)
59.0

59.0

59.0

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on DOD’s FY2020 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2020 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.
FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11, 2019) on S.
1790, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 1.

43 Mark Mazzetti et al., “SEAL Team 6: A Secret History of Quiet Killings and Blurred Lines,” New York Times, June
6, 2015.
44 In DOD research and development accounts, line items are referred to as program elements, or PEs.
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FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2968)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-84 of May 23, 2019) on H.R.
2968, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 1. The recommended
increase of $3.0 million for line 263 is for “Program increase—diver propulsion.” (Page 296)

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Appendix A. April 2018 Navy and Marine Corps
Testimony on Special Operations Forces
This appendix reprints the prepared statements of Rear Admiral Tim Szymanski, U.S. Navy,
Commander, Naval Warfare Special Warfare Command, and Major General Carl E. Mundy, III,
U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, for an
April 11, 2018, hearing the Special Operations Command’s efforts to transform the force for
future security challenges.
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Szymanski
The text of Admiral Szymanski’s statement is as follows:
Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member Heinrich and distinguished Members of the
Committee, I am honored to appear before you, and proud to provide an update on your
Navy’s Special Operations Force and the U.S. Special Operations Command’s maritime
component.
As you are aware, the security challenges facing our nation today are numerous, and are
made more difficult by adversaries who are exploiting emerging technologies and gaining
ground. We will continue to face Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), while the
battlefield expands and becomes more complex and chaotic. Today, our most pressing
security concerns involve the aggressive, coercive, and disruptive actions of near-peer
competitors and rogue regimes. Exerting power by fighting below the level of armed
conflict favors these players to the point that they are gaining advantages that threaten our
national security. We must continue to be smarter, stronger, quicker, and more lethal than
our adversaries, in order to protect our nation in a world that grows more complex every
day.
As an enterprise of nearly 10,000 personnel—2,810 SEALs; 780 Special Warfare
Combatant-craft Crewmen; 4,100 support personnel; 780 reservists; 1,240 civilians—your
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) Command accounts for only 2.4 percent of the Navy’s
personnel. Our budget accounts for less than one percent of the Department of the Navy’s
budget, and approximately 12 percent of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
budget.
We continue to have a global presence—operating in more than 35 countries on any given
day. We are networked with the U.S. Navy and Joint Forces, the interagency, and allies
and foreign partners, executing missions in support of USSOCOM, the U.S. Navy,
geographic Combatant Commanders, and ultimately, national objectives across a full range
of political and operational environments.
NSW’s ALIGNMENT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) published earlier this year charged the Department
of Defense (DoD) to be more agile, more lethal, and more innovative in order to maintain
our competitive advantage. The Chief of Naval Operations, in turn, laid out the maritime
responsibilities articulated in the NDS, focusing on increasing Naval Power through
balancing capability and capacity with readiness and sustainment.
As the Commander, my challenge is to man, train, and equip the Force to be better
positioned to support the NDS, the National Military Strategy and the Navy’s Strategy for
Maintaining Maritime Superiority, while supporting the operational requirements of the
theater commanders. Furthermore, the long-term sustainment, health, and well-being of
our people remains my highest priority.
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NSW RESOURCING
After nearly 17 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, we are focused on reasserting our
capabilities as the maritime component to Special Operations, properly postured to meet
the threats of the future, enhancing our partnership with the Navy and exploring
opportunities for increased integration and interoperability, while building capabilities and
capacity with fleet, submarine, aviation and cyber forces.
Acknowledging that manpower requirements have outpaced authorized and actual growth,
we have spent the last year taking a hard look at our force structure to determine how we
can best use the resources we have to optimize the impacts we are making on the battlefield.
We looked at how to eliminate redundancy, redirect resources and merge assets to build
depth and agility and how to meet transregional threats and provide increased combat
lethality to the Theater Special Operation Commands. Optimizing our Force is paramount
to meeting current operational requirements and provide greater agility to meet future
requirements.
We recently collaborated with the Naval Post graduate school to conduct a maritime, multi-
thread experiment in Southern California. The exercise allowed us to explore a realistic
scenario using unmanned systems in a multi-domain (sea, air and land) environment. We
learned a lot and advanced the potential use of artificial intelligence and human-machine
teaming in current conflicts which will eventually increase our lethality while reducing
risk.
We have made necessary investments aimed at increasing our lethality, and refining our
capabilities that enable access to contested areas.
We have made significant increases in our unmanned aerial vehicle lethality by adding
targeting capabilities, increasing the capabilities of current sensor suites, and using
algorithms and artificial intelligence to speed up the targeting cycle.
We have modernized numerous small arms systems, including procuring a purpose built,
full-time suppressed, medium range weapons system; a lighter weight medium machine
gun that matches and, in some cases, surpasses the effective range of a .50 caliber machine
gun; a sniper weapons system with optics and wind sensing technology; and shoulder-
launched munitions that allow for very precise engagements through hardened structures.
We have made great strides in modernizing our maritime mobility platforms. In fact, our
partnerships with maritime industries has never been stronger.
We have introduced high performance surface combatant craft into our fleet to serve across
the spectrum of maritime operations. They include our new Combatant Craft Assault which
replaced the NSW 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat and our Combatant Craft Medium
which replaced the Mark V Special Operations Craft and the introduction of the new
Combatant Craft Heavy.
Special Operations Force (SOF) undersea mobility platforms provide uniquely capable,
clandestine means to access peer/near-peer locations. To that end, we expect to introduce
two new undersea submersibles this year– the Shallow Water Combat Submersible
(SWCS), which will replace our legacy SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV), and the Dry
Combat Submersible (DCS), a new platform to our inventory.
Nearly a year ago, we piloted a deliberate effort to realize the Secretary of Defense’s
guidance of exploiting Industry’s investment in technology to relentlessly pursue
innovative and advanced operational capabilities for our warfighters at a greater speed,
relevant to the pace of technology in order to outpace our adversaries. This venture allowed
us to understand and take advantage of new DoD contracting and procurement authorities
as well as maximizing the utilization of DoD and USSOCOM outreach-to-industry
platforms such as Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) and SOFWERX.
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NSW has learned and applied how to effectively make use of these and other new and
emerging opportunities to rapidly bring future operational concepts to the present: such as
our realization of Artificial Intelligence-Autonomy of ISR Drones. This example among
others, show promise to have exponential impacts on our capabilities to accomplish our
mission in a more agile, lethal and sustainable manner. Our efforts—to rapidly prototype,
experiment with and lead in new and emerging technologies are aimed at delivering
capabilities at the speed of relevancy to our warfighters.
Finally, bottom up, operator-inspired innovation drives experimentation during exercises,
and training eventually equates to relevancy and leads to greater success on the battlefield.
With our component partners and throughout USSOCOM, innovation is happening at the
unit level up and through headquarters. Our focus on innovation is driven by our people –
buying down risk to our force while increasing our speed, accuracy, and lethality.
PEOPLE: THE FIRST SOF TRUTH
Our primary weapons system remains The Operator. We continue to invest heavily in our
personnel, whether it’s to train, retain or sustain them. We select, train and maintain
persons of character, who are mature, highly skilled, culturally attuned and trusted to
execute our nation’s most sensitive missions.
Thank you for your role in the preservation of our Force with the 10-year, $1 billion Silver
Strand Training Center-South, the single most important military construction effort
impacting the current and future operational readiness of the NSW Force. Once complete,
the complex will consolidate the training requirements of today’s force, creating
efficiencies and synergy of improved operational planning and preparedness, but also allow
our operators to spend more time with their families and communities.
We remain committed to the physical and mental health of our operators, as we have a
moral obligation to ensure their well-being. Preservation of the Force and Families, our
Human Performance Program, and our most important initiatives involving Cognitive
Health are about keeping our warriors in the fight, extending their service life, and giving
them a high quality life post-service.
With strong Congressional support, the USSOCOM Preservation of the Force and Family
program continues to meet and exceed the intent to build resilience and facilitate the long-
term care of our operators and their families, while never forgetting our fallen teammates
with ongoing support to our Gold Star Families.
Embedded professional care providers working within validated programs have helped turn
the corner on many of the negative trends that have impacted those who have been in this
long fight. Our usage data shows an increase in service members and families going to see
clinical psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, nurse case managers, which speaks
directly to de-stigmatization and trust. Similarly, there is a high number of cross referrals
among the various care providers that demonstrates mutual support and clinical trust and
reliance.
In regard to Human Performance, our athletic trainers, strength coaches and physical
therapists provide tailored and operationally relevant programs have resulted in injury
reduction and increased recovery time from injuries with a direct impact to overall team
readiness.
Our Warrior and Family Support staff provide hands on, personal touch and connection to
our families and children, connecting them to all the Service-provided and SOF-unique
programs that are so vital to the strength and resilience of our family members.
We have also learned that long-term physical and psychological challenges may result in
impacts to one’s memory, attention, processing speed, problem-solving, visuospatial
function and impulse control which can affect operational performance and mission
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accomplishment. Given that we are in the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in
our history, learning about the cognitive health of our force is a critical initiative.
We have initiated a Cognitive Surveillance Program that will be a more pre-emptive
approach to intervention where cognitive impacts are indicated. More broadly, this
initiative will seek to identify injuries earlier, track individual trends, and assist in
developing comprehensive treatment plans to aid in the recovery of our service members.
The end-state is to get NSW operators back into the fight while contributing to their long-
term wellness.
The Surveillance Program entails an initial baseline screening of all SEAL/SWCC
operators within NSW by 30 June 2018; and ongoing re-testing every two years to assess
significant change, similar to other routine exams such as dental or audiogram.
Aggressive efforts include increasing awareness of potential issues and not waiting for
perfect solutions. Therefore, we are actively ‘driving the science’ through our blast
exposure research efforts, ultimately looking to create a ‘dive-table-like’ approach to heavy
weapons/breaching exposure levels and mitigation needs.
NSW continues to seek and offer best practices as we develop our cognitive health
emphases. We rely on education, informed research efforts, and leadership support across
the continuum of care to help mitigate the range of brain injuries and increase recovery
rates for our members.
Part of that continuum of care focuses on our transitioning veterans, whether at four years
or after forty, with a holistic, SOF-unique initiative called Future Former Frogmen, or F3.
F3 focuses on ensuring the successful transition of our active duty into civilian life by
leveraging our neurocognitive science initiatives, continuum of leadership development
efforts, readiness support programs, and veteran’s resources. F3 provides structure, process
and guidance throughout the complex transition experience giving the service member
access to existing programs to ensure NSW veterans remain resilient. SOF for Life, a
powerful support network, continues from active duty life to veteran life.
Today in Coronado, California, at the Basic Underwater and Demolition / SEAL school,
otherwise known as BUD/S, there are approximately 100 of America’s best and brightest
going through training to be part of the Navy’s elite special operations maritime force as
part of the most recent class, Class 330.
Just like those seeking to be part of my brethren’s communities, those seeking to be part of
the SEAL community, those who succeed in the 63-week course will earn their Trident.
At the end of 63 weeks, each student will have swam 48 miles; hiked or patrolled over 150
miles; and conducted at least 40 dives while spending a minimum of 60 hours, or two and
a half days under water. As a class, at the end of those 63 weeks, they will have completed
the equivalent of swimming from Cuba to the southern tip of Florida, then running to New
York City.
And that is just a snapshot of what we ask them to do before they have taken their first step
into their first operation in defense of our country. It is precisely because of what we ask
them to do, starting in Coronado, then around the world, through operation after operation,
that we are focused on their long-term health, and the well-being of our Force and Families.
Naval Special Warfare Command will continue to place priority on strengthening,
equipping and protecting our people; outpacing our enemies in the employment of new
technologies and accelerating trends, enabling us to compete below the threshold of
conflict. We will refine and adapt our organizational structure to ensure Naval Special
Warfare remains relevant and lethal, and when necessary, stands ready, willing and able to
engage in combat to fight and win decisively for many years to come.
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Thank you for your time, your care for our Naval Special Warfare community, and I
welcome the opportunity today to answer your questions.45
Prepared Statement of Major General Mundy
The text of Major General Mundy’s statement is as follows:
Introduction
Marine Raiders are the Marine Corps’ contribution to United States Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM). Through specialized and advanced training, MARSOC builds
upon its unique attributes and ethos as Marines to produce agile, scalable, fully-enabled,
and responsive special operations forces (SOF) comprised of operators and special
operations-specific combat support and combat service support specialists. MARSOC
formations task organize for every assigned mission and leverage their robust command
and control capability and their ability to fuse operations with intelligence down to the team
level. All of these factors enable our Raiders to succeed in distributed environments and
enable partners at the tactical and operational levels of war. MARSOC contributes to the
SOF enterprise and US combatant commands by providing full spectrum special operations
capabilities to combat complex transregional problems.
Established in 2006, our organization continues to address the most immediate threats to
our Nation and has become a key participant in the ongoing fight against violent extremist
organizations. Accepting this, we are also cognizant that we must work to minimize
pressure on our force and our families as we simultaneously prepare for future threats. We
ensure preparedness by adapting our training methods using feedback from currently
deployed forces to better prepare our Raiders for what they will encounter while deployed.
Simultaneously, we minimize pressure on the force by ensuring adequate access to
Preservation of the Force and Families (POTFF) resources. We recognize that our
operational capability ultimately rests upon a foundation of outstanding individuals and
their families. In order to safeguard and sustain MARSOC’s human capital, our most
valuable resource, we continually strive to balance operational commitments with time
Raiders spend at home station. Part of our effort to take care of families involves ensuring
that our POTFF program not only delivers responsive and effective support, but that it
continues to evolve with changing demands and needs of our force.
Background
During my tenure as the Commander of MARSOC, I have continually been impressed by
the caliber of our individuals, be they Marines, Sailors, or civilians. They are well trained,
well equipped, and provide the full spectrum special operations capability that has been
crucial to success on the modern battlefield in places as diverse as Mali in West Africa,
contested areas of Iraq, and Marawi in the Philippines. Twelve years on, MARSOC is
maturing into a full and integral member of the SOF enterprise just as it continues to
provide Raiders to counter our Nation’s threats. Taking into account where MARSOC is
today, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge some of the formative episodes in
the history of our Marine Corps that got us here.
The United States Marines Corps’ rich history is one that is replete with expeditionary
operations against what we know today as irregular threats. These actions serve as the
foundation for what is Marine Corps Special Operations today. Although the United States
Marine Corps (USMC) did not provide a service component to the United States Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) until 2005, the Marine Corps has demonstrated an
ability to conduct and support special operations throughout its history.

