Transformation at the U.S. Agency for
June 19, 2019
International Development (USAID)
Emily M. Morgenstern
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has initiated a series of major internal
Analyst in Foreign
reforms, branded as Transformation at USAID. The reforms are largely in response to Trump
Assistance and Foreign
Administration directives aimed at making federal agencies more efficient, effective, and
Policy
accountable. Most of the reforms proposed under this initiative do not involve statutory

reorganization, but USAID Administrator Mark Green has sought congressional input as the
Nick M. Brown
reform process is developed and launched, especially in the area of changes to USAID
Analyst in Foreign
organizational structure. Congress has the power to shape USAID reforms through oversight
Assistance and Foreign
activities, and through funding requirements and restrictions.
Policy

Some of these proposed reforms are consistent with efforts by past USAID Administrators and
do not represent major changes of course for USAID. At the same time, USAID policy
Marian L. Lawson
documents signal a consistent emphasis on “ending the need for foreign assistance” by
Specialist in Foreign
supporting partner countries’ “journey to self
Assistance Policy
-reliance.” This report highlights reforms that

represent new or enhanced approaches to achieving longstanding objectives, including the
following:
For a copy of the full report,
please call 7-5700 or visit
 Process and policy reforms focused on promoting and measuring partner country
www.crs.gov.
progress toward economic self-reliance, engaging the private sector in international
development, and reforming procurement practices to better support these broader goals.
 Organizational structure reforms intended to enhance the agency’s leadership structure, improve the
efficiency of humanitarian assistance programming, and consolidate technically specialized offices within
the agency.
 Workforce management reforms, including the creation of a new noncareer hiring mechanism.
The figure below depicts the timing of key events of Transformation implementation to date.
Figure 1.Key Elements of Transformation at USAID

Source: Created by CRS using various Administration documents.
Note: OMB = Office of Management and Budget.
Congress may view USAID’s reform initiatives through longstanding areas of interest and policy questions, including
 the relationship between the “journey to self-reliance” and broader U.S. foreign policy concerns, including
great power competition;
 the consistency of the “self-reliance” goal with foreign assistance priorities identified by Congress in
annual appropriations legislation;
 potential impacts of significant USAID funding cuts repeatedly proposed by the Trump Administration;
 potential impacts of proposed new Senate-confirmed management positions on agency operations;
 implications of replacing existing strategies, indicators, and mechanisms with new strategies, indicators,
and mechanisms proposed in the Transformation initiative;
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“Transformation” at the U.S. Agency for International Development

 the means for prioritizing goals identified in the new USAID Policy Framework and initiatives such as
Prosper Africa, which do not seem appear to fall under the Transformation umbrella;
 alignment of USAID policies and foreign assistance indicators with those of other U.S. agencies funding
and implementing assistance, including the State Department and the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
and
 the effect on food assistance funded by Congress through multiple channels, including the Food for Peace
account, of the proposed bureau restructuring and consolidation of the Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance and Food for Peace.

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Introduction
Many Members of the 116th Congress have demonstrated an ongoing interest in Trump
Administration efforts to reform the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The
reforms, branded Transformation at USAID, target a broad range of programs, structures, and
processes in an effort to improve the agency’s efficiency and effectiveness. The reform process
was initiated by an executive order and an Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
memorandum, both issued in 2017. The OMB memorandum called on U.S. government agencies
to submit reform plans focused on making the government “lean, accountable, and more
efficient.”1
USAID provided several preliminary plans to the State Department (to which USAID reports)
and OMB in the summer of 2017, but the internal restructuring initiative began in earnest after
Mark Green was confirmed as USAID Administrator in August 2017. USAID submitted its own
reform plan to OMB, separate from State, though USAID cooperated with the State Department’s
“redesign” initiative as well. OMB’s government-wide reform plan, “Delivering Government
Solutions in the 21st Century,”2 released in June 2018, prescribed 32 government-wide reforms,
several of which directly related to USAID. These included
 restructuring U.S. humanitarian assistance programs,
 establishing a new Development Finance Institution to incorporate USAID credit
programs, and
 changing USAID’s Washington, DC-based bureau structure.
Soon after the release of the OMB report, USAID finalized and began implementing its reforms,
newly branded as Transformation. No single public report or other document comprehensively
details the Transformation effort or what it encompasses. This CRS report relies on various
publications on the USAID website focused on specific reforms or priorities described as being
part of the Transformation, the testimony of USAID Administrator Mark Green before Congress
on multiple occasions, implementation documents such as the Country Roadmaps and the Private
Sector Engagement Strategy, and the new USAID Policy Framework. Each of these sources
differs in what they include, and in the emphasis given to different reform components, making it
difficult to ascertain the full picture and the prioritization USAID ascribes to the various
elements.
Role of Congress. Most of the reforms proposed under Transformation do not require
congressional approval, but some require advance notification to Congress.3 Notification does not
require congressional action, but it gives Congress the opportunity to weigh in on the action being
notified and to apply “holds” (nonbinding but generally respected requests that action be deferred
until a related Member concern is resolved). Nevertheless, Administrator Green appears to have

