Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer
Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated June 18, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32109

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The Navy began procuring Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, also known as Aegis
destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 82 have been procured through FY2019. The Navy’s
proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of three more DDG-51s, which
would be the 83rd, 84th, and 85th ships in the class.
DDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2018-FY2022 are being procured under a multiyear
procurement (MYP) contract that Congress approved as part of its action on the Navy’s FY2018
budget. DDG-51s procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new design (the
Flight III DDG-51 design), which incorporates a new and more capable radar called the Air and
Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or SPY-6 radar.
The Navy procured DDG-51s from FY1985 through FY2005, and resumed procuring them in
FY2010. In FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring DDG-51s, the
Navy procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The Navy plans no further
procurement of DDG-1000s. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $155.9 million in
procurement funding to help complete the total procurement cost of the three DDG-1000 class
ships.
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three DDG-51s requested for
procurement in FY2020 at $5,463.0 million, or an average of $1,821.0 million each. The ships
have received $363.7 million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) advance
procurement (AP) funding (i.e., funding for up-front batch orders of components of DDG-51s to
be procured under the FY2018-FY2022 MYP contract). The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget
requests the remaining $5,099.3 million in procurement funding needed to complete the estimated
procurement cost of the three DDG-51s, as well as $224.0 million in EOQ funding for DDG-51s
to be procured in FY2021 and FY2022, bringing the total amount requested for the DDG-51
program for FY2020 to $5,323.3 million, excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The Navy wants to procure the first ship of a new class of large surface combatants in FY2025.
Under the Navy’s plan, FY2025 would be the final year of DDG-51 procurement.
Issues for Congress for FY2019 for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 destroyer programs include the
following:
 whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2020 funding requests for
the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs;
 cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 effort;
 the potential impact on the DDG-51 program of a possible change in the surface
force architecture; and
 the Navy’s plan to shift the mission orientation of the DDG-1000s from an
emphasis on naval surface fire support (NSFS) to an emphasis on surface strike.

Congressional Research Service

link to page 18 link to page 28 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendixes
Appendix. Additional Background Information on DDG-1000 Program ..................................... 14

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 24

Congressional Research Service

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Introduction
This report presents background information and potential oversight issues for Congress on the
Navy’s Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyer programs. The
Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of three DDG-51s.
Decisions that Congress makes concerning destroyer procurement could substantially affect Navy
capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the DDG-51, DDG-1000, and
other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.1
Background
Navy’s Force of Large Surface Combatants (LSCs)
LSC Definition
Decades ago, the Navy’s cruisers were considerably larger and more capable than its destroyers.
In the years after World War II, however, the Navy’s cruiser designs in general became smaller
while its destroyer designs in general became larger. As a result, since the 1980s there has been
substantial overlap in size and capability of Navy cruisers and destroyers. (The Navy’s new
Zumwalt [DDG-1000] class destroyers, in fact, are considerably larger than the Navy’s cruisers.)
In part for this reason, the Navy now refers to its cruisers and destroyers collectively as large
surface combatants (LSCs), and distinguishes these ships from the Navy’s small surface
combatants (SSCs), the term the Navy now uses to refer collectively to its frigates, Littoral
Combat Ships (LCSs), mine warfare ships, and patrol craft. The Navy’s annual 30-year
shipbuilding plan, for example, groups the Navy’s surface combatants into LSCs and SSCs.2
LSC Force Levels
In December 2016, the Navy released a goal to achieve and maintain a Navy of 355 ships,
including 104 LSCs. At the end of FY2018, the Navy’s force of LSCs totaled 88 ships, including
22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers3 and 66 Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. Under
the Navy’s FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan, the Navy is to achieve a force
of 104 large surface combatants by FY2029.4

1 See also CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Michael Moodie.
2 The Navy sometimes also uses the term Cru-Des (an abbreviation of cruiser-destroyer, pronounced “crew-dez”) to
refer collectively to its cruisers and destroyers.
3 A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between
1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too
expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005.
4 For additional information, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 6

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

DDG-51 Program
Overview
The DDG-51 program was initiated in the late 1970s.5 The DDG-51 (Figure 1) is a multi-mission
destroyer with an emphasis on air defense (which the Navy refers to as anti-air warfare, or AAW)
and blue-water (mid-ocean) operations.
Figure 1. DDG-51 Class Destroyer

Source: Navy file photograph accessed October 18, 2012, at http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=134605.
DDG-51s, like the Navy’s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers, are equipped with the Aegis
combat system, an integrated ship combat system named for the mythological shield that
defended Zeus. CG-47s and DDG-51s consequently are often referred to as Aegis cruisers and
Aegis destroyers, respectively, or collectively as Aegis ships. The Aegis system has been updated
several times over the years. Existing DDG-51s (and also some CG-47s) are being modified to
receive an additional capability for ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations.6
The first DDG-51 was procured in FY1985 and entered service in 1991. A total of 82 have been
procured through FY2018, including 62 in FY1985-FY2005 and 20 in FY2010-FY2019. (In
FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring DDG-51s, the Navy

5 The program was initiated with the aim of developing a surface combatant to replace older destroyers and cruisers
that were projected to retire in the 1990s. The DDG-51 was conceived as an affordable complement to the Navy’s
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers. For an early discussion of the DDG-51 program, see Alva M. Bowen and
Ronald O’Rourke, “DDG-51 and the Future Surface Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1985: 176-189.
6 The modification for BMD operations includes, among other things, the addition of a new software program for the
Aegis combat system and the arming of the ship with the SM-3, a version of the Navy’s Standard Missile that is
designed for BMD operations. For more on Navy BMD programs, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

2

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers, which are discussed below.) With a total
of 82 ships funded through FY2019, the DDG-51 program is, in terms of number of hulls, one of
the largest Navy shipbuilding programs since World War II.
Design Changes
The DDG-51 design has been modified over time. The first 28 DDG-51s (i.e., DDGs 51 through
78) are called Flight I/II DDG-51s. In FY1994, the Navy shifted DDG-51 procurement to the
Flight IIA DDG-51 design, which incorporated a significant design change that included, among
other things, the addition of a helicopter hangar. A total of 47 Flight IIA DDG-51s (i.e., DDG-79
through DDG-124, plus DDG-127)7 were procured through FY2016.
In FY2017, the Navy shifted DDG-51 procurement to the Flight III DDG-51 design, which
incorporates a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or
SPY-6 radar and associated changes to the ship’s electrical power and cooling systems. DDG-51s
procured in FY2017 and subsequent years (i.e., DDGs 125 and higher, except for DDG-127 noted
above) are to be Flight III DDG-51s.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2018 budget, Congress granted the Navy authority to use a
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for DDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2018-
FY2022. This is the fourth MYP contract for the DDG-51 program—previous DDG-51 MYP
contracts covered DDG-51s procured in FY2013-FY2017, FY2002-FY2005, and FY1998-
FY2001.
Shipbuilders, Combat System Lead, and Radar Makers
DDG-51s are built by General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and
Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS. Lockheed is
the lead contractor for the Aegis system installed on all DDG-51s. The SPY-1 radar—the primary
radar for the Aegis system on Flight I/II and Flight IIA DDG-51s—is made by Lockheed. The
AMDR—the primary radar for the Aegis system on Flight III DDG-51s—is made by Raytheon.
Modernization and Service Life Extension
The Navy is modernizing its existing DDG-51s (and its CG-47s) so as to maintain their mission
and cost-effectiveness out to the end of their projected service lives. In April 2018, the Navy
announced that it wants to extend the service lives of all DDG-51s to 45 years—an increase of 5
or 10 years over previous plans to operate DDG-51s to age 35 or 40. Doing this, the Navy has
said, will permit the Navy to achieve a total of 355 ships by 2034, or about 20 years earlier than
under the FY2019 budget submission, although the 355-ship fleet of the 2030s would have more
destroyers and fewer ships of other kinds (including attack submarines and aircraft carriers) than
called for in the 355-ship force-level goal.
Older CRS reports provide additional historical and background information on the DDG-51
program.8