45 Statement of Rear Admiral Tim Szymanski, U.S. Navy, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, before the
Senate Armed Services Committee subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, April 11, 2018, 9 pp.
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In the early years of America’s involvement in World War II, President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt was determined to bring the war to our enemies as rapidly as possible. Because
of the Marine Corps’ historical successes in small wars and its recent development of
amphibious operational concepts, it was considered to be the ideal parent organization for
the president’s vision for “commando” operations.
In January 1942 the United States Marine Corps established two Raider battalions. The
mission of the new Raider units was to spearhead amphibious landings, conduct raiding
expeditions against Japanese held territory, as well as conduct guerilla-type operations
behind enemy lines for extended periods. Marine Raiders were intellectually dynamic,
morally disciplined, and physically fit with an irrepressible sense of duty, loyalty to one
another, and imbued with a “Gung Ho” spirit in the face of adversity… much like the
Marines and Sailors we select and train as Raiders today.
During the Vietnam War and throughout the Cold War era, the Marine Corps did not
formally possess a specialized unit. However, many Marines were members of specialized
Joint and certain, tailored conventional units, such as force reconnaissance and Marine
Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable). These units performed some of the
types of missions we associate with Special Operations today. The complex global
environment produced by the end of the Cold War as well as the world changing events of
September 11, 2001, prompted an almost immediate need for additional special operations
capacity capable of achieving operational and strategic effects. In light of these events and
the pressing need for more SOF, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called for the
Marines to work more closely with USSOCOM.
After validating an initial proof of concept in 2004 known as the Marine Corps Special
Operations Command Detachment (DET One), the Secretary of Defense directed the
Marine Corps to provide a permanent contribution to USSOCOM – what would become
Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command – in November 2005. On 24 February
2006, MARSOC activated at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina as a service component
assigned to USSOCOM. MARSOC today comprises a headquarters, one Marine Raider
Regiment, one Marine Raider Support Group, and the Marine Raider Training Center. The
Command has forces on both the east coast at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and on the
west coast at Camp Pendleton, California. Presiding over a total force of approximately
3,000 Marines, Sailors, and 200 Federal Civilians, the Command is employed across the
globe executing special operations missions in support of SOCOM and the geographic
combatant commands that span the SOF core activities. With a focus on counterterrorism,
direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance,
and counterinsurgency, your modern-day Raiders also have the capability to directly
support hostage rescue and recovery, countering of weapons of mass destruction,
unconventional warfare, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information, and civil
affairs operations. In order to achieve success and provide full spectrum capability across
this wide swathe of core activities, we must prioritize our efforts.
MARSOC Priorities
Understanding our role as a force provider and capability generator within the SOF
enterprise, we have taken the SOCOM Commander’s priorities of “Win, Transform, and
People,” and applied them to how we prepare our forces to accomplish assigned missions.
To this end, MARSOC currently focuses on four priority areas: the provision of integrated
full spectrum SOF, capabilities integration between SOF and Marine Air Ground Task
Forces (MAGTF), future force development, and the preservation of the force and families.
Priority 1: Force Provider
Our first priority is to provide integrated full spectrum SOF that are task organized, trained
and equipped to accomplish assigned special operations tasks. At any given point in the
year, MARSOC has approximately 400 Raiders deployed across 18 countries carrying out
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assigned missions. We maintain three, forward task organized Marine Special Operations
Companies; one each in Central Command, Africa Command, and the Pacific Command
areas of responsibility. In addition to company-level deployments, we maintain one
persistent O-5 (Lieutenant Colonel) level Special Operations Task Force in Central
Command and a one-third rotational split with Naval Special Warfare Command for an O-
6 (Colonel) level Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters, also in
Central Command. At every level, these deployed formations bring integrated capabilities
across all functional areas and allow us to operate across the full range of special operations
missions. We believe that it is these high-end capabilities that provide our forces with a
competitive edge against the adversaries we face.
Providing our force begins with the recruitment process and continues through our
assessment, selection, and individual training pipeline. We are focused on recruiting the
best individuals from across the Marine Corps. Based on the results of our deployed forces
and feedback from supported commanders, our recruiting and selection methods are
working. Our training is progressive. As individuals earn new special operations
specialties, they are moved to teams or special skills training environments. This training
continues until deployment and covers everything from individual skill sets to high-end,
advanced, complex unit collective training.
In order to assess and certify Marine Special Operations Companies for deployment,
MARSOC has created the RAVEN exercise. Held six times each year, RAVEN
emphasizes realistic decision making for company and team commanders and provides a
venue to practice the full planning, decision, execution, and assessment cycle. Alternating
between Gulfport, Mississippi and Smyrna, Tennessee, RAVEN is a living exercise that
enables MARSOC to incorporate the most current lessons from our deployed units as well
as anticipated enemy actions inform and support ongoing joint contingency planning. For
example, our most recent RAVEN conducted in Tennessee, featured a more robust foreign
intelligence threat that undertook both physical and technical surveillance against our
Marine Special Operations Teams. During this RAVEN we also exposed our teams to the
degraded communications environment we would expect to encounter when facing a near-
peer/emerging competitor.
The training environments we create are dynamic. Not only do they prepare our Raiders
for the current operational challenge, but they also evolve based on emerging threats and
our expected participation in support of standing operational plans. Another benefit of the
RAVEN exercises is its utility as a venue for integrating conventional Marine Corps
resources into what is otherwise a SOF-centric exercise.
Priority 2: Capabilities Integration with MAGTFs (Interoperability, Integration, and
Interdependence)
Second, we provide a bridge for routine capabilities integration with SOF and the deployed
Marine Air Ground Task Forces to fully maximize the complimentary capabilities of each
formation; especially in light of near-peer/emerging competitors. Given the threats present
on contemporary battlefields and considering those we expect to face in the future, it has
become increasingly important for SOF to be able to integrate “seamlessly” with the
conventional forces and vice versa. Conventional forces offer capabilities and a capacity
that simply do not exist in our small formations. In today’s complex operating environment,
the extent to which we, across the Joint Force, are able to leverage one another’s strengths,
and thereby offset our vulnerabilities, could determine the difference between success and
failure. Cyber and space based capabilities, intelligence exploitation, mobility, fire support,
logistics and medical support, are all examples of capabilities that we partially rely on
conventional forces to provide– especially in scenarios involving high intensity combat.
Examples of interoperability and capabilities integration occur every day across the globe
from Syria and Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and remote locations in Africa. With
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deliberate efforts to participate in each other’s wargames, exercises, and training, we can
institutionalize these efforts to the point that they become routine.
Priority 3: Future Force Development
As the operating environment evolves and more complex threats emerge, MARSOC must
adapt its force to meet these new challenges. Constant and deliberate innovation, and
evolution is critical to our success. Our concept for development is based on both a bottom-
up driven process that incorporates immediate battlefield feedback into our training
curricula, equipment research, testing, procurement; and a top-down approach that
combines more traditional capability acquisition processes with longer-term future concept
and wargaming efforts.
Regarding equipment development and acquisition, we are tightly integrated with SOCOM
and the Marine Corps and look forward to benefiting from the ongoing efforts of SOCOM’s
Acquisition Technology &Logistics, SOFWERX, and the Marine Corps’ Rapid
Capabilities Office. All of these organizations offer us an expedited procurement process
for emerging technology. We have already taken steps to bring our vision to fruition with
regard to capability development in particular technology areas. These include freeze dried
plasma, semi-autonomous seeing and sensing capability, organic precision fires, counter-
UAS rapid self-defense, unmanned cargo UAS and ground systems, rapid fusion of big
data analytics and machine assisted learning, broadband tactical edge communications, and
specialized insertion capabilities. As we research and improve our warfighting capabilities,
we must kept in mind that our near-peer/emerging competitors are also making similar
advances and investing in emerging technology. It is critical that we ensure that the
technological capabilities we opt for are able to operate, communicate, and self-heal in a
signals degraded environment.
Likewise from a training perspective, we recognize the need to simulate operations in a
degraded/denied communications environment that reflect what we might face when
confronting near-peer/emerging competitors. We also plan to continue to improve our
proficiency in the critical combined arms skills that both increase our lethality and allow
us to maintain a tactical advantage over our adversaries. Last, we acknowledge that we
must be able to operate in any clime and place, therefore we are committed to training in
environments that replicate the full range of what we may experience on the battlefield.
Complementing our near and mid-term efforts at capability development is longer term
work on the development of a MARSOC-specific futures concept. Although this concept
bears a resemblance to similar initiatives undertaken with the Department, it very much
reflects MARSOC’s unique place within SOF and interpretation of what the future
operating environment might look like. We see a world overwhelmingly influenced by a
resurgence of regional competition and instability. As these two themes collide, the
complexity of the operating environment will dramatically challenge the ability of leaders
at all levels to first, understand what is happening and, second, make sound decisions. This
is the very situation in which Raider formations of the future must be prepared to operate;
an urgent, volatile, complex, high-stakes problem that comprises multiple actors and defies
the application of traditional US strengths and solutions.
The results of our futures analysis, conducted over the past 18 months, have provided broad
implications for the force as well as options which MARSOC can use to shape future
capability to meet the challenges posed by the future operating environment. Throughout
our internal wargame series, four discrete concepts or ‘themes’ consistently emerged. Each
theme describes a distinct aspect of a vision for MARSOC, but at the same time each built
upon the others such that the four are interconnected and mutually supporting. Together
they provide a strong conceptual basis for a future MARSOC force that outpaces changes
in the operating environment and remains a reliable force across warfighting and Title X
functions. Collectively, these themes have come together to form the four, core pathways
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of innovation: MARSOF as a Connector, Combined Arms for the Connected Arena, The
Cognitive Operator, and Enterprise Level Agility.
Our futures vision document, MARSOF 2030 explains each of these innovation pathways
in depth and also explores how they interconnect with one another. I will briefly introduce
them here for the benefit of the committee. ‘MARSOF as a Connector’ is intended to
capture MARSOC’s facility in building cohesive, task organized teams. It is the idea that
MARSOC can be the ideal integrator and synchronizer of U.S. Governmental capabilities
with USSOF and partner nation actions. It also acknowledges the non-military nature of
many of the problems we face and the need to look beyond for more durable solutions that
involve tools other than the military.
‘Combined Arms for the Connected Arena’ aims to get at the requirement to ‘sense’ and
‘make sense of’ what is happening in diverse and multi-dimensional environments. This
second pathway also speaks to the use of cyber and information ‘domains’ as potential
venues for conflict now, but certainly with increasing relevance as we look toward the
future. From our standpoint, we must become as comfortable operating in these ‘virtual’
domains as we are in the physical.
Perhaps the most foundational of all of our innovation pathways is ‘the Cognitive
Operator’. This pathway touches all others. At its core is the idea that the future requires a
SOF operator with an equal amount of brains to match the brawn; foresight in addition to
fortitude. Your future Raiders must preside over expanded capabilities that include the
ability to influence allies and partners; understand complex problems; apply a broad set of
national, theater, and interagency capabilities to those problems; and fight as adeptly in the
virtual space as the physical.
The last innovation pathway, ‘Enterprise Level Agility’, leverages MARSOC’s relatively
small size as an advantage. MARSOC possesses the advantage of being a relatively small
force with its own component headquarters – this allows the command to rapidly reorient
the organization to confront new challenges as they emerge. In other words, MARSOC’s
organizational dexterity can provide SOCOM with an agile, adaptable force to meet
unexpected or rapidly changing requirements. In this context, MARSOC’s small size
becomes a strength; one that can provide both institutional and operational agility to the
SOCOM Commander.
Priority 4: Preservation of the Force and Families
Calling to mind the SOF Truth that “people are more important than hardware,” our fourth
priority is the preservation of our force and families program that provide our Raiders and
their families with the access to resources promoting personal resiliency increasing
longevity in service. Although listed as my fourth priority, preservation of the force and
families is equally as important as the previous three priorities because people are at the
heart of all we do. Currently, MARSOF special operators average 1 day overseas for every
1.9 days at home. Our capability specialists that enable communications, intelligence, air
support, explosive ordnance disposal, and our canine handlers, vary by occupational
specialty but average between 1 to 1.7 and 1 to 1.2 days deployed as opposed to days spent
at home station. What these numbers do not reflect is the additional time that is spent away
from home while training in CONUS. Although difficult to measure, Personnel Tempo or
PERSTEMPO receives significant attention at all leadership levels within the Command
such that we aim to balance our service members’ schedules between training at and
training away from home station.
Because of this high operational tempo, POTFF has become an integral tool for
maintaining the overall health of our force through programs that are focused on improving
human performance, providing resources for behavioral health, developing spiritual
fitness, and offering other family-oriented opportunities that are designed to strengthen the
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family unit. We appreciate the continual support from Congress on providing the funding
for programs and specialized capabilities to make these programs effective.
Culture of accountability:
Closely tied to these efforts, in concert with both SOCOM and the Marine Corps, is our
command-wide push to enhance our culture of accountability as it relates to issues such as
sexual misconduct, illicit drug use, personal accountability, and unauthorized media
release. As an example, our reported number of sexual assault cases remains in the low
single digits and we have not had any victim reported incidents in Fiscal Year 18. We
attribute this low number of incidents to our constant command level messaging campaign
and our strong Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program. While we
believe that even a single incident is one too many, we continue to strive to eradicate sexual
and other forms of misconduct from our force. We strive each day to provide you SOF
personnel that continue to embody the values of accountability, integrity, and commitment
in honorable service to our nation.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I am committed to providing Marine Raiders that provide the nation with
full spectrum special operations capability and whose actions continually demonstrate our
motto of Spiritus Invictus, or ‘unconquerable spirit’. Your Marine Special Operators will
remain always faithful, always forward. I thank the committee for your continued support
of our military members and their families and also for your commitment to national
security.46