1 See Executive Order 13781, March 17, 2017, and OMB Memorandum M-17-22, April 2017. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-22.pdf. For more information, see
CRS Report R44909, Executive Branch Reorganization, by Henry B. Hogue.
2 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Government-Reform-and-Reorg-Plan.pdf.
3 Section 7073 of the current SFOPS appropriation (P.L. 116-6, Division F) states that funds in the act may not be used
to implement a reorganization or redesign plan at USAID without prior consultation by the Administrator with the
relevant committees (House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Foreign relations Committee and both the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees), and requires that the committees be notified 15 days in advance of obligation of
any funds for reorganization purposes.
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actively involved Congress in the shaping and implementation of Transformation and has
suggested that he does not intend to move forward without congressional support.4 Congress has
the power to shape USAID reforms through both oversight activities and funding requirements
and restrictions.
This report analyzes key elements of current USAID reform efforts under the Transformation
umbrella. Although the report highlights key reforms and changes in USAID policy and practice,
it is not a comprehensive overview of this broad initiative. The report first discusses key
objectives of Transformation, then describes several process, structure, and workforce reforms
intended to support these objectives, with an emphasis on reforms that are distinct from prior
USAID reform efforts. The report concludes with a discussion of broader issues that may be
relevant to congressional perspectives on USAID reforms.
Transformation Objectives and Historic Context
Transformation at USAID is an implementation framework for reforms that are multifaceted and
still evolving. Administrator Green’s testimony at April 2018 budget hearings described
Transformation as “experience-informed, innovation-driven reforms to optimize our structures
and procedures and maximize our effectiveness.”5 In these broad terms, many of the reforms are
similar to general government or organization reform efforts in their focus on efficiency and
effectiveness. While much of Transformation reflects incremental policy adjustments, several
components signal a distinct vision for USAID’s role in foreign affairs.
As noted, no single public document comprehensively details the components and objectives of
Transformation. However, various USAID fact sheets, videos, and statements by Administrator
Green since 2018 suggest some of the initiative’s key objectives:
 supporting country transitions toward self-reliant, locally led development;
 increasing USAID-private sector collaboration in development;
 supporting U.S. national security strategy;
 enhancing USAID’s core capabilities and strengthening leadership; and
 using taxpayer dollars more efficiently and effectively.6
A consistent emphasis across USAID policy documents, including those describing
Transformation, is the core objective of “ending the need for foreign assistance” by supporting
partner countries’ “Journey to Self-Reliance.”7 As Transformation has evolved, moving partner

4 In April 2018 testimony before the Senate Appropriations SFOPS subcommittee, Administrator Green said, “We’re
also committed to working closely with this committee to ensure that your ideas are reflected in our Agency’s
transformation plan.” In April 2019 testimony before Congress, Administrator Green cited nearly 100 consultations
with Members of Congress and their staffs related to the reform agenda, and asked for Congress to clear several
notifications related to agency restructuring.
5 Testimony of USAID Administrator Mark Green before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee of State-Foreign
Operations, April 26, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/apr-25-2018-us-agency-
international-development-administrator-mark.
6 In April 2019, USAID released a new policy framework, “Ending the Need for Foreign Assistance,” the title of which
summarizes the key motivation behind agency’s reform efforts. The framework includes a chapter on “USAID’s
Transformation,” which describes the reform efforts as organized around USAID’s “three indispensable resources”—
people, policy, and budget—and presents various objectives in these areas. Available at https://www.usaid.gov/
PolicyFramework.
7 USAID Policy Framework, p. 8.
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countries toward economic self-sufficiency has become become the primary reform objective
cited by USAID—the one that all the specific reform proposals are designed to support. Other
stated objectives, such as advancing national security goals, are deemphasized in later
Transformation materials.
Many of the proposed Transformation reforms are consistent with efforts by past USAID
Administrators. For example, successive Administrations have sought to refine the deployment of
foreign assistance to advance U.S. national security, asserting that it should be a major component
of U.S. foreign policy strategy.8 The Obama Administration’s USAID Forward initiative focused
on bringing new partnerships, innovation, and a renewed focus on results to USAID’s work.9
Under the George W. Bush Administration and Administrator Henrietta Fore, USAID’s
Development Leadership Initiative focused on building USAID’s workforce capacity and
leadership. The self-reliance objective at the center of Transformation has been cited as a goal in
various USAID document for decades.10 Nearly every Administration and USAID Administrator
has proposed reforms intended to improve USAID’s efficiency and effectiveness, and
Transformation may be viewed as the latest step in the agency’s evolution.
Process and Policy Reforms
To implement the objectives and strategic priorities of Transformation, the agency is making
several changes to its programs and work processes intended to establish a more flexible and
field-responsive approach to programming. Much like the strategic objectives described above,
these adjustments build on efforts by previous Administrations, aiming to align USAID’s
approach to development with the current global landscape.
The “Journey to Self-Reliance”
The organizing principle for USAID policy reforms under Transformation is the “Journey to Self-
Reliance.” Self-reliance is Transformation’s term for a country’s ability to plan, finance, and
implement solutions to address their own development challenges absent foreign assistance.11 To
operationalize the concept, USAID produced a matrix comprising 17 existing indicators to
quantify countries’ progress toward ending their need for foreign assistance.12 These indicators
are maintained by third-party sources, including multilateral institutions, think tanks, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). USAID selected these indicators based on their
perceived alignment with the self-reliance concept, the reputation of reporting institutions, public
availability of the underlying data and methodology, comparability across countries, and

8 The Obama Administration’s 2010 U.S. Global Development Policy, for example, described development assistance
as a core pillar of American power, part of a comprehensive approach to national security alongside diplomacy and
defense. See https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-
policy.
9 Information on USAID Forward is available at https://www.usaid.gov/data/dataset/d45f05be-50de-4840-83a1-
8ebb8e93f25f.
10 See, for example, the P.L. 480 (Food for Peace) annual report for 1972, which notes “management's continued stress
on the necessity for food-receiving countries to increase their own self-reliance.” The Annual Report On Activities
Carried Out Under Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, as Amended, During The Period January 1 Through December 31,
1972, p.59.
11 USAID, USAID Self-Reliance Metrics: FY2019 Methodology Guide, Washington, DC, September 2018, p. 1.
12 A list of these indicators is available at https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/.
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comprehensiveness of reporting across countries.13 This matrix, on which all less-developed
countries have been plotted (including nonrecipients of U.S. foreign assistance), divides the
indicators into two quantitative measures (see Figure 2):
 Commitment is meant to indicate whether a country’s government and its
people demonstrate a desire to rise beyond their current condition.
 Capacity is meant to illustrate whether a country has sufficient resources to
assist itself in moving beyond poverty.
Taken together, these two indices are meant to provide a comprehensive portrait of a country’s
development status to inform country-level planning. Under this new approach, USAID’s five-
year country plans, called Country Development Cooperation Strategies, are to prioritize
approaches centered on advancing a country’s commitment to self-reliance and augmenting its
capacity to achieve it. While USAID has long supported efforts to build partner countries’
capacity and emphasized their “ownership” of development programs, the “Journey to Self-
Reliance” may be unique in making self-sufficiency the primary goal shaping USAID country
strategies.
Figure 2. Self-Reliance Metrics

Source: USAID, “The Journey to Self-Reliance” (Washington, DC, September 18, 2018), p. 5,
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/Journey_to_Self_Reliance.pdf.