7 The hull-number discontinuity regarding DDG-127 is an administrative consequence of the ship having been funded
as a Congressional addition to the Navy’s proposed FY2016 shipbuilding request.
8 See CRS Report 94-343, Navy DDG-51 Destroyer Procurement Rate: Issues and Options for Congress, by Ronald
Congressional Research Service

3

link to page 18 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

DDG-1000 Program
In FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring DDG-51s, the Navy
procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The Navy plans no further procurement of
DDG-1000s. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $155.9 million in procurement
funding to help complete the total procurement cost of the three DDG-1000 class ships.
The DDG-1000 is a multi-mission destroyer with an originally intended emphasis on naval
surface fire support (NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. Consistent with
that mission orientation, the ship was designed with two new-design 155mm guns called
Advanced Gun Systems (AGSs). The AGSs were to fire a new 155mm, gun-launched, rocket-
assisted guided projectile called the Long-Range Land-Attack Projectile (LRLAP, pronounced
LUR-lap). DDG-1000s are designed carry 600 LRLAP rounds (300 for each gun), and to have
additional LRLAP rounds brought aboard the ship while the guns are firing, which would create
what Navy officials called an “infinite magazine.” In November 2016, however, it was reported
that the Navy had decided to stop procuring LRLAP projectiles because the projected unit cost of
each projectile had risen to at least $800,000.9 The Navy began exploring options for procuring a
less expensive (and less capable) replacement munition for the AGSs.
The Navy to date has not announced a replacement munition for the AGSs.10 In the meantime, it
was reported in December 2017 that, due to shifts in the international security environment and
resulting shifts in Navy mission needs, the mission orientation of the DDG-1000s will be shifted
from an emphasis on NSFS to an emphasis on surface strike, meaning the use of missiles to attack
surface ships and perhaps also land targets.11
Under this new plan, the mix of missiles carried in the 80 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes of
each DDG-1000 may now feature a stronger emphasis on anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles
missiles. The two AGSs on each DDG-1000 will, for the time being at least, remain for the most
part dormant, pending a final decision on whether to procure a replacement munition for the
AGSs (which would require modifying the AGSs and their below-deck munition-handling
equipment, since both were designed specifically for LRLAP), or instead pursue another option,
such as removing the AGSs and their below-deck equipment and replacing them with additional
VLS tubes.
For additional background information on the DDG-1000 program, see the Appendix.

O’Rourke (April 25, 1994; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author), and CRS Report
80-205, The Navy’s Proposed Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Guided Missile Destroyer Program: A Comparison With
An Equal-Cost Force Of Ticonderoga (CG-47) Class Guided Missile Destroyers, by Ronald O’Rourke (November 21,
1984; out of print and available to congressional clients directly from the author).
9 Christopher P. Cavas, “New Warship’s Big Guns Have No Bullets,” Defense News, November 6, 2016; Sam
LaGrone, “Navy Planning on Not Buying More LRLAP Rounds for Zumwalt Class,” USNI News, November 7, 2016;
Ben Guarino, “The Navy Called USS Zumwalt A Warship Batman Would Drive. But at $800,000 Per Round, Its
Ammo Is Too Pricey to Fire,” Washington Post, November 8, 2016.
10 See Sam LaGrone, “No New Round Planned For Zumwalt Destroyer Gun System; Navy Monitoring Industry,” USNI
News, January 11, 2018; Richard Abott, “Navy Still Has No Plans For DDG-1000 Gun Ammo,” Defense Daily,
January 12, 2018: 1-2.
11 Megan Eckstein, “New Requirements for DDG-1000 Focus on Surface Strike,” USNI News, December 4, 2017. See
also Richard Abott, “Navy Will Focus Zumwalt On Offensive Surface Strike,” Defense Daily, December 5, 2017;
David B. Larter, “The Navy’s Stealth Destroyers to Get New Weapons and a New Mission: Killing Ships,” Defense
News, February 15, 2018.
Congressional Research Service

4

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Surface Combatant Construction Industrial Base
All cruisers, destroyers, and frigates procured since FY1985 have been built at GD/BIW and
HII/Ingalls. Both yards have long histories of building larger surface combatants. Construction of
Navy surface combatants in recent years has accounted for virtually all of GD/BIW’s ship-
construction work and for a significant share of HII/Ingalls’ ship-construction work. (HII/Ingalls
also builds amphibious ships for the Navy and cutters for the Coast Guard.) Navy surface
combatants are overhauled, repaired, and modernized at GD/BIW, HII/Ingalls, and other U.S.
shipyards.
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon are generally considered the two leading Navy surface combatant
radar makers and combat system integrators. Lockheed is the lead contractor for the DDG-51
combat system (the Aegis system), while Raytheon is the lead contractor for the DDG-1000
combat system, the core of which is called the Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure
(TSCE-I). Lockheed has a share of the DDG-1000 combat system, and Raytheon has a share of
the DDG-51 combat system. Lockheed, Raytheon, and Northrop competed to be the maker of the
AMDR to be carried by the Flight III DDG-51. On October 10, 2013, the Navy announced that it
had selected Raytheon to be the maker of the AMDR.
The surface combatant construction industrial base also includes hundreds of additional firms that
supply materials and components. The financial health of Navy shipbuilding supplier firms has
been a matter of concern in recent years, particularly since some of them are the sole sources for
what they make for Navy surface combatants. Several Navy-operated laboratories and other
facilities support the Aegis system and other aspects of the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.
FY2020 Funding Request
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three DDG-51s requested for
procurement in FY2020 at $5,463.0 million, or an average of $1,821.0 million each. The ships
have received $363.7 million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) advance
procurement (AP) funding (i.e., funding for up-front batch orders of components of DDG-51s to
be procured under the FY2018-FY2022 MYP contract). The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget
requests the remaining $5,099.3 million in procurement funding needed to complete the estimated
procurement cost of the three DDG-51s, as well as $224.0 million in EOQ funding for DDG-51s
to be procured in FY2021 and FY2022, bringing the total amount requested for the DDG-51
program for FY2020 to $5,323.3 million, excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget also requests $155.9 million in procurement funding to
help complete the total procurement cost of the three DDG-1000 class ships.
Issues for Congress
FY2020 Funding Request
One issue for Congress for FY2020 is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2020
funding requests for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs. In considering this issue, Congress
may consider, among other things, whether the Navy has accurately priced the work it is
proposing to fund for FY2020.
Congressional Research Service