46 Statement of Major General Carl E. Mundy, III, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special
Operations Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, April 11, 2018, 10 pp.
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Appendix B. November 2011 Navy Testimony on
Navy IW Activities
This appendix presents the text of the Navy’s prepared statement for a November 3, 2011, hearing
before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on the IW activities of the military services. The text of the statement, by Rear
Admiral Sinclair Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, is as follows:
Chairman Thornberry, Congressman Langevin, and distinguished members of the House
Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, it is an honor for me to
be here with you today to address the U.S. Navy’s efforts to institutionalize and develop
proficiency in irregular warfare mission areas. These efforts are vital to our national
interests and, as part of a comprehensive approach for meeting complex global challenges,
remain relevant in a time of uncertainty and constant change. To meet these challenges
Admiral Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, recently provided his Sailing Directions to
our Navy emphasizing the mission to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to win our
Nation’s wars. Today, the Navy is engaged around the world conducting preventive
activities that stabilize, strengthen, and secure our partners and allies providing regional
deterrence against state and non-state actors, while at the same time fighting, and winning,
our Nation’s wars. We expect the demand for these activities to increase in the future
security environment as a capacity constrained Navy seeks to maintain access and
presence. Emphasis on increased training and education will enable our continued
readiness to effectively meet global demand.
As demand for our Navy continues to grow, we continue to leverage our Maritime Strategy
with our partners, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The maritime domain supports 90%
of the world’s trade and provides offshore options to help friends in need, and to confront
and defeat aggression far from our shores as part of a defense in depth approach to secure
our homeland. CNO’s Sailing Directions, coupled with an enduring Maritime Strategy,
underscore the Navy’s focus on multi-mission platforms and highly trained Sailors that
conduct activities across the operational spectrum. Key tenets of the force are readiness to
fight and win today while building the ability to win tomorrow; to provide offshore options
to deter, influence, and win; and to harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our
diverse force. While the Maritime Strategy spans the spectrum of warfare, the Navy’s
Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges (CIC), released in January 2010, addresses
mission areas of irregular warfare as well as maritime activities to prevent, limit, and
interdict irregular threats and their influence on regional stability through, insurgency,
crime, and violent extremism.
The CIC Vision is derived from our Maritime Strategy with the intention to implement
steps towards increasing the Navy’s proficiency in supporting direct and indirect
approaches that dissuade and defeat irregular actors who exploit uncontrolled or
ungoverned spaces in order to employ informational, economic, technological, and kinetic
means against civilian populations to achieve their objectives. The CIC Vision is guiding
the alignment of organizations, investments, innovation, procedures, doctrine, and training
needed to mainstream CIC capabilities within the Fleet. These efforts are focused on
outcomes of increased effectiveness in stabilizing and strengthening regions, enhancing
regional awareness, increasing regional maritime partner capacity, and expanding
coordination and interoperability with joint, interagency, and international partners. These
outcomes support promoting regional security and stability and advancing the rule of law
allowing good governance and promoting prosperity by helping partners better protect their
people and resources. In addition to preventive activities, the Vision guides efforts to
inhibit the spread of violent extremism and illicit, terrorist, and insurgent activities. To
achieve these outcomes, the Navy is actively reorienting doctrine and operational
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approaches, rebalancing investments and developmental efforts, and refining operations
and partnerships to better support a comprehensive approach to U.S. efforts. These efforts
will provide a Navy capable of confronting irregular challenges through a broad array of
multi-mission capabilities and a force proficient in the CIC missions of security force
assistance, maritime security, stability operations, information dominance, and force
application necessary to support counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and foreign internal
defense missions.
In line with its strategy for confronting irregular challenges the Navy has leveraged key
force providers, such as the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, and established
Maritime Partnership Stations, and Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations
Centers to meet the demands and missions consistent with its strategy and vision. The
evolution of intelligence and strike capabilities has enabled the Navy to meet urgent
Combatant Commander requirements for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
operations and highlighted further opportunities for the Navy as an important joint partner.
While these operational organizations and activities deliver Navy capabilities in theater,
the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, established by the CNO in July 2008, has guided the
implementation and institutionalization of the CIC Vision. The Navy Irregular Warfare
Office, working closely with USSOCOM, other Combatant Commanders, Services,
interagency and international partners, has rapidly identified and deployed Navy
capabilities to today’s fight, and is institutionalizing confronting irregular challenges
concepts in the Navy’s planning, investment, and capability development.
The Navy Irregular Warfare Office operates under three primary imperatives consistent
with the Maritime Strategy, CNO’s Sailing Directions, and the Navy’s Vision for
Confronting Irregular Challenges. They provide integration and institutionalization in CIC
mission areas and are; (1) improve the level of understanding concerning the maritime
contribution to the joint force; (2) increase proficiency of the whole of Navy to confront
irregular challenges; and (3) drive maritime and special operations forces to seamless
integration in addressing irregular challenges. These three imperatives focus the Navy’s
implementation efforts and mainstream the concept that preventing wars is as important as
winning them. Our Navy must be ready to transition seamlessly between operational
environments, with the capability and training inherent in the Fleet.
Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 directs the services to “improve DoD
proficiency for irregular warfare, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations”
and directs reporting to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annually. Navy efforts to
institutionalize and provide proficiency in confronting irregular challenges, includes
proficiency in irregular warfare missions along with missions of maritime security
operations and information dominance, a key enabler for CIC. Currently, the Navy
leverages its access and persistent presence to both better understand and respond to
irregular challenges and is actively evolving its proficiency to prevent and counter irregular
threats while maintaining its ability to conduct the full spectrum of naval warfare. Its
access, presence, and emphasis on maritime partnerships enable broader government
efforts to address underlying conditions of instability that enhance regional security.
Through its mix of multi-mission capabilities, the Navy provides political leaders with a
range of offshore options for limiting regional conflict through assurance, deterrence,
escalation and de-escalation, gaining and maintaining access, and rapid crisis response. In
addition to its inherent ability to protect the maritime commons, its effectiveness in
building maritime partner capability and capacity contributes to achieving partner security
and economic objectives. Operating in and from the maritime domain with joint and
international partners, the Navy is enhancing regional security while dissuading, deterring,
and when necessary, defeating irregular threats.
The Navy acknowledges the complexity of the future security environment and continues
to explore balanced approaches. Following are the Navy’s current focus areas:
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Fleet-SOF Integration: Navy’s afloat basing support to special operations forces has
extended their reach into denied or semi-permissive areas enabling highly successful
counterterrorism missions. Navy provides inherent combat capabilities, multi-mission
ships and submarines collecting mission critical information, approval for 1052 support
billets for Naval Special Warfare, two dedicated HCS squadrons, and shipboard controlled
UAV orbits supporting counterterrorism operations. The Navy is aligned to improve this
integration through pre-deployment training, mission rehearsals, improvements to fleet
bandwidth allocation, shipboard C4I enhancements, and C2 relationships needed to
prosecute time sensitive targets.
Maritime Partnerships: Establishing enduring maritime partnerships is a long-term strategy
for securing the maritime commons. Legal, jurisdictional, and diplomatic considerations
often complicate efforts to secure the maritime commons, especially from exploitation by
highly adaptive irregular actors. In recognition of these considerations, the Navy is
emphasizing partnership engagements with U.S. and international maritime forces to
strengthen regional security.
Information Sharing Initiatives: In an information dominated environment, initiatives that
link joint warfighters, the technology community, and academia are crucial to rapidly
fielding solutions to emerging irregular challenges. These initiatives are the basis for
longer-term efforts to adapt and improve proficiency of Navy platforms to address irregular
challenges.
Doctrine: Development of Tri-Service (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) Maritime
Stability Operations doctrine that will enable a more effective response to instability in the
littorals.
Organization: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command, which continues to provide in-
demand capabilities such as Maritime Civil Affairs Teams, Riverine Forces, Maritime
Security Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams, and Expeditionary Intelligence
Teams.
Today, the Navy continues to meet planned global operational commitments and respond
to crises as they emerge. Overseas Contingency Operations continue with more than 12,000
active and reserve Sailors serving around the globe and another 15,000 at sea in Central
Command. Navy’s Carrier Strike Groups provide 30 percent of the close air support for
troops on the ground in Afghanistan and our Navy and Marine Corps pilots fly almost 60%
of electronic attack missions. Yet, as our national interests extend beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan, so do the operations of our Navy. Over the last year, more than 50 percent of
our Navy has been underway daily; globally present, and persistently engaged. Last year,
our Navy conducted counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea
with a coalition of several nations, trained local forces in maritime security as part of our
Global Maritime Partnership initiatives in Europe, South America, Africa and the Pacific
and forces in the Sixth Fleet supported NATO in complex operations in Libya. Navy
responded with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the earthquake in Haiti, the
flooding in Pakistan, and the earthquake and tsunami in Japan; and, conducted the world’s
largest maritime exercise, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), which brought together 14
nations and more than 20,000 military personnel, to improve coordination and trust in
multi-national operations in the Pacific. Our Sailors continue to deploy forward throughout
the world, projecting US influence, responding to contingencies, and building international
relationships that enable the safe, secure, and free flow of commerce that underpins our
economic prosperity and advances the mission areas that address irregular challenges.
The future vision of the Navy in meeting the uncertain challenges around the globe remains
a force forward, present, and persistent in areas critical to the national interests of the
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United States. CNO, in previous testimony,47 stated: Our Navy continues to conduct a high
tempo of global operations, which we expect to continue even as forces draw down in
Afghanistan. Global trends in economics, demographics, resources, and climate change
portend an increased demand for maritime presence, power, and influence. America’s
prosperity depends on the seas… and as disruption and disorder persist in our security
environment, maritime activity will evolve and expand. Seapower allows our nation to
maintain U.S. presence and influence globally and, when necessary, project power without
a costly, sizeable, or permanent footprint ashore. We will continue to maintain a forward-
deployed presence around the world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our
allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging
partners, confront irregular challenges, and respond to crises. To continue as a global
force in the preventive and responsive mission areas that confront irregular challenges,
including those of irregular warfare, the Navy will be faced with increasing demand in a
fiscally induced capacity constrained environment. Constrained capacity requires a
prioritization of areas requiring persistent presence, to include those regions of current or
forecast instability. Also required is an understanding of the risk incurred to mission, and
to force, if we do not get that priority correct. We must ensure our Navy remains the finest,
best trained, and most ready in the world to sustain key mission areas that support
confronting irregular challenges, and has the ability to face a highly capable adversary. The
Navy looks forward to working with Congress to address our future challenges and thank
you for your support of the Navy’s mission and personnel at this critical crossroads in U.S.
history.48