13 USAID, USAID Self-Reliance Metrics: FY2019 Methodology Guide, Washington, DC, September 2018, p. 3,
https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/docs/USAID_Self-Reliance_Metrics_FY_2019_Methodology_Guide.pdf.
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Notes: Parentheticals denote the data sources for each indicator. The source institutions are varied, including
think tanks (Legatum Institute and Heritage Foundation), university research institutes (the Varieties of
Democracy project [VDem] and Yale’s Center for International Earth Science Information Network [CIESIN]),
and multilateral institutions (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD]; the World
Economic Forum [WEF]; and the World Bank, including the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators [WGI]
and an intergovernmental data set on education quality, here labeled IRED). A ful er description of these sources
is available at https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/docs/USAID_Self-
Reliance_Metrics_FY_2019_Methodology_Guide.pdf.
This matrix approach reflects a sweeping theory of development that policymakers and observers
have long debated. USAID asserts that the “Journey to Self-Reliance” allows for greater tailoring
of country-level programming to the unique challenges facing a given country, while also
establishing a common metric applicable across all countries. Although the self-reliance
indicators are ostensibly a succinct but holistic portrait of a country’s development along 17
indicators, they in fact comprise a wide array of issues.14 USAID argues that this inclusivity
strives for an “absence of judgment” about the relative importance of each metric, which may be
interpreted as an effort to integrate many theories of development into the framework.15 In fact,
the indicators selected are especially oriented toward theories that connect economic growth to a
country’s democratic institutions16 and its markets.17
The indicators USAID has selected reflect theories of development that continue to generate
debate among researchers and practitioners. For example, the theory that a country must lower its
trade barriers (measured by the “Trade Freedom” indicator) to achieve prosperity remains heavily
contested in academic circles,18 particularly for developing countries. In addition, the choice to
aggregate these indicators into the two composites of “commitment” and “capacity,” rather than a
single indicator, reflects some weighting: each of the seven “commitment” indicators contributes
relatively more to a country’s score than each of the 10 “capacity” indicators.
To address such concerns, USAID argues that missions should examine these indicators in their
local context and evaluate them based on each country’s unique condition—and that these
indicators do not reflect a comprehensive diagnosis of the causes of development. The
Administration’s attention to country-level indicators suggests a reorientation from recent
approaches. Recent Administrations have focused on broad, global development challenges, such
as climate change and the HIV/AIDS crisis, while implementing such initiatives in targeted
subnational regions and municipalities.19 Together, these global challenges and targeted
interventions refocused strategic planning away from the country level. USAID describes the
“Journey to Self-Reliance” as a high-level profile of a country’s national policy and its

14 VDem’s Liberal Democracy Index, for example, takes into account 23 subindicators that describe a country’s
governance system.
15 “The Self-Reliance Metrics & Country Roadmaps: FAQs,” USAID, accessed April 23, 2019.
https://selfreliance.usaid.gov/.
16 See, for example, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity,
and Poverty (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012).
17 See, for example, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History, vol. XLIX,
no. 4 (December 1989), pp. 803-832.
18 See, for example, Michael A. Clemens and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Why Did the Tariff-Growth Correlation Change
after 1950?,” Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 5-46.
19 For example, the Feed the Future Presidential Initiative structures its implementation on “zones of influence,”
localized areas for project implementation that in many cases have operated with municipal rather than national
governments. Programs in Central America’s Northern Triangle, similarly, have targeted areas as small as city blocks
to address chronic violence in some communities.
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institutions, in contrast to past initiatives focused on subnational regions. While USAID notes that
progress emerges locally, these indicators track progress only at the national level.20 It is unclear
if this approach will affect USAID’s relationship with municipal and regional governments.
In the past, commentators have expressed concern that such metrics could be used to cut aid to
poor performers, punishing people in need for the actions of their national leaders.21 USAID
asserts that these matrices are not scorecards to determine which countries are “deserving” of aid,
but instead are a quantitative tool to inform programmatic allocations. Thus, for example, a poor
score on open government may cause a mission to direct farmer-support programs through
independent NGOs rather than the national government, as the central government may not be
trusted to administer its services effectively. While USAID states that it is definitively not grading
countries’ performance, it is unclear whether the agency will be plotting countries’ advancement
over time along the self-reliance matrices, as “journey” implies. Considering the significant lag
time in many indicators’ reporting, as well as variance in reporting periods across indicators, it
may be difficult to draw straightforward conclusions about the effect of any program or policy
(whether the partner government’s or USAID’s) upon a country’s self-reliance.
Additional Tools: Financing Self-Reliance and Private Sector Engagement
Within the “Journey to Self-Reliance” framework, Transformation emphasizes two primary tools
for ending the need for foreign assistance: financing self-reliance and private sector engagement.
While many of the self-reliance indicators seek to describe the landscape against which USAID is
to deploy its programs, these two components of Transformation seek to provide the tools with
which to implement those programs. Financing self-reliance focuses on a country’s ability to
generate sufficient capital to invest in self-reliance, and private sector engagement seeks to create
and partner with a private sector entity through which capital can be invested.
Financing Self-Reliance
A key component of USAID’s self-reliance approach is facilitating access to capital for countries
to reinvest in their own progress, in line with broader recent trends in development finance. This
investment approach occupies a central place in several global development frameworks,
including the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) agenda22 and multilateral development
banks’ “billions to trillions” agenda, which seeks to leverage “billions” of Official Development
Assistance (ODA) dollars to mobilize “trillions” of private sector investments in developing
countries. Similarly, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development affirmed
the importance of strong local enabling environments and responsible fiscal policy to encourage
country-owned growth strategies.
Transformation’s focus on financing self-reliance builds upon existing U.S. approaches and
commitments toward achieving the SDGs. It combines efforts to advance domestic resource
mobilization (e.g., tax collection) with strong management of public finances and fiscal
transparency to enable effective and accountable administration of the public sector. This
approach is designed to create a strong market-based “enabling environment” for private