5

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Cost, Technical, and Schedule Risk in Flight III DDG-51 Effort
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns cost, technical, and schedule risk for the Flight III
DDG-51.
October 2018 CBO Report
An October 2018 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy’s
shipbuilding programs stated the following about the Flight III DDG-51:
To meet combatant commanders’ goal of improving future ballistic missile defense
capabilities beyond those provided by existing DDG-51s—and to replace 15 Ticonderoga
class cruisers when they are retired in the 2020s—the Navy plans to substantially modify
the design of the DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyer to create a Flight III configuration. That
modification would incorporate the new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), now
under development, which will be larger and more capable than the radar on current DDG-
51s. For the AMDR to operate effectively in the new Flight III configuration, however, the
ships must have a greater capacity to generate electrical power and cool major systems.
With those improvements incorporated into the design of the Flight III and the associated
increases in the ships’ displacement, CBO expects that the average cost per ship over the
entire production run would be $1.8 billion in 2018 dollars—about 15 percent more than
the Navy’s estimate of $1.6 billion. Costs could be higher or lower than CBO’s estimate,
however, depending on the eventual cost and complexity of the AMDR and the associated
changes to the ship’s design to integrate the new radar.12
May 2019 GAO Report
A May 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected DOD
acquisition programs stated the following in its assessment of the Flight III DDG-51:
Current Status
The Navy and the shipbuilders completed Flight III detail design activities in December
2017. As compared to Flight IIA, the Flight III design included considerable changes to
the ship’s hull, mechanical, and electrical systems to incorporate the AMDR program’s
SPY-6 radar, and changes to restore ship weight and stability safety margins. To reduce
technical risk, the Navy plans to field all but one—the SPY-6 radar—of the program’s four
mature critical technologies on other ship classes before integration with Flight III. In 2018,
however, the Navy identified software-related deficiencies affecting SPY-6 that delayed
delivery of a radar array for power and integration testing with the Aegis combat system
by at least 1 year. Despite these delays, the Navy plans to complete testing, install the radar
on the ship, and activate the combat system for shipboard testing by January 2022.
The Navy expects to complete a draft test and evaluation master plan for Flight III by early
2022. The Navy and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation continue to disagree on
whether the use of a self-defense test ship equipped with Aegis and the SPY-6 radar is
necessary to validate performance during operational test and evaluation….
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.

12 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2019 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2018, p. 22.
Congressional Research Service

6

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

The program office said that it has delivered 67 DDG 51 class ships since its inception in
1985 and the class remains in serial production at both new construction shipyards.13
Regarding the AMDR specifically, the report stated the following:
Technology Maturity and Design Stability
The program office reported that AMDR’s four critical technologies are mature—although
we disagree—and that the system design is stable. Since our 2018 assessment, the program
office has further demonstrated the radar system’s performance and capabilities through
live testing and simulation. However, based on industry best practices, the program cannot
fully demonstrate all critical technologies until the Navy tests them in their realistic, at-sea
environment with the Aegis combat system. According to the AMDR program schedule,
such testing will occur in 2023 during operational testing with a DDG 51 Flight III ship.
Until the Navy completes this testing, the program’s design stability remains at risk for
disruption. Specifically, any performance deficiencies the Navy discovers during at-sea
testing could require it to revise existing design drawings to remedy issues.
As part of developmental testing, the program office tested a full-scale, single-face radar
array at the Navy’s Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) beginning in September 2016.
The program office successfully completed several live ballistic missile defense, anti-air,
and anti-surface warfare tests. However, in March 2018, the array failed a ballistic missile
test because of a defective software update that caused the array to stop tracking a live
target. Officials said a software update corrected the issue and they verified the array’s
performance through a successful retest in January 2019. Officials said the single-face
array, originally scheduled to support Aegis combat system equipment testing, will
undergo additional testing at PMRF through 2019. As a result, the Navy has revised the
acquisition schedule and will instead divert the delivery of a new array to support land-
based Aegis combat system equipment testing sometime in 2019.
The program has completed software development to support core radar capabilities and
will continue to develop radar updates to support system improvements, cybersecurity, and
combat system integration through 2021. In parallel to the radar’s software development,
significant software development remains to integrate AMDR with the Aegis combat
system. Program officials said this software development must complete before both
systems can be fully integrated and tested. While the Navy plans to test the radar and initial
Aegis combat system software at a land-based site, the Navy will not test the radar and
final Aegis combat system until both are installed on the lead ship. Any issues identified
after the systems are installed on the lead ship could require retrofits to the radar or ship.
Production Readiness
Nearly 18 months after entering production, the program has not demonstrated that all of
its critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control. The program reported that it
exercised a contract option for the fourth low-rate initial production unit in April 2018 and
was authorized to procure five additional low-rate production units in February 2019.
However, in August 2018, the contractor reported early cost growth and schedule variance
for the first three low-rate production units because of increased material costs and other
production delays. Officials said the delays are partly due to a problem with a digital
receiver component, which the contractor is testing. As a result, contractor delivery of the
first production radar is at risk of delay from December 2019 to April 2020.
The AMDR program office plans to procure more than two-thirds of its 22 total radars
prior to completing operational testing. The Navy deliberately planned for AMDR to begin
production prior to the start of Aegis upgrade software development to allow time for key
radar technologies to mature and for the design to stabilize. However, this concurrency

13 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Limited Use of Knowledge-Based
Practices Continues to Undercut DOD’s Investments, GAO-19-336SP, May 2019, p. 131.
Congressional Research Service

7

link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 13 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

means any deficiencies identified during combat system integration or operational testing
may lead to retrofitting after production is underway or complete for many of the radars.
Any required retrofitting is likely to increase program costs or delay radar deliveries.
Other Program Issues
DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has yet to approve the AMDR
Test and Evaluation Master Plan. DOT&E stated that the proposed test approach for the
AMDR and DDG 51 Flight III programs does not provide realistic operational conditions
without the use of an AMDR- and Aegis-equipped unmanned self-defense test ship.
Because the Navy has elected not to request funds for a test ship, DOT&E and the Navy
are revising the DDG 51 Flight III operational test strategy to include AMDR operational
requirements and an updated simulation strategy. DOT&E cautioned, however, that DDG
51 Flight III’s self-defense and survivability capabilities will not be fully known until the
program completes operational testing.
Program Office Comments and GAO Response
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. In
its comments, the program office disagreed with our assessment of the program’s
technology maturity, stating that combat system testing is not required to demonstrate
mature radar technologies since the technologies have been tested and proven at the land-
based PMRF site. We disagree. The PMRF site does not provide a realistic, at-sea
environment to test the fit and function of the radar and combat system on a ship.14
Potential Change in Surface Force Architecture
Another issue for Congress concerns the potential impact on the DDG-51 program of a possible
change in the surface force architecture. The Navy’s current force-level goal of 355 ships,
including 104 large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers), is the result of a Force
Structure Analysis (FSA) that the Navy conducted in 2016. The Navy conducts a new or updated
FSA every few years, and it is currently conducting a new FSA that is scheduled to be completed
by the end of 2019. Navy officials have suggested that the Navy in coming years may shift to a
new surface force architecture that will include a smaller proportion of large surface combatants,
a larger proportion of small surface combatants, and a third tier of numerous unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs). Some observers believe the results of the new FSA may reflect this potential
new surface force architecture.
Figure 2 shows a Navy briefing slide depicting the potential new surface force architecture, with
each sphere representing a manned ship or USV. Consistent with Figure 2, the Navy’s current
355-ship goal calls for a Navy with twice as many large surface combatants (104) as small
surface combatants (52). Figure 2 suggests that the potential new surface force architecture could
lead to the obverse—a planned force mix that calls for twice as many small surface combatants
than large surface combatants—along with the new third tier of USVs.15

14 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Limited Use of Knowledge-Based
Practices Continues to Undercut DOD’s Investments, GAO-19-336SP, May 2019, p. 100.
15 For additional discussion of this possible change in surface force architecture, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

8

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Figure 2. Navy Briefing Slide on Surface Force Architecture
Each sphere represents a ship or a USV

