link to page 1 
June 12, 2019
National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile
Technologies
The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will
telecommunication providers are focused on MMW
increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth
deployments and others on sub-6.
over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn
enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G
The Department of Defense (DOD), however, holds large
technologies are expected to support interconnected or
portions of the usable spectrum. Although DOD uses
autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving
certain MMW frequencies for high-profile military
vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial
applications such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency
machinery, and advanced robotics. According to a Defense
satellites that provide assured global communications for
Innovation Board (DIB) report, in the military realm, 5G
U.S. forces, it extensively uses sub-6 frequencies—leaving
will additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and
less sub-6 availability in the United States than in other
reconnaissance systems and processing; enable new
countries. The DIB advised DOD to consider sharing sub-6
methods of command and control; and streamline logistics
spectrum to facilitate the build-out of 5G networks and the
systems for increased efficiency. As 5G technologies are
development of 5G technologies used in the sub-6 band.
developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies
While DOD has been moving toward greater spectrum
for spectrum management and national security, as well as
sharing, it has expressed concern that sharing presents
implications for U.S. military operations.
operational, interference, and security issues for DOD
users. As an alternative to spectrum sharing, some analysts
Spectrum Management
have argued that portions of the sub-6 spectrum should be
5G requires deployment of technologies that work in
reserved for commercial use. This would likely require
various segments of the electromagnetic spectrum (“the
DOD to relocate certain applications to other parts of the
spectrum”): sub-6, which operates below 6 GHz, and
spectrum. The DIB estimates that this approach would take
millimeter wave (MMW), which operates between around
around 10 years to complete, as opposed to 5 years for
24 and 300 GHz (see Figure 1).
spectrum sharing.
Figure 1.5G Proposed Spectrum
National Security Concerns
According to a DIB assessment, China is the current leader
in sub-6 technologies and is likely to deploy the world’s
first 5G wide-area network. Chinese companies, which
often receive government subsidies (e.g., subsidized land
for facilities, R&D grants), are therefore well-positioned as
global 5G suppliers. Huawei alone has signed contracts for
the construction of 5G infrastructure in around 30 countries,
including U.S. allies Iceland and Turkey.
Source: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/
DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF
Some experts have expressed concern that vulnerabilities in
Chinese equipment could be used to conduct cyberattacks
Millimeter waves allow for greater bandwidth and faster
or military or industrial espionage. These experts claim that
transfer rates, which some telecommunications companies
such vulnerabilities have been introduced through the poor
have argued is required for autonomous vehicles and other
business practices of many Chinese companies. However,
data-intensive applications; however, MMW travel
they note that vulnerabilities could also be intentionally
comparatively short distances and can be absorbed by rain
introduced for malicious purposes. China’s National
or disrupted by physical objects such as buildings, vehicles,
Intelligence Law, enacted in June 2017, declares that “any
and people. As a result, the use of MMW requires the
organization and citizen shall, in accordance with the law,
installation of a higher number of cell sites—at much
support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national
higher cost and on a much slower deployment timeline than
intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national
the sub-6 approach. 5G deployment thus relies on MMW
intelligence work that they are aware of.” Some analysts
for high-speed, high-bandwidth communications and on
interpret this law as requiring Chinese telecommunications
sub-6 waves for nationwide coverage.
companies to cooperate with intelligence services to include
being compelled to install backdoors or provide private data
Telecommunication companies around the world are
to the government.
deploying 5G in different ways. Chinese
telecommunications companies are focusing on the less
Other analysts have argued that the risks posed by Chinese
expensive sub-6 approach, while some U.S.
telecommunications equipment vary depending on the
https://crsreports.congress.gov
link to page 2 
National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies
equipment’s location within the cellular network
communications. However, satellites on orbit can
architecture. Most cellular networks are broken into two
significantly increase latency due to the amount of distance
groups: the core network, which provides the gateway to
a signal needs to travel, causing delays in the execution of
the internet and ensures devices meet the provider’s
military operations. Having terrestrial communications like
standards, and the radio access network, composed of the
5G could potentially reduce latency in video- and
cellular towers that broadcast and receive radio signals (see
teleconferencing, thereby improving communications and
Figure 2). These analysts state that, while the risks posed
situational awareness among deployed forces.
by Chinese core networks are significant, the risks posed by
Chinese radio access networks could be managed. Still
While each of these applications could increase military
other analysts have argued that having any Chinese
effectiveness, DOD may refrain from using them due to
equipment in the network could pose potential security
concerns over data security, particularly passing sensitive
concerns. Such concerns have prompted some analysts to
information like intelligence or operational requirements
argue that the United States should limit intelligence
over commercial systems. These risks could potentially be
sharing with any country operating Chinese-supplied 5G
mitigated using end-point encryption, where devices would
equipment.
encrypt data before transmitting it over the network, to
prevent adversaries from gaining access to information.
Figure 2.Cellular Network Architecture
Potential Questions for Congress
What approach to spectrum management (e.g., spectrum
sharing, spectrum reallocation) will best protect DOD
missions while meeting growing commercial demands?
What are the risks to U.S. national security posed by
Chinese 5G infrastructure in allied and partner nations?
Can that risk be managed and, if so, how?
What impact would the use of Chinese 5G infrastructure
by allied and partner nations have on military
effectiveness and interoperability? Should the United
Source: https://medium.com/@miccowang/5g-c-ran-and-the-
States limit intelligence sharing with countries operating
required-technology-breakthrough-a1b2babf774
Chinese-supplied 5G equipment?
Are any changes to operational concepts, force structure,
Implications for Military Operations
doctrine, or posture required as a result of developments
5G technologies could have a number of potential military
in or applications of military 5G?
applications, particularly for autonomous vehicles,
How might encryption techniques and technologies
command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance,
allow the United States to utilize commercial networks
and reconnaissance (ISR) systems—which would each
to communicate?
benefit from improved data rates and lower latency (time
delay).
CRS Products
Autonomous vehicles are currently in development across
CRS Report R45485, Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications
the military services. These vehicles, like their commercial
Technologies: Issues for Congress, by Jil C. Gallagher and
counterparts, could potentially circumvent on-board data
Michael E. DeVine
processing limitations by storing large databases (e.g.,
CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies,
maps) in the cloud. Safe vehicle operations would, in turn,
by Kelley M. Sayler
require 5G’s high data rates and low latency to quickly
CRS In Focus IF11155, Defense Primer: Military Use of the
download off-board information and synthesize it with on-
Electromagnetic Spectrum, by John R. Hoehn
board sensor data. Similarly, 5G applications could be used
to transfer sensor data between operators and uninhabited
CRS Report R45392, U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and
vehicles. 5G could also be used to network vehicles,
Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI):
potentially enabling new military concepts of operations,
Considerations for Congress, coordinated by Andrew Feickert
such as swarming (i.e., cooperative behavior in which
vehicles autonomously coordinate to achieve a task).
Other Resources
Defense Innovation Board, The 5G Ecosystem: Risks and
In addition, 5G technologies could be incorporated into ISR
Opportunities for DOD, April 2019, https://media.defense.gov/
systems, which increasingly demand high-bandwidths to
2019/Apr/03/2002109302/-1/-1/0/
process, exploit, and disseminate information from a
DIB_5G_STUDY_04.03.19.PDF
growing number of battlespace sensors. This could provide
commanders with timely access to actionable intelligence
data, in turn improving operational decisionmaking.
Finally, command and control applications could benefit
John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and
from the high speed, low latency capability of 5G. For
Programs
example, the U.S. military currently uses satellite
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
communications for the preponderance of its long-distance
Global Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies
IF11251
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11251 · VERSION 1 · NEW