20 USAID, USAID Policy Framework: Ending the Need for Foreign Assistance, Washington, DC, April 10, 2019, p.
26, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/WEB_PF_Full_Report_FINAL_10Apr2019.pdf.
21 "Donald Trump cuts off aid to Central America," The Economist, April 4, 2019.https://www.economist.com/the-
americas/2019/04/04/donald-trump-cuts-off-aid-to-central-america.
22 The Sustainable Development Goals, agreed in 2015 by all United Nations member states, aim to advance global
peace and prosperity along 17 priority areas. They follow on the eight prior Millennium Development Goals that
organized many donors’ efforts from 2000 to 2015.
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investment, that is, one in which private investors are able to operate with reasonable confidence
in the rule of law and protection for their investments. The initiative also prioritizes effective
financial markets to enable capital access for economic development investments.
Private Sector Engagement
Private sector engagement is a central conduit through which Transformation envisions
repositioning USAID’s role in development and supporting partner country self-sufficiency.
USAID released a new Private Sector Engagement Policy (PSE Policy) in April 2019.23 The
approach it outlines is not new, but rather builds on longstanding efforts to leverage the resources
of nongovernmental actors, including businesses and charitable foundations, to advance
international development. The Global Development Alliance (GDA) program, launched in 2001,
has long been USAID’s flagship mechanism for incubating and executing public-private
partnerships for development assistance. The Obama Administration elevated several such
programs when launching the U.S. Global Development Lab (the Lab), an innovation-oriented
bureau intended to source breakthrough innovations to address development challenges. The
Lab’s Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) program, for example, seeks to integrate venture
capital approaches into USAID’s programs.
The Transformation focus on private sector engagement tweaks the existing approach and
includes several components not seen in previous Administrations. The Obama Administration
generally viewed private sector partnerships as one component of a broader Science, Technology,
Innovation, and Partnerships (STIP) agenda.24 This PSE Policy emphasizes business partnerships
as a mechanism to attract solutions from scientists and technology innovators. The “enterprise-
driven development” approach articulated in the PSE Policy may be a shift from economic
development programs’ focus on the market system to a focus on individual enterprises as their
programmatic target. While past efforts, such as the GDA program, created partnerships with the
private sector to address individual development challenges, the new PSE Policy seeks to infuse a
private sector engagement orientation across all programming.
The PSE Policy does not clarify the types of private sector partners to be favored. Micro, small,
and medium enterprises (MSMEs), for example, a historical focus of USAID programming, are
not specifically highlighted, suggesting that this policy may seek to support USAID collaboration
with enterprises ranging from multinational corporations to smallholder farmers. Private sector
engagement, then, is expected to broaden USAID’s partner makeup, integrating nontraditional
partners, both in the United States and overseas, by changing the way USAID engages its partners
in program design. The PSE Policy is still in early stages of implementation. Many of the tools
cited in the strategy have been in place at USAID for several years. The scope and depth of
changes in USAID’s implementation approach may emerge in the coming months.
Procurement and Partnering
The USAID Acquisition and Assistance Strategy (A&A Strategy), released in February 2019,
gives some indication of the shift in private sector engagement envisioned by Transformation.25

23 USAID, Private-Sector Engagement Policy, April 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/private-sector-
engagement/policy.
24 See, for example, Monalisa Salib and Brit Steiner, “‘What’s in an acronym?’ Decoding CLA and STIP,” USAID
Learning Lab, September 14, 2016, https://usaidlearninglab.org/lab-notes/%E2%80%9Cwhat%E2%80%99s-acronym
%E2%80%9D-decoding-cla-and-stip-3, accessed April 23, 2019.
25 USAID, Acquisition and Assistance Strategy, Washington, DC, February 4, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/work-
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Restructuring USAID’s engagement methodology and sourcing mechanisms is another means by
which Transformation aims to build partnerships and promote partner self-sufficiency. Noting
that more than 80% of USAID program funds are issued in award and assistance mechanisms to
NGOs,26 the A&A Strategy lays out several shifts to its partnering approach: diversifying
USAID’s partner base, which has steadily shrunk since 2011;27 supporting the self-reliance of
local partners through capacity building;28 and establishing a more flexible partnering approach
through more collaborative and adaptive award management principles. Reforms from this
initiative are still in progress, including the recent launch of a New Partnerships Initiative and
expected revisions to USAID’s internal series of operational policies, the Automated Directive
System.29
Past experience may inform A&A Strategy implementation. USAID has attempted to expand its
partner base in the past, notably under the Obama Administration’s USAID Forward initiative.
USAID Forward sought to shift funding away from longtime international development firms and
NGOs in the U.S. toward organizations based in developing countries, as a means of promoting
recipient country “ownership” of their development. The Lab also contributed to new partnering
modalities and frameworks such as “co-creation,” a model for collaborative program design that
is increasingly referenced in USAID’s public solicitations.30 Transformation aims to build on
these efforts by highlighting tools that encourage greater collaboration with partners and more
adaptive management, consistent with revisions to USAID’s process for developing and
implementing programs (the “Program Cycle”).31
Organizational Structure
The structural component of Transformation is meant to align the agency’s organization with the
Administration’s stated goals for U.S. international development and humanitarian assistance.
This part of Transformations has been subject to the most direct congressional oversight. USAID
submitted nine Congressional Notifications (CN) to the appropriate committees in July and
August 2018 detailing the proposed structural changes. Upon receipt, each CN was put on “hold,”
signaling that committee members wanted to look into the proposed changes further. The
Administrator has signaled that he will not make changes without the approval of all four
congressional oversight committees.
Organizationally, USAID is split into two sections—field missions, and headquarters’ bureaus
and independent offices—each with its own key functions and personnel. The headquarters’
bureaus and offices are divided among four categories: (1) geographic bureaus, (2) functional
bureaus, (3) central bureaus, and (4) independent offices (see Figure 3). The geographic bureaus
directly correspond with country field missions, while the functional bureaus manage cross-