Source: Il ustration accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy Testing
as NAVSEA Moves Forward with Draft RFP,” USNI News, April 29, 2019.
Notes: Each sphere represents a ship or a USV. LSC means large surface combatant (i.e., cruiser or destroyer);
SSC means small surface combatant (i.e., frigate or Littoral Combat Ship); LUSV means large USV; MUSV means
medium USV. Spheres with multiple colors (the LSCs and SSCs) are ships equipped with a combination of
sensors (green), command and control (C2) equipment (red), and payloads (including weapons) (blue). Spheres
with single colors (the USVs) are equipped with either payloads (blue) or sensors (green).
A January 15, 2019, press report states:
The Navy plans to spend this year taking the first few steps into a markedly different future,
which, if it comes to pass, will upend how the fleet has fought since the Cold War. And it
all starts with something that might seem counterintuitive: It’s looking to get smaller.
“Today, I have a requirement for 104 large surface combatants in the force structure
assessment; [and] I have [a requirement for] 52 small surface combatants,” said Surface
Warfare Director Rear Adm. Ronald Boxall. “That’s a little upside down. Should I push
out here and have more small platforms? I think the future fleet architecture study has
intimated ‘yes,’ and our war gaming shows there is value in that.”16
An April 8, 2019, press report states that Navy discussions about the future surface fleet include

16 David B. Larter, “US Navy Moves Toward Unleashing Killer Robot Shps on the World’s Oceans,” Defense News,
January 15, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 15 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

the upcoming construction and fielding of the [FFG(X)] frigate, which [Vice Admiral Bill
Merz, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfare systems] said is surpassing
expectations already in terms of the lethality that industry can put into a small combatant.
“The FSA may actually help us on, how many (destroyers) do we really need to modernize,
because I think the FSA is going to give a lot of credit to the frigate—if I had a crystal ball
and had to predict what the FSA was going to do, it’s going to probably recommend more
small surface combatants, meaning the frigate … and then how much fewer large surface
combatants can we mix?” Merz said.
An issue the Navy has to work through is balancing a need to have enough ships and be
capable enough today, while also making decisions that will help the Navy get out of the
top-heavy surface fleet and into a better balance as soon as is feasible.
“You may see the evolution over time where frigates start replacing destroyers, the Large
Surface Combatant [a future cruiser/destroyer-type ship] starts replacing destroyers, and in
the end, as the destroyers blend away you’re going to get this healthier mix of small and
large surface combatants,” he said—though the new FSA may shed more light on what that
balance will look like and when it could be achieved.17
Change in DDG-1000 Mission Orientation
Another potential oversight issue for Congress for FY2019 concerns the Navy’s plan to shift the
mission orientation of the DDG-1000s from an emphasis on NSFS to an emphasis on surface
strike. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 What is the Navy’s analytical basis for shifting the ships’ mission orientation?
 What are the potential costs of implementing this shift? How much of these costs
are in the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission?
 How cost-effective will it be to operate and support DDG-1000s as ships with an
emphasis on surface strike?
 When does the Navy plan to decide on whether to procure a replacement
munition for the ships’ AGSs, or instead pursue another option, such as removing
the AGSs and their below-deck equipment and installing additional VLS tubes?
What would be the cost of the latter option, and how many additional VLS tubes
could be installed?
 If the ships will operate with their AGSs for the most part dormant, to what
degree will that reduce the return on investment (ROI) involved in developing,
procuring, operating, and sporting the DDG-1000s?
Legislative Activity for FY2020
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request
Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 procurement funding requests
for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs.

17 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Sees No Easy Answer to Balance Future Surface Fleet,” USNI News, April 8, 2019. Ellipsis
as in original.
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 15 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Table 1. Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
DDG-51 procurement
5,099.3

5,079.3

5,015.3

DDG-51 advance procurement (AP)
224.0

484.0

224.0

DDG-1000 procurement
155.9

155.9

155.9

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2020 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2020 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee; Conf. is conference agreement.
FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11, 2019) on S.
1790, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 1. The
recommended reduction of $20 million in DDG-51 procurement funding is for “Available prior
year funds,” and the recommended increase of $260 million in DDG-51 advance procurement
(AP) funding is for “Accelerate LLTM [long leadtime materials] for FY[20]21 Flight III
destroyers.” (Page 432) S.Rept. 116-48 further states:
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers
The budget request included $5.1 billion in line number 8 of Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN), for Arleigh Burke-class destroyer procurement.
The committee notes that the budget request includes procurement of three Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers, which is one additional destroyer in fiscal year 2020 as compared to last
year's request.
The committee has not received sufficient justification for the unit cost increases of the
fiscal year 2020 destroyers, as compared to last year's request. In addition, the committee
notes that this program has available prior years funds, which are excess to need.
Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $20.0 million in line number 8 of
SCN.
Arleigh Burke-class destroyer advance procurement
The budget request included $224.0 million in line number 9 of Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN), for Arleigh Burke-class destroyer advance procurement.
The committee notes that the Navy future years defense program includes procurement of
two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in fiscal year 2021, which would be procured using a
multiyear procurement contract. The committee understands that advance procurement of
long lead time material could reduce component costs and enable optimal ship construction
intervals.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $260.0 million in line number 9 of
SCN. (Page 23)
Congressional Research Service

11

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Regarding two research and development funding line items relating to the Large Surface
Combatant—a new cruiser- or destroyer-type ship that the Navy wants to begin procuring in
FY2025 as the procurement successor to the DDG-51—S.Rept. 116-48 states:
Large Surface Combatant preliminary design
The budget request included $20.3 billion in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E), Navy, of which $69.1 million was for PE 63564N Ship Preliminary Design and
Feasibility Studies. The committee notes that the Chief of Naval Operations stated in
March 2019, referring to the next Large Surface Combatant (LSC) class of ships, that the
" ... first question that we have to do is prove to ourselves that we need a large surface
combatant. What is the unique contribution of something like that in the face of all these
emerging technologies? Right now the discussions point to the fact that it brings a unique
capability in terms of hous[ing] larger types of weapons, larger missiles; you certainly get
more aperture on a bigger sensor[.]"
Given the uncertain requirements for the next LSC class of ships and the lack of clarity on
the new systems under consideration for such class, including the associated technical
maturity of such systems, the committee believes that funding design efforts for a new LSC
class is early to need.
The committee urges the Navy to identify capability gaps, set LSC requirements, and
engage in robust component-level prototyping of potential new critical systems, including
those related to propulsion, electrical distribution, radar, and missile launching systems,
prior to initiating LSC design efforts.
Accordingly, the committee recommends a decrease of $46.6 million, for a total of $22.5
million, in RDT&E, Navy, for PE 63564N.
Advanced surface machinery system component prototyping
The budget request included $20.3 billion in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E), Navy, of which $25.4 million was for PE 63573N Advanced Surface Machinery
Systems.
The committee notes the Chief of Na val Operations stated in March 2019, referring to the
next Large Surface Combatant (LSC) class of ships, that the " ... first question that we have
to do is prove to ourselves that we need a large surface combatant. What is the unique
contribution of something like that in the face of all these emerging technologies? Right
now the discussions point to the fact that it brings a unique capability in terms of hous[ing]
larger types of weapons, larger missiles; you certainly get more aperture on a bigger
sensor[.]"
In addition, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower on March 27, 2019, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition stated in
response to a question related to actions necessary to improve acquisition performance on
lead ships, "The second piece is really improved sub-system prototyping like we have done
on Columbia. Try and get everything prototyped as soon as we can. [The Navy] learn[ed]
some lessons on Ford by not having land-based prototypes for all the subsystems."
The committee supports the Assistant Secretary's intent to improve sub-system prototyping
well in advance of difficult-to-reverse ship design decision points.
The committee urges the Navy to identify capability gaps, set LSC requirements, and
engage in robust component-level prototyping of potential new critical systems, including
those related to propulsion, electrical distribution, radar, and missile launching systems,
prior to initiating LSC design efforts.
Congressional Research Service