47 At this point, the statement includes a footnote citing the prepared statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert before the
House Armed Services Committee on July 26, 2011. Greenert became the Chief of Naval Operations on September 23,
2011.
48 Statement of Rear Admiral (Lower Half) Sinclair Harris, Director, Navy Irregular Warfare Office, before the House
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, November 3, 2011. Italics as in
original.
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Appendix C. 2010 Navy Irregular Warfare Vision
Statement
This appendix reproduces the Navy’s January 2010 vision statement for irregular warfare.49

49 Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges,
January 2010, 7 pp. (including the cover page).
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Appendix D. 2012 RAND Corporation Report
Findings and Recommendations
This appendix presents findings and recommendations from a 2012 report on maritime regular
warfare by RAND Corporation, a research firm.
Findings
The report made the following findings, among others:
The study’s main findings span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Several are
specific to MIW, while others have implications both for MIW [maritime irregular warfare]
and for IW operations more broadly.
First, the maritime force is generally considered to play a supportive role to ground forces
in IW and therefore has the potential to be underutilized even in IW operations conducted
in a predominantly maritime environment....
Second, countries that have a prevalent maritime dimension associated with an insurgency
could potentially benefit from the enhancement of civil-military operations (CMOs) in the
maritime arena....
Third, maritime operations in IW can allow the United States to scale its ground
involvement in useful ways....
Fourth, if one assumes that future MIW engagements that entail building a partner’s
capacity will resemble OEF-P [Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines], it is important
to manage strategic expectations based on realistic assessments of the partner’s
capabilities....
Fifth, when building partner capacity, either in MIW or land-based IW, the United States
should make efforts to provide equipment and technology that the partner will be able to
maintain and operate without difficulty....
Sixth, with regard to operational methods, coastal maritime interdiction can play an
instrumental role in setting the conditions for success in IW by cutting the supply lines that
sustain an insurgency....
Seventh, as the [1980s] Nicaragua case illustrates, U.S. partners in MIW may only have
to influence and monitor the sensibilities of a local population, but the legitimacy of U.S.
involvement may be tested in worldwide public opinion....
Finally, international cooperation in confronting MIW adversaries is often necessary, and
the U.S. Navy should make an effort to ensure that it is tactically and operationally
interoperable with partner navies in order to facilitate coordination....50
Recommendations
The report made the following recommendations, among others:
The findings presented here have several direct implications for the U.S. conventional
Navy and Naval Special Warfare Command (NSW). First, U.S. naval forces should
continue to provide U.S. partners with suitable equipment that they will be able to operate
and maintain and should continually strive to increase their interoperability with partner