usaid/how-to-work-with-usaid/acquisition-and-assistance-strategy.
26 USAID, Acquisition and Assistance Strategy, p. 1.
27 USAID, Acquisition and Assistance Strategy, p. 1.
28 USAID, Acquisition and Assistance Strategy, p. 4.
29 Further information on the New Partnerships Initiative is available at https://www.usaid.gov/npi.
30 For example, see the recently released Philippines DELIVER RFP, for which the selection process is envisioned to
culminate in a “co-design work planning session.” The process graphic for the award-making process was amended
twice throughout the solicitation process, a clear indication that USAID continues to refine its approach to this new
paradigm for procurement.
31 USAID, Program Cycle Policy: Revisions to ADS 201, Washington, DC, December 15, 2016, p. 4,
https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/2016_1215_ads_201_implementing_partners_
webinar_.pdf.
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cutting sectoral issues, including education, global health, and humanitarian assistance, among
others. The central bureaus and independent offices manage day-to-day agency operations,
including human resources, security, legislative affairs, and financial management.
Figure 3. USAID Organization, 2019

Source: USAID Organization, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization, February 2018.
Leadership Structure Reforms
Under Transformation, USAID is seeking to amend the chain of command to include two new
Administration-appointed Associate Administrators. Currently, all bureaus report directly to the
Administrator and Deputy Administrator. In the reorganization proposal, the Associate
Administrators would each be responsible for three bureaus:
 The Associate Administrator for Relief, Response and Resilience (R3) would
manage the Bureaus for Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Conflict Prevention and
Stabilization (CPS), and Resilience and Food Security (RFS).
 The Associate Administrator for Strategy and Operations would oversee the
Bureaus for Legislative and Public Affairs (LPA), Policy, Resources and
Performance (PRP), and Management (M).32

32 U.S. Agency for International Development, Restructuring the Office of the Administrator, Congressional
Notification #8, August 30, 2018, pp. 94-103, https://pages.devex.com/rs/685-KBL-765/images/USAID-Congressional-
Notifications.pdf.
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By adding the two Associate Administrators, the Deputy Administrator would be responsible only
for overseeing the remaining functional bureaus (Global Health and Development, Democracy
and Innovation) and geographic bureaus. In establishing this three-pronged oversight structure,
USAID aims to relieve the Administrator of some day-to-day oversight responsibilities, allowing
the Administrator greater ability to focus on agency-wide management priorities, and to enable
additional, functionally specialized leadership voices to represent the agency on the global stage.
Some observers and policymakers have expressed concern with these changes; they worry that
adding two political appointees might increase politicization of the agency’s development
decisions.
Beyond the proposed leadership additions, reorganization proposals under Transformation are
primarily focused on the headquarters’ functional and central bureaus and their respective
offices.33 In broad strokes, the agency is moving from four functional bureaus, six central
bureaus/offices, and six independent offices to five functional bureaus, three central bureaus, and
four independent offices. (For a detailed chart of the proposed structural changes, see the
Appendix.) Two of the proposed changes are presented in greater detail below.
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
Perhaps the most publicized reorganization proposal is the creation of a Bureau for Humanitarian
Assistance (HA). This proposal would take the Offices of Food for Peace (FFP) and U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) out of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance (DCHA) and combine them into HA. FFP and OFDA would no longer remain separate
offices with independent functions; instead, they would be consolidated into one bureau made up
of eight offices—three geographically focused and five technical.
USAID cites two primary reasons for the creation of HA:
 Elevating U.S. humanitarian assistance on the global stage. The Trump
Administration maintains that it has placed a greater emphasis on humanitarian
assistance than previous Administrations—although such claims are open to
debate—but that having two separate offices within USAID leads to confusion
when articulating U.S. humanitarian efforts to the international community. In
merging FFP and OFDA and creating HA, USAID contends that it will have one
unified, and more prominent, voice on humanitarian assistance on the global
stage.
 Removing duplication of efforts. FFP and OFDA currently share some of the
funding appropriated under the international disaster assistance (IDA) account. In
combining the two offices, USAID asserts that it can better manage IDA funds by
removing the distinction between food and nonfood assistance. In doing so,
USAID states that it will be able to respond more quickly and effectively to
today’s increasingly complex humanitarian emergencies.34