12

link to page 15 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Accordingly, the committee recommends an increase of $125.0 million, for a total of
$150.4 million, in RDT&E, Navy, for PE 63573N for advanced surface machinery system
component prototyping. (Pages 81-82)
Section 127 of S. 1790 as reported by the committee states:
SEC. 127. Limitation on the next new class of Navy large surface combatants.
(a) In general.—Milestone B approval may not be granted for the next new class of Navy
large surface combatants unless the class of Navy large surface combatants incorporates
prior to such approval—
(1) design changes identified during the full duration of the combat system ship
qualification trials and operational test periods of the first Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in
the Flight III configuration to complete such events; and
(2) final results of test programs of engineering development models or prototypes for
critical systems specified by the Senior Technical Authority pursuant to section 8669b of
title 10, United States Code, as added by section 1017 of this Act, in their final form, fit,
and function and in a realistic environment, which shall include a land-based engineering
site if the propulsion system will utilize integrated electric power technology, including
electric drive propulsion.
(b) Limitation.—The Secretary of the Navy may not release a detail design or construction
request for proposals or obligate funds from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
account for the next new class of Navy large surface combatants until the class of Navy
large surface combatants receives Milestone B approval and the milestone decision
authority notifies the congressional defense committees, in writing, of the actions taken to
comply with the requirements under subsection (a).
(c) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) The term “Milestone B approval” has the meaning given the term in section 2366(e)(7)
of title 10, United States Code.
(2) The term “milestone decision authority” means the official within the Department of
Defense designated with the overall responsibility and authority for acquisition decisions
for the program, including authority to approve entry of the program into the next phase of
the acquisition process.
(3) The term “large surface combatants” means Navy surface ships that are designed
primarily to engage in attacks against airborne, surface, subsurface, and shore targets,
excluding frigates and littoral combat ships.
FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2968)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-84 of May 23, 2019) on H.R.
2968, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 1. The recommended
reduction of $84.0 million in DDG-51 procurement funding is for “Basic construction excess
growth” ($66.0 million) and “Electronics excess growth” ($18.0 million). (Page 175)

Congressional Research Service

13

link to page 18

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Appendix. Additional Background Information on
DDG-1000 Program
This appendix presents additional background information on the DDG-1000 program.
Overview
The DDG-1000 program was initiated in the early 1990s.18 The DDG-1000 (Figure A-1) is a
multi-mission destroyer with an originally intended emphasis on naval surface fire support
(NSFS) and operations in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. (NSFS is the use of naval guns to
provide fire support for friendly forces operating ashore.)
Figure A-1. DDG-1000 Class Destroyer

Source: U.S. Navy photo 151207-N-ZZ999-435, posted December 8, 2015, with a caption that reads in part:
“The future USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) is underway for the first time conducting at-sea tests and trials in the
Atlantic Ocean Dec. 7, 2015.”
The DDG-1000 was originally intended to replace, in a technologically more modern form, the
large-caliber naval gun fire capability that the Navy lost when it retired its Iowa-class battleships
in the early 1990s,19 to improve the Navy’s general capabilities for operating in defended littoral

18 The program was originally designated DD-21, which meant destroyer for the 21st century. In November 2001, the
program was restructured and renamed DD(X), meaning a destroyer whose design was in development. In April 2006,
the program’s name was changed again, to DDG-1000, meaning a guided missile destroyer with the hull number 1000.
19 The Navy in the 1980s reactivated and modernized four Iowa (BB-61) class battleships that were originally built
during World War II. The ships reentered service between 1982 and 1988 and were removed from service between
1990 and 1992.
Congressional Research Service

14

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

waters, and to introduce several new technologies that would be available for use on future Navy
ships. The DDG-1000 was also intended to serve as the basis for a planned cruiser called CG(X)
that was subsequently canceled.20
The DDG-1000 is to have a reduced-size crew of 175 sailors (147 to operate the ship, plus a 28-
person aviation detachment), compared to roughly 300 on the Navy’s Aegis destroyers and
cruisers, so as to reduce its operating and support (O&S) costs. The ship incorporates a significant
number of new technologies, including an integrated electric-drive propulsion system21 and
automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew.
With an estimated full load displacement of 15,612 tons, the DDG-1000 design is roughly 64%
larger than the Navy’s current 9,500-ton Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and larger than any Navy
destroyer or cruiser since the nuclear-powered cruiser Long Beach (CGN-9), which was procured
in FY1957.
The first two DDG-1000s were procured in FY2007 and split-funded (i.e., funded with two-year
incremental funding) in FY2007-FY2008; the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission estimates their
combined procurement cost at $9,242.3 million. The third DDG-1000 was procured in FY2009
and split-funded in FY2009-FY2010; the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission estimates its
procurement cost at $3,789.9 million.
The first DDG-1000 was commissioned into service on October 15, 2016, although its delivery
date was revised in the Navy’s FY2018 budget submission to May 2018, and revised further in
the Navy’s FY2019 budget submission to December 2018, creating an unusual situation in which
a ship was commissioned into service more than two years prior to its delivery date. The delivery
dates for the second and third ships were revised in the Navy’s FY2018 budget submission to
May 2020 and December 2021, respectively, and were revised further in the Navy’s FY2019
budget submission to September 2020 and September 2022, respectively.22
Program Origin
The program known today as the DDG-1000 program was announced on November 1, 2001,
when the Navy stated that it was replacing a destroyer-development effort called the DD-21
program, which the Navy had initiated in the mid-1990s, with a new Future Surface Combatant
Program aimed at developing and acquiring a family of three new classes of surface
combatants:23

20 For more on the CG(X) program, see CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
21 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
22 The revised delivery dates for the three ships reflect Section 121 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act
(S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016), a provision that establishes standards for determining vessel delivery
dates and which also required the Secretary of the Navy to certify that the delivery dates for certain ships, including the
three DDG-1000s, had been adjusted in accordance with the provision. The Navy’s original plan for the DDG-1000
program was to install certain elements of each DDG-1000’s combat system after delivering the ship and
commissioning it into service. Section 121 of P.L. 114-328 in effect requires the Navy to defer the delivery date of a
DDG-1000 until those elements of the combat system are installed. By the time P.L. 114-328 was enacted, DDG-1000,
per the Navy’s original plan, had already been commissioned into service without those elements of its combat system.
23 The DD-21 program was part of a Navy surface combatant acquisition effort begun in the mid-1990s and called the
SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) program. The SC-21 program envisaged a new destroyer called DD-21
and a new cruiser called CG-21. When the Navy announced the Future Surface Combatant Program in 2001,
development work on the DD-21 had been underway for several years, while the start of development work on the CG-
Congressional Research Service

