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Updated June 13, 2019
Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy
Recent Trends
Socioeconomic Conditions
According to estimates from the digital publication
The Northern Triangle includes some of the poorest nations
Lawfare, approximately 265,000 people, on average, have
in the Western Hemisphere. Land ownership and economic
left the Northern Triangle region of Central America
power historically have been concentrated in the hands of a
(composed of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) in
small group of elites, leaving behind a legacy of extreme
each of the past five years, with the majority bound for the
inequality. Although the adoption of market-oriented
United States. More than twice as many people may leave
economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s produced greater
the region this year, however, as an estimated 508,000
macroeconomic stability and facilitated the diversification
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Hondurans left their homes
of the region’s once predominantly agricultural economies,
and headed north during the first eight months of FY2019.
the economic gains have not translated into improved living
Although total U.S. apprehensions of unauthorized migrants
conditions for many of the region's residents (see Figure 2).
had been near historic lows in recent years, the arrival at the
In the Western Highlands of Guatemala, where significant
Southwest border of a growing number of Central
out-migration has occurred over the past year, 76% of the
American families and children, many of whom are seeking
population lives in poverty and 27% lives in extreme
asylum, reportedly has strained the U.S. immigration
poverty according to the U.S. Agency for International
system. Congress has sought to understand and address the
Development (USAID).
root causes of these migration trends.
Figure 2. Poverty Rates in the Northern Triangle
Figure 1. Northern Triangle of Central America
Source: World Bank, DataBank, accessed in June 2019.
Note: Data from most recent year available: 2017 for El Salvador,
2014 for Guatemala, and 2018 for Honduras.
According to the World Bank, approximately 47% of
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.
Salvadorans, 56% of Guatemalans, and 52% of Hondurans
are under the age of 25. Because of their relatively young
Root Causes
populations, all three countries are expected to see a
Most analysts characterize this flow as mixed migration,
continued rise in their prime working age populations over
with some individuals traveling north for economic
the next two decades. Although this presents a window of
opportunity, others seeking refuge from violence and
opportunity to boost economic growth, the region is failing
insecurity, and many in search of both. In October 2018, the
to generate sufficient employment to absorb the growing
International Organization for Migration conducted a rapid
labor supply. In 2017, for example, the Northern Triangle’s
survey of a group of Salvadoran migrants who had banded
labor force increased by more than 353,000 people, but
together into a “caravan” to make the journey north. It
fewer than 35,000 jobs were created in the formal economy,
found that nearly 52% cited economic opportunity as their
according to the Inter-American Dialogue, an international
motive for leaving the region, 18% cited violence and
affairs think tank. The vast majority of new workers were
insecurity, 2% cited family reunification, and 28% cited a
left to work in the unregulated informal sector, without job
combination of those factors. Although motives vary by
protections or benefits, or search for opportunity elsewhere.
individual, difficult socioeconomic and security
conditions—exacerbated by natural disasters and poor
Vulnerability to Natural Disasters
governance—appear to be the most important drivers of the
External shocks have exacerbated the difficult
current mixed migration flow. A 2017 Center for Global
socioeconomic conditions in the region. According to the
Development study suggests that migration may be self-
2018 World Risk Index, El Salvador and Guatemala are
reinforcing, as those who leave the region can share their
among the 15 countries in the world most at risk from
experiences and provide migration assistance to those who
natural disasters, due to their frequent exposure and weak
remain behind through social networks or other means.
response capacity. The Central American Dry Corridor,
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Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy
which encompasses 58% of El Salvador, 38% of
and some of the lowest tax collection rates in Latin America
Guatemala, and 21% of Honduras, is extremely susceptible
all contribute to underfunded state institutions. This has
to irregular rainfall. According to a 2017 United Nations
depleted state coffers of funding for social services,
World Food Programme study, repeated droughts since
contributing to low educational attainment, persistent
2014 have destroyed crops and resulted in “levels of food
poverty, and social instability. Weak institutions also limit
insecurity [that] have not been previously seen in the
these countries’ abilities to protect citizens or prevent or
region.” This reportedly has forced households to engage in
prosecute crimes. Without a strong state presence, their
extreme coping strategies, such as taking on debt, selling
border areas are vulnerable to criminal trafficking of
off land, and migrating.
people, drugs, and arms. Citizens in the region express low
levels of confidence in nearly all of their government
Security Conditions
institutions according to polling by Latinobarómetro.