33 The only structural proposal related to the geographic bureaus and offices is the movement of the Office of
Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA) into the Bureau for Asia. OAPA had previously been housed in the Bureau
for Asia but was made independent of the bureau in 2010.
34 U.S. Agency for International Development, Merger and Restructuring of the Offices of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance and Food for Peace into the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, Congressional Notification #1, July 27,
2018, pp. 1-13, https://pages.devex.com/rs/685-KBL-765/images/USAID-Congressional-Notifications.pdf.
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Housing the humanitarian offices in a stand-alone bureau is not new to USAID. In the 1990s, the
agency had a Bureau for Humanitarian Response, which included both FFP and OFDA as distinct
offices. It was not until 2001, after a reorganization, that the humanitarian offices were combined
with other functions to become the current DCHA Bureau.35 The HA structural proposal differs
from the Bureau for Humanitarian Response in that it dissolves the FFP and OFDA offices as they
currently exist.
For a number of years, the humanitarian community has engaged with the U.S. government on
issues of efficiency, effectiveness, and coordination of humanitarian assistance. Consultations
within the U.S. government, Congress, and the broader humanitarian community continue on HA.
Specifically, some say the proposed HA elevates USAID’s humanitarian functions and is a
positive step forward on reform, while others are more skeptical about its broader impact on
interagency cooperation, levels of global humanitarian funding, and U.S. leadership and
priorities.36 Food assistance stakeholders, for example, have raised concerns about the dissolution
of FFP. Because FFP receives approximately half of its funding through Title II of the Food for
Peace Act, most of which must be used to buy U.S. agricultural commodities, some have
expressed concern that without the designation of FFP as an independent office, the provision of
U.S. in-kind commodities will decline as a percentage of U.S. emergency food assistance.37
Further, while the proposal notes that FFP’s mandated nonemergency programs would remain in
HA, some are concerned that the nonemergency programs will be deemphasized in the new
bureau context. These FFP-related concerns have been exacerbated by the Administration’s
repeated requests to eliminate Title II funding in its annual budget requests.38
Bureau for Democracy, Development, and Innovation
The prospective creation of the Bureau for Democracy, Development, and Innovation (DDI) is
the largest structural change proposed. It seeks to consolidate the agency’s “cross-cutting and
sector-specific learning and knowledge management, and other technical assistance,” noting that
the current structure has left these functions “scattered … inconsistent and uncoordinated.”39 The
proposal pulls technical staff from regional bureaus and moves offices from three different

35 In 2001, USAID Administrator Natsios created the DCHA Bureau to “adopt a more holistic approach to the troubling
phenomenon of failing, failed, and recovering states.” DCHA combined the Bureau for Humanitarian Response with
the Office of Democracy and Governance and established a new Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. Anita
Menghetti and Jeff Drumta, “Improving the U.S. Government’s Humanitarian Response,” Ethics & International
Affairs, vol. 18, no. 2 (2004), p. 46. According to the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, moving the
humanitarian offices was meant to “better integrate the humanitarian agenda into senior policy deliberation, to
coordinate humanitarian and transitional programs across U.S. organizational boundaries and with other donors, and to
link emergency and transitional assistance with long-term development and crisis prevention.” The Advisory
Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, U.S. Foreign Assistance Priorities: Recommendations by the Advisory
Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid, Washington, DC, December 2000, p. 10.
36 CRS interviews in April and May 2019 with representatives from the humanitarian community, including
policymakers, international organizations, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations.
37 For more on the Office of Food for Peace and the provision of international food assistance, see CRS Report R45422,
U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview, by Alyssa R. Casey.
38 In each of its Presidential Budget Requests, the Trump Administration has zeroed out funding for Food for Peace Act
Title II, citing Administration efforts to streamline and prioritize foreign assistance.
39 U.S. Agency for International Development, Merger and Restructuring of the Bureau for Economic Growth,
Education and Environment; the Global Development Lab; the Office of Democracy, Human Rights and Governance;
the Office of American Schools and Hospitals Abroad; and the Center for Faith and Opportunity Initiatives into the
Bureau for Development, Democracy and Innovation, Congressional Notification #6, August 3, 2018, pp. 64-86,
https://pages.devex.com/rs/685-KBL-765/images/USAID-Congressional-Notifications.pdf.
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bureaus into one. The new bureau would include 10 offices from the Bureau for Economic
Growth, Education, and Environment (E3), two offices from DCHA, and four centers currently
housed in the Global Development Lab. In addition, the bureau would include technical experts
previously embedded in regional bureaus. These changes are intended to make DDI the technical
“one-stop-shop” for missions in the field. The new DDI would comprise “centers” and “hubs” to
provide “missions with coordinated consultancy services,” from education and environment to
private sector engagement, youth, and gender equality.40
DDI has emerged as a controversial component of the structural proposal for Transformation.
Supporters believe that in creating one place for “centers” and “hubs,” field offices will be able to
garner more cohesive technical support for their respective programs. Detractors worry that DDI
is an amalgamation of offices with unrelated functions, and that its various components will be
unwieldy to manage.41 The Global Development Lab’s absorption into a larger bureau, in
particular, may cause concern among supporters that innovation in development is set for a
demotion among agency priorities.
Workforce Management42
Through Transformation, USAID seeks to modify its workforce management structures and
processes to strengthen “the ability of its entire workforce to thrive in, and adapt to, increasingly
complex and challenging situations and opportunities.”43 These changes include developing and
piloting a new noncareer hiring mechanism, developing and operationalizing a leadership
philosophy, and establishing and implementing a knowledge management framework. Much like
the rest of Transformation, these pieces are described by the agency as being “employee-led,”
developed by working groups comprising employees from across the agency.
Hiring Mechanisms: The Adaptive Personnel Project
USAID staff are hired under more than 20 different hiring mechanisms. These include direct-hire
(DH) positions, like Civil and Foreign Service, and non-DH positions, including U.S. personal
services contractors (USPSCs), fellows, and institutional support contractors (ISCs), among
others. DH positions are generally funded using USAID’s Operating Expenses (OE) account and
come with the full suite of U.S. government benefits. The non-DH positions are primarily funded
using program funds, and benefits vary depending on the mechanism. For example, USPSCs have
time-limited contracts and receive a subsidy to arrange for their own health care and life
insurance on the open market. ISCs are hired through a parent firm and receive their paychecks,
health care, and other benefits through that entity.