15

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

 a destroyer called DD(X) for the precision long-range strike and naval gunfire
mission;
 a cruiser called CG(X) for the air defense and ballistic missile mission; and
 a smaller combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to counter
submarines, small surface attack craft (also called “swarm boats”), and mines in
heavily contested littoral (near-shore) areas.24
On April 7, 2006, the Navy announced that it had redesignated the DD(X) program as the DDG-
1000 program. The Navy also confirmed in that announcement that the first ship in the class,
DDG-1000, is to be named the Zumwalt, in honor of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of
Naval operations from 1970 to 1974. The decision to name the first ship after Zumwalt was made
by the Clinton Administration in July 2000, when the program was still called the DD-21
program.25
New Technologies
The DDG-1000 incorporates a significant number of new technologies, including a wave-
piercing, tumblehome hull design for reduced detectability,26 a superstructure made partly of large
sections of composite (i.e., fiberglass-like) materials rather than steel or aluminum, an integrated
electric-drive propulsion system,27 a total-ship computing system for moving information about
the ship, automation technologies enabling its reduced-sized crew, a dual-band radar, a new kind
of vertical launch system (VLS) for storing and firing missiles, and two copies of a new 155mm
gun called the Advanced Gun System (AGS).
Shipbuilders and Combat System Prime Contractor
GD/BIW is the builder for all three DDG-1000s, with some portions of each ship being built by
HII/Ingalls for delivery to GD/BIW. Raytheon is the prime contractor for the DDG-1000’s
combat system (its collection of sensors, computers, related software, displays, and weapon
launchers).
Under a DDG-1000 acquisition strategy approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) on February 24, 2004, the first DDG-1000
was to have been built by HII/Ingalls, the second ship was to have been built by GD/BIW, and
contracts for building the first six were to have been equally divided between HII/Ingalls28 and
GD/BIW.

21 was still years in the future. The current DDG-1000 destroyer CG(X) cruiser programs can be viewed as the
descendants, respectively, of the DD-21 and CG-21. The acronym SC-21 is still used in the Navy’s research and
development account to designate the line item (i.e., program element) that funds development work on both the DDG-
1000 and CG(X).
24 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
25 For more on Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
26 A tumblehome hull slopes inward, toward the ship’s centerline, as it rises up from the waterline, in contrast to a
conventional flared hull, which slopes outward as it rises up from the waterline.
27 For more on integrated electric-drive technology, see CRS Report RL30622, Electric-Drive Propulsion for U.S. Navy
Ships: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
28 At the time of the events described in this section, HII was owned by Northrop Grumman and was called Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).
Congressional Research Service

16

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

In February 2005, Navy officials announced that they would seek approval from USD AT&L to
instead hold a one-time, winner-take-all competition between HII/Ingalls and GD/BIW to build
all DDG-1000s. On April 20, 2005, the USD AT&L issued a decision memorandum deferring this
proposal, stating in part, “at this time, I consider it premature to change the shipbuilder portion of
the acquisition strategy which I approved on February 24, 2004.”
Several Members of Congress also expressed opposition to the Navy’s proposal for a winner-
take-all competition. Congress included a provision (§1019) in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for 2005 (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13 of May 11, 2005) prohibiting a winner-take-
all competition. The provision effectively required the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but did not specify the share of the program that is to go to the additional
shipyard.
On May 25, 2005, the Navy announced that, in light of Section 1019 of P.L. 109-13, it wanted to
shift to a “dual-lead-ship” acquisition strategy, under which two DDG-1000s would be procured
in FY2007, with one to be designed and built by HII/Ingalls and the other by GD/BIW.
Section 125 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163) again prohibited
the Navy from using a winner-take-all acquisition strategy for procuring its next-generation
destroyer. The provision again effectively requires the participation of at least one additional
shipyard in the program but does not specify the share of the program that is to go to the
additional shipyard.
On November 23, 2005, the USD AT&L granted Milestone B approval for the DDG-1000,
permitting the program to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. As
part of this decision, the USD AT&L approved the Navy’s proposed dual-lead-ship acquisition
strategy and a low rate initial production quantity of eight ships (one more than the Navy
subsequently planned to procure).
On February 14, 2008, the Navy awarded contract modifications to GD/BIW and HII/Ingalls for
the construction of the two lead ships. The awards were modifications to existing contracts that
the Navy has with GD/BIW and HII/Ingalls for detailed design and construction of the two lead
ships. Under the modified contracts, the line item for the construction of the dual lead ships is
treated as a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) item.
Until July 2007, it was expected that HII/Ingalls would be the final-assembly yard for the first
DDG-1000 and that GD/BIW would be the final-assembly yard for the second. On September 25,
2007, the Navy announced that it had decided to build the first DDG-1000 at GD/BIW, and the
second at HII/Ingalls.
On January 12, 2009, it was reported that the Navy, HII/Ingalls, and GD/BIW in the fall of 2008
began holding discussions on the idea of having GD/BIW build both the first and second DDG-
1000s, in exchange for HII/Ingalls receiving a greater share of the new DDG-51s that would be
procured under the Navy’s July 2008 proposal to stop DDG-1000 procurement and restart DDG-
51 procurement.29
On April 8, 2009, it was reported that the Navy had reached an agreement with HII/Ingalls and
GD/BIW to shift the second DDG-1000 to GD/BIW, and to have GD/BIW build all three ships.
HII/Iingalls will continue to make certain parts of the three ships, notably their composite
deckhouses. The agreement to have all three DDG-1000s built at GD/BIW was a condition that
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates set forth in an April 6, 2009, news conference on the FY2010

29 Christopher P. Cavas, “Will Bath Build Second DDG 1000?” Defense News, January 12, 2009: 1, 6.
Congressional Research Service

17

link to page 23 Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

defense budget for his support for continuing with the construction of all three DDG-1000s
(rather than proposing the cancellation of the second and third).
Reduction in Procurement to Three Ships
Navy plans for many years called for ending DDG-51 procurement in FY2005, to be followed by
procurement of up to 32 DDG-1000s and some number of CG(X)s. In subsequent years, the
planned total number of DDG-1000s was reduced to 16 to 24, then to 7, and finally to 3.
At the end of July 2008, in a major reversal of its destroyer procurement plans, the Navy
announced that it wanted to end procurement of DDG-1000s and resume procurement of DDG-
51s. In explaining this reversal, which came after two DDG-1000s had been procured, the Navy
stated that it had reevaluated the future operating environment and determined that its destroyer
procurement now needed to emphasize three missions: open-ocean antisubmarine warfare
(ASW), countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and countering ballistic missiles. Although
the DDG-1000 could perform the first two of these missions and could be modified to perform
the third, the Navy concluded that the DDG-51 design could perform these three missions
adequately and would be less expensive to procure than the DDG-1000 design.
The Navy’s proposal to stop procuring DDG-1000s and resume procuring DDG-51s was
presented in the Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget, which was submitted to Congress in 2009.
Congress, in acting on the Navy’s FY2010 budget, approved the idea of ending DDG-1000
procurement and restarting DDG-51 procurement, and procured a third DDG-1000 as the final
ship in the class.
In retrospect, the Navy’s 2008 reversal in its destroyer procurement plans can be viewed as an
early indication of the ending of the post-Cold War era (during which the Navy focused its
planning on operating in littoral waters against the land- and sea-based forces of countries such as
Iran and North Korea) and the shift in the international security environment to a new situation
featuring renewed great power competition (during which the Navy is now focusing its planning
more on being able to operate in mid-ocean waters against capable naval forces from near-peer
competitors such as China and Russia).30
Increase in Estimated Procurement Cost
As shown in Table A-1 below, the estimated combined procurement cost for all three DDG-
1000s, as reflected in the Navy’s annual budget submission, has grown by $4,218.4 million, or
47.0%, since the FY2009 budget (i.e., the budget for the fiscal year in which the third DDG-1000
was procured).