50 Molly Dunigan et al., Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, pp. xv-xviii (italics as in original).
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forces. Second, U.S. naval forces may have to continue or expand training of partner forces
to confront future MIW threats. Third, when conducting MIW, operating from a sea base
offers advantages to NSW. However, due to the costs of such a practice, both NSW and
the conventional Navy must also recognize that decisions regarding when and where to
support sea basing of this sort need to be made carefully. Fourth, in support of future MIW
operations, NSW is likely to have ongoing requirements for maritime interdiction and
containment. Fifth, the United States could benefit from maintaining operational and
tactical capabilities with which to assist its partners in surveillance, particularly against
small submarines and mining threats. Sixth, NSW should consider increasing its capacity
to conduct maritime-based CMOs.
Conventional U.S. naval forces should similarly consider their role in supporting significant
irregular ground operations launched from the sea, as well as their role in interdiction and
containment campaigns. In contrast to those of NSW, conventional U.S. Navy capabilities to
support IW might entail CMOs and related activities to a greater extent than direct action.51

51 Molly Dunigan et al., Characterizing and Exploring the Implications of Maritime Irregular Warfare, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica (CA), 2012, pp. xix-xx.
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Appendix E. Detention of Terrorist Suspects on U.S.
Navy Ships
This appendix presents additional background information on detention of terrorist suspects on
U.S. Navy ships.
On July 6, 2011, it was reported that
The U.S. military captured a Somali terrorism suspect [named Ahmed Abdulkadir
Warsame] in the Gulf of Aden in April and interrogated him for more than two months
aboard a U.S. Navy ship before flying him this week to New York, where he has been
indicted on federal charges....
Other U.S. officials, interviewed separately, said Warsame and another individual were
apprehended aboard a boat traveling from Yemen to Somalia by the U.S. military’s Joint
Operations Command. The vessel was targeted because the United States had acquired
intelligence that potentially significant operatives were on board, the officials said. Court
documents said the capture took place April 19.
One of the senior administration officials who briefed reporters said that the other suspect
was released “after a very short period of time” after the military “determined that Warsame
was an individual that we were very much interested in for further interrogation.”
According to court documents, Warsame was interrogated on “all but a daily basis” by
military and civilian intelligence interrogators. During that time, officials in Washington
held a number of meetings to discuss the intelligence being gleaned, Warsame’s status and
what to do with him.
The options, one official said, were to release him, transfer him to a third country, keep
him prisoner aboard the ship, subject him to trial by a military commission or allow a
federal court to try him. The decision to seek a federal indictment, this official said, was
unanimous.
Administration officials have argued that military commission jurisdiction is too narrow
for some terrorism cases - particularly for a charge of material support for terrorist groups
- and the Warsame case appeared to provide an opportunity to try to prove the point.
But some human rights and international law experts criticized what they saw as at least a
partial return to the discredited “black site” prisons the CIA maintained during the Bush
administration....
Warsame was questioned aboard the ship because interrogators “believed that moving him
to another facility would interrupt the process and risk ending the intelligence flow,” one
senior administration official said.
The official said Warsame “at all times was treated in a manner consistent with all
Department of Defense policies” - following the Army Field Manual - and the Geneva
Conventions.
Warsame was not provided access to an attorney during the initial two months of
questioning, officials said. But “thereafter, there was a substantial break from any
questioning of the defendant of four days,” court documents said. “After this break, the
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights” - including his right to legal representation –
“and, after waiving those rights, spoke to law enforcement agents.”
The four-day break and separate questioning were designed to avoid tainting the court case
with information gleaned through un-Mirandized intelligence interrogation, an overlap that
has posed a problem in previous cases. The questioning continued for seven days, “and the
defendant waived his Miranda rights at the start of each day,” the documents said....
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U.S. Navy Vice Adm. William H. McRaven alluded to the captures in testimony before a
Senate committee last week in which he lamented the lack of clear plans and legal
approvals for the handling of terrorism suspects seized beyond the war zones of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
At one point in the hearing, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), the chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, referred to “the question of the detention of people” and noted that
McRaven had “made reference to a couple, I think, that are on a ship.”
McRaven replied affirmatively, saying, “It depends on the individual case, and I'd be more
than happy to discuss the cases that we've dealt with.”52
Another press report on July 6, 2011, stated the following:
In a telephone briefing with reporters, senior administration officials said Mr. Warsame
and another person were captured by American forces somewhere “in the Gulf region” on
April 19. Another official separately said the two were picked up on a fishing trawler in
international waters between Yemen and Somalia. That other person was released.
Mr. Warsame was taken to a naval vessel, where he was questioned for the next two months
by military interrogators, the officials said. They said his detention was justified by the
laws of war, but declined to say whether their theory was that the Shabab are covered by
Congress’s authorization to use military force against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks; whether the detention was justified by his interactions with Al Qaeda’s Yemen
branch; or something else.
The officials also said interrogators used only techniques in the Army Field Manual, which
complies with the Geneva Conventions. But they did not deliver a Miranda warning
because they were seeking to gather intelligence, not court evidence. One official called
those sessions “very, very productive,” but declined to say whether his information
contributed to a drone attack in Somalia last month.
After about two months, Mr. Warsame was given a break for several days. Then a separate
group of law enforcement interrogators came in. They delivered a Miranda warning, but
he waived his rights to remain silent and have a lawyer present and continued to cooperate,
the officials said, meaning that his subsequent statements would likely be admissible in
court.
Throughout that period, administration officials were engaged in deliberations about what
to do with Mr. Warsame’s case. Eventually, they “unanimously” decided to prosecute him
in civilian court. If he is convicted of all the charges against him, he would face life in
prison.
Last week, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven, who was until recently in charge of the
military’s Joint Special Operations Command, told a Senate hearing that detainees are
sometimes kept on Navy ships until the Justice Department can build a case against them,
or they are transferred to other countries for detention.
Another senior administration official said Tuesday that such detentions are extremely rare,
and that no other detainees are now being held on a Navy ship.53
A July 7, 2011, press report stated the following:

52 Karen DeYoung, Greg Miller, and Greg Jaffe, “Terror Suspect Detained On Ship,” Washington Post, July 6, 2011: 6.
53 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. To Prosecute A Somali Suspect In Civilian Court,” New York Times, July 6,
2011: 1.
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In interrogating a Somali man for months aboard a Navy ship before taking him to New
York this week for a civilian trial on terrorism charges, the Obama administration is trying
out a new approach for dealing with foreign terrorism suspects.
The administration, which was seeking to avoid sending a new prisoner to Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, drew praise and criticism on Wednesday [July 6] for its decisions involving the
Somali suspect, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, accused of aiding Al Qaeda’s branch in
Yemen and the Shabab, the Somali militant group.54
A July 6, 2011, entry in a blog that reports on naval-related events stated that the U.S. Navy ship
to which Warsame was taken was the amphibious assault ship Boxer (LHD-4).55
An October 24, 2012, press report stated the following:
Over the past two years, the Obama administration has been secretly developing a new
blueprint for pursuing terrorists, a next-generation targeting list called the “disposition
matrix.”
The matrix contains the names of terrorism suspects arrayed against an accounting of the
resources being marshaled to track them down, including sealed indictments and
clandestine operations. U.S. officials said the database is designed to go beyond existing
kill lists, mapping plans for the “disposition” of suspects beyond the reach of American
drones.
Although the matrix is a work in progress, the effort to create it reflects a reality setting in
among the nation’s counterterrorism ranks: The United States’ conventional wars are
winding down, but the government expects to continue adding names to kill or capture lists
for years....
The database is meant to map out contingencies, creating an operational menu that spells
out each agency’s role in case a suspect surfaces in an unexpected spot. “If he’s in Saudi
Arabia, pick up with the Saudis,” the former official said. “If traveling overseas to al-
Shabaab [in Somalia] we can pick him up by ship. If in Yemen, kill or have the Yemenis
pick him up.”
Officials declined to disclose the identities of suspects on the matrix. They pointed,
however, to the capture last year of alleged al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Abdulkadir
Warsame off the coast of Yemen. Warsame was held for two months aboard a U.S. ship
before being transferred to the custody of the Justice Department and charged in federal
court in New York.
“Warsame was a classic case of ‘What are we going to do with him?’” the former
counterterrorism official said. In such cases, the matrix lays out plans, including which
U.S. naval vessels are in the vicinity and which charges the Justice Department should
prepare.56
An October 6, 2013, press report stated the following:
An accused operative for Al Qaeda seized by United States commandos in Libya over the
weekend is being interrogated while in military custody on a Navy ship in the