40 Ibid.
41 InterAction stated in its assessment of the proposed DDI that “USAID’s intentional merging of numerous assistance
sectors and cross-cutting lenses into a single bureau could help modernize its programming and lead to more consistent
coordination with field missions but could also lead to thorny management challenges and unintended delays in
programming.” InterAction, Proposed USAID Bureau for Development, Democracy, and Innovation (DDI),
https://www.interaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/usaid_transformation_outcome_2_-_ddi.pdf. Also see Robbie
Gramer and Dan De Luce, USAID Redesign Moves Forward, With No Drama, Foreign Policy, April 25, 2018,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/25/usaid-redesign-moves-forward-with-no-drama-u-s-agency-for-international-
development-humanitarian-relief-development-crises-disaster-assitance/.
42 Information in this section is informed by a CRS briefing with USAID officials on April 18, 2019.
43 U.S. Agency for International Development, Transforming our Workforce, November 9, 2018,
https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/transformation-at-usaid/transforming-workforce.
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A key element of the Transformation workforce reforms is a new hiring mechanism designed to
address staffing concerns raised in the aftermath of USAID’s 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola
response. At the peak of that outbreak, the agency deployed 94% of its crisis roster, leaving the
agency with little capacity to respond to other crises.44 Recognizing that this staffing challenge
could easily arise again, the agency convened a working group in late 2016 to start developing a
new hiring mechanism for crisis response. By 2018, the working group comprised approximately
80 USAID employees from different bureaus and under different employment mechanisms (e.g.,
DHs, USPSCs) and was supported by experts from the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA).45 Since its creation, the working group and consequent plans have been
folded into the larger context of Transformation.
Contractors at USAID
Since its establishment in 1961, USAID has had the legislative authority to contract for experts, consultants, and
retired officers to carry out foreign assistance functions.46 As the agency evolved, the proportion of non-DH
positions in the agency’s workforce increased considerably. In 2018, non-DHs made up 29% of the agency’s
workforce. Some assert that Congress’s increased scrutiny on the OE account pushed USAID to turn to non-DH
hiring mechanisms that could be funded with program funds. Others believe that USAID chose to rely on non-DH
positions for their flexibility—by maintaining a workforce on shorter contracts, the agency can regularly rebalance
its workforce based on its programmatic priorities. Regardless of the reason for imbalance, many in the
development community have expressed concern that the shortage of fil ed DH positions has resulted in a lack of
institutional knowledge throughout the agency. USAID has stated that “current hiring mechanisms do not provide
sufficient staffing agility to meet current and future requirements.” Further, “numerous hiring mechanisms create
management burdens and inefficient workforce planning, as well as a lack of equitable benefits.”47
The new proposed mechanism is the Adaptive Personnel Project (APP), a noncareer, excepted
service (potentially Schedule B) mechanism. (Excepted service positions are those not in the
Senior Executive or competitive services.)48 USAID contends that the APP would provide the
agency with more workforce flexibility, allowing it to more easily surge and contract with the
agency’s needs and resources. A few USAID-identified features of the APP include the following:
 Flexible tenure. Positions could be time-limited, much like current USPSC or
Foreign Service Limited (FSL) positions (limited to five years and nine years,
respectively), but the time limitations would be determined by the relevant hiring
managers. This means that the APP could accommodate a 1-year position for a
discrete project or a 10-year tenure with an office if the need for the role
continues.
 “Talent-based.” Nonexcepted federal positions are required to be classified, with
each role assigned to a group, series, title, and pay band. Once in a group and
series, an employee is effectively locked in; in order to move into a different
group and series, the employee would need to apply for the new position. USAID