30 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential
Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33153, China Naval
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

18

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

Table A-1. Estimated Combined Procurement Cost of DDG-1000, DDG-1001, and
DDG-2002
In millions, rounded to nearest tenth, as shown in annual Navy budget submissions
Estimated combined
Change from prior
Cumulative change
Budget
procurement cost
year’s budget
from FY2009 budget
submission
(millions of dollars)
submission
submission
FY09
8,977.1
—
—
FY10
9,372.5
+395.4 (+4.4%)
+395.4 (+4.4%)
FY11
9,993.3
+620.8 (+6.6%)
+1,016.2 (+11.3%)
FY12
11,308.8
+1,315.5 (+13.2%)
+2,331.7 (+26.0%)
FY13
11,470.1
+161.3 (+1.4%)
+2,493.0 (+27.8%)
FY14
11,618.4
+148.3 (+1.3%)
+2,641.3 (+29.4%)
FY15
12,069.4
+451.0 (+3.9%)
+3,092.3 (+34.4%)
FY16
12,288.7
+219.3 (+1.8%)
+3,311.6 (+36.9%)
FY17
12,738.2
+449.5 (+3.7%)
+3,761.1 (+41.9%)
FY18
12,882.0
+143.8 (+1.1%)
+3,904.0 (+43.5%)
FY19
13,032.2
+150.2 (+1.2%)
+4,055.1 (+45.1%)
FY20
13,195.5
+163.3 (+1.3%)
+4,218.4 (+47.0%)
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data in annual Navy budget submissions.
Some of the cost growth in the earlier years in the table was caused by the truncation of the DDG-
1000 program from seven ships to three, which caused some class-wide procurement-rated costs
that had been allocated to the fourth through seventh ships in the program to be reallocated to the
three remaining ships.
The Navy states that the cost growth shown through FY2015 in the table reflects, among other
things, a series of incremental, year-by-year movements away from an earlier Navy cost estimate
for the program, and toward a higher estimate developed by the Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As one
consequence of a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach experienced by the DDG-1000 program in 2010
(see discussion bvelow), the Navy was directed to fund the DDG-1000 program to CAPE’s
higher cost estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015, and to the Navy’s cost estimate for FY2016
and beyond. The Navy states that it implemented this directive in a year-by-year fashion with
each budget submission from FY2010 through FY2015, moving incrementally closer each year
through FY2015 to CAPE’s higher estimate. The Navy stated in 2014 that even with the cost
growth shown in the table, the DDG-1000 program as of the FY2015 budget submission was still
about 3% below the program’s rebaselined starting point for calculating any new Nunn-McCurdy
cost breach on the program.31
Procurement Cost Cap
Section 123 of the FY2006 defense authorization act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006)
limited the procurement cost of the fifth DDG-1000 to $2.3 billion, plus adjustments for inflation

31 Source: Navy briefing for CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the DDG-1000 program, April 30,
2014.
Congressional Research Service

19

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

and other factors. Given the truncation of the DDG-1000 program to three ships, this unit
procurement cost cap appears moot.
2010 Nunn-McCurdy Breach, Program Restructuring, and
Milestone Recertification
On February 1, 2010, the Navy notified Congress that the DDG-1000 program had experienced a
critical cost breach under the Nunn-McCurdy provision. The Nunn-McCurdy provision (10
U.S.C. 2433a) requires certain actions to be taken if a major defense acquisition program exceeds
(i.e., breaches) certain cost-growth thresholds and is not terminated. Among other things, a
program that experiences a cost breach large enough to qualify under the provision as a critical
cost breach has its previous acquisition system milestone certification revoked. (In the case of the
DDG-1000 program, this was Milestone B.) In addition, for the program to proceed rather than be
terminated, DOD must certify certain things, including that the program is essential to national
security and that there are no alternatives to the program that will provide acceptable capability to
meet the joint military requirement at less cost.32
The Navy stated in its February 1, 2010, notification letter that the DDG-1000 program’s critical
cost breach was a mathematical consequence of the program’s truncation to three ships.33 Since
the DDG-1000 program has roughly $9.3 billion in research and development costs, truncating
the program to three ships increased to roughly $3.1 billion the average amount of research and
development costs that are included in the average acquisition cost (i.e., average research and
development cost plus procurement cost) of each DDG-1000. The resulting increase in program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC)—one of two measures used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for
measuring cost growth34—was enough to cause a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach.
In a June 1, 2010, letter (with attachment) to Congress, Ashton Carter, the DOD acquisition
executive (i.e., the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), stated
that he had restructured the DDG-1000 program and that he was issuing the certifications
required under the Nunn-McCurdy provision for the restructured DDG-1000 program to
proceed.35 The letter stated that the restructuring of the DDG-1000 program included the
following:
 A change to the DDG-1000’s design affecting its primary radar.
 A change in the program’s Initial Operational Capability (IOC) from FY2015 to
FY2016.
 A revision to the program’s testing and evaluation requirements.
Regarding the change to the ship’s design affecting its primary radar, the DDG-1000 originally
was to have been equipped with a dual-band radar (DBR) consisting of the Raytheon-built X-

32 For more on the Nunn-McCurdy provision, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background,
Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz and Charles V. O'Connor.
33 Source: Letter to congressional offices dated February 1, 2010, from Robert O. Work, Acting Secretary of the Navy,
to Representative Ike Skelton, provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on February 24, 2010.
34 PAUC is the sum of the program’s research and development cost and procurement cost divided by the number of
units in the program. The other measure used under the Nunn-McCurdy provision to measure cost growth is average
program unit cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the number of units in the
program.
35 Letter dated June 1, 2010, from Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics)
to the Honorable Ike Skelton, with attachment. The letter and attachment were posted on InsideDefense.com
(subscription required) on June 2, 2010.
Congressional Research Service

20

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

band SPY-3 multifunction radar (MFR) and the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 Volume Search
Radar (VSR). (Raytheon is the prime contractor for the overall DBR.) Both parts of the DBR
have been in development for the past several years. An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter
stated that, as a result of the program’s restructuring, the ship is now to be equipped with “an
upgraded multifunction radar [MFR] and no volume search radar [VSR].” The change eliminates
the Lockheed-built S-band SPY-4 VSR from the ship’s design. The ship might retain a space and
weight reservation that would permit the VSR to be backfitted to the ship at a later point. The
Navy states that
As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification process, the Volume Search Radar (VSR)
hardware was identified as an acceptable opportunity to reduce cost in the program and
thus was removed from the current baseline design....
Modifications will be made to the SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR) with the focus of
meeting ship Key Performance Parameters. The MFR modifications will involve software
changes to perform a volume search functionality. Shipboard operators will be able to
optimize the SPY-3 MFR for either horizon search or volume search. While optimized for
volume search, the horizon search capability is limited. Without the VSR, DDG 1000 is
still expected to perform local area air defense....
The removal of the VSR will result in an estimated $300 million net total cost savings for
the three-ship class. These savings will be used to offset the program cost increase as a
result of the truncation of the program to three ships. The estimated cost of the MFR
software modification to provide the volume search capability will be significantly less
than the estimated procurement costs for the VSR.36
Regarding the figure of $300 million net total cost savings in the above passage, the Navy during
2011 determined that eliminating the SPY-4 VSR from the DDG-1000 increased by $54 million
the cost to integrate the dual-band radar into the Navy’s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class
aircraft carriers.37 Subtracting this $54 million cost from the above $300 million savings figure
would bring the net total cost savings to about $246 million on a Navy-wide basis.
A July 26, 2010, press report quotes Captain James Syring, the DDG-1000 program manager, as
stating the following: “We don’t need the S-band radar to meet our requirements [for the DDG-
1000],” and “You can meet [the DDG-1000’s operational] requirements with [the] X-band [radar]
with software modifications.”38
An attachment to the June 1, 2010, letter stated that the PAUC for the DDG-1000 program had
increased 86%, triggering the Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach, and that the truncation of the
program to three ships was responsible for 79 of the 86 percentage points of increase. (The
attachment stated that the other seven percentage points of increase are from increases in
development costs that are primarily due to increased research and development work content for
the program.)
Carter also stated in his June 1, 2010, letter that he had directed that the DDG-1000 program be
funded, for the period FY2011-FY2015, to the cost estimate for the program provided by the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office (which is a part of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense [OSD]), and, for FY2016 and beyond, to the Navy’s cost estimate for the program.