54 Charlie Savage, “U.S. Tests New Approach To Terrorism Cases On Somali Suspect,” New York Times, July 7, 2011:
10. See also Dave Boyer, “Interrogation At Sea Skirts Obama Pledge,” Washington Times, July 7, 2011: 1.
55 See “The STRATCOM [Strategic Communications] Opportunity of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame,” Information
Dissemination (www.informationdissemination.net), July 6, 2011, accessed online July 6, 2011, at
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/07/stratcom-opportunity-of-ahmed.html.
56 Greg Miller, “The Permanent War, U.S. Set To Keep Kill Likes For Years,” Washington Post, October 24, 2012: 1.
Bracketed material as in original.
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Mediterranean Sea, officials said on Sunday [October 6]. He is expected eventually to be
sent to New York for criminal prosecution.
The fugitive, known as Abu Anas al-Libi, is seen as a potential intelligence gold mine,
possessing perhaps two decades of information about Al Qaeda, from its early days under
Osama bin Laden in Sudan to its more scattered elements today.
The decision to hold Abu Anas and question him for intelligence purposes without a lawyer
present follows a pattern used successfully by the Obama administration with other terrorist
suspects, most prominently in the case of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a former military
commander with the Somali terrorist group Shabab....
“Warsame is the model for this guy,” one American security official said....
Abu Anas is being held aboard the U.S.S. San Antonio, a vessel brought in specifically for
this mission, officials said.57
A June 27, 2014, press report stated the following:
Right now, a suspected terrorist is sitting in the bowels of a U.S. Navy warship somewhere
between the Mediterranean Sea and Washington, D.C. Ahmed Abu Khattala, the alleged
leader of the September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, is imprisoned
aboard the USS New York, likely in a bare cell normally reserved for U.S. military
personnel facing disciplinary action at sea. En route to the United States for more than a
week, he’s being questioned by military and civilian interrogators looking for critical bits
of intelligence before he’s read his Miranda rights, formally arrested, and transferred to the
U.S. District Court in Washington, where he’ll face trial. Meanwhile, the sailors aboard are
going about the daily business of operating an amphibious transport ship—even as the
ship’s mission has been redefined by the new passenger in their midst.
This isn’t the first time the Navy has played such a critical, curious, and largely under-
reported role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In 2011, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a
military commander for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabab, was captured aboard a
fishing boat in the Gulf of Aden and detained by the Navy, on the high seas, for two months.
In 2013, Abu Anas al-Libi, the alleged mastermind of the 1998 terrorist attacks on
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was held aboard the USS San Antonio—an
identical ship to the one being used this week. Both men were interrogated at sea before
being flown to the United States to face criminal charges in federal courts....
In many ways, it’s not surprising that the U.S. government has been turning Navy assets
into floating prisons for these dangerous men. Taking the slow route back to the United
States offers interrogators the time and space to gather crucial intelligence from high-value
sources like al-Qaeda-linked operatives. During the two months that Warsame was at sea,
a select team of FBI, CIA, and Defense Department officials, part of the Obama
administration’s High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, questioned the Somali terrorist
on “all but a daily basis.” He was cooperative throughout and some reports suggest that
subsequent U.S. counterterrorism operations, including a drone attack in Somalia shortly
after his capture, were a direct result of intelligence Warsame provided to authorities.
While al-Libi was only detained at sea for about a week—a chronic medical condition
prevented him from being held on a ship for an extended period—reports suggest that
similar intelligence-collection efforts were underway in his case as well.
The U.S. government has also embraced the approach because it has limited options for
holding and interrogating men like Abu Khattala after capture. The Obama administration
remains committed to ending detention operations at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. While the

57 Benjamin Weiser and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy Ship,” New York Times, October 6,
2013. See also Mark Hosenball and Phil Stewart, “Elite U.S. Team Questions Seized al Qaeda Leader on Navy Ship,”
Reuters.com, October 7, 3013.
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facility is still home to almost 150 alleged terrorists, the United States has not sent any new
detainees there since March 2008. Detaining suspected terrorists at other overseas facilities
is likewise not an option. For a time, U.S.-run prisons in Afghanistan were a possibility.
But the detention facility in Parwan is now an Afghan-run prison, and using facilities in
other countries would raise a host of legal, operational, and humanitarian concerns. Even
if U.S. officials were willing to forgo the opportunity to question Abu Khattala before he’s
arraigned in federal court and provided with a lawyer, flying alleged terrorists to the United
States immediately presents its own set of problems. Seemingly small operational and
political considerations about the ways in which the United States transports terrorists
captured abroad have major strategic implications, particularly given lingering questions
about U.S. rendition efforts under the Bush administration. In this context, the Navy has
taken on the role of high-seas prison warden, even as lawyers continue to debate whether
and what international legal rules apply to terrorists captured abroad and detained,
temporarily, on a ship.58

58 Marisa Porges, “America’s Floating Prisons,” The Atlantic (www.theatlantic.com), June 27, 2014. See also “The USS
Guantanamo,” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2014.
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Appendix F. Background Information on FY2020
Funding Requests for Lines 263 and 63
As noted earlier in this report, DOD’s proposed FY2020 budget requests, among other things,
 $72.6 million in the FY2020 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation,
Defense-Wide (RDT&EDW) account for Program Element (PE) 1160483BB,59
(Special Operations Command [SOCOM]) maritime systems (line 263 in the
FY2020 RDT&EDW account), including $45.2 million for Project S0417:
Underwater Systems, and $15.6 million for S1684: Surface Craft; and
 $27.4 million in the FY2020 Procurement, Defense-Wide (PDW) appropriation
account for procurement of underwater systems for SOCOM (line 63 in the
FY2020 PDW account).
Research and Development for Maritime Systems (Line 263)
Regarding the FY2020 funding request for line 263, DOD states that
This program element provides for engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) of
Special Operations Forces (SOF) Surface and Undersea Mobility platforms. This program
element also provides for pre-acquisition activities to quickly respond to new requirements
for SOF surface and undersea mobility, looking at multiple alternatives to include cross-
platform technical solutions, service-common solutions, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
technologies, and new development efforts. Middle-Tier Acquisition (2016 NDAA,
Section 804) to accommodate rapid prototyping, may be utilized.
The Underwater Systems project provides for EMD of combat submersibles, SOF operator
diving systems, underwater support systems, and underwater equipment. This project also
provides for pre-acquisition activities (material solutions analysis, advanced component,
prototype development, and exploitation of emerging technology opportunities to deliver
enhanced capabilities) to respond to emergent requirements. These submersibles,
equipment, and diving systems are used by SOF in the conduct of infiltration/extraction,
personnel/material recovery, hydrographic/inland reconnaissance, beach obstacle
clearance, underwater ship attack, and other missions. The capabilities of the submersible
systems, diving systems, and unique equipment provide small, highly trained forces the
ability to successfully engage the enemy and conduct clandestine operations associated
with SOF maritime missions.
The Surface Craft project provides for EMD of medium and heavy surface combatant craft,
combatant craft mission equipment, and pre-planned product improvement and technology
insertion engineering changes to meet the unique requirements of SOF. This project
element also provides for pre-acquisition activities (materiel solutions analysis, advanced
component development and prototypes) to quickly respond to new requirements for
maritime craft and subsystems. The craft capabilities and unique equipment provide small,
highly trained forces the ability to successfully engage the enemy and conduct operations
associated with SOF maritime missions….
[S0417: Underwater Systems] provides for engineering and manufacturing development
of combat underwater submersibles, Special Operations Forces (SOF) operator diving
systems, underwater support systems, and underwater equipment. This project also
provides for pre-acquisition activities (materiel solutions analysis, advanced component
development and prototypes) to respond to emergent requirements. Middle-Tier

