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Updated June 12, 2019
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview
Introduction
Strategy for Engagement in Central America and, with
Instability in Central America is a pressing challenge for
congressional support, more than doubled aid to the region.
U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. Several nations—
particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in the
The Trump Administration initially maintained the strategy
“Northern Triangle” of Central America—are struggling
but adjusted it to place more emphasis on preventing illegal
with widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial
immigration, combating transnational crime, and generating
systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment.
opportunities for U.S. businesses. The Administration has
also sought to scale back funding for the initiative.
The inability of Central American governments to address
Although Congress has rejected some of the
those challenges effectively has had far-reaching
Administration’s proposed reductions, annual assistance to
implications for the United States. Transnational criminal
Central America has declined by nearly 30% since FY2016
organizations have used the Central American corridor for a
(see Figure 2).
range of illicit activities, including the trafficking of
approximately 90% of cocaine bound for the United States.
The future of the Central America strategy is now in
Central America has also surpassed Mexico as the largest
question, as the Trump Administration announced in March
source of irregular migration to the United States. In the
2019 that it intends to end foreign assistance programs in
first eight months of FY2019, U.S. authorities apprehended
the Northern Triangle. Some Members of Congress have
nearly 445,000 unauthorized migrants from the Northern
objected to the Administration’s abrupt policy shift and
Triangle at the southwest border (see Figure 1). More than
have introduced legislation that would restrict its ability to
81% of those apprehended were unaccompanied minors or
transfer funds away from the region. The decisions made by
families, many of whom were seeking humanitarian
the 116th Congress could play a crucial role in determining
protection
the direction of U.S. policy toward Central America in the
coming years.
Figure 1. U.S. Apprehensions of Northern Triangle
Nationals at the Southwest Border: FY2011-FY2019
Funding
Since FY2016, Congress has appropriated nearly $2.6
billion for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America. The funding has been divided fairly evenly
between bilateral assistance programs focused on good
governance, economic growth, and social welfare and
Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
programs intended to prevent violence, reform justice-
sector institutions, and combat gangs and organized crime.
The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International
Development have allocated the vast majority of that aid to
the Northern Triangle, including at least 75% of the funding
appropriated in FY2016 and FY2017.
Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, “U.S. Border Patrol Nationwide Apprehensions by
Citizenship and Sector in FY2007-FY2018;” and “U.S. Border Patrol
Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year 2019,” press
release, June 5, 2019.
Notes: FY19* includes October 2018-May 2019.
In 2014, the Obama Administration determined that it was
in the national security interests of the United States to
work with Central American governments to promote
economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen
governance. It approved a new, whole-of-government U.S.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview
Figure 2. Appropriations for the U.S. Strategy for
assistance away from the Northern Triangle. If Congress
Engagement in Central America: FY2016-FY2020
thinks the Administration is using that authority in ways
that do not reflect congressional intent, it could enact
legislation—such as H.R. 2839 (incorporated into H.R.
2740), S. 1445, and H.R. 2615—that would restrict the
Administration’s ability to transfer or reprogram assistance
appropriated for Central America.
Regional Developments
The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
are carrying out complementary efforts under their Plan of
the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle.
Drafted with technical assistance from the Inter-American
Development Bank, the plan aims to address the root causes
of emigration from the region by stimulating the productive
sector, developing human capital, improving public safety,
and strengthening institutions. The Northern Triangle
governments collectively allocated an estimated $7.2 billion
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget
to the initiative from 2016 to 2018.
Justifications for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Years 2017-2020; and
H.Rept. 116-9.
With U.S. support, the Northern Triangle nations have
made some tentative progress over the past three years.
Conditions
They have implemented policy changes intended to
Congress has placed strict conditions on assistance to the
stabilize their economies and have benefitted from more
Northern Triangle in an attempt to bolster political will in
favorable international economic conditions. Nevertheless,
the region and ensure that foreign aid is used as effectively
the improved macroeconomic situation has not translated
as possible. According to the Consolidated Appropriations
into better living conditions for many residents of the
Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), 50% of assistance for the central
region. Approximately 29% of Salvadorans, 49% of
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
Guatemalans, and 53% of Hondurans live on less than
must be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies that
$5.50 per day, according to the World Bank.
the governments are addressing 16 congressional concerns.
These include improving border security, combating
Security conditions in the region have improved in some
corruption, countering gangs and organized crime,
respects, with homicide rates falling in all three countries in
supporting programs to reduce poverty and promote
each of the past three years. The Northern Triangle
equitable economic growth, protecting the right of political
countries remain among the most violent in the world,
opposition parties and other members of civil society to
however, with homicide rates of 22 per 100,000 in
operate without interference, and resolving commercial
Guatemala, 41 per 100,000 in Honduras, and 51 per
disputes. The State Department has yet to certify that any of
100,000 in El Salvador in 2018. The percentage of
the countries have met the FY2019 conditions. Similar
individuals reporting that they were victims of crime in the
certifications for FY2018 are also still pending.
past year increased in all three nations from 2014 to 2017,
according to the Latin American Public Opinion Project.
Potential Termination of U.S. Assistance to the
Northern Triangle
Efforts to improve governance have produced mixed
In March 2019, the Trump Administration announced that it
results. The attorneys general of El Salvador, Guatemala,
intends to end foreign assistance programs in the Northern
and Honduras—with the support of the U.N.-backed
Triangle. Although the Administration has yet to detail its
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala
plans, the State Department has indicated that the decision
(CICIG) and the Organization of American States–backed
will affect approximately $450 million in FY2018 funding.
Mission to Support the Fight Against Corruption and
That appears to include nearly all bilateral aid appropriated
Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH)—have begun to
for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, as well as
investigate and prosecute high-level corruption cases. Their
CARSI aid allocated to the Northern Triangle. In May
efforts have generated considerable pushback, however, and
2019, however, Attorney General William Barr announced
the Guatemalan and Honduran governments have sought to
that some law enforcement assistance would continue. It
undermine CICIG and MACCIH repeatedly. The region has
remains unclear how the decision may affect assistance
also experienced democratic backsliding over the past four
appropriated in other fiscal years or if the Administration
years, with Freedom House reporting erosions in political
intends to revise its FY2020 budget proposal, which
rights and/or civil liberties in all three Northern Triangle
requested $445 million for Central America, including at
nations.
least $180 million for the Northern Triangle.
Policy Considerations
Congress appears to have provided the President with
As Congress assesses potential changes to U.S. policy in
significant authority—in annual appropriations legislation
Central America, it may consider the following questions:
(P.L. 115-141) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (22 U.S.C. §2151 et seq.)—to reprogram
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U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview
How would ending foreign assistance programs in the
Northern Triangle affect U.S. objectives in the region?
How have conditions in Central America changed since
If assistance to the region is reduced significantly, which
the launch of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement? How
programs and activities should remain priorities?
much aid over how many years would be necessary to
alter conditions in the region substantially?
For further information and analysis, see CRS Report
R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America:
To what extent are governments in El Salvador,
Policy Issues for Congress.
Guatemala, and Honduras bolstering or undermining the
effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts? How could the
Peter J. Meyer, Analyst in Latin American Affairs
U.S. government better support reformers in the region?
IF10371
Disclaimer
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