36 Source: Undated Navy information paper on DDG-51 program restructuring provided to CRS and CBO by Navy
Office of Legislative Affairs on July 19, 2010.
37 Source: Undated Navy information paper on CVN-78 cost issues, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to
CRS on March 19, 2012.
38 Cid Standifer, “Volume Radar Contracted For DDG-1000 Could Be Shifted To CVN-79,” Inside the Navy, July 26,
2010.
Congressional Research Service

21

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

The program was previously funded to the Navy’s cost estimate for all years. Since CAPE’s cost
estimate for the program is higher than the Navy’s cost estimate, funding the program to the
CAPE estimate for the period FY2011-FY2015 will increase the cost of the program as it appears
in the budget for those years. The letter states that DOD “intends to address the [resulting]
FY2011 [funding] shortfall [for the DDG-1000 program] through reprogramming actions.”
An attachment to the letter stated that the CAPE in May 2010 estimated the PAUC of the DDG-
1000 program (i.e., the sum of the program’s research and development costs and procurement
costs, divided by the three ships in the program) as $7.4 billion per ship in then-year dollars
($22.1 billion in then-year dollars for all three ships), and the program’s average procurement unit
cost (APUC), which is the program’s total procurement cost divided by the three ships in the
program, as $4.3 billion per ship in then-year dollars ($12.8 billion in then-year dollars for all
three ships). The attachment stated that these estimates are at a confidence level of about 50%,
meaning that the CAPE believes there is a roughly 50% chance that the program can be
completed at or under these cost estimates, and a roughly 50% chance that the program will
exceed these cost estimates.
An attachment to the letter directed the Navy to “return for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
review in the fall 2010 timeframe when the program is ready to seek approval of the new
Milestone B and authorization for production of the DDG-1002 [i.e., the third ship in the
program].”
On October 8, 2010, DOD reinstated the DDG-1000 program’s Milestone B certification and
authorized the Navy to continue production of the first and second DDG-1000s and commence
production of the third DDG-1000.39
Technical Risk and Test and Evaluation Issues
May 2019 GAO Report
A May 2019 GAO report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated the
following of the DDG-1000 program:
Technology Maturity and Design Stability
The DDG 1000 program has fully matured most, but not all, of its nine current critical
technologies and reports a stable design. According to the Navy, the fire suppression
system, hull form, deckhouse, power system, and undersea warfare suite technologies are
all mature. At the same time, the vertical launch system, infrared signature, multi-function
radar, and total ship computing environment technologies each continue to approach
maturity. The Navy expects to fully mature these systems as it completes ship construction,
certification, and testing over the next 2 years.
The program originally had 12 critical technologies, but in the last several years, the Navy
removed three, including two technologies associated with the advanced gun system—the
projectile and the gun—because of the projectile’s high cost per round. The Navy planned
to rely on these munitions for precision fires and offensive operations. Following an
evaluation of five other munition options, the Navy determined that no viable replacement,
guided or unguided, was feasible. As a result, the guns will remain inoperable on the ships
for the foreseeable future. Lastly, the Navy will use a modified multi-function radar in
place of a volume search radar, which the Navy removed from the class.

39 Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Approves Key Milestone For Multibillion-Dollar Destroyer,” Inside the Navy,
November 22, 2010.
Congressional Research Service

22

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

As we have previously reported, the Navy and its shipbuilders had not stabilized DDG
1000’s design by lead ship fabrication start in 2009—an approach inconsistent with best
practices. This approach contributed to numerous design changes after the fabrication start
and significant cost increases and schedule delays. Nearly 10 years later, development and
shipboard testing of technologies continues, each of which could lead to discovery that
could disrupt the design stability the Navy currently claims.
The Navy plans to complete software development for the class in September 2020—a
delay of 24 months since our 2018 assessment. As a result, the Navy has had to delay some
testing. Also that month, the program plans to complete its cyber security vulnerability
evaluation along with the remainder of a 2-year regimen of certifications and several
different tests. The Navy expects this regimen to demonstrate the full functionality of the
ship’s systems.
Production Readiness
The DDG 1000 shipbuilder is approaching completion of the hull, mechanical, and
electrical (HM&E) systems for all three ships of the class. Shipbuilder delivery of the lead
ship's HM&E occurred 18 months behind schedule, in part because of problems completing
electrical work associated with the ship’s power system. The shipbuilder also experienced
problems completing the power system for DDG 1001, the second ship in the class.
Following sea trials, the Navy inspected one of the ship’s main turbine generators and
found that the generator was damaged by a woodscrew. The damage was extensive enough
that the Navy chose to replace the engine and send it for repair. Officials report that the
shipbuilder delivered the ship in April 2018 and the Navy replaced the engine in September
2018 at its expense.
The Navy has scheduled DDG 1000’s final delivery, including HM&E and combat
systems, for May 2019. The Navy has scheduled DDG 1001’s final delivery to follow in
September 2020. However, the Navy is still working to correct serious deficiencies that its
Board of Inspection and Survey has identified on both ships. Specifically, the board found
over 320 serious deficiencies when the shipbuilder delivered DDG 1000’s HM&E in May
2016, and 246 serious deficiences after the Navy conducted acceptance trials for DDG
1001 in January and February 2018. This increases the likelihood that the ship will not be
fully capable and sustainable when provided to the fleet.
To limit further delays to DDG 1000 and DDG 1001 construction, the Navy has authorized
its shipbuilder to take parts from DDG 1002—the third and final ship of the class, which
is under construction. The Navy does not yet know the full extent to which these actions
will delay DDG 1002’s construction schedule, but stated that these parts typically can be
borrowed and replaced without causing a delay. The Navy has scheduled the ship’s HM&E
delivery in March 2020 followed by final delivery in September 2022.
Other Program Issues
In a January 2018 decision memorandum, the Navy changed DDG 1000’s primary mission
from land attack to offensive surface strike. Navy officials are in the process of determining
the operational concept for the ship within its new mission. The Navy has yet to establish
testing plans to evaluate these future mission sets. According to Navy officials, the Navy’s
planned modifications to support the new mission will cost about $1 billion, from non-
acquisition accounts.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office also stated that it is making good progress delivering the Zumwalt
class. The Navy said that, since our assessment, DDG 1000 completed combat systems
availability, combat tests are underway, and final delivery is now planned for September
Congressional Research Service

23

Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

2019. The program office also said that DDG 1001 started combat systems availability in
April 2019, and DDG 1002 is 84 percent constructed. The program office further noted
that future addition of new systems onto Zumwalt-class ships will provide offensive fire
capabilities.40

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

40 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Limited Use of Knowledge-Based
Practices Continues to Undercut DOD’s Investments, GAO-19-336SP, May 2019, p. 106
Congressional Research Service
RL32109 · VERSION 221 · UPDATED
24