59 In DOD research and development accounts, line items are referred to as program elements, or PEs.
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acquisitions to accommodate rapid prototyping may be utilized. These submersibles,
equipment, and diving systems are used by SOF in the conduct of infiltration/extraction,
personnel/material recovery, hydrographic/inland reconnaissance, beach obstacle
clearance, underwater ship attack, and other missions. The capabilities of the submersible
systems, diving systems, and unique equipment provides small, highly trained forces the
ability to successfully engage the enemy and conduct clandestine operations associated
with SOF maritime missions….
[Within Project S0417, the subproject for Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS)]
provides for the design, development, test, manufacturing and sustainment of one
Engineering Development Model (EDM) and ten production units to replace the legacy
MK 8 MOD 1 Seal Delivery Vehicle (SDV) system. SWCS is a free-flooding combat
submersible mobility platform suitable for transporting and deploying SOF and their
payloads for a variety of SOF missions. SWCS will be deployable from a Dry Deck Shelter
(DDS), surface ships, and land. The SWCS system includes the SWCS vehicle and SWCS
support Equipment, comprised of Mission Support Equipment (MSE), Pack-Up Kit (PUK),
and Transportation and Handling (T&H). It also includes integration efforts with the
current Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) and development of product improvements accomplished
throughout the lifecycle of the system….
[The sub-project for Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) Modernization] provides for the pre-planned
product improvements, testing, and integration of specialized underwater systems to meet
the unique requirements of SOF, and compatibility with the submarine fleet. The current
DDS is a certified diving system which attaches to modified host submarines that provides
for insertion of SOF forces and platforms. Funding supports product improvements to the
current DDS, as well as associated diver equipment for in-service submarine support
systems, unmanned underwater vehicles, and follow on development efforts for future SOF
payloads….
[The sub-project for combat diving] is a Middle Tier of Acquisition designated program
which provides for the development, testing, and rapid fielding and prototyping of SOF
peculiar diving equipment providing the SOF combat diver the ability to engage the enemy
and conduct operations. SOF Combat Diving will support the SDV, SWCS, and DCS with
the conduct of infiltration/extraction, material recovery, underwater ship attack, beach
clearance, and other missions. Technologies include, but are not limited to, commercial
and developmental life support, maneuverability and propulsion, diver navigational
accuracy and situation awareness, environmental protection, and communications between
dive teams as well as between divers and external vessels/craft….
[The sub-project for Undersea Craft Mission Equipment (UCME)] provides a rapid
response capability to support SOF underwater craft and diver systems, subsystems, and
their emerging requirements. UCME provides technology refresh efforts to correct system
deficiencies, improve asset life, and enhance mission capability to leverage and exploit
emerging technologies within the maritime Special Operations Forces undersea capability
portfolio….
[Project S1684: Surface Craft] provides for engineering and manufacturing development
of medium and heavy surface combatant craft, combatant craft mission equipment, and
preplanned product improvement (P3I) and technology insertion engineering changes to
meet the unique requirements of Special Operations Forces (SOF). This project also
provides for pre-acquisition activities (materiel solutions analysis, advanced component
development and prototypes) to quickly respond to new requirements for maritime craft
and subsystems Middle-Tier acquisition to accommodate rapid prototyping, may be
utilized. The craft capabilities and unique equipment provide small, highly trained forces
the ability to successfully engage the enemy and conduct operations associated with SOF
maritime missions….
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[The sub-project for Combatant Craft Medium (CCM) Mk 1] is a semi-enclosed multi-
mission combatant craft for platoon-size maritime mobility in maritime denied
environments. It is multi-mission capable, including Maritime Interdiction, Insert / Extract,
and Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) Operations. CCM is Naval Special
Warfare’s (NSW) craft-of-choice for long-range, high-payload SOF mobility operations in
denied environments up to high threat. CCM has NSW’s best Iron Triangle: 40 knot (kt)
speed; 4 crew + 19 passengers (pax) / 10,000 pound (lb) payload; and 600 nautical miles
(nm) range. CCM Mk 1 payload capacity enables inclusion of shock mitigating seats,
which is critical for ride quality, operator tactical readiness, and operator health. At 60 feet
long, CCM is C-17 / C5 transportable and can launch/recover by well deck or shore based
trailer….
[The sub-project for Combatant Craft Heavy (CCH)] represents a family of solutions that
provides platoon-size maritime surface mobility. The current CCH is the Sea, Air, Land
Insertion, Observation, and Neutralization (SEALION) craft. SEALION is a fully-
enclosed, climate- controlled, semi-submersible craft that operates in denied environments
up to high-threat. SEALION is NSW’s most versatile and survivable combatant craft and
the craft-of-choice for sensitive maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions. Iron Triangle: 40 kt speed; 7 crew + 12 pax / 3,300 lb payload; and 400 nm range.
SEALION payload capacity enables inclusion of shock mitigating seats, which is critical
for ride quality, operator tactical readiness, and operator health. At 77+ feet long,
SEALION is C-17/C-5 transportable and can launch/recover by well deck or shore based
mobile travel lift or crane….
[The sub-project for Combatant Craft Mission Equipment (CCME)] provides a rapid
response capability to support SOF combatant craft systems, subsystems, and their
emerging requirements. CCME provides technology refresh efforts to correct system
deficiencies, improve asset life, and enhance mission capability. Demonstrations and
modifications may be made to support emerging capability enhancements such as, but not
limited to, conformal antennas, identification friend-or-foe capabilities, enhanced
communications, weapon integration, software refresh, and navigation subsystems in
support of future missions. Solutions to these emerging requirements may be commercial-
off-the-shelf leveraged from other government agencies, or new solutions….
[The sub-project for Combatant Craft Assault (CCA)] is a combatant craft for squad-size
maritime mobility operations in maritime denied environments. CCA is NSW’s best craft
for VBSS in maritime denied environments up to and including medium threat. It is the
craft-of-choice for maritime interdiction and boarding operations because of the open deck
space, maneuverability, and interoperability with an Afloat Forward Staging Base. Iron
Triangle: 40 kt speed; 3 crew + 12 pax / 5,000 lb payload; and 300 nm range. At 41 feet
long, CCA is air transportable by C-130 / C-17 / C-5 and can launch/recover by crane,
davit, well deck, or shore based trailer….
[The sub-project for Threat Awareness System (TAS)] provides SOF with an Electronic
Intelligence capability for enhanced force protection of SOF in Maritime denied
environments by allowing them to identify and avoid enemy detection capabilities. TAS
will utilize technological advancements to gain significant improvements in capability such
as miniaturization and marinization to enable seamless craft integration….
[The sub-project for Maritime Precision Engagement (MPE)] is a family of standoff,
loitering, man-in-the-loop weapons systems deployed on combatant craft and capable of
targeting individuals, groups, vehicles, high value targets, and small oceangoing craft with
low collateral damage. The program consists of combatant craft alterations, launcher
systems, and munitions.60

60 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, United States Special Operations Command
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Procurement of Underwater Systems (Line 63)
Regarding the FY2020 funding request for line 63, DOD states that
The Underwater Systems line item procures dry and wet combat submersibles,
modifications, field changes to the Dry Deck Shelter (DDS), and various systems and
components for Special Operations Forces (SOF) Combat Diving. Current acquisition
procurement programs of record are the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS)
program, Dry Combat Submersible (DCS), SOF Combat Diving and Dry Deck Shelter
(DDS). Middle-Tier Acquisition (2016 NDAA, Section 804) to accommodate rapid
fielding, may be utilized. SWCS is the next generation free-flooding combat submersible
that transports SOF personnel and their combat equipment in hostile waters for a variety
of missions. SOF units require specialized underwater systems that improve their
warfighting capability and survivability in harsh operating environments. The DCS will
provide the capability to insert and extract SOF and/or payloads into denied areas from
strategic distances. The program is structured to minimize technical, cost, and schedule
risks by leveraging commercial technologies, procedures, and classing methods to achieve
an affordable DCS. SOF Combat Diving supports the unique requirements impacting fully
equipped operators while conducting underwater, real-world missions. Examples of
underwater systems and maritime equipment include, underwater navigation, diving
equipment, and underwater propulsion systems. These systems and equipment are used for
infiltration/extraction, reconnaissance, beach obstacle clearance, and other missions. The
capabilities of submersible systems and unique equipment provides small, highly trained
forces the ability to successfully engage the enemy and conduct operations associated with
SOF maritime missions….
Justification:
1. DDS: The DDS is a certified diving system that attaches to modified host submarines
and provides for insertion of SOF forces and platforms. SOCOM has a cost share
agreement with the Navy to support the modernization of the DDS in order to
accommodate current and future Naval Special Warfare payloads as well as large U.S.
Navy payloads.
FY 2020 PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION: Funding continues the support of the DDS
modernization effort, which includes relocation of equipment inside the DDS Hangar to
support current and future payloads. Funding also includes field changes for product
improvements developed to overcome obsolescence and Diminishing Manufacturing
Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS).
2. SWCS: Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) is a free-flooding combat
submersible mobility platform suitable for transporting and deploying SOF and their
payloads for a variety of SOF missions. SWCS will be deployable from a DDS, surface
ships, and land.
FY 2020 PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION: Purchases two SWCS vehicles and support
equipment, Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), engineering change proposals
(ECP), detachment deployment packages, and initial spares.
3. DCS: The DCS provides SOF with a dry diver lock-in and lock-out capability that
transports personnel and their combat equipment in hostile waters for a variety of missions.
FY 2020 PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION: Purchases initial spares, GFE, ECP, system
integration lab, and simulator.

Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 5 of 5, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, March
2019, pp. 235, 237-239, 252-255.
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4. SOF Combat Diving: This is designated a Middle-tier Acquisition program allowing for
rapid fielding which provides the transition of SOF peculiar diving technologies for the
SOF combat diver while conducting underwater, real-world missions.
FY 2020 PROGRAM JUSTIFICATION: Procures total of 10 divers' maritime
environmental protection and diver navigation.61
Press Reports
A November 30, 2016, press report states the following:
USSOCOM is currently pursuing two programmes to enhance the sub-surface capabilities
of US Navy (USN) SEALs including the Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) and
Dry Combat Submersible (DCS). Both solutions are fully enclosed vehicles for operators,
thereby reducing any requirement for teams to wear rebreathing equipment during mission
insertions and extractions....
The main difference between SWCS and DCS is range, with the latter solution providing
a longer insertion distance with a greater depth capability.
The SWCS, for example, is being designed to replace legacy Mk 8 Mod 1 SEAL Swimmer
Delivery Vehicles (SDVs), bringing an improved electronic architecture and software on
top of the requirements list for NSWC. SOF sources associated with USSOCOM explained
to IHS Jane‘s how the first SWCS could be delivered to the Command in 2017. This would
be followed by extensive operational evaluation with NSWC elements ahead of initial and
full entry into service, sources added.
According to USSOCOM officials, a total of two SWCS platforms will be procured by the
DoD in 2017, along with associated batteries, trailers, mission system suites, and spares.
Capable of transporting six operators at low-level depths close to the surface, the SWCS
can carry a total payload of 10,000 lb (4,535 kg). SWCS contractor Teledyne Brown
Engineering was unable to provide further details to IHS Jane’s because of operational
security reasons. However, industry sources have suggested that the SWCS measures
approximately 22 ft (6.7 m) in length and 5 ft in width.
The SWCS has yet to be officially designated, but the nomenclature Mk 9 is expected to
be granted to the platform type. Teledyne Brown Engineering beat the incumbent
manufacturer of the Mk 8 Mod 1, Columbus Group, to the programme in 2011 when it was
awarded a USD383 million contract by the DoD.
Ahead of SWCS’s entry into service, General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT)
continues to assist the NSWC with ongoing support for legacy Mk 8 Mod 1 SDV systems.
Work will include projects relating to SDVs as well as other NSWC-specific efforts
associated with the Maritime Mission Systems Division. The latest support contract, worth
USD4 million, was signed in December 2015.
Elsewhere, the DCS solution has been designed as a dry diver lock-in/lock-out solution,
capable of inserting and extracting personnel and all associated combat equipment,
including in hostile waters, according to USSOCOM sources. The development of this
option follows the cancellation of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) in 2006.
Designed to carry six operators, the DCS has a larger payload capacity than the SWCS,
with the ability to carry up to 40,000 lb at depths as low as 58 m. Sources also informed
IHS Jane’s that the DCS could have a maximum operating range of 60 n miles.