44 For more information on the West Africa Ebola outbreak, see CRS Report R44507, Status of the Ebola Outbreak in
West Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther, Susan B. Epstein, and Bolko J. Skorupski.
45 See https://www.napawash.org/.
46 P.L. 87-195.
47 U.S. Agency for International Development, Transforming our Workforce, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1868/Fact_Sheet_Workforce_Mobility_and_Flexibility.pdf.
48 Agencies responsible for hiring excepted service positions can set qualification requirements that are not subject to
the classification rules defined in 5 U.S.C. §2103. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is responsible for
excepting positions from the competitive service (see 5 C.F.R. §213.302 2019). Excepted service positions are subject
to Schedules A, B, C, or D, as defined by OPM. Each schedule provides the authority to hire for specific excepted
positions and defines the requirements for the positions to be hired (see 5 C.F.R. §213.3201 and §213.3202 2019).
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is working with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to structure the APP
to either use a multidisciplinary approach to the classification system or not
adhere to the classification system, allowing APP employees to move across
different functional areas with relative ease.
 Equity in benefits. Even though APP would be noncareer, APP employees
would receive government benefits like their career counterparts. This is a
departure from the USPSC structure.
 Streamlined processes. USAID would create a common performance
management system for all APP hires.
The APP pilot would establish 300 positions for the crisis response offices, including FFP and
OFDA (the proposed HA Bureau), OTI, and the Bureau for Global Health. USAID anticipates
that many current USPSCs, ISCs, and Participating Agency Service Agreement employees
(PASAs) would move into these APP positions, ultimately changing the agency’s balance of
hiring mechanisms.
USAID has determined that it requires congressional approval to use program funds for the APP
pilot. It notes that it does not have funds from the Operating Expenses account available to fund
the pilot and meet the agency’s other personnel needs (i.e., funding DH positions). If it receives
approvals from Congress and OPM, USAID states that it will move forward with drafting internal
policies and procedures to guide the new personnel system. The agency seeks to have the 300
APP positions filled in 2020. If those positions are filled and the onboarding of APP personnel
provides the intended flexibilities, USAID is to expand the project to include an additional 1,200
positions in the following two years.
Outlook and Potential Issues for Congress
Congress may have several ongoing areas of interest related to U.S. foreign assistance policy and
USAID operations and budget. As Members of Congress consider proposed and ongoing USAID
reform activities, several cross-cutting issues may emerge, including the following:
 Role of foreign assistance in broader U.S. foreign policy. At a time when many
in Congress have expressed significant concern about the influence of rival
powers such as China and Russia in regions in which USAID is active, Members
may consider whether the overarching Transformation goal of ending the need
for foreign assistance is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security
interests. U.S. foreign assistance programs are driven by multiple rationales,
including supporting U.S. security and diplomatic and commercial interests.
Foreign assistance also is widely recognized as a tool of foreign policy, which
promotes social and economic development in partner countries, while also
enhancing U.S. influence and leverage in those countries. If USAID is successful
in ending the need for foreign assistance, Congress and the Administration may
consider alternative forms of engagement with current aid partners to maintain
U.S. influence and presence. For example, a reorientation to cultural exchange
programs like the Fulbright program, as well as increased business ties and
investment agreements, may help maintain strong relationships and U.S.
influence in countries transitioning away from U.S. aid.
 USAID funding. USAID is carrying out Transformation at the same time that
the Administration, for a third straight year, has proposed cuts of over 20% to the
agency’s annual budget. While some of the proposed reforms could reduce
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agency costs over time, Transformation documents do not appear to specify how
the proposed budget cuts, if enacted, would be reflected in program allocation. To
date, Congress has not supported the proposed cuts, and appropriations for
USAID have remained fairly level in recent years.
 New positions from restructuring. The Transformation proposal to add two
new Associate Administrator positions at USAID would increase the number of
political appointees at the agency, potentially raising concerns about the
politicization of USAID’s development decisions. Given the challenges some
Administrations have faced in filling existing high-level positions, some
observers are concerned that the new positions could sit vacant for months or
even years—possibly further hamstringing future Administrations’ policy crafting
and implementation.
 Impact on existing USAID activities. Overall, Transformation focuses on the
new—new strategies, new indicators, and new hiring mechanisms. There is less
discussion of what, if anything, may fall away. For example, in staffing, the
agency is creating a hiring mechanism to “streamline” the workforce—it
discusses plans to eventually phase out one hiring mechanism. This means that as
the new hiring mechanism is getting off the ground, the agency would still be
managing more than 20 others. Congress may consider asking the agency what
other strategies, structures, and processes the agency may plan to phase out or
integrate as a result of Transformation.
 Self-reliance goals versus congressional priorities. Administrator Green has
argued that the self-reliance roadmaps are not just to be used after taking into
account congressional directives and country/technical allocations, but as a guide
for congressional allocation decisions as well. Congress typically appropriates
funds to support priority accounts and sectors (such as global health, basic
education, agricultural development, democracy promotion, and women’s
empowerment) rather than countries. The seeming shift under Transformation to
a country-specific aid agenda may conflict with congressional funding of
transnational programming, such as countering trafficking and regional trade
hubs. Furthermore, the self-reliance indicators themselves may warrant attention.
Advising countries that lowering their tariff barriers will signal their commitment
to economic prosperity may be difficult to sustain, some may argue, in light of
other actions of the Trump Administration, for example. Congress may consult
with USAID to ensure its indicator configuration is consistent with its priorities.
 Other initiatives in Transformation. Transformation was initially launched with
several other priorities that do not feature prominently in recent media on the
initiative. For example, USAID operational flexibility in nonpermissive
environments and programmatic effectiveness in countering violent extremism
were core features of Transformation at launch. It is unclear whether these and
other priorities have fallen in prominence because they require more interagency
coordination, because solutions have been fairly straightforward, because the
challenges in those sectors are too intractable to address, or because of other
reasons. Congress may also consider seeking additional information on how
Transformation would align with the Administration’s planned Prosper Africa
trade and investment initiative, which is expected to focus, in part, on USAID’s
three trade hubs in Africa and elements of its trade capacity-building programs.
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 Alignment with State Department. The State Department’s Office of Foreign
Assistance Resources (F) has maintained a comprehensive database of indicators
to quantify the results of U.S. foreign assistance programs since 2006. It is
unclear how these indicators, or those used by the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, will be used in conjunction with USAID’s new self-reliance
indicators, if at all. Also unclear is the extent to which the State Department has
been engaged with Transformation at USAID, and whether these reforms are
aligned with Secretary Pompeo’s vision for the future of U.S. diplomatic
engagement. Congress may consider whether certain reforms should be
broadened to include State Department policies and structure, or elsewhere in
government.
 Impact on Food for Peace programming. The proposed merger of the Offices
of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace into the Bureau of
Humanitarian Assistance has raised questions about the future of Food for Peace
Act Title II programming. The Office of Food for Peace is currently dual-funded,
receiving approximately half of its funding through the agriculture appropriations
bill and its authorization from regular farm bills.49 In the proposed HA Bureau,
the Office of Food for Peace would cease to exist in name and program officers
would be programming food and nonfood assistance side-by-side. Congress has
not adopted proposals by multiple Administrations to eliminate Title II programs,
and it may seek to further understand how the HA Bureau would be structured to
ensure it meets its mandates outlined in the farm bill, including the minimum
level of nonemergency programming.

49 For more information on international food assistance, see CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance:
An Overview, by Alyssa R. Casey.
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Appendix. USAID Structural Transformation

Source: USAID Congressional Notifications; consultation with USAID officials in May 2019.
Notes: As part of Transformation at USAID, the offices wil be renamed. This diagram is meant to il ustrate the
movement of current offices and their functions.
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Author Information

Emily M. Morgenstern
Marian L. Lawson
Analyst in Foreign Assistance and Foreign Policy
Specialist in Foreign Assistance Policy

Nick M. Brown

Analyst in Foreign Assistance and Foreign Policy

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