Although violence has long plagued the Northern Triangle,
homicide rates rose rapidly in the 2000s as the region
U.S. Policy
became the primary transit corridor for South American
Over the past five years, the U.S. government has worked
narcotics bound for the United States. Transnational
with partners in the region to deter migration in several
criminal organizations have sought to secure trafficking
ways. The U.S. and Northern Triangle governments have
routes through Central America by battling one another and
engaged in public awareness campaigns to inform the
local affiliates and seeking to intimidate and infiltrate
region about the potential dangers of unauthorized
government institutions. Gangs, such as the Mara
migration and to correct possible misperceptions about U.S.
Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th street gang (M-18), have
immigration policies. These campaigns have included
engaged in neighborhood turf wars to control local drug
billboard, radio, television, and social media advertisements
distribution, extortion, and other illicit activities. High
across El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Some
levels of poverty, fragmented families, and a lack of
analysts have questioned the effectiveness of such
legitimate employment opportunities leave many youth in
deterrence campaigns. A 2018 study published in the Latin
the region susceptible to recruitment by these organizations.
America Research Review found that Hondurans’ “views of
the dangers of migration to the United States, or the
Figure 3. Homicide Rates in the Northern Triangle
likelihood of deportation, do not seem to influence their
emigration plans in any meaningful way.”
The U.S. government is also providing foreign assistance to
partners in the region to combat smuggling operations and
address the root causes of migration. For example, the U.S.
State Department has allocated more than $100 million
since FY2014 to help Mexico control migration through its
territory. Under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in
Central America, for which Congress has appropriated
nearly $2.6 billion since FY2016, the United States is
supporting efforts to promote economic prosperity, improve
security, and strengthen governance in the region. Some
Sources: Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y
analysts are skeptical of such efforts given the Northern
Social and Insight Crime (El Salvador); Diálogos (Guatemala); and
Triangle governments’ corruption and resistance to reform.
Observatorio de la Violencia (Honduras).
Others argue that previous U.S. assistance has contributed
to improvements in the region and further progress will
Homicide rates have fallen every year since 2015 (see
require concerted, long-term U.S. support. It is too early to
Figure 3), but they remain high by global standards. Other
assess the full impact of the current strategy since many of
crime is also widespread. According to the Latin American
the activities funded by the initiative are less than two years
Public Opinion Project, nearly a quarter of Northern
into implementation.
Triangle residents surveyed in 2017 reported they had been
Additional Analysis
victims of crime in the past year. A study published in the
Latin American Research Review in 2018 found that the
For further analysis of conditions in the region and U.S.
probability that an individual intends to migrate is 10-15
policy, see CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background
percentage points higher for Salvadorans and Hondurans
and U.S. Relations; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala:
who have been victims of multiple crimes than for those
Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S.
who have not.
Relations; CRS Report RL34027, Honduras: Background
and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s
Governance
Immigration Control Efforts; and CRS Report R44812, U.S.
Northern Triangle governments have struggled to address
Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues
the region’s difficult socioeconomic and security
for Congress.
conditions. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras all have
long histories of autocratic rule. Since the regional civil
Peter J. Meyer, Specialist in Latin American Affairs
wars in the 1970s to 1990s, their transitions to democracy
Maureen Taft-Morales, Specialist in Latin American
have faced several challenges. A lack of political will and
Affairs
capacity, rampant bribery and embezzlement of state funds,
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Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy
IF11151
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