61 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, United States Special Operations Command
Defense-Wide Justification Book Volume 1 of 2, Procurement, Defense-Wide, March 2019, pp. 141-142.
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In July 2016, it was announced that Lockheed Martin and Submergence Group would
jointly design, develop, and manufacture the DCS for USSOCOM, with industry figures
reiterating the vessel’s ability to provide improved endurance and operating depths.
According to Lockheed Martin, a USD166 million contract will involve the delivery of
three DCS vehicles over a five-year period, with the gross weight for each vessel being
more than 30 tons. A company spokesperson explained to IHS Jane’s how NSWC concepts
of operations would see the DCS launched at a stand-off position from surface vessels,
before inserting SEAL operators over “long distances underwater” onto objectives and
target areas....
Details regarding the DCS design remain scarce. However, sources indicated to IHS Jane’s
that the solution will feature technology drawn from Lockheed Martin’s S302 Manned
Combat Submersible (MCS) craft, which is capable of carrying six personnel as well as a
pilot and navigator.
According to Lockheed Martin company literature, “The dry one-atmosphere environment
of these vehicles provides an alternative to traditional wet submersibles being used by the
US and international Special Forces communities today, and will deliver operators to their
destination in better physical condition to complete a mission.”
Vessels are fitted with standard inertial navigation systems and Doppler velocity logs, as
well as a communications suite featuring an underwater telephone and a UHF radio;
obstacle avoidance sonar; and fathometer. Additional sensor payloads, dependent upon
mission requirements, can also be integrated, Lockeed Martin explained.
The S302 MCS measures 31 ft in length, and can operate 100 m below the surface for more
than 24 hours. The craft can travel up to 60 n miles at a 5 kt cruising speed, although it has
a top speed of more than 7.5 kt for rapid reaction.
USSOCOM continues to integrate Dry Deck Shelter (DDS) technology on board a variety
of Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and Virginia-class
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for special operations support....
Although a total of six DDS systems are currently in service with the USN and USSOCOM,
by the end of 2016 nine submarines will possess DDS capabilities, enabling them to launch
and recover SDVs, sources explained.
Featuring automated launch-and-recovery technology, DDS enables combat divers to enter
and leave the dry dock individually, as was explained during a press briefing by NSWC
officials at the Special Operations Forces Industry Conference (SOFIC) in Tampa, Florida,
in May 2016.
In 2017, the USN aims to concentrate on a series of modifications to the DDS in order to
allow for the integration of DCS and SWCS, including the relocation of equipment stowage
in the DDS and upgrades in lighting, cameras, and mechanical noise reduction.
Industry sources have noted that DDS solutions are being extended by 50 inches to enable
the integration of DCS and SWSC variants, thereby supporting a ‘mothership’ concept of
operations (CONOPS) for maritime special forces. This would enable SOF teams to insert
at greater distances from submarines and surface vessels, before entering the water at a
suitable stand-off range from target areas and inserting via onboard DCS or SWCS craft.62
A September 15, 2016, press report states the following:
SEALs will soon have new underwater vehicles delivering them to targets that officials say
will make a huge difference during missions.

62 Andrew White, “Spec ops at sea: Technologies for maritime SOF insertion,” IHS Jane’s International Defence
Review, November 30, 2016.
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SEALs now use a delivery vehicle that one SEAL described as a kind of underwater sled.
SEALs ride in the sled in full scuba gear completely exposed to the water, in often freezing
cold and in “pure blackout” conditions and total silence for eight to 10 hours.
Ask a SEAL what that’s like, and they'll say it’s like being locked in a cold, dark, wet closet
for hours....
The new vehicles, which are called dry combat submersibles, will be akin to mini-
submarines, and allow SEALs to stay warmer and drier for longer, and more physically
ready, as they close in on their target.
That’s a huge advantage for missions that one retired SEAL who is now a congressman
described as “can't fail.”...
The vehicles will also allow the SEALs to communicate before a mission, compared with
“only seeing your buddy’s eyes” and a glow stick for 10 hours, the SEAL joked.
The first submersible is due to arrive in July 2018, and it will be operational as early as the
fall. Final testing is to be completed in 2019.
As SEALs await the delivery of the first vehicle, they have two “demonstrator” vehicles to
experiment with....
That demonstrator is about 39 feet long, is about 7 to 8 feet in diameter, and weighs about
30 tons. So far, it has gone up to five knots for 60 nautical miles....
It is also surface-launched, which means it is launched into the water by a crane or from a
surface ships with a crane, versus from a submarine.
The vehicle is able to hold up to eight SEALs and their gear, in addition to a pilot and
navigator.
The submersible consists of three compartments: a swimmers’ compartment where the
SEALs will ride for the duration of the time, a “line in and line out” compartment where
they exit and enter the submersible, and a compartment for the navigator and pilot.
The swimmers’ compartment is only about 10 to 12 feet long, which could be a tight
squeeze for eight SEALs.
Still, officials say it’ll be a huge improvement over the current systems.
“The DCS Program is on track to provide a capability that our warfighters have not had in
a long time,” said Navy Capt. Kate Dolloff, who is in charge of all maritime programs for
Special Operations Command Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
“We still have a long way to go, but a stepped approach using technology demonstrators
to mitigate risk and a close relationship with the user community has been extremely
successful to date and led to contract award,” she said.
The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) finalized a contract in July with
Lockheed Martin for the first submersible to be delivered in July 2018, with the option of
two more by 2020—an unusually fast schedule for acquiring new technology.
The total cost for the three submersibles is $236 million.
The timeline and cost is years shorter and hundreds of millions cheaper than a previous
submersible program, which was killed in 2006 after cost overruns and other issues.
That program would have cost $1 billion for one submersible and have taken two to three
times longer to build, officials said.
Officials say the costs are much lower because they're taking off-the-shelf commercial
technology developed by Lockheed Martin and modifying it to fit their needs, whereas the
previous program started from scratch.
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Officials say the new vehicles will have 80 to 90 percent of the same capability, but will
be delivered much faster at a much lower cost.
The new program also comes with a “fixed price incentive fee” structure, where the cost
of the program is fixed and any overruns are shared with the manufacturer.63
A July 22, 2016, press report states that
... a new ‘missile sub’ promises to deliver to battle underwater far more easily—and keep
them dry when they travel.
Called the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle, it will be built by Lockheed Martin and
Submergence Group after winning a US$166 million contract to supply the US Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) with a new class of combat submersibles.
According to Lockheed, the three 30-ton (27-tonne) DCS [Dry Combat Submersible]
vehicles that it is contracted to build will allow warfighters to travel deeper and farther
underwater than today.
The craft are dry submersibles that support two operators (pilot and navigator) plus up to
six swimmers with the ability to lock them out and in.
‘The dry one-atmosphere environment of these vehicles provides an alternative to
traditional wet submersibles being used by the U.S. and international Special Forces
communities today, and will deliver operators to their destination in better physical
condition to complete a mission,’ Lockheed Martin says....
It will carry two pilots and six passengers, have a depth rating of 328 ft (100 m), a lock-
out depth of 98 ft (30 m), and a top speed of 5 knots (6 mph, 9 km/h).
Lockheed says the new DCS will boast improved hydrodynamics and propulsion compared
to the previous vehicles.64
An August 20, 2014, blog post states the following:
The U.S. Navy is hard at work developing new underwater transports for its elite
commandos. The SEALs expect the new craft—and improvements to large submarine
“motherships” that will carry them—to be ready by the end of the decade.
SEALs have ridden in small submersibles to sneak into hostile territory for decades. For
instance, the special operators reportedly used the vehicles to slip into Somalia and spy on
terrorists in 2003.
Now the sailing branch is looking to buy two new kinds of mini-subs. While details are
understandably scarce, the main difference between the two concepts appears to be the
maximum range.
The Shallow Water Combat Submersible will haul six or more naval commandos across
relatively short distances near the surface. The SWCS, which weighs approximately 10,000
pounds, will replace older Mark 8 Seal Delivery Vehicles, or SDVs.
The other sub, called the Dry Combat Submersible, will carry six individuals much farther
and at greater depths. The most recent DCS prototype weighs almost 40,000 pounds and
can travel up to 60 nautical miles while 190 feet below the waves.
Commandos could get further into enemy territory or start out a safer distance away with
this new vehicle. SEALs could also use this added range to escape any potential pursuers.

63 Kristina Wong, “Navy SEALS Are About to Get More Lethal,” The Hill, September 15, 2016.
64 Mark Prigg, “The $166m ‘Missile Sub’ Set to Take Special Forces Soldiers Silently Into Combat,” Daily Mail (UK),
July 22, 2016.
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Both new miniature craft will also be fully enclosed. The current SDVs are open to water
and the passengers must wear full scuba gear—seen in the picture above.
In addition, the DCS appears to pick up where a previous craft, called the Advanced SEAL
Delivery System, left off. The Pentagon canceled that project in 2006 because of significant
cost overruns.
But the Navy continued experimenting with the sole ASDS prototype for two more years.
The whole effort finally came to a halt when the mini-sub was destroyed in an accidental
fire.
Special Operations Command hopes to have the SWCS ready to go by 2017. SOCOM’s
plan is to get the DCS in service by the end of the following year.
Underwater motherships
SOCOM and the sailing branch also want bigger submarines to carry these new mini-subs
closer to their targets. For decades now, attack and missile submarines have worked as
motherships for the SEALs.
Eight Ohio- and Virginia-class subs currently are set up to carry the special Dry-Deck
Shelter used to launch SDVs, according to a presentation at the Special Operations Forces
Industry Conference in May.
The DDS units protect the specialized mini-subs inside an enclosed space. Individual divers
also can come and go from the DDS airlocks.
The first-in-class USS Ohio—and her sisters Michigan, Florida and Georgia—carried
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads during the Cold War. The Navy had expected to
retire the decades-old ships, but instead spent billions of dollars modifying them for new
roles. Today they carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and SEALs.
The Virginias—Hawaii, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina and the future North
Dakota—are newer. The Navy designed these attack submarines from the keel up to
perform a variety of missions.
SOCOM projects that nine submersible motherships—including North Carolina as a
backup—will be available by the end of the year.
The Navy has a pool of six shelters to share between the subs. SOCOM expects the DDS
to still be in service in 2050.
But prototype DCS mini-subs cannot fit inside the current shelter design. As a result, a
modernization program will stretch the DDS units by 50 inches, according to SOCOM’s
briefing.
The project will also try to make it easier to launch undersea vehicles and get them back
into the confines of the metal enclosure. Right now, divers must manually open and close
the outside hatch to get the SDVs out.
Crews then have to drive the craft back into the shelter without any extra help at the end of
a mission—underwater and likely in near-total darkness. The sailing branch wants to
automate this process.
With any luck, the SEALs will have their new undersea chariots and the motherships to
carry them ready before 2020.65

65 Joe Trevithick, “U.S. Navy SEALs Are Getting New Mini-Subs,” Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com),
August 20, 2014.
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Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

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